Initial Decision Release No. 1340

Administrative Proceeding

File No. 3-17650

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Before the

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Washington, D.C. 20549

In the Matter of

Joe Lawler

Initial Decision of Default

December 21, 2018

Appearance: Polly Atkinson for the Division of Enforcement,

Securities and Exchange Commission

Before: James E. Grimes, Administrative Law Judge

Summary

I grant the Division of Enforcement’s motion for default and sanctions. 

Respondent Joe Lawler is barred from associating with a broker, dealer, 

investment adviser, municipal securities dealer, municipal advisor, transfer 

agent, or nationally recognized statistical rating organization, and from 

participating in an offering of penny stock.

Procedural Background

The Securities and Exchange Commission initiated this proceeding in 

October 2016, when it issued an order instituting proceedings (OIP) under 

Section 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

1 This is a follow-on 

proceeding based on a final judgment entered in May 2016 by the United 

States District Court for the District of New Mexico.

2 The Division alleges 

that from May 2008 through August 2012 Lawler offered and sold the

 

1 OIP at 1; see 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b).

2 See SEC v. Projaris Mgmt., LLC, No. 1:13-cv-849 (D.N.M.).
2

securities of a pooled investment vehicle, and received compensation for each 

transaction in which investors bought the securities.3 During that time 

period, he was neither registered with the Commission nor associated with 

any person or entity registered with the Commission.4 The Division alleges 

that the district court enjoined Lawler in a consent judgment from violating

the registration and antifraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 and the 

Exchange Act.

5 And the OIP paraphrases the Commission’s allegations from 

its complaint in the district court.

6

A different administrative law judge originally presided over this 

proceeding and issued an initial decision of default.

7 But the Commission 

vacated that decision following the Supreme Court’s decision in Lucia v. 

SEC,

8 and the matter was reassigned to me to provide Lawler with the 

opportunity for a new hearing.9 Lawler was directed to propose how further 

proceedings should be conducted,10 but he never submitted a proposal or filed 

an answer.11 Only the Division of Enforcement participated in the telephonic 

prehearing conference that I held on October 25, 2018.12 Thereafter, I ordered 

Lawler to show cause why the proceeding should not be determined against 

him due to his failure to answer the OIP or otherwise defend the 

 

3 OIP at 1.

4 Id. at 1.

5 Id. at 1; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a), 77e(c), 77q(a), 78j(b), 78o(a); 17 C.F.R. 

§ 240.10b-5.

6 OIP at 1–2. 

7 Joe Lawler, Initial Decision Release No. 1117, 2017 SEC LEXIS 887

(ALJ Mar. 21, 2017).

8 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018); see Pending Admin. Proc., Securities Act of 1933 

Release No. 10536, 2018 SEC LEXIS 2058, at *2–3 (Aug. 22, 2018).

9 Pending Admin. Proc., Admin. Proc. Rulings Release No. 5955, 2018 SEC 

LEXIS 2264, at *2–3 (ALJ Sept. 12, 2018).

10 Joe Lawler, Admin. Proc. Rulings Release No. 6088, 2018 SEC LEXIS 

2600, at *1 (ALJ Sept. 26, 2018).

11 Joe Lawler, Admin. Proc. Rulings Release No. 6275, 2018 SEC LEXIS 

3037, at *1 (ALJ Nov. 1, 2018).

12 Id. at 1.
3

proceeding.13 The Division then filed a motion for default and sanctions, 

supported by a declaration and six exhibits.

14 Lawler did not file an 

opposition to the Division’s motion. In conducting this proceeding and 

considering the Division’s motion, I gave no weight to the opinions, orders, or 

rulings issued by the prior administrative law judge.15

Findings of Fact

The findings and conclusions in this initial decision are based on the 

record and on facts officially noticed.16 Because Lawler is in default, I have

deemed true the allegations in the OIP and, consistent with Commission 

precedent, will rely on those allegations in conjunction with other evidence in 

the record developed since the proceeding was reassigned to me.

