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Order filed August 14, 2024. 2024 IL App (5th) 230084 

Motion to publish granted 

August 28, 2024. NO. 5-23-0084 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the

 ) Circuit Court of 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Williamson County.

 ) 

v. ) No. 18-CF-667 

 ) 

DEVIN O’DANIELL, ) Honorable 

 ) Michelle M. Schafer,

 Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE SHOLAR delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices Boie and McHaney concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

 

 OPINION

¶ 1 Defendant was charged with first degree murder for the death of his infant son, C.O. Prior 

to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine, seeking to bar the introduction of his video-recorded 

police interview. The Williamson County circuit court granted the motion in limine, barring the 

State from presenting the video recording in its entirety. Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 

604(a)(1) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016), the State seeks interlocutory review of the circuit court’s order. For 

the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. 

¶ 2 I. Background 

¶ 3 On November 26, 2018, the State charged defendant by three-count information related to 

the death of C.O. Count I charged defendant with aggravated battery of a child, a Class X felony, 

in that on November 23, 2018, defendant committed a battery and knowingly caused bodily harm 
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to C.O., in that defendant dropped C.O. on the floor causing a skull fracture and bleeding. 720 

ILCS 5/12-3.05(b)(1) (West 2018). Count II charged defendant with aggravated domestic battery, 

a Class 2 felony, in that on November 23, 2018, defendant caused great bodily harm or permanent 

disfigurement to C.O., defendant’s child, by dropping C.O. on the floor. Id. § 12-3.3(a). Count III 

charged defendant with domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor, in that defendant knowingly 

made physical contact of a provoking nature with Claudia Bolivar, defendant’s girlfriend, in that 

he pushed Bolivar to the ground. Id. § 12-3.2(a)(2). 

¶ 4 On December 12, 2018, the State filed an amended information. The State amended count 

I to allege that on November 23, 2018, defendant intentionally caused great bodily harm to C.O. 

in that defendant applied significant force to the body of C.O., causing multiple layers of bleeding 

in the brain, optical nerve hemorrhage, and other injuries associated with closed-head injuries, 

resulting in C.O.’s death. The State also added count IV, first degree murder, in that defendant, 

without lawful justification, by some means applied significant force to the body of C.O. knowing 

such act created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to C.O., ultimately causing 

C.O.’s death. Id. § 9-1(a)(2). 

¶ 5 Detective Maria Dwyer indicated by affidavit of probable cause and through testimony 

provided at a preliminary hearing and arraignment held on December 18, 2018, that on November 

23, 2018, three-month-old C.O. was taken to the hospital by his mother, Claudia Bolivar, where 

hospital staff found that C.O. was examined and found to be flaccid, without a pulse, not 

responding, cyanotic, and almost at room temperature. Hospital staff observed bruising to C.O.’s 

left upper lip and left ear. A CT scan revealed a skull fracture and “fresh brain bleed.” A radiologist 

expressed concern about a prior injury in the same area of C.O.’s head. 
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¶ 6 Claudia was interviewed and advised law enforcement that she was at work between 5:30 

p.m. and 9:30 p.m. and C.O. was left in the sole care of his father, the defendant. When Claudia 

returned to the residence, she found C.O. and defendant in the living room together with the lights 

off. Claudia picked up C.O. to change his diaper but “noticed he felt very limp.” Claudia turned 

the lights on and observed that C.O. had “a bloody nose, a bruise on his nose, a bruise on his eye, 

and a bruise on the left side of his face.” Claudia asked defendant what happened to C.O., but 

defendant continuously replied that nothing had happened. 

¶ 7 Claudia attempted to secure C.O. in his car seat, and defendant tried to prevent her from 

leaving by pushing her down to the ground several times and raised his arm back as though he was 

going to strike her with the back side of his hand. Defendant took the car seat containing C.O. from 

Claudia’s possession, took C.O. out of the front door, sat on a porch chair, and began to smoke a 

cigarette. 

¶ 8 Claudia advised that she grabbed the car seat and took C.O. through the house and out the 

back door. Claudia contacted a neighbor across the street and asked for help. The neighbor, 

Rashawn McFadden, called the police without allowing Claudia inside of their home. During the 

time that Claudia waited outside of McFadden’s home, defendant again took the car seat containing 

C.O. Defendant eventually placed the car seat on the ground next to her vehicle. Claudia was able 

to place C.O. inside of her vehicle and drove him directly to Heartland Regional Medical Center. 

Law enforcement found defendant walking and detained him. 

¶ 9 Detective Dwyer of the Marion Police Department and Special Agent Rolape conducted 

an interview with defendant at the Marion Police Department at approximately 1:30 a.m. on the 

night of the incident. Shortly after the officers finished their interview, two officers with the Illinois 

State Police conducted an interview of defendant. During the interviews, defendant stated that he 
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took care of C.O. while Claudia worked. Defendant indicated that he was the only person with the 

baby while Claudia was at work. Defendant initially denied that anything had happened to the 

baby and indicated that he never observed any type of injuries to C.O., stating that Claudia came 

home and “freaked out.” Later, the video-recorded interview shows defendant becoming visibly 

upset and exclaimed, “I dropped the baby!” Defendant indicated that he was feeding the baby and 

tripped on a tear in the carpet in the living room and dropped C.O. onto the carpeted floor. 

