T h e H on or abl e Ann Al dr i ch , U n i t ed St at es D i s t r i ct J u dg e f o r t he N or t h er n D i s t r i ct of O h i o, s i t t i n g by * d esi gnat i o n. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 06a0824n.06 F iled: Novem ber 9, 2006 Case No. 05- 1637 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT ROYAL OAK

ENTERTAINMENT, LL C.; MURR AY HODG SON; ROYAL OAK THEA TR E, L LC .; P ETER HENDRICK SON; NEW P ROMO, LLC, P lai nt iffs- App e lla nt s,

v. CITY OF ROYAL OAK , MICHIG AN; JA M ES M AR CI NK OWS KI; CH ARLES SEMCHENA; DONALD F OST ER; T.J. BERRI NG TON ; T ER RYDRIN K WI NE ; M IC HA EL A ND RZ EJA K ; C ARLO GIN OTTI ; ILENE LANFEAR; JEANNE SARNACK

I; RODNEY K

ETE YIAN, De fend ant s- App e lle e s.

______________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE E ASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIG AN

BEFORE: K

EITH and B ATCHELDER, Circuit Jud ges; ALDRICH , District Judge. * ALICE M. BATCHEL DER, Circ uit Jud ge. P l a i n t i f f s R o y a l O a k E n t e rt a i n m e n t , LLC (“ROE” ), Roy al Oak T heatr e, L L C (“ROT”) , Murra y Hodg son (“H odg son”), and Peter Hendr ickson (“H endric kson”) ( co l l ec t ively , “Plaintiffs”) a ppeal the judg ment of the district cour t gr anting Def endant City

of Roy al Oak, Michig an (“Roy al Oak” ) and sever al of its employ ees a nd members of its Cit y

Commi s s i o n and City L iquor Control Comm ission C ommitt ee ( “Committ ee” )2

(col le c ti v e ly , “ D e f

e n d an ts ” ) s u mm ar

y ju d g me n t o n Pl a in ti f

f s ’ c la im s b r o u g h t u n d e r 4 2 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), 42 U.S.C. § 1986, and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 and 1962. We will affirm the judgme nt of the district court dismissing the Plaintiffs’ f eder al claims, i n part for

the re asons g iven by the dis tr ic t c ourt , a

nd in p art on oth e r g ro un ds

. I. Statem ent of Fac ts Nobody in Particular Pre sents (“N I PP”), which i s n o t a par ty to this action, purchase d the Roy al Oak Music Theate r (“the Theater” ), l ocate d in Roy al Oak, Mic higa n, and the The ater ’s liquor license, at a bankr

uptcy sale some time bef

ore 2000. N I PP t here afte r obtained the City ’s appr oval of a pla n o f o pe ratio n ( “ PO” ) f

or the Th e a te r, and

fo r a tim e op e rate d th e Th e a te r i tse lf . In th e fa ll of 2002, Hodg son and He ndrickson beg an neg otiating with NI PP for the pu rc h as e o f t he The ater , inc lud ingthe liq

uo r l ic e ns e , th e Sun da

y sa le s p e rm it a

nd the da nc e pe rm it. I n a

nti c ipatio n o f t

he sa le

– a nd wi tho ut e ve r havin g re qu e ste d th a t th e liq uo r l ic e ns e be tr ans fe rr e d – Ho dg so n s ub mit te d a

PO to the Com mit te e on May 28 , 20 03 , statin g that he wa s do ing bu sin e ss a s “ Roy a l Oak M usic Th e a te r” on

be ha lf of “ an e nti ty

to b e fo rmed. ” Th e Com mit te e vo te d to se t th is PO fo r a pu bli c hear ing on June 26, 2003. For rea sons not expl ained by the par ties and ce rtainly

not clear from the

rec ord, the minutes of the Committee state that the public hea ring would be set for

J une 26, 2003, but the minutes of the hea ring itself indicate that it was he ld on J une 25, 2003. On J une 24, 2003, Serg eant T.J. Ber ring ton (“ Be rr ington” ) of the Roy al Oak Police Dep artm e n t ( “ RO PD ” ) s e n t a me mo r an d u m to h is s u

p e r io r s r e g ar d in g a n ig h tc lu b c a ll e d “Space ” that Hodg son had op e r a

te d in D e tr o it. The memorandum c ontained information – appare ntly derive d from B err ington’ s conver sations with members of the D etroit Police Depa rtmen t and from two

new s p a p e r arti c le s

– in d ic a ti n g th a t th e r e w e r e 1 9 a s s a u lt an d b a tt e r

y r e p o rts s te mm in g from3

incidents at Space , mostly conce rning bouncer s’ assaulting customers. B err ington’ s memorandum was for war ded to Deputy

