J-S19008-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ROBERT LEONARD TAYLOR 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1654 MDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 24, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-06-CR-0001134-2020

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: AUGUST 14, 2023

Appellant, Robert Leonard Taylor, appeals pro se from the postconviction court’s October 24, 2022 order denying his timely-filed petition 

under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After 

careful review, we vacate the court’s order and remand for further 

proceedings.

The facts of Appellant’s underlying convictions are not pertinent to our 

disposition of his present appeal. We need only note that on March 2, 2021, 

a jury convicted Appellant of various offenses, including aggravated assault 

and carrying a firearm without a license. He was sentenced on March 10, 

2021, to an aggregate term of 5 to 17 years’ incarceration. Appellant did not 

file any post-sentence motions or a direct appeal.

On November 24, 2021, Appellant filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition, 

raising various claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness. David Long, Esq., was 
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appointed as Appellant’s counsel. Rather than filing an amended petition on 

Appellant’s behalf, Attorney Long filed a petition to withdraw and “no-merit” 

letter in accordance with Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 

1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en 

banc). 

On September 22, 2022, the PCRA court filed an order granting Attorney 

Long’s petition to withdraw. That same day, the court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 

907 notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing. On 

October 11, 2022, Appellant filed a pro se response, raising for the first time 

a claim that his trial counsel had been ineffective for not filing a direct appeal 

on his behalf. On October 24, 2022, the PCRA court issued an order denying

Appellant’s petition.

Appellant filed a timely, pro se notice of appeal. He also timely complied 

with the PCRA court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal.1 The PCRA court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion 

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1 The court filed its Rule 1925(b) order on December 16, 2022, and directed 

Appellant to file his concise statement within 21 days, or by Friday, January 

6, 2023. While Appellant’s statement was not filed until January 9, 2023, the 

proof of service attached to it indicates that he delivered that document to 

prison authorities for mailing on December 30, 2022. Thus, we deem it timely. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 121(f) (“A pro se filing submitted by a person incarcerated at a 

correctional facility is deemed filed as of the date of the prison postmark or 

the date the filing was delivered to the prison authorities for purposes of 

mailing as documented by a properly executed prisoner cash slip or other 

reasonably verifiable evidence.”).
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on January 17, 2023. Herein, Appellant raises six claims for our review, which 

we reproduce verbatim:

Claim 1.

Trial counsel was ineffective when she failed to ask Officer 

Contreras how was he shooting at petitioner while simultaneously 

making a radio call about shots being fired.

Claim 2.

Trial counsel was ineffective when she failed to contact a witness,

Willamarie Morales-Oliveras, who allegedly posted something on 

facebook saying “someone is going to die tonight”.

Claim 3.

Trial counsel was ineffective due to her failure to object to the 

playing a 911 call made by Bradley Duane as this was a violation 

of the Confrontation Clause.

Claim 4.

Trial counsel was ineffective when she failed to object to the 

absence of two witnesses, Michael Joseph Alberta and Bradley 

Duane. She was ineffective for failure to ask questions regarding 

the whereabouts of these witnesses and her failure to locate and 

interview them.

Claim 5.

Trial counsel was ineffective for not establishing who the victim 

was or who was he alleged to have been pointing the gun at during 

his crime. And that police never ascertained the name of the 

individual.

Claim 6.

Petitioner asked his PCRA attorney to challenge the fact that his 

Trial attorney did not file his Direct appeal and attorney said no 

merit.
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Appellant’s Brief at 2-4 (unnumbered).2

We begin with Appellant’s last issue, as it is dispositive of our decision 

to vacate the court’s order and remand for further proceedings. Appellant 

argues that his PCRA counsel, Attorney Long, acted ineffectively by 

disregarding Appellant’s request that counsel file an amended petition 

asserting that Appellant’s trial counsel ineffectively failed to file a direct appeal

on Appellant’s behalf. According to Appellant, his “[t]rial attorney didn’t ... 

consult [with him] about filing a direct appeal.” Appellant’s Brief at 4 

(unnumbered). When he asked his trial counsel to file a direct appeal on his 

behalf, she “disregarded his request.” Id. Appellant contends that he asked 

his PCRA counsel, Attorney Long, to file an amended petition raising this trialcounsel-ineffectiveness claim, but Attorney Long refused to do so. Id. 

