UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

FELIX BOADU,

Petitioner,

v.

No. 97-2265

U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION

SERVICE,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order

of the Board of Immigration Appeals.

(A73-113-127)

Submitted: June 9, 1998

Decided: September 23, 1998

Before MURNAGHAN, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL,

Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Randall L. Johnson, JOHNSON & ASSOCIATES, Arlington, Virginia, for Petitioner. Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General,

Karen Fletcher Torstenson, Assistant Director, Donald A. Couvillon,

Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Felix Boadu petitions for review of a final order of the Board of

Immigration Appeals ("BIA") denying his application for asylum and

withholding of deportation. Because substantial evidence supports the

BIA's decision, we affirm.

The Immigration and Nationality Act (the "Act") authorizes the

Attorney General, in her discretion, to confer asylum on any refugee.

See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1994). The Act defines a refugee as a person

unwilling or unable to return to his native country"because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political

opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1994).

A finding of past persecution creates a rebuttable presumption of

a well-founded fear of future persecution. 8 C.F.R.§ 208.13(b)(1)

(1997). This presumption may be rebutted by evidence demonstrating

that there is no longer a reasonable fear of future persecution, such as

when conditions in an alien's native country have changed significantly. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i) (1997).

Eligibility for asylum can also be based on grounds of past persecution alone even though there is "`no reasonable likelihood of present persecution.'" Baka v. INS, 963 F.2d 1376, 1379 (10th Cir. 1992)

(quoting Rivera-Cruz v. INS, 948 F.2d 962, 969 (5th Cir. 1991)). "To

establish such eligibility, an alien must show past persecution so

severe that repatriation would be inhumane." Id.

We must uphold the BIA's determination that Boadu is not eligible

for asylum if the determination is "supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole." 8

U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) (1994).* We accord the BIA all possible defer-

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*We note that 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) (1994) was repealed by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.

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ence. See Huaman-Cornelio v. Board of Immigration Appeals, 979

F.2d 995, 999 (4th Cir. 1992). The decision may be"reversed only if

the evidence presented by [Boadu] was such that a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude that the requisite fear of persecution

existed." INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992).

Evidence established that Boadu, a native and citizen of Ghana,

was a leader of the movement for freedom and justice in the Kipi

region from 1984 until he left Ghana in 1990. This group opposed the

military dictatorship of Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings and later

formed into the New Patriotic Party ("NPP") of Ghana. As a result of

these activities, Boadu was arrested in September 1990 and was

detained for four days. While detained, he was beaten and interrogated. Boadu was released from detention after the intercession of his

family and other people from Kipi and was warned not to participate

in future political activities under penalty of death.

Despite this warning, Boadu continued his political involvement. In

late 1990, he and four others were driving from a political meeting in

Kipi, when they were stopped by soldiers and confronted about their

political activities. There was no physical altercation, but the soldiers

again warned Boadu not to participate in politics. Fearing further

reprisals, Boadu secured a visitor's visa to the United States and fled

by disguising himself in Nigerian attire.

Citing the above evidence, Boadu maintains that the BIA erred in

finding that the past persecution he suffered did not merit a grant of

asylum on humanitarian grounds. He further contends that the BIA

erred in finding that, assuming he suffered past persecution, he could

not show a well-founded fear of future persecution in Ghana because

of significant changes in the political climate.

The BIA found that, even assuming Boadu suffered past persecution, it was not severe enough to warrant a grant of asylum on human-

_________________________________________________________________

L. No. 104-128, 110 Stat. 3009 ("IIRIRA"), effective April 1, 1997.

Because this case was in transition at the time the IIRIRA was passed,

§ 1105a(a)(4) is still applicable under the terms of the transitional rules

contained in § 309(c) of the IIRIRA.

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itarian grounds. We agree that, while unfortunate, Boadu's detention

and mistreatment by Ghanian authorities in 1990 does not merit a

humanitarian grant of asylum based on past persecution alone. The

facts in this case are similar to those in other cases in which federal

courts have upheld administrative rejections of similar asylum claims

based on past persecution. See Skalak v. INS, 944 F.2d 364, 365 (7th

Cir. 1991) (denial of asylum lawful where claimant jailed twice for

interrogation, for three days each time, and harassed by officials at

work); Kapcia v. INS, 944 F.2d 702, 704, 708-09 (10th Cir. 1991)

(holding denial of asylum lawful where claimant was arrested four

times, detained three times, beaten once, had house searched, and was

treated badly at work; other claimant suffered two-day interrogation,

detention, and beating, had parents' home searched, received bad

work projects and no bonus, was conscripted into army where he was

harassed, and was finally fired from job); Kubon v. INS, 913 F.2d

386, 388 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding denial of asylum lawful where

claimant jailed for five days; "a brief confinement for opposition to

a totalitarian regime does not necessarily constitute persecution"); see

also Zalega v. INS, 916 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding denial of

asylum lawful where neutral, non-Solidarity member repeatedly

arrested and interrogated, fired from job). While"[t]he experience of

persecution may so sear a person with distressing associations with

his native country that it would be inhumane to force him to return

there, even though he is in no danger of further persecution," Skalak,

944 F.2d at 365, this is not such a case.

In addition, we find that Boadu cannot show a well-founded fear

of future persecution because of changes in the conditions in Ghana.

The State Department's report in the record cites various changes in

Ghana since Rawlings consented to permit popular elections in 1992,

including a decline in human rights abuses, an offer of amnesty to

Ghanians in voluntary exile outside of the country, the active participation of opposition political parties, and the release of the last known

political prisoner. Further, the NPP has now merged with other political groups to form an outspoken alliance in Ghana. Moreover, the

man who inspired Boadu to begin his political involvement ran for

president in 1992 and still remains in Ghana.

While Boadu submitted evidence painting a somewhat bleaker picture of Ghana's political and human rights developments, we cannot

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say that this evidence, which was fully considered by the Immigration

Judge, "compels" reversal of the BIA's decision. See Cruz-Diaz v.

INS, 86 F.3d 330, 331 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting standard of review

courts must apply in reviewing decisions of the BIA). Because substantial evidence supported the BIA's determination of changed conditions, we affirm.

The standard for withholding of deportation is more stringent than

that for granting asylum. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,

431-32 (1987). To qualify for withholding of deportation, an applicant must demonstrate a "clear probability of persecution." Id. at 430.

Because substantial evidence supports the BIA's finding that Boadu

is ineligible for asylum, he cannot meet the higher standard for withholding of deportation.

Accordingly, we affirm the BIA's order. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid

the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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