Initial Decision Release No. 1383

Administrative Proceeding

File No. 3-17849

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Before the

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Washington, D.C. 20549

In the Matter of

Angel Oak Capital Partners, LLC,

Peraza Capital & Investment, LLC,

Sreeniwas Prabhu, and

David W. Wells

Initial Decision

August 23, 2019

Appearances: John D. Worland, Jr., Stephan J. Schlegelmilch, Fuad 

Rana, and Christina M. Adams,

for the Division of Enforcement,

Securities and Exchange Commission

Mark David Hunter, Jenny D. Johnson-Sardella, 

and Robert C. Harris, Hunter Taubman Fischer & Li 

LLC, for Respondent Peraza Capital & Investment, LLC

Before: James E. Grimes, Administrative Law Judge

Summary

This is a partially settled proceeding in which Respondent Angel Oak 

Capital Partners, LLC, has conceded that it violated the broker-dealer 

registration requirement found in Section 15(a) of the Securities Exchange 

Act of 1934, and Respondents Peraza Capital & Investment, LLC, Sreeniwas 

Prabhu, and David W. Wells have conceded that they caused Angel Oak’s 

violation. The only remaining issues are whether Peraza should be ordered to 

pay disgorgement plus interest and a civil monetary penalty, and if so, in 

what amounts.
2

Introduction

The Securities and Exchange Commission instituted this proceeding 

under Exchange Act Sections 15(b) and 21C.

1 The proceeding was instituted, 

based on Respondents’ offers of settlement and concessions of liability, to 

determine whether Peraza should be ordered to pay disgorgement plus 

interest and a civil monetary penalty. 

In December 2018 and January 2019, I denied the parties’ motions for 

summary disposition and scheduled the merits hearing.2 After the parties’ 

later settlement discussions fell through, I held the merits hearing over the 

course of two days in May 2019, in Miami, Florida.

During the hearing, the Division called three witnesses, Peraza rested 

without calling any witnesses, and I admitted 73 of the parties’ 75 joint 

exhibits. 

Findings of Fact

The terms of the OIP require me to accept the OIP’s factual findings as 

true.3 I therefore base the following findings of fact and conclusions on the 

OIP’s binding factual findings and on the entirety of the remaining record. 

Outside of the binding factual findings in the OIP, I have applied

preponderance of the evidence as the standard of proof.4 All arguments that 

are inconsistent with this decision are rejected.

As noted, this case concerns violations of the broker-dealer registration 

requirement found in Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act. Section 15(a) makes 

it unlawful for a broker or a dealer to effect securities transactions unless the 

broker or dealer has registered with the Commission.5 As Respondents 

 

1 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b), 78u-3.

2 Angel Oak Capital Partners, LLC, Admin. Proc. Rulings Release No. 

6437, 2019 SEC LEXIS 71 (ALJ Feb. 1, 2019) (denying the Division’s motion); 

Angel Oak, Admin. Proc. Rulings Release No. 6416, 2018 SEC LEXIS 3571 

(ALJ Dec. 19, 2018) (denying Peraza’s motion).

3 OIP at 9.

4 See Rita J. McConville, Exchange Act Release No. 51950, 2005 WL 

1560276, at *14 (June 30, 2005), pet. denied, 465 F.3d 780 (7th Cir. 2006).

5 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a).
3

agreed, Angel Oak violated Section 15(a) and Peraza, Prabhu, and Wells 

caused that violation.6

At the time of the OIP, Peraza had been a Commission-registered 

broker-dealer since 2002.7 During the relevant time, however, Angel Oak was 

not registered with the Commission in any capacity.

8 Angel Oak is the 

general partner to Angel Oak Capital Advisors, LLC, which is a Commissionregistered investment adviser.9

Prabhu is Capital Advisors’ co-founder, managing partner, and chief 

investment officer.10 He was associated with Peraza from September 2009 

through September 2012.11

Wells is a Capital Advisors employee.12 He was registered with Peraza 

from 2009 through 2014, when he was the branch manager and supervisor of 

its Atlanta office.13 Peraza’s Atlanta office was essentially composed of Angel 

Oak employees who were registered representatives of Peraza.14

 

6 OIP at 8.

7 Id. at 4. Peraza has not been registered with FINRA or a national 

securities exchange since August 2017. J. Ex. 5 at 1–2 (Peraza’s FINRA 

BrokerCheck report); see Tr. 126.

8 OIP at 4.

9 Id. at 3–4. To keep things straight, I will refer to Respondent Angel Oak 

Capital Partners, LLC, as Angel Oak and any other, related Angel Oak 

entities by the functional parts of their names. Entities such as Angel Oak 

Capital Advisors, LLC, and Angel Oak Capital Partners II, LLC, are thus 

respectively referenced as Capital Advisors and Capital Partners II.

10 Id. at 4. Prabhu is also an owner of Angel Oak affiliate AOC Securities, 

LLC, which is a registered broker-dealer, Capital Partners II, and Angel Oak 

Consulting Group Portfolio Management, LLC. Id. at 4 & n.3.

11 Id. at 4.

12 Id.

13 Id.

14 Id. at 2, 5.
4

In 2009, Angel Oak’s owners became interested in establishing and 

running a securities business.15 To that end, they began negotiating an 

agreement with Peraza that would allow Angel Oak to run a securities 

business through Peraza in exchange for a portion of Angel Oak’s commission 

revenue.16 In October 2009, Angel Oak and Peraza signed an “independent 

contractor agreement” (the Agreement).17

The Agreement expressly provided that Angel Oak would conduct a 

securities business through Peraza.18 To this end, Peraza filed a Form BR 

with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) “designating” 

Angel Oak’s Atlanta office as a Peraza branch office and an Office of 

Supervisory Jurisdiction.19 And under the Agreement, Angel Oak’s employees 

who were involved in trading securities “were registered with FINRA as 

registered representatives of Peraza.”20 The Agreement entitled Peraza to 

15% of the commission revenue Angel Oak’s trades generated.21

Under the Agreement, Peraza provided Angel Oak with “a trading 

platform which allowed [it] ‘to operate a trading desk to execute trades in 

bonds and mortgage-backed securities.’”