Defendant told law enforcement that C.O. fell approximately three to four feet. Detective Dwyer 

indicated that Dr. Todd Engdahl with the Heartland Regional Medical Center and Dr. Jason 

Warner with Cardinal Glennon Children’s Hospital both noted that the event described by 

defendant would not have caused C.O.’s injuries. The force applied to C.O.’s body caused bleeding 

in his brain, optical nerve hemorrhage, and other injuries associated with a closed-head injury. The 

injuries eventually resulted in his death. Defendant’s statements were recorded at the Marion 

Police Department, and the video recording included the interviews by both the Marion Police 

Department and the Illinois State Police law enforcement officials.

¶ 10 On November 21, 2022, defendant filed a motion in limine alleging that the video-recorded 

interview shows that “defendant became visually frustrated and angry with the interrogators.” 

Defendant alleged that the “primary purpose of the State presenting the video during its case-inchief is to improperly admit otherwise inadmissible propensity and character evidence prior to the 

defendant testifying.” Defendant also argued that: “The defendant has the right to not testify in his 

own defense at trial, and he cannot be compelled to do so. Permitting the State to introduce the 

evidence during its case-in-chief improperly permits the State to present testimonial evidence.” 

Therefore, defendant asked the circuit court to “enter an [o]rder prohibiting the State from

introducing the video interrogation of the defendant during its case-in-chief.” The defendant’s 
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motion did not include any legal authority and did not specify any specific portion of the video 

that it found objectionable, but sought exclusion of the video-recorded interview in whole. 

¶ 11 On December 21, 2022, the circuit court held a hearing on defendant’s motion in limine. 

The State argued that “this is basically a motion to keep out the defendant’s statement.” The State 

argued that defendant was Mirandized and that:

“He became visibly agitated. When describing what had happened during the incident, he 

admits that he dropped the baby. He gets agitated. Both of those detectives leave the room. 

Two other detectives come in to speak to him, and those are two male detectives, Warren 

and Ramage. They again Mirandize him. He again agrees that he understands his Miranda

rights, and he goes on to speak with them about the incident.” 

¶ 12 The State argued that the interview was admissible as “a party-opponent statement” and 

contended: 

“He is very frustrated. He is screaming at detectives. He is angry. But that is what it is. It’s 

his statement. It’s a party-opponent statement. There is at no point anytime where he 

initiates any of his rights except for at the end when he says, I’m done talking, which they 

quit talking to him. And we are entitled to play his statement.” 

¶ 13 Defense counsel clarified that they were “not asking that his statement to the police or the 

questions that he answered to the police be suppressed at this point.” Thus, the defendant’s motion 

was not a motion to suppress statements. Rather, defense counsel asked that the “State not be 

permitted to play the actual video recording during its case in chief, not that the witnesses be barred 

from testifying as to the interrogation as it occurred.” Defense counsel argued that the video was 

“a means for the State to introduce, bluntly, my client’s bad behavior, his frustration, his anger.” 
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Defense counsel noted that in the event defendant testified, the video could be used in rebuttal as 

a prior inconsistent statement or impeachment evidence. 

¶ 14 In response, the State argued that the “video-recorded statement is the best evidence, and 

under the best evidence rule, we’re entitled to play that.” The State continued: “It’s his state of 

mind, it’s his demeanor, and it is the best evidence for us to show the jury.” 

¶ 15 After arguments of counsel, the circuit court stated as follows: 

“All right. So it’s clearly hearsay. It is best evidence. There is an exception, statement by 

a party-opponent. The question becomes, is it more probative than prejudicial? And 

without seeing what this is or determining the gravity of the behavior, it’s difficult for the 

Court to make a determination. I mean, clearly, transcribed statement of the events could 

be presented. If it is the best evidence, it should be allowed. But I honestly need to see what 

I’m talking about before I decide if it’s more probative or more prejudicial.” 

The circuit court asked the State to “put together the portions that you would both agree that the 

State may present” so the court could “examine it to make a full decision.” The circuit court further 

noted that “if [defendant] does testify, the State is entitled to use those for impeachment purposes 

or any part of the rebuttal in their case.” 

¶ 16 The State filed a response to defendant’s motion in limine on January 18, 2023, and 

indicated that it had provided the circuit court with an edited copy of the video recording which it 

intended to publish to the jury in its case-in-chief. The State argued that it was entitled to play the 

entirety of the edited version of the video and cited People v. Clay, 211 Ill. App. 3d 291, 302

(1990), for the proposition that “[a]ny statement by an accused person, unless excluded by the 

privilege against self-incrimination or other inclusionary rules, may be used against him as an 

admission.” The State argued that defendant’s statements were voluntary, relevant, and the 
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probative value was substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice, pointing out that there was 

nothing unfair about the prejudice defendant suffers from his own actions during an interview. 

