UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Before the

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

Release No. 98103 / August 10, 2023

ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ENFORCEMENT

Release No. 4437 / August 10, 2023

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING

File No. 3-21559

In the Matter of

GRUPO AVAL ACCIONES 

Y VALORES S.A. and 

CORPORACIÓN 

FINANCIERA 

COLOMBIANA S.A.,

Respondents.

ORDER INSTITUTING CEASE-ANDDESIST PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO 

SECTION 21C OF THE SECURITIES 

EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, MAKING 

FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING A CEASEAND-DESIST ORDER 

I.

The Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) deems it appropriate that ceaseand-desist proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted pursuant to Section 21C of the Securities 

Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), against Grupo Aval Acciones y Valores S.A. (“Grupo 

Aval”) and Corporación Financiera Colombiana S.A. (“Corficolombiana”) (referred to, collectively, 

as “Respondents”). 

II.

In anticipation of the institution of these proceedings, Respondents have submitted an Offer 

of Settlement (the “Offer”) which the Commission has determined to accept. Solely for the 

purpose of these proceedings and any other proceedings brought by or on behalf of the 

Commission, or to which the Commission is a party, Respondents admit the Commission’s 

jurisdiction over them and the subject matter of these proceedings, and consent to the entry of this 

Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 21C of the Exchange Act, 

Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order (“Order”), as set forth below.
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III.

On the basis of this Order and Respondents’ Offer, the Commission finds1 that: 

Summary

These proceedings arise out of Corficolombiana’s involvement, through its former 

president as described below, in a bribery scheme related to the largest highway construction 

project in the history of Colombia, known as Ruta del Sol II (“RDS 2”), and specifically the 

construction of a road extension to the RDS 2 (the “Ocaña-Gamarra Extension”). The bribe 

scheme took place against a backdrop of a failure to maintain sufficient internal accounting 

controls and books and records that concealed the bribes as legitimate business expenses. As 

Grupo Aval’s agent, Corficolombiana violated the anti-bribery provisions of the Foreign Corrupt 

Practices Act (“FCPA”) and was a cause of Grupo Aval’s violations of the books and records and 

internal accounting controls provisions of the FCPA. 

Respondents

1. Grupo Aval, a Colombian financial holding company based in Bogota, is one of the 

largest commercial banking groups in Colombia. Grupo Aval’s shares are listed on the NYSE, 

and its securities have been registered with the Commission under Section 12 of the Exchange 

Act since 2011 and has reporting obligations under Section 13 of the Exchange Act. 

2. Corficolombiana is Grupo Aval’s merchant bank subsidiary and the largest finance 

corporation in Colombia. Grupo Aval consolidates Corficolombiana’s results of operations into 

its financial statements. Corficolombiana’s board of directors included officers of Grupo Aval. 

Background

3. Colombia’s Ruta del Sol highway project is a long-term project to rehabilitate and 

construct highways connecting Bogota with large urban and rural areas throughout Colombia. 

In 2009, the Colombian government started a bidding process for RDS 2, a 328-mile highway 

infrastructure project. Corficolombiana sought partnerships with leading infrastructure 

companies to bid on RDS 2 on behalf of Grupo Aval. At the time, the RDS 2 project was the 

largest infrastructure project in Colombia’s history and was valued at approximately $1 billion.

4. In 2009, Corficolombiana’s former president (“Corficolombiana Executive”) 

negotiated a bidding proposal with a Brazilian construction company for the RDS 2 contract on 

behalf of Corficolombiana. The Corficolombiana Executive reported to Corficolombiana’s 

board of directors. 

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 The findings herein are made pursuant to Respondents’ Offer of Settlement and are not binding on any 

other person or entity in this or any other proceeding. 
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5. Corficolombiana and the Brazilian construction company submitted a bid for the 

RDS 2 project on October 27, 2009, and the Colombian government agency assigned to review 

the RDS 2 bidding proposals awarded the project to them on December 15, 2009. 

6. Soon thereafter, Corficolombiana, the Brazilian construction company, and a third 

company formed two legal entities based in Colombia: a company to manage the project and a 

construction company to build the highway (referred to, collectively, as the “RDS 2 Joint 

Venture”). The Brazilian construction company held an approximately 62% equity interest in 

the two entities, and Corficolombiana, through a Corficolombiana subsidiary, maintained an 

approximately 33% equity interest in the ventures. 

 

7. Corficolombiana’s participation in the RDS 2 bidding proposal was critical because 

it had a well-known record in the financial sector, including financing infrastructure projects in 

Colombia. Corficolombiana, through the Corficolombiana Executive and its subsidiary, 

maintained influence over the financial and accounting operations of the RDS 2 Joint Venture, 

including nominating and appointing employees responsible for monitoring and approving third 

party obligations at the RDS 2 Joint Venture (such as the controller responsible for monitoring 

the compliance framework and the contract administrator with joint approval authority over 

third-party obligations). 

8. Beginning as early as 2012, the RDS 2 entity that was granted the rights to operate 

the RDS 2 project (“concession company”) lobbied the Colombian government to add to the 

RDS 2 concession contract a road extension project that would intersect the Ruta del Sol 

highway. The Colombian government later added the Ocaña-Gamarra Extension to the original 

RDS 2 contract.

