1 ... T h i s pr oce edi n g a r i s es ou t of Cau s e N o. 08- 02- 4667 8 , s t y l ed T erri H a rt m a n , a s n ex t f

ri en d o f M a ri ssa H a rtm a n , a m in o r, e t a l. v . D a im le r T ru c k s No rth A m e ric a , L .L .C . d /b /a F re ig h tli n e r, L .L .C ., et a l., p e n d ing in the 7 9 th Jud i ci al D i st ri ct C o urt , Ji m W el l s C o unt y , T exas, t he H o no rable Richard C
. T errel l presi d i ng. i i i i i i



### OPIN ION No . 0 4- 09 -0 03 10 -C V J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT, INC
. ,

Ap pe lla nts
v. Te rr i HARTMAN , et al., Appellee s F ro m th e 79 th Jud ic ia l D ist ri c t Co ur t, Jim We lls County , T e xas Trial Court No.08-02- 46678, the Honora ble Richard C. Te rre ll presiding No. 04-09-00369- CV IN RE J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT, INC
. Orig inal Mandamus Proce eding 1 Opinion by : Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice Sitt ing: Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice

Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Marialy n Ba rnar d, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: J anuar y 20, 2010 APPEALDI SMI SSED FOR L ACK OF J URI SDI CTI ON; PETI TI ON F OR WR I T OF MANDAMUS CONDI TI ONAL L Y GRANTED04
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- 2- In these c onsolidated proce eding s, J .B. H unt Transport, Inc. ( A J .B. H unt @ ) complains of the trial court’s May 21, 2009 order denying its motion to c ompel arbitration. We dismiss J .B. H unt’s interlocutory

appea l for lac k of jurisdiction and cond i t i o n all y g rant the pe tition for writ of mandamus. B ACKG ROUND The unde rlying dispute a

rose out of a

wrong ful death claim fi l ed after Mr. Ga ry Pilat was killed in a car

acc ident while drivinga truck owned by J .B. Hunt, his employ er. J.B. Hunt provided its employ ees a

benef its plan, entitled “J .B. H unt Texas I njury Be nefit Plan Summary

Plan Desc ription” (her einaf

ter “ Be nefit Plan”). T he B enef it Pl an provide s that in the event a n employ ee die s a s a re su lt o f an o n th e job inj ur y , J.B . H un t w ill pa

y the e mpl oye e ’s be ne fi c iary $1 00 ,0 00 in death be nefits and wil l reimburse funer al expenses up to $6,000 to any one who incur s them. On J une 2, 2004, Mr. Pilat signe d the B enef it Pl an. Included in the B enef it Pl an is an a

rbitration
a g re e me nt whic h p ro vid e s a s f oll ow s: A ll c la im s o r d is p u te s d e s c r ib e d b e lo w th at c an n o t o th e rwise be re solved betwe en the Company and you are subject to final and binding a rbitration. This binding a rbitration is th e o n ly

method for resolvingany

such cla im or dispute. . . . This arbitration re quirement a pplies to: . . . [A] ny leg al or equitable claim by or wit h respe ct t o y ou for a ny form of phy sic a l or ps y c ho log ic a l dama g e , ha rm or de ath wh ic h re late s to an ac cident, occ upational disease , or cumulative tra uma. . . . Thes e provisions also apply to any claims that may

be brought by y our s po us e , c hil dr e n, be ne fi c iari e s, re pr e sent ativ e s, e xec uto rs , administrators, guardia

