Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 253

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISIONS II & III

No. CV-22-817

LEONARD REED 

APPELLANT

V.

M.A. MORTENSON COMPANIES AND 

ARCH INSURANCE 

COMPANY/GALLAGHER BASSETT 

SERVICES, INC.

APPELLEES

Opinion Delivered April 17, 2024

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS 

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

COMMISSION

[NO. G707727]

AFFIRMED

RITA W. GRUBER, Judge

The Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission unanimously found that 

Leonard Reed did not prove entitlement to additional temporary total-disability (TTD) 

benefits for his compensable injury beyond April 5, 2018, the date on which Dr. David 

Wassell first assessed maximum medical improvement (MMI). The injury occurred on 

October 20, 2017, when Mr. Reed was working as a truck driver, and a four-pound piece of 

metal struck his right leg. Dr. Wassell, an orthopedic surgeon, performed an open reduction 

and internal fixation of the right-tibial-plateau fracture on November 1, 2017. Mr. Reed 

subsequently received TTD benefits and additional medical care that included physical 

therapy.
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The Commission entered its decision in this case on October 13, 2022. On appeal, 

Mr. Reed contends that the Commission erred in finding that his healing period ended on

April 5, 2018, and he therefore was not entitled to additional TTD benefits beyond that 

date. We affirm. 

In an office visit on March 7, 2018, Dr. Wassell viewed an x-ray of Mr. Reed’s right 

knee and performed a battery of tests designed to evaluate his postop recovery. The medical 

record includes Dr. Wassell’s office notes of the x-ray images: 

Findings: No significant soft tissue swelling or radiopaque foreign body is 

demonstrated. No joint effusion is evident. No acute fracture is identified. There are

redemonstrated findings of lateral tibial plateau compression plate and screw internal 

fixation. Radiographic union is complete. There is no evidence of hardware loosening 

or screw fracture.

Impression

No evidence of hardware loosening.

Dr. Wassell felt that Mr. Reed had reached MMI on March 7 and could return to light-duty

work. But because Mr. Reed did not feel capable of returning to his previous work, Dr. 

Wassell ordered a functional capacity evaluation (FCE) to determine the level of work Mr. 

Reed could perform. 

The FCE was performed on March 26, 2018. On April 5, after receiving the FCE 

report, Dr. Wassell assessed a 0 percent impairment rating and reiterated his opinion from 

the March 7 office visit that Mr. Reed was capable of returning to light-duty work. Dr. 

Wassell opined that Mr. Reed demonstrated the ability to perform light-duty work, noting,

in part, that the FCE report reflected a lack of reliable effort by Mr. Reed. Dr. Wassell then 
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released Mr. Reed from his care. Mr. Reed later testified that he had been in pain both

during and after the FCE and that he had grown tired during the hours of testing. 

After Dr. Wassell released him, Mr. Reed returned to Dr. Christopher Morgan, the 

company doctor who had seen him after the accident and referred him to Dr. Wassell. Dr. 

Morgan then referred Mr. Reed to Dr. Dennis Yelvington, who saw him for leg pain on May 

1, 2018, and diagnosed chronic pain associated with significant psychosocial dysfunction. 

On July 23, 2018, Dr. Morgan wrote that Mr. Reed’s injury was work related and that he 

could not return to work due to restrictions. Dr. Morgan referred Mr. Reed to orthopedic 

surgeon Dr. James Tucker, who administered injections to Mr. Reed’s right knee and 

referred him to a pain-treatment facility. On February 25, 2019, Dr. Morgan noted that Mr. 

Reed had ongoing pain-related issues with his right knee, had been seen multiple times in 

orthopedics for ongoing issues with this knee, and was already in pain management for 

chronic back pain.1 Dr. Morgan wrote that Mr. Reed needed chronic pain management for 

his right knee. Dr. Wassell subsequently agreed in his deposition that it would be reasonable 

and necessary to at least evaluate Mr. Reed for chronic pain management of his knee. 

At a December 13, 2021 hearing before an administrative law judge, Mr. Reed 

contended that Dr. Wassell incorrectly assessed a rating of 0 percent and instead should have 

assessed a minimum rating of 2 percent to the whole body and 5 percent to the lower 

extremity. He claimed that he was entitled to additional medical treatment and TTD

 

1The chronic back pain was from a previous injury.
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benefits, to ratings of permanent partial disability, and to travel expenses for medical 

appointments. Mr. Reed testified that he had been told his employer did not have light-duty 

work for him, that he had traveled from Stuttgart to Little Rock for appointments with Dr. 

Tucker and for pain management, and that respondents would not cover additional

treatments.

