This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6

STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 7 Plaintiff-Appellant, 8

v. NO. 30,139 9 MANUEL TORRES, 10 Defendant-Appellee. 11

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TAOS COUNTY 12 Sam B. Sanchez, District Judge 13 Gary K. King Attorney General 14 Farhan Khan, Assistant Attorney General 15 Santa Fe, NM 16 for Appellant 17 Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender 18 J.K. Theodosia Johnson, Assi stant Appellate Defender 19 Santa Fe, NM 20 for Appellee 21 MEMORANDUM OPINION 22 WECHSLER, Judge. 232 The State appeals the district court’s order excluding Defendant’s breath 1 alcohol test. The sole issue inthis appeal is whether the district court erred in ruling 2 that collateral estoppel precluded the State from introducing the results of Defendant’s 3 breath alcohol test based on a hearing offi cer’s determination that the results were 4 inadmissible during a license revocation heari ng. We reverse the order of the district 5 court excluding the results of the breath alc ohol test and remand to the district court 6 for further proceedings. 7 BACKGROUND 8 Defendant Manuel Torres was charged on September 22, 2008 in the Taos 9 County magistrate court w ith (1) aggravated driving under the influence of 10 intoxicating liquor in violation of NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-102(A), (D)(1) (2008) 11 (amended 2010), and (2) criminal damage to property, in violation of NMSA 1978, 12 Section 30-15-1 (1963). Pursuant to the Implied Consent Act, NMSA 1978, Sections 13 66-8-105 to -112 (1978, as amended throu gh 2007), Defendant was served with a 14 notice of license revocation. The Moto r Vehicle Division (MVD) held a telephonic 15 license revocation hearing, pursuant to Se ction 66-8-112. At the license revocation 16 hearing, Defendant challenged the admissib ility of a breath alcohol test based on the 17 assertion that the arresting officer failed to verify that his mouth was free of foreign 18 substances for twenty minutes before administering the test. The hearing officer 193 rescinded the revocation of Defendant’s license, finding that the officer failed to 1 present evidence that he looked into Defendant’s mouth or asked questions to verify 2 that Defendant’s mouth was free of foreign substances, thereby violating the Scientific 3 Laboratory Division (SLD) re gulations that require verification as a necessary 4 foundational requirement for administering a breath alcohol test. 5 The magistrate court subs equently convicted Defendant, and he appealed his 6 conviction to the district court. While his appeal was pending in district court, 7 Defendant mistakenly filed a motion-in- limine in magistrate court, arguing that 8 collateral estoppel precluded the State from introducing the results of the breath 9 alcohol test because the MVD hearing offi cer determined that it was inadmissible 10 during the license revocation hearing. After amending the motion and refiling it in the 11 district court, the district court orally gr anted the motion-in-limin e after a hearing and 12 subsequently entered an order stating “the State is precluded from re-litigating the 13 admissibility of the breath alcohol tests, and therefore, orders: [t]hat the [b]reath 14 [a]lcohol [t]est may not be admitted at trial.” Pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 39-3- 15 3(B)(2) (1972), the State filed a timely appeal of the order excluding the breath 16 alcohol test results. 17 STANDARD OF REVIEW 18 We review the district court’s application of collateral es toppel under an abuse 194 of discretion standard. Shovelin v. Cent. N.M. Elec. Co-op., Inc ., 115 N.M. 293, 297, 1 850 P.2d 996, 1000 (1993). “An abuse of disc retion occurs when a ruling is clearly 2 contrary to the logical conclusions demanded by the facts and circumstances of the 3 case.” Sims v. Sims , 1996-NMSC-078, ¶ 65, 122 N.M. 618, 930 P.2d 153. 4 APPLICATION OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 5 Collateral estoppel prevents the “relitigation of ultimate facts or issues actually 6 and necessarily decided in a prior suit.” Silva v. State , 106 N.M. 472, 474, 745 P.2d 7 380, 382 (1987), limited on other grounds byArchibeque v. Moya , 116 N.M. 616, 618, 8 866 P.2d 344, 346 (1993). Under the proper circumstances, collateral estoppel may 9 be permitted in a criminal proceeding as to issues necessarily determined in a civil 10 proceeding. State v. Bishop , 113 N.M. 732, 734, 832 P.2d 793, 795 (Ct. App. 1992). 11 Four elements must be met to establish a prima facie application of collateral estoppel: 12 (1) the party against whom collateral estoppe l is asserted must be the same party or 13 in privity to the party in the original ac tion, (2) the subject matter or the cause of 14 action in the two proceedings must be different, (3) the ultimate issues must have 15 been actually litigated, and (4 ) the issue must have nece ssarily been determined. Id. 16 Even when a prima facie app lication of collateral estoppel is made, the district court 17 may determine that the application of th e doctrine would be fundamentally unfair to 18 the party against whom it is asserted if th e prior proceeding did not provide a full and 195 fair opportunity to litigate the issue. Id. ; see also Deflon v. Sawyers , 2006-NMSC1 025, ¶ 14, 139 N.M. 637, 137 P.3d 577 (“The main concern is that a party against 2 whom collateral estoppel is s ought must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 3 the issue in the prior action.”). The party opposing the application of collateral 4 estoppel has the burden to show that the prior proceeding did not provide a full and 5 fair opportunity to litigate once a prima facie showing is made. Padilla v. Intel Corp. , 6 1998-NMCA-125, ¶ 9, 125 N.M. 698, 964 P.2d 862. 