J-S31008-20

J-S31009-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant

v.

KENT OTTO HARTFORD

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1844 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered October 17, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-22-CR-0000338-2018

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant

v.

SHENANE LYNEA RIECO

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1858 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered October 17, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-22-CR-0000209-2018

BEFORE: BOWES, J., DUBOW, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED OCTOBER 26, 2020

The Commonwealth appeals from the October 17, 2019 order granting 

a pre-trial motion to suppress filed by Kent Otto Hartford (“Mr. Hartford”) at 

docket number CP-22-CR-0000338-2018, and joined by co-defendant,
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Shenane Rieco (“Ms. Rieco”) (collectively, the “Defendants”), at docket 

number CP-22-CR-0000209-2018.

1

 After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court has authored a cogent and thorough summary of the 

underlying factual circumstances of this case:

On January 3, 2018, Aishah Calloway (hereinafter “Ms. 

Calloway”), a caseworker with Dauphin County Children and Youth 

Services (hereinafter, “DCCYS”), received a voicemail at 

approximately 1:48 P.M. from a nurse at Women’s Outreach 

Facility stating that [the Defendants] were at the office for [an 

appointment with their child] and Ms. Rieco appeared to be under 

the influence. Ms. Calloway had previously been involved with the 

family on two (2) prior occasions in 2017. However, on January 

3, 2018, she was no longer working with the family, and she had 

previously informed [Mr. Hartford] that she was leaving DCCYS 

and that her last day would be on December 21, 2017. 

Additionally, the child was permitted to reside with [Mr. Hartford] 

and Ms. Rieco in their residence so long as DCCYS was able to 

perform two (2) unannounced visits per week.

. . . . When Ms. Calloway received the voicemail from the nurse 

at Women’s Outreach, she contacted the supervisor of the ongoing 

caseworker, Heather Gutshall (hereinafter “Ms. Gutshall”) 

assigned to the family. Since the ongoing caseworker was out of 

the office on vacation, Ms. Gutshall asked Ms. Calloway to call the 

nurse back for further information. Ms. Calloway called the nurse 

and was informed that Ms. Rieco’s behavior appeared more erratic 

than normal and at one point during the appointment the nurse 

had to hold the child tighter because Ms. Rieco bumped into her 

and almost knocked the child out of her hands. The nurse did not 

____________________________________________

1

 The above-captioned appeals stem from the same events, and the charges 

against the Defendants are identical. Moreover, the issues and arguments 

raised by the Commonwealth in both cases are identical. Accordingly, we 

have sua sponte consolidated these appeals for the sake of judicial efficiency. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 513 (“Where there is more than one appeal from the same 

order, or where the same question is involved in two or more appeals in 

different cases, the appellate court may, in its discretion, order them to be 

argued together in all particulars as if but a single appeal.”).
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indicate how long she observed Ms. Rieco nor whether she had 

any conversations with Ms. Rieco. [Mr. Hartford] was also present 

at the appointment and there were no concerns with his 

appearance or behavior.

Ms. Calloway then relayed the information she received from the 

nurse to Ms. Gutshall, who requested that she go to the home. 

While on her way to the residence, Ms. Calloway contacted 

Detective Ashley Baluh (hereinafter, “Detective Baluh”) of the 

Swatara Township Police Department to inform her of the call from 

the nurse and that she was on her way to [Mr. Hartford’s] 

residence. Detective Baluh stated she would send a patrol unit to 

assist Ms. Calloway.

Ms. Calloway arrived at [Mr. Hartford’s] residence on or about 

3:25 P.M. She knocked on the door, identified herself and stated 

that the ongoing caseworker was out of the office. No one 

answered the door. However, Ms. Calloway testified that she 

heard someone whisper “don’t open the door[,]” but was unable 

to state whether the voice was male or female. Ms. Calloway 

attempted to contact [Mr. Hartford] and left him a voicemail 

stating that she was there for a visit and was outside the home 

and could hear voices coming from inside. She then called Ms. 

Rieco and left a similar voicemail. At some point, two (2) patrol 

officers arrived on scene. One of the officers ran the license plate 

of a vehicle parked in front of the residence, which was registered 

to [Mr. Hartford]. The hood of the vehicle was still warm.

Ms. Calloway sent another text message to [Mr. Hartford] stating 

that she [was] outside the residence, [and could] hear them 

moving inside. She then contacted police to gain access to 

the home.

 [Mr. Hartford] responded via text message that he, Ms. 

Rieco and the child were not home and had left for Tioga County 

from their appointment. Ms. Calloway responded via text 

message that the police were on the way to verify – [Mr. Hartford] 

never responded.