ns, heirs or a ssigns.04
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2 ... A t t h e o u ts e t, th e p le a to the ju risd ic tio n p ro v id e d tha t i t i s “S u b je c t t o , an d w itho u t wa ivin g , i ts rig h t t o ar bi t r at e. ” I n a dd i t i on, t he pl ea cont ai ned a s ect i on en t i t l ed “ J. B
. H un t P r es er ves i t s Arbi t r at i on Ri gh t s , ” wh i ch s pec i f i ca l l y pr ov i des : ( 1) “ Fa r f r om s u bs t an t i al l y i n v ok i n g t h e j u di ci al pr oce s s , J. B
. H u n t s eeks t o avo i d l i t i g at i on al t oget her ”; ( 2) “ B y p ur s ui ng d i s mi s s al , J. B
. H un t has not j eopardi zed i t s r i gh t t o com pel ar bi t r at i on un der t he Federa l A rb itra tio n A c t” ; (3 ) “N o r c a n a n yo n e p ro v e a n ‘un e q u ivo c a l’ w a ive r, e sp e c ia lly b e c a u se J .B . H u n t ha s e x p re ssly re se rv e d it s rig h t to a rb itra te th ro u g h o u t.” A d d iti o n a lly, J .B . H u n t’s re p ly t o p la intiff s’ re sp o n se to J .B . H u n t’s p le a to t he j ur i s di ct i on s p ec i f

i ca l l y a s s er t s “ M ar i s s a mus t ar bi t r at e h er cl ai m, a def ens e di s put ed by P l ai nt i f f s , ” a nd gi ves su p p o rting a rg u m e n ts fo r su c h a n a sse rtio n . H a rtm a n c o n te n d s tha t a t th e h e a rin g o n the p le a to the ju risd ic tio n , p la intiff s broug ht up t he ar bi t r at i on i s s ue, but J. B
. H un t advi s ed t he cour t t hat t he i s s ue “ may be r es er ved f or a not her day
. ”

- 3- On J une 1, 2007, Te rri Ha rtman, individually and as next frie nd of Marissa Har tman, a minor
c hil d, fi le d s uit

in B e xar County a g a ins t J.B . H un t. T he pa rt ie s d o n ot d isp ute that th e on ly purp os e of this first suit was to seek appr oval from the tr ial court for the pay m en t o f d eath be nefits and funer al expenses under

the B enef it Pl an. The parties enter ed an agree d judgme nt, which orde red the death be nefits to be paid to Mr. Pilat’s minor daug hter, Mar issa Har tman. Then, on F ebrua

ry 7, 2 0 0 8 , Terr i Hartman, a s nextfriend of Marissa Ha

rtman, a minor, a

nd Marlene Har

tman, as Ex ecutr ix of the Estate of G ar y P i l at, dec ease d, filed a se cond suit in J im W ells County , which
n am e d a s d e f e n d a n t s D a i m l e r

T r u c k s N o rthA m e r i c a , L. L. C
. , J
. B
. H un t , an d C l a u d i o B ar r e r a , III
. Plaintiffs subsequently

filed an a mended petition, indicating that only Marissa Ha rtman (he reina fter “Ha rtman”) is seeking to rec over damag es for the wrongf ul death of her father and the Estate of Ga ry Pilat is not bring ing a

ny claims ag ainst J .B. H unt in the l aw s u i t b ec ause of the sig ned ar

bitration ag ree ment. J .B. H unt filed i ts origina l answer on May 12, 2008, indicatingthat it is “subject to, and wi th ou t w aiv in g, it s ri ght to com pel arbi tr ati on of all or an y part of t hi s cas e.” O n J un e 3, 20 08 , J .B. Hunt f ile d a ple a to t he jur isd ic tio n a

nd mot ion to s ta y pr oceedi ngs or

dis c ov e ry , whic h s ou g ht t o have the case dismiss ed on the f ollowing grounds: (1) standing ; (2) ele ct i o n of re medies; (3)
e sto pp e l; (4 ) moo tne ss; (5 ) re s jud ic ata ; and (6 ) an a g re e d s e ttl e me nt. 2 On August 28, 2008, the trial04
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- 4- court de nied J .B. H unt’s plea to the jurisdiction. Since the ince ption of the suit, various discovery has bee n conducte d that we will addr ess later in this opi nion. On Dec ember

