The Honor able James S
. Gw i n, United States District J udg e for the Northe rn District of * Ohio, sitti ng by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 09a0095n.06 Filed: F ebrua

ry 4, 2009 No. 07-5904 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, P laintif f-App ellee,
v. MARCUS DAL E ROBERTSON, Defendan t-Appellant.

_______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EAL FROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT C O U R T F O R

T H E M ID D LE DI STRI CT OF TEN

NESSEE O P I N I O N

Before: M ARTIN and MOORE, Circuit Jud ges; and GWIN, District Judge. * K A R ENN EL SO N M OO R

E, C ir c uit Jud ge. De fe n d an t -A ppellant Marc us Dale Rober tson (“ Rob e rt so n” ) a

pp e a ls h is s e nte nc e of

84 mon ths of

imp ri so nme nt r e su lti ng fr om his g uil ty ple a to one count of

being a fe lon in possession of a fire arm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g )(1) and 924. On appe al, Robertson’s sole argument is that his sentenc e is pr ocedur ally unrea sonable be cause the district court fa iled to addre ss his primary argument for a varia

nce from the g uideline ra

ng e. F or the
rea sons discussed below, we VA CA TE Robertson’s sentenc e and REMAND fo r r es en t en ci n g. I. F ACTS AND P ROCEDURE The fa cts of this case are n o t in dispute. On J anuar y 17, 2007, a g rand jury

indicted Rob e rt so n fo r o ne c ount o f b e inga fe lon in p os se ssi on

of a fi re arm , in

vio la tio n o f 1 8 U .S. C.2

§§ 922(g )(1) and 924. Robertson pleade d g uilty to the char g e on April 2, 2 0 0 7
. A P re s entence I nv e sti g a tio n Re po rt

(“ PSR” ) w a s su

bs e qu e ntl y

pr e pa re d, wh ic h

c a l c u l a t e d R o b e r t s o n ’ s t ota l of

fe ns e level to be 23 and his criminal history cate g ory to be V, re sulting in a guideline ra ng e of 84 to 105 months. I n calc ulating this g uideline ra ng e, the PSR twice consider ed one of Robertson’s prior controll ed -s ubstance s convictions, for attempted sale of le ss than 0.5 g rams of c ocaine , once f or purposes of c alculating his total offe nse l evel under U.S .S.G. § 2K2.1(a )(2) and ag ain in deter mining his criminal history

score . Robertson filed a se ntencingmemorandum, a rg uing f or a be low-g uideline sentenc e based on three fac ts: (1) Robertson’s prior controlled-substanc es convic tion had been double -counte d, once to set his base off

ense le vel to twenty -four

under § 2K2.1(a) (2) and once in increa sing his cr iminal history score by three points, which increase d his criminal history cate g ory by one leve l, resulting in “dual punishment” a

nd a guideline r ang e that wa s g reater than ne cessa ry to achieve the objectives of 18 U. S.C. § 3 55 3( a ); (2 ) R ob e rt so n c omp le te d b arb e r s c ho ol a nd ho pe d to sta

rt his ow n b us ine ss afte r re lease from prison; and ( 3) Robertson had a close relationship with his 12-y ear -old daug hter. Joint Ap pe nd ix (“ J.A. ” ) at 14 -2 2 ( Se nt. Me m. a t 1- 9) . T he me mor and um s ta te d th a t, b a se d o n th e se fac ts, Robertson “urg [ed] the C ourt, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) and U .S.S.G. §§ 5K2.0, 5H1.2
and 5H 1. 6, to d e pa

rt do wnwa rd fr om t he re c omm e nd e d a dv iso ry g uid e lin e ra

ng e .” J.A. a t 14 (S e nt. Me m. at 1)
. Rob e rt so n a lso re qu e ste d a se nte nc e of 63 mon ths , c on te nd ingthat su c h a se nte nc e “ is sufficie nt, but no gr eate r than ne ce ssary , to achieve the g oals of sente ncing under 18 U .S.C. § 3553(a) .” Id
. The Gove rnment r es p o n ded to the sente ncing memorandum a nd addre ssed all three of Robertson’s ar g uments. Howeve r, in addre ssing the double -counti n g argument, the Gover nment3

contende d only that the doubl e-c ounting of offe nses i s permissible under United States v. W heele r , 330 F.3d 407, 413- 14 (6th Cir. 2003), and U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1. T h e d i s t r i c t c o u r th el d

R o b er t s o n ’s s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g o nJ u l y 2 , 2 0 0 7
. At t h e h ea ri n g, Robertson’s counse l and the district judg e eng ag ed in t he following colloquy reg ardingRobertson’s do ub le -c ounti ngargume nt:

