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U.S. POLICY TOWARD PUTIN’S RUSSIA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 14, 2016

Serial No. 114–191

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Michael McFaul, senior fellow and director at the Freeman 

Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University (former 

American Ambassador to Russia) ....................................................................... 5

The Honorable Jack Matlock, fellow, Rubenstein Fellows Academy, Duke 

University (former American Ambassador to the U.S.S.R) .............................. 16

Leon Aron, Ph.D., resident scholar and director of Russian Studies, The 

American Enterprise Institute ............................................................................ 23

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Michael McFaul: Prepared statement .......................................... 8

The Honorable Jack Matlock: Prepared statement ............................................... 20

Leon Aron, Ph.D.: Prepared statement .................................................................. 25

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 56

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 57

The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California: Extraneous material submitted for the record ................. 59

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey: Prepared statement ................................................... 67

(1)

U.S. POLICY TOWARD PUTIN’S RUSSIA 

TUESDAY, JUNE 14, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:11 a.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROYCE. The committee will come to order. I will ask 

all our members to take their seats. 

Winston Churchill famously described Russia as ‘‘a riddle 

wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma,’’ but I think for many of 

us, less well-known is what he said next, because he commented 

about unlocking that riddle. He said, ‘‘But perhaps there is a key. 

And that key is Russian national interest.’’

The problem is that we are not dealing with the interests of the 

Russian people. We could be if we were broadcasting into Russia 

the way we did during the Reagan administration when we had 

that message about political pluralism and tolerance and that message of educating people effectively on what was going on inside 

Russia and around the world. But we don’t. 

Instead, we are dealing with the interests of Vladimir Putin, because he is in a position there where he is calling the shots. And 

he has not demonstrated much interest in cooperating with the 

United States. In fact, many of his policies are directly undermining America—from selling advanced weapons to Iran to destabilizing our allies by sending waves of Syrian refugees, over several 

million now, across their borders. And for the first time since the 

end of the Cold War, we have seen a situation where we have been 

forced to increase our military presence in Europe to make clear 

our readiness to defend NATO. 

Yet, in this environment, Putin continues to escalate. That is 

why we have this hearing today on our U.S. policy toward Putin’s 

Russia. Over the past year, he has repeatedly sent Russian warplanes to buzz U.S. ships and planes in international waters. These 

are reckless acts, these are provocative acts, and a miscalculation 

could easily result in direct confrontation. 

As this committee has examined, Russia’s propaganda machine—

and for any of you who have watched RT television, you can see 

how it has a constant stream of disinformation that it puts out 

about the United States, about the U.K., about what actually happens in the world. But that machinery, under Putin, is in overdrive. It is undermining governments, including NATO allies. And, 

2

meanwhile, back in Russia, independent media and dissidents are 

forcefully sidelined. And for the media, when I say ‘‘forcibly,’’ I 

mean imprisoned or sometimes shot. 

A big part of the problem is that the administration has repeatedly rushed to try to cooperate with Russia, beginning with a 

string of one-sided concessions in the New START arms-control 

agreement. I would just point out, when we pulled out the interceptor system in Poland and in the Czech Republic, I think that 

was a blunder. We were quick to join diplomatic efforts in Syria, 

even as the opposition forces we support have come under repeated 

Russian aerial attack. And this has convinced the Russians that, 

once again, the administration will concede a great deal for very 

little in return for the concession. 

That does not mean that we should rule out cooperation with 

Russia. We should cooperate with Russia. But cooperation means 

benefits for both sides. A tougher and more consistent approach on 

our part might convince Putin that cooperation is more advantageous than the reflexive confrontation that he often resorts to. 

We have clearly demonstrated that we are open to cooperation. 

It is Putin who is not. And if he continues playing a zero-sum game 

and regards the U.S. as an enemy to achieving his ends, then the 

possibility of compromise is zero under that circumstance. Much of 

his behavior to date fits that description, most glaringly seen by his 

invasion of Ukraine and what happened in Georgia. 

Unfortunately, Putin has repeatedly calculated—rightfully so—

that the administration’s response to his aggression will be lackluster. The U.S., in cooperation with the EU and others, has imposed sanctions, which have resulted in significant pressure on the 

Russian economy, but the administration has refused to provide 

Ukraine, for example, with the anti-tank weaponry needed to stop 

Russian tanks, which can only be interpreted in Moscow as weakness. 

The tragedy is that there are many problems where both countries could benefit from cooperation. One of the most obvious is 

combating Islamist terrorism. One witness today has intensely 

studied its rapid spread in Russia and in Central Asia, which, together, provide the largest number of recruits for ISIS outside of 

the Arab countries. 

Putin says he is genuinely concerned about the rising threat. In 

fact, that was his stated goal in intervening in Syria. But, as we 

know, his real agenda was to save the Assad regime, which has 

meant targeting the opposition forces that are supported by the 

U.S. far more than any targeting of ISIS forces. 

It is clear that U.S. strategies to deal with Russia have failed. 

If we want to accomplish a different result, we must negotiate from 

a position of strength. Only then will cooperation be possible with 

a man who has demonstrated that the hope of cooperation cannot 

survive the cold calculation of his narrow interests. 

And one way to address this, to get back to a theme that I have 

pushed for a number of years here with my colleague Eliot Engel, 

is the legislation that Eliot and I have advanced to try to get back 

to a program, as we once had with Radio Free Europe, which we 

should be doing with social media, with television. We should be 

broadcasting into Russia, telling Russians what is actually going on 

3

in their society, explaining to Russians what is happening around 

the world, explaining the issue of tolerance, of political pluralism, 

of these perceptions that the rest of the world have, and the truth. 

If Putin is going to continue to put out disinformation and misinformation and lie about the West, at the very least we could be telling the truth about what is happening inside Russia to Russians 

so that the people have a better understanding of this situation. 

I now turn to Ranking Member Eliot Engel of New York for any 

comments he may have. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And let me 

say I agree with the statement you just made. Thank you for calling this hearing. You and I have long shared deep concerns about 

Russia’s aggression under Vladimir Putin, and I am grateful that 

you have focused the committee’s attention on this challenge. 

To all of our witnesses, welcome to the Foreign Affairs Committee. We are grateful for your expertise and insight. 

Ambassador McFaul, let me say how particularly impressed I 

was with your service as our top diplomat in Moscow. I know you 

were the target of all sorts of absurd accusations and harassment 

by Putin’s allies, and I know that you were never afraid to push 

back against misinformation and stand your ground. And you are 

exactly the kind of diplomat we need to meet 21st-century challenges, so thank you for your service. 

And the other witnesses, thank you, as well, for your service. 

I have come to view Putin’s Russia as a unique challenge on the 

global stage. When we face crises around the world, we often ask 

ourselves, ‘‘What could we have done differently?’’ or, ‘‘What are 

the opportunities to defuse the situation?’’ But, with Putin, there 

may not be answers to those questions because he is playing by his 

own set of rules. 

Putin has ignored Russian law, cracking down on the human 

rights of Russia’s people and literally robbing future generations of 

their prosperity. He has destroyed Russia’s standing in the world, 

walking away from the country’s international obligations and 

shoring up the brutal Assad regime in Syria. And he has threatened the norms that have largely kept the peace in Europe since 

World War II, trampling on the sovereignty of Russia’s neighbors, 

testing the resolve of NATO, and working to undermine Western 

unity. 

I want to be careful not to conflate Putin and his corrupt leadership with the Russian people. Russia is a great nation, but Putin 

is not Russia. He is an unapologetic, authoritarian kleptocrat, a 

grave threat to his own people and to stability and security across 

Europe and beyond. 

So how do we craft a policy to deal with such an unpredictable 

and irresponsible leader? For now, the best approach seems to be 

one of geographical containment. We cannot fix what is ailing Russian society, but we can try to keep it within Russia’s recognized 

borders. 

This may be a great test for NATO’s role in the 21st century. 

NATO, of course, has no ambition to chip away at Russia’s territory, but I am confident that the alliance will keep its Article 5 

promise. Putin uses lies and confusion to cast doubt on NATO’s 

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ern Europe, sending a clear signal that the alliance will not back 

down in the face of Putin’s aggression. 

I believe and I have said for a long time that I think NATO is 

being tested. And if we fail the test, I think it the end of the alliance. We cannot fail the test. 

Aside from that, sanctions have given us mixed results. As violence in eastern Ukraine escalates again, it is clear that sanctions 

haven’t done enough to thwart Putin’s ambitions. But sanctions are 

better than nothing, and, in the long term, I believe we have weakened Putin’s ability to project a destabilizing force beyond Russia’s 

borders. 

But we know Putin isn’t going anywhere, so we are left to ask, 

what else should we be doing? 

I recently introduced legislation that, in my view, would take us 

in the right direction. My bill, the STAND for Ukraine Act, would 

tighten sanctions on Russia and would reject any form of recognition of Russia’s rule over Crimea in the same way we didn’t recognize Soviet occupation of the Baltic states during the Cold War. It 

would also help to drive investment in Ukraine and push back 

against Russian propaganda and disinformation. 

There are other issues I hope we can touch on today, as well: 

How do we help the Russian people hear a different point of view? 

And the chairman spoke about that in his opening statement. After 

all, Putin’s apparent approval ratings have a lot to do with the fact 

that there is simply no alternative. How do we seize on the common ground we share with the citizens of Russia? Even if the 

United States isn’t popular in Russia, we know that the country’s 

citizens are disgusted by corruption at every level of government. 

And let me close by saying we are not focusing on Russia today 

because we want to pick a fight, breathe new life into old animosities, or drag the country down. A failed Russia would spread damaging ripple effects around the world. Rather, we hold out hope for 

the people of Russia. We want to see them realize their democratic 

aspirations. We want to see their country become a stable and 

prosperous European power and partner on the world stage. Putin 

has strangled democracy in Russia. We had such high hopes. 

But I look forward to hearing our witnesses today and hearing 

what they have to say, and I thank them again for coming. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman ROYCE. All right. 

This morning, we are pleased to be joined by a distinguished 

panel. 

The Honorable Michael McFaul is a professor at Stanford University. Prior to his position, Ambassador McFaul served 5 years 

in the Obama administration, first as Special Assistant to the 

President and Senior Director for Russia and Eurasia at the National Security Council, and then as the U.S. Ambassador to Russia. 

Ambassador Jack Matlock is a fellow at Duke University, and, 

prior to this position, Ambassador Matlock served 35 years in the 

American Foreign Service. During that time, he has served as the 

Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Special Assistant to the President 

for National Security Affairs, and Ambassador to Czechoslovakia 

from 1981 to 1983. 

5

Dr. Leon Aron is a resident scholar and director of Russian studies at the American Enterprise Institute. He has served on the 

Broadcasting Board of Governors since 2015. Prior to these positions, he taught at Georgetown University. 

Without objection, the witnesses’ full prepared statements will be 

made part of the record, and our members will have 5 calendar 

days to submit statements and questions and extraneous material 

for the record. 

Ambassador McFaul, please summarize your remarks, if you 

could. Thank you, Ambassador. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL MCFAUL, SENIOR 

FELLOW AND DIRECTOR AT THE FREEMAN SPOGLI INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, STANFORD UNIVERSITY (FORMER AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO RUSSIA) 

Ambassador MCFAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you——

Chairman ROYCE. Ambassador, let me just interrupt you. If everyone would push that red button. 

Ambassador MCFAUL. Push the top button? 

Chairman ROYCE. There you go. 