¶ 17 The State provided the circuit court with a redacted video-recorded interview, attached to 

its responsive motion, which this court viewed as part of the record on appeal. The recording is 

approximately 57 minutes long. Defendant was initially interviewed by Detective Dwyer, of the 

Marion Police Department, and Special Agent Rolape, and defendant waived his Miranda rights. 

Defendant told law enforcement that he was home that evening with C.O., and when Claudia 

arrived home from work around 9 p.m., she “freaked out” and accused defendant of “dropping” 

the baby. Defendant advised law enforcement that the baby was “acting good” during the day and 

into the evening. 

¶ 18 A detective informed defendant that the baby had a bruise on his eye, at which point 

defendant became agitated. Defendant accused the detective of arguing with him. Defendant 

reiterated that he did not see anything wrong with the baby while he cared for him. Defendant 

asked to call Claudia, and law enforcement advised defendant that Claudia was on the way to the 

hospital with the baby. 

¶ 19 At this time, defendant became agitated and upset. Defendant yelled at law enforcement 

that “they ain’t told me nothin.’ ” A detective told defendant that the baby had a brain bleed, 

bruising on his cheek, a bruise behind the ear, and a bloody nose. Defendant yelled that he wanted 

Claudia to tell him this. Defendant pounded his chest and yelled, “I’m the father!” 

¶ 20 Detectives indicated that they wanted defendant’s cooperation, and defendant yelled, “I 

dropped the baby!” Defendant indicated that he dropped the baby in the living room. He stated 

that this was an accident. Defendant said he tripped on a rug and dropped the baby. Defendant 

stated there was no change in the infant’s behavior after the fall. Multiple times defendant yelled 
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“take me to jail.” Defendant pointed to one of the detectives and said “done talking to you” and 

the detectives exited the room. 

¶ 21 Approximately 25 minutes later, although the intervening time was redacted from the 

video, two detectives from the Illinois State Police entered the room. Defendant reaffirmed his 

Miranda rights. Defendant seemingly was calmer at this point in the interview, and he indicated 

that he tripped on a piece of carpet and dropped the baby. The baby fell face-down on the living 

room floor, and the baby cried. Defendant did not observe any injuries. 

¶ 22 Detectives asked defendant about the blood on a wall in the living room, and defendant 

again became loud and frustrated. He asked to speak with Claudia. He indicated that he wished to 

go to sleep. Referring to Claudia, defendant indicated that he “told her not to call the cops.” 

Defendant again stated, “I dropped him!” Defendant ultimately stated: “we’re done.” Detectives 

left the room; however, the video and audio recording continued. Defendant sat alone in the room 

stating, “f*** cops, f*** g*** jokes.” Officers reentered the room, placed defendant in handcuffs, 

and indicated that defendant was being charged with aggravated battery of a child and domestic 

battery. 

¶ 23 On February 7, 2023, the circuit court entered a final order on defendant’s motion in limine. 

The circuit court’s order noted that the “portions redacted by [the State] involve periods of time 

when Defendant is left alone in the interrogation room, without any substantive interaction with 

the arresting officers.” According to the circuit court, “[t]he redacted portions reveal the Defendant 

punching his hand, cursing at the officers while becoming visibly hostile.” Defendant states, “just 

take me to jail.” The circuit court noted that defendant says, “this is why I told her not to call the 

cops,” and the circuit court indicated that defendant made “other substantially prejudicial 

comments.” The circuit court found that the “probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
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danger of unfair prejudice.” “The behavior, comments and overall hostile/aggressive demeanor of 

Defendant could cast a negative light on Defendant which ultimately may affect the jury’s 

consideration.” Therefore, the circuit court ruled that the State “shall not be allowed to present the 

video interview” during its “case in chief” and granted defendant’s motion in limine. 

¶ 24 On February 15, 2023, the State filed a notice of appeal. On April 24, 2023, the State filed 

a certification of substantial impairment, noting that the circuit court’s order in limine excluding 

evidence substantially impaired the State’s ability to further prosecute the case. 

¶ 25 II. Analysis

¶ 26 On appeal, the State argues that the circuit court’s decision to wholly exclude the evidence 

of defendant’s video-recorded statement, which contained inculpatory evidence, was an abuse of 

judicial discretion. We agree, and for the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for further 

proceedings. 