9. In 2013, a senior executive at the Brazilian construction company in Colombia 

(“Brazilian Executive”) agreed to pay two individual intermediaries a success fee in exchange 

for the approval and acceleration of the Ocaña-Gamarra Extension. The Brazilian Executive 

knew that a portion of the success fee paid to the intermediaries would be paid to Colombian 

government officials as bribes. 

10. Soon thereafter, the Brazilian Executive told the Corficolombiana Executive about 

the bribe scheme to obtain the Ocaña-Gamarra Extension. The Corficolombiana Executive 

agreed to the bribery scheme and authorized the bribe payments to intermediaries through the 

RDS 2 Joint Venture using his influence over the financial and accounting operations of the 

RDS 2 Joint Venture.

11. On March 14, 2014, Colombian government officials signed the Ocaña-Gamarra 

Extension as a contract addendum to the RDS 2 highway project contract. At the time, the 

Ocaña-Gamarra Extension addendum was intended to create at least $350 million in additional

revenue and added new financing obligations for the RDS 2 highway project. As a result of the 

bribery scheme, the Colombian government approved the Ocaña-Gamarra Extension without a 

new public tendering process.
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12. After March 14, 2014, Colombian government officials reviewed the new financing 

obligations for the Ocaña-Gamarra Extension addendum critical to the RDS 2 Joint Venture. In 

May 2014, before Colombian government officials approved the new financing obligations for 

the Ocaña-Gamarra Extension, the Brazilian Executive agreed to pay additional bribes to 

Colombian government officials in the form of illicit campaign contributions. 

13. The Brazilian Executive informed the Corficolombiana Executive, and the 

Corficolombiana Executive agreed to the bribery scheme and authorized the bribe payments to 

intermediaries through the RDS 2 Joint Venture using his influence over the financial and 

accounting operations of the RDS 2 Joint Venture.

14. In October 2014, the Colombian government approved new financing obligations 

for the Ocaña-Gamarra Extension addendum to the RDS 2 contract that were more favorable to 

the RDS 2 concession company. The Brazilian Executive, together with the Corficolombiana 

Executive, intended to influence, and did influence, the approval and acceleration of the OcañaGamarra Extension by, among other things, causing the payment of bribes paid so the 

addendum would be included in the RDS 2 contract without a public tender or bidding process. 

15. The Corficolombiana Executive caused the RDS 2 Joint Venture to pay 

approximately $28 million in bribes to Colombian government officials from 2014 through 

2016 for the Ocaña-Gamarra Extension. Specifically, the Brazilian construction company paid 

approximately $4 million in 2014; the RDS 2 concession company paid approximately $13.2 

million from 2014 through 2016 (approximately $2.7 million through a correspondent bank 

located in the United States), and the RDS 2 construction company paid approximately $10.9 

million from 2014 through 2016. 

16. The Brazilian construction company, the Brazilian Executive, and the 

Corficolombiana Executive used no-work contracts and sham invoices to pay bribes from the 

RDS 2 Joint Venture to Colombian government officials by reimbursing or paying 

intermediaries directly. These contracts and invoices involved work that the RDS 2 

construction company handled internally or were fictitious, but were recorded as legitimate 

business expenses in the books and records of the RDS 2 Joint Venture. Grupo Aval reported

these expenses on financial statements it filed with the Commission. As a result, 

Corficolombiana, through the Corficolombiana Executive, its subsidiary, and RDS 2 Joint 

Venture, caused Grupo Aval to inaccurately record the payments in its books and records. 

17. Corficolombiana, through the Corficolombiana Executive and its subsidiary, 

exercised influence over the financial and accounting operations of the RDS 2 Joint Venture. 

For example, the Corficolombiana Executive caused the RDS 2 construction company to 

approve payments to vendors for work that was already performed or lacked supporting 

documentation. These payments resulted in the disposition of assets to pay for bribes. 

18. The bribery scheme provided Corficolombiana and other Grupo Aval subsidiaries 

with an improper financial benefit in the form of fees, interest income, and investment 
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distributions totaling approximately $32 million. These illicit profits were consolidated to 

Grupo Aval’s financial statements and accrued to Grupo Aval through 2020.

LEGAL STANDARDS AND VIOLATIONS

19. Under Section 21C(a) of the Exchange Act, the Commission may impose a ceaseand-desist order upon any person who is violating, has violated, or is about to violate any 

provision of the Exchange Act or any rule or regulation thereunder, and upon any other person 

that is, was, or would be the cause of the violation, due to an act or omission the person knew or 

should have known would contribute to such violation.

Corficolombiana Violated Exchange Act Section 30A

20. As a result of the conduct described above, the Corficolombiana Executive caused 

Corficolombiana to violate Section 30A of the Exchange Act, which prohibits any issuer with 

securities registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act or which is required to file 

reports under Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act, or any officer, director, employee, or agent 

acting on its behalf, to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate 

commerce corruptly in furtherance of an effort to pay or offer to pay anything of value to 

foreign officials for the purpose of influencing their official decision-making, in order to assist 

in obtaining or retaining business.