Ambassador MCFAUL. All right? There you go. 

So I will thank you again, Chairman Royce and Ranking Member 

Engel and other members of the committee, including several of 

you that I had the pleasure of hosting in Moscow when I was Ambassador. 

It is great to be back with Ambassador Matlock and Leon Aron, 

people I know well. I guarantee you, if you listen, you are going 

to learn something from these two gentlemen today. 

I have a longer report that I want to put in the record, but I just 

want to answer two questions today in the limited time I have: 

Why did we get here, how did we get here, in terms of this confrontation, which I believe is worse than at any time since the Cold 

War? In fact, I think you have to go deep into the Cold War to see 

a time that has been so confrontational. And, as the Russians like 

to say, ‘‘Chto delat,’’ what is to be done. 

And I want to focus on the diagnostics first, in part because I am 

an aspiring professor, recovering bureaucrat, and I think it is important to know the ‘‘why’’ question before you do the prescription. 

So I am going to first focus on that and, in my limited time, then 

get to prescriptions. 

One argument why we are in this mess that we are in today is 

that Russia, and Putin in particular, is pushing back after decades 

of American aggression against him. The United States lectured 

Russia about markets and democracy, we expanded NATO, we 

bombed Serbia, we invaded Iraq, we supported color revolutions, so 

the argument goes, and so Putin just had to push back; he was 

compelled to annex Crimea and intervene in eastern Ukraine. And 

most certainly that is the main conflict that has sparked the confrontation. 

Now, I want to be clear. None of those policies were popular in 

Moscow during the last three decades, although it should be noted 

that both President Yeltsin and Putin at one point flirted with the 

idea of actually joining NATO. 

6

But in between that negative record that I just described and our 

moment today, there was a period of cooperation. We in the Obama 

administration called it the ‘‘reset.’’ And, during that period, we got 

a lot of things done that, Mr. Chairman, in my opinion, were in the 

American national interests. We got the START Treaty done. We 

got sanctions on Iran. We expanded the northern distribution network to supply our troops in Afghanistan so we had an alternative 

route instead of Pakistan, which was vital to a military mission we 

had in 2011 when we killed Osama bin Laden. We got them into 

the World Trade Organization. We got them to support U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 on Libya. And we increased 

trade and investment during that period. By the way, during this 

period, 60 percent of Americans thought Russia was a friendly or 

allied country, and vice versa inside Russia. 

That was just 4 years ago. That wasn’t 40 years ago or before 

the Bolshevik revolution. So you can’t explain the period of cooperation that I just described looking at these previous variables. 

Something else has to be here. 

A second explanation is that Obama was weak and created the 

permissive conditions for Putin’s aggression. Maybe we will have 

time to talk about that in questions and answers in more detail. 

I would just remind you that every time a Russian leader has decided to use force or to suppress democratic movements in Eastern 

Europe, the United States has not had good options for deterring 

it. Whether it is in Georgia in 2008 under George W. Bush, the 

crackdown on Solidarity in 1981 under Ronald Reagan, 1968 in 

Czechoslovakia, or 1966 in Hungary, we did not have military 

means for stopping them. 

Let me say something really provocative. I believe the Obama administration’s response looks more like Ronald Reagan’s response 

to what happened in Poland in 1981 than George Bush’s response 

to what happened in Georgia in 2008. That did get your attention, 

didn’t it? I will bet you we are going to come back with that. 

The third explanation, and what I think is the real driving explanation for what is going on, is this is all about domestic politics in 

Russia and in Ukraine and very little to do with American foreign 

policy, either strong or weak. Two things are important to this explanation. One, Putin returned. And Putin is not Medvedev. He 

sees the world in zero-sum terms. He sees the hand of the CIA in 

fomenting revolutions in the Arab world, in Ukraine, and in Russia. And he sees us fundamentally as an enemy. And, second, there 

were giant demonstrations against his regime in December 2011 

and in the spring of 2012 when I was Ambassador, and he needed 

a new argument to suppress those people, to say that they were the 

enemies of the regime. And that is when he rolled out this old playbook from the Soviet era and described us—the United States, the 

Obama administration, and me personally—as the enemy, those 

that are fomenting revolution against him. 

And, in that context, there is not an easy way to cooperate with 

him if he sees the world in these zero-sum terms and if he sees an 

American hand behind these uprisings, be they in Moscow or Kiev. 

So, to me, I actually agree with both the previous statements. It 

is a tragic moment in U.S.-Russian relations; I don’t celebrate this 

at all. But we have to have a patient, comprehensive policy for deVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:21 Aug 30, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_FULL\061416\20454 SHIRL
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terring Russian aggression, working with the government when it 

is in our national interest, and supporting Russian society. 

In my written remarks, I go into detail about a six-point plan. 

Let me just mention the headlines and then stop. One, most important of all, in my opinion, to deter Putin’s aggression, is to help 

Ukrainian democracy and markets succeed. Nothing else is more 

important than that objective, and so I look forward to seeing your 

legislation. I think that is orders of magnitude more important 

than anything else. Second, strengthening NATO, as has already 

been noted. I fully concur with that. Third, pushing back on Russian propaganda, not through American propaganda but through 

facts. I agree with that. Fourth, working with the government in 

limited ways when we can, when it serves our national interest. 

And, finally, engaging in supporting the Russian people, because 

there is no reason to contain both the state and the people. We 

should continue to engage when the circumstances allow. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador McFaul follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador McFaul. 

Now we will go to Ambassador Jack Matlock. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JACK MATLOCK, FELLOW, 

RUBENSTEIN FELLOWS ACADEMY, DUKE UNIVERSITY 

(FORMER AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S.S.R) 

Ambassador MATLOCK. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for your invitation to join these distinguished 

scholars. 

Chairman ROYCE. Ambassador, I am going to suggest you pull 

that microphone closer. There you go. Thank you, sir. 

Ambassador MATLOCK. All right. 

Thank you for your invitation. And I am very pleased to join 

these distinguished scholars in discussing our relations with Russia. Ambassador McFaul coauthored, among his other works, a fine 

book which I make a required reading for my students of U.S.-Russian relations. And he, of course, was Ambassador to Russia. And 

I would have to say that I don’t know whether it was an advantage 

or disadvantage, but he had a larger staff to deal with Russia than 

I had to deal with the entire Soviet Union. So I don’t know whether 

that was a blessing or a curse, except that I had, I think, the best 

staff anyone could wish at the time that we were dealing with the 

Soviet Union. And, of course, Dr. Aron and I go back a long way 

in many different meetings and so on. So I am very happy to be 

here along with them. 

Some of my perceptions are going to be probably different, because I am deeply concerned with the direction U.S.-Russian relations have taken of late. We can debate—and I will participate in 

it if we wish—what caused this. I have written extensively on it. 

And I would simply say that the perception on both sides, in both 

cases, I think, has distortions. Theirs may be greater or lesser than 

ours, but there is cause and effect in the interaction that went both 

ways. 

The mutual accusations and public acrimony has at times been 

reminiscent of that at the height or the depth of the Cold War, but 

the issues are quite different. 

The Cold War was fundamentally about ideology, the attempt of 

the Communist-ruled Soviet Union to spread its control of other 

countries by encouraging what Karl Marx had called proletarian 

revolutions against existing governments. The Soviet leaders called 

their system socialist, but it actually was state monopoly capitalism that tried to replace market forces with government fiat. It 

was a catastrophic failure in meeting people’s needs, but it managed to build a formidable and, in some respect, unmatched military power. 

Today’s tensions are not about ideology. Russia is now a capitalist country. Okay, one that has more state control than many 

others, but basically capitalist. It is not trying to spread communism in the world. Today’s tensions, if we really look at them 

objectively, are more like those that, through incredible misjudgment, brought on World War I—that is, competition for control of 

territory in and outside Europe. 

We know how that ended. Every European country involved suffered more than they could possibly have gained. Competition over 

17

territory was bad enough a century ago. Since World War II, however, the danger has risen exponentially if countries with nuclear 

weapons stumble into military conflict. The number of nuclear 

weapons that remain in U.S. and Russian arsenals represent a potential existential threat to every nation on Earth, including specifically both Russia and the United States. 

So how did we end the Cold War and reduce this threat? One key 

element was an agreement that President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev made in their very first meeting. 

They agreed on a statement that Reagan had made in two previous 

speeches: A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. 

And then they added, since both countries are nuclear powers: 

That means there can be no war between us. 

With that statement agreed, Secretary of State George Shultz 

was able to argue convincingly that an arms race between us was 

absurd. We could not fight each other without committing suicide, 

and what rational leader was going to do that? In just a couple of 

years, we had abolished a whole class of nuclear weapons and our 

arsenals and, shortly thereafter, cut strategic nuclear weapons in 

half. 

In concluding the New START agreement, which Ambassador 

McFaul has reminded us of, the Obama administration made an 

important contribution to our national security. But, since then, 

nuclear cooperation with Russia has deteriorated and seems practically nonexistent. It is urgent to restore that cooperation if we are 

to inhibit further proliferation. We are unlikely to do so if we proceed with plans to increase our military presence in Eastern Europe. 

I am aware that one of our presumptive candidates for President 

has indicated that he might find some form of nuclear proliferation 

desirable. I believe that is profoundly mistaken, as is the idea that 

allies should pay us for their protection. I do not believe we should 

use our fine military as hired gendarmes to police the world, even 

if those protected were willing to pay the cost. 

These comments, however, do reflect one important truth which 

we need to recognize, and that is that military alliances can create 

liabilities rather than augmenting power. When our interests are 

not closely aligned, an American security guarantee can create a 

moral hazard. What is to keep an ‘‘ally’’ from picking a fight unnecessarily and then expecting Uncle Sam to win it for him? Sounds 

like schoolyard bullying to me. 

I have trouble, to take just one example today, to find much concurrence between American security interests and Turkish behavior. Is Turkey really an ally, or is it a problem? I don’t want to single them out—I could use other examples. 

Yes, when we have made commitments, we must honor them. 

But we must be more careful and selective about taking on liabilities. And some of our alliances formed under the different conditions of the Cold War should be reviewed. And I think that, increasingly, I believe you will find, if you question them, your constituents, many of them are worried about our over-military-involvement in the world, about attempts to use our fine military, the 

best in the world, to solve problems that can’t be solved by military 

18

means and to carry out tasks that are more in the interests of 

other countries than they are in the United States. 

We must set our priorities, and the highest priority should be the 

protection and security of the United States of America. The only 

thing that threatens our existence would be another nuclear arms 

race that gets out of hand. 

Let’s bear that in mind, because that is something President 

Ronald Reagan understood. Yes, he was a heavy critic of communism, but his idea was, yes, we have to stop the Soviet Union 

from expanding its influence; they have a crazy system. If that is 

what they want, that is their business. And, as a matter of fact, 

we didn’t bring down communism; Gorbachev brought down communism. It was brought down by internal pressures, and it was 

brought down by internal pressures when we ended the Cold War 

and ended the external pressures on the Soviet Union. I think 

there are lessons here that we have sometimes forgotten. 

Now, I have views on how we might deal with Russia on current 

issues such as Ukraine and Syria, democratization, and human 

rights and will share them if you wish. I believe there are dignified 

ways we can reduce tensions with Russia on those issues and others. 