5, 2008, all parties a g ree d to co n t i n u e t he Apr il 2009 trial setting. The n on Fe bruar y 13, 2009, In re Labatt Food Servic e, L.P. , 279 S.W .3d 640 (Tex. 2009) issued, mandating arbitration of wrong ful death claims broug ht by non-sig natories a g ainst an employ er. Shortly afte r In reLab att issued, counsel for Har tman wrote a

n email to counsel for

J .B. H unt, proposing to e nter int o a n ag re e me nt to jointly su

bmi t the dis pute s to ar

bit ra tio n an d dism iss J.B . H un t f ro m th e laws uit
. C o un s e l f o r J. B
. H un t r e s p o n d e d i n p art th at “ th e o n l y v i a b l e ar b i tr at i o nc l a i m s th atr e m a i nar e JB Hunt’ s a c tio n f

or atto rn e y fe e s inc ur

re d in c onne c tio n w iththe wr on g fu l la ws uit and JB H un t’ s c la im for subrog ation.” A series of emails betwe en counse l ensued on this issue. Then, on Apr il 1, 2009, J .B. H unt filed a motion to compel arbitration ag ainst plaintiffs and int erve nors. The Estate of Ga ry Pilat has never c ontested ar bitration, and only

Har t m an re s p o n d ed to the motion to compel
arb itr atio n. Th e re fo re , the on ly iss ue be fo re the tr ia l c ourt wa s w he the r H artman w a s c omp e lle d to
arb itr ate he r c laim s against J.B . H un t. H artman a sse rt e d th e de fe ns e of wa ive r t o th e mot ion

to compel ar bit ra t i on, alleg ing J.B. Hunt had substantially invoked the judicial proc ess. On May 4, 2009, the trial cour

t held a hea

ringon the m otion to compel arbitration, and on May 21, 2009 enter ed an orde r deny

ing the motion. The trial court did not enter any finding s of fa ct or c onclusions of law. J.B . H un t f

ile d a n inte rl oc uto ry

a pp e a l and a pe tit ion fo r wri t of

mand amus . A N A L Y SIS A. Mandam us or Interlocutor y Appeal As a pre liminary

matter, we first addre ss whether this court has jurisdicti o n o v erthe in ter lo cut ory

app eal andpet it io n fo r wri t o f m a n d a m u s . In i ts mo ti on to com pel arbi tr ati on , J .B.04
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3 ... Secti o n 51
. 0 1 6 of t he T exas C i vi l P ract i ce and R em ed i es Co d e p rovides t hat “ [i ]n a matt er s ub ject t o t he [ FAA] , a pe r s on ma y t ak e an a ppea l or w r i t of e r r or t o t h e cou r t of

a ppea l s f

r om t h e j u dg men t or i n t er l ocu t or y or der of a di s t r i ct cour t , count y cour t at l aw, or c ount y cour t un der t he s ame ci r cums t anc es t hat an appeal f r om a f eder al di s t r i ct cour t ’ s o r der or deci s i on wo ul d be permi t t ed by 9 U
. S. C
. Sect i on 16. ” T EX . C IV . P RAC . & R EM . C O D E § 51. 016 ( V er n on Su pp. 2 0 0 9 ). H o w e v e r, se c tio n 5 1 .0 1 6 o n ly ap p lies to a n a p p e a l i n iti a te d o n o r a fter S e p te m b e r 1 , 2 0 0 9
. Id

. B ec au se the p ro c e e d ing s in th is c o u rt w e re initiate d p rio r to the e ff e c tive d a te o f sec tio n 5 1 .0 1 6 , t h is p ro v isio n is no t ap p lica b le to the c a se a t ha n d , an d the p e tit io n fo r w rit o f m a n d a m u s is the a p p ro p ria te ve h ic le fo r th is c o u rt to c o n sid e r J .B . H u n t’s c o m p la int.

