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THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

___________________________

10th Circuit Court-Salem District Division

No. 2017-0692

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

v.

JEFFREY R. KEENAN

Argued: October 18, 2018

Opinion Issued: December 7, 2018

Gordon J. MacDonald, attorney general (Stephen D. Fuller, senior 

assistant attorney general, on the memorandum of law, and Elizabeth C. 

Woodcock, assistant attorney general, orally), for the State.

Randall Baldwin Clark, of Hollis, on the brief and orally, for the 

defendant.

DONOVAN, J. The defendant, Jeffrey R. Keenan, appeals his conviction 

in the Circuit Court (Stephen, J.) for driving a motor vehicle while his vehicle 

registration privileges were suspended, in violation of RSA 261:178 (2014). 

Because the defendant’s conviction was based upon his lawful operation of a 

vehicle owned and registered to his son, we reverse.

The following facts have been gleaned from the record and are not 

disputed. On January 25, 2017, the New Hampshire Department of Safety 
2

(DOS) suspended the defendant’s operating privileges.1 On January 31, DOS 

suspended the defendant’s registration due to a lack of insurance. Between 

these two dates, the defendant purchased an operator insurance policy and 

presented evidence of this coverage by way of an “SR-22” certificate to DOS.

2 

As a result, DOS restored the defendant’s operating privileges. The notice DOS 

issued to the defendant explicitly stated that “All license/operating privileges 

are hereby restored. Your registration remains suspended.” (Capitalization

omitted.)

On August 31, the defendant pulled out of his driveway and was 

promptly stopped by a Salem police officer who observed that the vehicle driven

by the defendant was uninspected. During the stop, the officer ran a computer 

check on the defendant’s license and learned that the defendant’s registration 

was suspended. The officer also checked the registration number of the vehicle 

and learned that the vehicle was registered to Jake Keenan, who was

subsequently identified as the defendant’s son. Nonetheless, the officer issued 

a summons to the defendant charging him with operating a vehicle while his 

registration privileges were suspended in violation of RSA 261:178.

At trial, the parties did not dispute the relevant facts — (1) the 

defendant’s operating privileges were restored and in good standing on the date 

of the motor vehicle stop; (2) at that time, the defendant’s registration remained 

suspended; and (3) the defendant was operating a vehicle, owned and properly 

registered in his son’s name. Thus, the only dispute at trial was whether the 

defendant’s act of driving a vehicle lawfully registered to another person while 

his registration was suspended constituted a violation of RSA 261:178.

In their arguments at trial, the parties focused on the last clause of RSA 

261:178, which states: “any person who shall drive or permit to be driven a 

vehicle owned or controlled by him upon any way after his registration has 

been suspended or revoked shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” The State 

argued that the statute prohibits any person with a suspended registration

from driving any vehicle, regardless of whether the vehicle is registered to

another person, in part, because the word “controlled” as it appears in the 

statute is synonymous with “driven.” The defendant countered that 

“controlled” does not mean “driven” but instead refers to circumstances where 

a person treats a vehicle as his own but does not legally own it. Based on this 

meaning of “controlled,” the defendant argued that the State failed to prove 

that he owned or controlled the vehicle he was driving when the officer stopped 

him.

 

1 The basis for the suspension of the defendant’s operating privileges is not disclosed by the record 

and, at any rate, is not relevant to this appeal.

2 An SR-22 insurance certificate is a “uniform document filed by an insurance company pursuant 

to RSA 264:21 and RSA 259:9 that certifies that the policyholder is insured for New Hampshire’s 

minimum liability requirements under RSA 264.” N.H. Admin. R., Saf-C 202.01(ah).
3

The trial court found that the defendant “drove a vehicle controlled by 

him, on a way, after his registration was suspended” and entered a finding of 

guilty. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court reviewed the defendant’s 

registration suspension and determined that the suspension was tied to him 

personally rather than to a specific vehicle. Based on this determination, the 

trial court concluded that the “legislative intent” was to prohibit him from

“driving any vehicle until he gets that straightened out.” The defendant 

appeals his conviction arguing solely that the trial court rested its decision 

upon an erroneous interpretation of RSA 261:178.

Resolving the purely legal issue now before us requires that we engage in 

statutory interpretation. The interpretation of a statute presents a question of 

law, which we review de novo. STIHL, Inc. v. State of N.H., 168 N.H. 332, 334 

(2015). In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiters of the 

legislature's intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a 

whole. Id. When construing its meaning, we first examine the language found 

in the statute, and where possible, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings 

to the words used. Id. When statutory language is ambiguous, however, we 

will consider legislative history and examine the statute’s overall objective and 

presume that the legislature would not pass an act that would lead to an 

absurd or illogical result. Id. at 334-35. We interpret statutory provisions in 

the context of the overall statutory scheme, id. at 335, and construe all parts of 

a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and avoid absurd or unjust 

results. State v. Fogg, 170 N.H. 234, 236 (2017). We apply the same principles 

of construction when interpreting administrative rules. State v. Villeneuve, 

160 N.H. 342, 347 (2010).

On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erroneously treated 

“controlled” as a synonym for the term “drive,” which constitutes an illogical 

interpretation of the statute. The State argues, as it did to the trial court, that 

the statute prohibits any person with a suspended registration from driving 

any vehicle. Although the parties and the trial court attempted to determine 

the meaning of RSA 261:178 by focusing their inquiry on the last clause of the 

statute, we construe all parts of the statute together to effectuate its overall 

purpose, even if the parties do not address it. See Fogg, 170 N.H. at 236. 