Chief Wightm an (“ Wightman”) and then to Police Chief Quise nberr y (“Q uisenberr

y ”). Wig htman also included his own memora nd um reiterating that ther e we re 19 assault and battery

repor ts resulting f

rom incidents at Space

. Be fore the J une 25th hear ing, Hodg son submitt ed a new PO; it is this PO that was discussed at the hea

ring on J une 25. At that heari n g, Deputy City Attorney

J ames Mar cinkowski (“Ma rcinkowski”) advised the Committee th at POs are not subject to public hear ing, so the Commi tt ee vo ted to c on tin ue the he ari ngun til July

15 . O n July

4, Ho dg so n w ro te an e ma il t o Quisenber

ry in order to se t the rec ord straig ht re gar ding the information containe d in the J une 24 memorandum, stating that 12 of the 19 assaults that alleg edly occur red at Space in fa ct occ urre d afte r Spa c e ha d c los e d. Ho dg so n s e nt a no the r e ma il t o Q uis e nb e rr y on July 10 , c omp la ini ng that D on a ld F o s t e r ( “ F o s t e r ” ) o f

t h e R O P D r e f

u s e d t o m e e tw i t h h i m i no r d e r t o h e ar h i s s i d e o f

t h e s t o r y. The ne x t day , Foster

sent Quisenber

ry a re port entitled “Spac e Ni g htclub Ba ckg round I nv e sti g a tio n ( 2n d Pa

rt ), ” wh ic h Pl a int if

fs a sse rt wa s ma de a va ila

ble to t he pu bli c and the me dia befor e the Plaintiffs we re a llowed to see it. The repor t w as not f lattering from Plaintiffs’ per spective. I t quoted a new spaper

article descr ibing Spac e as ha ving “ mind-alteringlights,” which it connec ted with possible use of the drug“ec stasy ” at the c lub, but it also sum marized interviews with neig hbors of Space and new s investigators, all of whom re ported that Spac e was well-run and a g ood neig hbor. A s ection entitl ed “Word on the Street” included nine unattributed quotes, supposedly provided by people on the “stre ets of De troit in area of Space ,” all of w hich ca st Space in a ne g ative lig ht from a law- enfor ceme nt perspec tive. The fina l section of the repor t a g ain stated that there had bee n 19 criminal re ports stemming fr om incidents at S pace , and additionally linked a murde r to the club byT h e r epor t appe ar s t o be m i s t ak en , as t h e s h oot i n g al l eg edl y t ook pl ac e on J an u ar y 16, 2000, bu t Spa ce di d n ot 1 op en i t s doo r s un t i l D ece mb er of t hat y ear , an d t he s hoot i ng i n fact to o k p l ac e i n t he park i ng l ot of t he Sweet W at er T av ern , an unre l ated b usiness. 4 statin g that th e su sp e c t and vic timha d b e e n a

rguin g ins ide Spa c e and

that the sh oo tin g oc c ur

re d in the Space parkinglot. Hod gs o n wa s eventua lly vindicated to some e x tent when a n investigator 1 from t h e De troit Pol ice De partment sent a letter to Hodg son admitting that “[a]t no ti me has [sic]

war rants bee n issued or bounce rs bee n investigated for a ny alleg ed cr imes at Space Nig ht Club.” The July 15th public he aringwent for war d as sche duled, and Hodg son told the Comm ittee that, if NI PP’s li quor license was e ver tra ns fer red, it would be tra

nsfer red to ROT, whic h Hendr ickson owns. The Committee voted to re co m m en d that the PO be denie d beca use neither Hodg son, Hendric kson, nor ROT owned a valid liquor license, and none of them had applied f

or a new lice nse or the tr ansfe r of a new lice nse into Roy al Oak. I n the Commit tee’s v i ew, the Cit y ’s ordinanc es did not permit a n o n -l i ce nsed par ty – other than a

n applicant f

or a ne w license or for transfe r into the City

of a ne w license – to submit a PO. On J uly 24, 2003, ROE and NI PP entered i n t o a m anage ment ag ree ment for the T heate r which provide d that NI PP would operate the Theater unti l all licenses a nd permits wer e tra

nsfer red to ROE, at whi ch t ime ROE would take ove r mana g ement. About the same time, Hendr ickson submitt ed a r equest that NI PP’s li quor license be tra nsfer red to ROT. On Aug ust 1, Marcinkowski draf ted two proposed r esolutions for the Commi ttee to adopt, stating“B E I T RESOL VED that the

re qu e st o f ‘ Spa c e ’ a

nd /or Murr ay Ho dg so n to op e ra

te the Roy a l O a k M us ic Th e a tr e (3 18 Wes t Four th Stre et) is de nied” and “B E I T FURTHE R RESOL VED that the proposed plan of operation of ‘ S p a c e ’ an d

/ o r M u r r ay H o d g s o n i s d e n i e d

. ” T h e C o m m i t t e e a d o p t e d b o t h r e s o l u t i o ns a t it s Au gu s t4 t h m ee t i n g.5