T H E CO U RT : A ll r ig h t. M r . Sm a ll , I th ink [th e ] g o v e r n me n t pointed out there is [ a] W heele r ca se ar ising out of our state that say s it’s a

ppropriate to consider the se dr ugc on vic tio ns . MR. SMA L L : Y our H on or , le t me jus t b e c le ar. Idid n’ t make a

sp e c if ic ob je c tio n to the c a lc ulatio ns . In f a c t, I ha d n o o bje c tio ns to t

he c a lc ulatio ns . THE COURT: But you wer e makingthe ar gu ment that the sentenc e oug ht to be re duced. MR. SMA L L : T hat’s th e argume nt I ’m makin g , Y our H on or . I ’m jus t making it under the 3553 (a) fac tor. And fr ankly , with the exception of the immigration guideline, the re is no other g uideline that puni s h es a defenda nt more harshly for a criminal re cord tha

n a g un g uideline. So Iwas just making that argument for f

actor s under 3 5 5 3 (a ), n ot as a spec ific objec tion to the guideline c a lc ulatio ns . TH E CO UR T: Ok ay . T he Court wi ll , th ere fo re , f ind that th e tot a l of

fe ns e level is 23, the Criminal History Categor y i s V, the g uideline ra ng e is 84 to 105 months . . . . J .A. at 45-46 ( Sent. Hr’gTr. at 4- 5). B oth parties then m ad e ar guments reg ardingthe § 3553(a ) fac to rs . Al t houg h neither pa rty expli citly

discussed the double- counting argument at this tim e, Robertson’s counsel did note that, “as I pointed out ear lier, the objec tion, it wasn’t an objection I had
ma de ,” bu t r a the r w a s me re ly an atte mpt

to i llumin a te the fa c t that c ouns e l c ou ld f ind no thi ng“ in the a pp lic a tio n n ote s in

[te rm s] of

ho w t he g uid e lin e s we re str

uc tur e d fo r the sp e c if

ic ty pe of of fe ns e4

that th e r e is an y

p a rti c u la r iz e d r e a s o nto
. . . s u

b s ta n ti a l[ ly ] e n h an c e [] M r . Ro b e rts o n ’ s g u ide line rang e to the 84 month rang e.” J.A. at 46-47 (Sent. Hr ’g Tr. at 5- 6). After hear ing the arguments of counsel a nd Robertson’s allocution, the district judg e stated that, “[f]or clar ity of t he record, the Court has consider ed the f actor s under 3553( a) c oncer ning the defe ndant, his persona l history , his c riminal history , [and] the other f actor s under 3553( a).” J .A. at 55 (Sent. Hr’ g Tr. at 14) . The district judg e then de tai l ed R obertson’s c riminal history and pronounce d sent en ce
— 8 4 months of imprisonment. J .A. at 55-56 ( Sent. Hr’gTr. at 14- 15). The d i s t ri ct j u d ge f

u rt h er n o t edt h at “[ t ] h e C o u rt h as t ri edt o re co gn i z e y o u r r ec en tef fo rt s a t g e t t i n g a
vo c a tio n th a t w ill g ive y ou a job , a pr od uc tiv e job . T he Court

ha s tr ie d to re c ognize y our s e ns iti vit y to the needs of

y our daug hter.” J .A. at 57 (Sent. Hr ’g Tr. at 16)
. After pronouncingsentenc e, the district judg e aske d, “Are there any other matter s, either side? ” Id . Robertson’s counse l p o inted out that the district judge had fa iled to inform Robertson of his rig ht to appeal. Af

ter infor ming Rober

tson reg ardingthis right, the district judg e asked a g ain, “Ar e ther e any

other matter s? ” Id
. Both c ounsel replied, “No, Your H onor.” Id . Ro be rt so n ti me ly appea led. II. AN AL YSI S Rob e rt so n’ s so le c on te nti on on a pp e a l is that the dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d wh e n it fa ile d to a dd re ss Robertson’s ar g ument that his se ntence should be reduc ed bec ause the double-c ounting of one prior drug conviction in calc ulating his guideline ra ng e led to dual puni shment that produce d a “guidelines rang e g reater than n ec es s ary to achieve the sentenc ing obje ctives of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) .” Robertson Br . at 9. For

the re asons discussed be low, we a g ree .I n its brief, t he g overnme nt seems to imply that a g ener al abuse -of- discretion standa rd 1 applies in sentenc ing c ases. Gov’ t Br. at 20. Suc h an assertion is i nacc urate . A re view of our c a se law r e ve a ls that th e “ a bu se -o f- dis c re tio n s tand ard , f or re a so na ble ne ss” i s a sta

nd ard wh os e para meters are specific ally define d by Six th Circuit prece dent and thus is more than g ener al abuse

of-discr etion revie w. See, e .g., Presley , 547 F.3d at 629-30 (h o l d i n g t h at a se ntence is reviewe d under a n “abuse -of- discretion standa rd, for rea sonablene ss,” but , in lieu of under taking traditional abuse- of-discr eti o n re view, apply ing the specific ally

define d proce dural a

nd substantive re a so na ble ne ss r e qu ir e me nts ); United States v. Bolds , 511 F.3d 568, 578- 79 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “[a] dis trict court ne cessa ri l y ab uses its sentencingdiscretion if it commit[ s][ a] significa nt proce dural e rror , such as f ailing to c alculate (or imprope rly calc ulating) the Guide l ines rang e, treating the Guidelines as mandatory , failing to c onsider the § 3553(a ) fa ctors, sele cting a sente nce based on c lear ly

err oneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chose n sentenc e—including an explanation for any

deviation from the G uidelines rang e,” r ather than apply ing the traditional abuseof-discr etion standard) (interna l quotation m arks omitted) (f irst alteration added). Thus, a ny argument that only

traditional abuse- of-discr etion principles apply i n re viewing a sente nce f or rea sonablene ss is mi splace d. 5 A. Standard of

