Affirm and Opinion Filed August 3, 2022 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-19-01137-CR 

NICHOLAS RYAN NADEAU, Appellant 

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court 

Collin County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 296-83228-2018 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Myers, Carlyle, and Goldstein 

Opinion by Justice Myers 

A jury convicted appellant Nicholas Ryan Nadeau of possession of 

methamphetamine and assessed punishment at twenty-five years in prison. In four 

issue, appellant contends (1) the case should be abated because of a conflict between 

a written order granting appellant’s motion to suppress and an oral denial of that 

same motion; (2) the court erred when it denied appellant’s motion to suppress; (3) 

the court erred in not allowing an investigator for the defense to testify as an expert; 

and (4) the court erred in not charging the jury pursuant to article 38.23 of the Texas 

Code of Criminal Procedure. We affirm. 
–2–

DISCUSSION

1. Abatement for Finding by Trial Court 

In his first issue, appellant argues the trial court should be required to make 

findings to clarify an apparent conflict in the record between a written order signed 

by the court granting appellant’s pretrial motion to suppress and, later, following a 

suppression hearing, an oral denial of that same motion. The State agreed with 

appellant to the extent that the law required abatement due to the conflicting oral 

denial of the motion to suppress. 

On June 14, 2022, we abated this matter to the trial court pursuant to rule 44.4 

of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure and Henery v. State, 364 S.W.3d 915, 

919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), to determine whether the trial court intended the written 

order granting the motion to suppress to control, or whether the court intended the 

oral pronouncement to control. On June 30, in response to our order, the court held 

a hearing and found it had inadvertently signed the order granting the motion to 

suppress. The court clarified that its ruling was that the motion to suppress was 

denied, and the court vacated the order granting the motion to suppress. 

Because the trial court’s ruling granting the motion to suppress resulted from 

clerical error, it did not warrant reversal. See id. We therefore overrule appellant’s 

first issue. 

2. Motion to Suppress 

In his second issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his 
–3–

motion to suppress the contraband found in his car because the police officer failed 

to provide specific and articulable facts to support his initial stop of appellant’s car. 

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated 

standard of review. State v. Staton, 599 S.W.3d 614, 616 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, 

pet. ref’d) (citing State v. Ruiz, 577 S.W.3d 543, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019)). We 

give almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts and 

review de novo the application of the law to the facts. Id. We view the record in the 

light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Id. When, as in this case, the trial 

court does not make explicit findings of fact, we view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the trial court’s ruling and assume the trial court made implicit findings 

of fact supported by the record. Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 190 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2018). We will sustain the ruling of the trial court if it is correct under any 

applicable theory of law. Id. 

Before trial, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress claiming Officer 

Colton Roelofs of the Frisco Police Department did not have reasonable suspicion 

to conduct the traffic stop that led to appellant’s arrest for possession of 

methamphetamine. Roelofs testified that on May 24, 2018, he was conducting 

narcotics interdiction with his K9 in an area where he had made a lot of drug arrests. 

He saw appellant leave a Valero gas station, get in his car, and drive off. Appellant 

was wearing a “7-Eleven” shirt, which caught the officer’s eye. 

Roelofs had a clear line of sight as appellant’s vehicle drove past the place 
–4–

where the officer’s Tahoe was parked, and appellant’s turn signal was off as he 

crossed in front of the officer’s patrol car. The officer pulled out and started driving 

behind appellant, who quickly activated his turn signal and made a right turn into a 

Snap-E-Jack gas station. Appellant’s car was approximately a car length or a car 

length and a-half away from the turn. The officer based this approximation on the 

length of his Tahoe, which was 17.1 feet long, and stated that there was “no way”

the turn signal was activated “outside of 25 feet” from the turn. He later summarized 

the distance as “maybe inside of 25 feet, but nowhere close to outside of a hundred 

feet” from the turn. Roelofs testified that what he saw was a violation of the Texas 

Transportation Code. 