¶ 27 A. Jurisdiction 

¶ 28 Defendant initially argues that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the circuit court’s 

order, because the circuit court did not suppress evidence. Defendant argues that the circuit court’s 

order only limited the State’s use of defendant’s video-recorded statement because the circuit court 

left open the possibility that the State could introduce the video for purposes of impeachment and 

in rebuttal, via other means such as a transcript or testifying witness, as impeachment or rebuttal 

evidence or via a different redacted version. The State disagrees, arguing jurisdiction lies under 

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(a), because the circuit court’s order has “the substantive effect” 

of suppressing evidence. The State argues that its ability to admit the video-recorded interview as 

direct evidence is suppression of that evidence, as other means, such as transcript or testimony of 

a witness, would not convey the same information as the video. Further, the State disagrees that 
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the circuit court’s order invited it to submit further attempts at editing the video-recorded evidence 

for the circuit court’s consideration. 

¶ 29 Whether the appellate court has jurisdiction to consider an appeal presents a question of 

law that we review de novo. People v. Salem, 2016 IL 118693, ¶ 11. Whether the circuit court’s 

order is appealable depends on the construction of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (eff. 

Mar. 8, 2016). People v. Young, 82 Ill. 2d 234, 239 (1980). The interpretation of a supreme court 

rule is a question of law reviewable under the de novo standard of review. People v. Drum, 194 

Ill. 2d 485, 488 (2000). 

¶ 30 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) gives reviewing courts jurisdiction to consider the 

State’s appeal from orders suppressing evidence in a criminal case. People v. Brindley, 2017 IL 

App (5th) 160189, ¶ 16. “The supreme court has emphasized that whether an order is appealable 

under Rule 604(a)(1) is determined by the substantive effect of the order, not its label or the 

underlying motion.” (Emphasis added.) Id. When an order prevents information from being 

presented to the fact finder, evidence is suppressed, and the State may appeal that order. Drum, 

194 Ill. 2d at 492. When the circuit court’s order solely impacts how the State can present evidence, 

however, then the evidence has not been suppressed within the meaning of the rule. In re K.E.F., 

235 Ill. 2d 530, 540 (2009). 

¶ 31 First, we note that the circuit court’s final order on defendant’s motion in limine video 

interview did not invite the State to submit further edited versions of the video-recorded interview 

for its consideration. To the extent that defendant argues that the video was not suppressed for this 

reason, we disagree. Defendant’s motion is in the nature of a motion in limine and sought to 

exclude evidence on the basis of admissibility rather than to suppress evidence that was illegally 

obtained. The burden of going forward on the motion in limine was initially on defendant—the 
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proponent or party seeking to bar the evidence—to show why the evidence should not be admitted 

(see People v. Smith, 248 Ill. App. 3d 351, 359 (1993)). As the circuit court ruled that the video 

the State intended to present was inadmissible in its entirety, further attempts at edits would be 

unwarranted. 

¶ 32 In People v. Drum, the State sought to admit the prior testimony of two codefendants who 

indicated that they would not testify at defendant’s trial. Drum, 194 Ill. 2d at 491. The circuit court 

barred the use of the prior testimony, and the State appealed. Id. The supreme court considered 

whether it had jurisdiction under Rule 604(a)(1), ultimately concluding that evidence was 

“suppressed” within the meaning of the rule when the circuit court’s order “prevents [the] 

information from being presented to the fact finder.” Id. at 492. 

¶ 33 The Drum court distinguished its decision in People v. Truitt, 175 Ill. 2d 148 (1997), 

abrogated in part by People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328 (2002). In Truitt, the State intended to use 

laboratory reports to prove the content, identity, and weight of a controlled substance pursuant to 

section 115-15 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-15 (West 1994)), 

which allowed the State, with certain procedural requisites, to establish lab results solely by means 

of a lab report, without live testimony from the analyst. Truitt, 175 Ill. 2d at 149-50. The circuit 

court held that section 115-15 was unconstitutional, and this ruling required the State to present 

testimony from the person who analyzed the substance in question and prepared the lab report. Id.

at 150. The State appealed, and in construing Rule 604(a)(1), the Truitt court concluded that it had 

no jurisdiction over the matter because the circuit court’s order did not have the effect of 

suppressing evidence. Id. at 152-53. The court noted that the order would not prevent any facts or 

opinions from being presented to the jury. Id. at 152. Instead, the sole impact of the order would 

be on the way those facts and opinions were presented. Id. Instead of merely introducing a lab 
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report into evidence, the order simply required the State to present testimony from an actual 

witness who could testify about the laboratory tests and results. Id. 

¶ 34 Similarly, in In re K.E.F., the State sought to admit a recording of the victim’s out-of-court 

statement pursuant to section 115-10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-

10 (West 2006)), and the circuit court indicated it would admit the recording if the State called the 

victim to the stand and asked her some questions about her statement pursuant to the hearing 

required by section 115-10. In re K.E.F., 235 Ill. 2d at 539. For reasons that the supreme court 

stated “defy comprehension,” the State chose not to ask the victim the necessary questions for the 

admission of the recording. Id. The circuit court, therefore, denied the State’s motion to admit the 

recorded statement, and the State filed an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 604(a)(1). Id. at 

535, 537. The appellate court dismissed the State’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction (id. at 537), and 

the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed (id. at 541). The supreme court held that, as in Truitt, 

“admissibility of the evidence in question was a matter entirely within the State’s control.” Id. at 

540. The court noted that “the prosecution had the option of presenting live testimony to secure 

admission of the information it sought to introduce, an option that it declined to pursue.” Id. The 

court concluded that, because the minor could still testify to the events relevant to the charge, “the 

sole impact of the circuit court’s order [was] on the means by which the information [was] to be 

presented” and, thus, it was “not suppression of evidence.” (Emphasis in original.) Id.

