2 Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-352, 120 St at. 2011 (2006) (“WARA”) mandates that accommodation be governed exclusively by the Five Party Agreement and the Airport Use and Lease Agreements (the “Lease”) between the C ity of Dallas (the “Cit y”) and the signatory airlines. The specific provisions of WARA displace the provisi ons of the Sponsor Assurances which would otherwise apply to accommodation and which would otherwise confer jurisdiction for this proceeding. Judge Kinkeade’s decision unders cores that the arguments raised by Delta in its Invited Brief of Delta Air Lines, Inc. (filed Dec. 23, 2015) lack merit. To assure that the FAA has a complete record before it, the City submits this Reply to explain the ef fect of Judge Kinkeade’s ruling and to respond to Delta’s brief. 1 The City fully understands that Judge Kinke ade’s order is only preliminary and that Southwest or other parties may contest the substa nce of the ruling. The City further recognizes that the Court has not yet addressed several key contract issues, such as whether any accommodation is permanent or subject to term ination; how to determine the appropriate “snapshot date” (or other approach for when to assess capacity for accommodation); and how to define “unduly interferes.” Until those and ot her outstanding issues are resolved, the legal uncertainty that drove the City to seek declarat ory relief continues to prevent the City from adopting a final accommodation policy.

1 By Order dated November 10, 2015, the FAA a llowed the six air carr iers operating, or recently operating, at Love Field to file briefs in response to the City of Dallas’s Response to the Notice of Investigation. On N ovember 13, 2015, the City filed a Motion to File a Reply to the Non-Parties’ Briefs requesting leave to file a reply to any briefs that were filed by the air carriers. The FAA has not ruled on that motion. On Dece mber 23, 2015, Delta and Southwest filed briefs in response to the “Response of th e City of Dallas to the Notice of Investigation and Motion to Dismiss the Notice of Investigat ion” (filed Nov. 23, 2015). No other entities filed briefs. Pursuant to its November 13, 2015 Motion, the City re spectfully submits this Reply. This Reply focuses on the arguments made by Delta since th e Southwest arguments do not raise any issues to which the City believes a response is needed.3 ARGUMENT I. THIS DISPUTE IS NOT RIPE FOR FAA ADJUDICATION Judge Kinkeade’s decision demonstrates that the accommodation controversy is not ripe for FAA review. Delta has been continuously accommodated at Love Field since 2009 and continues be accommodated at its hi storic level of five daily flight s. Delta will continue to be accommodated for at least the duration of the litigation and Judge Kinkeade will ultimately decide the details of the City’s accommodation oblig ations. If Delta ultimately prevails in the case, Delta will continue to be accommodated. Delta has not been denied accommodation and has a judicially enforceable right to continue oper ations at Love Field at least until resolution of the litigation unless Judge Kinkeade directs ot herwise. The City is fully bound by Judge Kinkeade’s decision, as are all othe r parties to the litigation. A ccordingly, any question that the City has improperly failed to accommodate Delta is premature until or unless Delta is no longer accommodated. 2 By issuing a preliminary injunction, the Court conclude d that that scenario is unlikely. Even if Southwest ultimately prevails , or Delta loses its a ccommodation, that result will be pursuant to a federal court judgment from which Delta, the FAA, or any aggrieved party could appeal. There is no warrant for pursuing th is issue in a Part 16 investigation when a federal court is addressing that precise i ssue in a case involving the same parties.

2 Delta attempts to articulate a theory of ri peness based on the notio n that Delta has not been accommodated at allbecause Delta has not been perm anently accommodated. Delta Br. at 3-7 & 24-25. Although Delta accuses the City of play ing a word game, it is Delta that is playing the games. Delta’s argument rests on its interp retation of the word “accommodation” to really mean “permanent accommodation pursuant to a deci sion by the City.” Semantics aside, it is obvious that Delta is being accommodated because it is currently operating at Love Field at the same level it has always operated. Moreover, Delta’s future accommodation will be determined by the Court and Delta’s proffered interpretation of “accommodation” in the District Court and is beyond the FAA’s jurisdiction to reso lve in a Part 16 proceeding.4 II. THE FAA LACKS JURISDICTION OVER THE CONTRACT ISSUES THAT CONTROL THE ACCOMMODATION DECISION In the Opinion, Judge Kinkeade ordered Sout hwest to continue to accommodate Delta’s five daily flights at Love Field pending final resolution of the litigation. Th e key to the Court’s decision was the finding that Delta had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its interpretation of Section 4.06(F) of the Lease that Southwest could ac commodate Delta’s five daily flights without “unduly inte rfere[ing] with” Southwest’s sc hedule. Opinion at 24-30. Accordingly, Delta will remain accommodated at Love Field, at least until Judge Kinkeade issues a final decision in the case, just as it has been since 2009. The Court’s decision underscores that the f undamental issues in the controversy are controlled by the terms of the Lease and make s clear that the Gate Accommodation Clause defines the accommodation duties at Love Field and is sufficient to resolve the current accommodation controversy. That result is precisely what Congress c ontemplated when it enacted WARA, which incorporated the Gate Accommodation Clause into federal law. WARA defines the accommodation obligation by explicit reference to the Lease: “To accommodate new entrant air carriers, the city of Dallas shall honor the scar ce resource provision of the existing Love Field leases.” WARA § 5(a). Congress explicitly prohibited the FAA from taking enforcement action that is inconsistent with the Five Party Agreement or that challenges the le gality of any provision of that Agreement. WARA § 5(d)(1)(A). Congre ss directed that actions taken by the City to reasonably comply with the terms of the Gate Accommodation Clause (whi ch is incorporated into the Five Party Agreement as well), be deem ed to comply with all requirements of Title 49, which includes the Sponsor Assurances. WARA § 5(d)(2). Even though Section 5(e)(1)(E) of WARA preserves limited FAA enforcement aut hority regarding grant assurances, Section5 5(e)(2)(B)(ii) expressly prohibits the FAA from enforcing grant as surances by requiring the City “to modify or eliminate preferential gate leases with air carriers in order to allocate gate capacity to new entrants . . . . .” except in lim ited circumstances not present here. The effect of those provisions is three-fold and demonstrates that Congress explicitly deprived the FAA of jurisdiction by making accomm odation an issue of contract compliance, not grant compliance. First, the City’s accommodation obligations are limited to those set forth in the Gate Accommodation Clause. Second, Congress determined that the City’s implementation of the Lease complies with the Sponsor Assurances as a matter of law. Th ird, even if the Lease could in some manner be interpre ted to be inconsistent with gr ant obligations, Congress removed the FAA’s authority to modify the Lease. By barring the FAA from changing the Lease, Congress reversed the ordinary rule in which a lease is subordinate to the Sponsor Assu rances and made clear that compliance with the
Lease is all that is necessary to address accommoda tion. There is no need for the FAA to review the Lease for compliance, as Delt a argues (Delta Br. 20-21), because the Lease itself contains the City’s accommodation obligations. Nor does the FAA have the power under Compliance Handbook ¶ 9.8(a) to order accommodation regardless of the terms of the Lease, as Delta argues (Delta Br. at 13) because WARA expressly for ecloses that approach. The only issue in any accommodation controversy is whether the parties to the Lease have complied with their contractual obligations; there are no additional sponsor obligations that appl y. That is exactly how Judge Kinkeade analyzed the issue in find ing that Delta should be accommodated for the duration of the litigati on. Opinion at 20-30. To find that the FAA has jurisdiction here, as Delta argues, would notonly run contrary to the plain terms of WARA, but would violate th e basic rule of statut ory construction that a6 specific statute controls over a general statute. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp. , 353 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1957) (“Specific terms prevai l over the general in the same or another statute which otherwise might be controlling.”). The Supreme Cour t has since reaffirmed the use of this canon describing it as “a warning agai nst applying a general provision when doing so would undermine limitations created by a more specific provision.” Varity Corp. v. Howe , 516 U.S. 489, 511 (1996). “That is particularly true where . . . ‘Congress has enacted a comprehensive scheme and has deliberately target ed specific problems with specific solutions.’” RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank , 132 S.Ct. 2065, 2071 (2012) (quoting Varity Corp. , 516 U.S. at 519 (Thomas, J., dissenting)). Here, WARA provides specific law with respec t to how to apply the Sponsor Assurances obligations in light of the specific solution Congress enacted to address access and capacity issues at Love Field. WARA § 5. The specific provisions of WARA control over the general provisions of Section 47107 as a matter of law. 3
III. THE CITY’S CONSENT TO SOUTHW EST’S SUBLEASE OF THE UNITED GATES DID NOT VIOLATE ASSURANCE 23 Delta argues that the City’s consent to the Sublease of United Airlines, Inc.’s (“United”) two gates to Southwest created an exclusive right by effectively excluding Delta from using those gates. Delta Br. at 29. That argument is incorrect because the Subl ease is fully subject to the Gate Accommodation Clause, and entering into th e Sublease did not change the City’s ability to accommodate Delta or any other requesting carrier. City Response at 93-98. The City’s consent to the Sublease was explicit ly subject to conditions to allo w the City to enforce the Gate Accommodation Clause if so required by federal law. Id. at 41-42 & Ex. 9.