At some point, [Mr. Hartford] called DCCYS and was essentially 

on a conference call with Matthew Wallace, Ms. Calloway’s 

supervisor, Richard Vukmanic, DCCYS assistant administrator, 

and Michelle Rush, DCCYS director. Ms. Calloway was informed 

that [Mr. Hartford] initially stated that they left from the 

appointment for Tioga County and when challenged, changed his 

story to state that they never returned home to drop the vehicle 
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off because someone else picked them up. After being at the 

home for some time with no success o[f] making contact with [Mr. 

Hartford] or the child, Ms. Calloway contacted Detective Baluh 

who stated that she would contact the District Attorney.

Detective Baluh arrived on the scene between 3:54 P.M. and 4:14 

P.M. Detective Baluh was also involved with the family on the 

same two (2) prior occasions that Ms. Calloway described. Prior 

to her arrival, Detective Baluh had contacted Mr. Mann from 

Pennsylvania Probation and Parole, who supervises [Mr. Hartford],

to see if he could get in contact with [Mr. Hartford] and persuade 

him to open the door. She spoke with Mr. Mann a second time to 

see if he was able to get ahold of [Mr. Hartford]. [Mr. Mann] was 

unable to reach [Mr. Hartford], but stated that if his vehicle was 

there then they were home. Detective Baluh then informed Mr. 

Mann what the nurse had reported and he responded that it made 

sense to him because [Mr. Hartford] was using again. She did not 

ask Mr. Mann the timeframe of when he believed [Mr. Hartford] 

was using nor did she ask what drug he was allegedly using. 

Detective Baluh assumed [Mr. Hartford] was using at that time 

because Mr. Mann used the present tense.

Detective Baluh testified that the decision to force entry into the 

residence was made at 6:29 P.M. – almost three (3) hours after 

Ms. Calloway’s arrival at the residence. The decision was based 

on the information from the nurse (that Ms. Rieco was under the 

influence and almost knocked the child out of the nurse’s arm[s]), 

that [Mr. Hartford] was lying about their whereabouts, the 

comment by Mr. Mann that [Mr. Hartford] was “using again,” and 

the two prior contacts with the family in 2017. After officers 

forced entry intro the home, Detective Baluh went inside to locate 

the child, but was unsuccessful. However, Detective Baluh noted 

that the apartment was warm, the television was on, and there 

was evidence that baby bottles had been recently made. Ms. 

Calloway then informed her that [Mr. Hartford] had previously told 

her that there is a hidden door that connects their apartment to 

the apartment next door. The [hidden] door was eventually 

located and [Mr. Hartford], Ms. Rieco, and the child were located 

huddled in the corner under the door. Detective Baluh then made 

the decision to take the child into protective custody.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/13/19, at 2-6 (internal citations, quotation marks, and 

footnotes omitted; emphasis in original).
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As a result of these above-described events, the Defendants were 

individually charged with intimidation or obstruction in a child abuse case and 

endangering the welfare of children. The Dauphin County Public Defender’s 

Office represented Ms. Rieco, and conflict counsel was appointed to represent

Mr. Hartford. On June 28, 2019, the Defendants filed an omnibus pre-trial 

motion arguing, inter alia, that the warrantless entry into their apartment by 

law enforcement was unconstitutional and not properly supported by either 

probable cause or exigent circumstances. See Mr. Hartford’s Omnibus PreTrial Motion, 6/28/19, at ¶¶ 1-10; see also N.T. Suppression Hearing, 

8/22/19, at 3. Consequently, the Defendants requested the suppression of 

“virtually all evidence obtained by [DCCYS] and/or law enforcement.” Id. at 

¶ 10.

On August 22, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on Mr. Hartford’s 

suppression motion at which Ms. Calloway, Detective Baluh, and Lieutenant 

Timothy Shatto testified for the Commonwealth. See N.T. Suppression 

Hearing, 8/22/19, at 5-73. On October 17, 2019, the trial court granted Mr. 

Hartford’s suppression motion, holding as follows: 

[T]he Commonwealth failed to prove sufficient exigent 

circumstances to justify the warrantless entry into the home. The 

evidence adduced at the pretrial hearing indicates that there was

ample time for law enforcement to obtain a search warrant for the 

residence from a neutral and detached magistrate. Further, there 

was insufficient evidence to prove the existence of an imminent 

threat of harm. Therefore, all evidence obtained from the illegal 

entry into the residence is hereby SUPPRESSED.
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Order, 10/17/19, at 1. On November 12, 2019, the Commonwealth filed a 

timely notice of appeal.2 The trial court did not order the Commonwealth to 

file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and no such statement was filed. Nonetheless, the trial 

court authored a comprehensive Rule 1925(a) opinion.