22 Peraza also “provide[d] ‘all 

necessary back office support’” regarding Angel Oak’s “sales and trading 

 

15 Id. at 4.

16 Id.

17 Id. at 2, 4; see J. Ex. 74.

18 OIP at 4.

19 Id. at 2. Form BR is used by FINRA members to register their branch 

offices. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Financial Industry Regulatory 

Authority, Inc.; Order Approving Proposed Rule Change To Amend the 

Uniform Branch Office Registration Form (Form BR), 79 Fed. Reg. 12,547, 

12,547 (Mar. 5, 2014). Under FINRA rules, a branch office is a “location 

where” persons associated with a FINRA member “regularly conduct[] the 

business of effecting [securities] transactions.” FINRA Rule 3110(f)(2)(A). An 

Office of Supervisory Jurisdiction is an office of a FINRA member at which 

certain enumerated functions, such as order execution and market making, 

take place. FINRA Rule 3110(f)(1).

20 OIP at 2, 5.

21 Id. at 2.

22 Id. at 4–5.
5

activities.”23 And all of Angel Oak’s trades under the Agreement were to “be 

cleared and settled by [Peraza’s] clearing firm.”24

Wells served as the branch manager of Peraza’s Atlanta office—meaning 

Angel Oak’s securities traders—and as the “supervisor of the employees that 

operated under the name of Angel Oak and engaged in trading activities as 

registered representatives of Peraza.”25

Under the Agreement, Angel Oak’s employees who were registered with 

Peraza began executing trades through Peraza’s trading platform in March 

2010.26 Between then and October 2014, they effected over 900 securities 

trades.27 Commissions from those trades flowed from Peraza’s clearing firm 

to Peraza.28 Peraza retained 15% plus expenses allocated to Angel Oak and 

transmitted the balance to Wells’s personal bank account.29 Wells retained 

commission revenue for trades he handled and doled out the remaining funds 

to traders and to Angel Oak.30 Peraza and Angel Oak received this 

commission revenue “through [the] arrangement” with each other, that is,

because of the Agreement.31

As a factual matter, none of Angel Oak’s trades would have occurred but 

for the Agreement.32 Specifically, Peraza registered Angel Oak’s traders; gave 

them access to its trading platform, including its settlement, clearing, and 

trade-support services; provided back office support; and interacted with 

 

23 Id. at 4.

24 Id. at 5.

25 Id. at 3.

26 Id. at 5.

27 Id.

28 Tr. 60–61.

29 OIP at 5–6, 8. Initially, Peraza transmitted funds directly to Angel Oak. 

Tr. 59–60. But throughout the relevant time period, which was January 1, 

2012, through October 2014, Peraza transmitted the funds to Wells. Tr. 60.

30 OIP at 6, 8.

31 See id. at 2–3, 8.

32 See id. at 2–8.
6

clearing firms on Angel Oak’s behalf.

33 Peraza thus “facilitated Angel Oak[’s]

... ability to operate as an unregistered broker-dealer.”34

Angel Oak’s owners, however, were not all registered as broker-dealers 

or associated with a registered broker-dealer.

35 And these unregistered and 

unassociated individuals “controlled certain” aspects of Angel Oak’s securities 

business, “including ... hiring new employees to engage in securities trading 

... who became registered representatives of Peraza Capital, determining 

compensation (including transaction-based compensation),” “engaging in 

marketing activities,” “and participating in relevant discussions [about] how 

to operate the securities business.”

36

Angel Oak also made all staffing decisions as to its securities business.37

While operating under the Agreement, it hired new employees as its 

securities business grew.38 The new employees received offer letters from 

Angel Oak, rather than Peraza, and Angel Oak set their salary, commission 

percentages, and amount of performance bonuses.39

During the time Angel Oak operated under the Agreement, it “held itself 

out as a broker-dealer.”40 It “marketed itself to prospective customers as 

providing broker-dealer services,” but failed to “always disclos[e] its 

relationship with Peraza Capital.”41 Instead, it often used the Angel Oak 

name.42 One of its marketing documents, “described the ‘Angel Oak Family of 

 

33 Id. at 2, 3, 8.

34 Id. at 8; see id. at 3 (stating that Peraza’s “assistance ... allowed Angel 

Oak ... to operate a brokerage business without registering as a brokerdealer”).

35 Id. at 6.

36 Id. at 6; see id. at 7–8 (“Wells ... took direction from[] unregistered 

owners of Angel Oak ... regarding the operation of the securities business and 

its profitability.”).

37 Id. at 6.

38 Id.

39 Id.

40 Id. at 2.

41 Id. at 6.

42 Id. at 2.
7

Companies’” as “includ[ing] a ‘Full-Service Fixed Income Broker-Dealer.’”43

Additionally, customers regularly received trade confirmations showing that 

Angel Oak was involved in the trade.44

Throughout the operative period of the Agreement, Peraza “knew or 

should have known that” Angel Oak’s “owners ..., who were not all registered 

as broker-dealers or associated with a registered broker-dealer, were 

controlling the securities activities of the employees involved in the securities 

business.”

45 Although it was not registered as a broker or dealer, Angel Oak 

received approximately $3,054,288 in transaction-based compensation.46

During the hearing, the Division called Brian Palechek, a CPA employed 

by the Commission, to testify.47 He testified about how the $3,054,288 figure 

in the OIP for Angel Oak’s commission revenue under the Agreement was 

derived and the seeming inconsistency between that binding figure and the 

similarly binding findings in the OIP as to the percentage of commission 

revenue Angel Oak and Peraza received. 

