# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued April 5, 2005

Decided May 12, 2005

Before

Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

Hon. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

IN RE:

ZENA D. CRENSHAW,

Appellant

.

No. 05-1042 Appeal from the United States

District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana,

South Bend Division.

No. 3:04-MC-34 RM

Robert L. Miller, Jr., Chief Judge

.

O R D E R

On October 4, 2004, the Indiana Supreme Court suspended attorney Zena Crenshaw from

the practice of law for 30 days for making false allegations against two judges. Later, that suspension

was extended until Crenshaw paid the costs--approximately $6,000--of the disciplinary proceeding

against her. The state court’s disbarment order prompted the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana to order Crenshaw to show cause why she should not be suspended from

its bar. After receiving her response, Chief Judge Robert Miller entered an order suspending

Crenshaw from the district’s bar “until such time as she complies with the ord ers of the Indiana

Supreme Court, at which time she may apply to this court for reinstatement pursuant to the court’s

Local Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement.” Chief Judge Miller entered his order pursuant to N.D. Ind.

L.R. Disc. Enf. II(a) and N.D. Ind. L.R. 83.5(e).

Crenshaw appeals Judge Miller’s order, but her complaints center on the Indiana Supreme

Court’s decision to discipline her. For instance, she claims that there was insufficient evidence of

misconduct, that the disciplinary hearing officer failed to explain why he discredited her testimony,

and that the Indiana Supreme Court erred by prolonging her suspension because she could not afford UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53No. 05-1042 2

to pay the costs of the proceeding against her in a lump sum. We do not have jurisdiction to consider

these grievances, however, as lower federal courts are not authorized to review attacks on the Indiana

attorney disciplinary proceeding. S ee Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.

, 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court

of Appeals v. Feldman

, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Johnson v. Supreme Court of Illinois

, 165 F.3d 1140,

1141-42 (7th Cir. 1999); Levin v. ARDC

, 74 F.3d 763, 766 (7th Cir. 1996); In re Palmisano

, 70 F.3d

483, 487 (7th Cir. 1995).

Crenshaw also argues t hat the district court erred by relying on the state disbarment

proceedings in suspending her from its bar. Although state disbarment proceedings are entitled to

great weight and should generally be relied upon, In re Jafree , 759 F.2d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 1985),

federal disbarment does not flow automaticall y from disbarment by state courts, T heard v. United

States

, 354 U.S. 278, 271 (1957). Federal courts may disregard a state disbarment in limited

circumstances when (1) the state procedure is wanting in due process due to a lack of notice or an

opportunity to be heard; (2) the factual findings suffer from an infirmity of proof; or (3) “some other

grave reason” exists to support admission to the federal bar. In re Reinstatement of Leaf

, 41 F.3d

281, 283 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Selling v. Radford , 243 U.S. 46, 51 (1917)).

None of these cir cumstances are present here. Crenshaw focuses on the second factor,

complaining that the Indiana Supreme Court’s factual findings are unsupported. But this contention

is flawed. In the first instance, Crenshaw remains suspended from the Indiana bar because she failed

to comply with a valid, and routine, order to pay the modest costs of the disciplinary proceedings that

w ere brought against her. And there is no dispute that she has not complied with that order. If

Crenshaw cannot afford to pay the costs in lump sum, she must provide the state court with sufficient

information to establish that fact. In any event, there is no “infirmity of proof” regarding the basis

for her suspens ion, but rather an infirmity of doubt. Moreover, the findings of the hearing officer

support the Indiana Supreme Court’s initial suspension, as Crensha w submitted court filings with

completely unfounded and unsupported a ccusations that Indiana state judges engaged in

discrimination and sexual harassment. The district court was entitled to accept these findings.

Finally, Crenshaw claims that Chief Judge Mil ler should have conducted an evidentiary

hearing. But because Indiana conducted a full evidentiary hearing, a second hearing in federal court

was unnecessary. See Palmisano , 70 F.3d at 486. Indeed, Crenshaw fails to explain how an

additional hearing would do her any good.

AFFIRMED.