Review

“ Pos t- Booke r , we r eview a district court’s sente ncing deter mination under a de fer ential abuse- of-discr etion standard, f or re asonable ness.” United States v. Presle y , 547 F .3 d 625 , 6 29 (6 th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omi tted). Reasonable ness re view has both a proce dural a

nd 1 a substantive compone nt. See Gall v

. Un i t ed S tates , --- U.S. --- , - --, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007); United States v. Thomas , 498 F.3d 336, 339 (6th Cir. 2007). Thus, when r eviewinga district cour t’s sentenc ing de termination, we “ first ensure that the district court commit ted no s ignif icant proc edura l
err or, s u ch as f

ailing to c alculate (or imprope rly calc ulating) the Guidelines ra ng e, tre ating the Guidelines as mandatory , failing to consider the § 3553( a) f actor s, selectinga s en t ence base d on clea rly err oneous fa ct s , o r fa iling to ade quately explain the chosen sentenc e.” Ga ll , 128 S. Ct . at 597. A s en t en ce i s p ro ce d u ra l l y u n re as o n ab l e “ i f t h e s en t en ci n g j u d ge f ai l s t o ‘s et fo rt h en o u gh [of a state me nt o f r e a so ns ] to s a tis fy the a pp e llate c ourt

that he ha s c on sid e re d th e pa rt ie s’ argume nts6

and has a rea soned basis for e x erc ising his own leg al dec ision making a uthority .’” United States v. Lalonde , 5 0 9 F. 3 d

7 5 0 , 7 6 9 -7 0 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( al t er at i o ni no ri gi n al ) ( qu o t i n g Rita v

. United States , 55 1 U .S. 33 8, -- -, 12 7 S. Ct. 24 56 , 2 46 8 ( 20 07 )) ; cf
. R i ta , 12 7 S
. Ct
. at 2468 (“ Un le ss a pa rt y contests the Guidelines se ntence g ener ally under § 3553( a)—that is arg ues that the G u id elines re flec t an unsound judg ment, or, for example, t h at t h ey

do not ge nera lly

treat cer

tain defe ndant char acte ristics in the proper way —or ar g ues for

depar ture, the judge normally

need sa y no more. . . . Where the de fenda

nt or prosec utor prese nts nonfrivolous rea sons for impos ing a diffe rent sente nce, ho we v er , t h e judg e will normally g o further

and explain why

he has r ejec ted those ar g uments.”). Al tho ug h s e nte nc ingc ourt s are no t re qu ir e d to “ g ive the re a so ns fo r r e je c tin g any

and a ll a rgume nts [m ade] by the par ties for a lternative se ntence s,” United States v. Vonne r , 516 F.3d 382, 387 ( 6th Cir. 20 08 ) ( e n b anc ), f

or a se nte nc e to b e pr oc e dura lly re a so na ble , “ [w]he n a

de fe nd ant r a ise s a particula r[, nonfrivolous] argument in seeking a lower sentenc e, the recor d must ref lect both t hat the district judge considere d the def end an t ’s argume nt and that the judg e explained the basis for reje cting it.” Lalonde , 5 09 F .3 d at 77 0 ( int e rn a l qu otatio n ma rk s o mit te d) ; see also United States

v . P e te rs , 5 12 F .3 d 7 87 , 7 89 (6 th C ir . 2 00 8) (h old ingthat a se nte nc e is n ot p ro c e dura lly re a so na ble if, “[w]hen the defe ndant or prosec utor ‘pre sents nonfrivolous rea sons f or imposing a differe nt sentenc e,’ . . . a sentenc ing judge [fails to] a ddress the ‘par ties’ arguments’ and ‘explain w hy he has
re j ec t edt h o s e a rgu m en t s ’” (q u o t i n g Ri ta , 127 S. Ct . at 2468)). The Gove rnment contends that, rathe r t han review Robertson’s argument under the normal
re a so na ble ne ss s tand ard , w e sh ou ld r e vie w R ob ert so n’s se nte nc e on ly fo r p la in e rr or

be c a us e Robertson did not o b

j ec tb el o w t o t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s fa i l u re t o co n s i d er R o b er t s o n ’s d o u

b l e- co u n ting
argume nt. Th is a

rgume nt i s w ith ou t me ri t.7

We have a

rticulated the require ments that must be satisfied at the district-court level in order to subject an a

rg ument on appea l to plain-err or re view: [D] istrict courts, afte r pronounc ing the defe ndant’s sente nce but be fore adjourning the sentenc ing hear ing, [m ust] ask the parties whe ther they have a ny objections to the sentenc e just pronounce d that have not previously been raised. I f t he dis trict court fa ils to p ro vide the pa

rt ie s w iththi s o pp or

tun ity , th e y

wi ll n ot h a ve fo rf

e ite d th e ir objections and thus wi l l n o t be re quired to demonstrate plain er ror on a ppeal. I f a party does not clea

rly articulate any

objection and the g rounds upon which the ob je c tio n is ba se d, wh e n g ive n this fi na l op po rt un ity [to] sp e a k, the n th a t pa

rt y wi ll have forf eited its opportunity to make any objections not previously raised a nd thus wi ll f a c e pla in e rr or

re vie w o n a

pp e a l. Un ite d Stat es v. B os tic , 371 F.3d 865, 872- 73 (6th Cir. 2004) (footnote omitted). See also Vonne r , 516 F.3d at 385-86 (ap p l y i n g Bosti c to p ro c e dura l r e a so na ble ne ss c la ims ). We h a ve re pe a te dly stressed that “ [a] district court ca n satisfy the re quirements of the Bo sti c rule only by clea rly asking for objections to the sentenc e that have not been pr eviously raised.” Un ite d S