3 Delta’s argument that the Sponsor Assuran ces continue to apply because Lease § 14.09 incorporates the Sponsor Assuran ces is entirely circular. DeltaBr. at 22-23. The Lease cannot apply law that Congress declared not to apply and Delta cannot invoke the Lease to moot the Gate Accommodation Clause that Congress made enforceable as a matter of federal law.7 Judge Kinkeade’s decision proves the po int. Although the Court acknowledged Southwest’s Sublease of United’s two gates, Judge Kinkeade applied the Gate Accommodation Clause and found, at least preliminarily, that Southwest must accommodate Delta. Opinion at 27-28. Clearly, the Sublease did not bar accommodati on. That should be the end of the issue.
IV. ISSUES RELATING TO THE CO MPETITION PLAN ARE BEYOND THE FAA’S PART 16 JURISDICTION One issue on the merits raised in Delta’s Brief requires a separate response. Delta argues that Sponsor Assurance 1 allows the FAA to cons ider whether the City violated its Competition Plan obligations under 49 U.S.C. § 40117(k). De lta Br. at 7-10 & 27-28. Delta appears to recognize that 49 U.S.C. § 40117 is not one of the laws over which the FAA has jurisdiction under 14 C.F.R. § 16.1(a). Delta attempts to su rmount that obstacle by arguing that Sponsor Assurance 1, which requires airport sponsors to comply with certain fe deral laws, creates the jurisdictional hook for the FAA to consider issues under 49 U. S.C. § 40117(k) in a Part 16 proceeding. Id. Delta is wrong. First, Assurance 1 incorporates only other federal laws that“relate to the application, acceptance and use of federal funds for this project. ” Section 40117(k) is not such a law, since it applies to the PFC program which does not invol ve the acceptance or use of federal funds. Accordingly, Assurance 1 does not incorporate Section 40117(k). See Boca Airport, Inc. v. Boca Raton Airport Authority , FAA Docket No. 16-04-02, Final Decision and Order at 11-12 (Nov. 29, 2004) (noting limited scope of Assurance 1 a nd finding no jurisdiction over certain criminal statutes not listed in Section 16.1(a)). Second, 14 C.F.R. § 16.1(b) makes clear th at Assurance 1 does not give the FAA jurisdiction over alleged violations of laws not cited in 14 C.F.R. § 16.1(a) when those laws have a separate enforcement process by requiring compla inants to follow those separate procedures.8 49 U.S.C. § 40117(1)(k) is part of the PFC program which has a separate enforcement procedure. 49 U.S.C. § 40117(1)(h) and 14 C.F.R. §§ 158.81-.85. Delta’s concerns about compliance with the City’s Competition Plan are beyond the FAA’s jurisdiction in this proceeding. Finally, Delta does not raise an issue that merits investigati on. Delta’s theory rests on the notion that Southwest’s Asset Transfer Agreem ent with United regarding compensation for the Sublease violates the Competition Plan because the Competition Plan notes that the City’s policy is to limit payments under a sublease. 4 Delta Br. at 7-9. But, as Delta admits, the Asset Transfer Agreement is separate from the Sublease and the City did not approve, or even know about, the Asset Transfer Agreement. Delta Br. at 28; City Response at 96. The City could not have violated the Competition Plan because it did nothing improper. In any event, neither the Sublease, nor the fact that Southwest paid for it, has in fact impaired Delta’s ability to secure accommodation now or in the future. Competition has not been impaired and Delta has simply failed to articulate a viable issue under the Competition Plan. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons set forth in the Response of the City of Dallas to the Notice of Investigation and Motion to Dismiss the Notice of Investigation, the City respectfully requests that the FAA dismiss the No tice of Investigation or, in the alternative, declare that the City is in full compliance withits obligations under Sponsor Assurances 22, 23, 39, and 49 U.S.C. § 40103(e).

4 Delta’s argument smacks of sour grapes. It competed with Southwest for the sublease of United’s gates and was outbid. City Response at 90. Delta di d not think that paying for the Sublease was impermissible when it tried to pay for the gates and now wants the FAA to give it the spoils of a competitive process that it lost.

# EXH I BIT 11 

### IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION CITY OF DALLAS, § § Plaintiff, § § v. § Civil Action No. 3:15-CV-2069-K § DELTA AIRLINES, INC., SOUTHWEST § AIRLINES CO., VIRGIN AMERICA § INC., AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., § UNITED AIRLINES, INC., SEAPORT § AIRLINES, INC., UNITED STATES § DEPARTMENT OF § TRANSPORTATION, and THE § FEDERAL AVIATION § ADMINISTRATION, § § Defendants. § 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER The Court is asked by Plaintiff City of Dallas, Defendant Southwest Airlines Co., and Defendant Delta Air Lines, Inc. to grant a preliminary injunction, each party requesting different relief. The followi ng motions are before the Court: (1)
Defendant Southwest Airlines Co.’s Verif ied Application for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, and Perman ent Injunction Against Delta Air Lines, Inc. (Doc. 10); (2) Plaintiff City of Dalla s’ Verified Cross-Motion for [Temporary Restraining Order] (Doc. No. 20); and (3 ) Defendant Delta Air Lines, Inc.’s Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 1 of 42 PageID 75362 Against Southwest Airlines Co. (Doc. No . 22). The Court held an evidentiary hearing (“injunction hearing” ) on these pending motions for injunctive relief on September 28-30, 2015. The Court has ca refully considered the motions, the responses, the replies, support ing appendices, pleadings, applicable law, and evidence offered at the injunction hear ing. Because the equitable fa ctors related to injunctive relief weigh heavily in favor of Delt a and not Southwest, the Court hereby GRANTS Delta’s motion for preliminary injunction and DENIES the motion for injunctive relief filed by Southwest. The City reques ts any one of several alternative forms of injunctive relief including th e relief requested by Delta. Because the equitable factors also weigh in favor of the City, the Court GRANTS the City’s motion.
I. Factual and Procedural Background History of Love Field an d The Wright Amendment Love Field Airport (“Love Field”) was or iginally constructed as a United States Army airbase during World War I. Plaint iff City of Dallas (“City”) has owned and operated Love Field since 1928. In the 1960s, the federal gove rnment ordered the cities of Dallas and Ft. Worth to designat e one airport from which federally regulated
air carriers could serve both ci ties. The cities were unable to agree on the designation of either Love Field or the airport in Ft. Wort h as the airport to serve both cities. But the cities did agree to construct a new airp ort, Dallas-Ft. Worth International Airport (“DFW Airport”), which ulti mately opened in 1974. Ever y federally certified airline then operating at Love Field and the Ft. Worth airport agreed to relocate their Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 2 of 42 PageID 75373 operations to DFW Airport. At that time, Defendant Southwest Airlines Company (“Southwest”) flew only within the State of Texas, so it was not a federally certified air carrier. Although the other airlines left Love F ield, Southwest continued its Texasonly flight operations from Love Field.
With the enactment of the Airline De regulation Act of 1978, Southwest announced plans to expand its Love Field fl ight operations to airports outside of Texas. In response to that announce ment and in an effort to protect the development of DFW Airport, Congress passed the Wright Amendment in 1979; named for Jim Wright, a congressman from Ft. Worth who was later Speaker of the House. The Wright Amendment restricted interstate flights from Love Field to Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma and New Mexico, the four states surrounding Texas. In several later amendments to the Wright Amendment, direct service from Love Field to Alabama, Kansas, Mississippi and Mi ssouri was allowed. During this time of restricted flight operations, other air carr iers moved in and out of Love Field, but
Southwest remained. Reforming and Repealing the Wright Amendment At the suggestion of Congress in 2006, Dallas and Ft. Worth began working on a recommendation for a long-term solution to the Wright Amendment’s flight
restrictions at Love Field. The result wa s an agreement entered into between the City of Dallas, the City of Ft. Worth, DFW Airport Board, Southwest, and Defendant Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 3 of 42 PageID 75384 American Airlines (“American”) on Ju ly 11, 2006 (“Five Party Agreement”). Important terms of the Five Part y Agreement includ e the following:
1. A reduction in the total number of gates at Love Field from 32 to 20.
2. A prohibition of the subdivision of a ga te in any form, in cluding the use of hardstands which permit an airl ine to “ground load/unload” their passengers. 3. The allocation of 16 “preferential use” gates to Southwest, two “preferential use” gates to American, and two “pre ferential use” gates to ExpressJet Airlines, Inc..