Using figures from January through July 2011, Palechek calculated that 

Angel Oak’s profit margin was approximately 37%.48 After reviewing Angel 

Oak’s financial records, he determined that from August 2011 through 2014, 

its net profit was $3,054,290.69.49 Assuming a constant profit margin, 

Palechek calculated that the latter figure was 37% of Angel Oak’s 85% share 

of total commissions during that period. According to Palechek, this meant 

that Angel Oak’s gross commission income from August 2011 through 2014 

was $8,327,647.20.50 Based on the fact that Angel Oak received 85% of the 

 

43 Id. at 6.

44 Id.

45 Id. at 8.

46 Id. at 2, 6.

47 See Tr. 16–18.

48 Tr. 27–28; see infra note 50.

49 Tr. 31; see Tr. 46 (affirming that $3,054,290.69 represented the “net 

proceeds that [Angel Oak] received”), 48 (“that was the net amount that they 

had retained after paying any of the broke[r] expenses”).

50 Tr. 33, 46–47. Because $3,054,290.69 is 37% of $8,254,839.70, not 

$8,327,647.20, it is apparent that 37% is a rounded figure. And going back to 

Palechek’s original calculation of Angel Oak’s profit margin—commission 

(continued...)
8

total commission revenue, Palechek calculated that the total commission 

revenue generated by Angel Oak’s trades from August 2011 through 2014 

was $9,797,232.00.51 And 15% of that figure—Peraza’s share of commission 

revenue—is $1,469,584.80.

52

The Division also called Xiomara Perez to testify. She is an accountant 

and holds a series 28 license.53 Perez worked at Peraza from 2009 through 

2016 and served as its chief financial officer and financial and operations 

principal.54 During the relevant time, her responsibilities included preparing 

commission calculations, filing certain financial reports with FINRA, 

preparing Peraza’s financials, and handling Peraza’s accounting 

responsibilities.55 Perez was responsible for tracking commission revenue and 

expenses for the Atlanta branch office.56

On a monthly basis, Perez received Peraza’s commission revenue from 

the clearing houses Peraza used, together with a description of assessed pertransaction ticket charges.57 She explained that after receiving the revenue, 

she would prepare a calculation showing the gross commissions less ticket, 

clearing, and related charges, and send the calculation to Wells for his 

review.58 On Wells’s approval, Perez would wire him the calculated amount.59

 

profit divided by commission income, Tr. 28—shows that the precise figure is 

36.6676514%. See J. Ex. 12. Using that percentage yields the figures 

Palechek calculated.

51 Tr. 36, 47. In the equation .85x=$8,327,647.20, x is $9,797,232.00.

52 Tr. 36.

53 Tr. 52–53. A Series 28 license allows a person to serve as an introducing 

broker-dealer financial and operations principal. See

http://www.finra.org/industry/series28#permitted-activities; see also FINRA 

Rule 1220(a)(4).

54 Tr. 54–55.

55 Tr. 57.

56 Tr. 59.

57 Tr. 60–61, 90–91, 111.

58 Tr. 61–62, 91; see J. Exs. 16–44.

59 Tr. 61–62, 91.
9

During its investigation, the Division asked Perez to prepare a 

spreadsheet showing revenue and expenses related to Angel Oak.60 That 

spreadsheet, which covers 2009 through 2014, was admitted as joint exhibit 

3. Subtracting figures before 2012 to avoid statute of limitations concerns,

Perez’s spreadsheet showed gross commission revenue of $8,724,505.44, gross 

commissions to the Atlanta branch office of $7,544,017.46, and commissions 

retained by Peraza of $1,180,487.98.

61

Perez’s spreadsheet also lists overhead expenses that Peraza incurred in 

its support of operations in the Atlanta branch office.

62 For 2012 to 2014, 

these overhead expenses included legal, professional, consulting, and 

accounting fees, as well as occupancy and equipment allocations.63 These 

expenses totaled $795,256.88 for 2012 through 2014, and according to the 

spreadsheet, reduced Peraza’s profits from the trading at the Atlanta branch

office.

64 On the other hand, Peraza deducted direct transaction costs such as 

ticket charges from the money that it sent to Wells.65 Those direct 

transaction costs, therefore, unlike the overhead expenses identified in the 

spreadsheet, did not affect Peraza’s bottom line.66

On cross-examination, Perez explained that the Agreement was drafted 

by Peraza’s counsel, Kevin Carreno, who was then a member of FINRA’s 

board of governors.67 She also further discussed the expenses listed on the 

spreadsheet that Peraza incurred but which were associated with Angel Oak 

and which were not charged to Angel Oak or withheld from revenue 

transmitted to Wells.68 Perez explained that she allocated the expenses on a 

 

60 Tr. 64.

61 J. Ex. 3 at 1; Tr. 68.

62 J. Ex. 3 at 1; Tr. 68, 76, 102–03, 111–12.

63 J. Ex. 3 at 1; see Tr. 69–75.

64 J. Ex. 3 at 1.

65 Tr. 62–63, 91; see J. Exs. 16–44.

66 See, e.g., J. Ex. 28 at 3 (showing that Peraza first took its 15% cut of the 

commissions generated by the Atlanta branch, and then deducted the ticket 

charges before sending the remainder of the money on to Wells).

67 Tr. 92–93; see Tr. 124 (affirming that Carreno was Peraza’s “in-house 

counsel”).