However, the main thing we should bear in mind, that is, in confronting the greatest dangers to civilized life in this country, such 

as terrorism—didn’t we have a reminder just 2 days ago in this 

horrible massacre? Now, if there is any issue that the U.S. and 

Russia have common interest, it is in fighting terrorism. They are 

more vulnerable than we are. Sometimes we tend to forget that. 

And I still don’t understand why we have not been able to have 

more effective cooperation. 

So I think the main thing we need to bear in mind is that, in 

confronting these things, whether it be terrorism, failed states, organized crime, environmental degradation, U.S. and Russian basic 

interests are not in conflict. As we deal with them, as we must, 

Russia will either be part of the problem or part of the solution. 

It is obviously in our interest to do what we can to encourage Russia to join us in confronting them. They are unlikely to do so if they 

regard us as an enemy or a competitor for influence in their neighborhood. 

As I said, we can argue about who is more responsible for the 

situation, but the fact is that, as you well know, politics is driven 

by perceptions. And their perceptions are that we have been consistently moving against their interests and trying to encircle them 

and even trying to interfere in their internal politics. 

Yes, President Putin has made many mistakes, many that are 

not in Russia’s interests. But Russia’s President, Russia’s Government is a matter for Russians to decide. Their scandals are a matter for them to deal with. And I think when we presume——

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Professor Matlock. 

Ambassador MATLOCK [continuing]. To do this ourselves, that 

is——

Chairman ROYCE. Thanks for——

Ambassador MATLOCK. Above all, I think we need to return to 

the position Reagan and Gorbachev set out: A nuclear war cannot 

be won, must never be fought, and that means there can be no war 

19

between us. To act on any other principle can create a risk to our 

Nation and the world of unimaginable gravity. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Matlock follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Thank you for those points. 

We now go to Dr. Aron. 

STATEMENT OF LEON ARON, PH.D., RESIDENT SCHOLAR AND 

DIRECTOR OF RUSSIAN STUDIES, THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 

Mr. ARON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the committee, I 

don’t have to remind anyone in this room that this is a tough, even 

rough, patch in the relations between the United States and Russia. There are many reasons for this troubling state of affairs, for 

which both sides bear responsibility. 

But I would like to explore today one of the key elements of the 

present situation, and that is Vladimir Putin’s system of beliefs, his 

vision of Russia in the world, and his understanding of his role as 

Russia’s leader. 

I want to do it because, contrary to a fairly popular view, I don’t 

believe that his foreign policy, in particular his relationship with 

the United States, are made on an ad hoc basis. I think, instead, 

it is part of a long-term geopolitical project rooted deeply in his ideology, in his self-imposed personal historic mission, and domestic 

political imperatives of his regime’s survival. 

There are few tenets in Vladimir Putin’s credo that can be fairly 

ascertained now after his 16 years in power. Whether he was taking a break as the President or not, he was the effective leader. 

One, the end of the Cold War was Russia’s equivalent of the 1919 

Versailles Treaty for Germany, a source of endless humiliation and 

misery. 

Two, the demise of the Soviet Union, in Putin’s words, was ‘‘the 

greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century.’’

Three, the overarching strategic agenda of a truly patriotic Russian leader, not an idiot or a traitor or both, as Putin almost certainly views Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, is to recover and 

repossess for Russia political, economic, and geostrategic assets lost 

by the Soviet state at its fall. A few years back, I called this the 

Putin doctrine, and I think he has implemented it successfully and 

consistently virtually from day one of his Presidency. 

In addition to his KGB training, these views are also shaped by 

Putin’s favorite philosopher, Ivan Ilyin, whom the Russian President cites in speeches, assigns as reading to governors, and whose 

remains he had moved from Switzerland to re-inter on one of the 

most hollowed Russian grounds, the Donskoy Monastery in Moscow. 

Ivan Ilyin believed, in essence, that Russia is never wrong but 

perennially wronged, primarily by the West; the West’s hostility to 

Russia is eternal and prompted by the West’s jealousy of Russia’s 

size, natural riches, and, most of all, its incorruptible saintly soul 

and God-bestowed mission to be the third Rome, the light among 

nations; the plots against Russia are relentless, and, while truces 

are possible and often tactically advantageous to Russia, genuine 

peace with the West is very unlikely. 

In addition to ideology—and Mike McFaul referred to this—

Putin’s foreign policy is also shaped by a large, I would say, urgent 

and powerful domestic political imperative. By the time of Putin’s 

24

third Presidency, the toxic domestic economic climate had begun to 

reduce Russian economic growth to a crawl, even with the oil prices 

historically high. Most troubling for the regime, Putin’s popularity, 

which was and continues to be a key to the regime’s legitimacy, 

dropped by almost one-third between 2008 and 2011. 

In the words of Putin’s personal friend, trusted adviser, and 

former First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, 

Alexei Kudrin, Russia had hit an institutional wall and needed a 

different economic model. 

Putin chose to ignore this advice and reject it. And, instead of 

liberalizing institutional reforms, he made likely the most fateful 

decision of his political career: He began to shift the foundation of 

his regime’s legitimacy from economic progress and steady growth 

of incomes to what might be called patriotic mobilization. There followed the annexation of Crimea, the hybrid war in Ukraine, and 

then Russia’s involvement in Syria. 

Putin appears to have stepped on an authoritarian escalator from 

which there is no exit except by physical demise or revolution. And 

the regime he is heading is presenting the West with an unprecedented challenge: A highly personalistic authoritarianism, which is 

resurgent, activist, inspired by a mission, prone to risky behavior 

both for ideological reasons and for those of domestic political legitimacy, and armed, by the latest count, with 1,735 strategic nuclear 

warheads on 521 delivery platforms. 

Does that mean that the United States cannot cooperate with 

Putin’s Russia? Of course not, so long as we do not waste time and 

effort in areas where the gap in ultimate goals between Washington and Moscow is too wide to bridge, such as it is, I think, in 

Syria. 

Yet there is one area where the coincidence of goals is not just 

possible but vital to the interests of the United States. Today, Russia does indeed find itself under siege—of course, not by the West, 

despite what the state propaganda machine asserts on national television daily. It is under the siege from what, in Mr. Rohrabacher’s 

subcommittee a few months ago, I described as the Russian jihad. 

Russia is indeed under pressure domestically and from the outside. And I will be happy to provide you with the results of my research, but let me just mention that we can and should cooperate 

with Moscow in Central Asia. Central Asia is more vulnerable to 

Taliban and ISIS than any other region in the world today. Yes, 

it is primarily Russia’s problem, yet it will be our problem, as well, 

when an area with a population of 68 million people becomes a terrorist haven and a magnet for would-be world jihadists. 

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, I would like to ask that a recent 

article of mine in Foreign Policy titled ‘‘Playing Tic-Tac-Toe with 

Putin’’ is entered into the record. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Aron follows:]

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Chairman ROYCE. Without objection. Very good. We will enter 

that into the record, Dr. Aron. 

I was going to ask you about your perceptions on Central Asia 

and where we could cooperate here. And I think your point about 

recruitment—there are literally thousands of recruits coming out of 

Russia into ISIS right now, but, on top of that, there is the wider 

problem of this radicalization and the pace of it. 

It seems to me that there is this room for cooperation, but, at the 

same time, there are questions about what Putin would seek from 

us, what could he offer. There is also the question in terms of associating ourselves with Putin’s counterterrorism efforts, because I 

am not sure what form they would take, given the way in which 

we try to conduct our counterterrorism operations with a great deal 

of, shall we say, care. 

And what is, obviously, most vexing to me is watching Syria. Instead of hitting ISIS, he hit the Free Syrian Army, and instead of 

hitting the army, he hit the markets. His bombers hit, you know, 

the hospitals, hit the schools. This aspect of this is what is so troublesome for us in the West because it seems counterproductive in 

terms of the effort of actually going after Islamist terrorism. 

So walk us through how, Dr. Aron, we could engage on that 

front. 

Mr. ARON. Well, on Syria, I mentioned, yes, all those things you 

mentioned could be summarized under the heading of ‘‘Different, 

Divergent Goals.’’ The goal of Putin in Syria is (A) to save the 

Assad regime, and we could discuss why he wants it; (B) to present 

the West with a total repugnant choice between Assad and ISIS; 

and (C) have Russia as the dominant outside player in the Middle 

East. Clearly, neither of those is our goal. 

In Central Asia, on the other hand, I think the goals do coincide. 

Let me remind you, Mr. Chairman, last week there was not just 

a terrorist act, there was street fighting in the city of Aktobe in 

Kazakhstan between government troops and terrorists. That is 400 

kilometers from Russia’s borders. You know, that is less than 250 

miles. 

Churchill was mentioned here, I think by Jack Matlock. Central 

Asia is the soft underbelly of Russia. This is an enormous area. 

You know that there are 6 million guest workers, many of them illegal, in Russia coming in and out from Central Asia. Russia is the 

major recruitment center for ISIS, an estimated 300 to 500 recruiters. Most of Central Asians have been recruited not in Kazakhstan 

or Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan, they were recruited on construction 

sites in Moscow to join ISIS. 

There are all kinds of statistics. For example, Russian speakers 

from Russia and the former Soviet Union, primarily Central Asia, 

are the second-largest language group in ISIS after Arabic speakers. 

We cannot help Putin inside the country, and we could discuss 

why he has this problem inside the country—radicalization of its 

own Muslims and the guest workers. But in Central Asia, I believe, 

Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and, to a certain extent, Uzbekistan and 

Kazakhstan are very troubled states. If they fall, as I said, the danger to us is that they will become havens for terrorists. 

32

Chairman ROYCE. But let me just add a point, because Mr. Engel 

and I have traveled in Central Asia, and we have had many meetings and many explanations from local government officials about 

how Gulf-state money floods into that region and acquires either 

radio stations, television stations, newspapers; increasingly, how 

also imams come from another part of the world——

Mr. ARON. Right. 

Chairman ROYCE [continuing]. And change the indigenous Muslim faith, or ideology, to a new ideology. As they would say to us, 

these are not our customs, these are customs that are being imported here, but they are changing our culture. 

And it looks like what we see happening across Central Asia is 

also happening across southern Russia. And that, then, leads to 

this problem. And I would argue this is going to be the next big 

problem because of the rate at which this is happening. 

The last point I wanted to ask you—I am almost out of time—

is just some of the stuff that we hear on RT television or in Russian propaganda—the Zika virus was created by the United States. 

You know, you have a $450 million budget spreading this kind of 

nonsense across Latin America, Central Asia, Europe, around the 

world, here, a lot of disinformation, 24 hours a day. 

There has to be a more effective way to move forward to counter 

this disinformation, get the facts out there, and, item by item, 

knock this stuff down, you know, knock this narrative down with 

the truth about what is going on, because, obviously, it is having 

an impact among the Russian-speaking population in Eastern Europe, certainly, but beyond that now. This is being translated in all 

these other languages. And it is just a constant, big lie, propaganda 

effort that has to be countered. 

Dr. Aron, any response on that? 

Mr. ARON. Well, Mr. Chairman, I have to put on my BBG Governor hat. We have a good relationship with your committee. We 

are working together to make U.S. international broadcasting more 

effective. 

Let me tell you, though, that my own experience is that, ultimately, the most effective countermeasure to the Russian propaganda is not just the U.S. airwaves but empowering the local Russian-speaking population in former Soviet Union. 

Chairman ROYCE. Reporters and stringers? 

Mr. ARON. Reporters, stringers——

Chairman ROYCE. Uh-huh. 

Mr. ARON [continuing]. Through nongovernment and government 

grants. 

