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i 

98–956 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–89] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND 

CAPABILITIES HEARING 

ON

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERING 

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 

POLICY AND PROGRAMS FOR 

FISCAL YEAR 2017 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 10, 2016 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina, Chairman 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona, Vice Chair 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

KATIE SUTTON, Professional Staff Member 

LINDSAY KAVANAUGH, Professional Staff Member 

NEVE SCHADLER, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Ranking 

Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities ..................... 2 

Wilson, Hon. Joe, a Representative from South Carolina, Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities ............................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Hopkins, Dr. Arthur T., Performing the Duties of the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs ............... 4 

Myers, Kenneth A., Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency and U.S. 

Strategic Command Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction ..... 5 

Smith, Dr. Wendin D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering 

Weapons of Mass Destruction ............................................................................. 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Hopkins, Dr. Arthur T. .................................................................................... 29 

Myers, Kenneth A. ............................................................................................ 36 

Smith, Dr. Wendin D. ...................................................................................... 54 

Wilson, Hon. Joe ............................................................................................... 27 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 67 

Mr. Zinke ........................................................................................................... 67 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 73 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 71 

(1) 

† ‘‘Daesh’’ is an Arabic acronym for Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL. 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COUNTERING WEAPONS OF 

MASS DESTRUCTION POLICY AND PROGRAMS FOR 

FISCAL YEAR 2017 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES, 

Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 10, 2016. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:36 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joe Wilson (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE WILSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. WILSON. I call this hearing of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee to 

order. 

I am pleased to welcome everyone here today for this very important and timely hearing on the Department of Defense, DOD, countering weapons of mass destruction, CWMD, policy and programs 

for the fiscal year 2017. 

The proliferation and potential use of weapons of mass destruction remains a grave and enduring threat. Adversaries of the 

United States continue to pursue weapons of mass destruction in 

an attempt to enhance their international influence and threaten 

the American people both at home and abroad. 

Recent media reports on the use of these weapons are widespread. They include news of Daesh’s † use of chemical weapons in 

Iraq and Syria, revolutionary advances in biotechnology, and the 

continued nuclear weapon development of North Korea. These reports highlight the diverse and continued threats posed by weapons 

of mass destruction to the United States and our allies. 

The entire Department of Defense countering weapons of mass 

destruction enterprise is critical in preventing, protecting against, 

and responding to the weapons of mass destruction threats. While 

the Department of Defense has made many important contributions to national security over the last year, there are challenges 

to the countering weapons of mass destruction enterprise that still 

must be addressed. 

The inadvertent shipment of inactivated anthrax from the 

Dugway Proving Ground to 194 laboratories in all 50 States, the 

District of Columbia, 3 territories, and 9 foreign countries, has exposed scientific, institutional, and workforce problems that need to 

be addressed to prevent this from ever happening again. 
2 

We also remain increasingly concerned about the proliferation of 

dual-use technologies that could potentially be used for WMD development activities. These dual-use technologies could make 

threats much more readily available to terrorist groups or even 

lone actors, domestically as well as abroad. 

So today we look forward to discussing the priorities for the Department of Defense to counter these evolving weapons of mass destruction threats for fiscal year 2017. 

We have before us a panel of three distinguished witnesses: Dr. 

Arthur Hopkins, performing the duties of the Assistant Secretary 

of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs; 

Mr. Kenneth Myers, Director of the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency [DRTA] and U.S. Strategic Command Center for Combating 

Weapons of Mass Destruction; and Dr. Wendin Smith, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

I would like to take this opportunity to recognize the outstanding 

service of Director Ken Myers, who will be moving on from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency next month. During his leadership 

as the longest-serving director in the history of the organization, 

the agency has expanded international operations, increased research and development cooperation, and transformed into a wholeof-government resource. Ken’s contributions have been critical in 

safeguarding our Nation and our allies and we wish him best of 

luck in future endeavors. 

I would now like to turn to my friend and the ranking member, 

Congressman Jim Langevin of Rhode Island, for any comments he 

would like to make. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson can be found in the Appendix on page 27.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to thank, thank you to all our witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee today to provide testimony on the fiscal year 2017 budget request for countering weapons of mass destruction and associated programs and policies. 

As we know, many state and non-state actors seek to develop, 

proliferate, acquire, or use weapons of mass destruction against our 

service members, allies, and innocent civilians overseas and here in 

the homeland. 

In late 2015, our subcommittee received a briefing from the intelligence community detailing the myriad WMD threats and associated actors. While I cannot go into details of that in this briefing, 

one needs to look no further than today’s headlines outlining ISIL’s 

aspirations to acquire and use chemical weapons, North Korea’s 

provocative actions, and global impact of the Zika virus to understand how real chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

threats are and how widespread their impact can be. 

Technological advancements often work in our favor, but they 

also work in our adversaries’ favor. Today’s hearing will provide insight on how we are investing in science and technology to provide 
3 

better capabilities to our warfighter and shaping our approach to 

this threat. 

I support a robust S&T [science and technology] investment in 

the chem/bio defense programs and hope to learn today why that 

budget request has been decreased by approximately $30 million 

compared to last year, while other S&T budgets in the Department 

have increased substantially. 

Equally important is reducing redundancy and achieving efficacy. 

For instance, a WMD situation awareness tool called Constellation 

is being prototyped, yet it remains unclear exactly how this program differs from others being used today and in development. 

Last week, the subcommittee heard from the Blue Ribbon Panel 

on their biodefense report. I found many of the findings and recommendations thought-provoking and look forward to hearing the 

Department’s feedback. I would like to note, however, that many 

of the recommendations can and should also be applied to the 

chemical, nuclear, and radiological enterprise as well. 

I have long been an advocate also for cybersecurity. I believe that 

cybersecurity must be a key component of all strategies and was 

pleased to see that the panel included recommendations pertaining 

to the management of cyber threats to pathogen and biological information. Again, I would stress this recommendation should be applied across the enterprise. 

With respect to the Department’s inadvertent shipment of anthrax, I expect to learn more about the scientific, institutional, and 

cultural changes being implemented within the Department as a 

result of the lessons that we have learned from this serious incident. 

Finally, although the authority is not just overseen by this subcommittee, I wanted to close by expressing support for the cooperative threat reduction program. Biological agents, once released, 

know no boundaries. ISIL has freedom of movement across large 

swaths of the Middle East, near our allies like Jordan and near 

where our troops are stationed. 

Improving our foreign partners’ capability to secure and dispose 

of WMD materials is in the best interests of our troops, our allies, 

innocent civilians, and ultimately the homeland. 

The witnesses’ testimony provides examples of the contributions 

to national security that have been made under this program. And 

I look forward to hearing more. 

There is no one more familiar with this authority than Director 

Myers. 

And like the chairman I want to congratulate you on all your accomplishments and on your new endeavors. 

He has led the Defense Threat Reduction Agency through extraordinary times, during which we have seen the destruction of serious chemical weapons aboard a ship, among other milestones. 

And Director Myers, let me say that you will certainly be missed. 

I also say that I have had the opportunity to have you testify before both this subcommittee, as well as the Intelligence Committee, 

as well as the Homeland Security Committee, and your contributions have always been well received and insightful. So, with that, 

I thank you for your service. 
4 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank our panel for appearing before us today, and thank you for all the work you that 

do to protect our Nation, our partners, and our service members. 

Thank you very much. 

And with that, I yield back. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Ranking Member Langevin. 

And our format today, each of you, we look forward to your testimony. When that concludes, we will begin rounds of questioning at 

5 minutes each, strictly enforced by Jackie Sutton. And then remarkably enough we might even have time and what you are dealing with is so important to all of us that we could actually have 

a second round. 

And so we will begin with Dr. Hopkins. 

STATEMENT OF DR. ARTHUR T. HOPKINS, PERFORMING THE 

DUTIES OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR 

NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS 

Dr. HOPKINS. Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Langevin, and 

distinguished members of the subcommittee, I appreciate this opportunity to testify on the Department’s efforts to counter the 

threats posed by weapons of mass destruction, and to provide context for the President’s fiscal year 2017 budget request. 

Our budget request includes resources to reduce threats and protect warfighters in several areas. The chemical and biological defense program budget request will continue the development of capabilities to protect against chemical, biological, and radiological 

threats. 

Our chemical demilitarization program will continue to ensure 

the safe, complete, and treaty-compliant destruction of the United 

States’ chemical weapon stockpile. 

