FILED 


OCT. 15,2013 


In the Office of the Clerk of Court 


W A State Court of Appeals, Division III 


IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 


DIVISION THREE 


STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 30798-1-III 

) 

Respondent, ) 

) 

v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION 

) 

MIGUEL A. CARRILLO DENIZ, ) 

) 

Appellant. ) 

KULIK, J. - Miguel Carrillo Deniz pleaded guilty to third degree rape. As part of 

Mr. Carrillo Deniz's sentence, the trial court ordered community custody for a term of36 

months. Mr. Carrillo Deniz appeals. We disagree with Mr. Carrillo Deniz's contention 

that the community custody statute applicable to his sentence, RCW 9.94A.701, is 

ambiguous. Therefore, we affirm the 36-month community custody term. 

FACTS 

Mr. Carrillo Deniz pleaded guilty to third degree rape, RCW 9A.44.060(1)(a). In 

addition to 13 months of confmement, the judgment and sentence ordered 36 months of 

community custody. Mr. Carrillo Deniz did not object to the term of community custody. 
No. 30798-1-III 

State v. Carrillo Deniz 

Mr. Carrillo Deniz now appeals. He contends that his term of community custody 

should be modified because of ambiguity in the community custody statute, 

RCW 9.94A.701. He maintains that the statute is ambiguous because more than one 

section ofRCW 9.94A.701 controls the length of his community custody term. 

Specifically, because third degree rape is both a sex offense and a crime against a person, 

his sentence falls under the statutory provisions for certain sex offenses, RCW 

9.94A.701(1)(a), and for crimes against persons, RCW 9.94A.701(3)(a). He applies the 

rule oflenity to the alleged ambiguity and maintains that he should receive the lesser 12­

month term of community custody for crimes against persons. 

ANALYSIS 

A sentence imposed contrary to the law may be raised for the first time on appeal. 

State v. Anderson, 58 Wn. App. 107, 110, 791 P.2d 547 (1990). On appeal, a defendant 

may challenge a sentence imposed in excess ofstatutory authority because "a defendant 

cannot agree to punishment in excess ofthat which the Legislature has established." In re 

Pers. Restraint ofGoodwin, 146 Wn.2d 861, 873-74, 50 P.3d 618 (2002). "Questions of 

statutory interpretation are questions oflaw subject to de novo review." State V. Franklin, 

172 Wn.2d 831, 835, 263 P .3d 585 (2011). 

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No. 30798-1-111 

State v. Carrillo Deniz 

When interpreting the meaning and purpose of a statute, the objective of the court 

is to determine the intent of the legislature. State v. Jones, 172 Wn.2d 236,242,257 P.3d 

616 (2011) (quoting State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 600, 115 P.3d 281 (2005)). Effect 

is given to the plain meaning ofthe statute when the plain meaning can be determined 

from the text of the statute. Id. The statute is to be read as a whole, with consideration 

given to all statutory provisions in relation to one another and with each provision given 

effect. State v. Merritt, 91 Wn. App. 969, 973, 961 P.2d 958 (1998). 

After conducting a plain meaning review, if the statute is still susceptible to more 

than one interpretation, then the statute is ambiguous and the court relies on statutory 

construction, legislative history, and relevant case law to determine legislative intent. 

Jones, 172 Wn.2d at 242 (quoting Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wn.2d 365,373, 173 

P.3d 228 (2007)). "When there is a conflict between one statutory provision which treats 

a subject in a general way and another which treats the same subject in a specific manner, 

the specific statute will prevail." Pannell v. Thompson, 91 Wn.2d 591, 597, 589 P.2d 

1235 (1979) (emphasis omitted). "Statutes are construed so as to avoid strained or absurd 

consequences." Merritt, 91 Wn. App. at 973. Interpretations are not to render any 

statutory language superfluous. Wright v. Engum, 124 Wn.2d 343,352,878 P.2d 1198 

(1994). 

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No.30798-1-II1 

State v. Carrillo Deniz 

The rule of lenity applies to situations where more than one interpretation can be 

drawn from the wording ofa statute. State v. Snedden, 149 Wn.2d 914,922, 73 P.3d 995 

(2003). "Under the rule oflenity, the court must adopt the interpretation most favorable 

to the criminal defendant." State v. McGee, 122 Wn.2d 783, 787, 864 P.2d 912 (1993). 

Here, the statute controlling Mr. Carrillo Deniz's term of community custody 

sentence is RCW 9.94A.701. Within this statute, RCW 9.94A.701(1)(a) provides that if 

an offender is sentenced to the custody ofthe Department of Corrections for a sex offense 

not sentenced under RCW 9.94A.507, the court shall sentence the offender to community 

custody for three years. 

Also of importance within the statute, RCW 9.94A.701(3)(a) provides that when a 

court sentences a person to the custody of the Department of Corrections for any crime 

against a person under RCW 9.94A.411(2), the court shall also sentence an offender to 

one year of community custody. 

Rape in the third degree, RCW 9A.44.060, is a sex offense as defined by 

former RCW 9 .94A.030( 45) (2010); rape in the third degree is not sentenced under 

RCW 9.94A.507. Also, rape in the third degree is listed as a crime against persons under 

RCW 9.94A.411(2). 

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No.30798-I-III 

State v. Carrillo Deniz 

The plain meaning ofRCW 9.94A.701 clearly indicates that persons who commit 

sex offenses not sentenced under RCW 9.94A.507 are to be sentenced to 36 months of 

community custody. The text of the statute specifically imposes this specific sentence for 

these certain sex offenses. The legislature clearly intended for persons convicted of a sex 

offense not listed under RCW 9.94A.507 to receive a longer sentence of community 

custody than persons convicted of other crimes against persons. 

Because Mr. Carrillo Deniz was convicted of a sex offense not sentenced under 

RCW 9.94A.507, the trial court applied the correct statutory provision and sentenced him 

to 36 months of community custody in addition to his 13 months of confinement. 

Mr. Carrillo Deniz suggests that the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw 

his gUilty plea is a potential issue. However, Mr. Carrillo Deniz provides no argument in 

support of his concern. "Passing treatment of an issue or lack of reasoned argument is 

insufficient to merit judicial consideration." Holland v. City ofTacoma, 90 Wn. App. 

533,538,954 P.2d 290 (1998); see RAP 10.3(a)(5). We will not address this issue on 

appeaL 

The trial court correctly sentenced Mr. Carrillo Deniz to 36 months of community 

custody for third degree rape. The court was not required to sentence Mr. Carrillo Deniz 

to the lesser term of community custody for crimes against persons. The legislature 

5 

No. 30798-1-111 

State v. Carrillo Deniz 

clearly intended for sex offenses to receive a longer tenn of community custody than 

general crimes against persons. 

We affinn. 

A majority ofthe panel has detennined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to 

RCW 2.06.040. 

Kulik, J. 

WE CONCUR: 

Sid~ Brown, J. 

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