One of the examples that I believe I gave, testifying on the issue 

of the Russian propaganda in the Senate, was StopFake, which is 

a very effective site in Kiev run by the students of the department 

of journalism of the Mohyla Academy. 

This is ultimately the only way to counter the Russian propaganda, because it gives the people of those countries—and, of 

course, this could be spread. Similar efforts are occurring in the 

Baltics and in Central Asia. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Dr. Aron. 

Mr. Eliot Engel of New York. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

33

Ambassador McFaul, I wanted to discuss with you a little bit 

about one of the things you mentioned when you said that Ukraine 

is central to blocking Putin. 

I have been really at odds with U.S. policy toward Ukraine. First 

of all, back in 2008, I think it was a strategic blunder that NATO 

did not admit Ukraine—and Georgia, by the way—in 2008. I know 

that the Bush administration said that they pushed to have it done 

but that the Germans and then, to a lesser degree, the French 

blocked it. I think that Putin’s aggression in both those countries 

would not have happened if they had been members of NATO. I 

think our lack of bringing them into NATO makes it virtually impossible for them to come into NATO in the future, and I think 

that was a time lost. 

I think that Ukraine is so important. It is really the center of 

where we have our disagreements with Russia. If we allow Crimea 

to just be annexed and do nothing about it, don’t even talk about 

it anymore, if we allow Putin to start this nonsense in—if we allow 

Putin to continue his nonsense, I should say—in eastern Ukraine—

you know, reports indicate that the fighting has stepped up again 

in Ukraine. And it seems that every time Putin feels pressure in 

one part of the world he will intensify the military campaign in the 

Ukrainian east as a valve to release that pressure. And, you know, 

at the same time, Ukraine is fighting serious corruption problems, 

and it limits its government’s ability to respond to the Russian aggression. 

I mean, I just think that we have the most pro-Western government in Ukraine that we could possibly have, and God forbid that 

government falls. It will be 100 years before we will have anything 

like that. 

And, to me, this really strikes at the core of NATO. If we want 

NATO to continue to be successful and not just worthless, it seems 

to me Ukraine is where we make our stand. 

I disagree with the administration’s lack of providing weapons to 

the people of Ukraine. I know they feel that Ukraine can never 

beat Russia, and so, if we provide Ukraine with more weapons, it 

will just escalate the situation. But I think Putin makes a different 

calculation. When Russian soldiers start coming home in body 

bags, I think that his calculation will be different, that he can just 

make trouble whenever he wants to and there will be no price to 

pay. 

So I want you to expand on Ukraine, because I think that is really where it is all about. And shame on us if we allow that regime 

in Ukraine to falter. 

Ambassador MCFAUL. Thank you for the question. 

I agree. I agree with everything you just said. I do believe that 

the best way to support reform and those that care about democracy and markets in Russia is to have Ukraine succeed. I believe 

that the best way to deter further aggression from Ukraine is to 

help Ukraine succeed. It is when the government is collapsing, 

when democracy is not working, when the economy is not producing that creates the permissive conditions for more mischief. 

So I really do think the key moment in all of European security 

right now is what this government will do over the next 2 to 10 

34

years. This is a long-haul issue. This is not something that is going 

to be solved in 6 months. 

Mr. ENGEL. ‘‘This government’’ meaning which government? 

Ambassador MCFAUL. The Ukrainian Government. 

Mr. ENGEL. The Ukrainian Government. 

Ambassador MCFAUL. Yes. 

Now, I would disagree slightly. I think there were people that 

used to be in the government that were better. You know, Minister 

Jaresko, for instance, was, I think, a great Finance Minister, the 

former Minister of the Economy. I hope to see them back again. 

But, generally, I think the glass is half-full, not half-empty. They 

are doing some extraordinary things, especially on the macroeconomic front, when facing some real big challenges. And, you 

know, talking to some very senior folks over at the IMF in the last 

few days, they are pleased with the progress they have made. 

The one issue that they agree, that the Ukrainians agree, and I 

agree that needs more focus is a fight against corruption and to get 

the oligarchs out of the political process. That is going to be a long 

process, and we should be engaged in that process. I think what 

happens in Ukraine really determines the fate of what Russia will 

do with respect to that part of the world. 

With respect to Europe, with NATO, I would just say two things. 

One, I disagree—I want to make sure everybody understands I do 

disagree with Ambassador Matlock right now. Whether it was right 

to expand NATO or not, we could relitigate that. We were probably 

on different sides of that debate. But to pull back now, I think, 

would be a very dangerous thing because it would create a vacuum, 

it would create uncertainty about our commitment to our NATO allies. 

And, to me, the best way to keep the peace—we are all quoting 

Ronald Reagan. Let me quote one more Ronald Reagan quote. I am 

also at the Hoover Institution, by the way. ‘‘Peace through 

strength.’’ So Putin needs to have zero doubt in his mind that we 

are going to have our Article 5 commitments to our allies, including 

our allies the Baltic states and Poland. And that is why I support 

making that clear. 

By the time when we got to the government, just to be clear 

about the historical record, the debate about Ukraine joining 

NATO was over. Whether that was good or bad, again, we can talk 

about that; it was not on the agenda. So when I see on RT that 

they are doing this in Crimea to stop NATO expansion, it is nonsense. There was no NATO expansion. 

I was in the government for 5 years, and pretty much every 

meeting with Mr. Putin and Mr. Medvedev and on every phone call 

but one, the issue of NATO expansion never came up once, because 

the issue was over. Ukraine was not asking to join NATO. NATO 

did not want Ukraine to join. After the election in 2010, Mr. 

Yanukovych even more so did not. 

It all is a post facto rationalization for what Putin did in Ukraine 

that he brings that up. And I think we need to be clear about that 

historical record. 

Mr. ENGEL. Okay. Thank you. 

Ambassador MCFAUL. Thank you. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

35

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you. 

We go to Mr. Dana Rohrabacher of California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes. And thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for making sure that this was a very balanced hearing today. 

And I appreciate that, realizing that some of the things that I believe are going on in the policies here don’t reflect very many of my 

fellow members’ ideas of what the policies should be. But we are 

all trying to be honest and trying to make a better world, trying 

to find a way that we can actually have peace between two of these 

major countries, the United States and Russia. 

And I am proud to have played a role in Ronald Reagan’s efforts 

to defeat communism and end the Cold War and, yes, Ronald Reagan’s intent to create a new era of friendship between the United 

States, the people of the United States, and the people of Russia. 

And I know that Ambassador Matlock played an important role in 

this, as well, and I am very happy to see him and hear him with 

us today. 

Let me just note, I have been watching this for a long time, as 

well, and I am appalled at the depth that we have let our relationship sink to at this point. We are at the lowest point of any time 

since the ending of the Cold War. 

And I do not believe, as some people have indicated already that 

they believe, that all of this can be related to Putin. The fact is 

there has been an unrelenting hostility toward Russia from the 

very days that we were negotiating with them and they were making concessions that led to tearing down the Berlin Wall; that led 

to the withdrawal of Soviet troops, which were no longer Soviet 

troops, were Russian troops from Eastern Europe; which led to 

major arms reduction agreements between our countries; that, even 

during those times, there was an element that hated Russia. Over 

and over again, we would hear it. And some of them had very good 

reasons, because their family were murdered by communists, who 

happened to be Russians, during the Cold War. 

And also we had people who just could not get over the fact that 

it was not Russia that was the enemy in the Cold War, it wasn’t 

the Russian people, but was, indeed, communism that was the 

enemy. It was the communism that spurred Russia to build these 

rockets and missiles that threatened us, to support radical elements around the world, to create revolutions in order to establish 

atheistic communist dictatorships throughout the world. That was 

communism. That wasn’t the Russian people. 

But yet there have been thousands of documents that have just 

recently been declassified—Mr. Matlock, I want to ask you if you 

have seen some of these and whether you agree with them—that 

did say that we actually proposed to the Russians that, if they 

would withdraw their troops from Eastern Europe, that at that 

point we would not be expanding NATO, and we gave them the impression they would be integrated into the economies of Western 

Europe and the world. And, in either case, there was no ability for 

the Russians to get into Europe. That is not even a question. But, 

at the same time, we end up expanding NATO. 

Was there an understanding, although it wasn’t written down, 

that we would not have an expansion of NATO, so that Russians 

would withdraw their troops and troops with guns aimed at Russia 

36

would not go right up to their border? Was that an understanding 

at that time, Mr. Matlock? 

Ambassador MATLOCK. It was indeed. It was indeed the understanding at that time. Now, this was not a legal commitment. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Ambassador MATLOCK. I must say I testified in the Senate 

against the original NATO expansion because I thought it was not 

in the U.S. interest, and I thought it was not necessary to begin 

to divide Europe again. At the end of the Cold War, we had a Europe whole and free, and that was the objection. You don’t keep a 

Europe whole and free by taking what had been a Cold War alliance, which should have been preserved as it was, and using it by 

moving the things left, and it was quite predictable then that if we 

did. 

So the reason that I had for not expanding NATO was the interest of the United States. However, it is quite true that the Bush 

administration and our allies, particularly our Germans, made 

statements during German unification that clearly implied that if 

the Soviet Union did not use force in Eastern Europe, and allow 

Germany to allow and stay in NATO, there would be no expansion 

of NATO jurisdiction. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And this——

Ambassador MATLOCK. At one point, Secretary Baker said not 

one inch to the east, and Gorbachev answered that, of course, that 

would be unacceptable. They were talking about east Germany, but 

the language is general. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman——

Ambassador MATLOCK. That was the understanding. Now, it was 

not a legal question. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let me jump in here for a moment. That was 

long before there was ever any Mr. Putin, and in fact, this is long 

before any of these ‘‘hostile acts’’ that we are being told about happened. That was an indication of what? That people were still going 

to be treating Russia as if it was the Soviet Union. And so right 

from the beginning, we have had this incredible hostility that—and 

just let me note, we have, for example, buzzing our airplanes right 

now, buzzing—are being buzzed by Russian airplanes, our ships. 

The American people see that. 

Well, where are our ships? The ship that was being buzzed—I 

don’t remember where I heard this—was in the Baltic Sea and here 

it was, I don’t know how many miles from St. Petersburg, but why 

are we sending our U.S. military forces that close to Russia? We 

have nuclear weapons delivery systems that are being aimed at 

Russia. How else would they think of that except as being a hostile 

act? And for them to buzz a ship to see what kind of ship it was 

right off their borders. 

By the way, some of these ships that we have sent there are closer to Russia than Catalina Island is to Los Angeles. What if some 

nuclear weapons delivery system showed up there? What would we 

think? Would we send an airplane out to buzz it around and see 

what kind of ship it is? 

I think that both sides, both Russia and the United States need 

to take a deep breath and step back from this whole military operation that are actually making things worse rather than making 

37

things better, and we need to find out where our differences are, 

negotiate them, see where we can work together. 

And Mr. Aron, thank you very much for your wonderful testimony today, which is aimed at where we need to work together, or 

we are all going to suffer because radical Islam is the threat today, 

not the Soviet Union. And so, I appreciate you focusing on where 

we could cooperate, which would be better for both of us. 

So thank you, Mr. Chairman, and——

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I will be ready for a second round if we have 

it. 

Chairman ROYCE. Okay. And we are going to go to Mr. Gregory 

Meeks of New York. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me first say, Ambassador McFaul, you are right, and that I 

have learned a lot listening to all three of you. As you said in your 

initial statements, it has been very——

Ambassador MCFAUL. And I will send you my book for free, okay. 