- 5- Hunt soug ht to compel arbitration under the Fe dera l Arbitration Act ( here inafter “F AA”) , and/or the Texas Arbitration Act ( here inafter “TAA ”), an d/or alternatively under Te x as common law. Howeve r, the a

rbitration agree ment upon which J.B. Hunt relies to compe l arbitration provide s that “the [FA A] wi ll gove rn the interpr etation, enf orce ment, and proc eeding s under this arbitration require ment.” When the re is a

n express ag ree ment to arbitrate under the FAA , we have upheld suc h choice
of-law provisions reg ardle ss of whe ther the tra nsaction at issue involves interstate commerc e. See Teel v. Be ldon Roofing & Remode ling Co. , 281 S.W .3d 446, 449 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, pe t. d e nie d) . A s a

re su lt, be c a

us e J.B . H un t and Mr . Pilat spe c if ic a lly a g re e d to ar

bit rate any c la ims under the FAA , we dismiss J .B. H unt’s interlocutory appea l for lack of

jurisdiction and only

consider the pe tit ion

fo r wri t of

mand amus . 3 B. Va lid A r bit r at ion Ag r e e m e nt Mandamus will issue only to corre ct a c lear abuse of discretion for

which the r elator ha s no adequate re medy

at law. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. , 1 4 8 S
. W
. 3 d 1 2 4 , 1 3 5 (T ex . 2 0 0 4 ) ( o ri g. pr oc e e din g ); W

alker v . Pack

er , 827 S.W .2d 833, 839-40 (Te x . 1992) ( orig . proce eding ). A trial c ourt has no discretion in deter

mining what the law is or in applying the law to the fa cts, and a clea r fa ilure to a naly ze or apply the law corr ectly will c onstitut e an abuse of discre tion. W alker , 827 S.W .2d at 840. When a motion to compel arbitration under the FA A has be en er

roneously denied, there is no04
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- 6- adequate remedy at law a

nd mandamus will issue. In re D. W ilson Cons t. Co. , 196 S.W .3d 774, 780 (Tex. 2006) (orig . proce eding ). A p art y se e kin ga pe tit ion fo r wri t of mand amus to co mpe l ar bit ratio n und e r t

he F AAmus t: (1) e stablish the exi stence of a valid arbitration ag ree ment; and (2) showthat the claims asse rted a re within the scope of the ag ree ment. See In re Advanc ePCS Health L.P. , 1 7 2 S. W. 3 d 6 0 3 , 6 0 7 ( T e x. 2005) (orig. procee ding)
. When, as here, a party resists arbitration, the t rial cour t must determine whether a valid agree ment to arbitrate exis ts. See J .M. Dav idson, Inc. v. W

ebster , 128 S.W .3d 223, 22 7 ( Te x. 20 03 ). Th e tr ia l c ourt ’s de te rm inat io n as t o th e va lid ity of an a rb itr atio n a g re e me nt i s subject to d

e n o vo revie w. Id. Although the re is a strongpresumption favor ing a rbitration, that presumption arises only

afte r the p ar t y

seekingto compel ar

bitration proves a

valid arbitration ag ree ment exis ts. Id. Under both the FAAand the TAA, we a pply ordinary state contra ct law principles in orde r to dec i d e wh et her a valid arbitration ag ree ment exis ts. See I n re D. W

ilson Constr. Co. , 1 9 6 S
. W
. 3 d a t 7 8 1 (c i t i n g First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan , 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995))
. Followingthe Texas Supreme Court’s de cision in In reLab att , wro ng fu l de ath c la ims br ou g ht b y

no n- signat ori es ag a ins t an e mpl oye r m us t be arb itr ate d if

the re wa s a

n a g re e me nt t o arbitrate betwe en the e mploy ee a nd the employ er. 279 S.W.3d at 643-46. In her r esponse to the motion to compel arbitration filed in the trial c ourt, Har tman acknow ledg ed that in l i gh t of In re Lab att , “ th e P l a i n t i f

