2015 IL App (2d) 140995 No. 2-14-0995 Opinion filed September 23, 2015

______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of De Kalb County. ) Plaintiff -Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 13- CF -385 ) CHRISTOPHER THODOS , ) Honorable ) Robbin J. Stuckert , Defendant -Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices McLare n and Jorgensen concurred in the judgment and opinion. OPINION ¶ 1 I. INTRODUCTION ¶ 2 Defendant, Christopher Thodos, was charged with violating an order of protection when he allegedly went to the home of his ex

- wife and slashed the tires on a car sitting in t he home’s driveway (720 ILCS 5/12 -3. 4(a) (West 2012)). At defendant’s bench trial, Robert Sutter invoke d the clergy

- penitent privilege (735 ILCS 5/8

- 803 (West 2012)) , claiming that, as defendant’s “ spiritual advisor, ” he could not be forced to testify about an incriminating admission defendant made to him. Defendant joined in invoking that privilege. The trial court found that the privilege applied, and the State filed a certificate o f impairment and timely appeals . See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(a)(1) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013). For the reasons that fol low, we affirm

.2015 IL App (2d) 140995

- 2

- ¶ 3 II. BACKGROUND ¶ 4 The facts relevant to the issue s raised are as follows. During the State’s case

- in

- chief, Sutter was called to testify. Before he was asked any su bstantive questions, Sutter inquired of the court whether, because he was defendant’s “spiritual advise r ,” he would have to testify. After the parties presented their positions on that issue, the court allowed the parties to present evidence on whether th e clergy -penitent privilege applied. In that re gard, Sutter testified that he

wa s neither a pastor at the First Baptist Church of Sycamore , which is where he met defendant, nor a paid member of any clergy

. 1 However, i n response to questioning about whether he had any formal training in spiritual counseling, Sutter indicat ed that he had spoken with his pastors and been discipl ed by numerous religious people throughout his Christian life. ¶ 5 Concerning his relationship with defendant, Sutter, who was a l eader of a small
B ible

- study group at the church, stated that, in 2013, when defendant allegedly violated the ord e r of protection, he was discipling defendant. Although Sutter and defendant could be considered
“ ‘ accountability partner [s],’ ” Sutter state d that he was “not so much just an accountability partner [as he] was *** a discipler to [defendant].” At first, Sutter began discipling defenda nt at defendant’s wife’s urging, 2 and he paid for defendant to attend a spiritual training seminar and a Christian

- based rehabilitation and recovery camp

. D efendant asked Sutter to “ ‘please look out for [him]’ ” and “ ‘keep [him] accountable,’ ” as “ ‘[defendant] need[ed Sutter].’ ” As the relationship continued, defendant confessed a number of things to S utter , while Sutter

1 Sutter testified that, although he attended the First Baptist Church of Sycamore in 2013, he now attend ed Bethel Assembly of God.

2 The record does not disclose whether defendant’s “wife” was a current wife or his

ex - wife.2015 IL App (2d) 140995

- 3

- remembered confessin g only one thing to defendant. After making his confessions, which were intended to be confidential, defendant would pray with Sutter and ask for forgiveness and strength , and Sutter would then, as part of this process, rebuke defendant

. Sutter indic a ted that, as a small

- group leader, he had the same type of relationship with other people, but he stated that he was not as invested in these other relationships. When defendant made the pertinent admission to Sutt er, defendant was at the Christian

- based rehabilitation and recovery camp and Sutter was at home

. ¶ 6 Sutter testif ied that he often would talk to and pray with the pastor, assistant pastor, and other members of the small group about the matters that defendant and Sutter discussed. One of the small

- group members to whom Sutter spoke was police of ficer Daniel Hoffman. When Sutter spoke to Hoffman about defendant’s admission pertinent here , which Sutter testified he shared with Hoffman at Sutter’s son’s baseball game, Hoffman did not “indicate that he was speaking to [Sutter] in [Hoffman’s] professional capacity.” That is, “[Hoffman] wasn’t talking
to [Sutter] about criminal charges, ” and Hoffman n ever indicated to Sutter that Sutter could be called to t estify against defendant. Indeed, “[Sutter] was flabbergasted when [he] found out that that was g oing to be the outcome .” Although Hoffman, who testified that he spoke to Sutter on the phone about defendant’s admis sion, stated that he did not specificall y tell Sutter that he was talking to him as a police officer, he did “advis[e] [Sutter ] obviously [that he] was involved in the case and that because of [their] conversation that it was going to go on record and [he] advised [Sutter] that he probably would be called to testify in court if need be.” In response, according to Hoffman, Sutter merely indicated that “he just wishe[d] that [defendant] would just plead guilty and accept what he had done.”2015 IL App (2d) 140995

