[Cite as C.S.J. v. S.E.J., 2019-Ohio-3273.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

C.S.J., : 

 Petitioner-Appellee, : 

 No. 107401 

 v. : 

 

S.E.J., : 

 

 Respondent-Appellant. : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 15, 2019 

 

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Domestic Relations Division 

Case No. DV-17-368501 

 

Appearances: 

Adam S. Baker, for appellee. 

S.E.J., pro se. 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J.: 

 Appellant S.E.J. appeals from the judgment of the trial court that 

granted appellee’s petition for a domestic violence civil protection order pursuant to 

R.C. 3113.31. He assigns three errors for our review: 

I. The trial court erred and abused its discretion when trial [court] 

continued to proceed with trial after the appellant established for 
the record the appellee had procedural [sic] defaulted by failing 

to timely answer the admissions as required by Civ.R 36(C). 

II. The trial court erred and abused its discretion when trial [court] 

continued to proceed with trial after the appellant established for 

the record the court’s order of service had not been perfected. 

III. The appellee failed to establish perfected service on three 

separate occasions without any proof of service. 

Having reviewed the record and the controlling law, we affirm the 

decision of the trial court. For the sake of clarity, we shall address the assigned 

errors out of their predesignated order. 

The record indicates that appellant and appellee were married in 

2008 and have one son who was born the following year. On August 22, 2017, 

appellee filed a petition for an ex parte domestic violence civil protection order 

against appellant. The court issued an ex parte protection order that day. 

The court scheduled a full hearing on the matter commencing in 

February 2018, after both parties signed an agreed entry approving trial dates. 

Appellant filed discovery requests, including multiple requests for admissions under 

Civ.R. 36. He also filed motions to deem various matters admitted that were later 

denied by the trial court. Both parties appeared at the evidentiary hearing and 

presented evidence. According to the App.R. 9(C) statement of the evidence 

submitted in this case:

On February 7, 2018, [appellee] was sworn and gave testimony that 

supports finding that [appellant] committed domestic violence as 

defined in R.C. 3113.31 and that the [appellee] is in danger of domestic 

violence. Her testimony is found to be credible. [Appellant’s] 

testimony was marginally credible. * * * 
[Appellee] testified that on or about August 1, 2017, [appellant] 

forcefully took [appellee’s] backpack from her person. 

[Appellant] picked up a box and threw it forcefully at [appellee’s] face, 

while she was wearing her glasses causing injury and bleeding. 

[Appellee] played an audio recording of the incident. [Appellee] was 

hysterical and crying. [Appellant] profusely apologized. [Appellee] 

submitted four (4) cell-phone photographs of herself taken 30 minutes 

after the aforementioned incident. The photographs clearly depict 

[appellee’s] swollen face, cheek and lips. [Appellant’s] objection to [the 

recording] is overruled as the [appellee] testified that she recorded the 

incident, and that the recording was accurate. Same corroborated her 

testimony. 

On or about August 15, 2017, [appellant] dropped [appellee] off at RiteAid drug store to pick up a prescription. [Appellant] left Petitioner at 

the drug store and she had to take bus home. Upon her return home, 

[appellee] noticed a camera set up with note that stated, “Don’t touch 

the camera.” [Appellee] testified that she was so frightened she called 

the police. The Police advised her to go to a shelter. [Appellee] 

contacted shelters and they were filled up [so she] stayed at a hotel. * 

* * 

[Appellant] disputed that on August 1, 2017, he threw a box at 

[appellee]. He testified that it was a “flinch,” and that [appellee] 

“bumped his wrist with her lips.” However, [appellant] conceded that 

the photographs accurately reflected [appellee’s] injuries. As such, it is 

readily apparent that [appellant] caused serious physical harm upon 

the [appellee]. R.C. 3113.31(A)(1)(a). 

The Court further finds by preponderance of the evidence * * * that 

[appellee is] in danger of or has been a victim of domestic violence 

* * * as defined in R.C. 3113.31(A), committed by [appellant.] 

The court imposed a domestic violence civil protection order and 

ordered it to remain in effect until August 2022. 