f s d o n o tc o n t e s tth e v a l i d i ty o f th e r e s p e c t i v e ar

b i tr at i o nc l a

u s e a s t o M ar iss a Har tman.” Howe ver, in this court Har tman now contests the validity of the a rbitration agree ment as follows: (1) se cti on 1 of the F AA exempts contrac ts of employ ment of seamen, ra ilroad employ ees or

any other c l ass of wor

kers e ng ag ed in fore ign or interstate c ommerce ; (2) sec tion04
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- 7- 406.033(e) of the Te x as L abor Code rende rs the ar bitration ag ree ment void and unenf orce able; and (3) the B enef

it Pl an wa s illusory

and not supported by

consideration. 1. F AA Exem ption Har tman asser

ts section 1 of the F AA exempts Mr. P ilat from the cove rag e of the FAA
. See 9 U.S.C. § 1. Sec tion 1 of the FAA provides that the Act does not apply to “contra cts of employ

ment of se ame n, ra ilr oa d e mpl oye e s, or any othe r c la ss o f w or

ke rs e ng a g e d in

fo re ig n o r i nte rs tate
commerc e.” Id. J .B. H unt contends this issue was not prese rved f or our revie w bec ause H artman did not present it to the trial court. We agree . An order that denies a motion to compel arbitration must be upheld by

this c ourt if it is proper on any basis considere d by the trial cour

t. See I n re W eek s Marine, Inc
. , 242 S.W .3d 849, 854 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2007, orig . proce eding[m and. denie d]) ; se e als o In re Bristol-My ers Squibb Co. , 975 S.W .2d 601, 605 (Tex. 1998) (o ri g. proce eding ) (holdingthat appellate revie w is limi ted to the re cord a nd issues the trial cour

t considere d when it ruled on the motion). The issue of whe ther sec tion 1 of the FA A exempts Mr. Pilat from cover ag e wa s n ever prese nted to the trial cour t. There fore , we c onclude this issue was not preser ved for our re view. 2. Labo r Co de Har tman further

asser t s th atT ex as L ab o r C o d e s ec t i o n4 0 6
. 0 3 3 (e ), wh i ch p ro h i b i t s p re-injury waiver s of per sonal injury or death claims, rende rs t he arbitration ag ree ment void and enf orce able. J .B. H unt ag ain asser

ts this i ssue was not pre serve d for our revie w bec ause H artman did not pre sent04
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4 ... H o w e v e r, e v e n if

this issu e w a s p re se rv e d , o n N o v e m b e r 2 0 , 2 0 0 9 the T e x a s S u p re m e C o u rt d ire c tly a d d re sse d the issu e o f wh e the r se c tio n 4 0 6 .0 3 3 (e ) re n d e rs a n a rb itra tio n a g re e m e n t v o id a n d h e ld it d o e s n o t. S ee In re G ol den PeanutCo. , LLC , N o . 0 9 -0 1 2 2 , 2 0 0 9 W L 3 9 6 9 4 2 8 , at *2 (T e x . N o v . 2 0 , 2 0 0 9 ) (o rig . p ro c e e d ing ).

- 8- it to the trial court. We ag ree . See I n re W eek s Marine, Inc
. , 2 4 2 S
. W
. 3 d a t 85 4; see also In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. , 975 S.W .2d at 605. 4 3. Illu sory and Not Sup ported by Consid erat ion Next, Hartman asserts the l anguag e in the “Funding ” section of t he Bene fit Plan rende rs the entire B enef

it Pl an illusory
. As t h e C ourt in In reLab att provided, “ [t ]here ar e two ty pes of challeng es to an a

rbitration provision: (1) a spe cific c halleng e to t h e v alidity of the a rbitration ag r e e me n t o r

