unnecessarily-suggestive-identification procedures we have examined 

previously and conclude that no plain error occurred. 

Second, appellant claims that the composite duplicate 

surveillance videotape should not have been admitted because the copy 

malfunctioned and was questionably edited. We review for constitutional 

or plain error as appellant failed to object at trial. Id. at 394, 834 P.2d at 

402. NRS 52.245 provides that duplicates are admissible to the same 

extent as the original unless a genuine question is raised as to the 

authenticity of the original or it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in 

lieu of the original under the circumstances. Appellant does not challenge 

the authenticity of the original video but argues that because the copy 

inexplicably malfunctioned at the preliminary hearing, it was unfair to 

admit the duplicate over the originals. Burrell testified that she created 

the composite from the surveillance footage and identified the material on 

the duplicate as being a fair and accurate copy. Appellant fails to show 

any unfairness in admitting the composite duplicate surveillance 

videotape; he does not suggest that relevant or exculpatory evidence was 

deleted or that the duplicate was inaccurate. His bare assertion that the 

tape malfunctioned and therefore its admission was clearly unfair does not 

persuade us, and we discern no error by the district court in admitting the 

composite duplicate surveillance videotape. 

Third, appellant argues that he was prejudiced at trial by the 

State's use of leading questions, particularly with Burrell. Appellant 

failed to object at trial, therefore we review for constitutional or plain 

error. Sterling, 108 Nev. at 394, 834 P.2d at 402. District courts have 

considerable discretion as to whether to allow leading questions, and 

unless the leading questions cause extreme prejudice, their use is not 

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ordinarily a ground for reversal. See Leonard v. State, 117 Nev. 53, 70, 17 

P.3d 397, 408 (2001); Barcus v. State, 92 Nev. 289, 291, 550 P.2d 411, 412 

(1976); Anderson v. Berrum, 36 Nev. 463, 470-71, 136 P. 973, 976 (1913)). 

After careful review of the record, we conclude that the leading questions 

did not cause appellant any prejudice or undermine the fairness of his 

trial. See Rowland v. State, 118 Nev. 31, 38, 39 P.3d 114, 118 (2002). 

Fourth, appellant contends that insufficient evidence was 

adduced at trial to sustain his conviction of burglary. The standard of 

review for a claim of insufficient evidence is whether the evidence, when 

viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to 

establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as determined by a rational trier 

of fact. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); McNair v. State, 108 

Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d 571, 573 (1992). What weight and credibility to give 

conflicting testimony is for the jury to determine, and a reviewing court 

will not disturb a verdict if it is supported by substantial evidence. Bolden 

v. State, 97 Nev. 71, 73, 624 P.2d 20, 20 (1981). 

Appellant claims that the State failed to establish that he had 

the requisite intent to commit a larceny when he had authorization to be 

in the hotel. 'As in any other case where the intent is material, the intent 

need not be proved by positive or direct evidence, but may be inferred from 

the conduct of the parties and the other facts and circumstances disclosed 

by the evidence." Mathis v. State, 82 Nev. 402, 406, 419 P.2d 775, 777 

(1966) (quoting State v. Thompson, 31 Nev. 209, 217, 101 P. 557, 560 

(1909)); see also NRS 193.200 ("Intention is manifested by the 

circumstances connected with the perpetration of the offense, and the 

sound mind and discretion of the person accused."). The jury heard 

testimony that, although appellant was not a registered guest, he had 

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permission from the director of hotel security to visit the guestroom area 

to briefly speak with friends who were staying at the hotel. The jury 

observed appellant on videotape speaking to a hotel maid then going into a 

guestroom he had no permission to enter. The jury saw appellant leaving 

the area with property that was later discovered to be missing from the 

guestroom. From the evidence presented, a juror could reasonably infer 

that appellant had the requisite intent to commit larceny upon entering 

the guestroom. 

Having considered appellant's claims' and concluded that no 

relief is warranted, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 

/ ,J. 

cc: Hon. Abbi Silver, District Judge 

Oronoz & Ericsson 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

'Appellant initially raised an insufficiency-of-evidence claim with 

regard to his conviction of preventing or dissuading a witness from 

testifying or producing evidence but subsequently withdrew the claim. 

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