AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed March 5, 2014.

S

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-12-01735-CV

JUANITA J. GAROFALO, Appellant

V.

CHANDLER MANAGEMENT D/B/A MCCALLUM CROSSING APARTMENTS, 

Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 05-01979-2012

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Francis, Lang-Miers, and Lewis 

Opinion by Justice Lang-Miers

Juanita J. Garofalo, pro se below and on appeal, appeals from the trial court’s takenothing judgment against her and awarding Chandler Management d/b/a McCallum Crossing 

Apartments its attorney’s fees. The parties are familiar with the facts of this case and we limit 

our recitation of the facts to those necessary for resolution of the appeal. Because the issues are 

settled, we issue this memorandum opinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4. We affirm the trial court’s 

judgment. 

Garofalo filed a lawsuit in small claims court against Chandler, her landlord, alleging 

discrimination, harassment, threatening behavior, misrepresentation, breach of contract, and 

threatening the rights of comfort, health, and safety of herself and her child. In a separate action, 

Chandler sought to evict Garofalo for nonpayment of rent, after which Garofalo amended her 
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lawsuit to add claims for intentional infliction of mental and emotional distress and unlawful 

retaliation. After a bench trial on Garofalo’s claims, the justice court granted a take-nothing 

judgment against her and awarded attorney’s fees to Chandler. 

Garofalo appealed to the county court at law. Chandler filed a no-evidence motion for 

partial summary judgment asserting that Garofalo had no evidence to support specific elements 

of her breach of contract and fraud claims. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). The motion also stated

“there is no evidence as to every element on any of the claims asserted by Plaintiff in Plaintiff’s 

Original Petition and/or as subsequently amended.” Chandler notified Garofalo of the date the 

trial court would hear the motion “by submission (no oral argument),” and Garofalo filed a 

motion, titled “Motion to Repeal Judgement on Defendants No-Evidence Motion for Partial 

Summary Judgement,” in which she asked the trial court to remove the setting from the court’s 

docket. She said the court had granted her an extension in which to respond to Chandler’s 

discovery requests, and, as a result, the summary judgment motion was “not applicable at this 

time.” 

Meanwhile, Garofalo did not file a response to the summary judgment motion, and the 

trial court considered the motion as scheduled. The court signed an interlocutory order granting

Chandler’s summary judgment motion and denying Garofalo’s “Motion to Repeal.” The sole 

remaining issue was Chandler’s request for attorney’s fees. A few months later, the court 

rendered a final take-nothing judgment against Garofalo and awarded Chandler attorney’s fees,

interest, and court costs.

On appeal to this Court, Garofalo argues that the final judgment is erroneous and prays 

that we will render a take-nothing judgment against Chandler. She complains that the summary 

judgment motion should not have been considered at all because the court granted her an 

extension in which to file responses to Chandler’s discovery requests. Chandler states that 
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Garofalo’s “Motion to Repeal” is more like a motion for continuance of the summary judgment 

setting and argues that the motion did not satisfy the requirements of a motion for continuance. 

Garofalo argues in reply that her “Motion to Repeal” was not a motion for continuance and 

should be construed only as a request to remove the summary judgment setting from the trial 

court’s docket. 

A trial court has broad discretion to manage and control its docket, and the complainant 

must show that the court clearly abused its discretion. Thomas v. Clayton, No. 04-10-00188-CV, 

2010 WL 3505141, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Sep. 8, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing 

Clanton v. Clark, 639 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex. 1982)). A trial court abuses its discretion when it 

acts arbitrarily or unreasonably, without reference to guiding rules or principles. Id. (citing 

Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985)).

The record here shows that at the time the trial court considered the summary judgment 

motion, all responses to discovery had been served at least two weeks before and there were no 

discovery requests pending.

1

 The record also shows that at the time of the hearing Garofalo had

not filed a response to the summary judgment motion. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). And 

although she had asked the court to remove the setting from its docket, she stated as her reason 

that the motion was “not applicable at this time.” She did not ask for additional time in which to 

respond to the motion or state that she had inadequate time for discovery. See TEX. R. CIV. P.

166a(g), (i) & cmt. 1997. We conclude that Garofalo has not shown that the trial court clearly 

abused its discretion by refusing to remove the summary judgment setting from its docket solely 

because the court had granted Garofalo an extension in which to file her discovery responses.

 1 The record shows that Garofalo filed her “First Set of Discovery Requests” a second time about three weeks before the scheduled setting 

on the summary judgment motion, but those requests were duplicates of her initial discovery requests.
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Rule 166a(i) “requires the nonmoving party to present evidence raising a genuine issue of 

material fact supporting each element contested in the motion.”2 Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 

S.W.3d 306, 310 (Tex. 2009). If the nonmovant fails to satisfy its burden, the trial court “must 

grant the motion[.]” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). Because Garofalo did not file a response to 

Chandler’s no-evidence summary judgment motion, we conclude that the trial court did not err 

by granting the motion. See id.; see also P-K Charter, Inc. v. Tumche Corp., No. 2-06-350-CV, 

2007 WL 3037743, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 18, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.).

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

121735F.P05

 2 We note that Chandler’s summary judgment motion identified specific elements of Garofalo’s breach of contract and fraud claims 

for which it contended there was no evidence, but it did not identify any specific elements for which it contended there was no evidence on her 

other claims. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i) & cmt. 1997. However, Garofalo does not complain about the sufficiency of Chandler’s motion. 

/Elizabeth Lang-Miers/

ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS

JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals

S

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

JUANITA J. GAROFALO, Appellant

No. 05-12-01735-CV V.

CHANDLER MANAGEMENT D/B/A 

MCCALLUM CROSSING 

APARTMENTS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law 

No. 5, Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 05-01979-2012.

Opinion delivered by Justice Lang-Miers, 

Justices Francis and Lewis participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED.

It is ORDERED that appellee Chandler Management d/b/a McCallum Crossing 

Apartments recover its costs of this appeal from appellant Juanita J. Garofalo.

Judgment entered this 5th day of March, 2014.

/Elizabeth Lang-Miers/

ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS

JUSTICE