Mr. MEEKS. Okay. I will take it. I will read it. I have a long trip. 

It will be good to read. And let me also say that, for me, you know, 

I consider myself a multilateralist, and I believe that diplomacy is 

the best way to try to resolve things. And you know, I have heard 

the conversations going back and forth about President Reagan and 

Gorbachev. Well, we can always go back to Kennedy and Khrushchev. Even when we were at the height of this danger of nuclear 

weapons, the dialogue between them continued. In fact, President 

Kennedy also went to the Soviet Union then to meet with Khrushchev so that they could have conversations, and there were telephone calls going back and forth in trying to make sure that we 

didn’t have a major catastrophic scenario that could have ruined 

the world actually. 

And so, for me, to cast off and say that we shouldn’t talk to one 

country or another just does not make sense in this day and age. 

It didn’t make sense in the 1960s, and it still doesn’t make sense 

today in 2016. And so we have to figure out, in my estimation, on 

how do we do talk and work with one another. And when I initially 

came into Congress, with me, there were two huge countries that 

are important. Sometimes we get along with them and sometimes 

we don’t, but we have got to figure this out. 

Russia is one of them. Turkey is the other. Because when you 

talk about the global context, you can’t act as though they don’t 

exist because they do. And so much so, that I was, at that time, 

tried to establish and we were moving a long a Russian caucus. 

We would talk with the Russians on a regular basis and try to 

get to know members of their Parliament, because sometimes I 

think when you have parliamentarian-to-parliamentarian conversation relationships, that helps things, as opposed to breaking things 

down, and I, for one, think that that is a direction that we still 

need to move in, and I think it is tremendously important. 

And as you said, Ambassador McFaul, in this current administration, there is a lot that we have done together, a lot of things. 

Some, you know, when you talk about the START Treaty and the 

interest of WTO, security, U.N. Security Council, dealing with, you 

know, the sanctions against Iran as far as nuclear weapons are 

38

concerned because it is all in our mutual interest, and I agree with 

you 100 percent in regards to supporting and making sure we are 

there for our NATO allies and not pulling out. 

Now, it seems to me, and I just want to be corrected one way or 

the other, that when Medvedev was in charge, there was really 

close dialogue, et cetera. Now, some will tell me that Putin was always in charge, and he was the guy in the background. And so 

when it ended, and Putin came back in, it seemed to me that there 

then became some real problems with reference to communication, 

even with reference to you as Ambassador to Russia, and whether 

or not the reset agreement, whether or not that was successful or 

not. 

Can you tell me what happened? Why, you know, in that change, 

especially when Putin was in charge all along, what happened 

right in that period so that our relationships at least try to work 

in a common interest on things that are common to both of us, 

what happened in that time? 

Ambassador MCFAUL. So Congressman, thank you for that great 

question that I can’t do justice to in a minute-and-a-half, but I 

think it is a fundamental question, because if we don’t get the answer right, the prescriptions are going to be wrong. 

I just want to remind you that we did have this period of cooperation, and your efforts, Congressman, I just want to applaud. 

I think engagement is always good. Even if you disagree, you want 

to know why you are disagreeing, and somebody—we were talking 

earlier about cooperation on counterintelligence with terrorists. We 

did that, Mr. Chairman. We did that with the Russians. And you 

remember, you and I spent a really interesting day down at the 

KGB offices, right, learning in terms of cooperation. We were doing 

all those things. 

Moreover, I just want to read you—you don’t have to believe. Let 

me quote President Medvedev speaking about NATO at the NATO 

summit in Lisbon. I was there with him. This is what he said on 

the record, and I will tell you what he said after the record later. 

He said, ‘‘Incidentally’’—this is the President of Russia—‘‘even a 

declaration approved at the end of our talks states that we seek to 

develop a strategic partnership. This is not a chance choice of 

words, but signals that we have succeeded in putting the difficult 

period in our relations behind us now.’’

That is the President of Russia. That is not Barack Obama. That 

is the President of Russia just a few years ago, so you have to explain what happened after that——

Mr. MEEKS. That is right. 

Ambassador MCFAUL [continuing]. To understand the conflict. 

And in my view, just to re-underscore it, it has to do with Putin 

coming back. Yes, he was the grand decision maker all the time. 

We dealt with both the Prime Minister and the President when I 

was in the government, but at the end of day, he had a much more 

suspicious view of the United States, and in particular, a suspicious view that we go around the world overthrowing regimes, either covertly or overtly that we don’t like. 

And by way, there is a lot of data to support his hypothesis about 

American foreign policy over the last 70 years. And so the President—I was at many of these meetings, and the President would 

39

sit with Putin and say, The CIA is not supporting the overthrow 

of Mubarak. The CIA is not supporting the overthrow of your regime. These Russians, some of them are in the back here actually, 

they are actually acting on their own. These Ukrainians, they are 

actually acting on their own. They are not controlled by the United 

States of America. 

Putin didn’t want to believe that. Now, whether he knew the 

truth but didn’t want to believe it for political purposes or genuinely didn’t believe it—we used to argue about that in the administration, but he decided that he needed us as an enemy, to discredit 

these people. 

And the last thing. We have heard—and you know, there is 

blame to go around, and I am happy to talk about some of the mistakes that we made if I had more time, because I do think we made 

a few mistakes in the Obama administration. But I want to radically reject this moral equivalency that somehow we are all to 

blame here, and you know, that it is blame on America, blame on 

the United States. I want to know precisely what the Obama administration did to cause this conflict, because I can tell you precisely what Putin did. 

If we had the 10 Commandments about how to be a good 

multilateralist, how to be a good international citizen, at the top 

three, one of them would be: Thou shall not annex the territory of 

thy neighbor. 

And I am sorry, that is what he did. 

Mr. MEEKS. That is right. 

Ambassador MCFAUL. We didn’t annex any territory. We didn’t 

support any revolution against him, and there has to be a response 

to that. We just can’t sit on our hands and say, Well, you know, 

let’s all try to get along here. No, there has to be a response. Thou 

does not—especially in Europe, we cannot allow annexation to become policy that does not have a response. 

Having said all that, I want to remind you that even during the 

conflict that we had, we still managed to cooperate with Mr. Putin. 

I was there with him when we did the chemical weapons deal between the United States and Russia in September 2003. That is 

smart diplomacy. We managed the P5+1 negotiations on Iran, even 

during this time, and some of these other issues, including terrorism, if we can cooperate where it is in our national interest, we 

should, but we have to also respond to these aggressive things 

when they happen. 

Mr. MEEKS. Absolutely. 

Chairman ROYCE. We are going to go to Mr. Steve Chabot of 

Ohio. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador MATLOCK. Since I was mentioned, may I make a 

statement here. I have never used moral equivalency. This is not 

my——

Ambassador MCFAUL. I did not——

Ambassador MATLOCK. Nor have I ever——

Ambassador MCFAUL. I didn’t mention you, Jack. 

Ambassador MATLOCK. You did. 

Ambassador MCFAUL. I didn’t mean to. 

Chairman ROYCE. If I could——

40

Ambassador MCFAUL. I was quoting my own testimony. 

Chairman ROYCE. If I could go to Mr. Steve Chabot of Ohio, he 

has some questions. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thanks. I have just have a couple of points first before I ask any question. I think it is pretty clear to me and a number of us that I think this administration’s withdrawal from America’s traditional leadership role has left a power vacuum around 

the globe, one that Putin has taken advantage of, as well as other 

bad actors. ISIS, obviously, comes to mind, China building islands 

in the South China Sea, and then militarizing them. 

But Putin, with invading Crimea, and to a great extent, I think 

the West lamely protested, but ultimately did little or nothing, I 

would like to commend my colleague from the Commonwealth of 

Virginia for his attention on Crimea, for example, and my colleague, the ranking member, obviously has stressed in his remarks 

of Crimea that we not forget what has happened there, because I 

think the world has to a great extent. 

But you know, after basically invading and then having a bogus 

referendum and essentially taken over the country, they have continued with aggression in eastern Ukraine, and the Ukraines have 

fought bravely, but they are just outgunned. Putin has also been 

expanding Russia’s military footprint in places like Armenia, which 

has welcomed thousands of Russian troops and an infusion of advanced weaponry, and this has resulted in Putin pressuring 

NATO’s southern flank, just as the alliance is trying to reinforce 

its eastern flank, and having been to Poland and Latvia and Lithuania and Estonia and Hungary and other countries in the region, 

a lot of these countries are just scared to death with what Putin 

is up to. 

But Putin continues to hone in on Nagorno-Karabakh, an area 

that we don’t talk about that much anymore. We talked about it 

maybe a couple of decades back, but not much anymore, but it is 

a region that is vulnerable to conflict, and tensions have flared up 

and deaths are occurring there. There has been military action 

there in recent months, and I believe he hopes this arrangement, 

Nagorno-Karabakh will shore up his international reputation and 

pull Armenia and Azerbaijan closer to Russia and further away 

from the West. 

Putin’s engagement in Syria in the Middle East has only complicated matters there. As the U.S. works to defeat a ruthless terrorist group, ISIS in the region, Putin undermines our efforts, to 

a great extent, by lending support to the Assad regime, continuing 

to test the limits of Turkey, supplying weapons systems to Iran, 

and on and on. 

But let me—and I don’t have a huge amount of time, obviously, 

even less. Let me go to the first point that I raised about Crimea. 

I think that, you know, the world, unfortunately, to a considerable degree, has accepted this as a fait accompli. You don’t hear 

much in the news about it about—in the press much at all. It is 

my understanding that the repression there is worsening, that Russia is tightening its grip on Crimea, that they are escalating their 

campaign against dissents, and Dr. Aron, would you comment on 

what is happening in Crimea and what the rest of the world ought 

to be doing about it, including the United States now? 

41

Mr. ARON. Well, thank you very much, and I am sure my colleagues could comment, too. Just the latest number by the refugee 

agency, Ukrainian refugee agency, but I think they are being quite 

honest here. About 100,000 refugees left Crimea. Now, this is out 

of a population of probably half a million. What I find most dangerous——

Mr. CHABOT. That is 20 percent of the population has left their 

country? 

Mr. ARON. Approximately. Approximately. I mean, you know, 

these numbers, because nobody could get there without being harassed, and many are barred from going there, many international 

organizations by Russia, it is hard to say, but the numbers are 

staggering. 

What concerns me—and I would like to circle back to my issue 

of the Russian jihad, is that as far as we could establish, in percentage terms, relative to their population, the greatest ethnic representation in ISIS is Crimean Tatars, at between 300 and 500 

people, and there are no more than 120,000 Crimea Tatars. Now, 

this is greatly exacerbated by the fact that Putin dissolved the selfgoverning body of the Crimea Tatars in Crimea. He prevented their 

leaders, including Mosad Jamilif, former Soviet dissident, from 

coming back to their homeland, returning. 

So there is a whole group of exiles now in Ukraine. So this all 

exacerbates the situation, and it, again, feeds into extremism in the 

case of Crimean Tatars. Because when I spoke about the danger of 

the Russian jihad, from the inside, the key danger is that the Islamic militancy that used to be confined largely to North Caucasus 

is now spreading inside Russia. It is spreading toward Tatarstan. 

It is spreading toward the fringes. Of course, always the fringes, 

of about 6 million strong Central Asian Diaspora in Russia. 