17 That other 

evidence includes the factual allegations admitted when Lawler pleaded 

guilty to twelve counts of wire fraud in a criminal action in the United States 

District Court for the District of New Mexico,18 and the factual allegations in 

the civil complaint, which Lawler agreed that he could neither “contest” nor 

 

13 Id.

14 The exhibits are cited as “Div. Ex. _” using the documents’ internal 

pagination.

15 See Pending Admin. Proc., 2018 SEC LEXIS 2058, at *4.

16 17 C.F.R. § 201.323. 

17 See Pending Admin. Proc., 2018 SEC LEXIS 2058, at *4; see also 17 

C.F.R. § 201.155(a); David E. Lynch, Exchange Act Release No. 46439, 2002 

WL 1997953, at *1 & n.12 (Aug. 30, 2002) (instructing that, “if additional 

evidence is adduced in a proceeding against a respondent” who is in default, 

“the decisionmaker properly should consider that evidence in the 

determination of the proceeding”).

18 Lawler did not enter a plea stipulating to only certain allegations, and 

nothing indicates that he objected to certain allegations. See, e.g., United 

States v. White, 408 F.3d 399, 402–03 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding that a 

defendant’s guilty plea did not constitute an admission to facts that the 

defendant disavowed during his plea hearing); Valansi v. Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 

203, 216 n.10 (3d Cir. 2002) (recognizing that a defendant “may . . . plead 

guilty to only one of the allegations required to prove an element of her 

crime”). Rather, he pleaded guilty to all twelve counts of a superseding 

indictment. See Div. Exs. 1–3. In that circumstance, he “admitted all the 

well-pleaded facts in the indictment by pleading guilty.” United States v. Hill, 

53 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
4

claim that he has not admitted.19 In making the findings below, I have 

applied preponderance of the evidence as the standard of proof.20 

In 2008, Joe Lawler opened Victory Partners Financial, which offered 

and sold securities in the form of investments in a trust, which in turn 

claimed to invest in metals, commodities, and a fund focused on overseas 

investments.21

By the end of 2010, Lawler had ceased operating Victory and transferred 

all investment accounts to Projaris Management, LLC, which he created in 

September 2010.22 Although Lawler’s name does not appear on Projaris’s

Articles of Organization, Lawler exercised sole control over Projaris’s

operation.23 Between October 2010 and April 2012, Lawler caused his sons to 

open multiple bank accounts for Projaris—accounts that he similarly 

exercised sole control over, despite not being named on them.24

Lawler represented to prospective investors in Projaris that he would 

invest their funds in metals, real estate, or a REIT (Real Estate Investment 

Trust).25 Lawler further represented that the trust would grow at a rate of 

twelve to fifteen percent annually, that risk was “limited,” that principal 

return was guaranteed, that there were no tax consequences, that there were 

 

19 Div. Ex. 4 at 4; see Div. Exs. 4–6; Siris v. SEC, 773 F.3d 89, 96 (D.C. Cir. 

2014) (“Whether or not issues established in the consent judgment were 

‘actually litigated’ for purposes of [collateral] estoppel, the Commission’s 

application of factual preclusion in the follow-on proceeding was appropriate 

because the judgment unambiguously barred Siris from making any future 

challenge to the allegations in the [civil] complaint.”); Marshall E. Melton, 

Investment Advisers Act of 1940 Release No. 2151, 2003 WL 21729839, at *9 

(July 25, 2003); 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(e).

20 See John Francis D’Acquisto, Advisers Act Release No. 1696, 1998 WL 

34300389, at *2 (Jan. 21, 1998).

21 Div. Ex. 5 at 6–7.

22 Id. at 7–8.

23 Div. Ex. 2 at 1; see Div. Ex. 5 at 5, 8.

24 Div. Ex. 2 at 1–2.

25 Id. at 3; Div. Ex. 5 at 8.
5

no fees apart from a set-up fee, and that a portion of investors’ funds would 

be donated to a charity of investors’ choice.

26

These representations were knowingly or recklessly false. Lawler never 

created a REIT, nor did he invest funds in real estate.27 Indeed, of the $1.4 

million Victory and Projaris received for investment, only about $600,000 was 

invested as represented.28 The approximately $835,000 in remaining funds 

were used to perpetuate the scheme or were misappropriated by Lawler and 

his codefendants in the civil case.