Our nuclear matters resources will support the development of 

policies that guide the safety and security of the Nation’s nuclear 

deterrent and help to counter threats of nuclear terrorism and proliferation. 

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency budget request includes 

resources to address the full spectrum of WMD-related threats, including cooperative threat reduction programs, and support to combatant commands. 

Finally, our countering weapons of mass destruction systems program will enhance situational awareness of WMD activities globally. 

The chemical and biological defense program includes research, 

development, testing, and fielding of medical countermeasures, that 

is advanced vaccines and therapeutic drugs. It includes advanced 

diagnostics, environmental detection, protective equipment, and 

hazard mitigation capabilities. 

In domestic chemical demilitarization, the Department continues 

to make significant progress in meeting the Nation’s commitments 

under the Chemical Weapons Convention by eliminating our remaining chemical weapons stockpiles in Colorado and Kentucky. In 

March 2015, the Department started agent destruction operations 

at the Pueblo, Colorado, site. At Bluegrass, Kentucky, facility construction is complete and destruction systems are being tested. 
5 

With respect to nuclear threats, the Department works with 

other departments and agencies to strengthen the Nation’s capability to detect and respond to nuclear proliferation. The Cooperative Threat Reduction’s [CTR] global nuclear security program establishes and maintains nuclear security cooperation with several 

countries. 

With respect to this Nation’s nuclear stockpile, the Domestic Nuclear Weapons Accident Incident Exercise program continues as the 

premier interagency training event. It enhances the whole-of-government ability to maintain the security of our nuclear weapons. 

The Department’s Cooperative Threat Reduction program and capacity-building efforts help to identify potential threats globally 

and they enable early actions that will prevent or mitigate them. 

The CTR program’s effectiveness was most recently highlighted by 

its contribution to the timeline confirmation of the first resurgent 

case of Ebola. 

The Department maintains strong relationships with allied nations to help reduce biological threats. 

The countering weapons of mass destruction systems portfolio is 

leading the development of situational awareness information system called Constellation. That system will enable the consolidation, 

the analysis, and the sharing of timely and relevant information. 

Constellation is being developed by Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency with support from Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA]. It 

will support analysis, planning, and decision-making by the combatant commands and their interagency and international partners. Our 2017 budget request includes resources to take Constellation from development to an operational prototype. 

The Department’s countering WMD activities support a broad 

spectrum of activities that help reduce threats from weapons of 

mass destruction. We strengthen program effectiveness and ensure 

efficiencies by acting in collaboration and coordination with numerous interagency and international partners. 

The President’s 2017 budget request will enable us to continue 

to perform that mission effectively. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify today. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hopkins can be found in the Appendix on page 29.] 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Dr. Hopkins. 

We now proceed with Mr. Myers. 

STATEMENT OF KENNETH A. MYERS, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE 

THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY AND U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND CENTER FOR COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 

Mr. MYERS. Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Langevin, and 

members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to be here today to 

share with you the work we do to make the world safer by countering the threats posed by the proliferation and use of weapons of 

mass destruction. 

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency is a unique place with a 

broad portfolio. In fact, the vast majority of the activities that my 

colleagues beside me will discuss today are carried out by DTRA. 

We have a rich history. Our roots go back to the Manhattan Project 
6 

where we provided expertise of analyzing weapons’ effects, work 

that we still do today. 

DTRA was created because of the existential threat posed by 

weapons of mass destruction. The consequences of a major attack 

on our country are almost unimaginable with potentially devastating impact. Those who wish to harm us understand that the 

use of such weapons could result in immense loss of life and enduring economic, political, and social damage on a global scale. 

As a defense agency, DTRA reports to Under Secretary Frank 

Kendall in providing research and development and capabilities. As 

a combat support agency, DTRA is under the control of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and provides direct support to combatant 

commanders and the services. 

Our expertise spans the full WMD threat spectrum: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear [CBRN] weapons, and high-yield explosives. We are a one-stop shop, open 24 hours a day to support 

the warfighter and the rest of the interagency. We are the only 

U.S. Government entity with this type of unique concentration and 

this critical mission area. 

Terrorists have clearly demonstrated that they will use any 

weapons or materials at their disposal. And for them, no targets 

are off limits. In addition, WMD-related events are occurring more 

often and in real time. While not an attack, the most recent example of this was the Ebola outbreak. The panic caused by Ebola was 

not just felt in Africa. The outbreak raised legitimate concerns all 

over the world. 

In the United States, there was a nonstop news cycle persisting 

for months and genuine fear in our communities. And the United 

States only had four confirmed cases. Now, just imagine if the outbreak hadn’t been controlled or if we had been dealing with a new, 

genetically modified biothreat. 

Nearly every year, we face a new WMD-related crisis: Fukushima, Libya, Syria, Ebola. We cannot easily plan or budget for 

these types of situations. This requires us to surge our efforts and 

reprioritize resources. Thankfully, the unique authorities and funding that Congress provides to us each year allows us to respond to 

these challenges. 

Thank you for the opportunity to be here, and I look forward to 

your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Myers can be found in the Appendix on page 36.] 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Director Myers. 

We now proceed to Dr. Smith. 

STATEMENT OF DR. WENDIN D. SMITH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR COUNTERING WEAPONS OF 

MASS DESTRUCTION 

Dr. SMITH. Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Langevin, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to testify 

today. I am honored to be here with Dr. Hopkins and Director 

Myers to present the Department’s approach. 

In line with our 2014 strategy for countering WMD, my office develops policy and guidance, supports and coordinates interagency 

initiatives, and contributes to international efforts focused on the 
7 

three pillars of that strategy: The first is preventing acquisition of 

WMD; second, containing and reducing those threats; and third, 

maintaining our capabilities to respond. Underpinning each of 

those is a constant cycle of preparation. 

Today’s complex security environment has made countering 

WMD threats ever more challenging and multidimensional. We 

face threats from state and, increasingly, non-state actors, who 

have access to knowledge and emerging technologies. It is critical 

to prepare for these emerging challenges, including WMD threats 

that evolve from advances in some of those areas, such as synthetics, cyber tools, unmanned systems, and additive manufacturing. We must continually exercise flexibility and creativity in 

our approaches. 

Ensuring that those who do not currently have WMD capabilities 

do not obtain them is a key component of our counter-WMD effort. 

As we have heard today, based on available information we believe 

that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant was responsible for 

some of the alleged attacks using sulfur mustard in the past year. 

We have been working proactively with our allies and partners 

to deny ISIL or its affiliates and other non-state actors with access 

to any of these CBRN materials. The international coalition combating ISIL will consider all elements of power to pursue those who 

use any of these CBRN capabilities. 

We also work with our allies and partners to strengthen the security of materials that are at risk of theft or diversion. And 

through the CTR, Cooperative Threat Reduction program, we have 

had a decades-long track record of working successfully with foreign partners to destroy WMD, to make those materials more difficult to acquire, and to detect and interdict dangerous components 

and materials. 

In line with our strategy, CTR has evolved from a focus on, initially, efforts in the former Soviet Union to now a response from 

this emerging threat environment. 

We also work closely with our partners in the Department of 

State to support international regimes, such as the Nonproliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention, the 

Chemical Weapons Convention and, clearly, the Proliferation Security Initiative now in its 13th year. 

So despite our best efforts to prevent actors from obtaining 

WMD, we must nevertheless contend too often with reducing and 

containing those threats. Here we look often to CTR which, again, 

has had great successes in working with partners. Some examples 

in the past year, Ukraine, Jordan, Lebanon, and other important 

areas. 

Also consistent with our strategy, we assist partners in proactively confronting emerging threats in regions that are also of 

emerging concern. One of those is North Africa. In response to the 

use of chemicals as weapons in both Iraq and Syria, coupled with 

growing encroachment of extremist groups, we have initiated proliferation prevention programs in cooperation with the Government 

of Tunisia and plan to implement a border surveillance system 

along its most vulnerable areas in fiscal year 2017. 

Ultimately, it is not enough to prevent, reduce, and contain the 

WMD, we also must be prepared to respond. We will, therefore, 
8 

continue to work with our partners, both internationally and domestically, to manage and respond to threats from North Korea 

and will remain vigilant in supporting interagency efforts to monitor and prevent Iran from acquiring WMD material. 

Complementing these efforts is the CBRN Preparedness Program, or CP2 program, which works with partner nations to respond to and mitigate the effects of a CBRN incident. 