The Commonwealth has raised a single issue for our consideration:

“Whether the lower court erred in granting [Mr. Hartford’s] pretrial motion to 

suppress where law enforcement officers possessed probable cause and 

exigent circumstances to enter the house, and were also acting pursuant to 

the public servant exception to the community caretaking doctrine?” 

Commonwealth’s brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Our standard and scope of review in this context are well-established:

When the Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order, we 

follow a clearly defined standard of review and consider only the 

evidence from the defendant’s witnesses together with the 

evidence of the prosecution that, when read in the context of the 

entire record, remains uncontradicted. The suppression court’s 

findings of fact bind an appellate court if the record supports those 

findings. The suppression court’s conclusions of law, however, are 

not binding on an appellate court, whose duty is to determine if 

the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.

Commonwealth v. Korn, 139 A.3d 249, 252-53 (Pa.Super. 2016). Thus, 

“[o]ur standard of review is restricted to establishing whether the record 

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2

 Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 904(e), the Commonwealth certified that the order 

substantially handicapped the prosecution.
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supports the suppression court’s factual findings; however, we maintain de 

novo review over the suppression court’s legal conclusions.” Id. at 253.

Both the U.S. Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee 

an individual’s freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S.

CONST. Art. IV, PA. CONST. Art. I, § 8. This case arose in the context of an 

investigation of suspected child abuse being conducted by Ms. Calloway on 

behalf of DCCYS. This Court has held that the relevant constitutional 

protections against unreasonable searches and seizures applies equally “to an 

investigation by a children and youth agency caseworker.” In re Petition to 

Compel Cooperation with Child Abuse Investigation, 875 A.2d 365, 373-

74 (Pa.Super. 2005). Consequently, “[i]n a private home, searches and 

seizures without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable[.]” 

Commonwealth v. Roland, 637 A.2d 269, (Pa. 1994). 

The following legal principles guide our review:

“The law of search and seizure remains focused on the delicate 

balance of protecting the right of citizens to be free from 

unreasonable searches and seizures and protecting the safety of 

our citizens and police officers by allowing police to make limited 

intrusions on citizens while investigating crime.” 

Commonwealth v. Bostick, 958 A.2d 543, 556 (Pa.Super.2008) 

(citations and quotations marks omitted). It is well established 

that “probable cause alone will not support a warrantless search 

or arrest in a residence . . . unless some exception to the warrant 

requirement is also present . . . . [A]bsent consent or exigent 

circumstances, private homes may not be constitutionally entered 

to conduct a search or to effectuate an arrest without a warrant, 

even where probable cause exists.” Commonwealth v. 

Santiago, 736 A.2d 624, 631 (Pa.Super.1999) . . . .
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Commonwealth v. Johnson, 68 A.3d 930, 935-36 (Pa.Super. 2013). “Thus, 

a dual inquiry, both parts requiring affirmative answers[,] must be made: first, 

whether there existed probable cause to search; and secondly, whether 

exigent circumstances can be found to excuse the obtaining of a warrant.” 

Commonwealth v. Wright, 961 A.2d 119, 137 (Pa. 2008) (internal citation 

and quotation marks omitted).

3

The Commonwealth’s substantive argument is succinct: 

Commonwealth respectfully submits that law enforcement officers 

not only possessed probable cause and exigent circumstances to 

justify their entry, but also were justified under the public servant 

exception to the community caretaking doctrine where they were 

able to point to specific, objective, and articulable facts that 

reasonable suggested to the experienced officers that the child 

was in need of assistance due to her parents’ intoxication. This 

was supported by their deceptive claims in multiple phone 

calls/text messages, their increasingly erratic behavior, and the 

officer’s knowledge of [the Defendants’] previous endangering 

behavior towards [the child].[4] Upon learning from Agent Mann 

that [Mr.] Hartford was “using again,” it became clear that 

immediate entry into the home was necessary to ensure the safety 

of [the child]. Probable cause and exigent circumstances 

concerning [the child’s] safety existed to allow for warrantless 

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3

 We also note that “[t]he expectation of privacy protected [by] the United 

States and Pennsylvania Constitutions has been held to be greatest in one’s 

home.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 68 A.3d 930, 936 (Pa.Super. 2013)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

4 The only evidence presented at the suppression hearing regarding the 

Defendants’ “endangering behavior” was that the child had previously suffered 

a broken arm, which was the result of the Defendants’ negligent supervision. 