So Crimea, in addition to being a gross violation of international 

norms, in addition to being a gross violation of human rights of the 

Crimean Tatars and others who live in Crimea, it is also a very 

dangerous situation where it could lead to the rise of Islamic extremism. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER [presiding]. Thank you very much, Dr. Aron, 

and—thank you, and look who has got the gavel now. 

Ms. BASS. Oh, oh, we are all in trouble. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. My goodness, isn’t democracy wonderful. 

I now recognize Karen Bass. Thank you very much. 

Ms. BASS. Why, thank you, Mr. Chair. 

One, I just wanted to thank the panelists. I really appreciated all 

the testimony, and I wanted to agree with my colleague here, Representative Meeks, that I am sure all of us learned a lot from what 

each of you had to say. 

I wanted to ask, Ambassador Matlock, you referred to, in your 

testimony, that you had some additional views on how we could reduce tension. You also said that—I believe you said that one thing 

that we shouldn’t do is increase our military involvement, or require payments from NATO countries, and then you cautioned on 

taking on liabilities. 

And I was wondering, the ranking member is talking about legislation that would impose additional sanctions, and I wondered 

42

about your comments within that context, and if we did impose additional sanctions, would that be an example of the liabilities that 

you were concerned about? 

Ambassador MATLOCK. Yes. Thank you very much for the question. Obviously, in just a few minutes, I cannot go into great detail. 

Let me first address the issue of Ukraine in Crimea. 

I think everything said by the others has been correct, but they 

have taken a lot of things out of context. And frankly, I do not 

agree that our new national security is significantly affected by 

what happens in Ukraine. I think we have to have certain priorities. And second, I am certain there is no way to solve the problem 

militarily. Let’s look at reality. Russia, given its history, given its 

close association, is not going to allow the Ukrainian situation to 

be solved militarily, so giving military aid, encouraging a military 

response simply causes more damage to the area, and it is not 

going to be solved that way. 

The basic thing we have to bear in mind, and this is unfortunate, 

but it is reality, and that is, you cannot have a united prosperous 

Ukraine which does not have close relations with Russia. And the 

second thing is, if you look at the politics and history and the economics, Ukraine is better off without Crimea. Now, I don’t like the 

way Russians took it, and we should not recognize it, as we don’t. 

However, to think that by bringing pressure to bear on them we 

can make them change their policy simply plays into Putin’s hands 

because it makes it a national issue. So any attempts to use military force or to encourage it will make the situation worse. 

Now, that is one thing. Now, on the—this is true of some of these 

other issues. Obviously, terrorism is a threat to both of us. I think 

that we need to define our aims as to what the ultimate aim is. 

Our aim in Syria should not be to remove the leader, whoever he 

is. Our aim should be to do what we can to keep the country from 

falling apart to keep ISIS out, to keep the refugees out of Europe. 

Now, the Russian opinion has been, you will get more chaos in 

Syria if you remove the current regime the way we did in Iraq, the 

way we did in Libya. They have a point. Can’t we understand that? 

Ms. BASS. Can I ask you, if the ranking——

Ambassador MATLOCK. I think what we need to do is to concentrate on those areas where our interests are and find better 

ways to do them. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. 

Ambassador MATLOCK. As far as Russia’s internal government, 

Russians are going to decide that. And to the degree that we try 

to interfere, they look at it just as we looked at the Communist 

Party during the Cold War. 

Ms. BASS. Okay. 

Ambassador MATLOCK. That is if our democratization efforts are 

simply in opposition to the current regime. They are going to react 

to that. 

Ms. BASS. Let me ask, Ambassador McFaul, I wanted to one 

question. And thank you very much, Ambassador Matlock. 

What do you see as the future? I mean, do you think that Putin 

is going to make a switch again? I don’t know when his ‘‘term’’ is 

over, but do you think that he will switch again and become the 

43

Prime Minister and prop up another President? What is your best 

guess? 

Ambassador MCFAUL. So first of all, I just want to be clear about 

this. To the degree that which we interfere, Putin is going to react. 

I totally agree with Ambassador Matlock on that. What I disagree 

is the assumption that somehow we are interfering. 

We did not give one penny to the democratic opposition when I 

was in the U.S. Government, and I just want to make that clear 

because I think you said ‘‘perceptions.’’ Well, perceptions have to be 

rebutted when they are not true, okay. We are not fomenting revolution in Russia and——

Ambassador MATLOCK. But they had an Assistant Secretary of 

State speaking on a telephone, cell phone that could be monitored 

talking about who should be the Prime Minister of Ukraine in a 

revolutionary situation. 

Ambassador MCFAUL. I was speaking on——

Ambassador MATLOCK. Now, what are the Russians going to 

think about that? 

Ambassador MCFAUL. Well, that was a mistake. I agree with 

you. 

Ambassador MATLOCK. Not only was it a mistake, it was——

Ambassador MCFAUL. It was a mistake, but if you want to know 

the full details, it was the mistake in the——

Ambassador MATLOCK. And you wonder about perceptions. 

Ambassador MCFAUL. Well, let me give you the——

Ambassador MATLOCK. If it had happened in——

Ambassador MCFAUL. Doctor——

Ambassador MATLOCK [continuing]. Cuba or Mexico, how would 

we have reacted? 

Ambassador MCFAUL. So let me give you the full context of that 

conversation if you are interested. The conversation was about how 

to get a coalition government together with President Yanukovych. 

We, the United States Government, the Obama administration, 

were seeking to diffuse tensions on the streets, and we, on February 21, worked hard with our European allies to cut a deal between the opposition and Mr. Yanukovych, President Yanukovych. 

The Vice President called him about a dozen times to cut a deal 

between him and the street. We were not trying to overthrow Mr. 

Yanukovych, and 12 hours later, for some unexpected reason, he 

showed up in Rostov. To this day, I don’t know why he fled. So——

Ms. BASS. My question——

Ambassador MCFAUL [continuing]. You said we need context——

Ms. BASS [continuing]. About Putin——

Ambassador MCFAUL. There is little context. 

Ms. BASS. Hello. 

Ambassador MCFAUL. But I want to come back to your question, 

Ma’am. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you. 

Ambassador MCFAUL. I am a giant optimist about Russia. I want 

to make that clear. I am a huge optimist about Russia. I can’t predict when and where, and the interregnum, I have no prediction 

about, but I, as a social scientist, I study political and economic 

change around the world, and Russia is a rich country. Russia has 

a rising middle class. Most Russians want to be integrated into the 

44

world, and yes, Russians should be in charge of their own fate. But 

Russians, all of them, not just Mr. Putin or that regime, and I just 

don’t think those structural forces of change that Russia is going 

to somehow be the one country that becomes middle income or 

high—when they become an even higher income country, and be 

the one country that will not move in this kind of forces for political and economic modernization. 

I just have met too many young people that are just like my students at Stanford that just want a normal life. They want a good 

job, they want to travel abroad, and they want their government 

to represent them——

Mr. ROHRABACHER [presiding]. Thank you. 

Ambassador MCFAUL. And so in the long run, I am incredibly optimistic about Russia. I just don’t know how long the long run is. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

Mr. ARON. Chairman Rohrabacher——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. The Chair will recognize Mr. Joe Wilson of 

South Carolina. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Acting Chairman Dana Rohrabacher. 

And it is right on point. I have been optimistic about a U.S./Russian friendship. And I have had a number of visits have been very 

inspiring to me to promote nuclear cooperation, building friendships with the people of Russia from Moscow to St. Petersburg to 

Novosibirsk and Siberia. I have been very grateful that my home 

community of Columbia is the sister city of Shiabinsk. I have had 

wonderful visits. And every time I go, I have been so impressed by 

the people of Russia, the culture of Russia. 

I have had members of the Duma visit our office. They have been 

welcomed. But sadly, things have not developed like I anticipated. 

Additionally, in my home community of South Carolina, the midlands of South Carolina, we welcomed a large number of very prosperous Russian Americans to our community. In fact, the Columbia 

Civic Ballet could be misidentified as the St. Petersburg Civic Ballet, and we welcome the—again, the extraordinary contributions of 

Russian Americans to our State. 

But sadly, the high hopes that I had of mutual benefit cooperation, as you indicated, with growing middle class travel has really 

been crushed by the aggression that I have personally seen in our 

extraordinarily brave ally, the Republic of Georgia, and that hasn’t 

been mentioned. That was 2008. And then, of course, the aggression in Ukraine. 

With that, Dr. Aron, in April 2016, Russian fighter jets flew 

within 30 feet of the USS Donald Cook, then flew a Russian interceptor within 50 feet of American reconnaissance aircraft. Could 

you explain the rationale between such bizarrely dangerous actions 

on the part of Russia and what can be done by the United States 

and our allies to curtail such activity? 

Mr. ARON. My goodness, that is quite a question. Before I answer, just a factual correction, if I may. I misspoke. The population 

of Crimea is 2 million people. So 100,000 refugees constitutes about 

5 percent, not 20 percent, an important correction. 

I am a big believer, and I know—and I know Jack Matlock may 

not agree with that, but I think Mike McFaul, and I think similarly 

about these things. I think most of these acts are done for domestic 

45

political purposes. The government of 3 years ago, before Ukraine, 

before anything else, a top Russian political sociologist, whose 

name I will not mention, just I don’t want to get him in trouble, 

told me, Leon, you know, why are you talking about foreign policy 

as something separate from domestic? The only thing going for this 

regime is its foreign policy. This is where the legitimacy is. Russia 

rising off its knees again, Russia is where the Soviet Union used 

to be, and Vladimir Putin secured Russia as a great super power 

again. 

We underestimated the appeal that this caused in the hearts and 

minds of millions of Russians because we underestimated the hurt 

that occurred when the Soviet Union collapsed. So these singular 

facts of bringing it to the brink and bringing it to the point is to 

show domestically that Putin is not intimidated by the United 

States, that he is ready to take all the necessary means to defend 

Russia against the danger that may not exist. 

I think Mike McFaul and I agree on this. The point is that he 

is almost forced to act provocatively because that is where his regime support and legitimacy and popularity is. 

Mr. WILSON. And, but again, 30 feet, 50 feet, that is ridiculous. 

The obvious extraordinary loss of life that could occur is so irresponsible, and not in the interest of the people of Russia, or its foreign policy or its military. 

Mr. ARON. Sir, as I said in the concluding remarks to my statement, we are facing an unprecedented danger, a risk-prone, highly 

personalistic authoritarian regime that acts both out of mission 

and out of ideology. It is pushed toward these types of acts, and 

that is what scares me the most. 

Mr. WILSON. You mentioned Foreign Affairs magazine, and yesterday, General Philip Breedlove, the former commander of European commander and NATO supreme allied commander, had an 

article that I am confident you probably already read, that America 

needs to do more to deter the Russian threat. And so I, again, appreciate all of your service, and I thank you very much for being 

here today. And I yield back to the——

Mr. ARON. Thank you. 

Mr. WILSON [continuing]. Acting chairman, of all people, Dana 

Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, thank you. Now, let me get this 

straight. You have a candidate somewhere saying he wants to 

make his country great again? And then takes over the reigns of 

power? That could never happen really in a modern society, could 

it? 

All right. It is supposed to be a joke. That was supposed to be 

funny. All right. We now have Mr. Boyle. 

Mr. BOYLE. Thank you, and thank you to all three of the witnesses. I have several things I want to go over, but first, I can’t 

help the irony that we are having this hearing, and literally, in the 

last 5 minutes, The Washington Post is reporting that according to 

security experts, Russian Government hackers have hacked the 

Democratic National Committee to find oppo research that the 

DNC has, and that is according to our own security experts. So 

spare me the moral equivalency language that mistakes have been 

made on both sides. 