tat es v . Clar

k , 469 F.3d 568, 570 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that the Bo sti c require ments were not satisfied when a district court
a sk e d “ Any

thi nge lse , M s. Go od e ? ” ); Thomas , 498 F.3d at 340 (conc luding that the district c ourt
a s k i n g “ D o yo uh a v e an yt h i n g f u rt h e r f o r t h e r e c o r d , M r . C an a dy? ” d i d n o ts a t i s f y Bo sti c ); United States v. Love , 289 F. App’ x 889, 893 (6th Cir. 2008) (unpublished opinion) (noting that “Any thing else? ” wa s the ty

pe of “ spare question that we have found insuff icient under

[ Bo sti c ]”). I n the instant case , afte r the district judg e pronounc ed sente nce, h e as ked, “A re the re a ny other matter s, either side? ” J.A. at 57 (Sent. Hr’ g Tr. at 16) . After a brie f exchang e re g ardingthe rig ht to appeal, the district judg e ag ain aske d, “Ar e ther e any other matter s? ” Id
. T h e di s t ri ct j u d ge
never “cle arly ask[ed] for objections to the sentenc e,” Cla rk, 469 F.3d at 570; ra t h er , the district judge asked a

question that is sim i l ar t o t he ty pes of que stions that we have de termined a re8

insufficient unde r Bo sti c , se e id .; Thomas , 498 F.3d at 340. Thus, the district court did not meet the Bo sti c require ments, and Robertson’s a rg ument is theref

ore not subjec t to plain-err or re view. B. P r oc e dur al R e as ona ble ne ss Robertson asser

ts that the district court did not consider or addre ss h i s argume nt “that the double-c ounting of

[R obertson’s] prior controlled substanc es convic tion[ ]—onc e for purposes of calc ulating his total off

ense le vel under

2K2.1(a )(2) and then a g ain in dete rm i n i n g h is criminal history score —resulted in a[n] advisory g uidelines rang e g reater than ne cessa ry t o ac h i eve the
se nte nc ingob

je c tiv e s o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 35 53 (a ). ” Rob e rt so n B r. a t 9. As an in it ial matte r, it i s important to outli ne exactly what R obertson arg ued before the district court. Rober tson’s sentencing memorandum a sked t h e court for “ a downwa rd depa rture, ba sed on what amounts to dual punishment for the same conviction.” J .A. at 18 (Sent. Mem. at 5). Although Robertson used the word “ depar

ture,” it is clear f

rom the conte x t of the sentenc ing me mo ra n d u m an d Robertson’s counsel’s cl ar i fi ca t ion and ar g ument befor e the district cour t at the sentenc ing he aringthat what Rob e rt so n w a s re a lly re qu e sti ng wa s a dow nw ard va ri anc e ba se d o n th e § 3 55 3( a ) f a c tor s b e c a

us e of the double-c ounting issue. See United States v. Jordan , 544 F.3d 656, 671 n.12 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (explaining the diff

ere nce be tween a

“depa rture” and a “ varia

nce” for pur

poses of sente ncing ). An ar g ument that a district cour t should award a

varia n ce based on the § 3553(a) fac tors beca use the guideline ra

ng e double- counted pr ior offe nses is a nonfr i v o l o u s argument. See, e .g., United States v. Carbal l o -A r g uelles , 446 F. Supp. 2d 742, 745 (E.D. Mic h. 2006) (a war ding “ a one-le vel re duction in [ defe ndant’s] total off en s e l evel to mitigate the double- counting of [de fe nd ant’ s] pr ior

c on vic tio n” ); United States v. He rnandez-Fierros , 453 F.3d 309, 313 ( 6th Cir. 2 0 0 6 ) ( ac kn o wl ed gi n g t h a t a s en t en ci n g co u rt co u l d “r ej ec t [ ] t h e r ec o m m en d edGu i d el i n es ra n geI n a re cent de cision, United States v. Stephe ns , 549 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2008), we noted that 2 a district cour

t is not require d to awar d a depa rture or varia nce on double -counting g rounds. Id . at 468. Howeve r, Robertson is not arg uing that the district court er red by not awar ding a

varia nce, but only that the district c ourt did not consider this a rg ument. There fore , Stephens is n ot a pp lic a ble to the ins tant a

pp e a l. 9 based on de fenda

nt’s arguments” that d o u ble-c ounting of fense s under U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2 makes
a pp lic a tio n o f t

he g uid e lin e ra

ng e un wa rr ante d)
. B e c a

us e Rob e rt so n r a ise d a

no nf ri vo lou s r e qu e st 2 fo r a varian c e , th e dis tr ic t ju dg e wa s r e qu ir e d to “ a dd re ss [Ro be rt so n’ s ‘ ]ar gume nts ’ a nd ‘e xpla in why he has r ejec ted t hose ar g uments.’” Pe te rs , 5 1 2 F. 3 d at 7 8 9 (q u o t i n g Ri ta , 127 S. Ct . at 2468); Lalonde , 509 F.3d at 769-70. Thus, the questi on that we must answe r is whether the district court
a de qu a te ly

a dd re sse d Ro be rt so n’ s argume nt. We c on c lud e that it did no t. Complete review

of t he sentencing transcr ipt reve als that the sole discussion by the district court that involved the doubl e-c ounting arg ument was the short colloquy reg ardingthe W

