UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-1207

CHRISTIE ARRINGTON, Administrator of the Estate of Nyles 

Arrington; CHRISTIE ARRINGTON, Individually,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

v.

CITY OF RALEIGH; MICHELLE PEELE, individually, in her 

official capacity as an officer of the Raleigh Police 

Department, and in her capacity as a security guard with La 

Rosa Linda’s Mexican Restaurant,

Defendants – Appellants,

and

RALEIGH POLICE DEPARTMENT; ROSALINDA MARTINEZ,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, 

District Judge. (5:07-cv-00011-BO)

Argued: January 28, 2010 Decided: March 5, 2010

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded with instructions by unpublished per curiam 

opinion.
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ARGUED: Norwood P. Blanchard, III, CRANFILL, SUMNER & HARTZOG 

LLP, Wilmington, North Carolina; Hunt Kang Choi, OFFICE OF THE 

CITY ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellants. Mark 

Anthony Key, Lillington, North Carolina, for Appellees. ON 

BRIEF: Dorothy K. Leapley, OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY, Raleigh, 

North Carolina, for Appellant City of Raleigh; Patricia L. 

Holland, CRANFILL, SUMNER & HARTZOG LLP, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, for Appellant Michelle Peele.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

This case arises from the fatal shooting of a man by a 

Raleigh, N.C., police officer. Plaintiff Christie Arrington, 

acting in her individual capacity and as administrator of the 

estate of Nyles Arrington, filed a complaint seeking damages in 

North Carolina state court, asserting claims under both 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. Defendants removed the case to the 

United States District Court for the Eastern District of North 

Carolina on the basis of federal question jurisdiction; all of 

the parties are citizens of North Carolina. Thirteen days after 

the removal of the case to federal court, the plaintiff amended 

her complaint as of right, dismissing all the federal claims. 

The plaintiff never sought remand to state court; consequently, 

the case proceeded in federal district court. The case has come 

to us upon an interlocutory appeal on complex issues of immunity 

under North Carolina law. Having had the benefit of full 

briefing and oral argument, we conclude that the district court 

should have remanded the case to state court upon the dismissal 

of all federal claims, even in the absence of a motion from the 

parties that it do so. Accordingly, we vacate the interlocutory 

order brought up for review and remand this action with 

directions that the district court remand the case to state 

court for all further proceedings.
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I.

We draw the below summary of the facts from the record 

before the district court. On August 28, 2005, Officer Michelle 

Peele (“Peele”) fatally shot Nyles Arrington (“Arrington”) as he 

was attempting to steal her personally-owned vehicle from the 

parking lot of La Rosa Linda’s, a Raleigh restaurant and bar. 

At the time of the shooting, Officer Peele was a sworn police 

officer of the Raleigh Police Department (“RPD”) working as an 

off-duty security guard at La Rosa Linda’s. The City of Raleigh 

(“the City”) had passed an ordinance requiring nightclubs to 

hire off-duty uniformed officers to provide security. When RPD 

officers worked off-duty security jobs at local establishments, 

they were required to wear their RPD uniforms and carry their 

service weapons.

On the night of the shooting, Officer Peele was 

scheduled to work a four-hour shift providing security at La 

Rosa Linda’s from 10 p.m. to 2 a.m. Officer Peele’s friend, 

Lindsay Banning (“Banning”), accompanied Officer Peele that 

night, riding with her in Peele’s personal automobile (an SUV) 

to the restaurant. As the night progressed, Officer Peele 

occasionally sat, with Banning, in her vehicle, which was 

positioned in the parking lot so that Peele could watch the 

front entrance of the restaurant. Around midnight, Officer Peele 

went into the foyer area of La Rosa Linda’s and Banning followed 
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her, leaving the SUV in the parking lot with the windows down 

and the keys in the ignition. 

Shortly after entering the restaurant, Officer Peele 

looked outside and noticed a man (subsequently identified as 

Arrington) slowly walking past the driver’s side door, opening 

the door of her vehicle, and climbing into the driver’s seat. 