In fiscal year 2015, the DOD program provided response training 

and equipment to civilian and military first responders in a number of countries. And as we look forward to the next year, we will 

continue to improve WMD preparedness and response capabilities 

of key partners whom we identify collaboratively with the combatant commanders and the Department of State. 

So despite the progress I have described here, we can’t be complacent. We continue to adapt and respond to those static and 

emerging threats. And we must continue to anticipate those 

threats, again, from both state and non-state actors. 

So as we move forward, your continued support for and funding 

in these areas will be critical to our ability, and we appreciate your 

support. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 54.] 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Dr. Smith. 

We now will proceed to have a round of questions, beginning 

with myself. 

And Mr. Myers, later this year the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency [JIDA] will transition under the authority, direction, 

and control of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Can you provide an update on the status of this transition plan? How do you 

plan to maintain the important expertise in counter-improvised explosive devices through the transition? 

Mr. MYERS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, as you explained, the Joint Improvised-Threat Destruction Agency will move 

in and come in under the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. 

Lieutenant General Michael Shields is the director of JIDA at 

this time. He and I have been working very carefully and closely 

together. We have very specific orders and instructions from Under 

Secretary Kendall, and that is to ensure that the counter-WMD 

space and the counter-improvised threat reduction space continue 

to succeed at the rate they have been succeeding in the past. 

In other words, he expects both to take full advantage of the benefits and the potential coordination and complementary nature of 

some of the aspects of the two mission areas. He expects us to be 

advancing both of these missions. 

Right now, we are looking very carefully at opportunities where 

the two organizations might come together and integrate. But we 

are taking a very slow process. We want to make sure that each 

step we take is complementary to both mission areas. 

There may be areas that cannot be brought in together, and we 

want to make sure that those areas are preserved to ensure that 

the warfighter continues to receive the outstanding service in both 

the counter-WMD, as well as the counter-improvised-threat device 

arena. 
9 

And we are confident with the process that we have in place we 

will reach such a place. 

Mr. WILSON. And I want to thank you. Actually, personally, my 

oldest son conducted cross-country convoys in Iraq. And so, I know 

firsthand how important your efforts have been. 

Dr. Smith, there has been a lot of discussion about the fact that 

biotechnology is widely proliferated now, which could make biothreats much more readily available to terrorist groups or even 

lone actors domestically, as well as abroad. And I am particularly 

concerned with the occupation for almost 2 years now of such a 

large city as Mosul with a million people, that there are laboratories that could be easily used to create weapons of mass destruction. How does this change of strategy affect our ability to protect 

the American people from biothreats? 

Dr. SMITH. Thank you for the question, and an excellent one. 

Clearly, our strategy, which I referred to at the beginning of my 

remarks, is designed to account, again, for both state and non-state 

actors, any lone actor ideally in that mix as well, although it gets 

much harder at that end of the spectrum. 

So again, we foremost focus on preventing acquisition from the 

start. So, in the case of these international partners where our efforts focus, that is the most important step is preventing the acquisition at the beginning of either the materials or the know-how. 

So both being aware of where those capabilities exist and then 

having collaborative partnerships with entities within those countries that are cooperative through our CTR programs is critical. 

And again, anticipating that that may not always succeed, particularly in these cases of a non-state actor, we have to be better prepared than to contain and then respond to a threat should it exist. 

So, that is where, again, the programs we have support the detection, surveillance, information sharing, active engagement with 

our partners in countries such that we can better be aware of an 

evolving threat. 

But it is certainly, as I made in my opening remarks, a mounting 

challenge. The spread of technology and the accessibility of that 

technology, and thus no longer even, to use your example of Mosul, 

the need for a specific site, but the ability to acquire that knowledge anywhere is a mounting challenge. 

Mr. WILSON. And I appreciate you referenced efforts to deny Iran 

the ability to secure weapons of mass destruction. But how is that 

going to be achieved with the financial resources that they have 

now? I am just very concerned. 

Dr. SMITH. So, the agreement that we have in place is certainly 

the most robust, peacefully negotiated agreement we have ever had 

specific to their nuclear program. What that does give us is the 

ability to engage with Iran, which is important. And again, I think 

goes to the initial prevention side of our strategy, which is to prevent any nation or any actor from acquiring WMDs. 

So the transparency and engagement that we will now have 

should be helpful. But it certainly will require vigilance continued 

from our intelligence community, all of our partners in the region, 

and certainly the Department of Defense as well. 
10 

Mr. WILSON. Well, I am concerned is they have continued with 

intercontinental ballistic missile development, that they are just 

simply not trustworthy. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And again, I want to thank our witnesses for the testimony 

today. 

As I mentioned in my opening statement, I would like to hear 

more about the scientific, the institutional, and the cultural 

changes that the DOD is developing and implementing in response 

to the inadvertent anthrax shipments. 

Could you speak more to these changes and the lessons learned 

here? 

Dr. HOPKINS. Thank you very much. I would be glad to start to 

address that. 

First of all, let me say that the anthrax incident is something 

that shouldn’t have happened and it is something that we have to 

make sure never happens again. And in order to do that, we do 

have to make those changes you just talked about. 

Starting with the technical side of things, it has been the findings of at least two investigations now that what was needed was 

a stronger scientific basis underpinning the inactivation protocols 

for anthrax. And in fact, we have put into effect now research studies that will add that scientific rigor to understand what it takes 

to inactivate the anthrax spore. 

The second part of the technical, again there were several technical pieces to this, but the second most important part of the technical investigation had to do with the detection of viability. Because it is one thing to inactivate the spore, you also have to be 

able to confirm that these spores have been inactivated. 

And so, the viability testing protocols are another part of the research that we have put into effect in the chemical/biological defense program. And those will be applied only after they have been 

internally reviewed and externally reviewed by an independent scientific committee so that we can make sure they have the technical 

integrity that will enable that kind of research to continue. 

Institutionally, the Army’s Biosafety Task Force was not able to 

identify a specific person who was responsible for a specific action 

that caused the anthrax incident. However, they did uncover a 

number of cultural issues that really do need to be addressed, 

starting with what they characterized as complacency among the 

scientific and the managerial staff. 

In other words, there were indications that there were issues 

with the science and the staff was accused of being relatively complacent by not more aggressively addressing those things, those 

things that were uncovered. 

And so, I think that a combination of replacing some of the technical members, replacing the managerial members, some, as well 

as instituting a culture of accountability and technical integrity 

will go a long way. And I think it is our responsibility to help make 

sure that those are actually accomplished. 

Organizationally, the United States Army has stepped up and 

they have been identified, they have been tagged as the executive 
11 

agent for biosecurity in the Department. And that responsibility is 

going to fall under the Surgeon General of the Army. 

And so, things are being reorganized such that the direct oversight of biological safety in the laboratories will be overseen by the 

Office of the Surgeon General. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. Those are positive changes in the right 

direction, and I hope they will continue as such because this is too 

serious an issue not to do that. 

Also, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I support the Blue 

Ribbon Panel’s recommendations on strengthening cybersecurity on 

systems with biological pathogen information. What is the Department’s thought on this issue? And what steps is the Department 

taking to secure its systems? 

Mr. MYERS. Thank you, Congressman. I had the opportunity to 

watch the hearing that our former colleague Gerry Parker appeared at. And I have to be honest, I agreed with much of what 

Gerry had to say. 

This recommendation in particular is obviously one that we are 

taking very, very seriously. It is one the Department has taken seriously overall, even beyond the chem/bio defense program in an 

extremely serious manner. A very large portion of this year’s budget is dedicated to cyber defense and the like. 

I do not have numbers here in front of me today to share with 

you specifically in relation to your question. But if given the opportunity, I would like to come back to you and to the other members 

with specific answer in terms of the amount of resources being put 

towards this issue. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 67.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Yes, I would very much like to see that followup, 

so thank you for that. And I look forward to the followup. 

My time is expired. I have other questions. 

But at this point, I will yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congressman Langevin. 

We now proceed to Congressman Rich Nugent of Florida. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate the panel’s attendance today. 

The Blue Ribbon Study Panel on biodefense made several recommendations, one of which was to enhance public/private partnership in medical countermeasure development. If you could, please 

discuss DOD’s larger plan to incorporate the study panel’s findings, 

as well as touch upon the specific medical countermeasure issue, 

if you could, please. 

Dr. HOPKINS. Thank you very much for the question. 

First of all, let me say that I have read, we have read the Blue 

Ribbon Panel’s report, and every one of the 33 recommendations is 

a positive step in the direction of strengthening biodefense. 