heele r c a se b et we en t h e d i s t r i c t c o u rt an d R o b er t s o n ’s co u n s el
. T h i s co l l o qu y s u gges t s t h at t h e d i s t ri ct j u d ge may n o t h a v e u n d e r s to o d th e ar g u me n t t

h a t R o b e rts o nw a s ma

k in g . T h e d is tr ic t j u d g e , a s d id the Gover nment in its re sponse to Robe rtson’s sentenc ing memorandum, seems to have misunderstood Robertson to be conte nding that it wa s leg ally improper to double -count his prior convictions. See J .A
. a t 4 5 ( Se n t. H r ’ g T r . a t 4 ) ( “ T H E CO U RT : A ll r ig h t. M r . Sm a ll , Ith in k [th e ] g overnme nt pointed out there is [ a] W h ee l er c ase a rising out of

our state that sa

y s it’s appropriate to consider the se dr ugc on vic tio ns .” ). Rob e rt so n’ s a c tua l argume nt w a s t h a t , a l t h o u gh d o ub le -c ounti ngis l e g a lly pr op e r, in h is p art ic ula

r c a se su c h cou nt ingre su lte d in a g uid e lin e ra

ng e g re a te r t

ha n n e c e ssa ry toContrary to the dissent’s asser

tion, Robertson’s argument was n o t s im p ly th a t “ the Guideline 3 rang e is unne cessa

rily high under the parsimony provision” of § 3553(a) , Dissent at 4, but rathe r wa s a mor e nu anc e d a

rgume nt t hat th e us e of

do ub le -c ounti ng , th ou g h p ro pe r u nd e r t he g uid e lin e s, cause d Robertson’s g uideline ra ng e to be too high. B oth Robertson’s sentenc ing me morandum and his c oun s e l ’ s a

r g u m e nt a t th e se nte nc inghe ari ngsp e c if ic a lly me nti on the do ub le -c ounti ngargume nt. J .A. at 17-18 ( Sent. Mem. at 4-5); J.A. at 45-47 (Sent. Hr’ g Tr. at 4- 6). Mo re ov e r, Rob e rt so n’ s a c tua l argume nt, a s opp os e d to th e argume nt t hat th e dis se nt i ns ist s Robertson made, is a mor e complex argument than a g ener ic invocation of the par simony provision. An argume nt t

hat th e a pp lic a tio n o f a

pa rt icu la r guid e lin e -a

pp ro ve d p ra c tic e in a

sp e c if ic c a se pr od uc e s a se nte nc ingra

ng e that is un ne c e ssa

ri ly hig h r a ise s su

bs tanti a l pa

rt ic ula ri zed iss ue s w e ll bey ond a simple parsimony argument that a sente ncing rang e is excessive.

10 achie ve the se ntencingobjectives of § 3553(a) , and thus a downwar d varia nce under § 3553(a) was
war rante d. 3 Even thoug h Robertson’s counsel clar ified this issue twice during the sentenc ing he aring , the district court neve r re sponded to this arg ument. Rather, the district judg e simply descr ibed Rob e rt so n’ s c ri min a l his tor y and pr on ounc e d his se nte nc e . Ha d Rob e rt so n argue d o nl y that , g ener ally speaking , his criminal history did not support the guideline ra ng e ca lculated whe n applying the § 3553(a ) fa ctors, the district cour t’s mere rec itation of Robertson’s cr iminal hist ory may have been suf ficient. Se e Ri ta , 127 S. Ct . at 2469 (“ Where a matter is . . . conc eptually simple . . . and the
rec ord make s clea

r th at t h e s entenc ing judg e conside red the evidenc e and a rg uments, we do not believe the law require s the judge to w rite more extensively .”). Howeve r, this is not a case “ [w] here [ t h e] m at t er i s . . . co n ce p tu al l y s i mp l e, ” n o r d o es “t h e re co rd m ak e[ ] cl ea r t h at t h e s en t en ci n g j u d ge considere d [R obertson’s] arguments,” id .; Robertson’s argument wa s m u ch more specific and
c omp l e x t h an a g e n e r a l § 3 5 5 3 ( a ) v ar i an c e ar g um e n t an d t h u s t h e d i s t r i c t c o u rt w a s r e qu ir e d to “addr ess [Robertson’s ‘]arg ument[] ’ and ‘ explain why he has reje cted th[ e] arg ument[] .’” Pe te rs , 5 1 2 F. 3 d at 7 8 9 (q u o t i n g Ri ta , 1 27 S. Ct . at 24 68 ); Lalonde , 5 09 F .3 d at 76 9- 70 ; se e als o R ita , 127 S. Ct . at 2468 (imply ing that, when a de fe n dant “a rg ues that the Guide lines ref lect an unsound11

judg me n t, o r , f

o r e xa mp le , th a t th e y d o n o t g e n e r a ll y tr e a t c e rta in d e f e n d an t c h ar a c te r is ti c s in the proper way