Requests for Admissions

In the first assigned error, appellant argues that appellee did not 

“timely” respond to his requests for admissions pursuant to Civ.R. 36 because 
appellee’s counsel assured him that discovery responses would be returned within 

14 days, and responses were one day late. He maintains that various matters should 

be deemed admitted under Civ.R. 36. 

In order to grant a domestic violence civil protection order pursuant 

to R.C. 3113.31, the court must find that petitioner has shown by a preponderance of 

the evidence that petitioner or petitioner’s family or household members are in 

danger of domestic violence. Felton v. Felton, 79 Ohio St.3d 34, 42, 1997-Ohio-302, 

679 N.E.2d 672, paragraph two of the syllabus; Johnson v. Burke, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 103702, 2016-Ohio-2947, ¶ 23. R.C. 3113.31(A)(1) defines domestic 

violence to include, inter alia, “attempting to cause or recklessly causing bodily 

injury[.]” 

Because courts are expressly authorized to “craft protection orders 

that are tailored to the particular circumstances,” challenges to the scope of a 

protection order are reviewed for abuse of discretion. M.D. v. M.D., 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga Nos. 106581 and 106758, 2018-Ohio-4218, ¶ 45, citing Allan v. Allan, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101212, 2014-Ohio-5039, ¶ 11, quoting Reynolds v. White, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 74506, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 4454 (Sept. 23, 1999). “An abuse 

of discretion connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the 

court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. 

Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). When applying the 

abuse of discretion standard, a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for 
that of the trial court. Berk v. Matthews, 53 Ohio St.3d 161, 169, 559 N.E.2d 1301 

(1990). 

Civ.R. 36(B) provides that ‘[a]ny matter admitted under this rule is 

conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or 

amendment of the admission.” Generally, the express language of Civ.R. 36(A), 

requests for admissions are “‘self-executing; if there is no response to a request or 

an admission, the matter is admitted. Unlike other discovery matters, the admission 

is made automatically and requires no further action by the party requesting the 

admissions.’” Smallwood v. Shiflet, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103853, 2016-Ohio7887, ¶ 18, quoting State v. Cordell, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-361, 2008-Ohio6124, ¶ 10. 

However, Civ.R. 65.1 governs special statutory proceedings under 

R.C. 3113.31, and states: 

(A) Applicability; Construction; Other rules. The provisions of this 

rule apply to special statutory proceedings under R.C. 3113.31, R.C. 

2151.34, and R.C. 2903.214 providing for domestic violence, stalking, 

and sexually oriented offense civil protection orders, shall be 

interpreted and applied in a manner consistent with the intent and 

purposes of those protection order statutes, and supersede and make 

inapplicable in such proceedings the provisions of any other rules of 

civil procedure to the extent that such application is inconsistent with 

the provisions of this rule. 

* * * 

(D) Discovery. 

(1) Time. Discovery under this rule shall be completed prior to the time 

set for the full hearing. 
(2) Discovery order. Discovery may be had only upon the entry of an 

order containing all of the following to the extent applicable: 

(a) The time and place of the discovery; 

(b) The identities of the persons permitted to be present, which shall 

include any victim advocate; and 

(c) Such terms and conditions deemed by the court to be necessary to 

assure the safety of the Petitioner, including if applicable, maintaining 

the confidentiality of the Petitioner’s address. 

(Emphasis added.) 

Pursuant to the 2016 Staff Notes for this rule, 

The [domestic violence civil protection order] statutes do not address 

discovery. Division (D) provides for discovery only upon a court order 

containing accommodations and protections deemed necessary for the 

protection of the petitioner. 