4. A limitation on flight operations to the hours of 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m.

5. A prohibition of international flights originating from Love Field. In addition to these terms, the Five Party Agreement refe rs to the possibility of a new entrant airline seeking space to oper ate at Love Field under the new gate
limitations:
To the extent a new entrant carr ier seeks to ente r Love Field, the City of Dallas will seek voluntary accommodation from its existing carriers to accommodate th e new entrant service. If the existing carriers are not able or are not willing to accommodate the new entrant service, then the City of Dallas agrees to require the sharing of preferential lease gates, pursuant to Dallas’ existing lease agreements. The Five Party Agreement does not define th e term “preferential use” even though it is used in that agreem ent. At the time of the Five Pa rty Agreement, three airlines had Lease Agreements with the City to use Love Field gates and space. (These airlines with Lease Agreements are referred to herein as “Signatory Airlines”.) Unlike the Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 4 of 42 PageID 75395 Five Party Agreement, the Lease Agreement do es define the term “preferential use” as meaning the Signatory Airline has primary, but not sole, use of the le ased space. After the Five Party Agreement was fo rmalized, the parties presented their agreement to Congress as the collaborative local effort for reforming and/or repealing the Wright Amendment. Seve ral, though not all, prov isions of the Five Party Agreement were ultimately incorporated into the Wright Amendment Reform Act (“WARA”), which officially repealed the Wr ight Amendment when it was adopted on October 13, 2006; but maintained the long-d istance flight restrictions from Love Field for eight more years until October 2014 . Just as in the Five Party Agreement, WARA addressed new entrant airlines needing space to operate at the now gate restricted Love Field, specifically provid ing that, “[t]o accommodate new entrant air carriers, the city of Dallas shall honor the scarce resource provision of the existing Love Field leases.” (Emphasis added.) The substa ntive provisions regulating flights in and out of Love Field were incorporated into WARA. The provisions of the Five Party Agreement which were not incorporated into and adopted by WARA are simply contractual obligations between the five pa rties that are independent of WARA, and
do not include Delta. Post-WARA Changes Certain changes to the original preferenti al gate assignments have occurred since the Five Party Agreement was entered into and WARA was enacted. There were three airlines which entered into Lease Ag reements with the City for “preferential Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 5 of 42 PageID 75406 use” of the 20 gates at Love Field—ExpressJ et Airlines, Inc. (“ExpressJet”), American, and Southwest. In 2008, the ExpressJet ga tes were acquired by Continental Airlines, and then by Defendant United Airlines, Inc. (“United”) as part of its merger with Continental. With the merger, United beca me obligated as a successor to a Signatory Airline regarding all obligations under th e Lease Agreement for those two gates. American is still a Signatory Airline, bu t in May 2014, Defendant Virgin America, Inc. (“Virgin”) subleased American’s two ga tes pursuant to a federal divestiture order
related to the American and U.S. Airw ays merger which began in 2013 and was approved in 2014. This action effectively removed American Airlines from flying out of Love Field. (Southwest and Delta both sought those two American gates during the divestiture proceedings and both were rejected by the Department of Justice and the federal court.) Virgin then entered in to a gate usage agreement with Defendant Seaport Airlines allowing it to operate two flights daily from Virgin’s two gates. Southwest continues to have a Lease Agreemen t with the City for preferential use of 16 gates. Terms and Provisions of the Lease Agreement The terms of each Lease Ag reement for gates between the City and the respective Signatory Airline are essentially identical, according to the City. The Signatory Airline has either exclusive use or preferential use of its leased space at Love Field, as described in the Lease Agreements. “Exclusive use” pertains to that leased space that the Signatory Airline has the sole right to us e. “Preferential use”, on the other hand, Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 6 of 42 PageID 75417 applies to those leased spaces where the Si gnatory Airline is considered the primary, but not sole, user. Under ea ch Lease Agreement, no Sign atory Airline has exclusive use of any gate, only preferential use. Th ere is exclusive use le ased space at Love Field; but, there are no exclus ive use gates at Love Field. Just as both the Five Party Agreemen t and WARA recognized the limitations created by the gate restrictions, each Le ase Agreement addresses the possibility of Love Field facilities becoming a “scarce re source”. The Lease Agreement anticipates a new entrant air carrier (“Requesting Airlin e”) may seek to provide service at Love Field with the new gate restrictions. Recognizing the need for “open access and uniform treatment”, the Lease Agreement go es further and provides a procedure in Section 4.06F when accommodation is soug ht by a Requesting Airline. This procedure requires the Requesti ng Airline first exhaust all re asonable efforts to secure

a voluntary arrangement for accommodations from each Signatory Airline. If the Requesting Airline’s attempt for voluntar y accommodation fails, then the City’s Director of Aviation (“Direct or”) will notify each Signator y Airline that if a voluntary accommodation is not made within the 30-day time frame under each Lease Agreement, the Director will select one of the Signatory Airlines to fulfill the accommodation request. Notice will then be sent to the select ed Signatory Airline which will have 10 days to comment on or dispute the Director’s choice. The Signatory Airline must accommodate the Re questing Airline unless the Director Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 7 of 42 PageID 75428 rescinds his selection. The accommodation procedure does not specify options or remedies the Requesting Airline might have if the Director rescinds his selection. Delta’s First Accommodation Request Beginning July 2009, Delta en tered into a month-to-month sublease with American for partial use of its two gates, which allowed Delta to begin service from Love Field. Delta enjoyed uninterrupted service from Love Field under this monthto-month arrangement. But Delta’s service was placed in jeopardy when its monthto-month sublease with Amer ican was set to end on October 12, 2014, the effective date of American’s divesting sublease with Virgin for those two gates. Delta began contacting the Signatory Airlines, as well as Virgin, on June 13, 2014, to request voluntary accommodation for its five daily flights, but that effort was unsuccessful. In a letter dated July 16, 201 4, Delta requested the City initiate the mandatory or forced accommodation procedure set fort h in each Lease Agreement with the Signatory Airlines. Following Section 4.06F, Mr. Mark Duebner (“Mr. Duebner”), Director of the City’s Department of Avia tion, notified the Sign atory Airlines that
unless Delta was accommodated within 30 days, Mr. Duebner would select one Signatory Airline to comply with the a ccommodation order. On September 18, 2014, Delta informed Mr. Duebner in a letter that no accommodation had been made even though the 30-day deadline had passed. Delta emphas ized the urgency of
the situation with American terminating its agreement wi th Delta effective October 12, 2014. Delta also remindedMr. Duebner that “the De partment of Aviation has Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 8 of 42 PageID 75439 previously assured us that we would be accommodated, and we are relying on that
commitment.” With no sublease or volunt ary or forced accommodation in place, Delta entered into temporary gate usage agr eements with different air carriers at Love Field at various points in ti me to ensure continued servic e, all while reasserting its accommodation request to the City. During this time, United was operating only seven daily flights out of its two leased gates. On September 19, 2014, Mr. D uebner notified United in a letter that the City selected United to accommodate Delta on one of its gates. Mr. Duebner stated that the City’s decisi on was based on United’s actu al gate usage at that time and he told United that the accommodation must be made within 30 days. The day before that notification, on September 1 8, 2014, United entered into a gate usage agreement with Southwest for its use of Unit ed’s two gates only for overflow purposes or irregular operations; United continued to operate its flights fr om both gates. On September 23, 2014, Mr. Bob Montgo mery (“Mr. Montgomery”), Vice President of Airport Affairs for Southwest, sent a letter to Mr. Duebner disputing and disagreeing with the City’s decision to fo rce United to accommodate Delta on these two gates Southwest had contracted to use fo r overflow or irregular operations. To bolster Southwest’s argument, Mr. Montgome ry pointed to Southwest’s recent gate usage agreement with United , Southwest’s own desire an d intent to “ramp up” its flight operations, and his interpretation of the Lease Agreement language providing only an accommodation process for requests, but not an actual requirement of the Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 9 of 42 PageID 754410 Signatory Airline to accommodate. The next day, September 24, 2015, Southwest CEO Mr. Gary Kelly emailed Mr. AC Gonzal ez, City Manager, that Southwest was not happy with the City’s decision: It has come to my attention that once again, as recently as this week, [the City] has taken steps to frustrate and impede Southwest Airlines’ growth and success. Fu rther, the [C]ity has acted in a manner that again puts us in adverse positions legally. The 43-year history of Southwest Airlines has been a constant struggle to overcome [sic] with the City of Dallas. If anyone from the City Manager’s Office or the Aviation Dept. had attended the program we hosted for Dallas leaders two weeks ago at our $100 million+ new traini ng and operations center, they would have learned that Southwest, based on 2013 accumulated data: --generated over $4 billion in local economic activity --contributed $2 billion to the Dallas area GDP --aided in the creation of over 22,000 jobs --paid $1 billion in salaries, wa ges, and benefits to 8,000 Dallas area Employees --paid $42 million in taxe s in the Dallas area --supported 428 local civic and charitable organizations with cash and/or free travel All of the above has been accomplished without financial incentives or tax abatements asked fo r or offered. In return, Dallas has, by choice—not necessity, elec ted to reward competitors that have contributed nothing to Da llas while denying Southwest the opportunity to grow from Dallas Love Field, the airport [Southwest] first saved from elim ination by the [C]ity and then [Southwest] rebuilt at no cost to the city. We thought that after working so hard to resolve the historic dispute between Dallas and Ft. Wo rth over our airports and then investing so massively to reinvent Love Field that we were finally past these acrimonious hardships with our hometown. After 43 years of this, we have ‘Dallas fati gue.’ We are moving on to focus Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 10 of 42 PageID 754511 our corporate investments in thos e markets that place a value on them and their corporate residents. On September 26, 2014, United sent a letter to the City objecting to the City’s requirement that United acco mmodate Delta. United stat ed both of the gates would be fully utilized as of October 13, 2014, poin ting to United’s flight operations and the recent gate usage agreem ent with Southwest for overfl ow or irregular operations on those gates. United said that Delt a could not be accommodated and asked the City to rescind its directive. On Se ptember 27, 2014, Southwest offered $120 million cash consideration for the preferential use of both United gates at Love Field, which was accepted by United on Septem ber 29, 2014. The City acquiesced to Southwest’s demands on September 29, 2015 , and decided to rescind the September 19 accommodation order to be implemented by United. In a letter dated September 29, 2014, the City noti fied Delta that it could no longer be accommodated on United’s gates because of United’s recently provided flight schedules which included the new gate usage agreement between Southwest and United. Delta’s Second Accommodation Request Section 4.06F provides no options or altern atives for a Requesti ng Airline in the case of the Director rescinding his selectio n. After the City rescinded its original September 19 accommodation directive to Un ited, Delta made a second request for forced accommodation with the City. Delt a sent Mr. Duebner a letter dated October 2, 2015, asserting that the Ci ty had “obligations under Se ction 4.06 of the [Lease Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 11 of 42 PageID 754612 Agreement], the Five Party Agreement, th e City’s recent promise to accommodate Delta, its commitment in its Airline Competition Plan filed with the [FAA]. . ., its Airport Improvement Program grant assuranc es, and Federal law” to act on Delta’s accommodation request and designate a Signat ory Airline to share its gate space with Delta on a more permanent basis. The City began another accommodation process on December 1, 2014, and sent a letter to Virgin, United and So uthwest stating that Delta’s accommodation request had triggere d the formal accommodation process set out in Section 4.06F. The City stated that if none of the Sign atory Airlines would voluntarily accommodate Delta, the City would choose one to accommodate Delta. None of the Signatory Airlines offered to voluntarily accommodate Delta in response
to that letter. The City Asks DOT for Guidance on Accommodation Request On December 8 and 11, 2014, the City contacted Defendant Department of Transportation (“DOT”) by phone for help an d guidance on how to handle air carrier access at Love Field, specifically as it re lated to Delta’s accommodation request. The DOT responded with a letter dated De cember 17, 2014, outlining what the DOT understood the City’s obligations to be regarding competition at Love Field. Specifically, the DOT stated that the City had legal obligations to accommodate Delta, which included the City’s obliga tions under the federal Competition Plan statute and also the grant assu rances the City made in relation to grants under the Airport Improvement Program. The DOT emphasized the importance of Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 12 of 42 PageID 754713 accommodating a requesting airline and ensu ring competition at this “constrained” airport. As for the length of any acco mmodation, the DOT’s position was that an accommodated airline “is entitled to an ongo ing similar pattern of service as long as the carrier continues to operat e the accommodated flights.”
Southwest’s Sublease of United ’s Two Gates Takes Effect Although none of the Signatory Airlines agreed to voluntary accommodate Delta after Mr. Duebner’s December 1 letter, the City chose not to select any of the airlines to comply with the accommodation request, even though that accommodation is required under Section 4.06F2: “[T]he Direct or will notify all Signatory Airlines in writing that if Requesting Ai rline is not accommodated within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the notice, the Director will select one of the Signatory Airlines to comply with the request for accommodation in a non-discriminatory ma nner.” (Emphasis added.) Then on January 28, 2015, Southwest en tered into a Sublease Agreement with United for Southwest’s preferential use of United’s two gates, which formalized the $120,000,000 deal agreed to on September 29. The United Lease Agreement with the City required the City to approve any sublease before that sublease could take effect. On January 28, the City consente d to that Sublease Agreement between
United and Southwest. The City Seeks DOT Guid ance a Second Time Although the City refused to select a Signatory Airline to accommodate Delta, Mr. Peter Haskell, the Assistant City Attorney , emailed the DOT on February 26, 2015, Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 13 of 42 PageID 754814 asking for further guidance on the City’s federal and legal obligations and also the proper duration for Delta’s requested ac commodation. The DOT sent another letter to the City on June 15, 2015, again explaini ng the DOT’s interpretation of the City’s obligations. The DOT reiterated that the grant assurances and the Competition Plan statute both require the City to accommodate a requesti ng airline if a voluntary accommodation cannot be arranged. The DOT al so stated that “the City is required to accommodate a requesting carrier unless Love Field’s facilities are fully-utilized at the time of the request, or the signatory ca rriers at the time of the request are selling tickets for future flights fully-utilizing the facilities.” The DOT specifically noted that the City should not consider a Signat ory Airline’s unscheduled future expansion plans because it “may give a signatory carrier the ability to block a competitor’s accommodation request by deciding or assertin g, after a request is made, that it will expand service.” Finally, the DOT rest ated its position on the length of accommodation, which is that “once accommodated at Love Field, ‘the accommodated carrier is entitled to an ongo ing similar pattern of service as long as the carrier continues to operate the accommodated flights’ and that ‘the accommodated carrier should not be pushed out by incumbent carriers at a later date.’” The DOT concluded its response wi th a reminder that it is the City’s responsibility to decide how to act on Delta’s request. Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 14 of 42 PageID 754915 City of Dallas Files This Lawsuit—“Tell Us What to Do!” Ultimately, none of the Signatory Airlin es (meaning an airline having a Lease Agreement with the City for use of Love Field space and gates) or Virgin (having a Sublease Agreement with American) offere d to voluntarily accommodate Delta and the City refused to force an accommodation choosing not to follow the guidance the City solicited from the DOT. Delta cont inued to operate flights from Love Field under a temporary gate usage ag reement with United to use one of its preferential use gates for 180 days to operate Delta’s five da ily flights; Southwest offered to honor the temporary 180 day gate usage agreement af ter the effective date of the Sublease Agreement. This temporary gate usage agr eement was set to expi re on July 6, 2015. As the expiration date loomed closer, Southwes t rejected Delta’s req uests to extend it. Continuing to press the accommodation reques t with the City, Delta told the City it would refuse to cease operations at Love Field on July 7, 2015, because it had a right to accommodation. In an attempt to avoid what it says would be potential chaos at Love Field beginning July 7, 2015, the City filed this lawsui t on June 17, 2015, seeking declaratory relief related to, among other things, its legal obligations and rights with respect to the Five Party Ag reement, WARA, the Le ase Agreements and federal regulations and laws affecting Love Field; essentially the Ci ty is asking this
Court to “Please tell us what to do.” On June 19, 2015, Southwest filed the pending Verified Application for Temporary Restra ining Order, Preliminary Injunction, and Permanent Injunction Against Delta. The City filed the pending Cross-Motion for Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 15 of 42 PageID 755016 TRO [sic] on June 23, 2015. On the same date, Delta filed th e pending Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining Orde r and a Preliminary Injunction Against
Southwest. Taking into account the complexity of this case and the importance of this matter to the citizens of Dallas and the Metroplex, the Court urged the parties to come to a temporary agreement related to Delta’s gate usage at Love Field in order to allow the parties adequate time to brief the injunctive relief requests and responses, as well as
allow the Court time to conduct a hear ing. Southwest and Delta reached a temporary gate usage agreement whereby So uthwest would permit Delta to continue operating its five flights daily until th e Court rules on the pending motions for injunctive relief. The Court conducted a three-day hearing on the motions on September 28-30, 2015.
II. Legal Standard “’The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo and thus prevent irreparable harm until the respective rights of the parties can be ascertained during a trial on the merits.’” Serna v. Tex. Dept. of State He alth Services, Vital Statistics
Unit , No. 1-15-CV-446-RP, 20 15 WL 6118623, at 13 (W.D . Tex. Oct. 16, 2015) (quoting Exhibitors Poster Exch., Inc. v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp. , 441 F.2d 560, 560 (5th Cir. 1971)). To be entitled to a preliminar y injunction, the movant must satisfy each of the following equitable factors: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury; (3) the threatened injury to the Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 16 of 42 PageID 755117 movant outweighs the threatened harm to the party sought to be enjoined; and (4) granting the injunctive relief will not disserve the public interest. Canal Auth. of State of Fla. v. Callaway , 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974); see also Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey , 667 F.3d 570, 574 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bluefield Water Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Starkville, Miss. , 577 F.3d 250, 252 -53 (5th Cir. 2009)). Because a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, it should not be granted unless the movant has “’clearly carried the burden of persuasion’ on all four requirements.” Bluefield Water , 577 F.3d at 253 (quoting Lake Charles Diesel, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 328 F.3d 192, 195-96 (5 th Cir. 2003)). Fa ilure to sufficiently establish any one of the four factors requires this Court to deny the movant’s request for a preliminary injunction. See Enter. Int’l, Inc. v. Corporacion Estatal Petrolera
Ecuatoriana , 762 F.2d 464, 472 (5th Cir. 1985). Any fact ual findings and/or
conclusions of law the Court makes herein ar e not binding at a trial on the merits. Jonibach Mgmt. Trust v. Wartburg Enterprises, Inc. , 750 F.3d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 2014).
