* Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secr etary of Health and

Human Services in social security cases were transf erred to the Commissioner of Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. Pursuant to Fe d. R. App. Proc. 43(c), Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, is subs tituted for Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, as the defe ndant in this action. Although we have substituted the Commissioner for the Secretary in the caption, in the text we continue to refer to the Secretary b ecause she was the appropriate party at the time of the underlying decision.

** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 10/17/96 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

PATSY G. REDFEARN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security Administration, *

Defendant-Appellee. No. 96-5003 (D.C. No. 94-C-1063-W) (N.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT **

Before ANDERSON, LOGAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.-2-

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34 (f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Patsy Redfearn appeals from an order of the distric t court affirming the Secretary’s decision denying her application for so cial security disability benefits. Ms. Redfearn filed for disability benefits on March3, 1993. She alleged disability due to arthritis and a shoulder injury. Her request was denied initially and on reconsideration. Following a de novo hearin g on March 1, 1994, an administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that she was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The Appeals Co uncil denied review, and Ms. Redfearn filed suit in district court. The dis trict court affirmed the Secretary’s decision, and she appealed to this court. We review the Secretary’s decision to determine whe ther the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record viewed as a whole and whether the correct legal standards were applie d. Andrade v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. , 985 F.2d 1045, 1047 (10th Cir. 1993). Substantia l evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Fowler v. Bowen , 876 F.2d 1451, 1453 (10th Cir. 1989)(quotation omitted).-3-

The Secretary has established a five-step sequentia l evaluation process pursuant to the Social Security Act for determining whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. See Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988)(discussing five-step disability te st). The claimant bears the burden of proving disability at steps one through f our. See id. at 751. Here, the ALJ found, at step four, that Ms. Redfearn could perform her past relevant work as a dispatcher. Ms. Redfearn conten ds that the Secretary’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence b ecause the ALJ improperly relied on opinions of nonexamining consultants, fai led to develop the record concerning her depression, and improperly evaluatedher complaint of pain. The ALJ determined that Ms. Redfearn retained the r esidual functional capacity to perform the full range of light work, e xcept for work requiring frequent stooping and bending or frequent overhead reaching. Ms. Redfearn challenges this assessment based upon a “functional tolerance profile” dated August 19, 1991, which shows that she can sit for o nly ten minutes and can lift and carry only three pounds. She contends that the profile constitutes an “opinion of her treating physician,” which outweighs the non examining consultants’ assessment of her capabilities. See, e.g. , Reid v. Chater , 71 F.3d 372, 374 (10th Cir. 1995)(treating physician’s opinion generally f avored over that of consultant). There is no indication who prepared the tolerance p rofile; it is unsigned and-4-

appears to have been prepared as part of a general workup at the “return to work program” Ms. Redfearn attended. The profile was no t entitled to the great weight accorded to a treating physician’s opinion. Moreover, we have reviewed the record and have dete rmined that it contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion that Ms. Redfearn’s exertional limitations do not prevent he r from performing her past relevant work. The medical evidence does not suppo rt the extreme limitations on sitting, standing, and walking which she alleges. The VE testified that her work as a dispatcher was sedentary, with occasional reac hing and handling, and could be performed with limitations on overhead reaching. The VE further stated that the restrictions with use of her hands due to arth ritis Ms. Redfearn described would not prevent her from working as a dispatcher. She could even perform the job with alternating sitting and standing. Appellant’s Supp. App. at 67-69. Ms. Redfearn next asserts that the ALJ failed to de velop the record concerning her depression. Where the evidence pres ented to the ALJ reveals that the claimant suffers from a mental disorder, but co ntains insufficient medical evidence to evaluate the disorder and its effect on the claimant’s ability to work, the ALJ has a duty to further develop the record. See Carter v. Chater , 73 F.3d 1019, 1021-22 (10th Cir. 1996).1 During the review by the district court, Ms. Redfearn attempted to clear up

the mystery of the Zoloft prescription with new evi dence. She presented, among other documents, a record dated July 21, 1993, fromDr. Choteau showing that estrogen treatment had failed to relieve Ms. Redfea rn’s depressive symptoms. Dr. Choteau diagnosed her with depression and lethargy and prescribed the Zoloft for these symptoms. Appellant’s App. at 90. The distr ict court declined to remand the case to the Secretary for consideration of this new evidence. It is unclear whether Ms. Redfearn seeks review of the district c ourt’s decision declining to remand for consideration of these records. -5- Ms. Redfearn’s list of medications included Zoloft for “nervous[ness]/ depression.” Appellant’s Supp. App. at 206. The A LJ asked Ms. Redfearn about the Zoloft at the hearing. In response to the ALJ’ s questions, she stated that the Zoloft helped her nervousness and depression. She did not complete her sentence. Id. at 45. She also stated that the medication left h er drowsy, id. at 46, and that she could not hold her train of thought very long and had periods of time where she went “totally blank” and forgot what she was go ing to say, id. at 45. The ALJ commented that it was unusual that Ms. Redf earn was taking antidepressant medication without any evidence of p sychiatric or psychological treatment in the record. Id. at 63-64. 1 Apparently, he accepted without further inquiry her husband’s explanation that she took the medication to help her with “nerves” associated with menopause. Id. at 63. There was evidence in the record that Dr. Choteau had previously prescribed estrogenfor this purpose. Id. at 136-37. The ALJ did not order a consultative exami nation or complete a PRT form, and made no mention of depression in his deci sion. The evidence of-6-

depression in this record, however, including the t estimony at the hearing, required the ALJ to further develop the record conc erning depression, see Carter , 73 F.2d at 1021-22, and we must remand for this purpose. Finally, Ms. Redfearn contends that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate her complaints of pain. She argues that the ALJ’s eval uation was based on several mistaken factual assumptions: that she was no long er receiving medical care or treatment for pain, that she took no medication oth er than over-the-counter pain remedies, and that she did not use a crutch or cane

. Having reviewed the record, we hold that the ALJ’s factual findings on these points are supported by substantial evidence. On remand, after further development of the record, the ALJ should consider whether Ms. Redfearn suffers from an affec tive disorder, see 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.04, or a nonexertio nal mental impairment. Her mental impairments, if any, must then be evaluated in combination with her physical impairments and any nonexertional limitati ons. The ALJ should consider her mental impairments, if any, in completing the P RT form, in evaluating her residual functional capacity, and, if necessary, in framing a revised hypothetical question to the vocational expert.-7-

The judgment of the United States District Court fo r the Northern District of Oklahoma is REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with this order and judgm ent. Entered for the Court Michael R. Murphy Circuit Judge