29 Approximately $429,000 of the remaining 

funds were used by Lawler and his family for daily living expenses and to 

support their lifestyle.30 Lawler and his family also spent approximately 

$172,000 on unapproved business ventures and undisclosed trading.31

Approximately $199,000 was used to make Ponzi-style payments to 

withdrawing investors.32 If an investor complained of the investment’s lack of 

performance and threatened to report him, Lawler would use funds from 

another Projaris investor to pay off the concerned investor.33 After various 

investors complained, Lawler conducted a conference call in July 2014, with 

the complaining investors and falsely said he could not return their 

 

26 Div. Ex. 2 at 2–3; Div. Ex. 5 at 8–9, 13–14.

27 Div. Ex. 2 at 3.

28 Div. Ex. 5 at 15; see Div. Ex. 2 at 2. Lawler and Projaris are not even 

able to account for all of the $600,000 that was purportedly invested. Div. 

Ex. 5 at 15.

29 Div. Ex. 5 at 16.

30 Id. These expenses included auto purchases, personal rent and utilities, 

travel, restaurants and bars, groceries, department stores, and expenses 

related to a defaulted mortgage. Id. at 16–17.

31 Id. at 16. The unapproved trading accounted for $129,000 of lost investor 

money. Id. The trades included unsuccessful margin trading for metals and 

unsuccessful equities trading. Id. Another $43,000 was spent on real estate 

training seminars, unbeknownst to investors. Id.

32 Id.

33 Id. at 15–16.
6

investments because the assets were tied up in real estate.34 Finally, 

approximately $35,000 was used to pay commissions for soliciting investors.35

Lawler therefore knew that the representations regarding returns, lack 

of fees, and charitable donations were false because he was knowingly 

operating a Ponzi scheme and had access to the bank statements while 

directing how the money in the bank accounts should be spent.36 He

comingled investors’ funds without regard to each investor’s investment 

objectives or risk tolerance.37 In addition, Lawler either knew or was reckless 

in not knowing that Projaris was not able to legitimately accept IRA rollovers 

under IRS rules but he nevertheless successfully targeted investors’ 

retirement accounts.

38

Once investors were pulled into the scheme, Lawler created inflated 

account statements that misrepresented the allocation of each investor’s 

assets in the trust, how many “units” the investor owned in each category, 

the current value of the investment, and the interest accrued.39 The 

manufactured account statements caused some investors to make additional 

investments in the trust.40

In June 2015, Lawler pleaded guilty to the superseding indictment in the 

criminal prosecution against him.

41 He was sentenced in November 2015 to 

thirty-six months in prison and restitution of $478,511.37 to five identified 

victims.42

 

34 Div. Ex. 2 at 3.

35 Pamela Hass received commissions as the National Sales Director of 

Projaris for soliciting investors and inviting them to participate in calls with 

Joe Lawler, among other duties. Div. Ex. 5 at 17. 

36 Div. Ex. 2 at 3; Div. Ex. 5 at 14–15.

37 Div. Ex. 5 at 9–10.

38 Div. Ex. 2 at 3; Div. Ex. 5 at 8–9, 14–15.

39 Div. Ex. 5 at 13.

40 Id.

41 Div. Ex. 1.

42 Div. Ex. 3 at 3, 6.
7

In January 2016, Lawler consented to the entry of injunctions against 

him in the civil case.

43 And in May 2016, the district court enjoined Lawler 

from violating Sections 5(a), 5(c), and 17(a) of the Securities Act and Sections 

10(b) and 15(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.

44 The court 

also found that Lawler profited from his scheme in the amount of $835,000.

45

It thus found him jointly and severally liable to disgorge that amount, plus 

$85,146 in interest.

46 The court further ordered him to pay a civil monetary 

penalty of $150,000.