III. Analysis At this juncture, the Court is only concer ned with the need fo r immediate relief pending a trial on the merits. The City’s Request The City moves for injunctive relief in the form of the Court granting either the relief requested by Southwest, or alternat ively, the relief re quested by Delta, or further in the alternative, the Court limiting both Southwest’s and Delta’s flight Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 17 of 42 PageID 755218 operations in order to prevent double-booking and limit interference with gate rights. The City takes no position on precisely wh at the injunctive reli ef should be. The City simply moves for some sort of injunc tive relief, whatever the Court determines that to be, while the lega l issues are decided. Delta’s Request Delta seeks injunctive relief against Sout hwest to “freez[e] the status quo . . . allowing Delta to continue op erating its limited schedule of five daily flights . . . pending final resolution of this proceeding.” Delta specifically asks the Court to issue a preliminary injunction prohibiting Southwest from (1) evicting Delta from its gate(s) at Love Field, (2) expanding its flig ht operations at Love Field, or (3) any
other action inconsistent with Delta’ s right to long term accommodation. Southwest’s Request Southwest seeks injunctive relief against Delta to protect “Southwest’s property rights and to protect the righ ts of the flying public.” Sp ecifically, Southwest seeks a preliminary injunction prohibiting Delta fr om trespassing on Southwest’s gates at Love Field after the expiration of the temporary gate usage agreement.
A. Delta’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction
1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits In establishing a “substantial likelih ood of success”, the movant “is not required to prove [his] entitlement to summary judgment” for purposes of preliminary injunction. Byrum v. Landreth , 566 F.3d 442, 4 46 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 18 of 42 PageID 755319 Janvey v. Alguire , 647 F.3d 585, 595-96 (5 th Cir. 2011). The district court “look[s] to ‘standards provided by the substantive law’” to determine likelihood of success on the
merits. Janvey , 647 F.3d at 596 (quoting Roho, Inc. v. Marquis , 902 F.2d 356, 358 (5th Cir. 1990)). At the time Delta filed its motion, it had not yet filed an answer or any counter- and/or crossclaims. At the time of the injunction hearing, Delta had filed its amended cross-claims against Southwest s eeking or asserting: (1) a declaratory judgment that the Sublease Agreement betw een United and Southwest violated the Lease Agreements; (2) a declaratory judg ment that Delta is entitled to be accommodated; (3) a claim for breach of the Southwest Lease Agreement; and (4) a
claim for tortious interference with the United Lease Agreement. The Court need only consider whether Delta has a likelihood of success on the me rits of one of its
claims. See Ramada Franchise Sys., Inc. v. Jacobcart, Inc. , Civ. No. 3:01-CV-306-D, 2001 WL 540213, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 17, 20 01)(Fitzwater, J.). To establish a breach of contract claim under Texas law, the party must prove: (1) the existence of a valid contract; (2) that the [party] performed or tendered performance; (3) that the other party brea ched the contract; and (4) that the party was damaged as a resu lt of the breach. Cordero v. Avon Products., Inc. , No. 15-40563, 2015 WL 6530721, at *2 (5th Cir. Oct. 29, 2015). A party must establish its privity to the contract or its status as a third-part y beneficiary in order to sue for breach of

contract. Maddox v. Vantage Energy, LLC , 361 S.W.3d 752, 756-57 (Tex.App.—Ft. Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 19 of 42 PageID 755420 Worth 2012). Delta’s breach of contract claim is based on the Lease Agreement entered into by the City and Southwest. Because Delta is not a signatory to the Lease Agreement, the Court must determin e as a threshold matter that Delta has standing as a third-party beneficiar y to enforce the Lease Agreement.

a. Is Delta a Third-Pa rty Beneficiary? Texas courts have traditionally “presu med that a party contracts only for its
own benefit and have therefore maintain ed a presumption against third-party beneficiary agreements.” Id. at 757. Unless there is clear and unequivocal representation that the contracting parties intended to directly be nefit a third-party,
courts will not infer such intent in order to confer third-party beneficiary status.
Tawes v. Barnes , 340 S.W.3d 419, 425 (T ex. 2011). The contract does not need to specifically name the third-party, but it must adequately describe or designate the third-party. Maddox , 361 S.W.3d at 757. A third-part y beneficiary is either a donee beneficiary or creditor beneficiary. Id. When the completed contracted performance comes to the party as a pure donation, that party is a donee beneficiary. Id. (citing MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Tex. Util. Elec. Co. , 995 S.W.2d 647, 651 (Tex. 1999)). When the contracted performance satisfie s a duty or legally enforceable commitment owed to the party by the prom isee, the party is considered a creditor beneficiary. Id. A party is not a third-party beneficiary if it simply bene fits incidentally from the

contract. Maddox , 361 S.W.3d at 757. Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 20 of 42 PageID 755521 Delta contends that a “new entrant ai rline” is an intended, contemplated, and/or third-party beneficiary of the Leas e Agreement between the Signatory Airline and the City. Delta contends that its request for voluntary accommodation from Southwest, beginning in June 2014, satisfie d Delta’s obligations as a “new entrant airline” or “Requesting Airl ine” under Section 4.06F. De lta, the City and Southwest disagree as to the exact definition of “new entrant airline”. The Five Party Agreement, WARA, and the Lease Agreement do not define “new entrant airline”.
The Court must first define “new entrant airl ine” before it can address the third-party beneficiary analysis.
i. “New Entrant Airline” Defined Delta defines “new entrant airline” as any airline that is not a Signatory Airline in a Lease Agreement with the City. Southwest defines “new entrant airline” as an airline that does not currently operate at Love Field. The City does not offer a definition, but instead asks the Court to define it. The Lease Agreement uses the
term “new entrant airline” in Sectio n 4.06F interchangeably with “Requesting Airline”, but the Lease Agreem ent does not define “new entrant airline”. The Lease Agreement does define “Requesting Airline” in Section 1.50, but the definition is limited, stating only that the term has the meaning given to it in Section 4.06F. The Lease Agreement provid es in Section 4.06F: Airline and City agree that alth ough most of the airline areas in the Terminal Building [at Love Field] are or will be leased to Signatory Airlines for their excl usive or preferential use, and Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 21 of 42 PageID 755622 Terminal Building facilities [which includes gates] at the Airport may become a scarce resource if a new entrant airline (“Requesting Airline”) requests to provide serv ice at the Airport. In such circumstances, Airline agrees to accommodate such Requesting Airline as its Leased Premises at such times that will not unduly interfere with its operating sche dule and upon such reasonable terms as may be agreed upon be tween Airline and the Requesting Airline[], taking into consideratio n all the circumstances of such an accommodation agreement. . . . To insure compliance with this obligation and to provide open access and uniform treatment for all airline tenants, the followi ng [accommodation] procedure is established. . . . By signing the Lease Agreement which contains this language, all parties acknowledge the potential scarce resources at Love Field. The language is clear that the purpose of the accommodation procedure is to insure there would be open access for an airline requesting accommodation for gate space at Love Field in light of the gate limitations and overall constraints which the parties all recognized. The language discusses the potential scarcity of Love Field facilities because most “are or will be leased to Signatory Airline for their exclusive or preferenti al use”. Because of this, the Signatory Airline agre es to provide space to a ne w entrant airline seeking to provide service at Love Field. There is no language limiti ng the new entrant airline to one not currently operating at Love Field. The Lease Agreement language does not limit the parties’ accommodation obligation to an airline not currently operating at
Love Field. Such a narrow construction of “new entrant airline” is unreasonable and too restrictive in light of th e language of section 4.06F of the Lease Agreement. The Court agrees with Delta’s proposed definiti on of “new entrant”. Although the Lease Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 22 of 42 PageID 755723 Agreement language is not artfully drafted, the Court finds “new entrant airline” to mean any airline that is not a Signatory Ai rline in a Lease Agreement with the City and an airline needing space at Love Field to provide service.