In discussion with our staff, we have identified a number that we 

have already started to step out on. And in particular, we were 

quite pleased to see the stress on medical countermeasure development. It is obviously something the Nation needs and it is very important to the Department of Defense. 

There were a number of recommendations in there that also talk 

about interagency collaboration. And that, again, is something that 
12 

is born out by recent experience with Ebola and others. That is 

something that can only do good things for the enterprise. 

Another area that we thought was especially helpful was a recommendation for rapid point-of-care diagnostics, something that, 

again, will speed up the process of recovery. 

But one of the things we are doing in the Department in order 

to come up with novel and agile manufacturing techniques is establishing an advanced development and manufacturing capability to 

address those things that are particular to the Department of Defense. And we think that will help a lot in the direction of implementing some of the panel’s recommendations. 

Most importantly, though, I think, is the interagency collaboration. I think that what they essentially called for was for agencies, 

organizations who all have a stake in the biodefense field to collaborate and cooperate much more closely. And I think if we all 

take that seriously, I think we can strengthen the biodefense enterprise. 

Mr. MYERS. If I could add on to Dr. Hopkins’s answer, you know, 

two of the specific recommendations, obviously the public/private 

partnerships, but also the time in between events, between an 

Ebola outbreak and things like that, that was the opportunity for 

us to make significant progress in these areas. 

And I will give you one example where I think we are already 

making good use of the recommendations that came from the Blue 

Ribbon Panel, and that is in regard to Ebola. 

Prior to the Ebola outbreak, the Defense Threat Reduction Agen- cy had spent over $300 million in vaccine treatment research and 

development. So we had put the resources forward. Those resources 

went towards building a partnership. The first one was with a 

small corporation in California called the Mapp Corporation. And 

they developed one of the drugs that is being tested right now in 

West Africa called ZMapp, and it is doing very, very well. 

And the third leg of that stool, if you will, was the Government 

of Canada who was also involved in terms of bringing important 

technology, technological contributions to what became ZMapp. 

So I share that example with you as we completely concur with 

the example that you laid out there and we are trying to apply 

those things daily in approaching and responding to these difficult 

biological threats. 

Mr. NUGENT. One of the recommendations I believe from that 

panel was also to invest more in medical countermeasures. Are we 

doing that? Are we investing more or are we staying status quo? 

Dr. HOPKINS. Since the report just came out—— 

Mr. NUGENT. I realize that. 

Dr. HOPKINS. Certainly our emphasis is going to be to invest 

more, I just can’t say how much at this point. But given the stress 

that the Blue Ribbon Panel put on it and given the lessons learned 

from Ebola, our emphasis will be on putting more money into that 

area. 

Mr. NUGENT. Obviously, there are things popping up all the time, 

Zika virus down, you know, in the Caribbean is a threat, at least 

it will be a threat to Florida, and we are concerned about that obviously. And what a great, if you could weaponize that. I mean, what 

it does to newborns, infants is unbelievable. 
13 

So I think, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the time. My time is almost expired. 

I want to thank the panel. Thank you very much. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Sheriff Nugent. 

We now proceed to Congressman Brad Ashford of Nebraska. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Thank you for this. 

And thank all of you. 

And I appreciate the comments about Ebola. Obviously, the University of Nebraska Medical Center [UNMC] was a major player, 

in fact it has the largest bio-containment unit in the Ebola area. 

And to Congressman Nugent’s point about public/private partnerships, UNMC continues to grow its efforts and bringing, expanding 

the training center and has a desire to continue to expand it. 

And it is interesting, going back to Dr. Phil Smith, who actually 

developed the idea of bio-containment at UNMC 12 years ago and 

then working on it for a period of 10 years, and then the Ebola crisis hit we were ready to go and those patients were brought to 

UNMC. 

The city of Omaha and the State of Nebraska participated in 

making sure that, you know, on the fly we were able to put procedures in place to get those patients to UNMC. And in all but one 

case we were successful in bringing them back. So, I think there 

were a lot of lessons there. 

You mentioned training. Would you comment, either of you, any 

of the three of you, comment on I agree that training is very important in all medical facets, how is that in practice going to work? 

We need to be able to train a lot more people to deal. And the 

Ebola crisis did sort of highlight sort of the lack of training that 

was immediately available, but that is now beginning to become 

available. 

So how do we enhance that training as we move forward? Whomever would like to respond. 

Mr. MYERS. So, I will take a first stab at it and then let my colleagues add onto it. I think there are two ways to look at training. 

I think, obviously, first and foremost, I think this is what you are 

referring to, Congressman, is the domestic training. How do we 

help prepare first responders, hospital staffs, civil support teams, 

National Guard, if you will, those who will be responding, how do 

we prepare them for this eventuality or possibility, if you will? 

On the other side of the equation is, what can we be doing overseas to train partners and allies to be better able to deal with these 

threats as far from American shores as possible? 

In both of these areas, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency is 

playing a role. We are providing training, we are providing advice, 

we are providing subject matter expertise to a lot of these entities 

who would be involved in first response. 

Organizations and hospitals like the University of Nebraska are 

true gems. I mean, that is what is going to be required in some of 

these events. And given my relationship and participation in the 

STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command] chain of command, I am 

well aware of what a jewel you have there in Nebraska. 

But the other side of the equation is, what can we be doing today 

to help prepare our partners and allies to detect, potentially help 

begin to respond to these outbreaks overseas? 
14 

You know, one of the things I think we learned from the Ebola 

outbreak is that the more we are able to help prepare those first 

responders, those hospital staffs, give them the tools that they need 

to detect and begin to work on it, the better off we are going to be 

here. So, I think it is a two-phased approach. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Yes? 

Dr. SMITH. If I could just add on and echo everything that Director Myers offered, but also would highlight the important work of 

the Global Health Security Agenda which has brought together 

now 50 nations across the globe, an excellent effort at getting, 

again, across first responders, military, and so on. 

So it is not just a DOD initiative, but a Presidential initiative 

initially, to bring those countries together to meet health regulations, to identify training gaps, which then enable us to identify 

whether the United States could appropriately fill that gap, a different partner, and looking to regional models where we can draw 

on our regional strengths to also address some of the concerns that 

have arisen. 

So it does take it away from our borders where possible, but is 

also now a global effort, which is fantastic. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Yes, sir, Doctor? 

Dr. HOPKINS. I would just like to add that the Department of Defense will bring very important and very effective training capabilities, both domestically as well as internationally. I think one of the 

key lessons learned from the Ebola experience, though, is that it 

takes multiple agencies and it takes a lot of collaboration. So, our 

partnering with the Department of Health and Human Services 

will be essential in order to make sure that that training is as 

widespread and as effective as it can be. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Sir? 

Mr. MYERS. Congressman, one last thing to add. When I started 

in this position 61⁄2 years ago, and you had told me one of the most 

important relationships and valuable relationships and closest relationships that I would have is with the director of the Centers for 

Disease Control [CDC], I wouldn’t have believed it. But I think 

that the events and the threats that we are dealing with today has 

driven that into reality. 

And Tom Frieden and I are in contact on a regular basis to make 

sure that DTRA and the CDC are working hand-in-glove in unison 

to make sure there is no overlap and there is no gap and that we 

are complementary. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Thank you. And I do appreciate the fact that the 

Congress put language in the omnibus that expanded the reach of 

some of these efforts. So, thank you very much. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congressman Ashford. 

We now proceed to Congressman Trent Franks of Arizona. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank all of you for being here today. 

It is always encouraging when we are able to speak to people 

who have kind of a comprehensive view of some of these things. 

And I guess my first question, I know you have talked a lot 

about some of the chemical and biological considerations, that will 

be my second question, but my first question is related to, what 

area of nuclear proliferation gives you the most concern, you know, 
15 

I guess, a wrong that might gain a capability to potentially utilize 

even a nascent nuclear capability for EMP [electromagnetic pulse] 

attacks or something along those lines? 

In terms of the nuclear issues out there, Pakistan, whatever it 

might be, tell us what you think, and I will start with you, Dr. 

Hopkins, what is the area of greatest concern to you that could 

translate to be dangerous to our country? 

Dr. HOPKINS. Thank you for that question. The thing that would 

keep me awake at night is being able to detect the fact that nuclear 

proliferation is happening in the first place. 