46

Second point I would like to make is I know that there are some 

who want to conveniently take shots at President Obama and the 

Obama administration over what happened in Crimea, and that 

somehow if the U.S. President had been stronger, this would have 

been prevented. Is it Hungary, 1956, President Eisenhower; 1968, 

Czechoslovakia would have been Lyndon Johnson; 2008, when 

George W. Bush was President, the invasion of Georgia. Those 

were previous Presidents, both Democrats and Republicans, who 

were unable to prevent a Russian premier, or then chairman of the 

USSR, from acting. 

Now, third, that having been said, I want to associate myself 

with what Ranking Member Engel said in terms of our response 

now moving forward to support Ukraine. I believe there is more 

that we can be and should be doing. Clearly, we are in joint operations now with the three Baltic Republics as well as in Poland. 

I wish that we were doing more, and I am a cosponsor of legislation 

to do more in Ukraine, and I was hoping that possibly Mr. McFaul, 

you could speak to that more specifically what we could be doing 

now to bolster Ukraine and make sure that those who are Western 

looking succeed, because I agree, that would be one of the greatest 

things for American foreign policy. 

Ambassador MCFAUL. So thank you for your question, and I 

agree. I want to associate myself with you in terms of that historical record. I think, in terms of Ukraine, I just want to underscore, 

again, more context, that I don’t see consolidating democracy or 

strengthening markets in Ukraine as anti-Russian. When I was 

Ambassador, we had this argument frequently with senior members of the Russian Government, and we—our position, our administration’s position, was you should be able to join whatever trade 

agreement you want, whatever treaty you want, as long as it 

doesn’t infringe on other rights and responsibilities that you have 

in other organizations that you joined in terms of seeking win-win 

outcomes. 

I think the idea of going back to some 19th century idea of 

spheres of influence makes no sense in the 21st century. The borders, you know, where I live in the Silicon Valley, the idea that 

somehow borders and geography are what makes countries rich or 

not is just, you know, that is a very outdated——

Mr. BOYLE. Very retrograde. 

Ambassador MCFAUL. Yeah, I want to just really make that clear 

that this is not an anti-Russian policy that to support Ukrainian 

democracy or Ukrainian markets. And in that regard, I think the 

best investment that you all have supported with your support has 

been to help develop Ukrainian civil society. I think it has been a 

fantastic success story, that it cannot be done in other countries for 

other circumstances. But I think the pressure from society to make 

the government perform is the best way to try to help reform in 

Ukraine. 

And it is working now. It is difficult, it is hard, it is not easy to 

correct 30 years of oligarchic corrupt capitalism. I want to underscore that. It is going to be a long process. It is going to take some 

electoral cycles, in my view, to change that, but I think that is the 

core. Support society, support independent media, and they will put 

the pressure on the government. 

47

Mr. BOYLE. Let me—since I have time and now less than, in 50 

seconds, let me just shift a bit. You know, there is something kind 

of self-centered in a sense that we always think when foreign policy 

actor does X, it is somehow because of something that the U.S. did 

or did not do. I tend to believe that a lot of Putin’s actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine have less to do with any U.S. policy and 

more to do with Russian domestic politics, and specifically, his 

standing, and I was wondering if any of you would like to speak 

to that. Agree or disagree? 

Ambassador MCFAUL. Could I just briefly say——

Ambassador MATLOCK. Now——

Ambassador MCFAUL. Go ahead, Jack. Go ahead. I will go second. 

Ambassador MATLOCK. I think one thing we tend to forget is that 

there is only one country that can solve Ukraine’s problems, and 

that is Ukraine. The basic problem is that Ukraine is a deeply divided society. 

When I was Ambassador to the Soviet Union, whenever I went 

to Ukraine, I always gave my speeches in Ukrainian language. I 

have been following things that happened in Ukraine since I was 

a high school student and did reporters on the role during the war. 

I know this country. And I also know that when they got independence, their borders were, to some degree, artificial. Crimea had 

only been added by fiat without consulting anybody in the 1950s. 

Now—and so Ukraine—I went there to advise a group in the late 

1990s on national security from—other former colleagues from our 

National Security Council, we were telling them how we organize 

our national security. The Ukrainians came back and said: Look, 

you are talking about foreign policy. Let me show you what our 

problem is. And they showed the sides of the last election, very 

evenly divided almost entirely on the west on one side and on the 

other side in the east and south. 

Now—and this is in every election. Also, they had a constitution, 

which was not a Federal constitution, it was unitary. A President 

who won maybe by just 1 percentage of the vote named every governor. And you know where the violence started after the Maidan? 

It started in the west by them taking over the governorships. The 

corrupt President that they got rid of would never have been elected if Crimea had not been part of Ukraine. 

There are a lot of issues here, a very deep history, and the basic 

problem is Ukraine. Yes, Russia has intervened, just as we take a 

very close interest in countries to us but——

Chairman ROYCE [presiding]. Yes, Ambassador, but we have run 

over the time. 

Ambassador MATLOCK [continuing]. The fact is the Ukrainians 

are going to have to solve it. 

Chairman ROYCE. Right. 

Ambassador MATLOCK. And our involvement tends to have a negative effect. 

Chairman ROYCE. Yes, Ambassador. We are going to need to go 

to Mr. Ted Poe of Texas. Thank you. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for being 

here. Ambassador Matlock, I appreciate the fact that you are so 

knowledgeable, and you have looked at the whole issue with Russia 

48

as a historical point of view starting with really before World War 

I. I think we need to understand history, especially the way the 

Russians understand history so that we can move forward. 

I am not going to ask you a question, because if I ask you a question, it is like asking you the time, you will tell me how to make 

a watch, and so I am just going to make a couple of comments. 

I never thought I would see the day that in a committee hearing, 

we would have two former Ambassadors from the same region of 

the world mix it up together during the committee hearing. I think 

that is—it is a good thing. I am not being critical. 

Ambassador MCFAUL. It is democracy, right? 

Mr. POE. It is democracy. I think it is a good thing. Let’s talk 

a little bit about Hitler. 

The Russians moved into Georgia in 2008. I am always in the 

wrong place at the wrong time. I happened to be there a week after 

they invaded, and I saw the tanks up on the hill, and then in the 

West, we didn’t do anything, and the tanks are still there and they 

have one-third of Georgia. 

Crimea, the Russians took Crimea, their little green men, they 

moved into eastern Ukraine, chairman and I and some others were 

there right after the Russians came into eastern Ukraine, and they 

are still there. I just need a yes or no from the three of you. 

Are the Russians going to stay in that one-third portion of Georgia, Crimea, and eastern Ukraine? Are they going to stay there or 

are they going to go home? Are they going to stay, Mr. Ambassador 

McFaul? Let’s start on—I will start on the far left here. Are they 

going to stay in those areas? 

Ambassador MCFAUL. My prediction is yes. You said one word. 

Mr. POE. One word. It is either yes or no. 

Ambassador MCFAUL. I am a professor. I don’t know how to give 

one word answers. Yes. 

Mr. POE. Ambassador Matlock, just yes or no. 

Ambassador MATLOCK. I think they are going to stay in those enclaves in Georgia, which the Georgians treat it the way the Serbs 

were treating Kosovo. 

Mr. POE. All right. 

Ambassador MATLOCK. And the problem has been——

Mr. POE. Mr. Ambassador, excuse me for interrupting. 

Ambassador MATLOCK. Crimea——

Mr. POE. Crimea, are they going to stay in Crimea? 

Ambassador MATLOCK. Will they stay? Most likely, unless——

Mr. POE. Answer the question. 

Ambassador MATLOCK. Unless——

Mr. POE. Are they going to stay in Crimea? 

Ambassador MATLOCK [continuing]. The majority of the people 

prefer to be in Ukraine. In that case, Crimea will become a liability, and there will be incentive to join with Ukraine. 

Mr. POE. Eastern Ukraine, are they going to stay in eastern 

Ukraine? 

Ambassador MATLOCK. They would be required to give Crimea 

autonomy——

Mr. POE. Mr. Ambassador, just answer the question. 

Ambassador MATLOCK [continuing]. Which now they haven’t 

been. I think a lot of——

49

Mr. POE. Mr. Ambassador, to stay in eastern Ukraine? The Russians in eastern Ukraine? 

Ambassador MATLOCK. In eastern Ukraine, no. I think there was 

never an intent——

Mr. POE. Dr. Aron, what is your opinion? 

Ambassador MATLOCK [continuing]. To take the Dombok. The 

Dombok——

Mr. POE. I have moved on to the next witness. 

Ambassador MATLOCK. But they——

Mr. POE. I have moved on to the next witness, please, sir. I reclaim my time. My time. 

Chairman ROYCE. I think just——

Ambassador MATLOCK. They will make sure that there is not an 

anti——

Mr. POE. I need some help, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador MATLOCK. In charge of the Dombok. 

Chairman ROYCE. I think my hearing is a little impaired, and I 

am not the only one with the difficulty sometimes of hearing, and 

so we will go to Dr. Aron. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. ARON. Yes, on all three until the regime changes 

Mr. POE. All right. The only other question I have time for is 

what do you think the Russians will do next? Where are they 

going? I think Putin finds an opportunity, he seizes it, and he 

moves in. People in Russia are nationalistic. His popularity skyrocketed when he went into Georgia and Ukraine. You know, I 

think he wants to be the next czar of Russia. I think that is probably what he is after, but where do you think they are going to 

go—Putin is going to move next? 

Ambassador MCFAUL. I don’t assume that he has a grand plan 

to go into this place and that place and the other. I think it is incumbent upon us to reduce the opportunities for him to do those 

things. I think Novorossiya has been a fantastic failure, for instance. What he tried to do in seizing territory in the eastern 

Ukraine has been a fantastic failure, and it is, in part, a failure 

because there was pushback. And that is why, you know, I go back 

to peace through strength. If we make sure that he has no doubt 

about our commitments to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, that will 

keep the peace, and that is what I would want us to focus on as 

a way not because to confront Russia, but to keep the peace on that 

very precarious border. 

Mr. POE. Dr. Aron, what is your opinion, future movement, if 

any, by Mr. Putin? 

Mr. ARON. The most vulnerable is the Baltics, and of them, the 

most vulnerable, the Narva area between Russia and Estonia. And 

I agree with Mike, those are three NATO members now, and presumably, that is a deterrent. 

But if the domestic situation requires it, I think Putin may try 

to expose NATO as a paper tiger, and have a great upsurge in domestic popularity. So that is a huge risk. 

Chairman ROYCE. We need to go to Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our witnesses. I had an opportunity recently to travel with my good friend, 

Mr. Rohrabacher, to Moscow, and one of the meetings we had was 

50

at the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe. What I learned was 

very disturbing. The Russian Government, under the leadership of 

President Putin, had shut down all of the radio stations. I think 

there were 30 or so. 

There was one station remaining that had a freestanding license, 

and then the Russian Government passed a law that required, if 

I am remembering this correctly, that it have the majority Russian 

ownership, so that license ultimately was revoked as well. 

So Ambassador McFaul, it seems to me that in responding to this 

very sophisticated and very pervasive state-controlled media and 

propaganda machine, I think, really extraordinary, I think the best 

estimates are that they spend more than $450 million a year to 

broadcast to more than 30 million Russian speakers 24 hours a 

day, 7 days a week. What, if anything, are we doing, can we do to 

provide information that counters that narrative when the Voice of 

America and Radio Free Europe are basically precluded from providing information, or maybe that has changed since my visit? 