ii. Is Delta Able to Bring Breach of Contract Claim as a “New Entrant Airline”? Having defined “new entrant airline”, th e Court now turns to whether Delta, as a “new entrant airline”, can be a thir d-party beneficiary to the Lease Agreement and bring its breach of contract claim. Th e Court finds Delta is a creditor beneficiary because the duty owed to Delta is a cont ractual obligation or some other legally enforceable commitment under the Lease Agreement. See Stine v. Stewart , 80 S.W.3d 586, 589 (Tex. 2002). Section 4.06F sp ecifically provides that when an accommodation request is made, Southwest as the Signatory Airline agrees to accommodate the “Requesting Airline”, here Delta, at times that would not unduly
interfere with Southwest’s schedule. This agreement by Southwest satisfies a duty or legally enforceable commitment owed to Delt a once Delta made that accommodation request in compliance with section 4.06F. The Court finds the Lease Agreement is clear and unequivocal that the City and th e Signatory Airlines intended to directly benefit a “new entrant airline” or “RequestingAirline”, in this case Delta, with this accommodation provision. See Tawes , 340 S.W.3d at 425. Delta would not simply benefit inci dentally from the accommodation provision. See Stine , 80 S.W.3d at 589. The parties drafted an accommodation Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 23 of 42 PageID 755824 procedure that would be triggered upon a request from a “new entrant airline” and this was incorporated into the Lease Agreement. The pu rpose of that procedure is explained in the Lease Agreement as providin g a “new entrant airline” access to scarce space at Love Field. Obviously, the Le ase Agreement does not specifically name Delta as a beneficiary, but it does adequa tely describe or designate Delta by use of the term “new entrant airline” or “Requesting Airline”. See Maddox , 361 S.W.3d at 757. If the City and Southwest as parties to the Lease Agreement did not intend for
a “new entrant airline” to ha ve the right to enforce this section, there would be no other way for the accommodation procedure to work and no remedy for the “new
entrant airline” should the City and/or Southwest not co mply with their agreement. There is no reasonable interpretation of this accommodation provision other than
that the “new entrant airline” is in fact th e only intended beneficiary. Otherwise, this is superfluous language because no one benefi ts from this provisio n. The Court finds at this preliminary stage that Delta has stan ding to bring its breach of contract claim against Southwest as a thir d-party beneficiary.
b. Did Southwest Breach the Lease Agreement?
The Court now turns to Southwest’s alle ged breach of the agreement. To
establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its breach of contract claim, Delta must to prove: (1) the exis tence of a valid contract; (2) that Delta performed or tendered performance; (3) th at Southwest breached the contract; and (4) that Delta was damaged as a result of the breach. See Cordero , No. 15-40563, Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 24 of 42 PageID 755925 2015 WL 6530721, at *2. There is no dispute that a contract, the Lease Agreement, exists and the Court has already determined Delta is a third-party beneficiary, so the
first factor is established. As for Delta’ s performance, the record establishes that Delta performed its obligation under the accommodation procedure in section 4.06F by contacting all Signatory Airlines and any airline subleasing gate space from a Signatory Airline beginni ng June 13, 2014, to tr y to secure voluntary
accommodation. Section 4.06F provides that the Signatory Airline “agrees to accommodate such Requesting Airline at its Le ase Premises at such times that will not unduly interfere with its operating schedule.” The Lease Ag reement does not define “unduly interfere with”. The Court finds it very interestin g that former Mayor Laura Miller testified about this exact phrase in the Lease Ag reement at the Congressional subcommittee hearing on reforming the Wright Amendmen t Act. In response to a subcommittee member’s question about the meaning of the undefined and “vague” term “unduly interfere with”, Ms . Miller testified: Well it was crafted by the Dallas City Attorney’s Office and we understand, since it has never been tested, we have never had a conflict; that we should, if we are responsible, create a very clear policy using this as the template for how we ar e in real terms going to be executing this . This [term] gives us the auth ority to tell [a Signatory Airline], you have to make room. But I think that like other airports like you cited that have this issue of capacity, we need to have a very clear policy in place so that the tenants have a clear expectation for how its going to work when the director say we shall make room for [a Requesting Airline] and this is how we are going to do it. Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 25 of 42 PageID 756026 Ex. 631, p. 0052. As we no w know, the City wholly failed to craft any policy, let alone a clear one, setting forth how the accommodation procedure and process would work in reality. This “vague language ab out ‘unduly interfere with’” was drafted by the City itself and was noted by at leas t one concerned subcommittee member of contributing to “Southwest [being] in th e catbird seat”. And worse, then Mayor Laura Miller acknowledged the need for the City, “ if we are responsible, [to] create a very clear policy . . . for how we are in re al terms going to be executing this. ” Now in this case, the Court is asked to follow through with what the City should ha ve done years ago.
i. “Unduly Interfere With” Defined The Court concludes, for purposes of th is preliminary injunction, that “unduly
interfere with” in section 4.06F means the requested flight accommodation can fit within the Signatory Airline’s existingpublished schedule, at the time the accommodation request is made, without ca using the Signatory Airline’s existing
schedule to reach maximum usage. The evidence es tablishes that Southwest considers maximum usage or “fu ll utilization” of gates at Love Field to be 10 flights daily per gate. The Court finds Delta provided evidence that, at several points in time after its initial accommodation requ est in June 2014, Sout hwest was able to accommodate Delta’s five daily flights on Southwest’s 16 gates without unduly interfering with Southwest’s existing operating schedule. At the time of the Delta’s original accommodation requ est in June 2014, Southwest was flying approximately seven flig hts daily out of 16 gates. The evidence Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 26 of 42 PageID 756127 shows that as of October 1, 2014, prior to the repeal of the Wright Amendment, Southwest operated 118 flights daily out of 16 gates, approxim ately seven flights daily per gate. That flight schedule wo uld certainly have permitted accommodation of Delta’s five flights dai ly without reaching Southwest’ s interpretation of “full utilization” as 10 flights daily from each ga te. The Court recognizes this was before the lifting of domestic flight distance rest rictions and Southwest planned to increase its flight operations. Even if the Cour t considers Southwest’s post-WARA increased flight operations schedule, there was room in Southwest’s schedule to accommodate
Delta. The evidence shows that Southwes t was operating 149 flights daily out of 16 gates as of November 3, 2014. That is nine flights daily per gate. Once the Sublease Agreement between United and Southwest took effect at the end of January 2015, Southwest was operating 153 flights daily out of 18 gates or 8.5 flights daily per gate. It was not until February 26, 2015, that Southwest announced it was increasing flight operations to 180 flights daily out of 18 gates beginning August 9, 2015. Southwest’s claim that Delta’s five flight s daily unduly interferes with Southwest’s operations is simply not supported by the ev idence. Up until its announcement on February 26, 2015 of increase d flight operations, the ev idence establi shes that Southwest was able to accommodate Delta without “unduly interfering with” Southwest’s own operations. Taking the Court’s definition of “unduly interfere with” into consideration, Southwest could have voluntarily accommoda ted Delta’s five flights without unduly Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 27 of 42 PageID 756228 interfering with Southwest’s schedule when the initial request was made in June
2014. Southwest’s schedule st ill allowed for accommodation of Delta’s five flights
without undue interference if the Court were to consider Southwest’s schedules at each of the following points in time: June 13, 2014, November 3, 2014, and January 28, 2015. Southwest did not announce plans to increase its flight operations to 180 flights daily out of 10 gates until February 26, 2015. It was not until August 2015, over one year after Delta’s first voluntary accommodation request in June 2014, that Southwest’s increased operating schedule actually reached “full utilization” of 10 flights daily from each gate. Under the Lease Agreement, preferential use of airport facilities means the Signatory Airline is the primary, but not so le, user. Exclusive use means the airline has the sole right to use the space. There are no exclusiv e use gates at Love Field. Southwest has preferential use of the gates it leases from the City and subleases from United. Therefore, Southwes t is considered to be the pr imary, but not sole, user of the gates. Southwest does not have an unfettered right to the gates it has leased; and, despite Southwest’s argument to the contrary, the preferen tial use rights are subject to the accommodation provision contained in the Lease Agreement, which Southwest agreed to and signed. Southwest’s position is that accommodation is not required as long as they are using the gates at full utiliz ation of 10 flights daily out of each gate. Southwest did not “fully utilize” its gate spac e until, at the earliest, its announcement on February 26, 2015 of increased flight op erations, or, at the latest, until August Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 28 of 42 PageID 756329 2015 when the actual increa se was fully realized. Sout hwest cannot “ramp up” its flight schedule to thwart the pend ing accommodation request by Delta. As testimony from the Congressional subcommittee hearing on reforming the Wright Amendment Act revealed, these acco mmodation procedures were intended to help “fit those people in” when a Req uesting Airline makes an accommodation request. Also during the subcommittee hearing, certain City officials, government representatives, and local business leaders stated that competition at Love Field would be ensured if the Five Party Agreemen t was enacted into legislation. Mr. Herb Kelleher, then-CEO of Southwes t, testified at the hearing. He testified that “[A]ny carrier that is desirous now of serving Love Field can easily be accommodated even after those [12] gates come down,” limiting Love Field to 20 gates. In response to a question involving a very similar scenario as to that which the Court has before it today, Mr. Kelleher testified, And it is very simple. There is no mystery to the way it operates, and that is, I can show you Southwest Airlines schedule, gate schedules, we have got hours on our gates wh ere another carrier could operate there. . . . And we would simply be told by the City of Dallas, you have got these vacant spaces in your ga te utilization and by golly you are going to put another carrier in there. Subcommittee member responded, “They wo uld be able to tell you that?” Mr. Kelleher answered, “That is the way it works, oh, yes absolutely.” Ex. 631, p. 0054. Apparently at that time, Mr . Kelleher understood Southwes t’s obligations, as well as the City’s. In spite of that understand ing, no accommodation ever happened. Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 29 of 42 PageID 756430 Southwest agreed in Section 4.06F that it would accommodate a “new entrant
airline” when accommodation would not “u nduly interfere” with its own operating schedule. As the Court has found, Southw est’s schedule would clearly accommodate Delta when it made its initial request fo r voluntary accommodation in accordance with Section 4.06F, and for several months after. Delta has established Southwest did not comply with its contractual obliga tion and, therefore, breached Section 4.06F, the accommodation provision, of the Lease Agreement.