¶ 35 Unlike Truitt and In re K.E.F., here, the contents of the video-recorded interview were not 

admissible under any other alternative means. There is a fundamental distinction between a 

properly Mirandized video-recorded interview of defendant, closely following the events at 

dispute, and the lab reports the State sought to admit in Truitt. Moreover, here, the suppressed 

evidence is an actual video recording, which captures defendant’s words and demeanor closely 
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following the time that the alleged crime was committed. While the defendant argues that the State 

could present defendant’s statements by other means, such as testimony of the detectives who were 

present during the interviews, testimony, which may or may not be presented, is not a means of 

presenting the same evidence contained on the recording. See Brindley, 2017 IL App (5th) 160189, 

¶ 23. Therefore, Truitt is not applicable. 

¶ 36 Defendant’s reliance upon In re K.E.F. is misplaced. Pursuant to K.E.F., where an order 

solely impacts how the State can present the evidence, the evidence has not been suppressed within 

the meaning of Rule 604(a)(1), and consequently appellate jurisdiction is lacking. In re K.E.F., 

235 Ill. 2d at 540. Here, under the circuit court’s order, the State did not have the means to secure 

the admission of the recording by alternate means. See id. As correctly noted by the State, the State 

could not compel defendant to testify, reiterate his statements, or facilitate a means for the jury to 

see him following the discovery of the injuries to C.O. We agree with the State that “it is a false 

equivalence to claim that impeachment and rebuttal provide an alternate means of presenting the 

video-recorded statement, when the admission of such evidence in those circumstances is wholly 

contingent upon the occurrence of an event over which the State has no control.” For these reasons, 

In re K.E.F is distinguishable.

¶ 37 We find People v. Brindley, 2017 IL App (5th) 160189, instructive. In Brindley, the circuit 

court granted defendant’s motion to suppress an audio-video recording of a drug transaction. Id.

¶ 23. The State appealed that ruling to this court under Rule 604(a)(1). Id. ¶ 1. Prior to considering 

the merits of the appeal, we addressed our jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 14. We rejected defendant’s contention 

that the circuit court’s order “simply impacted the means by which the State could present the facts 

depicted in the recording” because it could instead present the testimony of the confidential 

informant about the transaction. Id. ¶ 22. We explained that “the suppressed evidence [was] actual 
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audio-video recording of relevant events as they occurred, capturing the defendant’s exact words, 

demeanor, and visual manifestations at the time he is alleged to have committed the crimes 

charged.” Id. ¶ 23. As such, we found that testimony describing these events was “not the same 

evidence” as the recording itself. Id. For this reason, we concluded that the order excluding the 

recording had the substantive effect of suppressing evidence and that we, therefore, had 

jurisdiction over the appeal. Id. ¶ 24. 

¶ 38 Unlike the cases defendant relies upon, here, there is no live witness that can be compelled 

to testify to mirror the evidence barred by the circuit court’s ruling. Defendant seems to suggest 

that an officer could testify about defendant’s interview, including his reactions and nonverbal 

conduct. However, as properly noted by the State, such testimony would merely convey the 

officer’s subjective interpretation of the interview and his recollection of defendant’s responses.

A victim’s demeanor when making a statement is very important in determining the weight to be 

given that statement. People v. Hubbard, 264 Ill. App. 3d 188, 194 (1994). Where, as here, a videorecorded interview is available and lawfully obtained, it serves as the most accurate and reliable 

evidence of the interview. 

¶ 39 In the case before us, the suppressed evidence is the video-recorded interview of defendant 

recording relevant events immediately following the death of the infant. The video captured 

defendant’s words and demeanor shortly after the time he was alleged to have committed the 

crimes charged. The State could not compel defendant to testify, reiterate his statements, or 

facilitate a means for the jury to see him following the incident at dispute. Therefore, the circuit 

court’s order suppressing the recording has the substantive effect of suppressing evidence. 

Accordingly, we find that we have jurisdiction to consider the merits of this appeal. 
15

¶ 40 B. Defendant’s Motion in Limine

¶ 41 Turning to the merits, the State argues that the circuit court erred by suppressing the 

redacted video-recorded interview of defendant. A circuit court’s decision whether to admit 

evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. King, 2020 IL 123926, ¶ 35. “An abuse 

of discretion occurs only where the trial court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable to 

the degree that no reasonable person would agree with it.” People v. Rivera, 2013 IL 112467, ¶ 37. 