68 Tr. 95–103.
10

profit and loss statement she prepared at the Division’s request, but had not 

calculated the expenses contemporaneously.69 She said they represented her 

“educated allocation.”70

Sam Lewis was Peraza’s president and chief investment officer from 

approximately 2001 through 2017.71 He signed Peraza’s offer of settlement on 

Peraza’s behalf.72

Lewis’s testimony revealed that Peraza has settled charges with FINRA 

three times.73 In 2005, Peraza settled allegations related to its failure to 

comply with certain anti-money laundering requirements in the Bank 

Secrecy Act, and agreed to a censure and $10,000 fine.74

In 2010, it settled allegations that it failed to maintain required 

minimum net capital on three separate days in 2008, failed to file or failed to 

timely file notifications of its failures to maintain net capital, failed to 

maintain accurate books and records, and filed two inaccurate reports with 

FINRA.75 Peraza agreed to a censure and a $12,500 fine.76

Finally, in 2014 Peraza settled allegations that during a three-month 

window in 2012, it failed to report 83 transactions to FINRA’s Trade 

Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE), which represented 29% of the 

 

69 Tr. 104–05.

70 Tr. 105.

71 Tr. 118, 125.

72 J. Ex. 75 at 14; Tr. 129–30.

73 See Tr. 132; J. Exs. 13–15. Peraza’s first settlement was with FINRA’s 

predecessor, the NASD. See J. Ex. 13. For ease of reference, and because it 

makes no difference for present purposes, I will refer to all settlements as 

being with FINRA.

74 J. Ex.13; see 31 U.S.C. § 5318; United and Strengthening America by 

Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 

(USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, § 356(a), 115 Stat. 272; 

31 C.F.R. § 103.19 (2005); FINRA Rule 3310.

75 J. Ex. 14 at 2.

76 Id.
11

transactions it was required to report during that period.

77 Peraza agreed to a 

censure and $10,000 fine.78 Without contradiction, both Perez and Lewis 

explained that this violation related to a branch office’s failure to timely file 

TRACE reports.79

In each settlement, Peraza agreed that on the settlement offer’s 

acceptance, the settlement could “be considered in any future actions brought 

by FINRA or any other regulator against the firm.”80

On cross-examination, Lewis testified that no customer had ever 

complained about the trades that are the subject of this proceeding.

81 He also 

opined that absent Peraza’s relationship with Angel Oak, customers still 

would have paid commissions on their trades in the same amounts.

82

Issues

A. Whether Peraza must pay disgorgement and prejudgment interest?

B. Whether Peraza should pay a civil monetary penalty as a result of the 

fact that it caused Angel Oak’s violation of Section 15(a)?

 

77 J. Ex. 15 at 1–2. The NASD developed TRACE to respond to concerns 

about the need for greater “transparency in, and better surveillance of, the 

corporate debt market.” Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of 

Proposed Rule Change and Amendment No. 1 by the National Association of 

Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Permanent Fee Structure for the Trade 

Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE), 68 Fed. Reg. 62,483, 62,486 

(Nov. 4, 2003).

78 J. Ex. 15 at 2.

79 Tr. 85, 144–45 (explaining that Wells entered the trades in question), 

148.

80 J. Ex. 13 at 1; J. Ex. 14 at 4; J. Ex. 15 at 3. Peraza’s FINRA 

BrokerCheck report indicates that these three settlements were accepted. J. 

Ex. 5 at 19–24.

81 Tr. 150.

82 Tr. 153.
12

Discussion and Conclusions of Law

1. Peraza must disgorge the commission revenue it received under the 

Agreement. 

As noted, because Peraza’s settlement and the OIP resolve the issue of 

whether Peraza caused Angel Oak’s violation of Section 15(a), the only 

remaining questions are whether Peraza should be ordered to pay 

disgorgement and interest and a civil monetary penalty and, if so, how much.

By statute, the Commission has the authority to order respondents to 

pay disgorgement and interest in cases where the Commission may impose a 

penalty under Exchange Act Section 21B and in cases brought under Section 

21C.

83 Disgorgement is an equitable, discretionary remedy, which is intended 

to prevent unjust enrichment and to act as a deterrent.84 To establish the 

appropriate amount of disgorgement, the Division need only show “a 

reasonable approximation of profits causally connected to the violation” in 

question.85 Ordinarily, once the Division makes the required showing, the 

 

83 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-2(e), 78u-3(e).

84 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-2(e), 78u-3(e) (providing that the Commission “may” 

order disgorgement); SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890 F.2d 1215, 1230 (D.C. 

Cir. 1989). The Supreme Court’s decision in Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 

1643 (2017), that disgorgement is a penalty for statute of limitations 

purposes, did not change the fact that disgorgement is “primarily an 

equitable remedy ‘designed to deprive a wrongdoer of his unjust enrichment.’” 

SEC v. Analytica Bio-Energy Corp., 317 F. Supp. 3d 574, 580 (D.D.C. 2018) 

(quoting First City Fin., 890 F.2d at 1230)); accord United States v. Meyer, 

376 F. Supp. 3d 1290, 1295 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (“Kokesh certainly did not discuss 

or overrule the longstanding precedent of categorizing disgorgement as an 

equitable remedy”) (quoting United States v. Rapower-3, LLC, 294 F. Supp.

3d 1238, 1242 (D. Utah 2018)).

85 First City Fin., 890 F.2d at 1231; see SEC v. Warren, 534 F.3d 1368, 1370

(11th Cir. 2008); see also Montford & Co. v. SEC, 793 F.3d 76, 83–84 (D.C. 

Cir. 2015) (“[t]he touchstone of a disgorgement calculation is identifying a 

causal link between the illegal activity and the profit sought to be disgorged”) 

(quoting SEC v. UNIOIL, 951 F.2d 1304, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Edwards, J., 

concurring)) (alteration in original); cf. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. 

of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (“breadth and flexibility are inherent in 

equitable remedies”).
13

burden shifts to the respondent to show “that the disgorgement figure was 

not a reasonable approximation.”86

Here, the Division has shown, and Peraza has not seriously disputed, 

that Peraza’s 15% share of commissions earned during the life of the 

Agreement was $1,521,705.87. To avoid statute of limitations issues, 

however, the Division seeks only $1,180,487.98, the amount earned after 

2011. This figure is drawn from Ms. Perez’s calculation. Because she kept 

Peraza’s books and then, during the Commission’s investigation, calculated 

Peraza’s and Angel Oak’s share of commission revenue, her calculations 

persuasively establish the amount of commissions earned after 2011. 