Accordingly, we consider all of the relevant language set forth in RSA 261:178, 

which states:

Suspension of Registration of Vehicle. The director, upon 

evidence satisfactory to him that the owner of a vehicle is 

permitting or has permitted the same to be driven in violation of 

any of the provisions of this title . . . may suspend the registration 

of such vehicle until [the director] is satisfied that the offense will 

not be repeated or the owner has been acquitted, and any person 

who shall drive or permit to be driven a vehicle owned or controlled 
4

by him upon any way after his registration has been suspended or 

revoked shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.

The statute is not a model of clarity, but its terms are susceptible to a plain 

and unambiguous interpretation when we consider the overall purpose of the 

statutory scheme and construe all parts of the statute together. See Fogg, 170 

N.H. at 236.

While the parties focus on the final clause of RSA 261:178, the statute 

specifically references the suspension of “the registration of such vehicle” in its 

immediately preceding language. RSA 261:178 (emphasis added). Accordingly, 

the final clause, which criminalizes the act of driving or permitting to be driven 

“a vehicle owned or controlled by [a person whose registration has been 

suspended],” RSA 261:178, logically applies only to the vehicle registrations 

that have been suspended, and not to the driver. To equate the term “control” 

with the term “drive,” as the State did in its argument to the trial court, would 

prohibit an individual from driving a vehicle that is properly registered and 

insured, regardless of whether the vehicle is owned by that individual. We find 

the interpretation proffered by the State to be illogical.

The State’s interpretation of RSA 261:178 would prohibit an individual 

whose registration has been suspended from driving a vehicle owned, properly 

registered, and insured by his employer. The State’s interpretation would also 

prohibit this same individual from renting and operating a vehicle owned, 

properly registered, and insured by a car rental agency. Indeed, this 

interpretation equates the suspension of an individual’s registration privileges 

with a suspension of his or her driving privileges, despite the fact that these 

two privileges are distinct and are governed by separate statutes. See RSA 

263:53 to :64-b (2014 & Supp. 2017) (statutes governing driver’s licenses 

suspensions and revocations). We do not find that these results are either 

logical or just.

More significantly, equating the term “controlled” with the terms “drive”

or “own” fails to recognize that the legislature specifically sought to distinguish 

these terms as they apply to the prohibition the statute criminalizes. Because 

we interpret legislative intent from the statute as written, we will not consider 

what the legislature might have said, add language that the legislature did not 

include, or disregard or conflate language that the legislature saw fit to include. 

See N.C. v. N.H. Bd. of Psychologists, 169 N.H. 361, 366 (2016) (“We also 

presume that the legislature does not waste words or enact redundant 

provisions and, whenever possible, we give effect to every word of a statute.”). 

Thus, the term “controlled” in RSA 261:178 refers to conduct separate and 

distinct from either the ownership or the operation of a vehicle. But, the term 

“control” is not defined by RSA chapter 261 or anywhere else in the motor 

vehicle code.
5

When a term is not defined in a statute, we look to its common usage 

using the dictionary for guidance. See K.L.N. Construction Co. v. Town of 

Pelham, 167 N.H. 180, 185 (2014). Webster’s Third New International 

Dictionary defines “control,” in relevant part, as “power or authority to guide or 

manage; directing or restraining domination.” Webster’s Third New 

International Dictionary 496 (unabridged ed. 2002). Applying this approved 

and common usage of the term “control” to RSA 261:178 establishes that an 

individual can control a motor vehicle, without operating or owning it, by

exercising power and authority over it by managing or directing its use. For 

example, an individual who leases or purchases a vehicle and registers it to a 

third party, yet still exercises authority over it by determining or managing its 

use, would “control” a motor vehicle as that term is used in RSA 261:178. 

Given the overall purpose of this statute, the legislature intended to prohibit 

any person from driving or permitting to be driven “a vehicle owned or 

controlled by him” which has a suspended registration. This interpretation is 

consistent with the legislature’s reference to “such vehicle” within RSA 261:178 

and the statute’s overall purpose without producing the unjust results we have 

previously noted.