Proliferation of the technologies, proliferation of the materials is 

something that we have to be on top of. And given the knowledge 

that has been proliferated and given the fact that there are multiple places where there are materials out there, I think first and 

foremost we have to have the ability to be able to detect the action 

of proliferation right from the outset. 

Mr. FRANKS. Any area of special concern? Any state or non-state 

actor that has you most concerned? 

Dr. HOPKINS. Well, at this point, given what is in the headlines, 

it would be North Korea. 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Myers. 

Mr. MYERS. Thank you, Congressman. For me, I would say it is 

the intersection of nuclear weapons and fissile materials with terrorist organizations. That, to me, is an absolute crucial problem because, A, it is very difficult to determine who got it, how they got 

it, where they got it from, where they might be taking it. 

There is no known source or location, capital or what have you. 

That would be my answer to the question. 

Mr. FRANKS. Dr. Smith. 

Dr. SMITH. Sir, mine probably is a combination of the three in 

the sense that I do believe from a state perspective North Korea 

represents the greatest threat. We have seen just provocative, destabilizing actions across that nuclear portfolio, most recently, and 

even over the past many years, as you are well aware. 

But particularly to Dr. Hopkins’s point, North Korea is also a 

known proliferator. So, to the extent that some of the initiatives, 

the Proliferation Security Initiative, other regimes can both be 

aware of those activities and prevent them or detect them or detect 

activities even within North Korea I think is critical. 

And then certainly, as you have heard in my remarks, the nonstate actor expressed interests as demonstrated interests now in 

the use of CBRN. We haven’t seen it on the ‘‘N’’ [nuclear] side of 

that equation, but that is certainly an area of concern. And again, 

they have expressed openly that that is an intent. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I think, you know, that is one of the main concerns some of us have, the vaunted agreement that we had with 

North Korea was supposed to eviscerate that danger. And of 

course, now we are facing it in spades. 

And it occurs to me then, looking at the two agreements, the one 

with North Korea, as opposed to the one with Iran, that the one 

with North Korea was a much stronger agreement. So, you have 

to forgive me for not being as calm about the whole thing as it may 

be. 
16 

But let me shift to the second question. In terms of non-nuclear 

threats, what keeps you up at night in that regard? 

And I will start again with you, Dr. Hopkins, and we will see if 

we can get to the end here. 

Dr. HOPKINS. Well, thank you again. By far, the potential for the 

proliferation and use of biological threats is number one. 

Mr. FRANKS. In any particular area? 

Dr. HOPKINS. Given what I know about our capability to provide 

protection against conventional threats, I would be concerned about 

genetic modifications of various potential threats. 

Mr. MYERS. I concur with Dr. Hopkins completely. That is exactly my concern. 

Dr. SMITH. And again, I think sort of twofold, there is both a current and a future threat. The future threat, I would concur with 

the gentlemen to my right. From a current threat, again, in the 

field, we have seen ISIL use of chemicals as weapons. That is certainly an area of concern for me from both the chemical and biological threat. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you all very much. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Vice Chairman Franks. 

And we now proceed to Congressman Ryan Zinke of Montana. 

Mr. ZINKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you for being here. 

I guess Dr. Smith, the launching of the two ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles], do you see that as a violation of the U.N. 

[United Nations] resolutions? 

Dr. SMITH. Specifically to North Korea’s recent launch? 

Mr. ZINKE. No, Iranian. 

Dr. SMITH. Oh, absolutely. I mean, in both cases then I will say 

yes. Those are—— 

Mr. ZINKE. What was our action? 

Dr. SMITH. So, my office is not responsible for the U.N. security 

resolutions. 

Mr. ZINKE. Do you know of any U.S. action taken against that? 

Dr. SMITH. I am sorry, I don’t. But I can certainly get back to 

you on that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 67.] 

Mr. ZINKE. Well, Dr. Hopkins, you had mentioned one of your 

greatest fears is to evaluate testing and whether or not they are 

cheating or testing or inspections. Have you read the International 

Atomic Energy Agency and Iranian agreement in regards to testing 

protocol? 

Dr. HOPKINS. No, I haven’t. 

Mr. ZINKE. Do you know of anyone that’s in your department 

that has? 

Dr. HOPKINS. Certainly. 

Mr. ZINKE. By name? 

Dr. HOPKINS. Our Nuclear Matters Office. 

Mr. ZINKE. Are you in—so you think that the Congress should 

have a copy though? Because I don’t know of anyone in Congress 

who has read it. 

Dr. HOPKINS. Well, assuming we are talking about the same document—— 
17 

Mr. ZINKE. I think we are. 

Mr. HOPKINS [continuing]. You should have it. 

Mr. ZINKE. I think so, too, because my concern is is that I agree 

with you, North Korea is a threat, I also agree that Iran is a 

threat. But it becomes even more of a threat if we don’t take action 

of something. 

Now, we are all concerned about weapons of mass destruction. 

And I fought in the desert and I directly understand the threat. 

But North Korea is not tweeting the destruction of Israel, and 

North Korea is not tweeting the destruction of the ‘‘great Satan,’’ 

us. Iran is. 

And I don’t think we have—do you think we have the inspection 

protocols that have some assurance that Iran is not skirting the 

agreement? 

Dr. HOPKINS. I don’t have enough knowledge about the protocols 

to judge the effectiveness. 

Mr. ZINKE. Ms. Smith. 

Dr. SMITH. So, I can’t speak to that except to say that there is 

certainly a commitment from both the United States Department 

of Defense, intelligence community, and other partners to carefully 

monitor and verify. And the program, the joint program, is set up 

to support that, so we should identify issues of any abrogation. 

Mr. ZINKE. Let me turn to the border, the southern border. How 

much of a threat do you think our southern border is for infiltration of weapons of mass destruction, particularly chemical? 

Dr. Hopkins. 

Dr. HOPKINS. The potential threat is probably coincident, probably about as strong as the threat from bringing in illicit drugs. 

From what I understand, the networks that might be used would 

be ones that would capitalize on the existing infiltration routes. 

Mr. ZINKE. Mr. Myers, do you share that same opinion? 

Mr. MYERS. Yes, sir. When you look at the paths that these terrorist organizations use, they are using the same paths, whether 

they are moving illegal contraband, illegal drugs, human trafficking, or what have you. It is difficult to believe they would change 

their pattern of behavior to move another valuable asset, whether 

it be weapons of mass destruction or the like. 

So yes, I would agree. This is one of the reasons that we have 

spent an awful lot of time dealing with deeply buried targets and 

potential WMD pathways such as this. We have a specific R&D [research and development] effort that is focused on finding, detecting, and then potentially eliminating, if the choice is made, to deal 

with those types of threats. 

Mr. ZINKE. And Dr. Smith, based on your knowledge of chemical, 

do you think it is more probable for homegrown chemical or do you 

see chemical being transported across border as a principal threat? 

Dr. SMITH. So, inherently, because of the chemical industry, 

there are certainly precursor chemicals that are commonly found 

easily around the globe for normal use, so the dual-use question is 

certainly an issue there. So, I would say both are of concern. But 

to the extent to which we are aware and are working with our 

partners to make them aware of those concerns related to toxic 

chemicals that may be part of normal industry is very critical. 
18 

Mr. ZINKE. And do we have the same monitoring in Mexico as 

we do in the U.S. as far as the chemical companies? 

Dr. SMITH. I can’t speak to that. We can come back to you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 67.] 

Mr. ZINKE. Okay. 

I will yield the remaining part of my time. Thank you very much. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congressman Zinke. 

We will now proceed with a second round. 

Dr. Hopkins, the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense noted 

that work dealing with cyber threats to pathogen security is nascent and that the United States is not yet well positioned to address cyber threats that affect the biological science and technology 

sectors. Can you describe the cyber threat that you see to biological 

security? How is the Department of Defense addressing these biological security cyber threats? 

Dr. HOPKINS. Thank you very much. The cyber threats to the biological systems have to be handled through the process of defining 

hardness requirements, cyber hardness requirements, for the systems, the communication systems, the diagnostics, and devices that 

would be used. 

We have to start doing that. We have to build them in and basically get away from the legacy systems that may not be as strong 

in that area. 

Mr. WILSON. And I believe a vote is being called. 

One real quick question, Director Myers, before you run off. The 

Department of Defense played a large role in the U.S. Government 

response to Ebola. What do you think is an appropriate role for the 

Department of Defense in other global epidemics, such as Ebola? 

And as you depart, what role would you recommend the Department of Defense to play in the recent Zika virus as cited by Sheriff 

Nugent? 