—or argues for depar

ture,” a district judg e should spe ak more elabor ately than in a ty

pical
case ). In this case, the district c ourt provided no suc h revie w and e x planation. The Gover

nment makes much of the fac t that the district c ourt, when detailing Robertson’s criminal history , ref

err ed to the particular c onviction that Robertson contends wa s double-counte d. Howeve r, the mer e m enti on of the c rime does not mea n that the district judge understood and considere d the spec ific double-c ounting arg ument, espec ially in light of the f act that the c onviction in question was mentioned in tandem with many other prior

convictions that Robertson did not arg ue
wer e double- counted. This conte x t streng thens o u r b el i ef that the district judge simply looked at Robertson’s cr iminal hist ory in ge nera l, and did not c o n s id e r h o w the double-c ounted conviction wa s applied in ca lculating the g uideline ra ng e. Moreove r, af

ter pronounc ing the sentenc e, the district judg e specific ally addre ssed the other two g rounds R o b er t s o n raised in support of Robertson’s re quest for a varia nce, stating that “ [t ]he Court has tried to re cog nize y our re cent e ffor ts at get t i n g a v ocation that will g ive y ou a job, a productive job. The Court has tried to re cog nize your sensitivity to the needs of y our daug hter.” J .A. at 57 (Sent. Hr’ g Tr. at 16) . The district cour t’s specific mention of these two arg uments for a varia nce while failing to disc uss Robe rtson’s primary argument for a varia nce le nds further

support to our conc lusion that the district judg e did not understand Robertson to be ar g uing f or a va rianc e based on the doubl e-c ounting gr ound. There would be no other logic al re ason to specif

y only two of the thre e g rounds Robertson ra ised in support of a va rianc e. Th e Go ve rnmen t f

ur the r c on te nd s th a t Ro be rt so n’ s se nte nc e wa s n ot p ro c e dura lly
unrea sonable be cause , in this case, “[t]he District Court’s discussion of t he Section 3553(a ) fa ctors12

was more detailed a

nd responsive tha

n in case s where this Court has found [t hat] the sentenc e wa s proce durally

unrea sonable due to the court’s failure to addre ss a def endant’ s sentencingarguments.” Gov’t B r. at 27. This asse rtion i s i n ac cu ra t e. In Thomas , “[t] he district cour t noted that it ‘ha[d]
rec eived [Thomas’s se ntencing memorandum], r ead it a nd underst[oo] d its presentations.” Thomas , 49 8 F .3 d at 33 9 ( se c on d a nd thi rd a lte ratio ns in o ri g ina l) . T he dis tr ic t jud g e the n a dd re sse d s ome of Thomas’s a

rg uments, calc ulated the a pplicable guideline ra

ng e, and e x plained why

he wa s sentenc ing T homas in the middle of t hat ra ng e. Id . The pa

nel vac ated Thoma s’s sentenc e, stating that T h o m as in his sentencing memorandum ra ised a number of ar g uments reg arding application of t h e § 3553(a) fac tors, but those arguments went unmentioned a nd unaddre ssed, save the g ener al statement by the district c ourt that it had rec eived, r ead, and un de rs too d th e se nte nc ingme mor and um. I n su ch c ir c ums tanc e s, we mus t co n cl u d e t h at “t h e ‘c o n t ex t an d t h e r ec o rd ’ d o n o t‘m ak e c l ea r’ t h e c o u rt 's re as o n i n g. Id
. at 3 4 1 (q u o t i n g United States v. Liou , 4 9 1 F. 3 d 3 3 4 , 3 3 9 n . 4 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Ri ta , 127 S. Ct . at 2469)). Simi larly in Pe te rs , when f

ace d with a “‘ Statement of Reasons’ that set out a number of mitigating fac tors” re g ardingwhy Peters, upon res entenc ing, should re ceive a “time- serve d”
se nte nc e , the dis tr ic t c ourt ma de on ly “ a c ur so ry state me nt a c kn ow le dg ing Pe te rs ’[s ] argum ents , [and] did not address the de fenda nt’s ‘time-ser

ved’ a rg ument or the mitigating f actor s” noted. Pe te rs , 512 F.3d at 788. The pane l vacated the sente nce, str es s i n g that the district judge did not “addr ess the ‘pa

rties’ a rg uments’ and ‘ explain why he has r ejec ted those ar g uments’” a nd thus the sentenc e wa s proce durally unrea sonable. Id . at 789. As in Thomas and Pe te rs , the di strict judge in the i nstant case was face d with a sentenc ing
me mor and

um t hat r a ise d a

no n- fr ivo lou s argume nt t

hat th e dis tr ic t judg e did

no t a dd re ss s pe c if

ic a lly13

at the sente ncing hear ing. N owher e in the sente ncing hear ing tr anscr ipt is it evident that the dist rict jud g e un de rs too d, le t a lon e c on sid e re d, Rob e rt so n’ s d ou ble -c ounti ngargume nt, wh ic h d e fe ns e
c ouns e l re ne we d at th e he ari ng . T hu s, we ho ld t hat Ro be rt so n’ s se nte nc e is p ro c e dura lly
unrea sonable. III . C ON CL USI ON Be cause the district c ourt err ed when it f ailed to a ddress Robertso n ’s d o uble-c ounting argument, we VA CA TE Robertson’s sentenc e and REMAND fo r r es en t en ci n g.14