The ALJ found that Mr. Reed had proved he was entitled to additional medical 

treatment. She found that he had credibly testified he was unable to return to work. She 

attached minimal weight to Dr. Wassell’s determination of a zero impairment rating and 

great weight to Dr. Morgan’s opinion that Reed was unable to return to work. She found 

that Reed remained in his healing period and was unable to work and that it would be 

premature to assess an impairment rating. Therefore, she held the issue of permanent partial 

disability in abeyance. 

Respondents appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Commission. The Commission 

reversed the ALJ’s finding that Mr. Reed proved he was entitled to additional TTD

compensation “from July 23, 2018, until [he] is released at maximum medical improvement 

by Dr. Tucker.” The Commission instead found that Mr. Reed did not prove entitlement to 

additional TTD benefits beyond April 5, 2018, the date that Dr. Wassell assessed MMI in a 

letter to respondents. The Commission, finding that Dr. Wassell’s opinion was corroborated 

by the record, gave his opinion significant weight; found that Mr. Reed reached the end of 

his healing period no later than April 5, 2018; and therefore found that Mr. Reed was not 

entitled to additional TTD benefits beyond that date. It further found that Mr. Reed proved 
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he was entitled to additional medical treatment and a permanent anatomical impairment in 

the amount of 12 percent to his right lower extremity.2

Mr. Reed contends on appeal that the ALJ’s opinion appropriately analyzed the

shortcomings of Dr. Wassell’s opinions, gave them minimal weight, and gave greater weight

to both Dr. Morgan’s opinion and Mr. Reed’s testimony that he was in pain during and after

the FCE. However, we do not review the decision of the ALJ; rather, we review the decision 

of the Commission, which performs a de novo review of the evidence. Pharmerica v. Seratt,

103 Ark. App. 9, 11, 285 S.W.3d 699, 701 (2008).

The law requires the Commission to render findings adequate for appellate review

but does not require the Commission to render findings on every conceivable point of 

contention and dispute between the parties. See Williams v. Prostaff Temps., 64 Ark. App. 128, 

979 S.W.2d 911 (1999). The substantial-evidence standard of review requires us to affirm if 

the Commission’s decision displays a substantial basis for the denial of relief. Sanchez v. Pork 

Grp., Inc., 2012 Ark. App. 570, at 1–2. We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences 

deducible from the Commission’s decision in the light most favorable to the Commission’s 

findings. Id. at 9.

 

2The Commission has adopted the American Medical Association Guides to the 

Evaluation of Permanent Impairment to be used in assessing anatomical impairment. Little Rock 

Ambulance Auth. v. Binkley, 2022 Ark. App. 229, at 11, 646 S.W.3d 193, 202. It is the 

Commission’s duty, using the AMA Guides, to determine whether the claimant has proved 

that he is entitled to a permanent-impairment rating. Id. The Commission did so in this case. 
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The Commission may accept and translate into findings of fact only those portions 

of testimony it deems worthy of belief; the appellate court is foreclosed from determining 

the credibility and weight to be accorded testimony. Barber v. Pork Grp., Inc., 2012 Ark. App. 

138, at 5. The Commission has authority to accept or reject medical opinions, and its 

resolution of the medical evidence has the force and effect of a jury verdict. Watson v. 

Highland Pellets, 2022 Ark. App. 132, at 6, 643 S.W.3d 267, 270; Stafford v. Arkmo Lumber 

Co., 54 Ark. App. 286, 288, 925 S.W.2d 170, 172 (1996). In deciding the weight and 

credibility of a doctor’s opinion, the Commission is entitled to review the basis for it. 

Maverick Transp. v. Buzzard, 69 Ark. App. 128, 10 S.W.3d 467 (2000). 

“The Commission is authorized to decide which portions of the medical evidence to 

credit and to translate this evidence into a finding of permanent impairment using the 

AMA Guides; thus, the Commission may assess its own impairment rating rather than rely 

solely on its determination of the validity of ratings assigned by physicians.” Ark. Dep’t of 

Corr. v. Washington, 2024 Ark. App. 181, at 6, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___. In doing so, “the 

Commission examines the entire record.” Id. at 7, ___ S.W.3d at ___. We will reverse the 

Commission’s decision only when we are convinced that fair-minded persons with the same 

facts before them could not have reached the findings arrived at by the Commission. Maupin 

v. Pulaski Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 90 Ark. App. 1, 5, 203 S.W.3d 668, 670 (2005).

Here, it is true that the Commission’s opinion did not specifically address Dr. 

Wassell’s testimony that he did not read the entire FCE report. The Commission instead 

relied on Dr. Wassell’s testimony that he stood by his prior conclusion that Mr. Reed reached 
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MMI on or about March 7, 2018, and that he sustained 0 percent permanent impairment 

under the AMA Guides. The Commission noted that Dr. Wassell testified in his deposition,

“Based on my documentation and everything that I documented, . . . based on what I 

examined and what I compared it to and looked at,” he stood by his prior opinion that no 

impairment rating was warranted. Additionally, the Commission summarized the extensive 

medical record in this case. 