¶ 42 Defendant’s motion in limine sought to exclude the video recording of defendant’s 

statements to police in the hours after defendant’s infant child was found with significant injuries 

after being in the sole care of defendant. Defendant argued in the circuit court that the State’s 

primary purpose of presenting the video during its case-in-chief would be to improperly admit 

otherwise inadmissible propensity and character evidence prior to defendant testifying at trial. 

Defendant also argued at the hearing on his motion that the video is “simply a means for the State 

to introduce, bluntly, my client’s bad behavior, his frustration, his anger as a means to introduce 

those issues to the jury.” Defendant did acknowledge that the statements were admissible and that

the State’s witnesses would not be barred from testifying to the contents of the interrogation. Thus, 

the only evidence that defendant sought to exclude was the actual recording, not testimony about 

the events depicted on the recording. The motion in limine additionally argued that permitting the 

State to play the video-recorded interview impermissibly compelled defendant to testify in his own 

defense at trial; however, this argument was abandoned in defendant’s appellate brief. 

¶ 43 In the circuit court, the State argued that, pursuant to Illinois Rule of Evidence 403 (eff. 

Jan. 1, 2011), the video-recorded interview’s probative value was not substantially outweighed by 

its prejudicial effect. The circuit court’s orders recite the balancing test from Rule 403, while also 
16

mentioning propensity evidence consistent with an analysis under Illinois Rule of Evidence 404 

(eff. Jan. 1, 2011). 

¶ 44 On appeal, the State argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in granting 

defendant’s motion in limine, where the probative value of the evidence was not substantially 

outweighed by any unfair prejudice to defendant. Defendant maintains that the primary reason the 

State sought to introduce the video recording of his police interrogation was to highlight 

defendant’s demeanor during the interview, which showed him upset, cursing, and at times 

aggressive. Defendant argues that such evidence constitutes evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 

acts which are generally inadmissible if the purpose of such evidence is merely to show that the 

person has a bad character and to suggest that the person must have therefore behaved badly 

relative to the charged offense. See Ill. R. Evid. 404(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) (“Evidence of other 

crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action 

in conformity therewith” on a particular occasion.). Such evidence includes not just acts which 

constitute criminal offenses but any bad or wrongful acts. People v. Davis, 248 Ill. App. 3d 886, 

891 (1993).

¶ 45 A motion in limine is addressed to a circuit court’s power to admit or exclude evidence. 

People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365, 369 (1999). Motions in limine are used to bring the circuit 

court’s attention to potentially inadmissible evidence and obtain a pretrial order from the circuit 

court excluding or permitting the evidence. People v. Owen, 299 Ill. App. 3d 818, 822 (1998). 

Because a ruling on a motion in limine can restrict evidence, the motion must be specific and allow 

the circuit court and the parties to understand what evidence is at issue. People v. Stevenson, 2014 

IL App (4th) 130313, ¶ 27. This allows the movant to carefully identify the evidence sought to be 

excluded and articulate his or her argument in support. Id. A written motion eliminates confusion 
17

and misunderstanding by defining the evidence at issue and capturing the movant’s arguments. Id.

We mention this importance where, in the present case, neither defendant nor the circuit court cite 

the rules of evidence or other legal authority relied upon in the lower court. This lack of authority 

clearly caused confusion, where, in this court, defendant’s brief focuses on character evidence 

contemplated by Illinois Rule of Evidence 404 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011), while the State’s briefs focus on 

the balancing test contemplated by Illinois Rule of Evidence 403 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). 

¶ 46 In resolving the evidentiary issue presented in a motion in limine, a circuit court considers 

the movant’s offer of proof. Stevenson, 2014 IL App (4th) 130313, ¶ 28. An offer of proof may be 

formal or informal, but an informal offer of proof must identify the complained-of evidence with 

“particularity.” Id. Here, because defendant sought the exclusion of the video recording in its 

entirety, the offer of proof was an unredacted copy of the recording. The State also submitted a 

proposed redacted copy of the recording that it intended to present to the jury in its case-in-chief. 

¶ 47 C. Rule 404 

¶ 48 Due to the apparent confusion regarding the arguments below and the difference in 

understanding of the circuit court’s ruling made apparent by the parties’ briefs to this court, we 

will briefly address Illinois Rule of Evidence 404 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). The law distrusts the inference 

that, because a person committed other crimes or bad conduct, he is more likely to have committed 

the crime charged. People v. Brown, 319 Ill. App. 3d 89, 99 (2001). Thus, where the other-acts 

evidence has no value beyond that inference, it is excluded. People v. Manning, 182 Ill. 2d 193, 

214 (1998). Even other-acts evidence that is relevant for a proper purpose will be excluded if its 

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. People v. Pikes, 

2013 IL 115171, ¶ 11. 
18

¶ 49 First, we note that the video-recorded interview went directly to an element of the crime 

charged and, thus, it defies logic that it would be introduced merely to establish defendant’s general 

propensity to commit the crime charged. The evidence is directly relevant to whether or not 

defendant committed the crime charged. Defendant was the sole caretaker for C.O. during the time 

that he was fatally injured. Defendant’s description of the events of the evening goes directly to 

the elements of the charged offenses. Further, as previously mentioned, an individual’s demeanor 

when making a statement is very important in determining the weight to be given that statement. 