c. Was Delta Harmed by Southwest’s Breach? Delta has shown that it suffered harm, the fourth element of breach of contract, because there is no longer available gate sp ace at Love Field able to accommodate its current flight operations. Delta has indicate d a desire to expand its service at Love Field, but as it stands, ther e is arguably no possibility that Delta will be able to expand. Southwest currently leases or suble ases 18 gates, and Virgin subleases the remaining two gates. The evidence indica tes that because Virgin subleased those gates under very different circumstance s involving a forced divestiture from American, and the DOJ specifically rejectedDelta (and Southwest) from subleasing those gates from American, the only possibi lity for accommodation of Delta comes
from Southwest. At this point, Delta will be locked out of Love Field. Testimony at the injunction hearing established that accommodations are common at other airports, and those accommodations can take many forms, such as subdividing a gate, using hardstands Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 30 of 42 PageID 756531 to load/unload passengers, or building addi tional brick-and-mortar gates. None of these options are available at Love Field be cause of the terms of WARA and the Five Party Agreement. The Court finds Southw est and the City are playing a game of musical chairs with Love Field gate space, and with Virgin’s “chairs” not in play in this game, there’s no “chair” for Delta—So uthwest occupies all 18 gates and the City
consents. The Court finds Delta has establi shed it suffered harm from Southwest’s failure/refusal to follow its contractual o bligation under sectio n 4.06F of the Lease Agreement. Having established all four factors of a breach of contract claim, the Court
concludes that Delta has established a substa ntial likelihood of su ccess on the merits of its breach of contract claim against Southwest.
Even if Delta did not make a sufficient sh owing on its breach of contract claim,
the Court finds Delta has established a substa ntial likelihood of su ccess on the merits of its declaratory judgment claim that it is entitled to be accommodated by Southwest. The Declaratory Judgment Act pr ovides: “In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . any court in the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the ri ghts and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). The party seeking the declaratory judgment “must have suffered ‘an invasion of a legally prot ected interest,’ which is ‘traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process,’ and is currently fit Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 31 of 42 PageID 756632 for judicial review.” Crane v. Napolitano , 3:12-CV-2347-O, 20 13 WL 1744422, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 20 13)(O’Connor, J.) (quoting Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of America v. Magaw , 132 F.3d 272, 280 (6th Cir. 1997)). As previously set out, the Court’s discussion of “new entrant airline”, “u nduly interfere with”, and Southwest’s obligation under Section 4.06F of the Lease Agreement regarding accommodation hold true to Delta’s claim for declaratory judgme nt. As it pertains to injunctive relief, Delta has shown that, as a new entrant or “Requesting Airline”, Southwest had an obligation under the Lease Agreement to accommodate Delta at the time of its request because such accommodation would not “unduly interfere with” Southwest’s existing flight schedule. Delta has shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its (1) breach of contract cl aim against Southwest and (2) declaratory judgment claim that it is entitled to be accommodated by Southwest.
2. Substantial Threat of Irreparable Harm The second factor in the preliminary injunction analysis is a threat of irreparable harm. To establish this factor, Delta must show “a significant threat of injury from the impending action, that the injury is imminent, and that money damages would not fully repair the harm.” Humana, Inc. v. Jacobson , 804 F.2d 1390, 1394 (5th Cir. 1986). Irre parable injury may be established where damages cannot be easily calculated. Miller Paper Co. v. Roberts Paper Co. , 901 S.W.2d 593, 602 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, no writ). Where the potential damage to a party’s business cannot be easily calculated, such as lo ss of good will, a legal remedy is Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 32 of 42 PageID 756733 inadequate. T-N-T Motorsports, Inc. v. Hennessey Motorsports, Inc. , 965 S.W.2d 18, 24 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Di st.] 1998, pet. denied).
Delta has established that immediate and irreparable harm may result if it is prohibited from operating its cu rrent schedule of five flight s and is forced out of Love Field during the pendency of this case. Thousands of passengers, both traveling to and from Love Field, would have to be refu nded or rebooked if Delta is forced to
discontinue its service at Love Field. Lo ss of business and goodwill are immeasurable through money damages. Simmons v. Quixtar, Inc. , No. 4:07CV389, 2007 WL 3256244, at *5 (E.D. Tex. 2007). If Delta is forced to discontinue service immediately from Love Field, the extent of lost business Delta would suffer plus the extent of loss of good will cannot be known. See Henson Patriot Lt d. Co. LLC v. Medina , Civ. Action No. SA-14-CV-534-XR, 2014 WL 4546973, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 11, 2014). Without an injunction, Delta would have no adequate remedy at law because it will most certainly suffer a loss of business and goodwill. Despite Southwest’s argument to the contrary, the Court does not find Delta’s harm minimized or eliminated simply because it has or can secure gate space at DFW Airport. The Court need not address Southw est’s “one marketplace” argument at this juncture. The Court is addressing the requested injunctive relief based on accommodation at Love Field as required under the Lease Agreement. The Lease Agreement does not contemplate accommodati on at DFW Airport; not one word is
said that the accommodatio n procedure includes consideration of DFW Airport, Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 33 of 42 PageID 756834 whether a party has access to gate space at DFW Airport, and DFW Airport is not a party to these Lease Agreements in this case. To deny Delta’s injunctive relief woul d remove Delta from Love Field and, were the Court or a jury to ultimately determine Delta has a right to accommodation,
Delta would have lost busine ss and endured negative impa ct to its name and brand during that period. The Court also agrees with Delta that it would “have to fight an uphill battle” to make the public aware of its presence once again at Love Field. All of this would undoubtedly cause Delta to su ffer great injury in such a way that is
immeasurable and could be ir reparable. Therefore, the Co urt finds that the risk of substantial threat of irreparable harm weighs heavily in favor of Delta.
3. Balance of Harms and the Public Interest The Court now turns to the balance of harms, considering whether the threatened injury to Delta outweighs th e threatened harm to Southwest. As previously discussed, the Court found th e potential harm Delt a would likely suffer upon being removed from Love Field is great—damage to reputation, name, brand and overall goodwill in addition to moneta ry harm. Southwest argues it will suffer harm in the form of cancelled flights or unto ld delays or inability to fully utilize its gate if it is forced to continue allowing Delta to fly its five flights daily. First,
Southwest has suffered no harm as it relates to an inabilit y to fully utilize its gates. Not only has Southwest been able to “fully ut ilize” its 18 gates with its own schedule of 180 flights daily, Delta has operated its five flights dai ly, for a total of 185 flights Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 34 of 42 PageID 756935 daily out of 18 gates. Furthermore, the ev idence before the Court does not establish Southwest has suffered any harm or the threat of harm in the form of cancelled flights because of Delta’s use of the gates. At the injunction hearing, Southwest offered testimony that it has experienced so me flight delays as well as two instances of equipment damage due to Delta’s pres ence at the gates. Assuming without deciding these flights delays and equipment damage have harmed or threaten to harm Southwest, this in no way outweighs the thre atened harm to Delta if it is forced to leave Love Field while these legal issues are resolved. Although Southwest may not be able to run its flights and operations as efficiently as it would like because of Delta’s presence, that factor simply does not outweigh the potential harm to Delta from removing it from Love Field altogether. In considering the public interest, the Court finds the chaos and inconvenience of disrupted service by removing Delta from Love Field before the legal issues are decided would be a great disservice to the public. Forcing Delta to cease flight operations at Love Field would necessarily require its passengers to be rebooked on a Delta flight from another airport or to have their ticket purchase refunded, requiring them to find alternate travel arrangements , possibly at greater expense if on shortnotice. Also, Love Field is owned by the Ci ty which obviously vests its citizens with an interest in the airport and issues surrounding it.
The Court finds the balance of harms and the public interest both weigh heavily in favor of Delta. Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 35 of 42 PageID 757036 In conclusion, the Court finds Delta has established all four equitable factors entitling it to injunctive relief. Therefore, the Court grants Delta’s motion for injunctive relief and the requ ested relief that Southwest be enjoined from evicting or otherwise removing Delta from Southwest’ s gate(s) at Love Field, or otherwise interfering with or preventing Delta’s cont inued use of Southwest’s gate(s) to operate Delta’s five daily flights.