See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 8/22/19, at 6-7, 19-20. Thereafter, there was 

a second incident involving the child being in Defendants’ custody while she 

was supposed to be in Tioga County with her maternal grandmother. Id. at 

9. On January 3, 2018, the child was properly in the Defendants’ custody.
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police entry into the [Defendants’] home given the information 

[Detective] Baluh knew at the time of entry.

Commonwealth’s brief at 14-15. We disagree.

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court concluded that the 

Commonwealth failed to establish either probable cause or exigent 

circumstances to justify their warrantless entry into the Defendants’ home. 

See Trial Court Opinion, 12/13/19, at 10-11. We begin by reviewing the trial 

court’s conclusion that the Commonwealth lacked probable cause to suspect 

child abuse in the instant case. Accord Wright, supra at 137. For our 

purposes, probable cause exists “where the facts and circumstances within 

the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant person of reasonable caution 

in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” 

Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 935 A.2d 1275, 1284 (Pa. 2007). This 

inquiry requires us to view the totality of the circumstances presented. Id.

The trial court discussed probable cause, as follows:

The only allegation received by DCCYS was that [the Defendants]

were present for the child’s medical appointment and Ms. Rieco 

appeared to be under the influence and bumped into a nurse who 

was holding the child. Further, there was no specificity as to the 

degree of Ms. Rieco’s impairment or how such impairment caused 

the child to be abused or neglected. There was also no testimony 

that there was a link between the alleged abuse/neglect and [Mr. 

Hartford’s] home. Notably, there were no reported concerns 

regarding [Mr. Hartford], who was also present for the 

appointment.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/13/19, at 10. 
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This assessment is fully supported by the certified record. The only 

testimony directly speaking to potential child abuse in this case was the report

that Ms. Rieco’s behavior was “more erratic” than usual during a medical 

appointment, and that she had “almost knocked [the child] out of the nurse’s 

hands.” See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 8/22/19, at 11. This report may have 

raised some colorable suspicion that Ms. Rieco was intoxicated while in the 

presence of the child, but it was not sufficient to establish probable cause of 

child abuse.5 Specifically, we find this case fairly analogous to Interest of 

D.R., 216 A.3d 286 (Pa.Super. 2019).

6

 

In that case, Fayette County Children and Youth Services Agency 

(“CYS”), “received three separate reports of Father being under the influence 

of an unknown substance,” including one instance when he “was accompanied 

____________________________________________

5

 Where “[a] subject of the report of suspected child abuse refuses to 

cooperate with the county agency in an investigation, and the county agency 

is unable to determine whether the child is at risk,” the proper remedy is to 

petition the court. See 55 Pa. Code § 3490.73(2); see also In re Petition 

to Compel Cooperation with Child Abuse Investigation, 875 A.2d 365, 

377 (Pa.Super. 2005) (“As we interpret the statute and agency regulations, 

[the county agency] must file a verified petition alleging facts amounting to 

probable cause to believe that an act of child abuse or neglect has occurred 

and evidence relating to such abuse will be found in the home.”). Instantly, 

the Commonwealth did not file any such petition.

6

 Interest of D.R., 216 A.3d 286 (Pa.Super. 2019), does not arise in the 

context of a warrantless entry into a home by law enforcement. As discussed 

further infra, it concerns whether probable cause existed to compel an 

involuntary home inspection. We read this case for the limited proposition 

that mere allegations of a parent’s intoxication in the presence of a child do 

not, alone, give rise to probable cause of child abuse.
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by one of his five children.” Id. at 289. CYS was unable to corroborate these 

allegations, but sought to compel both parents to submit to, inter alia, an 

involuntary home inspection. Thereafter, the court of common pleas directed 

the parents to comply with the involuntary home inspection or face sanctions.

On appeal, this Court concluded that CYS could not demonstrate 

probable cause to suspect child abuse based upon the uncorroborated 

allegations of Father’s intoxication: 

[CYS] did not allege sufficient facts to warrant compelled 

compliance. Here, while there were three separate reports 

regarding Father’s alleged intoxication, none contained any 

specificity regarding the degree or type of impairment, nor alleged 

how such impairment caused any of the children to be abused or 

neglected.

. . .

[CYS] did not allege any concerns with Mother, . . . . And critically, 

[CYS] did not allege a link between the alleged abuse/neglect and 

the parents’ home. Nor did [CYS] allege exigent circumstances; 

in fact, the allegations were months old. It appears here that CYS 

merely sought compliance so that they could close the 

investigation.

Id. at 295. Thus, we concluded that “[t]hese facts do not constitute a 

sufficient foundation for a finding of probable child abuse[.]” Id.