Hubbard, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 194. Thus, defendant’s demeanor is probative to the jury’s 

determination of the credibility of his statements. 

¶ 50 Even if we agreed that defendant’s demeanor during his custodial interview constituted 

other bad acts as contemplated by Rule 404, such evidence may be admissible for other purposes, 

such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 

mistake or accident. Id. Defendant’s statement to the officers was that he did not see anything 

wrong with C.O. while he cared for him, and that nothing out of the ordinary occurred on that 

evening. Eventually, defendant stated that the injuries were inflicted by accident, when the 

defendant tripped and dropped C.O. Defendant is charged with a specific intent crime and has, at 

least prior to trial, indicated his likely defense of accident. Thus, intent is expected to be at issue 

in this particular trial. 

¶ 51 While defense counsel further argued that propensity was the sole purpose for introducing 

the evidence at trial, counsel did not argue that the video-recorded interview was not relevant to 

show modus operandi, motive, intent, or any other proper fact, consistent with Rule 404. Counsel, 

in fact, argued that the evidence of defendant’s statements and demeanor was admissible in another 

form, such as by witness testimony or transcript, which would not be the case were the evidence 
19

offered solely to show defendant’s character for hostility, anger, or violence for the sole purpose 

of indicating his propensity to commit the present offense. Further, the circuit court’s order did not 

indicate that it considered whether the orders were relevant for any purpose other than propensity, 

and then conduct a balancing test. The circuit court seemingly conducted the balancing test 

consistent with Rule 403. 

¶ 52 D. Rule 403 

¶ 53 We will now turn to the circuit court’s ruling that defendant’s video-recorded interview 

was more prejudicial than probative. We begin with the basic principles governing the 

admissibility of a defendant’s custodial statements to police officers. Generally, evidence is 

admissible if it is relevant. Ill. R. Evid. 401 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). Relevant evidence is defined as 

evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 

determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 

Id. To establish the relevance of a piece of evidence the proponent must (1) identify the fact that 

it is seeking to prove with the evidence, (2) explain how that fact is of consequence, and (3) show 

how the evidence tends to make the existence of this fact more or less probable than it would be 

without the evidence. People v. Maldonado, 402 Ill. App. 3d 411, 418 (2010). 

¶ 54 Pursuant to Illinois Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011), a defendant’s out-ofcourt statements generally are not covered by the rules against hearsay and thus are admissible at 

his trial. People v. Harper, 2013 IL App (4th) 130146, ¶ 13. If a defendant receives his Miranda

warnings and chooses to speak with police officers, his statements are admissible as evidence 

against him so long as the statements given are voluntary. People v. Harris, 2012 IL App (1st) 

100678, ¶ 52. Here, the circuit court found that defendant’s statements were voluntary. 
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¶ 55 Further, statements made by police officers when questioning a defendant, including 

opinions and observations regarding the defendant’s guilt or credibility, are generally relevant and 

admissible to demonstrate the statements’ effects on the defendant, to provide context to the 

defendant’s responses, or to explain the logic and course of the officers’ interview or investigation. 

People v. McCallum, 2019 IL App (5th) 160279, ¶ 56. Such is the case even if the statements 

themselves would not be admissible as direct testimony. Id. 

¶ 56 Relevant evidence may, however, be excluded if its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or by 

considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Ill. 

R. Evid. 403 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011). “Evidence is unduly prejudicial only if it ‘cast[s] a negative light 

upon the defendant for reasons that have nothing to do with the case on trial’ [citation], or invites 

the jury to decide the case ‘on an improper basis, commonly an emotional one, such as sympathy, 

hatred, contempt, or horror’ [citation].” (Emphases in original.) People v. Romanowski, 2016 IL 

App (1st) 142360, ¶ 30. A confession is like no other evidence. People v. Rebollar-Vergara, 2019 

IL App (2d) 140871, ¶ 119. It is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be 

admitted against a defendant. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991). Here, the 

recording is the strongest evidence of defendant’s statements during his interview, as well as 

defendant’s demeanor in the hours after the commission of the alleged offense. Defendant recounts 

the events that occurred earlier that evening, indicating that nothing occurred that would injure 

C.O. Then, defendant changed his version of events, indicating that he dropped the baby, exposing 

inconsistencies between defendant’s initial statement and his later statement. The video evidence 

is undoubtedly relevant, as it contains defendant’s accounting of the events within hours of the 

alleged incident. Here, defendant’s child was injured—and ultimately perished—while in 
21

defendant’s exclusive care. Significantly, the circuit court noted that defendant’s “statements are 

relevant to the issues in this case, as they go directly to Defendant’s recollection of the events of 

November 23, 2018, which gave rise to the Information filed against him on November 26, 2018.” 