Officer Peele had never seen Arrington before. She testified 

during discovery that she was particularly concerned about the 

theft of her vehicle because she had left her personal handgun 

on the floor of the driver’s side of the SUV under the front 

seat. Officer Peele stepped out of the restaurant and approached

the vehicle, shouting “Stop . . . Police . . . Get out!” but 

Arrington did not step out of the vehicle. Instead, he revved 

the engine and began driving the car slowly forward. Officer 

Peele continued calling for him to stop and drew her service 

weapon. As the vehicle moved forward, Arrington made a hard 

right. Banning, who had followed Officer Peele outside, was now 

either in or close to the path of the moving vehicle. The 

parties vigorously dispute Banning’s precise location. Officer 

Peele discharged her weapon one time, fatally striking Arrington 

in the chest.

Plaintiff Christie Arrington filed this action in Wake 

County Superior Court on September 11, 2006, against the City; 

Officer Peele, individually and in her official capacity; the 
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RPD; and Rosalinda Martinez, the owner of the restaurant. The 

six-count complaint included five state law counts and one 

federal law count (containing numerous legal theories) pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On January 9, 2007, the defendants timely 

removed the case based on federal question removal jurisdiction 

to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

North Carolina. Thirteen days later, the plaintiff filed an 

amended complaint, as of right, dismissing her federal claims

and adding an additional state law claim for punitive damages. 

The plaintiff never sought remand to state court, and, 

exercising supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367(a), the district court proceeded with the case.

At the time of the shooting, the Raleigh City Council 

had authorized a limited waiver of the City’s sovereign immunity 

for specified types of damages up to $1 million, provided the 

claimant agreed to execute a release in favor of all persons, 

firms, and corporations that might also or otherwise be liable. 

The City also had in place two insurance polices: one issued by 

Genesis Insurance Company providing indemnity for certain claims 

above $1 million and below $2 million, and another issued by The 

Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania, providing 

indemnity for certain claims above $2 million and below $11 

million. The plaintiff refused to agree to execute the release 

as provided under state and local law. 
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After several preliminary matters had been resolved by 

the district court, on July 14, 2008, the City and Officer Peele 

filed motions for summary judgment, inter alia, on the ground of 

immunity from suit based on certain principles of state law. 

After a hearing, the district court entered its memorandum and 

order granting summary judgment in favor of the City on the 

merits of some claims but it rejected, either as a matter of 

law, or on the basis of the existence of genuine disputes of 

material fact, both the City’s motion and Officer Peele’s motion 

insofar as they asserted immunity from suit. The City and 

Officer Peele have timely noted the instant interlocutory 

appeal, seeking review of the district court’s immunity rulings.

Under Bailey v. Kennedy, 349 F.3d 731, 738-39 (4th Cir. 2003), 

and Gray-Hopkins v. Prince George’s County, 309 F.3d 224, 231 

(4th Cir. 2002), we have jurisdiction over this interlocutory 

appeal based on the denial of state law immunity. 

II.

The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her federal claims 

a mere thirteen days after the case was removed from state court 

but she did not move for remand. Thus, the district court

elected to retain jurisdiction over the state law claims being 
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pursued by plaintiff.1

Section 1367(c) provides:

No doubt, as permitted by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367(c), the district court had the discretion to make that 

election. But both the plain text of § 1367(c) as well as our 

precedents make clear that in this instance, that discretion 

should have been exercised to decline jurisdiction. 

The district courts may decline to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under 

subsection (a) if--

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of 

State law, 

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the 

claim or claims over which the district court has 

original jurisdiction, 

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims 

over which it has original jurisdiction, or 

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other 

compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. 