47

Conclusions of Law

The Exchange Act gives the Commission authority to impose collateral 

and penny stock bars48 against Lawler if, as is relevant here, (1) he was 

associated with or seeking to become associated with a broker or dealer at the

time of his misconduct; (2) he was enjoined “from engaging in or continuing 

any conduct or practice . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any 

security”; and (3) imposing a bar is in the public interest.49 

As to the first element, Lawler acted as an unregistered broker-dealer 

throughout the time of his misconduct. A broker is a “person engaged in the 

 

43 Div. Ex. 4.

44 Div. Ex. 6.

45 Id. at 4.

46 Id.

47 Id.

48 A collateral bar, also referred to as an industry bar, is a bar that 

prevents an individual from participating in the securities industry in 

capacities in addition to those in which the person was participating at the 

time of his or her misconduct. See Toby G. Scammell, Advisers Act Release 

No. 3961, 2014 WL 5493265, at *1 & n.1 (Oct. 29, 2014).

49 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(C), (6)(A)(iii). Although Lawler’s misconduct began 

before Congress conferred the authority to impose a collateral bar in the 

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 

111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), Lawler’s operation of Projaris as part of his 

ongoing fraudulent scheme occurred after collateral bars were authorized. 

See Bartko v. SEC, 845 F.3d 1217, 1220–21, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding 

that a collateral bar cannot be imposed for wrongdoing committed before July 

22, 2010, the effective date of Dodd-Frank). 
8

business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others,”

while a dealer trades on his own account.50 Lawler did the former for over 

four years, throughout the period of his misconduct.51 He held himself out as 

a broker to his investors, and he offered and sold—that is, effected 

transactions in—securities to investors around the United States.

52 In 

addition, Lawler was compensated each time investors bought the securities, 

which is “one of the hallmarks of being a broker-dealer.”53

As to the second element, when the district court permanently enjoined 

Lawler from violating the registration and antifraud provisions of the federal 

securities laws, it necessarily enjoined him from “engaging in . . . conduct . . .

in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”54

That leaves the third element. To determine whether to impose a bar, I 

must consider the public-interest factors discussed in Steadman v. SEC.

55 

The public interest factors include: 

the egregiousness of the respondent’s actions, the 

isolated or recurrent nature of the infraction, the degree 

of scienter involved, the sincerity of the respondent’s 

assurances against future violations, the respondent’s 

recognition of the wrongful nature of his conduct, and 

 

50 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A), (5).

51 See OIP at 1; Div. Ex. 2 at 1; Div. Ex. 5 at 1.

52 OIP at 1; Div. Ex. 5 at 18; see Anthony Fields, CPA, Securities Act 

Release No. 9727, 2015 WL 728005, at *18 (Feb. 20, 2015) (discussing 

“[a]ctivities that are indicative of being a broker”); see also Erik W. Chan, 

Securities Act Release No. 8078, 2002 WL 507022, at *7 n.42 (Apr. 4, 2002) 

(“A person effects transactions if he or she participates in . . . helping an 

issuer to identify potential purchasers of securities, soliciting securities 

transactions, and participating in the order-taking or order-routing process 

(for example, by taking transaction orders from customers).”).

53 James S. Tagliaferri, Securities Act Release No. 10308, 2017 WL 632134, 

at *4 & nn. 27–28 (Feb. 15, 2017) (quoting SEC v. Helms, No. A-13-CV-1036, 

2015 WL 6438872, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2015)); see Div. Ex. 5 at 18.

54 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(4)(C); see Div. Ex. 6.

55 603 F.2d 1126, 1140 (5th Cir. 1979), aff’d on other grounds, 450 U.S. 91 

(1981); see Scammell, 2014 WL 5493265, at *5. 
9

the likelihood that the respondent’s occupation will 

present opportunities for future violations.56

The Commission also considers the deterrent effect of administrative 

sanctions.57 This public interest inquiry is “flexible, and no one factor is 

dispositive.”58 Before imposing a bar, an administrative law judge must 

specifically determine why the Commission’s interests in protecting the 

investing public would be served by imposing an industry bar.