c la u s e , an d ( 2 ) a b r o a d e r c h a ll e n g e to th e e n ti r e c o n tr a c t, e it h e r o na g r o un d that direc tly aff ects the e ntire agree ment, or on the g round that one of the c ontrac t’s provisions is il leg al and re nders the whole contra ct invalid.” 279 S.W.3d at 647 -4 8
. T h e ca se at ha nd prese nts the
s ec o n d ty p e of ch al l en ge: a b ro adch al l en ge t o th e e n t i re co n tra cto nth e gr o un d th atth e “ Fu n d i n g” provision is il lusory , and, ther efor e, ther e is no binding c ontrac t. “[U] nless a challeng e is to the arbitration clause or arbitration a g ree ment itself,
. . . the question of a c ontrac t’s validity is for the arbitrator and not the c ourts.” Id. at 649. There fore , we do not addr ess Har tman’s asser

tion that the funding section of the Be nefit Plan is illusory beca use this issue must be decide d by the ar bitrator. As a re sult of the fore g oing, w e conc lude there wa s a valid arbitration ag ree ment betwee n Mr. Pilat and J .B. H unt. I n addition, the parties do not dispute t he claims asserted by Har tman are wi thi n th e sc op e of

the arb itr atio n a g re e me nt. Th e re fo re , H artman’ s w ro ng fu l de ath c la ims a g a ins t J .B. H unt must be arbitrate d unless Har tman establishes a va lid defense to enfor cingthe ar bitration ag ree ment.04
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- 9- C. Wa ive r by Sub st ant ial ly I nvo king th e Judi c ialP r oc e ss Once a valid ar

bitration agr eement has bee n established, a pr esumption attache s favor ing arbitration and the burde n shifts to the party resisting arbitration to establish a def ense to e nforc ing arbitration. S

e e I n r e A d v a n c e PCS , 1 7 2 S.W .3d at 607; In re Hartigan , 107 S.W .3d 684, 687-88 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, orig . proce eding[m and. denied]). The only defe nse to the arbitration ag ree ment asser ted by Har tman in the trial court wa s waiver
. A par ty waives a rbitration by substantially invoking the judicial proce ss to the other pa rty ’s detriment. Pe rry

Ho me s v . Cu ll , 2 5 8 S
. W
. 3d 580, 589-90 (Te x . 2008). “D ue to the strong presumption ag ainst waiver of arbitration, this hurdle is a high one .” Id. at 59 0. Up un til Pe rry , the Texas Supre me Court ha d never found such a w aiver
. Id. T h e C o urth e l d th at“ a p arty w h o e n

j o ys substantial direct be nefits by g aining an advantag e in the pretrial litigation process should be barr ed from turning around and seeking arbitration with the spoils.” Id. at 593. The Court c oncluded that “in close c ases, th e ‘strongpresumption ag ainst waiver ’ should g overn.” Id. (quoting In re D. W ilson , 196 S.W .3d at 783). Whether a pa rty has wa ived its right to ar

bitration is a question of law that we r eviewde novo , g iving no de fer ence to the trial court’ s ruling. Id. at 598. The Te x as Sup re m e C o u rt has take n the fe dera l court appr oach to wa iver by adoptingthe “totality of t he circumstance s” analy sis. Id. at 590-91. The Court acknowle dg ed in Pe rry that like fe de ra l c ourt s, it h a s c on sid e re d f a c tor s su c h a s: (1 ) whe n th e mov ant k

ne w o f t he arb itr atio n c la

us e ; (2 ) h owmuc h d isc ov e ry

ha s b e e n c on du c te d; (3 ) who ini tiate d th e dis c ov e ry ; (4) whe ther it related to the merits rather than a rbitrability

or sta

nd ing ; (5) how muc h of it would be usef ul in arbitration; and (6) whe ther the mova

nt sought judg ment on the merits.04
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- 10- Id. at 591-92. “ Mere ly taking part in litigation i s not enoug h unless a par ty has substantially