Grupo Aval Violated Exchange Act Section 13(b)(2)(A) and Corficolombiana Caused 

Grupo Aval’s Violations

21. As described above, the RDS 2 Joint Venture used no-work contracts and sham 

invoices to pay bribes to Colombian government officials. These payments were recorded as 

legitimate business expenses in the books and records of the RDS 2 Joint Venture and of 

Corficolombiana, and were reported in Grupo Aval’s financial statements. In addition, the 

Corficolombiana Executive signed various sub-certifications in connection with Grupo Aval’s 

financial reporting that falsely stated he was unaware of illegal acts. As a result,

Corficolombiana caused violations of, and Grupo Aval violated, Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the 

Exchange Act, which requires reporting companies to make and keep books, records, and 

accounts which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect their transactions and 

dispositions of their assets.

Grupo Aval Violated Exchange Act Section 13(b)(2)(B) and Corficolombiana Caused 

Grupo Aval’s Violations

22. As described above, bribe payments to intermediaries were approved by 

Corficolombiana, through the Corficolombiana Executive and its subsidiary, relying on invoices 

lacking supporting documentation or using contracts for vaguely described services typically 

handled internally rather than by third parties. As a result, Corficolombiana caused violations 

of, and Grupo Aval violated, Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act by failing to devise and 

maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances 
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that transactions are executed and access to assets is permitted only in accordance with 

management’s general or specific authorization. 

Disgorgement and Non-Imposition of a Civil Penalty

23. Respondents acknowledge that the Commission is not imposing a civil penalty 

based upon the imposition of a $20,300,000 criminal fine as part of Corficolombiana’s 

resolution with the U.S. Department of Justice. 

24. The disgorgement and prejudgment interest referenced in paragraph IV.C., below, 

is consistent with equitable principles, does not exceed Grupo Aval’s net profits from its 

violations, and returning the money to Grupo Aval would be inconsistent with equitable 

principles. Therefore, in these circumstances, distributing disgorged funds to the U.S. Treasury 

is the most equitable alternative. The disgorgement and prejudgment interest referenced in 

paragraph IV.C. shall be transferred to the general fund of the U.S. Treasury, subject to Section 

21F(g)(3) of the Exchange Act.

Grupo Aval’s Remedial Efforts

25. In determining to accept the Offer, the Commission considered remedial acts 

promptly undertaken by Respondents and cooperation afforded the Commission staff. 

Respondents’ cooperation included voluntarily summarizing and providing facts developed 

during their own internal investigation and producing and translating certain documents. 

Respondents’ remediation included conducting a comprehensive risk assessment; re-evaluating 

and re-designing their anti-corruption compliance program; improving policies and procedures; 

and enhancing internal controls, including those related to joint venture entities and investments. 

Deferred-Prosecution Agreement

26. Corficolombiana has entered into a deferred-prosecution agreement with the U.S. 

Department of Justice that acknowledges responsibility for criminal conduct relating to the 

findings in the Order. United States v. Corporación Financiera Colombiana S.A. (to be filed in 

D. Md.) 
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IV.

In view of the foregoing, the Commission deems it appropriate to impose the sanctions 

agreed to in Respondents’ Offer.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:

A. Pursuant to Section 21C of the Exchange Act, Respondent Grupo Aval cease and 

desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Sections 13(b)(2)(A) 

and 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act. 

B. Pursuant to Section 21C of the Exchange Act, Respondent Corficolombiana cease 

and desist from committing or causing any violations and any future violations of Sections

13(b)(2)(A), 13(b)(2)(B), and 30A of the Exchange Act. 

 C. Grupo Aval shall, within 10 days of the entry of this Order, pay disgorgement of 

$32,139,731 and prejudgment interest of $8,129,558 to the Securities and Exchange Commission 

for transfer to the general fund of the United States Treasury, subject to Exchange Act Section 

21F(g)(3). If timely payment is not made, additional interest shall accrue pursuant to SEC Rule of 

Practice 600. 

Payment must be made in one of the following ways: 

(1) Grupo Aval may transmit payment electronically to the Commission, which 

will provide detailed ACH transfer/Fedwire instructions upon request; 

(2) Grupo Aval may make direct payment from a bank account via Pay.gov 

through the SEC website at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/ofm.htm; or 

(3) Grupo Aval may pay by certified check, bank cashier’s check, or United 

States postal money order, made payable to the Securities and Exchange 

Commission and hand-delivered or mailed to: 

Enterprise Services Center

Accounts Receivable Branch

HQ Bldg., Room 181, AMZ-341

6500 South MacArthur Boulevard

Oklahoma City, OK 73169
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Payments by check or money order must be accompanied by a cover letter identifying 

Grupo Aval and Corficolombiana as Respondents in these proceedings, and the file number of 

these proceedings; a copy of the cover letter and check or money order must be sent to Charles E. 

Cain, Chief of the FCPA Unit, Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission, 

100 F St., NE, Washington, DC 20549-5631B.

By the Commission.

Vanessa A. Countryman

Secretary