- 4

- ¶ 7 Sutter testified that he talked to about eight people about the pertinent admission . These people included Sutter’s wife, defendant’s counselor at the rehabilitation and recovery camp , a man who attended the spiritual training seminar with defendant, the pastor, the assistant pastor, and other members of the small group. As was defendant’s intent when he made the admission to Sutter, Sutter’ s intent in sharing it was that it would remain confidential and result in defendant’s betterment, as Sutter would gain advice on how to proceed in discipling defendant. ¶ 8 When asked more about his position with the church, Sutter testified that he was

“ designated by the authority in the church” to be a small

- group leader. That is, regardless of whether Sutter or the chu rch initiated interest in his becoming a leader , he was “accepted” by the “[church] elders.” The church elders are the “people that are responsible for the spiritual decisions of the church.” They are “the governing body, even over the pastor,” and, as s uch, they determine things like “how much money [the church] spend[s and] who [are the] lea ders in the church.” Sutter , who had been in “eldership training,” explained that he and his wife started

a small group and that they sought members at a pig roast the church hosted. At the pig roast, church members could sign up for whatever group session of Sutter’s they wanted to attend. Sutter estimated that th e church had eight small groups with seven to eight people in each g roup, and he said that the groups would meet at the ch urch or at members’ homes. Sutter also stat ed that he believed that there we re written rule s governing small

- group leaders and accountability partners. Sutter testified that, i n addition to lea ding the small group , he was “authorized” by the elders to baptize defendant. ¶ 9 The court found that, because the clergy

- penitent privilege applied, Sutter did not have to testify about the pertinent admission . In reaching that conclusion, the court found t hat Sutter was approved by the church elders, who comprised the governing body responsible for making2015 IL App (2d) 140995

- 5

- spiritual decisions, to lead a small group and baptize defendant. Defendant and Sutter entered into a relationship “ [that] was referred to as a discipl e to the defendant, and the relationship was supervised by the pastor.” Moreover, “conversations between [Sutter] and the defendant were intended to be of a confidential nature” and “were discussed with the pastor, counselors [at the rehabilitation and recovery camp,] and other church members for the purposes of prayer.” ¶ 10 Turning to consider the clergy

- penitent statute in light of these facts, the court noted that many of the terms in the statute are not defined . T hus, the court considered the common meaning of various words. For example, the court found that Sutter was a “ practitioner ”

“ accredited ” by the First Baptist Church of Sycamore, as the church elders authorized him to do various things. See 735 ILCS 5/8

- 803 (West 2012). Moreover, the court determined that the mere fact that Sutter talked to others about what defendant told him did not waive the privilege, as the eviden ce indicated that such admissions were shared with the understanding that they would remain confidential. See id. ¶ 11 III. ANALYSIS ¶ 12 A t issue in this appeal is whether the cler gy - penitent privilege applies so that Sutter may not be made to testify about the pertinent admission defendant made to him

. In addressing that issue , w e must first exami ne the applicable statute. The clergy -peni tent statute provides: “A clergyman or practitioner of any religious denomination accredited by the religious body to which he or she belongs, shall not be compelled to disclose in any court, or to any administrative board or agency, or to any public officer, a confession or admission made to him or her in his or her professional character or as a spiritual advisor in th e course of the discipline enjoined by the rules or practices of such religious body or of the religion which he or she professes, nor be compelled to divulge any information which2015 IL App (2d) 140995

- 6

- has been obtained by him or her in such professional character or as such spiritual advisor.” Id. ¶ 13 E ssentially , the statu te provides that a “clergyman” or “accredited” “practitioner” cannot be compelled to testify about admissions or confessions made to him or her for the purpose of seeking spiritual guidance. See People v. McNeal , 175 Ill. 2d 335, 359 (1997) (sta tements the defendant made to his brother, the defendant’s spiritual advisor, were not covered by the clergy

- penitent privilege, as the statements were not relayed to the brother in the brother’s
p osition as a spiritual advisor). Here, the State does not dispute that defendant relayed the pertinent admission to Sutter for the purpose of obtaining spiritual guidance. 3 Rather, the State claim s that (1) Sutter was not a “clergyman” or “practitioner” as defined in the statute and that, even if he was, (2) the privilege was waived once Sutter discussed the admission with other people. ¶ 14 Both of the issues raised require us to construe the clergy