Because, as discussed below, these commissions are causally connected to the 

violation, $1,180,487.98 represents an appropriate amount of disgorgement.87

Although it does not dispute this figure,88 Peraza argues that Angel 

Oak’s trades were legal because Angel Oak’s traders were registered with 

Peraza.89 But this argument runs headlong into the binding factual findings 

in the OIP. As the OIP details, Peraza “received commissions as a result of 

[its] arrangement” with Angel Oak, under which it “facilitated” Angel Oak’s 

“ability to operate as an unregistered broker-dealer.”90 And Peraza did this by

(1) registering some of Angel Oak’s employees, and (2) allowing Angel Oak 

access to Peraza’s trading platform.

91 So the fact Angel Oak’s employees were 

registered is not necessarily evidence the trades were legal; but it is evidence 

of Peraza’s efforts that caused Angel’s Oak’s violation of Section 15(a). 

Moreover, all of the 900 trades “were cleared through Peraza[’s] ... clearing 

firm,” something that would not have happened but for the Agreement and 

 

86 SEC v. Calvo, 378 F.3d 1211, 1217 (11th Cir. 2004).

87 Cf. optionsXpress, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78621, 2016 WL 

4413227, at *36 (Aug. 18, 2016) (finding that the commissions that the 

respondent earned by impermissibly executing buy-writes to satisfy its closeout obligations represented “an appropriate disgorgement amount”), 

abrogated in part on other grounds by Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).

88 See Resp’t’s Post-hearing Br. at 3 (affirming that “[t]he total amount of 

gross commissions that Peraza received between 2012 and 2014, as a result of 

the 900 trades, was $1,180,487.98”).

89 Id. at 3, 8.

90 OIP at 6, 8.

91 Id. at 3, 8.
14

Peraza’s facilitation of Angel Oak’s violation.92 Had it not been for the 

Agreement, none of the trades would have occurred through Peraza’s trading 

platform and Peraza would not have earned the commissions it did. In short, 

all of the trades occurred and commissions were earned under the auspices of 

the Agreement and are causally connected to Angel Oak’s Section 15(a) 

violation, which Peraza caused. Under the binding terms of the OIP, all of the 

trades were a core component of the illegal activity.

Peraza also suggested during the merits hearing that once it started 

paying Wells—who then disbursed the commission revenue—and stopped 

paying Angel Oak directly, the Agreement ceased to have effect and no trades 

were entered under it.93 This is a red herring as the trades occurred and

commissions were earned as a result of the arrangement between Angel Oak 

and Peraza, as the binding facts in the OIP establish. Whether Peraza paid 

Angel Oak directly or through Wells is irrelevant.

Peraza also argues that disgorgement should be offset by its legitimate 

expenses, including legal and professional fees, accounting fees, and 

equipment allocations.

94 In making this argument, it continues to assert that 

the 900 trades were “legal trades,” and although Peraza “‘facilitated’ Angel 

Oak in operating as an unregistered broker-dealer,” the back-office support it 

provided to Angel Oak to support the legal trades should be offset from the 

disgorgement amount.

95

In general, “securities law violators may not offset their disgorgement 

liability with business expenses.”96 But precedent on this point typically deals 

with wholly illegitimate enterprises that exist to defraud investors.97 And 

here, there is no evidence Angel Oak’s customers were defrauded, did not 

 

92 Id. at 5.

93 Tr. 194–95, 202–03.

94 Resp’t’s Post-hearing Br. at 6–9; Resp’t’s Reply at 2–4; see J. Ex. 3 at 1. 

Peraza does not attempt to argue that its disgorgement should be reduced by 

direct transaction costs such as clearinghouse expenses. Indeed, as noted 

above, the record demonstrates that those costs were paid by Angel Oak, not 

Peraza. Tr. 62–63, 91; see J. Exs. 16–44.

95 Resp’t’s Post-hearing Br. at 8–9.

96 SEC v. Markusen, 143 F. Supp. 3d 877, 893 (D. Minn. 2015).

97 See id.; see also SEC v. Kenton Capital, Ltd., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 

1998)).
15

receive the securities they wanted to purchase, or were charged unreasonable 

commissions. From the customers’ perspectives, nothing untoward happened.

In denying the Division’s motion for summary disposition, I left open the 

possibility that Peraza could demonstrate that offsetting expenses is 

appropriate.98 But Peraza has failed to establish entitlement to an offset. 

During the hearing, Peraza conceded that Angel Oak did not enter other 

trades, legitimate or otherwise, outside of the 900 trades discussed in the 

OIP.99 Nor did it attempt to establish that for any of those 900 trades, Angel 

Oak was not holding itself out as a broker-dealer. And although no customers 

were harmed or mistreated, all of those 900 trades were nonetheless at the 

core of Peraza’s and Angel Oak’s illegal activities. Angel Oak, an unregistered 

broker-dealer, should not have been engaged in the business of effecting 

these securities transactions.

100 Peraza, therefore, cannot demonstrate that 

any of its expenditures related to Angel Oak were legitimate because it 

should not have incurred any expenses to support Angel Oak.101 The “back 

 

98 Angel Oak, 2019 SEC LEXIS 71, at * 12–13. In SEC v. JT Wallenbrock & 

Assocs., the Ninth Circuit granted that in “some circumstances, [a] broker” 

subject to disgorgement “might be entitled to offset expenses customarily 

incurred in the purchase and sale of such stock if the investor would have 

had to pay for such expenses in any legitimate transaction.” 440 F.3d 1109, 

1114 (9th Cir. 2006). The court, however, declined to rely on that rationale 

because the defendants’ “entire business enterprise and related expenses 

were not legitimate at all, and no aspect of the defendants’ conduct [could] be 

fairly characterized as a ‘function of the way a securities firm does business.’”