JAMES S. GWIN, Distr ict Judge. B e c a us e De fe nd ant R ob e rt so n’ s d ou ble -c ounti ngargume nt w a s n o d if fe re nt f ro m hi s § 35 53 (a ) a rgume nt t

hat th e Gu ide lin e ra

ng e was to o hi gh, a

nd be c a us e the dis tr ic t c ourt

bo th
c on sid e re d a

nd su ff ic ie ntl y e xpla ine d his re a so ns fo r r e je c tin g that argume nt, Ire sp e c tf ull y dis se nt. Wit h his sentencing memorandum, Robertson expli citly asked the district court, “pur suant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) and U.S.S.G. §§ 5K2.0, 5H1. 2 an d 5 H1.6, to depart downward from the
rec ommended advisory

g uideline ra

ng e.” J.A. at 14 (empha sis added)
. I n addition to his request for a downwa

rd depa rture, Robe rtson asked the district court for a var iance o f “63 months, as such a sentenc e is sufficie nt, but no gr eate r than ne cessary , to achieve the g oals of sente ncing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id
. As g rounds for a

depar ture, Rober

tson’s double-counting ar g ument fails. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) ( “[T] he cour

t shall impose a sentenc e of the ki nd, and withi n the rang e . . . unless the cour t fin d s t h at t h er e exists an ag g ravating or mitigating circ umstance of a kind, or to a de g ree , not adequately

ta k e n in to c o n s id e r a

tion by the SentencingCommi ssion in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentenc e diffe rent fr om t hat desc ribed.” ); Appl. Note 10 to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 (“Prior f elony conviction(s) r esulting i n an i n cr ea s ed base offe nse leve l . . . are also counted f or purposes of de termining criminal hi s tory points pursuant to Chapter F our, Part A ( Criminal Hi sto ry ). ” ); U. S.S. G. § 5K 2. 0( a )( 2) (B ) (“ A de pa rt ur e may be wa rr ante d in the e xce pti on a l c a se in which there is present a circumstancethat the Commission has not identified in the g uidelines but that ne ve rt

he le ss i s r e le va

nt t o d e te rm ini ngthe a

pp ro pr ia te s ente nc e .” ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) ; United States v. W

heele r , 330 F.3d 407, 413- 14 (6th Cir. 2003)
. The district cour t was aw are of this Court’s15

decision in United States v. W heele r , 330 F.3d 4 0 7 (6th Cir. 2003), and c alculate d the Guideline rang e ac cording ly
. See J .A. at 45-46. Th e ma jor ity , h ow e ve r, c on c lud e s th a t “ [a]lt ho ug h Ro be rt so n us e d the wo rd ‘d e pa rt ur e ,’ it is clear from the c ontext . . . that what Robertson wa s rea lly re q u est ing w as a dow nwar d varia nce based on the § 3553 fac tors beca use of the double -counting issue.” Majority Opinion at 8-9. I

ag ree . I n making t h e double-counting argument, the Def endant made no argument differ ent from a n
ar gu m en tu n d er

§ 3 5 5 3 (a ): “B ec au s e o f t h i s [ d o u b l e- co u n t i n g] an o maly , the advisory gu i d el i n e r an ge in the p re s en t ca s e results in a somewhat gr eate r than ne cessa ry term of punishment to satisfy the purposes of se ntencing .” J .A. at 18. Robertson was simply arguing that the Guideline ra ng e wa s g reater than ne cessa

ry under § 3553' s parsimony provision. To fi ndtha t th is c a se sh ou ld b e r e m an d e d f o r re -s e nte nc ing , th e ma jor ity re a so ns : “Robertson' s argument wa s m u ch more spec ific and c omplex than a g ener al § 3553(a ) var iance
argume nt a

nd thu s th e dis tr ic t c ourt wa s r e qu ir e d to a dd re ss [Ro be rt so n' s] argume nt[] a nd e xpla in wh y h e h as re j ec t edt h [ e] ar gu m en t [ ]
. " M aj o ri t y o p i n i o nat 1 0 -1 1 (c i t i n g Un ite d S tat es v . P e te rs 512 F.3d 787, 788- 89 (6th Cir. 2008)) (inter nal quotations omitt ed). Howeve r, Robertso n ’s s en t encing memor andum made no spe cific or complex argument
re g ard ingdo ub le -c ounti ng . I n the me mor and um, Rob e rt so n’ s c omp le te po sit ion on the iss ue wa s: Th e PSR pla c e s Mr
. Rob e rt so n in a Cr imi na l Hi sto ry Ca te g or y of V. I nc lud e d in

thi s calc ulation ar e t h ree criminal history points for a c onviction in 2000 for attempted sale of less than .5 g rams of coca ine. (PSR ¶ 34). Be cause of this same convic tion, Mr. Robertson re ceive d an off ense lev el incre ase f

rom 20 to 24. (PSR¶ 11). Mr. Rob e rt so n r e sp e c tf

ull y re qu e sts a

do wnwa rd de pa rt ur e , b a se d o n w hat amou nts to du a l pu nis hme nt f

or the same c on vict ion . T y pic a lly , th e g uid e lin e pr ov isi on s in Chapter Two, establish offe nse levels based on a def endant’ s releva

nt conduct, rather than a de fenda

nt’s prior re cord. H o we v er, firea rms offe nses under

§ 2K2.1(a )(2) , primarily g iv e g r e a te r

w e ig h t t o a

d e f e n d an t’ s p r io r

c o n v ic ti o n s in

e s ta b li s h in g the16

offe nse leve l. The more e g reg ious ex ceptions being for immigration offe nses under U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.1. Be cause of this anomaly , the advisory g uideline ra

ng e in the pr e se nt c a se res ult s in

a so me wh a t g re ate r t

ha n n e c e ssa ry te rm of punis hme nt t o s at i s fy t h e p u rp o s es o f s en t en ci n g. J.A. a t 18 . T he ma