B. Southwest’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction Also pending before the Court is Southwest’s competing motion for preliminary injunction, which was filed first before eithe r the City’s motion or Delta’s motion. To establish entitlement to a preliminary in junction, Southwest must satisfy all four equitable factors to obtain a preliminary injunction. See TGI Friday’s Inc. v. Great Northwest Restaurants, Inc. , 652 F.Supp.2d 763, 767 (N .D. Tex. 2009)(Fitzwater, C.J.). Southwest cannot establish a likelihood of success on the merits of its trespass claim against Delta because Delt a is not trespassing at this point. The gates are not exclusive use, but rather preferential use; there can be no trespass on preferential use gates. Southwest’s payment of $120,000,000 to su blease United’s tw o gates does not convert those gates from preferential use to exclusive use. Though expensive, trespass would not lie for a preferential use gate which is subject to accommodation. Southwest’s other argument that Delta is a “trespasser” because it is “invading the possession of [Southwest’s] property,” and that requires no additional showing of Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 36 of 42 PageID 757137 irreparable injury, also fails. Southwest must show “a significant threat of injury from the impending action, that the injury is imminent, and that money damages would not fully repair the harm.” Humana , 804 F.2d at 1394. Sout hwest fails to make this showing. The Court does not find that Southwest has established a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits of its trespass cl aim against Delta. The Court has also previously determined that the bala nce of harms and publi c interest weight heavily in favor of Delta; therefore, Sout hwest would be unable to satisfy all four equitable factors. The Court finds that Southwest has not proven all the equitable factors to establish entitlement to a preliminary injunction. See TGI Friday’s , 652 F.Supp.2d at 767. Accordingly, the Court denies Southwest’s motion for preliminary injunction.
C. City’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction In its motion, the City’s requested inju nctive relief includes an injunction “allowing Delta to continue using Southwest’s Love Field gates temporarily and barring all others from interfering in th at temporary use.” Because the City has
refused to take action on Delta’s accomm odation request, the Court is forced to impose some sort of injunctive relief to maintain order at Love Field. The Court has already determined that Delt a’s motion for injunctive relief should be granted. However, even if the Cour t could not grant Delta’s motion, the Court grants the City’s motion, finding that the City has satisfied each of the equitable factors to establish entitlement to injunctive relief. In its Original Complaint, the Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 37 of 42 PageID 757238 City seeks declaratory judgment relief from this Court. Sp ecifically, the City requests the Court declare the City’s rights and responsibilities under the Five Party Agreement, WARA, the DOT letters, the Le ase Agreements, the Sublease Agreement, the grant assurances and other obligati ons to the DOT and FAA, and any other applicable federal law as related to acco mmodation requests, the Signatory Airlines’ preferential use rights and the City’s cons ent to the Sublease Agreement. It is well established there is a dispute between Delt a and Southwest. E ssentially, the City asks the Court to declare what the City is required to do. Ultimately, the Court will make such declarations giving the clarificat ion and certainty being sought. Therefore, the Court finds that the City will prevail on its declarator y judgment claims once the Court determines and declares the City’s ri ghts and responsibilities pertaining to accommodation requests made by Delta as well as any future requests. The first equitable factor has been established. To establish irreparable harm, the City must show “a significant threat of injury from the impending action, that the inju ry is imminent, and that money damages would not fully repair the harm.” Humana , 804 F.2d at 1394. Irreparable injury may be established where damages cannot be easily calculated. Miller Paper , 901 S.W.2d at 602. Removing Delta from Love Field will negatively impact the flying public who have paid tickets flying into/out of Love F ield. In turn, this likely would negatively impact the reputation of Love Field and th e City, which owns Love Field. The Court finds the City faces the threat of irreparabl e harm if Delta is removed from Love Field Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 38 of 42 PageID 757339 while the legal issues are determined. Fi nally, the balance of harms and the public interest weigh in favor of granting injunctive relief. The harm or threat of harm to Southwest is minimal in comparison to pote ntial chaos if injunctive relief were not granted and Delta was removed. Furthermor e, some amount of certainty among the flying public as to the gate situation and gene rally flight operations at Love Field is in the public interest. The Court finds all four equitable factors were established entitling the City to injunctive relief. The Court finds that a preliminary injunction order enjoining Southwest from evicting or otherwise remo ving Delta from Southwest’s gate(s) at Love Field, or otherwise interfering with or preventing Delta’s continued use of Southwest’s gate(s) to operate Delta’s five da ily flights is the proper injunctive relief in this case. This is the same injunctive relief requested by Delta which the Court granted on Delta’s motion. So, even if th e Court did not to grant Delta’s motion, the
Court grants the City’s motion fo r injunctive relief. As previously stated, none of these factua l findings and/or conclusions of law are binding at a trial on the merits.
IV. Conclusion Love Field is unique in that it is the on ly airport in the United States that is controlled by a federal statute and is gate-c onstrained, thereby freezing growth. Love Field is in that respect the most unique airport in the world; no other airport has to deal with the Congressionally mandated no-growth and limited hourly flight Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 39 of 42 PageID 757440 restrictions. Assuming WARA is constituti onal since no one is attacking the statute at this point, the constraints imposed on this airport by WARA are constraining to the point of being out of date. These ar e political constraints, not constraints resulting from business relate d development. Love Field does not have the expansion options available to other airports which allow future growth. As Delta so succinctly stated, “At most airports, accommodation is not the equivalent of access.” Love Field is the exception to this rule. Unless circumstances change, accommodation is the only means by which Delta can have long-term access with any certainty at Love F ield. These airlines unders tandably fight tooth-and-nail for virtually non-existent expansion of gate space. The City clearly does not want to force accommodation on any airline, partic ularly one that has paid $100s of millions in improvements to Love Field and controls 90% of the airport’s flights. Southwest is a model for running an airline. Understanda bly it is aggressively trying to gain 100% of the gates at Love Field. Mr. Montgome ry of Southwest testified that Southwest would buy the last two gates at Love Field an d control all 20 if it could. Southwest is contractually and legislatively bound to not expand to DFW Airport without relinquishing preferential use of its gates at Love Field. As Southwest has said, there may be a time when no future accommodations can be made at Love Field. Today is
not that time. With the evidence before the Court, the Court finds Southwest must accommodate Delta under the Lease Agreemen t it signed because an accommodation would not have “unduly interfered with” Sout hwest’s operations schedule at the time, Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 40 of 42 PageID 757541 nor Southwest may not add flights after the accommodation request is made to
thwart the accommodation. The Court also fi nds Delta’s five flights currently do not unduly interfere with Southwest’s schedule.
Love Field will continue to face thes e challenges being so severely gate constrained. To change this no-growth situ ation at Love Field, Congress will need to act. The political powers-that-be can addres s and correct these issues that face Love Field and new entrant airlines through repeal ing legislation unique to this airport. Without this change, new entrant airlines, the City, Signatory Airlines, and the
citizens of Dallas will continue to face di lemmas like this one. The flying public deserves more courage from its elected offici als about travel to and from Love Field.
The time for these elected officials to consid er an end to all constraints on Love Field
is now. The Court DENIES Southwest’s motion for preliminary injunction. The Clerk of the Court is hereby directed to terminate the City’s motion for preliminary injunction as moot. The Court GRANTS Delta’s motion for preliminary injunction. Southwest is hereby enjoined from evicting or otherwise removing Delta from Southwest’s gate(s) at Love Field, or otherw ise interfering with orpreventing Delta’s continued use of Southwest’s gate(s) to oper ate Delta’s five daily flights. Southwest
is also enjoined from adding additional flights on any Southwest ga te(s) Delta uses to operate its five daily flights. Furthe rmore, Southwest must inform the Court in writing within five (5) days of any reduction and/or change in Southwest’s flights Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 41 of 42 PageID 757642 operations at Love Field so that the Court can evaluate what the Court considers to be full utilization of the gate s and other leased space at Lo ve Field. Reduction and/or change in flight operations includes, but is not exclusive of, destinations, hours of flights, and number of flights each day. Furthermore, pursuant to Rule 65(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Delta mu st post a bond in the amount of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) on or before January 15, 2016, at 4:00 P.M., to secure payment of any damages sustaine d if Southwest is found to have been wrongfully enjoined. Also pursuant to Ru le 65(c) of the Fede ral Rules of Civil Procedure, the City must po st a bond in the amount of one hundred dollars ($100) on or before January 15, 2016, at 4:00 P.M., to secure payment of any damages
sustained if Southwest is found to have been wrongfully enjoined.
SO ORDERED. Signed January 8 th , 2016.

______________________________________ ED KINKEADE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Case 3:15-cv-02069-K Document 257 Filed 01/08/16 Page 42 of 42 PageID 7577