The State argues, however, that the statute’s general purposes should be 

examined in conjunction with RSA chapter 264 (2014 & Supp. 2017), the 

Accidents and Financial Responsibility Act, which is “intended to induce, but 

not to compel, motor vehicle operators to provide security to persons injured by 

their negligence.” Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., 149 

N.H. 489, 492 (2003) (quotation omitted). New Hampshire does not require 

that a motor vehicle be insured prior to the operation of the vehicle. Coltey v. 

N.E. Telephone, 135 N.H. 223, 224 (1991). Yet, in certain circumstances 

enumerated in RSA 264:2 and :3 (2014), proof of financial responsibility may 

be required when, for example, a driver has been convicted of certain trafficrelated offenses or has caused an accident.

Proof of financial responsibility, and the restoration of a driver’s 

operation and registration privileges, can be secured by the purchase of 

“owner” or “non-owner” insurance which is evinced by the insurance 

company’s issuance of an SR-22 certificate establishing that the policyholder is 

insured for New Hampshire’s minimum liability requirements. See RSA 264:21

(2014); RSA 259:9 (2014); N.H. Admin. R., Saf-C 207.06. Restoration of a 

driver’s operating or registration privileges “shall be based on the type of filing 

made,” such that the purchase of non-owner’s coverage can restore a driver’s 

operating privileges, but not the driver’s registration privileges. N.H. Admin. 

R., Saf-C 207.08. The State maintains that permitting so-called “risky drivers,”

who have had their registration privileges suspended, to drive after purchasing

non-owner insurance would effectively circumvent the registration requirement 

because these drivers could lawfully operate any vehicle he or she did not own 

or control. We disagree.
6

DOS regulations explicitly permit New Hampshire drivers to purchase 

either owner or non-owner insurance whenever proof of financial responsibility 

is required. See N.H. Admin. R., Saf-C 207.06. As in this case, an individual 

can have his or her operating privileges restored once that individual produces 

proof of financial responsibility to operate a vehicle. Id. The applicable 

regulations further provide that “where non-owner’s coverage is filed, 

registration of a vehicle shall not be permitted and active registration shall be 

suspended until evidence of owner coverage on any such vehicle is filed with 

the director.” N.H. Admin. R., Saf-C 207.08 (emphasis added).

3 As with RSA 

261:178, this regulation specifies that evidence of insurance coverage on a 

specific vehicle is required before an individual’s registration can be restored. 

Thus, while an individual with a suspended registration cannot register any

vehicle upon securing non-owner coverage, nothing in either RSA chapter 264 

or DOS regulations suggests or implies that a suspended registration bars an 

individual from restoring his or her operating privileges or thereafter employing 

them.

RSA chapter 264 and DOS regulations establish an overall objective of 

requiring high-risk drivers to provide security for their operation of a motor 

vehicle, as well as a policy of inducing motor vehicle owners to provide security 

for the operation of their vehicles when the owner has permitted or is 

permitting that vehicle “to be driven in violation of any provision of [the motor 

vehicle code].” RSA 261:178. These purposes are entirely consistent with our 

interpretation of RSA 261:178 as prohibiting the operation of a vehicle which 

has a suspended registration. The legislature did not intend to limit the 

statute’s reach to the Accidents and Financial Responsibility Act, because RSA 

261:178 authorizes the director to suspend the registration of a vehicle when 

its owner has permitted it to be driven “in violation of any provision of this 

title.” RSA 261:178 (emphasis added).

In fact, there may be circumstances in which the director suspends the 

registration of fewer than all vehicles owned or controlled by a person. For 

example, if a motor vehicle has not been properly inspected, the director may 

suspend the registration of that vehicle, see RSA 266:5 (2014), but may not 

suspend the registration of other vehicles owned by that person as a 

consequence of the initial registration suspension. Under these circumstances, 

RSA 261:178 would not prohibit the person, assuming he or she holds a valid 

driver’s license, from operating the properly registered vehicle owned or 

controlled by him or her. The legislature did not expand the statute’s

application to that portion of the motor vehicle code regulating operating 

privileges, however, because the motor vehicle code authorizes the director to 

 

3 We note that, by virtue of New Hampshire Administrative Rule Saf-C 207.08, the defendant here 

could not have registered another vehicle in his name or operated another vehicle that he owned 

or controlled because all active registrations would have been suspended until he filed an SR-22 

certificate establishing his purchase of owner insurance.
7

suspend an individual’s operating privileges for specifically enumerated 

violations and conduct. See RSA 263:56 (2014). In light of these separate 

statutory provisions governing two distinct privileges, we find it unreasonable 

to interpret this statutory scheme as automatically imposing a penalty on one 

privilege by virtue of the imposition of a suspension as to the other.

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court erred by 

interpreting RSA 261:178 and the suspension of the defendant’s registration as 

barring the defendant’s operating privileges.

Reversed.

LYNN, C.J., and HICKS, BASSETT, and HANTZ MARCONI, JJ., 

concurred.