jor ity of thi s p a ssa g e is d e sc ri pti ve ; on ly the fi na l se nte nc e make s an a rgume nt, contendingg ener ally

that the double-c ounting r esults in a g reater than ne cessa ry sentenc e. At the s entenc ing hear ing, Robertson completely g ave up the double-c ounting issue, save a
cursor y reque st that the issue be consider ed u n d er the § 3553(a) fac tors. When the district court asked Rober

tson’s attorney

whether W

h e eler preven te d th e do ub le -c ounti ngargume nt, de fe ns e counsel a cknowledg ed ther e w e r e n o gr ounds to depart f rom the Guideline c alculation. He explained that th e do ub le -c ounti ngargume nt s ho uld on ly be c on sid e re d und e r t

he § 3 55 3( a ) f

a c tor s: That' s the argument I ' m making , Your Honor. I ' m just m aking it under the 3553(a ) fa c tor
. . . So Iwa s ju st m a kin g tha t argume nt f

or fa c tor s und e r 3 55 3( a ), no t a s a sp e c if ic ob je c tio n to the g uid e lin e c a lc ulatio ns . J .A. at 45. These br ief, unsupporte d positions exhaust all ref ere nces that Robertson made to the doublecounting issue in h i s s en t encingmemorandum a nd at the sente ncing hear ing. G iven Robertson’s
cursor y treatment of the double-c ounting issue, I do not believe the r ecor d supports the majority ’s finding that Robertson’s arg ument was specific. As the refer ence s descr ibed above show, Robertson sim ply ma de an a

rgume nt t hat he su ff

ered do ub le -c ounti ngand su c h d ou ble -c ounti ngc a

us e d h is Guideline ra

ng e to be too hig h under § 3553( a). Moreove r, the re cord now here supports the majority ’s sug g estion that Robertson’s doublecounting argument was co m p l ex . As discussed above , Robertson simply argued that whatever double-c ounting oc curr ed ca used his Guideline ra

ng e to be unne cessa

rily high unde r § 3553(a )’s17

pa rs imo ny pr ov isi on . Ro be rt so n’ s argumen t was no t un c omm on or c omp le x. Se nte nc ingc ourt s
re c e ive argume nts tha

t th e Gu ide lin e ra

ng e is unn e c e ssa

ri ly hig h und e r t

he pa rs imo ny pr ov isi on

in
near ly ever y case . I n this c ase, the district c ourt hear d and conside red the Def endant’ s argument that 63 months
was a sufficie nt but not g reater than nece ssary sentenc e. I n reje cting that sug g estion, and dec iding on the Guideline sentenc e of 84 months, the district court spec ifically considere d the Def

endant’ s criminal hi story , including his past offe nse conduct and also the circumstanc es of the of fense s and the l enient sentences the Def endant had previously

rec eived. See J .A. at 55-56. A ll of these fa ctors led the district c ourt to be lieve a 63-month sentenc e was not suf ficient and an 8 4 -m o n t h sentenc e was not g reater than ne cessa ry . I n arr iving at this conclusion, the district court “r ecog nize[ d] t hat [the Defe ndant] has made
so me e ff or ts t o im pr ov e him se lf

,” inc lud ingthr ou g h h is v oc a tio na l e ff or ts a nd his re la tio ns hip wi th his da ug hte r. J.A. a t 56 -5 7. Th e ma jor ity re a so ns that be c a

us e the di st ri ct court

a dd re sse d th e se arguments that the Def

endant ha d raised, b u t failed to ex plicitly ref er to the double -counting argument, the di strict court must not have unde rstood the Def endant’ s argument for a

varia nce ba sed on the double-c ounting. J.A. at 12. Acc ording to the majority , “[t] here would be no other logic al
rea son to specify

only two of the thre e g rounds Robertson ra ised in support of a va rianc e.” Id
. Howeve r, the district court’s ref ere nce to the Def

endant’ s arguments for a varia nce ba sed on his vo c a tio na l e ff

or ts a nd his re la tio ns hip withhis da ug hte r w e re lik e ly

the re su lt o f t

he e mph a sis place d on those argum en t s b y t h e De fenda nt himself. I n addition to mentioning them in the
s en t en ci n g m em o ra n d

u m , R o b er t s o n ’s at t o rn ey el ab o ra t ed o n b o t h t h es e ar gu m en t s at t h e h ea ri n g. See at 48-49. Rober

tson, himself, also raised b o t h o f t h es e issues whe n, seekingleniency , he18

addre ssed the district cour t at his sentencing
. See J .A. at 50-51. A s important, Robe rtson’s doublecounting argument simply argu ed that the Guide line rang e wa s unnece ssarily high. T he district court’s discussion of Rober tson’s relationship with his daug hter and his eff orts to learn a

trade wer e direc tly related to Robertson’s argument that double-c ounting c aused his Guideline r ang e to be too high. Iconclude t h at t h e district court consider ed the double- counting argument, which wa s no d i ff er en tfr o m , n o r m o re co mp l ex t h an , an ar gu m en t t h at a Gu i d el i n e s en t en ce wo u l d b e t o o l o n g. Th e re fo re , I

be lie ve the se nte nc ingwa s p ro c e dura lly re a so na ble and the dis tr ic t c ourt did no t a bu se its discretion in rej e c ti n g

th e D e f e n d a nt’ s contention that the Guideline se ntence imposed was g reater t h ann e c e s s ar

y.