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). As can be seen, under subsections (c)(1), 

(2), and (3), above, there were compelling reasons not to retain 

supplemental jurisdiction over the non-diverse state law claims 

in this case. As contemplated by subsection (1), the state law 

immunity issues here are both novel and complex.2

 1 District courts have supplemental jurisdiction over state 

law claims that “form part of the same case or controversy” as 

the federal claim supporting removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

As contemplated 

2 The briefing and argument in this case have shown that 

issues surrounding municipal sovereign immunity and public 

official immunity pose intricate and important state law issues 

under North Carolina law. A decision or ruling in this case 

could well bring waves of consequences to other North Carolina 

municipalities and governmental entities. The district court, in 

(Continued)
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by subsection (2), virtually from the start, there has existed

solely state law claims in this case. And relatedly, as 

contemplated by subsection (3), the sole federal claim 

supporting the district court’s original jurisdiction was 

dismissed voluntarily by the plaintiff without objection by 

defendants less than two weeks after the case arrived in federal 

court. Under the circumstances, therefore, we fail to see why a 

federal district court would elect to retain jurisdiction. 

Indeed, our precedents evince a strong preference that 

state law issues be left to state courts in the absence of 

diversity or federal question jurisdiction under circumstances 

 

finding that the City had waived sovereign immunity through its

purchase of two insurance policies seemingly never considered, 

and — at a minimum – did not discuss in its order, pertinent

North Carolina cases speaking directly to the issue. See, e.g.,

Magana v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 183 N.C. App. 146 

(2007); Williams v. Holsclaw, 128 N.C. App. 205 aff’d, 349 N.C. 

225 (1998); Overcash v. Statesville Bd. of Ed., 83 N.C. App. 21 

(1986). Furthermore, while the district court concluded that the 

City waived sovereign immunity through the mere purchase of 

liability insurance, some North Carolina courts have 

consistently rejected that notion. See, e.g., Kephard by 

Tutweiler v. Pendergraph, 131 N.C. App. 559 (1998). Similarly, 

North Carolina’s doctrine of public officer immunity includes 

variants that heighten its complexity. See Jones v. Kearns, 120 

N.C. App. 301, 305 (1995); Slade v. Vernon, 110 N.C. App. 422, 

428 (1993). Certainly, we do not suggest, by emphasizing such 

complexities in state law, that we harbor doubt as to the 

ability of any district court in this circuit to resolve them in 

a proper case. We have grave doubt, however, that this is a 

“proper case” in which a federal district court should undertake 

the task. 
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such as those reflected here. That is to say, although we have 

consistently acknowledged that district courts “enjoy wide 

latitude in determining whether or not to retain jurisdiction 

over state claims when all federal claims have been 

extinguished,” Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 

1995), at the same time, we have taken heed of the Supreme 

Court’s teaching (even before the enactment of § 1367 in 1990)

that “a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, 

and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial 

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in order to decide 

whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case brought in that 

court involving pendent state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon 

University v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (emphasis added).

Thus, we have observed under circumstances analogous to those 

here: “With all its federal questions gone, there may be the 

authority to keep [this case] in federal court under 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1367(a) and 1441(c) (2000), but there is no good reason to do 

so.” Waybright v. Frederick County, MD, 528 F.3d 199, 209 (4th 

Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 725 (2008) (alteration 

added); see also Farlow v. Wachovia Bank of North Carolina, 

N.A., 259 F.3d 309, 316 (4th Cir. 2001). We think that is 

equally true here. 
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III.

In sum, we are persuaded that, under the circumstances 

here, and for the reasons set forth above, resolution of the 

important and potentially far-reaching issues of state law 

presented by this case should be remitted to state courts.

Accordingly, the district court should not have maintained 

jurisdiction over this action upon the early dismissal by the 

plaintiff of the federal claims. Therefore, the order of the 

district court entered on January 26, 2009, granting in part and 

denying in part motions for summary judgment is vacated. This 

case is remanded to the district court with directions to remand 

the case to the Superior Court for Wake County, North Carolina. 

Upon the remand to state court, the state court shall be free to 

adopt, modify, or reject any and all such orders as may have 

been previously entered in this action.

VACATED AND REMANDED 

WITH INSTRUCTIONS