Mr. MYERS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

When it comes to the Zika virus, obviously our colleagues at the 

Department of Health and Human Services have the lead. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, parts of the chemical biological defense program that Dr. Hopkins oversees are standing by in support through the Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs at the Department of Defense. So, we are standing by to support. 

And on the larger issue of epidemics like Ebola, I believe that 

Congress has provided the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and 

others with some significant tools that can be brought to bear in 

these things. 

Specifically, I am referring to the Nunn-Lugar CTR program. 

That was the tool we used to help respond to the Ebola threat. You 

have given us the flexibility, you have given us the authorities to 

go out and do some incredible things in these places. I think that 

is going to continue to be a very effective tool. I think it is one that 

the Secretary and the President will turn to in some of these 

events and situations. 

And quite frankly, I think the program is going to be used for 

more and more of these types of things because of the authorities 

that Congress has provided us. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, thank you very much. 
19 

And we now proceed to Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CWMD systems organization, as we touched upon, is developing a prototype situational awareness tool, Constellation, and, 

Dr. Hopkins, you spoke about this briefly in your opening statement, to provide a platform for sharing information across secured 

domains supporting various communities of interest. What efforts 

have been taken to eliminate duplication with other CWMD systems? And how is Constellation leveraging over large-scale data 

tools? 

Dr. HOPKINS. Thank you very much for that. First of all, Constellation is using the most up-to-date technology possible in order 

to make sure that the very ambitious attempt to try to integrate 

and synthesize and report weapons of mass destruction-related activities can actually be accomplished. And it is focusing very, very 

heavily on identifying the specific user requirements to make sure 

that it is useful. 

If I could, since Defense Threat Reduction Agency is actually 

doing the development, I would like to ask Mr. Myers to add. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Certainly. 

Mr. MYERS. Congressman, I know our time is short, but I will try 

and condense this. 

We are leveraging the DISA [Defense Information Systems Agency] big-data platform as one of the ways that we are kind of using 

the technology that is already in place to make sure that we are 

not duplicating efforts elsewhere. 

Similarly, we are working very closely with the Strategic Capabilities Office, part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to field 

Constellation on the next generation of the tactical cloud environment. 

So those are two specific steps that we are taking to utilize technology that is already in place and not duplicate something that 

has already been invested in and working well. 

Furthermore, I think the other important part of this is the requirements. Where did we get them? Who defined what Constellation will do and what won’t it do? 

First and foremost, in 2013 STRATCOM put together a situational awareness Senior Warfighter Forum, something called a 

SWarF, brought all the combatant command, services, and potential customers of Constellation together. They compiled a good list 

of what they needed from this tool, what the tool that we were creating needed to provide to them if it was going to be useful. So, 

that was another way we went about defining that. 

And obviously since then, we have developed a concept of operation and an office under Dr. Hopkins has been providing us implementation guidance. And each and every time we put the implementation guidance together and every time we look at that 

CONOPs [concept of operations], we are constantly scanning the 

horizon. Because if there is no need to build a wheel and we can 

use someone else’s we will. 

At this time, we believe we are taking full opportunity and advantage of technology that is already in place to put this necessary 

capability together. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good, thank you. Thank you for that. 
20 

One of the stated goals of the Constellation CWMD situational 

awareness tool is to be able to share information among different 

organizations both within the United States Government and between our allies. How have the requirements for Constellation been 

developed and validated? 

Mr. MYERS. Well, the first part of the answer would be the 

SWarF that I mentioned and brought all the combatant commands 

and the services together. 

But one comment I would make about your question is we are 

going to be operating on four different levels simultaneously. And 

we are talking about an open system where we can communicate 

with international organizations. We are talking about what we 

call in the Department of Defense our NIPRNET [Non-Secure 

Internet Protocol Router Network], as well as SIPRNET [Secret 

Internet Protocol Router Network] on the secret level and on the 

top-secret level as well. 

So one of the difficulties we are having or we are trying to overcome is, how do you operate on all four levels simultaneously to 

make sure this tool is useful, not only for Department of Defense, 

but our interagency partners, but also our international partners? 

I think one of the lessons learned from Ebola was the portal that 

we were able to put together, which is kind of an early version, a 

much smaller version of Constellation, getting our international 

partners, the World Health Organization, some of the national governments involved and all of us on the same page in terms of being 

able to share information and have it located in one place, turned 

out to be absolutely critical. It allowed us to coordinate the assistance quicker and much more effectively. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. So, does it interact with or will it interact with 

World Health, as well as CDC, as well as Department of Defense 

assets? 

Mr. MYERS. Yes, sir, but it would probably be on three different 

levels, though. I mean, obviously, on the open level, we would be 

able to work with our international partners. Our friends down at 

the Centers for Disease Control, we would be able to work with 

them on any of the three levels. And obviously within the Department of Defense, we would be able to do it from the unclassified 

level all the way to the top-secret level. And similarly not only with 

the CDC, but our partners at the Agency for International Development at the State Department. 

That is really what we expect to get out of this, that is what we 

are hoping for. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay, thank you. 

My time is expired. I appreciate the answers and your testimony. 

Again, Mr. Myers, wish you well. 

And thank you all for your service. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WILSON. And thank you, Congressman Langevin. 

It is very fitting that we would end on a high note with Congressman Rich Nugent. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. NUGENT. Oh, Mr. Chairman, you are always a joy. I appreciate it. 

You have got to have a little levity, folks. 
21 

As we talk about CBRN, and particularly as we work with our 

allies in Europe now, they are obviously facing huge migration 

issues coming across. Are our allies, our NATO [North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization] allies in particular, are they up to speed in 

regards to CBRN, in regards to dealing with those issues? 

Dr. SMITH. So, sir, I will address that first, and then perhaps, Dr. 

Hopkins, you might want to add in. But we work closely, so 

through the OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] Policy Office, 

work closely both in very important bilateral engagements, as well 

as some multilateral engagements with our partners, and then certainly NATO in and of itself is an important part of that equation 

as well. 

So I would say in some areas we offer more strengths than they 

do, and in other areas they have strengths that we don’t. And I 

mean that both broadly and both to the defense community itself, 

but also, in some cases, academia and the NGO [non-governmental 

organization] and scientific communities in the countries from 

which those partners draw often have strengths that support ours. 

So where I will turn it over is we work at both executive levels, 

sort of senior steering groups, and then individual issue managers 

or working groups, where on an annual basis, depending on the 

topical area, we will set priorities for what we believe are the current or emerging areas and then—— 

Mr. NUGENT. Well, my question is really, do we have protocols 

in place if we are today in Europe and we are responding to a crisis 

with Polish troops, do we have cross-training in regards to CBRN? 

Mr. MYERS. Congressman, great example. We have had specific 

training with the Polish military forces just in the last 18 months, 

specifically through the chem/bio defense program, through our 

S&T efforts there. 

So yes, I mean, I don’t think it would be fair to characterize it 

as uniform across. Dr. Hopkins and I and Dr. Smith spend an 

awful lot of time with the United Kingdom, our relationship there, 

as well as colleagues in France. We have a special relationship in 

terms of CBRN cooperation with NATO. 

So yes, we have got deep relationships. I would not say it is uniform and even across the board, there are pros, there are cons, 

there are heights, there are lows. But I think we have got good, 

strong relationships with all of our partners who have specific and 

significant capabilities in this area. 

Mr. NUGENT. Yes, sir? 

Dr. HOPKINS. If I could just add, in addition to the partnerships 

and the agreements, we also do a burden sharing, to an extent, in 

the research and development area for chemical and biological defensive measures with a number of nations. 

Mr. MYERS. And to take that one step further, many of the nations that I have mentioned make significant contributions to the 

Nunn-Lugar CTR program. When we are doing nonproliferation or 

counter-proliferation programs with foreign partners, our allies in 

Europe and elsewhere may not be able to duplicate or do the training themselves, but they will make monetary contributions that the 

Nunn-Lugar CTR program can take and funnel into the program 

to offset some of the costs to the Department of Defense. And that 

is another way we have really built those partnerships. I have spe-
22 

cifically Germany in mind in a number of cases over the last 12 to 

18 months. 

Mr. NUGENT. Well, you know, my concern obviously is on the 

battlefield, if exposed to some kind of a biological or chemical attack, if we have the antidote or whatever it may be to treat or the 

Polish troops have it and we don’t, can we share that? 