Two day s later, Ma

rcinkowski sent a

letter to Jul ie Wendt, Direc t o r o f L icensing for the Michig an L iquor Control Comm ission (“ML CC”), informing her that the Commi ttee had pa ssed a resolution denying H odg son’s reque st to operate the Theater. He sent another letter on Aug ust 12th, te lli nghe r abo ut t

he mana g e me nt a g re e me nt b e tw e e n N I PP and RO E. Th e ML CC w ro te to Hendr ickson on Aug ust 11th, telli ng him not to invest any money in renovating the Theater until the transfe r of the liquor lice nse fr om NI PP t o ROT was a pproved. The R OE -N I PP m anag ement ag ree ment was dissolved shortly there afte r bec ause the Commi ttee had vote d to not allow Hodg son to operate the The ater , and, on August 28th, ROT and NI PP entered into a mana g ement ag ree ment for the T heate r. Meanw hile, on Aug ust 18th, Hodg son submitt ed anothe r PO to the Commit tee f or its a pp ro va l. Hodg son therea fter r equeste d that the Commit tee r econside r its August 4th decision to not allow him to operate t he Theater. The Com mittee met the nex t day and made no decisions re g arding H o d g s o n ’ s n e w e s t P O o r h is r e qu e s t f

o r r e c o n s id e r a ti on, b u t s u g g e s te d th a t i t a d dr e s s a t i ts n e xt meeting the issue of whe ther NI PP’s li quor license should be transferr ed to ROT. On Oc tober 3rd, NI PP (which still owned the liquor lice nse) a nd ROT jointly

submitt ed a PO to the Committee, and RO T s ub mit ted ano th er on e onOc tob e r 8 th. Th e Com mit te e a pp ro ve d th e Oc tob e r 3 rd

PO at it s October 14th me eting , but did not addre ss the liquor license tra nsfer . ROT there afte r submitted y et

ano the r P O, wh ic h th e Com mitte e a pp ro ve d o n N ov e mbe r 6 th. At th at ti me , it a lso vo te d to

rec ommend to the City

Commi ssion that NI PP’s li quor licen s e n o t b e renewe d unless, befor e the license c ame up for re newa l, NI PP i nstalled a fir e suppre ssion sy stem in the Theate r. More over, the Commi ttee voted to re commend that NI PP’s C lass C liquor license be tra nsferred to ROT, but

re c omm e nd e d th a t th e da nc e pe rm it a c c omp anyingthe liq uo r l ic e ns e no t be tr ans fe rr e d. Th e CityT he di s t r i ct cour t ac t ual l y “ r emanded” t he s t at e l aw c l ai ms e ven t houg h t he cas e wa s ori gi nal l y f i l ed i n f eder al 2 cour t
. T hi s cour t wi l l t ake t he di s t r i ct cour t ’ s r emand as t houg h i t ha d decl i ned s uppl ement al j ur i s di ct i on an d di s mi s s ed t he st at e l aw cl ai m s f

o r l ack o f

s ub ject m at t er j uri sdi ct i o n. 6 Commi ssion adopted these r ecommendations, but t he ML CC, which ha s the final a uthority to gr ant or deny a liquor license tra

nsfer , never

acte d on these re commendations and ha s never transfe rre d N IP P ’ s l i qu o r

l i c e n s e t o an y e n t i t y. Pla int if fs fi le d th is a c tio n o n July 21 , 2 00 4, a lle g ingthat th e De fe nd ants ha d v iol a te d th e ir ri g hts to d

ue pr oc e ss a

nd e qu a l pr ote c tio n, re ta liate d a g a ins t th e m f or e xer cis in g th e ir

F ir st Amendment rig hts, conspired to depr ive them of their constitutional rig hts, and fa iled to preve nt the violation of their constitutional rights, a nd that the Def

endants a re liable to them for dama g es under the RI CO Act. The c omplaint also contains sever al state-la w ca uses of a ction. On Se pte mbe r 1 4, 20 04 , th e De fe nd ants c oll e c tiv e ly fi le d a mot ion to d ism iss fo r f

a ilure to state a claim upon which re lief ca n be g rante d. The district cour t took the motion under advisement and, on January

6, 2005, enter ed an or der c onverting it to a motion fo r summary judgme nt and direc ting the pa

rties to prese nt to the court any evidenc e and arguments that they wanted c onsidered for pur poses of the motion. Severa l months l ater , aft er h earing oral a rg ument on the motion, the court g rante d summary judgme nt to the Def endants on all of the Plaintiffs’ fede ral cla i m s and declined to e x erc ise jurisdiction over the r emaining state-law claims. Plaintiffs tim ely appea led. 2 II. Stand ard of Review I nitially , Plaintiffs contend that the district cour t actually disposed of their f

eder al claims on a F eder al Rule of Civil Procedur e 12(b)( 6) motion, which w ould require us to treat all of the ir fac tual

asser tions as true, because Def endants had initially filed such a motion and the parties ha d eng ag ed in very limit ed dis covery . See W estside Mothers v . Olszewski , 454 F.3d 532, 537 ( 6th Cir. 2006)7