Ambassador MCFAUL. So I want Leon Aron to speak to this because he does serve on the BBG board and he knows these issues 

a lot better than I do, but I do want to just associate myself with 

what he said earlier in his testimony. 

It is difficult for the United States Government to give money to 

reporters because that immediately will taint them. I know, you 

know, all the reporters, almost all the reporters in Russia, and if 

they were here today, the independent ones, they would say do not 

do that. We can’t—we can’t take your money. We need to be independent. What we can do is we can provide them with information, 

we can have strategic alliances with them to provide that, we can 

provide internships in our news organizations. We, at Stanford 

University, for instance, we have a Knight Fellowship program 

where we will soon have the former editor of Oktyabr as a visiting 

scholar because she was thrown out of her job. 

And so those kinds of things, educational programs, I think, need 

to get much more attention. Because there are lots of, literally 

thousands of Russians, trying to figure out a way to contribute to 

their country that are now living in exile. These are the kind of opportunities that we should expand, but what we can do internally, 

I will let Leon answer that question, if he wants to. 

Mr. ARON. Thanks very much, Mike. Thank you, sir. Just a brief 

comment. Russia is still not Iran or China. Social media are more 

or less free, and this is where the effort is going, because the generation we will want to affect is the generation of social media. And 

you know, as far as I know, BBG and the gruntees, that is the radios, are less of radios. They are more of TVs, they are more of 

Twitter, they are more of social media platforms, and I think there 

is hope there. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. The second question I have is, one 

thing we saw a tremendous evidence of was the deterioration of the 

Russian economy, serious structural problems, falling oil prices, the 

Ukraine-related sanctions, and it is pretty clear the Kremlin has 

worked to preempt potential domestic discontent through this distraction of foreign interventions. 

And my question really is, with the conflict in eastern Ukraine 

settling into a stalemate and the Russian military intervening in 

51

Syria last fall, how long can this kind of opportunistic strategy 

work? And what should we do to prepare against it? Maybe Ambassador McFaul, I can start with you? 

Ambassador MCFAUL. So I agree with your analysis, and public 

opinion poll data out of Russia, even though it is very difficult to 

get accurate data, also concurs with that. I would just say historically and comparatively, we are not very good at predicting when 

declines and economic growth or depression leads to political 

change, and I would just remind you that I would never try to 

make a prediction based on that. But is there tension around that? 

Are people asking why are we in eastern Ukraine when, you know, 

our economic situation is getting worse? That question is being 

asked more and more there. 

My view is we need to stay the course in terms of what the policy 

is. I want to lift sanctions on Russian individuals and companies. 

I want to associate myself with that, if and when they do what 

they have signed up to do and their proxies have signed up to do 

in Mensk. It is just that simple. If you do this, then the sanctions 

will be lifted. 

I find it very scary when people say sanctions aren’t working, so 

let’s lift them, or an idea that is floating around Europe right now, 

let’s do partial sanctions for partial implementations. I think those 

are very bad ideas. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. We have luncheon with the Dalai Lama, so—

and without objection, there are a couple of witness statements 

that I am going to include for the record. 

And now we will go to Mr. Tom Marino of Pennsylvania. 

Mr. MARINO. Thank you, Chairman. Excellent hearing. Gentlemen, I would like you to be as precise as possible. We all have 

something to do after this. I have three questions. 

Ambassador MCFAUL. I am not having lunch with the Dalai 

Lama. I wish I were. 

Mr. MARINO. I am a former prosecutor. I don’t have time for long 

winded answers. Let’s go to number 1. 

Ambassador McFaul, Putin obviously has a very big ego. People 

say to me he wants to be next General Secretary. I disagree with 

that. I think Putin wants to be the second Peter the Great, and the 

plan to make Russia a leading power, if not, the leading power 

with the world. What say you? 

Ambassador MCFAUL. I agree. 

Mr. MARINO. Great. 

Ambassador MCFAUL. But I want Russia to be great, too. I personally think it would be in our national interest for Russia to be 

great. I do not believe the strategy he is seeking to achieve that 

objective is a smart one. 

Mr. MARINO. Great. Okay. Dr. Aron, Bush’s decision not to intervene in Georgia and Obama’s decision not to intervene in Ukraine, 

I see that as signaling to Putin that the United States does not 

care to get involved in these foreign affairs, and as that, the U.S. 

will not challenge Putin, or NATO will not challenge Putin, will 

this allow him or signal to him that he could continue his expansionism? 

Mr. ARON. Putin has not been made to pay for his policies, definitely. The benefits, domestic political benefits, far supersede the 

52

price that he had to pay, either economically or militarily. There 

are ways to change this balance. It would require the things that 

Mike mentioned about Ukraine. I am also for arming Ukraine with 

strictly defensive weapons—but you’re absolutely right. So long as 

his benefits, his domestic political benefits, exceed, far exceed the 

price that he pays politically and economically and militarily for his 

adventures, he will continue. 

Mr. MARINO. Okay. And I am taking a gamble here, Ambassador 

Matlock. Please be very concise in your answer. Will Putin back off 

if the United States significantly increases its military strength 

and go back to the belief of Reagan through peace through 

strength? 

Ambassador MATLOCK. I think he is more likely. I don’t know 

that anybody can say precisely what he will do. He may not know. 

But the danger is, if we confront what he is doing militarily, which 

as yet, I think does not affect our national interest with military 

means, he can push us into another nuclear arms race. I think that 

is what we have to watch, because that is going to be very hard 

to deal with. 

Mr. MARINO. Okay. Good point, Ambassador Matlock. And then 

Dr. Aron, would you respond to that as well? Do we need to increase our military strength to keep Putin in check? Ambassador 

McFaul 

Ambassador MCFAUL. Yes. 

Ambassador MATLOCK. I think——

Mr. MARINO. Sir, Just a minute. Just a minute. I am asking Ambassador McCaul. 

Chairman ROYCE. Ambassador McFaul, you are recognized. 

Ambassador MCFAUL. My answer is yes. 

Mr. MARINO. Okay. 

Ambassador MCFAUL. I support everything we are doing leading 

up to the Warsaw Summit. 

Mr. MARINO. And I am sorry, I referred to you as McCaul. 

Ambassador MCFAUL. Because you have a Member McCaul. 

Mr. MARINO. I know. Dr. Aron. 

Mr. ARON. I believe that Putin needs to see some credible signs 

of paying more for his policies. Whether—I don’t think we need to, 

you know, boost, you know, tremendously our military forces, but 

we need to look at specific instances where we can credibly threaten Putin to pay a higher price domestically, politically, for his adventures abroad. 

Mr. MARINO. Just a little information. I am vice president of the 

NATO Parliamentary Assembly. I hear consistently, when I am in 

NATO meetings around the world, what is the United States going 

to do to put Putin in his place? I think perhaps he is one of the 

most dangerous people in the world, and gentlemen, I would love 

individually to have dinner with each one of you. I could learn so 

much. Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Chairman ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Marino, and I also want to 

thank the panel, the witnesses here today. We—and Jerry. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

Chairman ROYCE. How are you? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Fine. 

53

Chairman ROYCE. I am calling—I am going to recognize you. Go 

ahead. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, my friend. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to pick up where my friend Mr. Marino left off. I am 

the head of the U.S. delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, and I have to say, I heard a lot of stuff from my friend from 

California and from Ambassador Matlock that would not, in any 

way, reflect the reality of our NATO partners across the board, 

with one or two exceptions. Boy, it would come as news to the Baltic republics that the Russians are peace-loving people who are just 

buzzing our ships in the Black Sea because we are too close to their 

littoral, because the Russians are buzzing them, and they are 

guilty of one thing, sovereign independence. That is what they are 

guilty of. 

They are not doing anything provocative. In fact, the very last 

thing in the world they want to do is anything provocative. Explain 

that Russian behavior. The illegal annexation of the sovereign territory of the Ukraine, the Crimea, and now the illegal occupation. 

I was just in the Ukraine. Fighting goes on as we speak. People 

are dying because of Russian provocation. Russian subterfuge pretending these are Ukrainian nationalists and patriots who they 

have no control over. 

We have already lost one commercial airliner in that conflict. It 

was almost certainly downed. It was almost certainly downed at 

the loss of terrible civilian life over the sovereign territory of the 

Ukraine because of Russian provocation and Russian provocateurs, 

not Ukrainians, not Americans hating Russia. Russian behavior. 

Putin seems to be engaged in some kind of reestablishment of 

Russian hegemony in some kind of delusional czarist longing for 

some glorious past that really never existed, and that is very dangerous. It is also dangerous for Putin to misread U.S. resolve and 

NATO resolve. I worry about that. 

History, in the last 200 years of this republic, is strewn with people who made that miscalculation, pushed us too far. 

And Ambassador McFaul, I couldn’t agree with you more with 

what you said earlier. That is Russia’s responsibility. Maybe we 

have miscalculated an occasion. And we certainly shouldn’t cloud 

the fact that there are areas of cooperation we appreciate. You 

know, we cooperate on the space station. We cooperated on JCPOA 

to a great contribution to world peace, as far as I am concerned. 

Although many of my friends on the other side of aisle, in fact, all 

of them opposed it, but it has been 100 percent complied with, and 

we are grateful to Russian participation and responsibility for at 

that. 

But Putin seems to be pushing all the wrong—you know, the hot 

buttons with respect to the NATO alliance and to the United 

States. And I guess I would ask this, Ambassador McFaul: What 

is it you think Putin is trying to do? I mean, is it a testing of the 

system? Is it something more than that? 

Ambassador MCFAUL. So thank you for your question, and I do 

agree that we need to stand with our allies. I think the idea of four 

new battalions in the east is the correct thing. Again, those battalions are not going to invade Russia. Come on, let’s be honest about 

54

this. Only fools would think about doing that, and we are not foolish, but they are there in a defensive posture. 

You know, my own view of why he did what he did is very contingent and circumstantial and emotional. I was still Ambassador, 

right? He didn’t invade Ukraine when I was Ambassador. He invaded the day after I left. I want to point that out for the record. 

But the buildup was there, and it was in response to the collapse 

of the government in Kiev, right? It was to exact revenge over his 

ally falling there. It was not, in my view, some grand design to 

recreate the Soviet Union, and that, therefore, gives me hope that 

if we——

Mr. CONNOLLY. But let me interrupt you. 

Ambassador MCFAUL. Yeah, please. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Again, I just came back from the Ukraine, but 

I also was in Kurdistan, I was also in Mongolia. My sense in Central Asia is deep anxiety about Russian intentions. There is a sense 

among those countries that that is precisely what he is up to, that 

this was not an isolated example. 

Mr. Poe and I, the co-chairs of the Georgia caucus, I assure you 

the Georgians feel that this is about territorial reengagement and 

reexpansion after a period of contraction under Yeltsin and that period. And so I think there is real anxiety among lots of former eastern countries too and they are looking to our leadership to try to 

respond to it. 

Mr. Chairman——

Chairman ROYCE. And I think on that point, Mr. Connolly, we 

really want to thank all the members. I want to thank the witnesses here, too. We had a great exchange of information. We may 

be following up with each of the witnesses here, and Tom Marino 

may be following up with you on dinner plans. So again, thank you, 

and we stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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