Further, “[i]t is well settled that testimony regarding a defendant’s silence or nonverbal conduct 

during questioning subsequent to a valid waiver of rights is admissible.” People v. Theis, 2011 IL 

App (2d) 091080, ¶ 48. It is well within the province of the jury to make inferences from the 

defendant’s nonverbal conduct and demeanor. People v. Vaughan, 2015 IL App (3d) 120996-U,

¶ 54. 

¶ 57 Because we find the evidence relevant, we next consider whether its probative value is 

outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. “Under Rule 403, relevant evidence may be excluded 

if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice or confusion of the 

issues or the potential for misleading the jury.” People v. Epstein, 2022 IL 127824, ¶ 10. “Of 

course, all evidence is prejudicial in that it is intended to impact the fact finder’s decision.” People 

v. Gordon, 2017 IL App (3d) 140770, ¶ 25. “ ‘[U]nfair[ ] prejudice’ means that the evidence in 

question will somehow cast a negative light upon a defendant for reasons that have nothing to do 

with the case on trial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Prather, 2012 IL App (2d) 

111104, ¶ 23. 

¶ 58 In the case before us, the circuit court determined that the video-recorded interrogation of 

defendant unfairly prejudiced him. The circuit court’s order noted that the video “reveal[s] the 

Defendant punching his hand, cursing at the officers while becoming visibly hostile.” Defendant 

states, “just take me to jail.” The circuit court noted that defendant says, “this is why I told her not 

to call the cops,” and the circuit court indicates that defendant made “other substantially prejudicial 

comments.” The circuit court found that the “probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
22

danger of unfair prejudice.” “The behavior, comments and overall hostile/aggressive demeanor of 

Defendant could cast a negative light on Defendant which ultimately may affect the jury’s 

consideration.” Therefore, the circuit court ruled that the State “shall not be allowed to present the 

video interview” during its “case in chief” and granted defendant’s motion in limine. 

¶ 59 While defendant’s demeanor during his custodial interview has the potential to cast him in 

a negative light, this was a risk defendant chose when he voluntarily waived his Miranda rights 

and agreed to talk to the police. A fact finder should not be prevented from considering defendant’s 

demeanor merely because that risk did not work out in his favor. 

¶ 60 We cannot reasonably find that the probative value of defendant’s video-recorded 

interview, showing him provide a statement that nothing unusual occurred that would have injured 

his infant son, and then, exclaiming that he dropped the baby, is substantially outweighed by any 

potential for unfair prejudice. Nor can we reasonably find that the video-recorded interview as a 

whole unfairly prejudices defendant. Defendant was aware that he was being audio and video 

recorded, and he waived his Miranda rights accordingly. Defendant cannot now complain that 

there were times that he shouted, yelled, and acted out during his statement. Although defendant 

frequently had emotional outbursts during his interrogation, he ultimately stated that he “dropped 

the baby.” These outbursts are not “likely to arouse feelings of sympathy, horror, or disgust beyond 

those that might arise from the nature of the criminal charges against the defendant.” Id. Moreover, 

as noted by the State, some jurors may view the video sympathetically to defendant, who 

frequently inquired about the status of his injured son. However, both of defendant’s explanations 

for the events of the evening contained in his video- recorded interview were inconsistent with law 

enforcement’s findings of blood on a wall of the home, further bolstering the significant probative 

value of the evidence. Defendant’s statements also served to corroborate the testimony of other 
23

witnesses regarding the events that occurred before and after he was alone with C.O. Despite the 

deferential standard of review, here, we find the circuit court’s decision to be an abuse of 

discretion. 

¶ 61 Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s ruling on defendant’s motion in limine that the 

video-recorded interview, as a whole, should be excluded from the State’s case-in-chief on the 

basis that its probative value was substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice as an abuse of 

discretion. On remand, the circuit court may (1) reconsider defendant’s motion in limine in 

accordance with the views expressed herein, carefully considering specific portions of the videorecorded interview, and issue an order which gives the parties an accurate understanding of its 

reasoning and limitations; (2) require defendant to amend his motion in limine to be more specific 

and identify, with particularity, the evidence sought to be excluded and the reasons therefor; or

(3) decline to entertain the motion, or portions thereof, until they are ripe for consideration. 

¶ 62 III. Conclusion 

¶ 63 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order of the circuit court of Williamson County 

granting defendant’s motion in limine that suppressed the video recording of defendant’s interview 

with law enforcement, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this decision. 

¶ 64 Reversed and remanded. 

 
24

People v. O’Daniell, 2024 IL App (5th) 230084 

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Williamson County, No. 18-

CF-667; the Hon. Michelle M. Schafer, Judge, presiding. 

Attorneys 

for 

Appellant:

Patrick Daniel Daly, of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s 

Office, of Mt. Vernon, for the People.

Attorneys 

for 

Appellee:

Yasaman Hannah Naval, of State Appellate Defender’s Office, 

of Chicago, for appellee.