Roelofs testified that appellant passed the initial turn into the gas station and 

appeared to make a split-second decision to turn at the next entrance once the officer 

started driving behind him. Roelofs stated that it was not possible appellant’s turn 

signal was on at the time, but if it was, he did not see it “whatsoever” and he “had 

the angle to where I would have been able to see it.” The officer testified that he 

“would have been able to see [appellant’s] violation clearly, or I would . . . not have 

pulled him over.” 

During the hearing, the State showed Officer Roelofs’s in-car video. Within 

the first few seconds, the video depicts appellant’s car moving across the video 

frame, the officer pulling out behind appellant’s vehicle, and appellant’s turn signal 

blinking right just before the turn. 
–5–

The defense called a private investigator, Daryl Parker, who testified that he 

used software programs such as Google Earth and Corel Draw and made 

measurements at the scene. Based on his on-scene measurements and his review of 

the officer’s in-car video, Parker’s conclusion was that the turn signal was on at 

approximately 162 feet from the turn. Parker admitted on cross-examination that he 

was not there on the night of the stop, and he was basing his conclusion on estimates 

and could not say what the officer could or could not see. 

At the end of the hearing, the trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress, 

stating: 

Excellent investigation, I think, but we are not limited to what the video 

camera says. We are to take into consideration all of the evidence as a 

whole, including the officer’s testimony. Just think about the days when 

we didn’t have video cameras at all. And so the motion to suppress is 

denied. 

The court did not issue any findings of fact or conclusions of law. The case 

proceeded to trial on August 26, 2019, and the jury found appellant guilty. 

For Fourth Amendment purposes, a traffic stop is a seizure and must be 

reasonable to be lawful. Vasquez v. State, 324 S.W.3d 912, 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2019). A police officer may make a warrantless traffic stop based on reasonable 

suspicion of a traffic violation. See Jaganathan v. State, 479 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2015). An officer has reasonable suspicion if he or she has specific, 

articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, 

would lead him or her to reasonably suspect that a particular person has been or soon 
–6–

will be engaged in criminal activity. Id. This is an objective standard that disregards 

any subjective intent of the officer making the stop and looks solely to whether an 

objective basis for the stop exists. Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 668 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2013); Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). A 

determination of reasonable suspicion is made by considering the totality of the 

circumstances. Wade, 422 S.W.3d at 668; Ford, 158 S.W.3d 492–93. The burden 

is on the State to demonstrate the reasonableness of the investigatory stop. Goudeau 

v. State, 209 S.W.3d 713, 716 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no pet.); see 

also Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492. 

The evidence in this case supports that Officer Roelofs had reasonable 

suspicion to conduct a warrantless traffic stop of appellant based on appellant’s 

traffic violation. The officer testified that he observed appellant activate his turn 

signal at a distance of “maybe inside of 25 feet, but nowhere close to outside of a 

hundred feet” from the right-hand turn. According to the Texas Transportation 

Code, “[a]n operator intending to turn a vehicle right or left shall signal continuously 

for not less than the last 100 feet of movement of the vehicle before the turn.” TEX.

TRANSP. CODE § 545.104(b). The officer’s personal observation of appellant failing 

to signal his right turn continuously for at least 100 feet before turning, combined 

with the evidence from the officer’s in-car video, provided objective, articulable 

facts supporting a reasonable suspicion to stop appellant for a traffic violation. See 

Castro v. State, 227 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (officer’s observation 
–7–

of illegal lane change provided sufficient objective, articulable facts to support 

finding of reasonable suspicion that driver committed traffic violation by failing to 

signal lane change). Therefore, based on our review of the record, we conclude the 

trial court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to suppress. 

We next consider appellant’s alternative request that we remand this case to 

the trial court for entry of specific findings of fact. In support of his position, 

appellant cites State v. Elias, 339 S.W.3d 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), but this 

reliance is misplaced. Elias states in part that “‘upon the request of the losing party 

on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court shall state its essential findings.’” 

Id. at 674 (quoting State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). 

“‘[E]ssential findings’” mean “‘findings of fact and conclusions of law adequate to 

provide an appellate court with a basis upon which to review the trial court’s 

application of the law to the facts.’” Id. (quoting Cullen, 195 S.W.3d at 699). The 

findings may be written or stated on the record at the conclusion of the hearing. 