- penitent statute. In construing

a statute, we must keep in mind the well

- settled rules of statut ory construction. The primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent. People v. Thomas , 2014 IL App (2d) 121001, ¶ 93. The surest and most reliable indicator of this intent is the lang uage of the statute itself. Id. W hen the language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply the statute without resorting to any extrinsic aids of construction. Id. Moreover,

w e must construe the statute to avoid rendering any part of it meaningless or superfluous, and w e cannot view words and phrases in isolation

. People v. Martino , 2012 IL A pp (2d) 101244, ¶ 26. R ather, we must consider the words and phrases in light of other relevant provisions. Id.

3 In its brief, the State does not argue this point, and, although the State claimed at oral argument that it was disputing t his point, it did not clearly indicate why.2015 IL App (2d) 140995

- 7

- We also may consider the consequences that would result from construing the statute one way or the other, and, in doing so, we must presume that the l egislature did not intend absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results

. Id. ¶ 15 Although we review de novo the construction of a statute (see id. ), we review the court’s finding s of fact under the manifest

- weight -of-the-evidenc e standard ( see McNeal , 175 Ill. 2d at 359 ; see also People v. Diercks , 88 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 1078 (1980)) . Findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite conclusion is readily apparent or i f the findings are unreasonable, arbitrary , or not based on the evidence. People v. Robinson , 2015 IL App (1st) 130837, ¶ 102. ¶ 16 Here , the trial court found that the church elders authorized Sutter to lead a small group and to baptize defendant; that Sutter discipl ed defendant under the supervision of the pastor; that Sutter had confidential conversations with other people about the admission defendant made to him; and that Sutter shared defendant’s admission with others only for the purpose of gaining spiri tual advice. We determine that t hese findings are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. ¶ 17 Turning to the specific statutory -construction issues raised, we first consider whether Sutter was a “practitioner of any religious denomination accredited by the religious body to which he or she belongs.” 735 ILCS 5/8

- 803 (West 2012). Although “[t]he obvious effect of such a [term] is to be as inclusive as possible, only requiring that the [person] is indeed a bona fide religious counselor” (Ronald J. Col ombo, Forgive Us Our Sins: The Inadequacies of the Clergy

- Penitent Privilege , 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 225, 232 (1998)), neither “practitioner” nor “accredited” is specifically defined in the clergy

- penitent statute , and neither the parties nor this
court has fou nd Illinois authority addressing those terms as used in the statute. Accordingly, we, like the trial court , will look to the dictionary to give the terms their ordinary and popularly2015 IL App (2d) 140995

- 8

- understood meaning s . See In re Detention of Bailey , 317 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 1086 (2000) ( “[A] court may look to dictionary definitions to derive the plain and ordinary meaning without rendering the term ambiguous.”). ¶ 18 “Practitioner” is defined as “ one that does something or follows some course or regimen habitually or customa rily.” Webster’ s Third New In ternational Dictionary 1780 (1993 ). “Accredit” is defined as “to give official authorization to or approval of,” “to order or permit to proceed on an official mission or on one otherwise officially recognized,” or “to vouch f or offic ially.” Id. at 13. In light of these definitions , we conclude that Sutter was a “practitioner of [a] religious denomination accredited by the religious body to which he *** belong[ed].” 735 ILCS 5/8-803 (West 2012). ¶ 19 Specifically, the evidence es tablished that the church elders did authorize Sutter to lead a small group and to baptize defendant. Thus, the elders, acting on behalf of the church, certainly did “accredit” Sutter to perform certain activities. Although nothing in the statute specifically requires that the practitioner be authorized to receive confessions or admissions from others, the facts here strongly suggest that the church was well aware of the fact t hat Sutter, as defendant’s spiritual advisor, was doing just that. Indeed, Sutter regularly spoke with the pastor and assistant pastor about the things to which defendant confessed. Moreover, the evidence established that Sutter was fully and regularly engaged in his religio us edification with the church. He not only led a religious life, having been discipl ed himself throughout his Christian life, but he le d a small group for the church, was charged with discipling others , and was in training to become a church elder. ¶ 20 In reaching this conclusion, we find support in In re Verplank , 329 F. Supp. 433 ( C.D. Cal. 1971), which defendant cites. There, the court extended the clergy