59

In considering the public interest, I am mindful that “in most” cases 

involving fraud, the public-interest analysis will weigh in favor of a “severe 

sanction.”60 And because “[t]he securities industry presents continual 

opportunities for dishonesty and abuse,” it “depends heavily on the integrity 

of its participants and on investors’ confidence.”61

Turning to the Steadman factors, it is evident that the public interest 

and the Commission’s interest in protecting the public weigh in favor of an 

 

56 David R. Wulf, Exchange Act Release No. 77411, 2016 WL 1085661, at 

*4 (Mar. 21, 2016) (citing Vladimir Boris Bugarski, Exchange Act Release 

No. 66842, 2012 WL 1377357, at *4 & n.18 (Apr. 20, 2012)).

57 Peter Siris, Exchange Act Release No. 71068, 2013 WL 6528874, at *11 

n.72 (Dec. 12, 2013), pet. denied, 773 F.3d 89 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Although 

relevant, general deterrence is not determinative in assessing whether the 

public interest weighs in favor of imposing a bar. PAZ Sec., Inc. v. SEC, 494 

F.3d 1059, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

58 Gary M. Kornman, Exchange Act Release No. 59403, 2009 WL 367635, 

at *6 (Feb. 13, 2009) (quoting David Henry Disraeli, Securities Act Release 

No. 8880, 2007 WL 4481515, at *15 (Dec. 21, 2007), pet. denied, 334 F. App’x 

334 (D.C. Cir. 2009)), pet. denied, 592 F.3d 173 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

59 Mark Feathers, Exchange Act Release No. 73634, 2014 WL 6449870, at 

*1 (Nov. 18, 2014); see Ross Mandell, Exchange Act Release No. 71668, 2014 

WL 907416, at *2 (Mar. 7, 2014), vacated in part on other grounds, Exchange 

Act Release No. 77935, 2016 WL 3030883 (May 26, 2016).

60 Siris, 2013 WL 6528874, at *11 n.71 (quoting Jeffrey L. Gibson, 

Exchange Act Release No. 57266, 2008 WL 294717, at *7 (Feb. 4, 2008), pet. 

denied, 561 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2009)).

61 Feathers, 2014 WL 6449870, at *3 (alteration in original) (quoting 

Tzemach David Netzer Korem, Exchange Act Release No. 70044, 2013 WL 

3864511, at *6 & n.53 (July 26, 2013)).
10

industry bar. For starters, Lawler operated his business as a Ponzi scheme, 

using later investors’ funds to pay earlier investors who complained about the

nonperformance of their investment.

62

Lawler also deceived investors as to the nature of the trust they were 

investing in. He represented that the trust would grow at a rate of twelve to 

fifteen percent annually, that the trust was an IRA eligible investment, and 

that there were no fees other than a set-up fee.63 None of these assertions 

was remotely accurate.64 

Instead, Lawler used investor funds to benefit himself and his family. He 

used investor funds to pay off a mortgage.

65 He also used investor funds to 

support his and his family’s lifestyle, paying for auto purchases, personal 

rent and utilities, travel, restaurants and bars, groceries, department stores, 

and credit card bills.66 When investors attempted to withdraw their money, 

he paid them off with other investors’ funds.67 Lying to investors while using 

their funds to support one’s lifestyle and run a Ponzi scheme is highly 

egregious conduct. The egregious nature of his conduct is underscored by the 

$478,511.37 in restitution and $835,000 in disgorgement for which he is 

liable.68

Lawler’s conduct was recurrent. By its nature, a Ponzi scheme involves 

recurrent fraud; attracting ever more investors is necessary in order to keep 

the scheme operating. Lawler sold securities to over twenty investors over the 

course of at least four years.

69 

Lawler’s conduct showed a high degree of scienter. It was no accident 

that he used investor funds to fund his lifestyle or pay off a mortgage. Lawler 

did not mistakenly mishandle investor money; he had access to the Victory’s 

 

62 Div. Ex. 2 at 3; Div. Ex. 5 at 16.

63 Div. Ex. 5 at 13–14.

64 Id.

65 Id. at 16–17.

66 Id.

67 Id. at 16.

68 Div. Ex. 3 at 6; Div. Ex. 6 at 4. 

69 Div. Ex. 2 at 1; Div. Ex. 5 at 1, 17.
11

and Projaris’s bank statements and directed how the money in the bank 

accounts should be spent.

70 Therefore, he knew that he was sending out 

fraudulent account statements to investors.