The instant allegations concerning Ms. Rieco that formed the basis for 

the Commonwealth’s claim of probable cause are strikingly similar to those 

that we disapproved of in Interest of D.R. At a basic level, the nature and 

extent of Ms. Rieco’s alleged intoxication was not described with any specificity 

by the reporting party. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 8/22/19, at 10-11 
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(stating only that Ms. Rieco “appeared to be under the influence” during the 

child’s appointment). More importantly, there was no evident connection 

between Ms. Rieco’s alleged intoxication and the immediate concerns of child 

abuse. Id. at 11 (stating that the caller just wanted to “ensure that the child 

was safe,” but failing to articulate how the child was in danger). Mere concern 

about Ms. Rieco jostling the nurse is not indicative of any immediate danger

to the child, particularly where another parent is present.

7

Based upon the foregoing discussion, we discern no legal error or abuse 

of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that there was no probable cause 

to support the at-issue warrantless entry. Accord Interest of D.R., supra

at 295; see also In re Petition to Compel Cooperation with Child Abuse 

Investigation, 875 A.2d 365, 378 (Pa.Super. 2005) (concluding that an 

uncorroborated telephone tip alleging potential child abuse was “insufficient” 

to compel parents “to submit to a search of their home”). In the absence of 

probable cause, the warrantless entry in this case cannot be ratified under 

Pennsylvania law.8 Accord Wright, supra at 137. 

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7

 The only allegation related to Mr. Hartford’s alleged drug use was Mr. Mann’s 

statement to Detective Baluh that he was “using” an unspecified substance. 

See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 8/22/19, at 49. There was no allegation or 

suggestion that Mr. Hartford was intoxicated on the day in question.

8

 As a result of the nature our holding, we need not assess whether exigent 

circumstances existed in this case. However, we note that the Defendants’ 

“deceptive claims” and “erratic behavior” concerning their whereabouts only 

began once law enforcement and DCCYS began to demand entry into their
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Setting aside the threadbare probable cause in this case, the 

Commonwealth has argued in the alternative that the “emergency aid 

doctrine” to the “community-caretaking doctrine” should apply in these 

circumstances. This doctrine was recognized by our Supreme Court in 

Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 174 A.3d 609 (Pa. 2017), and permits 

“certain warrantless actions by police officers” so long as they are motivated 

by “a desire to render aid or assistance, rather than the investigation of 

criminal activity.” Commonwealth v. Schneider, ___ A.3d ___, 2020 WL 

5405426 (Pa.Super. 2020). In order for this exception to apply, two elements 

must be established: (1) “police officers must be able to point to specific, 

objective, and articulable facts that would reasonably suggest to an 

experienced officer that a citizen is in need of assistance”; and (2) “the police 

caretaking action must be independent from the detection, investigation, and 

acquisition of criminal evidence.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 194 A.3d 

625, 633-34 (Pa.Super. 2018). Neither prong has been satisfied here.

As discussed above, there are few indicia of an emergency in this case. 

Viewed in the proper light, the facts available to law enforcement merely 

suggested that Ms. Reico may have been intoxicated in the presence of child 

____________________________________________

home without a warrant. “Police cannot rely upon exigent circumstances to 

justify a warrantless entry where the exigency derives from their own actions.” 

Commonwealth v. Duke, 208 A.3d 465, 470 (Pa.Super. 2019).
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earlier that day. There was simply nothing in the situation to objectively 

suggest that immediate and emergency intervention was necessary. 

Even assuming, arguendo, that the first element is satisfied, the 

investigation in this matter was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to 

investigate suspected narcotics use by the Defendants. Indeed, it was only 

after suspicions were raised regarding both Defendants’ suspected drug use 

that a decision was made to breach the Defendants’ home. See N.T. 

Suppression Hearing, 8/22/19, at 49-50. 

Moreover, the Commonwealth’s arguments concerning emergency and 

exigency are conclusively belied by the timeline of events in this case. If the 

Commonwealth objectively believed that the child was in immediate danger 

and required assistance, why did the officers and officials wait nearly three 

hours before forcing their way into the Defendants’ apartment? During that 

time, the Commonwealth did not learn any new information regarding the 

child’s status to suggest immediate danger. It is entirely unclear why the 

Commonwealth did not simply seek a search warrant from a neutral 

magistrate, or petition for a court order of compliance. Accord In re Petition 

to Compel Cooperation with Child Abuse Investigation, supra at 380 

(“[The county agency’s] responsibilities . . . to investigate each and every 

allegation of child abuse/neglect . . . do not trump an individual’s constitutional 

rights under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution.”).
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No relief is due on the Commonwealth’s claim.

Order affirmed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/26/2020