Id. at 1115 (quoting and contrasting SEC v. Thomas James Assocs., Inc., 738 

F. Supp. 88, 95 (W.D.N.Y. 1990)).

99 Tr. 195–97.

100 In its reply brief, Peraza argues that “the OIP contains no findings that 

Peraza was not a legitimate broker-dealer” or that it “was created for a 

fraudulent or illegal purpose.” Respt’s Reply Br. at 3. This is true, but the 

issue is not whether Peraza is legitimate; the question is whether its business 

expenses related to the trades were legitimate, and Peraza has not shown 

that they were, as the expenses were in furtherance of Angel Oak’s illegal 

broker activities.

101 The fact that Angel Oak conducted no legitimate business serves to 

distinguish a case on which Peraza relies. SEC v. Gold Standard Mining 

Corp., No. 12-cv-5662, 2016 WL 6892101, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 26, 2016) 

(offsetting certain expenses because the company was “a legitimate 

accounting firm . . . that . . . performed legitimate accounting services for 

other customers”); see Resp’t’s Post-hearing Br. at 8–9. Peraza also relies on 

(continued...)
16

office” expenses identified by Perez, including legal fees, professional fees, 

and occupancy and equipment allocations, are among the kind of 

expenditures that facilitated Angel Oak’s illegal broker activities.

102 There is 

therefore no basis to apportion legitimate expenses associated with Angel 

Oak’s trades and Peraza’s support of Angel Oak. As the binding facts in the 

OIP reveal, those trades and that support were core components of the

unlawful conduct.

103

The OIP directs that if disgorgement is ordered, Peraza must pay 

prejudgment interest calculated from October 1, 2014.104 Based on that 

starting date and a disgorgement amount of $1,180,487.98, the Division 

calculates that as of the end of June 2019, Peraza should be ordered to pay 

$245,322.60 in prejudgment interest.

105 Peraza does not challenge this 

calculation. I order Peraza to pay prejudgment interest, which will be 

calculated from October 1, 2014, to the last day of the month preceding the 

month in which payment of disgorgement is made.106

 

SEC v. Hall, No. 15-cv-23489, at 12–16 (S.D. Fla. April 13, 2017), ECF No. 

142, in which a court could not determine a reasonable disgorgement amount 

because the Commission’s request appeared not to account for substantial 

offsets. Resp’t’s Post-hearing Br. at 7. It is not clear exactly how the facts in 

Hall are comparable to the matter here, and in any event, although Peraza 

does not mention it, the district court in Hall later granted reconsideration 

and declined to offset expenses against disgorgement. SEC v. Hall, No. 15-cv23489, 2017 WL 3635108 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2017), aff’d, 759 F. App’x 877 

(11th Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. May 20, 2019) (No. 18-1471).

102 See J. Ex. 3 at 1; J. Ex. 74 at 2 (Agreement states that Peraza will 

provide back office support services to Angel Oak in addition to a trading 

platform); OIP at 4.

103 Peraza asserts that “the 900 trades themselves did not violate any 

federal securities laws.” Resp’t’s Post-hearing Br. at 8. Whether the trades 

were legal independent of Angel Oak’s illegal broker activities misses the 

point. As the OIP established, Angel Oak’s trading activities were a core 

component of its unlawful operation as an unregistered broker-dealer. 

104 OIP at 9.

105 Div. Post-hearing Br. at 19; id. at App’x. 1.

106 See 17 C.F.R. § 201.600(a).
17

2. Peraza must pay a maximum first-tier penalty. 

The next question is whether to impose a civil monetary penalty. Section 

21B of the Exchange Act gives the Commission the authority, in cease-anddesist proceedings instituted under Section 21C, to impose monetary 

penalties against any respondent that causes a violation of the Exchange 

Act.107 Although the Exchange Act creates a three-tiered system based on 

increasing degrees of culpability for imposing civil penalties, the Division 

seeks only a first-tier (i.e., the lowest level) penalty of $75,000. A first-tier 

penalty may be imposed simply based on the determination that a 

respondent caused a violation.108 This statutory requirement is met here. 

Peraza’s settlement and the binding conclusion in the OIP show that Peraza 

caused a violation of Section 15(a). 

To determine whether to impose a civil monetary penalty, however, I 

must weigh the public-interest factors listed in Section 21B(c),109 bearing in 

mind that there is no requirement that all factors be shown before imposing a 

penalty.110

The first factor is whether Peraza’s conduct “involved fraud, deceit, 

manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard of a regulatory 

requirement.”111 Peraza did not commit fraud. And the record does not 

 

107 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(a)(2)(B).

108 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(b)(1).

109 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(c). In contrast to cases initiated under Section 

15(b), the Commission is not expressly required in cease-and-desist 

proceedings instituted under Section 21C, to weigh the public interest before 

imposing monetary sanctions. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(a)(1), with 15 

U.S.C. § 78u-2(a)(2). I have previously determined in ruling on the Division’s 

motion for summary disposition, however, that because the statutory factors 

found in Section 21B(c) provide an appropriate framework, I will weigh those 

factors in deciding whether to impose a monetary penalty. See Angel Oak, 

2019 SEC LEXIS 71, at *15 n.64.

110 R.E. Bassie & Co., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release 

No. 3354, 2012 WL 90269, at *13 (Jan. 10, 2012); see Phlo Corp., Exchange 

Act Release No. 55562, 2007 WL 966943, at *15 & n.84 (Mar. 30, 2007) 

(imposing a penalty despite respondent’s clean regulatory history and the 

absence of unjust enrichment).