Dr. HOPKINS. Thank you for the question. Actually, we can and 

we do. 

Mr. NUGENT. Okay. 

Dr. HOPKINS. In fact, with NATO, we actually share a common 

challenge standard to make sure that our masks, suits, gloves, individual protection, collective protection, decontaminants all can 

meet the same standards. 

Mr. NUGENT. Very good. 

Well, I appreciate your time, and I appreciate your answers. And 

thank you very much. 

And I yield back my remaining time, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WILSON. And thank you very much, Congressman Nugent. 

And again, thank each of you for being here today. 

And Director Myers, best wishes for the future. 

And I share the concern of Congressman Zinke, and that is that 

we are facing irrational enemies who truly believe in a policy and 

a course of death to America, death to Israel. And so, your agencies, your departments have never been more important. 

However, in a bipartisan manner, we can work together to protect American families. 

And with that, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:43 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 10, 2016 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 10, 2016 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

FEBRUARY 10, 2016 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. MYERS. DTRA funds research in many areas highlighted by the Blue Ribbon 

Study Panel on Biodefense in its October 2015 report, including medical countermeasures, biosurveillance, decontamination and remediation, and coordination with 

civil authorities. DTRA does not fund research or measures to strengthen cybersecurity of systems with biological pathogen information, and does not maintain or 

manage these systems. DTRA concurs with the Blue Ribbon Panel that cybersecurity measures are important in safeguarding this information. DTRA personnel are 

familiar with the particular sensitivity of information related to biological pathogens 

and receive regular training in cybersecurity. We require physical protective measures for our electronic devices, monitor our systems for intrusion on a 24x7 basis, 

and continually upgrade our cybersecurity measures. [See page 11.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ZINKE 

Dr. SMITH. Although Iran does not possess an ICBM, it has recently tested medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). Following these tests, the U.S. Treasury Department, pursuant to E.O. 13382, designated 11 individuals and entities for sanctions involved in procurement on behalf of Iran’s missile program. DOD will continue our efforts to address all threats posed by Iran, including the ballistic missile 

threat, through our partnerships and force presence in the region. [See page 16.] 

Dr. SMITH. DOD does not have a role in the regulatory regimes of commercial industry of our foreign allies and partners. In the event of an incident releasing hazardous materials in Mexico, particularly an incident with the potential for spillover 

into the United States, the Department of Defense is prepared to support a U.S. 

Government effort to help the Government of Mexico in its response. [See page 18.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 10, 2016 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

Mr. WILSON. The Army investigation into the inadvertent shipments of anthrax 

concluded that ‘‘no individual or institution was directly responsible,’’ but noted 

‘‘several findings related to scientific, institutional, and individual failures may have 

been contributing factors.’’ 

Can you give a status of corrective actions that are being put in place to prevent 

this type of error from occurring again? 

Dr. HOPKINS.

• Army established a ‘‘Biosafety Task Force’’ led by Headquarters Department of 

the Army, consisting of over 50 senior scientists and leaders from Army, Navy, 

and Air Force organizations to comprehensively address the direction given by 

the Deputy Secretary of Defense and guidance in the OSD Comprehensive Review Report. 

• Sub-working groups were chartered to address: (1) Development of a Department of Defense (DOD) standard operating procedure (SOP) for the inactivation of anthrax spores (once the science basis has been established); (2) New 

processes and procedures for the Critical Reagents Program to better ensure 

safety, consistency, and quality; (3) Designation of the Secretary of the Army 

as the DOD Executive Agent for the Biological Select Agents and Toxins 

(BSAT) Biosafety function; (4) Examination of chains of command over BSAT 

holding labs; (5) Establishment of a DOD standing Peer Review Panel to review and approve SOPs and protocols dealing with BSAT; and (6) Examination of BSAT related workload in DOD. 

• The Army Office of the Surgeon General has been designated Executive Agent 

(EA) Responsible Official (RO) for biosafety. 

• The Army Biosafety Directive, which establishes policy and describes the 

roles, responsibilities, and missions and functions for the DOD BSAT Biosafety Program, has been drafted. Formal staffing is underway. 

• On 15 January, 2016, the Department of the Army released the Dugway Anthrax AR–15–6 Report. 

• The 15–6 investigation team identified actions for the Secretary of the Army’s 

consideration: directing additional research to address existing gaps in scientific knowledge, making institutional changes aimed at reducing the overall 

risk associated with working with biological materials, and holding certain 

personnel at Dugway Proving Ground (DPG), including the leadership, accountable for their failures to eliminate the culture of complacency and ultimately prevent additional mishaps from occurring in the future. 

• An effort is underway to address the gaps in scientific knowledge related to 

inactivation and viability testing. 

• The preponderance of the evidence supports that no individual or institution 

was directly responsible for the unauthorized shipment of low concentrations 

of viable B. anthracis. 

Mr. WILSON. Are all of the investigation recommendations going to be implemented? What process will be used to ensure that any findings implemented are 

done effectively? Answer: 

Dr. HOPKINS.

• Multiple reviews and investigations were undertaken by OSD and by the Army 

Biosafety Task Force to determine the root cause of the anthrax incident. All 

of the recommendations from these reviews have been addressed and either the 

action was taken or a path forward was established that will be tracked to completion by the EA RO. 

• The EA RO is responsible for ensuring that corrective actions, once implemented, are effective and also for monitoring their continued effectiveness as 

the biosafety program evolves. 

Mr. WILSON. Given the significant increase in the number of facilities handling 

these select agents and deadly pathogens over the last 10–15 years, what efforts is 

the Department taking to determine if work can be consolidated to reduce the facilities necessary? 
72 

Dr. HOPKINS. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has tasked the Secretary of the 

Army with assessing the optimal distribution of research, development, and production activities at the laboratories in support of the Chemical and Biological Defense 

Program mission. As a result, the Army Biosafety Task Force formed a working 

group to determine the optimal command and control alignment of Army laboratories and to determine the optimal workload distribution across Service laboratories. Based on working group recommendations, the Army will move the Life 

Sciences Division of the West Desert Test Center under the command and control 

of the Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center. Other recommendations to consolidate work among DOD laboratories are under further review. 

Mr. WILSON. What is the DOD’s plan to ensure that the medical countermeasures 

advanced manufacturing facility is fully utilized? 

Dr. HOPKINS. The DOD plan is to coordinate and utilize the Advanced Development and Manufacturing (ADM) capability based on the needs of the Joint Force. 

DOD intends to establish the Medical Countermeasures (MCM) Advanced Development and Manufacturing (ADM) as a potential subcontractor for all DOD medical 

countermeasure efforts. MCM developers will have the opportunity to use the capability, either in its entirety or in part, to fulfill contracts with the DOD Chemical 

and Biological Defense Program (CBDP). Requirements and capabilities will be assessed by the Government on a case by case basis for each medical countermeasure 

program prior to award, and the decision regarding the extent to which the MCM 

ADM is employed will be made on the basis of ‘‘best value to the Government.’’ Although the MCM ADM has been designated by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

the Army (Procurement) as a ‘‘preferred source’’, medical countermeasure developers 

with strong in-house manufacturing capabilities can choose whether to use the 

MCM ADM. However, the MCM ADM will provide better sustainment for DOD 

MCM efforts because it will avoid the need for multiple manufacturing sites to be 

used at small scale. 

Mr. WILSON. Will the Department be requesting O&M funds to sustain the facility? 

Dr. HOPKINS. No. The intent is for the DOD MCM ADM to be sustained through 

use by the individual CBDP MCM development efforts. 

Mr. WILSON. Has a roadmap been developed to plan utilization of this facility? 

Dr. HOPKINS. Yes. 

Mr. WILSON. Can you discuss any potential utilization by Interagency partners? 

Dr. HOPKINS. Once fully operational, the DOD MCM ADM facility will be made 

available for additional production capacity in times of emergency to meet the needs 

of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). DOD will work through 

the Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise (PHEMCE) to 

coordinate MCM development, production, and availability across the Interagency. 

DOD’s coordination efforts have been assessed favorably by the Government Accountability Office (GAO): ‘‘DOD’s efforts to coordinate with the Department of 

Health and Human Services and the Department of Homeland Security align with 

best practices GAO has identified for collaborating across agency boundaries’’—GAO 

14–442 

Mr. WILSON. Specifically, how can the DOD’s medical countermeasures advanced 

manufacturing facility be utilized to respond to emerging threats? 