(stating that this court revie ws a district cour t’s g rant of a

defe ndant’s Rule 12(b) (6) motion de novo, bu t takin g the fa c ts in the lig ht mos t fa vo ra ble to t he pla int if

f a nd on ly a ff ir min g if the pla int if

f c ou ld

no t br ing fo rt

h a ny se t of fa c ts that w ou ld e nti tle him to r e lie f) ; TriH

e alt h, In c . v. Bd

. o f Co mm ’r

s of H am ilt on Cou nty

, O hio , 430 F. 3 d 7 8 3 , 7 89 (6th Cir. 2005) (e x plaining the differ ence betwee n

re vie w und e r R

ule 12 (b )( 6) and su mma

ry jud g me nt)

. Ho we ve r, the dis tr ic t court e xplic itl y g a ve a ll of the pa rt ie s n oti c e that it

wa s c on sid e ri ngthe mot ion to be on e fo r su mma ry jud g me nt a

nd that it

was c utting off

discovery , and the r ecor d ref lects that the Plaintiffs filed no motion reques t i ng additional discovery

or Rule 56(f) aff

idavit adv i sing the court of the need f or fur ther discove ry

or the kind of evide nce they would have been able t o produce during discovery that would have c reated

a g e nu ine iss ue of

ma te ri a l f

a c t f or tr ia l. T he dis tr ic t c ourt c le arl y c omp lie d w iththe re qu ir e me nts of Rule 12(b) in tre ating the motion as one fo r s u m m ar y judgme nt. We therefor e will revie w for abuse of discretion the district court’s de cision to lim it discovery

. Se e Cac e v ic v . City of H az e l P ar k , 226 F.3d 483, 488 ( 6th Cir. 2000) (“ T h e i m p o rt ance of complying w ith Rul e 56(f ) ca nnot be

overe mphasized. [ I ]f the appellant has not filed either a Rule 56(f) a ffidavit or a motion that gives the dis tr ic t c ourt a c ha

nc e to ru le on the ne e d f

or a dd iti on a l di sc ov e ry , th is c ourt wi ll n ot n or

ma lly addre ss w hether there was adequate time f or discovery .” (interna l quotation mar ks and c i t at i o ns omitted)). We revie w de novo a dis trict court’s gr ant of summ ary judgme nt, using the same standar d under Rule 56(c) u s ed by the district court, W

ill iam s v . M

e hra , 186 F.3d 685, 689 ( 6th Cir. 1999) (e nb an c) , an d

we co n s i d er

t h e r ec o rdas i ts t o o d

b ef o re t h e d i s t ri c t c o u r t a t t h e t i m e o f i t s ru l i n g. Niecko v . Emro Mk

tg. Co., 97 3 F .2 d 1 29 6, 13 03 (6 th C ir . 1 99 2)

. S um mar y ju dgment is p ro pe r i f “the plea dings, de positions, answers to interrog atories, a nd admissions on fi l e, t o gether with the8

a ff ida vit s, if any , sh ow that the re is no g e nu ine iss ue a s to any ma te ri a l fa c t and that th e mov ingpa rt y is entitled to a judgme nt as a matter of law.” F ED . R. C IV . P. 56 (c ). We v ie w t he e vid e nc e , a ll f

a c ts, and any infere nces that may be draw n from the fac ts in the light most fa vorable to the nonmoving party
. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). To wi ths tand

su mma ry jud g me nt, the no n- mov ant mus t pr e se nt su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e to c re a te a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t. Klepper v. First Am. B ank , 916 F.2d 337, 342 (6th Cir. 1990). A

me re sc int ill a

of e vid e nc e is i ns uf

fi c ie nt; “ the re mus t be e vid e nc e on wh ic h the jur y c ou ld r e a so na

bly find for the [non-movant] .” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc. , 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). Entry of

su mma ry jud g me nt i s a

pp ro pr ia te “ a g a ins t a pa

rt y wh o f a ils to m a ke a

sh ow ingsu ff

ic ie nt t o e sta

bli sh the exist ence of an e lement essential to that par ty ’s ca se, and on w hich that par ty will bear the burde n of proof at trial.” Ce lot e

xCor p. v . Ca tre tt , 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). III . D ue P r oc e ss A. Subst ant ive Due P r oc e ss We have g e n e r a ll y d e f

in e d th e te r

m “ s u b s ta n ti v e d u e p r o c e s s ” a s “ [t ]h e d o c tr in e that g overnme ntal deprivations of life, liberty or p ro p erty

are subject to limit ations reg ardle ss of the adequa cy of t he proc edure s employ ed.” Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc , 9 61 F .2 d 1 21 1, 12 16 (6 th Cir. 1992) (interna l citati o n s o m i t ted). And w e have long de fined a violation of substantive due proce ss a s an “e g reg ious abuse of g overnme ntal power .” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Se condary Sc h. Athletic Ass’n , 4 4 2 F. 3 d