invoked the judicial proc ess to its opponent’s detriment.” In re Vesta Ins. Group, Inc. , 192 S.W .3d 759, 763 (Tex. 2006). In th e tr i a l c o urt , H art m an a s s e rt e d J
. B
. H un t s u b s t an t i a l l y i n v o k e d th e j u d i c i a l p r o c e s s b y: (1) f iling multiple motions to quash t h e d ep o s i t ions of J .B. H unt employ ees; (2) noticing a nd deposinga co- defe ndant, Claudio Domingo B arr era ; (3) ac tively p articipating in at lea st thirteen depositions (producingseven J .B. H unt employ ees, attending othe r depositions, and cr oss-noticing depositions); (4) p ar t i cipating in the submission of an ag ree d motion for continuance ; (5) wa iting fourtee n months from the date the case was filed to f ile the m otion to compel ar bitration; (6) whe n plaintiff b rought up the issue of a rbitration at the plea

to the jurisdiction hearing , J .B. H unt stated that the issue of a

rbitration was not befor e the court; (7) reque sting numerous extensions of written discovery deadlines; (8) a ctively participating in pushingback the trial date; (9) ref using to sig n a confide ntiality

order and an order

on plaintiffs’ discove ry ; (10) propoundingreque sts for disclosure
and a de po sit ion

on wr itt e n q ue sti on s to Te xas D e pa

rtme nt o f Tr ans po rt atio n; (1 1) fi lin ga ple a to the jurisdiction which was de nied following a hear ing; and (12) failingto ag ree to arbitration whe n plaintiffs’ counse l emailed J.B. Hunt’s counsel. In addition, in her brief to this court, Hartman note s
sever al times where J .B. Hunt filed m otions to quash depositi ons, motions for protective orde rs, and objections to the notice of va rious oral de positions. J.B . H un t a sse rt s it

on ly pr op ound e d min ima l dis c ov e ry and at a ll tim e s re se rv e d its ri g ht t o
se e k a rb itr atio n. J.B . H un t a g re e s it kn e w o f t

he arb itr atio n p ro vis io n, bu t be c a us e the Sup re me Court had not y et ruled on In reLab att , J.B . H un t r e fr a ine d f ro m se e kin gto c omp e l arb itr atio n unti l04
- 09
- 00 31 0- CV an d 0 4- 09
- 00 36 9- CV

5 ... W e a ckn owl edge as a r es ul t of t he In r e L a b a tt opi n i on the la w c h a n g e d d u rin g the p e n d e n c y o f H a rtm a n ’s c a se in the trial c o u rt. See 2 7 9 S .W .3 d a t 6 4 3 -4 6
. H o w e v e r, b e c a u se w e h a v e c o n c lud e d J .B . H u n t d id no t sub sta n tially inv o k e the ju d ic ia l p ro c e ss w e a re un a b le to re a c h the issu e o f p re ju d ic e .

- 11- afte r the Supreme Court issued its opi nion. Other t h an answe ringdiscovery and cr oss-noticing depositions, J.B. Hunt has conducte d littl e discovery of its own. Most of the discover y was initiated by plaintiffs. In addition, unlike the situation in Perry when the Supr eme Court dete rmined there
was wa iver, the c ase at hand is not one in which the pa rties have waited until the eve of trial af ter all or the majority

of the discove ry

has bee n completed to compe l arbitration. Pe rry , 258 S.W .3d
at 59 5- 59 6. We c on c lude J.B . H un t di d n ot w a ive its ri g ht t o c omp e l arb itr atio n b y su bs tanti a lly invoking the judicia l proce ss. Due to this finding, we do not rea ch the issue of whe ther Ha rtman wa s prejudice d. 5 C ONCL US I ON We c onclude the trial court err ed in de nying J .B. Hunt’s mo t i o n t o co m p el arb itration. Ac c or din g ly , w e dis mis s J.B . H un t’ s int e rl oc uto ry a pp e a l fo r la c k o f j ur isd ic tio n a nd c on dit ion a lly g rant the petition for writ of m andamus. The writ will i ssue only if the trial cour

t fails to withdraw its May 21, 2009 order

denying J.B. Hunt’s motion to compel ar b i t ra t i o n and ente r an or der compellingarbitration within t en day s. Sandee B ry an Mar ion, J ustice