71 Lawler affirmatively and 

intentionally lied to investors and stole their money for his benefit. 

Furthermore, the wire fraud offense to which he pleaded guilty necessarily 

involved intent to defraud,

72 and the antifraud violations of Securities Act

17(a)(1) and Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 necessarily involved 

scienter.73

Given Lawler’s violations, the egregiousness of those violations, the level 

of scienter shown by his conduct, his relatively short period of incarceration,

74

and that Lawler has also failed to make any assurances against future 

violations or show that he recognizes the wrongfulness of his conduct, I 

determine that if Lawler remains in the securities industry, he is likely to 

engage in future misconduct.75 

Finally, imposing a bar will serve the Commission’s interest in deterring 

others from engaging in similar misconduct. 

In sum, Lawler’s egregious conduct harmed investors and if he were able 

to remain in the industry, he would have the opportunity to cause additional 

 

70 Div. Ex. 2 at 1–2; Div. Ex. 5 at 16.

71 See Div. Ex. 5 at 13.

72 See 18 U.S.C. § 1343; United States v. Caldwell, 560 F.3d 1202, 1207 

(10th Cir. 2009); Div. Exs. 1–3.

73 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a)(1), 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; Aaron v. SEC, 

446 U.S. 680, 701–02 (1980); Div. Exs. 4–6.

74 Div. Ex. 3 at 3. Lawler was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 

thirty-six months followed by thirty-six months of supervised release. Id. at 

3–4.

75 See Korem, 2013 WL 3864511, at *6 n.50 (“[T]he existence of a violation 

raises an inference that it will be repeated.” (alteration in original) (quoting 

Geiger v. SEC, 363 F.3d 481, 489 (D.C. Cir. 2004))); cf. John A. Carley, 

Securities Act Release No. 8888, 2008 WL 268598, at *22 (Jan. 31, 2008) 

(determining whether to impose a cease-and-desist order and holding that 

“[o]ur finding that a violation is egregious ‘raises an inference that [the 

misconduct] will be repeated’” (quoting Geiger v. SEC, 363 F.3d at 489)), 

remanded on other grounds sub nom. Zacharias v. SEC, 569 F.3d 458 (D.C. 

Cir. 2009).
12

harm. The Commission’s interest in protecting the investing public would be 

served by imposing an industry and penny stock bar.

Order

The Division of Enforcement’s motion for default and sanctions is 

GRANTED. 

Under Section 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Joe Lawler

is BARRED from associating with a broker, dealer, investment adviser, 

municipal securities dealer, municipal advisor, transfer agent, or nationally 

recognized statistical rating organization, and from participating in an 

offering of penny stock.

This initial decision will become effective in accordance with and subject 

to the provisions of Rule 360.76 Under that rule, a party may file a petition for 

review of this initial decision within twenty-one days after service of the 

initial decision. A party may also file a motion to correct a manifest error of 

fact within ten days of the initial decision, pursuant to Rule 111.77 If a motion 

to correct a manifest error of fact is filed by a party, then a party shall have 

twenty-one days to file a petition for review from the date of the 

undersigned’s order resolving such motion to correct a manifest error of fact.

The initial decision will not become final until the Commission enters an 

order of finality. The Commission will enter an order of finality unless a 

party files a petition for review or motion to correct a manifest error of fact or 

the Commission determines on its own initiative to review the initial decision 

as to a party. If any of these events occurs, the initial decision shall not 

become final as to that party.

Lawler may move to set aside a default. Rule 155(b) permits the 

Commission, at any time, to set aside a default for good cause, in order to 

prevent injustice and on such conditions as may be appropriate.78 A motion to 

set aside a default shall be made within a reasonable time, state the reasons 

for the failure to appear or defend, and specify the nature of the proposed 

defense in the proceeding. Such motion, if filed, should be directed to the 

 

76 See 17 C.F.R. § 201.360.

77 See 17 C.F.R. § 201.111.

78 17 C.F.R. § 201.155(b).
13

Commission, as the hearing officer may only set aside a default “prior to the 

filing of the initial decision.”79

_______________________________

James E. Grimes

Administrative Law Judge

 

79 Id.