4 1 0 , 4 3 2 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g Vi ns on v . Ca mp be ll Co un ty Fi sc al C ou rt , 82 0 F. 2d 19 4, 20 1 (6t

h Cir. 19 87 ))

. Th e Pla int if fs ’ fi rs t ste p in mak ing ou t a subs tanti ve du e pr oc e ss claim must be to show a prote cted pr o p er t y o r l iberty interest. See F

erenc z v. Hairston , 119 F.3d 1244, 1247 (6th Cir. 1997).9

Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

he ld t hat Pla int if

fs la c ke d sta

nd ing to su e on the ir su

bs tanti ve du e pr oc e ss

c la ims . Init ia lly , it

fo un d th a t th e law w a s c le ar t hat no ne of

the Pla int if

fs ha d a pr op ert y int e re st

ar i s i n g o u to f t h e l i qu o r l i ce n s e b ec au s e t h ey ar e n o tl i ce n s ee s , ci t i n g W ojcik v. City of Romulus , 257 F .3 d 6 00 , 6 09 -1 0 ( 6th

Cir . 2 00 1) ; Johnson v. Li quor Control Comm’n , 254 N.W. 557, 559 (Mich. 1934). I t also rejec ted the Plaintiffs’ conte ntion that they had a property interest in the appr oval of

a PO b a se d on eithe r the c ity liq uo r co ntr ol or din anc e or the mana g e me nt ag re e me nts fo rm e d w ith NI PP. W ith reg ard to the Plaintiffs’ c laim of a pro p er t y i n tere st purportedly derive d from the ordinanc e, the c ourt found that under the plain lang uag e of the ordinanc e, parties that do not own a liquor license h av e n o rig ht to submi t a PO unless that non-license d party is apply ing f

or a ne w license or for the tr ansfe r into the city of a lice ns e is sued elsew here . And bec ause a transfe r of

owner ship of an existi ng license in the city is subject t o the s ole di scre tion of t he C ommissi on, the proposed tra

nsfer ee c an have no proper ty rig ht in the license. Finally , the court found that Plainti ffs could not as s er t NI PP’s rights bec ause the circ umstances did not fa ll within t he exceptions to the g ener al rule that one par

ty may not repre sent the intere sts of another that has voluntarily chosen not to p ur su e its ow n c la im. Th e re are bo th A rt ic le I I Iand pr ud e nti a l li mit s o n th e a

bil ity of c e rt a in p e rs on s to br ingsu it to enforc e rig hts. See MX Group, Inc . v. City of Covington , 293 F.3d 326, 332 (6th Cir. 2002) (c iting W ar th v . S e ldi n , 422 U.S. 490, 498 ( 1975)). Under Article I I I , the plaintiff must show that he has suffe red a n invasion of a leg ally

protec ted i ntere st that is concre te, par ticularized, and a ctual or imminent; t hat there is a ca usal conne ction betwee n the injury and the c halleng ed conduc t; and that a fa vorable decision by

the cour t is li kely to redre ss t h e p l ai n t iff’s injury

. Lujan v. Defende rs of W ild lif e , 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). Case law has also created three prudential re quirements: that10

the plaintiff asse rt his own interests and not the inter ests of others, that the cla i m b e m o re t h an a g e ne ra l g ri e va

nc e , a nd , in c a se s w he re the plaint if

f com pl a ins a

bo ut a statut e , th a t th e c la im f

a ll within the “zone of intere sts” regulated by the statute. Coyne v . Am. Tobacco Co. , 183 F.3d 488, 494 (6th Cir. 1999). Moreove r, a party may asser t the rights of ot hers only in cer tain very limit ed si tuations: when the par ty asser ting the r ight ha s a “c lose relationship” with the person possessing the rig ht, when the party possessing the rig ht is hindered in its abilit y to enforc e that rig ht, and when the party bring ing suit has ha d an action taken ag ainst it that results in the violation of a third par ty ’s rig ht. Kowals ki v. Tesme r , 543 U.S. 125, 129-30 (2004). Michig an ca se l aw is clear that a par ty who has ne ver ha d an intere st in a particular liquor lic e ns e or e nte rt a inm e nt p e rm it h a s n o p ro pe rt y ri g ht i n th e tr ans fe r o f t

hat li c e ns e or

pe rm it t o h im. W ojc ik, 257 F .3 d at 61 0; Barr v. Pontiac City Comm’n , 282 N.W.2d 348, 350 (Mich. App. 1979); W ong v. City of Riverv iew , 337 N.W.2d 589, 590 (Mich. App. 1983). Only the hol d er o f s uch a license h as a p ro p er t y

interest in it. W

ojc ik, 257 F.3d at 609-10. I t is clear that the Roy al Oak Or d in an c e p r o v id e s th e s e Pl a in ti f f s w it h n o e n f o r c e a b le r ig h ts
. Pl a in ti f