- penitent privilege to2015 IL App (2d) 140995

- 9

- counselors assisting an ordained Protestant m inister in ta lking to service registrants about, allegedly, how to evade being d rafted to serve in the Vietnam W ar. Id. at 434 -36. The court found that the privilege should be extended to cover the counselors , many of whom were not ordained ministers, because, under the applicable state law and advisory notes , their acts, in a general way at least, conformed “ with a significant portion of the activities of a minister of an established Protestant denomination.” Id. at 436. In reaching that result, the court observed that, although the minister originally set out to counsel all the service people personally, that soon became impractical, given the growing number of people seeking his advice. Id. Moreover, the court observed that nothing in the law required that the person giving advice be ordained. Id. ¶ 21 Although Verplank differs from this case in some ways, we find the reasoning employed
in Verplank applicable here. Specifically, as in Verplank , nothing in Illinois’ s clergy -penitent statute requires that the person g iving spiritual advice be ordained or otherwise formally recognized after completing specific religious training. Indeed, whi le the use of the term “clergyma n” might require as much , 4 a “practitioner” needs merely to be authorized by the religious organization to which he or she belongs. 735 ILCS 5/8 -803 (West 2012)

. Further, as in Verplank , it is un feasible to expect a pastor of a church to counsel all of the people in the church. Although the specific nu mber of people attending the Fi r st Baptist Church of Sycamore i s unknow n, Sutter testified that there we re approximately 56 to 64 people in the small groups alone. When we consider the huge congregations of some other churches, like Willow

4 See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 421 (1993) (defining “clergyman” as “a member of the clergy,” “an ordained minister,” or a “man regularly authorized to preach the gospel and administer its ordinances”).2015 IL App (2d) 140995

- 10

- Creek Community Church , the ability of a clergyman to be available to counsel all of the people in the congregation becomes even less likely. 5 Thus, it makes sense that the church would authorize other people in the church to counsel fellow churchg oers in a manner simil ar to that of a clergyman. Moreover, as in Verplank , the evidence here strongly suggests that, when Sutter spoke with defendant, he, like the counselors in Verplank , did so as an assistant to the pastor of the church. That is, when defendant talked to Sutter, defendant, as he would with a pastor, admit ted to things that he had done and sought forgiveness. Sutter and defendant would then pray together and ask for forgiveness, and, afterward, as pa rt of the process, Sutter would rebuke defendant. ¶ 22 As an aside, we note that, in finding Verplank persuasive here, we certainly do not mean to define for the First Baptist Church of Sycamore, or any other church for that matter, the variou s roles that peopl e fulfill in the religious organization. Rather, we are concerned only with w hether the evidence regard ing Sutter’s position with the First Bapt ist Church of Sycamore demonstrated that he was qualified as a “practitioner” who wa s “accredited” by the churc h such that the privilege would apply. ¶ 23 Relying on People v. Campobello , 348 Ill. App. 3d 619 (2004), the State argues that the privilege does not extend to Sutter

. In Campobello , the defendant, a priest, was charged with sexually assaulting a young girl. Id. at 622

- 23. The State subpoenaed the Catholic Diocese of Rockford to produce all records related to an internal investigation of the defendant

. Id. at 623

.

5 See Gregory Array, 10 Bigge st Churches in United States , Turn Back to God (June 9, 2010, 1:51 a.m.), http:// www.turnbacktogod.com/10-biggest- churches

- in -united- states (listing the sole pastor at the church and noting that, at the South Barrington location alone, the total number of people in attendance is 23,400).2015 IL App (2d) 140995

- 11

- The Diocese cla imed that such materials were protected under, among other things, the clergy

- penitent privilege. Id. at 625. We determined that they were not, after de fining terms such as “discipline,” “information,” “professional character,” and “spiritual advisor” that are found in the lat t er part of the statute. Id. at 634

- 36. Nowhere in Campobello did we define “practitioner,” as a definition for that term was immaterial in light of the facts. ¶ 24 A side from the State’s misplaced reliance on Campobello , we f ind the State’s position to be in violation of the rules governing the construction of statutes. That is, under the State’s view, the privilege should apply only when the person to whom an admission or confession is made is a member of the clergy. The clear and unambiguous language of the clergy

- penitent
statute indicates that it applies to admissions and confessions made to clergymen and “practitioner[s] of any religious denomination accredited by the religious body to which [they] belong [] .” 735 ILCS 5/8

- 803 (West 2012). I f we adopted the State’s position, we would be reading out of the statute the “practitioner” language. This would make that language superfluous, which we must avoid. See Martino , 2012 IL App (2d) 101244, ¶ 26. ¶ 25 Second, we address whether the privilege was waived once Sutter discussed defendant’s admission with other people. “A plain reading of the [ clergy