111 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(c)(1).
18

indicate that Peraza’s violations were knowing or reckless.112 The very fact 

that the OIP found that Peraza caused Angel Oak’s violation—instead of that 

it aided or abetted the violation—suggests that Peraza lacked scienter.113

Likewise, in its briefing in support of a penalty, the Division has not argued 

that Peraza acted with scienter.114

The second factor concerns “the harm to other persons resulting either 

directly or indirectly from” Peraza’s “act or omission.”115 The Division 

presented no evidence that anyone suffered any harm because Peraza caused 

Angel Oak’s violation of Section 15(a).

The third factor concerns “unjust enrichment” but requires “taking into 

account any restitution made to persons injured by” the violation at issue.116

 

112 The OIP states that Peraza facilitated Angel Oak’s trading even though 

it “knew” that Angel Oak was not registered. OIP at 3. But this does not 

necessarily mean Peraza knew that Angel Oak was operating as an 

unregistered broker. The OIP also says that Peraza “knew or should have 

known” that unregistered Angel Oak employees were controlling the 

business. Id. at 3, 8. Although its meaning can vary with context, “the phrase 

‘should have known’ . . . is classic negligence language.” KPMG Peat Marwick 

LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 43862, 2001 WL 47245, at *20 (Jan. 19, 

2001), pet. denied, 289 F.3d 109 (D.C. Cir. 2002). And because negligence is 

sufficient to establish causing liability, it is appropriate to “give the phrase 

its ordinary meaning.” Id. at 19–20.

113 Although causing a primary violation which does not require scienter 

can be found based on negligence alone, an aiding and abetting violation 

requires knowing or reckless behavior. See KPMG, 2001 WL 47245, at *19; 

see also Graham v. SEC, 222 F.3d 994, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

114 In closing argument, the Division argued that the OIP’s finding that 

Peraza “knew or should have known” about Angel Oak’s activities 

demonstrates scienter. Tr. 216. But, as noted, the phrase “should have 

known” often connotes negligence. KPMG, 2001 WL 47245, at *20. Moreover, 

the Division has not pressed these arguments in its briefing, arguing instead 

for a maximum first-tier civil penalty based on three factors—none of them 

Peraza’s scienter. Div. Post-hearing Br. at 21–23; Div. Reply Br. at 10–12. 

Indeed, when Peraza argued in its opening brief that it is undisputed that 

Peraza’s “violative conduct included no degree of scienter,” the Division did 

not respond in its reply. Resp’t’s Post-hearing Br. at 11.

115 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(c)(2).

116 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(c)(3).
19

The term unjust enrichment is not defined in the Exchange Act. It ordinarily 

refers, however, to obtaining funds at the expense of others.117 Here, there is 

no evidence that Angel Oak’s customers did not actually receive the securities 

they bought or that Angel Oak preyed on customers, charging exorbitant 

commissions.118 But both Angel Oak and Peraza received commission 

revenue, which, given the findings in the OIP, was illegitimate because Angel 

Oak was operating as an unregistered broker-dealer and Peraza facilitated 

its ability to do so. And Commission precedent suggests that revenue earned 

as a result of a Section 15(a) violation amounts to unjust enrichment.119

The fourth factor is Peraza’s regulatory history.120 Peraza has settled 

allegations with FINRA on three separate occasions. In settling those 

allegations, Peraza agreed that its settlements could “be considered in any 

future actions brought by ... any ... regulator against the firm.”121 Of the 

three violations, the Division focuses on the second, which involved three 

consecutive months in which Peraza was net capital deficient.122 But these

net capital violations occurred 11 years ago. Without minimizing the 

seriousness of these violations, their remoteness in time tends to lessen their 

current importance. 

Instead, the most relevant settlement involved the 2012 failure of 

Peraza’s Atlanta branch office—which was staffed by Peraza’s registered 

representatives employed by Angel Oak—to report 83 transactions in

 

117 See Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 1 cmt. 

a (2011) (“the paradigm case of unjust enrichment is one in which the benefit 

on one side of the transaction corresponds to an observable loss on the 

other”); see also Texas Pig Stands, Inc. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int’l, Inc., 951 F.2d 

684, 694 & n.15 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that “[t]he definition of unjust 

enrichment provided to the jury accurately” defined “[u]njust enrichment [as]

the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another or unjust retention of 

money or property of another which is against the fundamental principles of 

justice or equity and good conscience”).

118 See Tr. 153.

119 See Allen M. Perres, Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 10287, 2017 WL 

280080, at *3–4 (Jan. 23, 2017), pet. denied, 695 F. App’x 980 (7th Cir. 2017).

120 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(c)(4).

121 J. Ex. 13 at 1; J. Ex. 14 at 4; J. Ex. 15 at 3.

122 Div. Post-hearing Br. at 22.
20

FINRA’s TRACE program, involving 29% of the transactions it was required 

to report.123 When considered in conjunction with the previous two violations

and the current dispute, this latter settlement suggests a continuing problem 

regarding Peraza’s ability to comply with the statutory and regulatory 

requirements that apply to it.

The fifth factor is deterrence.124 On this score, because Section 15(a) “was 

enacted as an original part of the” Exchange Act,125 its requirements are of 

“utmost importance in effecting the [Act’s] purposes.”126 Section 15(a)’s 

registration requirement allows the Commission to “exercise[]” “discipline ...

over those who ... engage in the securities business and” to “establish[]”

“necessary standards ... with respect to training, experience, and records.”127

Given the Commission’s mission—“‘protecting investors[,] ... safeguarding 

the integrity of the markets,’” and “making securities law violations 

unprofitable”

128—and the importance of Section 15(a)’s requirements, the 

need for deterrence weighs against Peraza in favor of a monetary sanction.129

 

123 J. Ex. 15 at 2; Tr. 144–45, 148.

124 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(c)(5).