f s ’ e v id e n c e d e mo nstrates that they had no prope rty

interest her e: they did not have a liquor license or dance permit; they wer e not seeking to transfe r an e x isting license into Roy al Oak; a nd they wer e not ap p l y i n g fo r a new lic e ns e . Pl a int if

fs the re fo re we re no t wi thi n the lim ite d c la sse s of a pp lic ants wh o w e re e nti tle d to

su bmi t a pla n of op e ratio n and to be he ard

. Th e or din anc e c on fe rr e d no su bs tanti ve ri g hts on

the se Plaintiffs, and whethe r we hold, a s the district c ourt did, that the y have there fore suffe red no injury

and do no t ha ve sta nd ingto b ri nga

su bs tanti ve du e pr oc e ss c la im w ith re g ard to t he liq uo r l ic e ns e and the plan of operation for the The ater , or that they cannot state any

claim for a

substantive due11

proce s s v io lati o n b e c a

u s e th e y h a v e n o p r o p e rty in te r e s t in th e li c e n s e o r it s tr an s f e r o r a p lan of operation for the The ater , the re sult is t he same

. Plaintiffs do not fare any better by arguing that they are simply seekingto vindicate NI PP’s rig hts beca

use NI PP i s not at all hindered in br inging the suit or in its ability to submit a PO to the City , a nd Pla int if

fs do no t a sse rt ho w the a c tio ns take n a g a ins t the m have a ff e c te d NI PP’ s r ig ht t o operate an e stablishment in the Theater or the rig ht to serve a lcohol there. T h e district court wa s

c le arl y c or re c t in ho ldi ngthat th e Pla int if

fs la c ke d s tand ingto b ri ngany c la im o n b e ha lf

of NI PP. B. P r oc e dur al D ue P r oc e ss Due pr ocess r equire s that befor e an individual is finally deprive d o f h i s p ro p erty , he be provided notice and an oppor tunity to be hea rd at a meaning ful time and in a mea ningf ul manner. See M athews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). Plaintiffs ha ve asser ted that they wer e denie d due proc ess when the Def endants de prived them of the rig ht to speak bef ore the Commi ttee adopte d the tw o r e s o luti o n s th a t

– a c c o r d in g to Pl a in ti f f s

– p r e v e n te d H o d g s o n f r o m e v e r o p e rating the Theater, a nd when the Committee g rante d the request for a transfe r of the liquor lice nse to ROT but then re voked the lice nse without notice. 1. Aug ust4t h Re so lut ion s Plaintiffs complain that at the September 11, 2003, meeting Commi ttee member s conspired t o al t er t h e mi n u t es o f th e Au gu s t 4 , 2 0 0 3 , m ee t i n g wi t h re gar d t o re s o l u t i o n s p as s ed at t h at m ee t i n g. Making sense of

this claim from Plaintiffs’ brief has bee n no mean f

eat, but we are satisfied that the Plaintiffs have provided no evidenc e to support it. The district court he ld, and we a g ree , that Plaintiffs’ argument that these resolutions preve nted Hodgson from ever operating the T heate r is not te na ble . T he re c or d d oe s n ot s up po rt the cl aim th at the De fe nd ants a lte re d th e Au g us t 4t h12

re so lut ion s. F ur

the rm or e , RO T e ve ntu a lly re c e ive d p e rm iss ion

to o pe ra te the Th e a te r u

nd e r s ome of the POs that it

su bmi tte d f or a pp ro va l. Finally , Plaintiffs cannot pre vail on their proc edura l du e p ro ce s s claim bec ause the y wer e entitled to no proce ss whatsoeve r. As we have explained with reg ard to Plaintiffs’ substantive due proce ss claim, under the ordinanc e they did not fit withi n any

of the c ateg ories of applicants who

wer e entitled to submit a p l an o f operation and to be hea rd, and the y

there fore had no rig ht to be he ard and no le g a l in te re sts to p ro te c t. 2. Re vo c at ion of Liq uor Lic e nse I f t he Defenda

nts had revoke d Plaintiffs’ lawfully transfe rre d liquor license with no hea ring whatsoeve r, Plaintiffs would cer tainly have a colora ble procedura l due process claim. Howeve r, the Def endants did not revoke any such l icense