Dr. HOPKINS. The DOD MCM ADM will be available for use by DOD’s medical 

countermeasure programs to conduct research to counter emerging threats. This 

state-of-the-art facility will develop and manufacture MCMs for the DOD faster and 

more efficiently than most current production processes. In the event of an emerging 

threat (Ebola-like scenario) where the Department had potential candidates in the 

pipeline, these candidates could use the ADM in an attempt to speed up the delivery 

time. The disposable, single-use manufacturing equipment will allow for rapid configuration, which reduces downtime between production runs. The facility’s flexibility will enable the capability to rapidly assess potential MCM candidates. 

Mr. WILSON. Can you give us a quick update on the timeline for U.S. Chemical 

Weapons Destruction Operations at the last two remaining sites in Colorado and 

Kentucky? Are we meeting our International Treaty Obligations? 

Dr. HOPKINS. The Pueblo Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant located in Pueblo, Colorado is scheduled to begin chemical weapons destruction operations in or before June 2016, and complete operations by November 2019. The Blue Grass Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant located in Richmond, Kentucky is scheduled to 

begin chemical weapons destruction operations by April 2020, and complete operations by September 2023. 

The United States is meeting our obligations to destroy our chemical weapons 

stockpile as required by the Chemical Weapons Convention. We remain fully com-
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mitted to safely completing chemical weapons destruction by the December 31, 2023, 

congressionally-mandated destruction deadline. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER 

Mr. SHUSTER. What is DTRA doing to leverage existing information management 

systems, such as the NGB’s Civil Support Team (CST) Information Management 

System (CIMS), to ensure such prior systems investments are efficiently utilized by 

follow on forces like the NGB’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High 

explosive Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP) and Homeland Defense Response Force (HRF). Do you have an investment plan and timeline for deployment 

of this system? How will systems like CIMS be incorporated into the NGB’s overall 

information management architecture and have you seen an improvement in the 

timeliness and quality of information sharing through use of these systems? 

Dr. HOPKINS. Although specific questions related to the NGB’s CIMS are best answered by the NGB’s Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Division, DTRA does 

have a strategic partnering understanding with the NGB to support its Civil Support Teams to fill any gaps. In DTRA’s role as the lead organization for the National 

Countering WMD Technical Reachback Enterprise, the Operational Information 

Management System (OIMS) provides web-enabled operational work space to include secure CST portal pages, Request For Information processing and management, team status reporting, and other capabilities and associated training. DTRA 

provides support for all 57 CST’s as well as the various CERFPs, and some discussions with the HRF. 

DTRA continues to provide software (e.g, Mobile Field Kit) and modeling capabilities (e.g., Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability) to the NGB’s information 

system configuration manager. DTRA also provides technical conditions in support 

of integration of the software into the CST communications architecture and potential integration into future NG CIMS. Pilot CST teams have demonstrated a reduction in the time it takes to complete certification evaluations by over 50% simply 

by employing Mobile Field Kit over conventional methods. 

Mr. SHUSTER. In order to ensure the most efficient and transparent use of taxpayer monies, it is critical the funds are spent on mission-centric activities. Would 

you agree that excessive administrative, overhead and/or pass through fees in excess 

of 10% for ‘‘program management’’ add nothing more than unnecessary extra costs? 

Would you also agree that administrative costs need to be minimal so that the majority of the money will be spent on the best possible product for the services in 

building, programming, fielding, testing, implementing, and providing technical expertise and not wasting government or tax payer dollars on paying high administrative costs and adding additional costs and layers of bureaucracy? Would you support 

an administrative cap of 10% being imposed for pass through entities? 

Dr. HOPKINS. Oversight of administrative costs in contracting is not an ASD(NCB) 

function, so we received input from the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP), Ms. Claire Grady, who shares the following: The Department 

is always concerned with excessive administrative, overhead and/or pass-through 

fees. It is imperative that the acquisition team determine the appropriate amount 

of administrative, overhead and pass-through required for each contracted capability, as well as an appropriate compensation for such. Such costs should be as 

minimal as possible while still ensuring effective program management. Capping 

these costs at any arbitrary amount limits the acquisition team’s capabilities to 

evaluate and appropriately manage risk contained within these categories as the 

vendor strives to manage and provide the required capability in accordance with the 

contract. 

Mr. SHUSTER. What is DTRA doing to leverage existing information management 

systems, such as the NGB’s Civil Support Team (CST) Information Management 

System (CIMS), to ensure such prior systems investments are efficiently utilized by 

follow on forces like the NGB’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High 

explosive Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP) and Homeland Defense Response Force (HRF). Do you have an investment plan and timeline for deployment 

of this system? How will systems like CIMS be incorporated into the NGB’s overall 

information management architecture and have you seen an improvement in the 

timeliness and quality of information sharing through use of these systems? 

Mr. MYERS. Although specific questions related to the NGB’s CIMS are best answered by the NGB’s Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Division, DTRA does 

have a strategic partnering understanding with the NGB to support its Civil Support Teams to fill any gaps. In DTRA’s role as the lead organization for the National 

Countering WMD Technical Reachback Enterprise, the Operational Information 
74 

Management System (OIMS) provides web-enabled operational work space to include secure CST portal pages, Request For Information processing and management, team status reporting, and other capabilities and associated training. DTRA 

provides support for all 57 CST’s as well as the various CERFPs, and some discussions with the HRF. 

DTRA continues to provide software (e.g, Mobile Field Kit) and modeling capabilities (e.g., Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability) to the NGB’s information 

system configuration manager. DTRA also provides technical conditions in support 

of integration of the software into the CST communications architecture and potential integration into future NG CIMS. Pilot CST teams have demonstrated a reduction in the time it takes to complete certification evaluations by over 50% simply 

by employing Mobile Field Kit over conventional methods. 

Mr. SHUSTER. In order to ensure the most efficient and transparent use of taxpayer monies, it is critical the funds are spent on mission-centric activities. Would 

you agree that excessive administrative, overhead and/or pass through fees in excess 

of 10% for ‘‘program management’’ add nothing more than unnecessary extra costs? 

Would you also agree that administrative costs need to be minimal so that the majority of the money will be spent on the best possible product for the services in 

building, programming, fielding, testing, implementing, and providing technical expertise and not wasting government or tax payer dollars on paying high administrative costs and adding additional costs and layers of bureaucracy? Would you support 

an administrative cap of 10% being imposed for pass through entities? 

Mr. MYERS. DTRA concurs with the input received from the Director of Defense 

Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP), Ms. Claire Grady, who shares the following: The Department is always concerned with excessive administrative, overhead and/or pass-through fees. It is imperative that the acquisition team determine 

the appropriate amount of administrative, overhead and pass-through required for 

each contracted capability, as well as an appropriate compensation for such. Such 

costs should be as minimal as possible while still ensuring effective program management. Capping these costs at any arbitrary amount limits the acquisition team’s 

capabilities to evaluate and appropriately manage risk contained within these categories as the vendor strives to manage and provide the required capability in accordance with the contract. 

Mr. SHUSTER. What is DTRA doing to leverage existing information management 

systems, such as the NGB’s Civil Support Team (CST) Information Management 

System (CIMS), to ensure such prior systems investments are efficiently utilized by 

follow on forces like the NGB’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High 

explosive Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP) and Homeland Defense Response Force (HRF). Do you have an investment plan and timeline for deployment 

of this system? How will systems like CIMS be incorporated into the NGB’s overall 

information management architecture and have you seen an improvement in the 

timeliness and quality of information sharing through use of these systems? 

Dr. SMITH. I concur in Mr. Myers’ response. 

Mr. SHUSTER. In order to ensure the most efficient and transparent use of taxpayer monies, it is critical the funds are spent on mission-centric activities. Would 

you agree that excessive administrative, overhead and/or pass through fees in excess 

of 10% for ‘‘program management’’ add nothing more than unnecessary extra costs? 

Would you also agree that administrative costs need to be minimal so that the majority of the money will be spent on the best possible product for the services in 

building, programming, fielding, testing, implementing, and providing technical expertise and not wasting government or tax payer dollars on paying high administrative costs and adding additional costs and layers of bureaucracy? Would you support 

an administrative cap of 10% being imposed for pass through entities? 

Dr. SMITH. Given that my office does not have responsibilities for program management, I defer to ASD Hopkins’ sentiment with respect to the program-management cap. My understanding is that a Services Requirements Review Board (SRRB) 

is currently being conducted to identify the true service contractual requirements. 

This effort should afford additional opportunities for efficiencies and reductions. 

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