125 Celsion Corp. v. Stearns Mgmt. Corp., 157 F. Supp. 2d 942, 947 (N.D. Ill. 

2001).

126 Eastside Church of Christ v. Nat’l Plan, Inc., 391 F.2d 357, 362 (5th Cir. 

1968); Celsion, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 947; see Perres, 2017 WL 280080, at *3. 

127 Eastside Church, 391 F.2d at 362; Perres, 2017 WL 280080, at *3.

128 Gordon Brent Pierce, Securities Act Release No. 9555, 2014 WL 896757,

at *19 (Mar. 7, 2014) (quoting SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1491 (9th Cir. 

1993)), pet. denied, 786 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

129 Peraza argues that a penalty will have no deterrent effect on it because 

it “has been administratively dissolved.” Resp’t’s Post-hearing Br. at 11; see 

Resp’t’s Reply Br. at 6. But this ignores both the Commission’s interest in 

deterring others from violating Section 15 and the fact that the Commission 

may validly weigh general deterrence, among other factors, in considering 

whether to impose a penalty. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(c)(5); see also David R. 

Wulf, Investment Advisers Act of 1940 Release No. 4356, 2016 WL 1085661, 

*4 & n.16 (Mar. 21, 2016), vacated in part on other grounds, Advisers Act 

Release No. 5287, 2019 WL 2903943 (July 5, 2019).
21

The final factor is whether there are any “other matters as justice may 

require.”130 I’ve noted the importance of Section 15(a)’s registration 

requirement. Because Angel Oak’s violations of Section 15 involved 900 

trades occurring over a period of years, those violations were persistent and 

not isolated.131 Peraza thus caused repeated violations of a foundational 

requirement of the Exchange Act. This alone marks its conduct as serious, 

although given the lack of harm to investors and absence of evidence of fraud, 

I cannot say that its conduct is egregious. Nonetheless, the fact that the 

violations involved millions of dollars in commission revenue supports my 

determination that Peraza’s violations are serious.132

Considering the foregoing factors, I find it appropriate to impose a 

monetary penalty. Although no one was harmed, and Peraza’s scienter 

cannot be shown on this record, the company caused violations of a 

foundational requirement of the securities laws for several years following

three previous violations. Imposing a penalty would further the Commission’s 

interest in protecting the investing public by serving as a deterrent to others 

who might otherwise follow Peraza’s example.

The Division seeks a full first-tier penalty. Because Peraza’s conduct was 

serious, recurrent, and followed several prior violations, I impose the full 

penalty in my discretion.

Record Certification

I certify that the record includes the items set forth in the record index 

issued by the Secretary of the Commission on August 1, 2019.

133

 

130 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(c)(6).

131 See Perres, 2017 WL 280080, at *1–4 (concerning registration violations 

involving 97 investors over a 29-month period). I reject Peraza’s argument 

that its violations were isolated and not repeated. Resp’t’s Post-hearing Br. at 

11; Resp’t’s Reply Br. at 5. Even though the violations only occurred at one 

branch, every transaction entered into by Angel Oak at that branch is 

implicated in this case.

132 Cf. Perres, 2017 WL 280080, at *3–4.

133 See 17 C.F.R. § 201.351(b).
22

Order

Under Section 21B(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Peraza 

Capital & Investment, LLC, shall PAY A CIVIL MONEY PENALTY in the 

amount of $75,000.

Under Sections 21B(e) and 21C(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 

1934, Peraza Capital & Investment, LLC, shall DISGORGE $1,180,487.98,

plus prejudgment interest. The prejudgment interest owed shall be calculated 

from October 1, 2014, to the last day of the month preceding the month in 

which payment of disgorgement is made. Prejudgment interest shall be 

calculated at the underpayment rate of interest established under Section 

6621(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 6621(a)(2), and shall be 

compounded quarterly.134

Payment of civil penalties, disgorgement, and interest shall be made no 

later than 21 days following the day this initial decision becomes final, unless 

the Commission directs otherwise. Payment shall be made in one of the 

following ways: (1) transmitted electronically to the Commission, which will 

provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon request; (2) direct 

payments from a bank account via Pay.gov through the SEC website at 

http://www.sec.gov/ofm; or (3) by certified check, bank cashier’s check, bank 

money order, or United States postal money order made payable to the 

Securities and Exchange Commission and hand-delivered or mailed to the 

following address alongside a cover letter identifying Respondent and 

Administrative Proceeding No. 3-17849: Enterprise Services Center, 

Accounts Receivable Branch, HQ Bldg., Room 181, AMZ-341, 6500 South 

MacArthur Blvd., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73169. A copy of the cover letter 

and instrument of payment shall be sent to the Commission’s Division of 

Enforcement, directed to the attention of counsel of record.

This initial decision shall become effective in accordance with and 

subject to the provisions of Rule of Practice 360.135 Under that rule, a party 

may file a petition for review of this initial decision within 21 days after 

service of the initial decision. Under Rule of Practice 111, a party may also 

file a motion to correct a manifest error of fact within ten days of the initial 

decision.136 If a motion to correct a manifest error of fact is filed by a party, 

 

134 17 C.F.R. § 201.600(b).

135 17 C.F.R. § 201.360.

136 See 17 C.F.R. § 201.111.
23

then a party shall have 21 days to file a petition for review from the date of 

the order resolving such motion to correct a manifest error of fact. This initial 

decision will not become final until the Commission enters an order of 

finality. The Commission will enter an order of finality unless a party files a 

petition for review or motion to correct a manifest error of fact or the 

Commission determines on its own initiative to review the initial decision as 

to a party. If any of these events occur, the initial decision shall not become 

final as to that party.

_______________________________

James E. Grimes

Administrative Law Judge