. The Com mittee voted to rec ommend that NI PP’s li quor lic e ns e be tr ans fe rr ed to ROT, and the City Com mis sio n a g re e d, bu t th e ML CC n e ve r a c tua lly transfe rre d the license . The ML CC is in fac t the only body that has the powe r to effec t uate a transfe r; its failure to act on the recommendation of the C ommitt ee and C ity Commi ssion was not the equivale nt of a re vocation of the licen s e, and, in any event, wa s not attributable to the Def endants. None of the Plaintiffs eve r had a liquor license that c ould be re voked. IV . F ir stAm e ndm e nt Pla int if fs a lso argue that th e De fe nd ants re ta liate d a g a ins t th e m f or e xer c isi ngthe ir

ri g ht t o sp e a k a nd pe ti t i o n t h e g o v e rnme nt u

nd e r t he F ir st A me ndme nt. A F ir st A me ndme nt r e ta liatio n c la im require s evidenc e that: (1) the plaintiff eng ag ed conduct protec ted by the Fir st Amendment; (2) the g overnme nt actor took a

n adver se ac tion ag ainst the plaintiff t hat would deter a person of ordinar y fi rmne ss f ro m con tin

uin g to en g a g e in that con du c t; an d (3) the a dv e rs e a c tio n w a s mo tiv a te d at le a st13

in pa rt by the fa ct that the plaintiff e ng ag ed in the prote cted c onduct. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter , 175 F.3d 378, 394 ( 6th Cir. 1999). We will assume for purpose s of ar g ument only th at P l ai ntiffs have shown that they wer e

e ng a g e d in

pr ote c te d c on du c t be c a

us e the y we re sp eaki ng befo re the Com mit te e in a n atte mpt to have the ir various POs approved (although, as we have ex plained, under the ordinance, the Plaintiffs ha d n o r ig ht t o s ub mit

the ir POs and the or din anc e imp os e d n o o bli g a tio n o n th e Commi tt ee to listen), and that they

suffe red a

n adver se ac tion because the Commit tee de nied their re quests and arguably disseminated fa lse information re g ardingincidents occ urring during Hodg son’s tenure as

owner of “Space.” But the rec ord i s devoid of evidenc e showing a causa l connec tion between the protec ted ac ti v it

y an d th e a d v e r s e a c ti o n , n o r

h a v e th e Pl a in ti f

f s p r o v id e d

an y in d ic a ti o nw h at evidenc e in this reg ard they could have produce d had further discove ry been pe rmitted. Se e Sie rra Club v. Slater , 120 F.3d 623, 638 ( 6th Cir. 1997) (“[A] a plaintiff complaining t hat a district cour t g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt w ith ou t all owi ng a de qu a te dis c ov e ry mus t, at a

min imum, b e a

ble to show that he c ould obtain information throug h discovery that would disclose materia l f acts[.] ”). The dis tr ic t c ourt

pr op e rl y g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt o n th is c la im. V. Equ al P rote ction, §§ 1985 and 1986, an d RICO Act Pla int if fs a lso br ou g ht c la ims fo r vio la tio ns of the ir e qu a l pr ote c tio n r ig hts un de r 4 2 U .S. C. § 1983, violati o n s o f 4 2 U

. S. C. § § 1 9 8 5 an d 1 9 8 6 , an d f o r d a ma g e s u n d e r th e RI CO A c t. The dis tr ic t c ourt

did no t a dd re ss a ny of the se c la ims , a lth ou g h it state d th a t it

wa s g ra nti ng“ De fe nd a nts ’ motion for summary

judgme nt on Plainti ffs’ f eder al claims.” A. Equ al P rote ction14

Plaintiffs claim that the Def endants de nied them equa l protectio n o f the law s by denying Hodg son the rig ht to conduct any business at the Theater, a nd by voting to re voke He ndrickson’s transfe rre d liquor license (both repr ises of earlier arg uments), and by “taking other a dverse actions ag ainst Plainti ffs . . . in a ma nner that treated P laintiffs much m ore harshly than similarly

[] situated businesses in Roy al Oak.” Plaintiffs chara cter ize these as cla ims of selective enforce ment, and, as

we unders tan d th is a

rgume nt, a lle g e that th e City tr e a te d th e m di ff

e re ntl y fr om o the r s imi larl y situated pers o n s b ec au s e P l ai n t i ff s ex er ci s edt h ei r F i rs tAm en d m en tri gh t s t o p et i t i on the g overnme nt

and to c ri tic ize pu

bli c ly the mann e r i n w hic h th e De fe nd ants ha nd le d matte rs inv olv ingthe P l a i ntif fs

. Putti ng aside the f

act that this a

ppear s to be no more tha

n a re casting of the F irst Amendment reta liation claim addre ssed earlier, it is clea r t hat P laintiffs have wholly failed to set forth e vidence of disparate treatment. “Selective e nforc ement cla ims are judg ed ac cordingto ordinary Equal Protection standar ds, which re q u ire a petitioner to show both a discriminatory purpose a

nd a discriminatory

eff ect.” Ga rd

e nh irev . S

c hu be rt , 205 F. 3 d 3 0 3 , 318 (6th Cir. 2000). I n this case, be c a us e Pla int if

fs c la im that the y are “ a c la ss of on e ” fo r p ur po se s o f t he e qu a l pr ote c tio n a

na ly sis , see Village of W

illow brook v. O lech , 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000), they must show that they

have be en “intentionally

treated diffe rently

from others simi larly

situated and that ther e is no rational ba sis for the diffe renc e in treatment.” Id . Plaintiffs have wholly failed in this re gar d