Cullen, 195 S.W.3d at 699. “[A]n appellate court must abate for additional findings 

of fact when a party has requested findings of fact and the findings that are made by 

a trial court are so incomplete that an appellate court is unable to make a legal 

determination.” State v. Saenz, 411 S.W.3d 488, 495 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). In 

this case, however, there is no indication either party requested findings. 

Furthermore, because the trial court made oral findings at the conclusion of the 

hearing that are adequate for our review, a remand for additional findings is 
–8–

unnecessary. We overrule appellant’s second issue. 

3. Defense Investigator Testifying as Expert 

In his third issue, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion and 

violated rule 702 by not allowing defense investigator Daryl Parker to testify as an 

expert witness regarding his investigation and findings. 

The admission of expert testimony is governed by Texas Rule of Evidence 

702. Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Pursuant to 

rule 702, a witness may offer an expert opinion if the witness is qualified to do so 

by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education and the witness possesses 

scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge that will assist the trier of fact 

to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. TEX. R. EVID. 702. If the 

trial court determines the underlying facts or data do not provide a sufficient basis 

for the expert’s opinion, the opinion is inadmissible. See TEX. R. EVID. 705(c). 

Before admitting expert testimony under rule 702, the trial court must be satisfied 

that three conditions are met: (1) the witness qualifies as an expert by reason of his 

knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education; (2) the subject matter of the 

testimony is an appropriate one for expert testimony; and (3) admitting the expert 

testimony will actually assist the factfinder in deciding the case. Vela v. State, 209 

S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). These requirements are commonly 

referred to as qualification, reliability, and relevance. Id. Each requirement raises 

distinct questions and issues, and an objection based on one requirement does not 
–9–

preserve error as to another. Shaw v. State, 329 S.W.3d 645, 655–56 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d).

We review a trial court’s decision on whether to allow expert opinion 

testimony for an abuse of discretion. Gallo v. State, 239 S.W.3d 757, 765 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2007). We must uphold the trial court’s ruling if it was within the zone 

of reasonable disagreement. Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2000). We also review the trial court’s ruling in light of the evidence before 

the trial court at the time the ruling was made. Id. 

At the outset, we note that appellant’s brief does not identify what particular 

testimony by Parker the trial court excluded. The record shows there were two 

hearings on the admissibility of Parker’s testimony that were held out of the jury’s 

presence, the first before he testified and the second part of the way through his 

testimony. At the first hearing, defense counsel, when asked by the court under what 

rule he was conducting the hearing, hesitated to clarify if was offering Parker as an 

expert or a lay witness, saying both that Parker was being offered as an investigator 

and “not necessarily as an expert witness,” and that he was going to offer Parker as 

an expert regarding the results of his investigation. 

After admitting Parker’s CV and listening to him explain his background and 

education and the specific techniques he used in his analysis of the traffic stop (e.g., 

using Google Earth “to map out the scene,” and then using the officer’s in-car video 

“to determine reference points throughout the video”), the trial court appeared to 
–10–

rule that Parker was not qualified to testify as an expert that, based on looking at the 

lights on the video, appellant’s blinker was on at least 100 feet before the turn. The 

court noted there was no indication Parker was “some lighting expert” or “what 

expert would testify to that,” and the jury could “watch the same video” and reach 

its own conclusion. The court indicated it had no concern about Parker testifying to 

“where he thinks the hundred feet [mark] was or is because he measured it.” But the 

court was concerned about Parker testifying “that based upon his analysis the blinker 

was on outside of a hundred feet” because Parker was not qualified to provide such 

testimony. 

The second hearing held out of the jury’s presence occurred after Parker 

started testifying, and it involved multiple rulings on redactions of Parker’s slide 

presentation due to hearsay and speculation objections from the State. The trial court 

also appeared to rule that Parker could not testify to where appellant activated his 

blinker “because that’s complete speculation,” and, again, the jurors could watch 

“the very same video” and come to their own conclusions. 