The record in this case indicates that without obtaining prior approval 

from the court, appellant served multiple requests for admissions upon appellee, 

which were followed by motions to deem matters admitted. Under the clear 

language of Civ.R. 65.1, however, in order to fulfill the aims of accommodating and 

protecting an ex parte petitioner, a discovery order must first be obtained before 

proceeding with discovery. Such order would specify the time, place, terms and 

conditions of discovery. Moreover, as the magistrate thoughtfully opined in this 

case: 

Neither party requested a discovery order prior to the date of this 

proceeding, January 3, 2018. The purpose of the statute is to determine 

whether the Petitioner and/or the parties’ minor child are in danger of 

domestic violence based on the truth of the allegations contained in the 

Petition. Felton v. Felton[, 79 Ohio St.3d 34, 37-38, 679 N.E.2d 672 

(1997)]. This Magistrate is of the opinion that such requests for 

admissions are inconsistent with the purpose of the statute, to protect 
individuals from domestic violence. Discovery should be used as a 

shield and not a sword. Civil Rule 65.1 addresses discovery in these 

proceedings. This Magistrate offered that the Respondent could 

schedule the Petitioner’s deposition to take place in this Courthouse 

prior to the full hearing taking place. The Respondent declined the 

opportunity to do so. 

In accordance with the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motions to deem various matters 

admitted. The first assigned error lacks merit. 

Appellee’s Service of Discovery Documents 

In the third assigned error, appellant maintains that appellee failed 

to properly serve him with her discovery responses. 

 Again, we note that appellant did not first obtain a court order for 

discovery as required under Civ.R. 65.1. Additionally, the magistrate properly 

denied his attempt to deem matters submitted to appellee as admitted prior to the 

full evidentiary hearing. Further, appellant was permitted to extensively crossexamine appellee and pursue expansive areas of inquiry during the full evidentiary 

hearing. Accordingly, we find no prejudicial error. 

The third assigned error is without merit. 

Service of Notices and Orders from the Court

In the second assigned error, appellant asserts that he was not 

properly served with court notices and orders after he notified the court of his 

change of address. 
In order to render a valid judgment, a court must have jurisdiction 

over the defendant in the action. Maryhew v. Yova, 11 Ohio St.3d 154, 156, 464 

N.E.2d 538 (1984). A court may acquire personal jurisdiction over the defendant 

either by service of process upon the defendant, the voluntary appearance and 

submission of the defendant or his legal representative, or by certain acts of the 

defendant or his legal representative that constitute an involuntary submission to 

the jurisdiction of the court. Id. Jurisdiction over the person is presumed to exist 

in the absence of an objection. Jones v. Jordan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88696, 

2007-Ohio-2519, ¶ 11. 

Under R.C. 3113.31(D), 

The court shall give the respondent notice of, and an opportunity to be 

heard at, the full hearing. The court shall hold the full hearing on the 

date scheduled under this division unless the court grants a 

continuance of the hearing in accordance with this division. Under any 

of the following circumstances or for any of the following reasons, the 

court may grant a continuance of the full hearing to a reasonable time 

determined by the court: 

(i) Prior to the date scheduled for the full hearing under this division, 

the respondent has not been served with the petition filed pursuant to 

this section and notice of the full hearing. 

(ii) The parties consent to the continuance. 

Here the record indicates that appellant was properly served with the 

ex parte order and the notices of the full hearing that were initially scheduled. 

Appellant moved to a new residence after the ex parte order was issued. However, 

he subsequently signed several agreed orders outlining the trial dates. Significantly, 

appellant signed various agreed judgment entries scheduling the hearing on the 
protection order and explaining that the ex parte order would remain in effect. 

Furthermore, appellant did not raise an objection to the sufficiency of process. 

Civ.R. 12(H). Appellant also appeared in the action and filed numerous documents, 

clearly demonstrating his awareness of the scheduling of trial as well as the court’s 

personal jurisdiction. In accordance with all of the foregoing, we conclude that the 

trial court had personal jurisdiction over appellant in this matter. 

The second assigned error is without merit. 

Motion No. 528115 (which was referred to the merit panel for 

disposition) seeking reconsideration of this court’s prior order striking Exhibit D 

from appellant’s merit brief is denied in part and granted in part. The motion to 

reconsider is denied as to the letter included within Exhibit D, but is reversed as to 

the remainder of Exhibit D, which is part of the trial court record. 

Judgment is affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment 

into execution. 
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

______________________________________ 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, PRESIDING JUDGE 

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., and 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., CONCUR