. Although Plaintiffs have a l l ege d t h at others similarly situated to them were treated diffe rently , the re cord c ontains no evidenc e to support that allegation, nor have Plaintiffs provided any indication how t hey would be

a ble to s up po rt

it i f f ur the r d isc ov e ry

we re c on du c te d. Th e e qu a l pr ote c tio n c la im i s w ho lly unsupported by

evidenc e in the re cord a

nd the Def

endants a re e ntitled to sum mary

judgme nt on that

c la im.15

B. Sections 1985 and 1986 P l ai n t i ff s al s o b ro u gh t cl ai m s al l egi n g v i o l at i o n s o f 4 2 U. S

. C

. § § 1 9 8 5 an d 1 9 8 6 , ar gu i n g –

as we understand thi s claim – t hat the De fenda nts conspired to cha

ng e the minutes of a

prior Commi ttee mee ting to re flec t that the t wo resolutions denying H odg son’s PO were passed on a day when they

wer e in fa ct not addre ssed. Section 1986 liability

is derivative of

§ 198 5 l i ab i l i t y . Have rstick Enterprises, Inc . v. Financial Federal Credit, Inc. , 32 F.3d 989, 994 (6th Cir. 1994) . A § 1985(3) c ause of action for conspirac y

require s that the plaintiff prove four e lements: (1) the e x istence of a conspira cy ; (2) the purpose of

the conspira cy was to deprive a ny person or class of pe rsons the equa l protection or e qual privileg es and imm unities of t he law; (3) an act in further ance of t he conspiracy ; and (4) injury or d e p r iv a ti o no f

a f e d e r a ll y p rotec ted right. Id . at 99 3. We h a ve he ld t hat § 1 98 5( 3) a

pp lie s o nly wher e the discr imination was based on r ace or m ember ship in another class comprising “disc rete and insular minorities that rec eive spe cial pro t ec t i o n under the Equal Protection Clause be cause of inhere nt personal c hara cter istics.” Volunteer Me d. Clini c, Inc . v. Ope ration Rescue , 948 F.2d 218, 224 (6th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks and c itations omi tted). Plaintiffs argue that just as they may comprise a

“cla ss of one” for purposes of t heir equal protec tion claim, they are a “c lass of one” for pur poses of their § 1985(3) claim. Not surprising ly , Plaintiffs provide no authority whatsoeve r for this claim, and we rejec t it. I t is clea r t hat even if these P laintiffs can c laim to be a “c lass of one,” their member ship in that class is “not entitled to the ki nd of special protec tion which would make § 1985(3) applicable to Plaintiff[s’] claim.” Mc Ge e v . Sc ho olc ra ft Cm ty . Co ll. , No. 04-1924, 167 F e d. Ap px 42 9, 43 6 ( 6th

Cir . J anu ary 18 , 2 00 6) (“ Th e g ro up of ind ivi du a ls s e e kin g a

de g re e a s a

c e rt if ie d o c c up a tio na l th e ra

py a ssi sta nt m ay be a re la tiv e ly

dis c re te min or ity , b ut c e rt a inl y it i s16

neither ba sed on i nhere nt persona l char acte ristics nor t raditionally the s ubject of special prote ction under the Equal Protection Clause.” ). Nothing in the Supreme Court’s opini on in Village of W illow brook pr ov ide s any su pp or t f or arguin g to t

he c on tr ary . T he De fe nd ant s are e nti tle d to

su mma ry jud g me nt o n th e se c la ims a s w e ll. C. RICO Finally , Plaintiffs assert that De fenda nts are liable to them for dama g es ar ising ou t of the Def endants’ a lleg ed ra ckete eringactivity . 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 and 1962 provide a ca use of a ction for civil damag es ar ising out of r acke teer ing a ctivity , provided the plaintiff can show ( 1) two or more predic ate of

fense s; (2) the e x istence of an “e nterprise”; (3 ) a n ex us betwee n the patter n of

r a c k e t e e r i n g a c t i v i t y a n d t h e e n t e r p r i s e ; an d ( 4 ) ani n j u r y t o t h e p l a i n t i f

f ’ s b u s i n e s s o r

p r o p e rt y. VanDenBroe ck v

. CommonPoint M ortgage Co. , 2 10 F .3 d 6 96 , 6 99 (6 th C ir . 2 00 0) ; Se dim a, S. P. R. L. v. Im rex Co. , 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985). Plaintiffs have w holly failed to plea d – let alone show evidenc e of – any predic ate offense s committed by the Defenda nts, and the most g ener ous rea ding of their c omplaint and the evidenc e in the rec ord comes up short with r eg ard to the e x istence of an

e nte rp ri se . D e fe nd ants are e nti tle d to su mma ry jud g me nt o n th is c la im. VI. Conclusion For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt
.