Honorable Charles H. Bolton Opinion No. M-119

CountyAttorney Meridian, Texas Re: Must a writ of possession be issuedwithin a period of 20 days after theperlod of redemption on property sold attax salehas expired and not thereafterunder the authority of Art. 73&b, Sec. 12, V.C.S., and related Dear Mr. Rolton: statutes.

You have requested the opinion of this Office In regard to the following question:

Must a writ of possession be issuedwithin a period of 20 days after the period of redemption on property sold at a tax sale has expired, and not thereafter,under the provisions of Article 7345b, Section 12,Vernon's Civil Statutes, and the related statutes? Section 12 of Article 7345b,provides as follows:

"In all suits heretofore or hereafter filed ,tocollectdelinquent taxes against property, judgment in said suit shall provide for the Issuanceof writ of possession within twenty (20)days after theperiod of redemption shallhave expired to the purchaser at foreclosure sale or its or his assigns; but whenever land fs sold under judgment in such suit for taxes,' the owner of suchproperty, or anyone having an lnterest therein, or theirheirs, assigns or legal representatives,may, within two (2) years from the date of the filing for record of thepurchaser's deed and not thereafter, have the right to redeem said property from such purchase on the followingbasis,

. . .'I

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The statute under consideration is a part of Chapter 10, Title 122,Vernon's Civil Statutes, dealing with the collection of delinquent ad valorem taxes. In order to arrive at a proper meaning of Section 12, It shouldbe considered in connectionwith thepurposes of Chapter 10, and, in particular, with all of Article 7345b. In brief, this Article deals with suits for delinquent taxes by taxing units, the judgments,rights of redemption,and other related matters.

Tht literalmeaning of thephrase of Sectfon 12, whfch provides

. . , judgment In said suit shallprovide for the issuance of a writ of possession within twenty (20)days after the period of redemption shallhave expired to tl;fe purchaser at foreclosure sale or its or his assigns;

. . . would be that the "writof possession"must Issuewithin 20 days after the period of redemptionhas expired.

If the legislaturehad intended this as a limitation to be strictly limited to theperiod state?, It would Gave added after the words "shallhave expired, the words and not thereafter" or other language of similarmeaning.

We find the following language In 53 Tex.Jur.2d 195, 196, Statutes, Sec. 134:

"Statutesare frequentlygiven an lnterpretatlon at variance with their llteral terms. The court will depart from the exact and literal import of a statute,or a particular part, provision, or word thereof, if this is necessary to effectuate or preserve the leglslative intent. Thus, worasor clauseswill not be given their literalmeaning if such an interpretationwould thwart theplain purpose of the legislature,or would lead 'topalpable absurdity, contradiction,injustice,OP uncertainty, and if such a constructioncan reasonably be avoided.

"Indeparting from the literalmeaning of a statute, its letter is sometimesenlarged, sometimes restrained, and sometimes the construction given Is contrary to the letter of the law."

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Clearly, it was the intent of the legislature in making the detailedprovisions of Article 7345b, dealing with suits for delinquent ad valorem taxes, sales of the property by thepurchaser at the sales, and the redemption thereofby the owners, to place thepurchaser at such sales in possession of the property so purchased after theperiod of redemptionhas expired. To place the literal construction limiting the issuanceof the writ of possession to the period of "within20 days after theperiod of redemption shall have expired,"would do violence to thepurpose and intent of all of Article 7345b, when consideredas a whole.

In the case of Dolan v. Walker, Land Commissioner, 121 Tex. 361, 49 S.W.28 693 (1932) the Court used the foliowing language relating to the co;structionof statutes:

'In the constructionof statutes certain fundamental rules control. The paramount rule In construing statutes Is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature. If the language or terms used in the statute are uncertain or confusing in arriving at the Intention, it is proper to consider the generalpolicy towards the matter legislatedupon, thepurpose of the legislation, the evils to be remedied, and the object to be accomplished. Cannon's Adm'r v. Vaughan, 12 Tex. 399; Higgins V. Rinker, 47 Tex. 393; City of Austin v. Cahill, 99 Tex. 172, 88 S.W. 542, 89 S.W. 552; Clary v. Hurst, 104 Tex. 423, 138 S.W. 566; article 10, subd. 6, R. S. 1925."
It is stated in 37 Tex.Jur.2d 83, Limitations, Sec. 3:

. . . statutes of limitation should be construed In likemanner as other statutes,and should receive such Interpretation;consistent with their terms, as will defeat themischief intended to be suppressed,and advance the policy and remedy theywere designed to promote."

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We have been unable to find a case direct1 on the question involved. However, the case of &%&k?~. Owens, 209 S.W.2d 622 (Tex.Civ.App.,1948, no writ hist.) deals with the subjectgenerally. One of the points of error relied on byAppellant was to the effect that in one of the suits (fordelinquent ad valorem taxes) ,theOrder of Sale was issued'less than twenty days after the judgmentwas rendered.
The Court, in disposing of this point, stated:

rr

. . .The fact that the Order of Sale was issued less than twenty days after judgmentwas renderedwas but an irregularity and it will be respected until set aside by a direct proceeding.

. , .)l Further, it was stated:

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. . .The purchase of the property at the sheriff's sales,namely, the State of Texas, was not bound to examine into the regularity of the proceedings under which the Orders of Salewere issued and, however irregular they might have been, the title of the purchaser was not affected thereby.

. . .' Applying the proper rules of construction, as announced by many decisions of the Supreme Court of Texas, it is the opinion of this Office that the literalwording of Section 12, Article 7345b, provides that the writ of possession is available to the purchaser within 20 days after the date of redemption, but that this is not a limitation statute, and suchwrit may issue after the expmtion of 2mays aster the period of redemptionhas expired.
SUMMARY ------- Section 12 of Article 7345b,Vernon's Civil Statutes, is not a statute of limitation, and the writ of possessionprovided for thereinmay issue to the purchaser

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Honorable Charles H. Bolton, Page 5 (M-119)

after the expirationof 20 days after theperiod of redemption shall have expired. truly yours,

Preparedby John R. Grace Assistant Attorney General JRG/dls
APPROVED: OPINION COMMITTED
A.J. Carubbi, Jr., Chairman Staff Legal Assistant W.O. Shultz, Co-Chairman John Reeves Tom Mack Tom Thurmond Bob Flowers

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