Instead, Attorney Long petitioned to withdraw, leaving Appellant with no other 

option than to raise this claim pro se, which he did in response to the court’s 

Rule 907 notice. Id. The PCRA court deemed Appellant’s trial-counselineffectiveness claim waived, reasoning that Appellant improperly presented 

it for the first time in his Rule 907 response, rather than seeking leave to file 

an amended petition. PCO at 5 (citing Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 

1080, 1084-85 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating that “a petitioner must request 

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2 We note that Appellant’s brief does not comply with the Rules of Appellate 

Procedure, in that he does not include, inter alia, a Statement of the Questions 

Involved (Pa.R.A.P. 2116) or a Summary of Argument (Pa.R.A.P. 2118). 

Nevertheless, we can discern the issues Appellant is raising and the arguments 

he makes in support thereof. Accordingly, we will overlook his briefing errors.
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leave to amend his petition in his Rule 907 response to raise new trial counsel 

ineffectiveness claims”)). In response, Appellant explains that he “was not 

aware that he himself could amend” his PCRA petition, which is why he asked 

Attorney Long to do so. Appellant’s Brief at 4 (unnumbered). He insists that 

Attorney Long acted ineffectively by refusing that request and seeking to 

withdraw. 

Appellant argues that he may raise Attorney Long’s ineffectiveness for 

the first time on appeal under our Supreme Court’s decision in 

Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 (Pa. 2021), discussed infra. See 

id. at 8 (unnumbered). We agree. At the time of the Bradley decision, a 

PCRA petitioner could raise a claim of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness only in a 

response to a Rule 907 notice of intent to dismiss a petition without a hearing. 

See Bradley, 261 A.3d at 397-98 (citing Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 

875 (Pa. 2009)). The Bradley Court expanded the manner in which a claim 

of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness may be raised, holding “that a PCRA 

petitioner may, after a PCRA court denies relief, and after obtaining new 

counsel or acting pro se, raise claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness at the 

first opportunity to do so, even if on appeal.” Id. at 400. Here, the PCRA 

court denied Appellant relief and Appellant, acting pro se, has raised Attorney 

Long’s ineffectiveness for the first time on appeal. We conclude that Bradley 

permits us to review Appellant’s allegation of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness.

However, in attempting to conduct this review, it quickly became 

apparent that we must remand “for further development of the record and for 
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the PCRA court to consider [this] claim[] as an initial matter.” Id. at 402. 

Namely, Appellant provides “more than mere boilerplate assertions of PCRA 

counsel’s ineffectiveness....” Id. (cleaned up). Attorney Long must be given 

an opportunity to respond to the allegation that he refused Appellant’s request 

to file an amended petition raising the trial counsel ineffectiveness issue, and 

the PCRA court must make credibility determinations regarding this issue. 

Clearly, Appellant’s claim raises “material facts” concerning counsel’s 

representation, and “relief is not plainly unavailable as a matter of law” if 

Appellant’s allegation is true. Id. (cleaned up). 

Thus, we vacate the order denying Appellant’s petition and remand for 

the PCRA court to conduct a hearing regarding Appellant’s PCRA-counselineffectiveness claim. Prior to that proceeding, the court shall appoint 

Appellant new counsel, as this is his first PCRA petition. See Bradley, 261 

A.3d at 391 (stating that a first-time PCRA petitioner has a rule-based right 

to effective assistance of counsel) (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 904; Commonwealth 

v. Albrecht, 720 A.2d 693, 699-700 (Pa. 1998) (holding that the appointment 

of counsel pursuant to Rule 904 carries with it an “enforceable right to 

effective post-conviction counsel”)). If the PCRA court finds that Attorney 

Long acted ineffectively by failing to raise trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for 

not filing a direct appeal, the court must also then permit Appellant to present 

evidence that his trial counsel acted ineffectively in this regard. Upon the 

PCRA court’s grant or denial of relief, if either Appellant or the Commonwealth 

appeal that determination, the PCRA court should file a supplemental Rule 
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1925(a) opinion to address its decision. Given that the PCRA court could 

potentially reinstate Appellant’s direct appeal rights, we will not now address

his challenges to the PCRA court’s denial of his remaining trial-counselineffectiveness claims, which Appellant can reassert in a future proceeding. 

See Commonwealth v. Miller, 868 A.2d 578, 580 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“When 

a PCRA court grants a request for reinstatement of direct appeal rights nunc

pro tunc, it may address, but not ‘reach’ the merits of any remaining claims.”).

Order vacated. Case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/14/2023