7 The district court concluded that the Motor Vehicle Division and the Taos 8 district attorney’s office were identical parties for purposes of collateral estoppel 9 because “‘the State of New Me xico is the State of New Mexico, it doesn’t matter what 10 department is pursuing an action, it is the State of New Mexico.’” However, our 11 previous case law does not support the conclusi on that different agencies of the state 12 are necessarily identical parties fo r purposes of collateral estoppel. See Albuquerque 13 Police Dep’t v. Martinez , 120 N.M. 408, 415, 902 P.2d 563, 570 (Ct. App. 1995) 14 (holding that the Albuquerque police departme nt and district attorney’s office are 15 identical parties “in the circumstances presented by this case” only after concluding 16 that both “have like interests in imposing punitive sanctions for violation of the 17 [s]tate’s criminal laws”). While we have stated that the “general rule is that litigation 18 by one agency is binding on other agencies of the same government” there are 196 “exceptions . . . if there are important diffe rences in the authority of the respective 1 agencies.” Id. at 414, 902 P.2d at 569 (internal quot ation marks and citation omitted). 2 We must therefore determine whether the State agency thatwas a party in the license 3 revocation hearing, the Motor Vehicle Division, and the Taos district attorney’s office 4 had sufficiently similar interests and purposes in the respective proceedings. 5 As our Supreme Court stated in Maso v. State Taxation & Revenue Department , 6 2004-NMSC-028, ¶ 12, 136 N.M. 161, 96 P.3d 286, a “license - revocation proceeding 7 is distinct from a criminal trial for driving under the influence.” The purpose of 8 license revocation proceedings is to protect the public by the prompt removal of 9 drivers who drive under the influence. Id. They are conducted by a hearing officer 10 from the Motor Vehicle Division, an agency only vested withpower to administer and 11 enforce the Motor Vehicle Code. See NMSA 1978, § 66-2-3(A) (2007). In contrast, 12 the “central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the 13 defendant’s guilt or innocence.” State v. Alvarez-Lopez , 2004-NMSC-030, ¶ 57, 136 14 N.M. 309, 98 P.3d 699 (Serna, J., concurring inpart, dissenting in part) (internal 15 quotation marks and citation omitted). The district attorney is elected by voters to 16 make prosecutorial decisions in the best interests of the people of the state. State v. 17 Brule , 1999-NMSC-026, ¶ 14, 127 N.M. 368, 981 P.2d 782. Given the differing 18 purposes of the revocation proceedings and criminal trials, and the intended summary 197 nature of the license revocation hearings , we do not believe that the parties in 1 Defendant’s license revocation hearing and criminal trial were identical parties or in 2 privity for the purposes of collateral estoppe l. Indeed, this Court has already stated 3 that “[t]he [S]tate si mply was not represented during th is [license revocation] hearing” 4 in addressing a contention that collateral estoppel applies to a determination on the 5 admissibility of breath alcohol tests madein a license revocation hearing in a 6 subsequent criminal prosecution. Bishop , 113 N.M. at 734, 832 P.2d at 795. The 7 district court therefore abused its discretion in finding that Defendant made a prima 8 facie showing of collateral estoppel. 9 Even assuming Defendant made a prima facie showing of collateral estoppel, 10 this Court has previously determined that applying collateral estoppel to a 11 determination in a license revocation heari ng that SLD regulations were violated, and 12 therefore a breath alcohol test is inadmissi ble, in a subsequent criminal prosecution 13 is fundamentally unfair to the State. Bishop , 113 N.M. at 734-35, 832 P.2d 795-96. 14 In Bishop , this Court determined that the summary nature of the typical license 15 revocation hearing may prevent the state from having a full and fair opportunity to 16 litigate issues during the hearing. Id. at 735, 832 P.2d at 796. Additionally, we noted 17 that “because the more serious issues of criminal guilt or innocence are not at stake 18 in an administrative hearing, the state may lack the incentive to fully litigate issues.” 198 Id. We expressed concern in Bishop that applying collateral estoppel in such 1 situations would unnecessarily force the stat e to be represented in license revocation 2 hearings and would lead to revocation hearings becoming “full-blown trials at which 3 every possible issue regarding the defendant’s actions would have to be fully 4 litigated.” Id. These concerns regarding the full and fair opportunity of the state to 5 litigate the admissibility of the br eath alcohol tests expressed in Bishop are identical 6 to this case. The record indicates that Defendant’s license revocation hearing was 7 held telephonically, and, although the arresting officer tes tified, no one from the Taos 8 district attorney’s office was present. A dditionally, a license revocation hearing is a 9 “summary administrative proceeding desi gned to handle license revocation matters 10 quickly.” Maso , 2004-NMSC-028, ¶ 12 (internal quotation marks and citation 11 omitted). We therefore conclude that th e district court abused its discretion by 12 applying collateral estoppel in light of our decision in Bishop

. 13 Moreover, this Court in Bishop stated that “we believe there are good policy 14 reasons for not applying collateral estoppel” in this context. 113 N.M. at 735, 832 15 P.2d at 796. First, we expressed concern that applying collateral estoppel would slow 16 down what is meant to be a summary administrative hearing because the state “may 17 feel compelled to intervene in every administrative action to effectively protect its 18 interests in some future criminal proceeding.” Id. Second, we recognized “that the 199 integrity of our judicial system requires adjudications of criminal guilt or innocence 1 to be made in a judicial setting, not in an administrative hearing.” Id. These policy 2 reasons support our conclusion that the distri ct court abused its discretion in finding 3 that collateral estoppel applied to findings in the license revocation hearing and that 4 the breath alcohol test was inadmissible precluded use in the subsequent criminal 5 prosecution of Defendant. 6 CONCLUSION 7 Because we hold that the district court abused its discretion in applying 8 collateral estoppel as to the admissibility of the breath alcohol test, we reverse and 9 remand to the district court for further proceedings. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11

_______________________________ 12 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 13 WE CONCUR: 14

__________________________________ 15 CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Chief Judge 16

__________________________________ 17 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge 18