Appellant contends the trial court’s refusal to allow Parker to testify to his

“findings and conclusion” was an abuse of discretion, yet appellant does not identity 

what, specifically, Parker was prevented from offering. He provides only general 

references to Parker’s testimony. Even so, to the extent the court limited Parker’s 

testimony, appellant fails to show an abuse of discretion by the court in its rule 702 

evaluation. Appellant claims Parker has experience in crime scene reconstruction; 
–11–

he is a crime scene investigator; and an accident reconstruction expert. There is, 

however, nothing in the record to indicate Parker is an accident reconstruction 

expert. Also, while Parker testified to his training and experience in investigations 

and crime scene reconstruction, appellant fails to make the connection between those 

fields of expertise and Parker’s testimony. The trial court asked defense counsel 

what expertise Parker had regarding lighting and the way it reflected “off the road,”

to which counsel responded that Parker took measurements. The court observed that 

measurements were “a different thing,” and the court said it did not know “what 

expert testimony [Parker] is providing” regarding lighting. The trial court also 

questioned whether such an opinion was verifiable and asked if there was a journal 

on that subject, to which counsel responded that any conclusory statements on 

Parker’s slide presentation could be edited out. Furthermore, the court could have 

considered other factors that impacted Parker’s credibility, e.g., testifying that the 

turn signal was on at 162 feet during the suppression hearing and at the 148-foot 

mark at the rule 702 hearing; acknowledging that he could not say what Officer 

Roelofs could or could not see on the night of the stop. 

We additionally conclude that appellant was not harmed by any error in the 

limitation of Parker’s testimony. See TEX.R. APP. P. 44.2(b). The record shows that 

Parker testified at length before the jury regarding the results of his investigation. 

He showed the jury a series of slides with satellite images, maps, and photos of the 

officer’s in-car video. He showed an image “approximating the field of view” of the 
–12–

officer’s in-car camera, and it showed where, on the image, the 100-foot mark was 

located from the turn into the gas station. Parker testified that he took physical 

measurements at the scene; he calculated the speed of appellant’s car; and he testified 

that he believed appellant’s brake lights were activated at the 148-foot mark. He 

also showed nine frames depicting appellant’s car moving from the point at which 

he believed “the brake lights were activated until it leaves the screen.” He described 

what he believed was a “change in dimensions of the light . . . as the vehicle moves 

through the frame,” stating that it appeared to grow and diminish as appellant’s car 

moved across the video screen. He discussed what he believed was a “color change” 

in the image from one frame to the next, and that the vehicle at that point was at the 

148-foot mark. During closing arguments, defense counsel emphasized its theory 

that appellant’s car was at the 148-foot mark when the turn signal was activated, 

based on the change in lighting. 

We overrule appellant’s third issue. 

4. Jury Charge 

In his fourth issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in not charging the 

jury pursuant to article 38.23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the issue of 

whether appellant was lawfully detained. 

Under article 38.23(a), when the evidence raises a question on whether 

evidence was illegally obtained, the jury shall be instructed that if it believes, or has 

a reasonable doubt, that the evidence was obtained in violation of the law, the jury 
–13–

shall disregard any evidence so obtained. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. 38.23(a); 

Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 

The record shows such an instruction was included in the court’s charge to the 

jury at guilt/innocence. It states as follows: 

Any evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any 

provision of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas or of the 

Constitution or laws of the United States shall be disregarded by the 

jury. 

You are instructed that before an officer has the right to make a 

temporary investigative detention of a defendant. the officer must have 

a reasonable suspicion that the defendant is connected with some 

criminal activity that is or has occurred. 

“Reasonable suspicion” means a suspicion that would be held by an 

ordinary and prudent person in the same circumstances as the officer. 

Now, therefore, before you consider the testimony of Officer Colton 

Roelofs concerning his observation of the defendant at the time of his 

detention, you must first find beyond a reasonable doubt that the officer 

had such reasonable suspicion, and if you do not so find beyond a 

reasonable doubt you will disregard such testimony and evidence. 

Indeed, defense counsel quoted and explained this language to the jury during 

closing arguments. 

 Because the issue raised by appellant was given to the jury, appellant’s 

complaint is without merit, and we therefore overrule his fourth issue. 
–14–

We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

191137f.u05 

Do Not Publish 

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b) 

/Lana Myers// 

LANA MYERS 

JUSTICE