- penitent] statute[] reveals a design to protect those communications between clergymen and laymen that originate in confidence that they will no t be disclosed.” Snyder v. Poplett , 98 Ill. App. 3d 359, 362 (1981). A t least two
court s have recognized that the privilege is not destroyed simply because a third person is present when a defendant confesses to a clergyman or practitioner. See Campobello , 348 Ill. App. 3d at 636 (“[T]he tr ial court erred in holding that the privilege extends only to admissions or confessions made in a one -on- one setting.”); Diercks , 88 Ill. App. 3d at 1078; see also Robert W. Webb, Priest -Pa nitent [ sic ] Privileg e , 46 Chi.- Kent L. Rev

. 48, 52 (1969) (“The presence of2015 IL App (2d) 140995

- 12

- third parties does not necessarily destroy the [clergy

- penitent] privilege if the information is given in confidence.”). Rather, if the third person is regularly engaged in aiding the clergyman
or pr actitioner in giving spiritual advice, the privilege will survive. See Diercks , 88 Ill. App. 3d
at 1078. ¶ 26 Here, the undisputed evidence revealed that, although Sutter relayed what defendant told him to eight other people, he did so only so that he could obtain advice on how to discipl e defendant. We note that courts have found that “a showing of indispensability [of the third person] is necessary before a privilege is extended to nonprofessional representatives

. ” (E mphasis added.) Id. ; see also Campobe llo , 348 Ill. App. 3d at 636. However, we also note some disagreement on that point. See Robert W. Webb, Priest -Panitent [ sic ] Privilege , 46 Chi.- Kent L. Rev. at 52 (noting that the presence of third parties when a confession is given to a clergyman for the purpose of spiritual advi c e should not waive the privilege because, among other things, the statute require s simply that the confession be given for the purpose of obtaining spiritual advice, and the presence of third parties should not affect the c lergyman’s capacity to do so). ¶ 27 In any event, even if we were to conclude that Sutter waived the privilege when he relayed defendant’s admission to other people, defendant did not do likewise. Because “[t]he privilege belongs both to the person making the statement and to the clergyman [or practitioner]” ( Thomas , 2014 IL App (2d) 121001, ¶ 94), the privilege would still apply here, as nothing indicates that defendant, who joined Sutter in invoking the privilege, ever shared his admi ssion with anyone other than Sutter. ¶ 28 Relying on Cox v. Miller , 296 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2002), the State claims that , because defendant’s admission was shared with others, the admission was not confidential, and, thus, the2015 IL App (2d) 140995

- 13

- privilege does not apply. We disagre e. At issue in Cox was whether statements the defendant made to members of his Alcoholics Anonymous group were privileged. Id. at 92. The cour t concluded that they were not

. Id. at 110. The court found that, even if Alcoholics Anonymous could be consi dered a religion for purpose s of the clergy

- penitent statute , the evidence established that the defendant confess ed to members of Alcoholics Anonymous about a murder “to unburden himself, to seek empathy and emotional support, and perhaps in some instances to seek practical guidance,” not for the purpose of attaining spiritual advice. Id . at 111. ¶ 29 Here, in contrast, the evidence revealed that Sutter discipl ed defendant, with defendant making numerous admissions to Sutter . D efendant specifically asked Sutter to “ ‘please look out for [him]’ ” and “ ‘keep [him] accountable,’ ” as “ ‘[ defendant] need[ed Sut ter].’ ” Once defendant made admissions to Sutter, Sutter and defendant would pray and ask for forgiveness, and , as part of the process, Sutter would rebuke defendant. Most importantly, in order to better guide defendant spiritually, Sutter spoke to other people affiliated with the church, including the pastor and the assistant pastor , about the admissions defendant made

. W hen Sutter shared defendant’s admissions with other people in the church, the unders tanding was that the admissions would remain confidential. Nothing in the record indicates that defendant or Sutter, like the defendant in Cox , spoke with other people for any purpose but to help def endant spiritually. ¶ 30 IV. CONCLUSION ¶ 31 In conclusion, we determine that the privilege applies, as Sutter was a “practitioner” as defined in the statute, and, even if Sutter waived the privilege, the privilege survived because defendant did not waive it . Because we conclude that the privilege applies, we w ill not address2015 IL App (2d) 140995

- 14

- defendant’s argument under the first a mendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. I). ¶ 32 For these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of De Kalb County is affirmed. ¶ 33 Affirmed.