The Commission recited sufficient findings of fact in its written decision to constitute 

substantial evidence supporting the denial of benefits. It was within the Commission’s

purview to weigh the evidence, interpret medical opinions, and translate into findings of fact 

only those portions of testimony it deemed worthy of belief. Because the Commission’s 

decision displays a substantial basis for the denial of relief, we affirm.

HARRISON, C.J., and GLADWIN, WOOD, and MURPHY, JJ., agree.

BARRETT, J., dissents.

STEPHANIE POTTER BARRETT, Judge, dissenting. The only doctor who opined that 

the claimant had reached the end of his healing period stated that he based his opinion on 

a functional capacity report that he later admitted he did not read fully nor understand. The 

majority affirms the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission determination that the 

appellant, Leonard Reed (“Reed”), reached the end of his healing period on April 5, 2018, 

and was not entitled to additional temporary total-disability (TTD) benefits beyond that date. 

Because I do not believe the Commission’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, I 

respectfully dissent.
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On October 20, 2017, Reed was an employee of Mortenson. While working, Reed 

was struck in his leg, just below his right knee, by a four-pound piece of scrap metal. He was 

able to see the company doctor, Dr. Christopher Morgan, four days later. Dr. Morgan 

ordered an x-ray of Reed’s leg, took him off work, gave him pain medication, and referred 

him to Dr. David Wassell, an orthopedist. Dr. Wassell discovered a fracture in Reed’s right 

shin and additional breaks in his knee and then performed surgery to install a plate and 

some screws in his shin. Reed attended all physical-therapy sessions that Dr. Wassell 

recommended and was compliant with all instructions. Dr. Wassell also prescribed 

additional physical therapy, but that was denied by the respondents. Reed also attended a 

functional capacity evaluation (FCE), after which Dr. Wassell wrote that Reed had reached 

maximum medical improvement, had a 0 percent impairment rating, and could return to 

light-duty work. Mortenson had no light-duty work available.

After Dr. Wassell released him, Reed continued to see Dr. Morgan as well as Dr. 

Dennis Yelvington, a doctor in the same clinic as Dr. Morgan. Dr. Morgan wrote a letter in 

July 2018 stating that Reed could not return to work and sent Reed for pain treatment at 

Pain Centers of America, but Reed was discharged because his treatment was not covered by 

Mortenson’s workers’-compensation insurance carrier. Reed was referred to and saw several 

other medical professionals, but the treatment he received from them was also not paid for 

by the insurance carrier. 

The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that Reed had proved by a preponderance 

of the evidence that the medical treatment he had received as well as future medical 
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treatment was reasonably necessary and that he was entitled to TTD compensation from July 

23, 2018, until he was released at maximum medical improvement (MMI). Because Reed 

had not yet reached MMI, the issue of permanent partial-disability benefits was held in 

abeyance, but the ALJ determined that Reed was entitled to related travel expenses for the 

medical treatment of record, and an attorney’s fee on all indemnity benefits was awarded. 

Mortenson then appealed to the Commission. In an opinion filed on October 13, 2022, 

the Commission affirmed in part and reversed in part.

The Commission found that Reed had proved he was entitled to additional medical 

treatment and that he was entitled to permanent anatomical impairment in the amount of 

12 percent to the right lower extremity based on the American Medical Association Guides 

to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment. Reed then appealed the decision on the ground 

that the Commission erred in its determination that he had reached the end of his healing 

period and was not entitled to additional TTD benefits beyond April 5, 2018.

The standard of review in workers’-compensation cases is “whether there is substantial 

evidence to support the Commission’s decision.” Schall v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Scis., 2017

Ark. App. 50, at 2, 510 S.W.3d 302, 303. While “we view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the decision of the Commission, that standard neither insulates the 

Commission from judicial review nor renders our function in these cases meaningless, and 

we will reverse the Commission when we are convinced that fair-minded persons with the 

same facts before them could not have reached the same conclusion.” Second Inj. Fund v. 

James River Corp., 53 Ark. App. 204, 211, 920 S.W.2d 869, 873 (1996).
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The Commission determined that Reed had reached the end of his healing period 

largely because of Dr. Wassell’s medical opinion that Reed had reached MMI on April 5, 

2018. Even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Commission’s decision, the 

decision must be supported by substantial evidence. I do not find that the Commission’s 

findings are supported by substantial evidence because of the Commission’s heavy reliance 

on Dr. Wassell’s opinion. Dr. Wassell admitted in his deposition that his opinion was based 

on commentary in the FCE report that Reed did not put forth a reliable effort. He admitted 

that he did not read the full report or understand that the unreliable effort was only in regard 

to the upper-body testing and that the only issue was the functional capacity of his lower 

body, which the report concluded that Reed did give a reliable effort. 

The “finding of fact must contain all of the specific facts relevant to the contested

issue . . . so that the reviewing court may determine whether the Commission has resolved

these issues in conformity with the law.” Hill v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 74 Ark. App. 250, 256, 57

S.W.3d 735, 740 (2001). In Lunsford v. Rich Mountain Electric Co-op, 33 Ark. App. 66, 70, 800

S.W.2d 732, 734 (1990), this court found that the denial of workers’-compensation benefits 

for continuation and reoccurrence of an earlier compensable back injury on the ground that 

claimant’s election to engage in horseback riding was unreasonable and thus not 

compensable required remand given the Commission’s failure to make any finding on the 

reasonableness of the claimant’s horseback riding under those circumstances; after finding 

that the claimant “believed he had cleared” horseback riding with his physician, the 

Commission did not find whether horseback riding was unreasonable. Here, the 
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Commission found that Dr. Wassell’s opinion that Reed could return to work was based on 

Reed’s unreliable effort. However, as in Lunsford, the Commission’s finding of fact did not 

contain all the specific facts. Here, it did not consider that Dr. Wassell had not read the 

entire FCE report. It also did not consider that Reed’s unreliable effort was only put forth 

on the upper-body part of the test and not the part of the test on his right leg, which was the 

location of the compensable injury. As a result, Dr. Wassell’s opinion could not reasonably 

be corroborated by the record. Therefore, the conclusion that Reed had reached MMI and 

was not entitled to TTD benefits after April 5 does not appear reasonable even when 

examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission. 

There are also several instances where Dr. Wassell’s testimony appears inconsistent 

and therefore lacking in substantial evidence to support the Commission’s findings. At a 

follow-up visit with Dr. Wassell on December 14, 2017, Dr. Wassell wrote that Reed had 

significant quadricep muscle weakness resulting in an antalgic gait and that Reed had not 

progressed as much as he should have in weaning off the use of his crutches. As a result, Dr. 

Wassell recommended another month of aggressive physical therapy with an emphasis on 

regaining his normal gait and strength. Dr. Wassell noted that from a work standpoint, Reed 

could work any type of sedentary job, if available. However, additional physical therapy was 

denied by Mortenson’s workers’-compensation insurance carrier, and no sedentary work was 

available. Six weeks after that recommendation, without additional physical therapy to 

address muscle weakness, antalgic gait, or persistent swelling, Dr. Wassell declared Reed had 

reached MMI and had an impairment rating of 0 percent. The commission disagreed with 
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his findings to the extent that it assigned an impairment rating of 12 percent. These findings 

are inherently inconsistent. 

The majority has also correctly pointed out that it is the Commission’s right, and not 

the appellate court’s, to determine the weight given to testimony. However, in Morgan v. 

Desha County Tax Assessor’s Office, 45 Ark. App. 95, 98, 871 S.W.2d 429, 430 (1994), the 

Commission found that the appellant failed to prove that treatment provided to her was 

reasonably necessary. In that case, the appellant had seen four doctors. Two of them 

concluded that additional surgery was needed, and two of them recommended a more 

conservative treatment. The recommendations of both groups of doctors were based on the 

same findings. The Commission placed greater weight on the opinions of the second group 

of doctors and the more conservative treatment. Morgan was reversed because, although the 

second group of doctors recommended conservative treatment, they did not suggest that 

further treatment was unnecessary. This, combined with the fact that the conservative 

treatments were not improving the appellant’s condition, caused the court of appeals to find 

that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have concluded that the 

appellant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that further medical treatment 

was reasonable and necessary.

Here, the Commission placed greater weight on Dr. Wassell’s opinion than that of 

any of the other medical professionals who testified. This testimony was given weight in spite 

of the fact that Dr. Wassell contradicted himself several times. He testified that Reed had 

not progressed as much as he should have in weaning off the use of his crutches and needed 
13

at least another month of aggressive physical therapy with an emphasis on regaining his 

normal gait and strength. However, that physical therapy was denied by the workers’-

compensation insurance carrier. Nevertheless, six weeks later, Dr. Wassell assigned Reed an 

impairment rating of 0 percent and declared he had reached MMI. In Morgan, the 

Commission chose to give more weight to the findings of one group of doctors over another. 

Here, however, the Commission chose to give weight to Dr. Wassell’s second opinion and 

completely ignored his first, even though the two are diametrically opposed. Further, despite 

the weight they lent his second opinion, the Commission deviated from Dr. Wassell’s 

impairment rating, finding instead that Reed had an impairment rating of 12 percent. An 

impairment rating of 12 percent was not recommended by any medical professional in the 

record.

For the reasons set forth above, I would reverse and remand.

Bell & Boyd, PLLC, by: Michael W. Boyd, for appellant.

Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, LLP, by: Joseph H. Purvis, for appellees.