alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA

(0) 1947A Hardesty

J. arraguirre

Cherry

2 J. J. was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(3). Moreover, because the State specifically pleaded laches, appellant was required to overcome the rebuttable presumption of prejudice. NRS 34.800(2). Appellant's sole good-cause argument was a mere reference tohis "statement of cause and prejudice" submitted with an earlier postconviction habeas petition. In affirming the denial of each of appellant's prior petitions,see Gallimort v. State, Docket Nos. 33289 & 36826 (Order of Affirmance, August 7, 2001); Gallimort v. State, Docket No. 49438 (October 11, 2007), this court necessarily rejected any good-cause arguments therein such that appellant's instant good-cause claim is barred by the doctrine of the law of the case. See Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 315-16, 535 P.2d 797, 798-99 (1975). Moreover, appellant failed to overcome the presumption of prejudice to the State pursuant to NRS 34.800(2). We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in denying the petition as procedurally barred, and we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

### cc: Hon. Jerome T. Tao, District Judge Jose A. Gallimort Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

3
Case 15-72504-SCS Doc 42 Filed 11/30/17 Entered 11/30/17 13:19:49 Desc MainDocument Page 1 of 1
#### John G. Holland, Appellant, v. Charles Ricketts, Respondent.

Order and judgment reversed and new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide event, upon the authority of *St. Lawrence County National Bank,*v. *Watkins*(153 App. Div. 551). All concurred.
#### Peter M. Keesler, Appellee, v. William E. Washburn, Appellant.

Gen. No. 5281.

Appeals and *errors—effect of absence of assignments of error.*If no assignments of error have been made on the record there is nothing presented for review. An assignment of error on the record, even though an assignment appears in the abstract, is not a mere matter of form to be considered waived, if not objected to, but one of substance.

Action in case for personal injuries. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Henry county; the Hon. Emery C. Graves, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1909.

Appeal dismissed.

Opinion filed March 11, 1910.

’ Nicholas J. Demerath and Sturtz & Ewan, for appellant.

James H. Andrews and Thomas J. Welch, for appellee.

Mr. Justice Thompson

delivered the opinion of the court.

*277Peter M. Keesler began this suit in case against William E. Washburn, to recover damages for injuries suffered by plaintiff, from being struck at a street intersection in the city of Kewanee, on December 7, 1907, by an automobile operated by the defendant. There have been three trials; at the first the jury disagreed; at the second a verdict for plaintiff for $200 was returned; at the third a verdict for $600 was returned in favor of the plaintiff on which judgment was rendered, and the defendant appeals from that judgment.

There is no assignment of errors on the record as required by rule 12 of this court. No assignment of error having been made, there is nothing for us to consider. An assignment of error on the record, even though an assignment appears in the abstract, is not a a mere matter of form to be considered waived, if not objected to but is essential to the consideration of a case by an Appellate Court. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Sanford, 197 Ill. 310; and cases cited in Butters v. C. B. & Q. Ry. Co., *ante,*p. 275. The appeal must therefore be dismissed.

*Appeal dismissed.*
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#### § 16.29 Delegation by Assistant Attorneys General.

With respect to any function that this subpart permits the designee of an Assistant Attorney General to perform, the Assistant Attorneys General are authorized to delegate their authority, in any case or matter or any category of cases or matters, to subordinate division officials or U.S. attorneys, as appropriate.
§ 58.27 Automatic expiration of providers' status as approved providers. ( a ) Except as provided in § 58.28(c), if an approved provider was not an approved provider immediately prior to the date it last obtained approval to be an approved provider, such an approved provider shall cease to be an approved provider six months from the date on which it was approved unless the United States Trustee approves an additional one year period.
( b ) Except as provided in § 58.28(c), if an approved provider was an approved provider immediately prior to the date it last obtained approval to be an approved provider, such a provider shall cease to be an approved provider one year from the date on which it was last approved to be an approved provider unless the United States Trustee approves an additional one year period.
[78 FR 16170, Mar. 14, 2013]
#### E. P. Lawson Co., Inc., Appellant, *v.*Rollin Browne et al., Constituting the State Tax Commission, Respondents.

First Department,

May 21, 1943.

*Edward B. Schulkind*of counsel *(Irving M. Marón*with him on the brief; *Schulkind & Marón,*attorneys), for appellant.

*John P. Powers*of counsel *(Orrin G. Judd*and *William F. McNulty*with him on the brief; *Nathaniel L. Goldstein, Attorney-General,*for respondents.

*184
      *Per Curiam.*

The action is for a declaratory judgment by a resident of New York County asking construction of Tax Law, section 214-a, and only in connection with final relief, for an order restraining defendants from levying the tax. Civil Practice Act, section 879, was not relied on in the notice of motion and it has no application as it relates to temporary and not final injunctions incidental to other relief as to which the Supreme Court has inherent power. The action is not one against a public officer for an official act or omission within the meaning of subdivision 2 of section 184 of the Civil Practice Act. The transactions took place in the county of New York. Considered as a motion under section 187 of the Civil Practice Act the motion should be denied as the moving papers fail to set forth the names of the witnesses or the relevancy of their testimony.

The order appealed from should be reversed, with twenty dollars costs and disbursements, and the motion in all respects denied.

Martin, P. J., Dore and Caldahan, JJ., concur; Townley and Untermyer, JJ., dissent and vote to affirm.

Order reversed, with twenty dollars costs and disbursements, and motion denied.
§ 802.14 Requests for access to records. ( a ) *Submission and processing procedures.* ( 1 ) Requests for any agency record about yourself ordinarily will be processed pursuant to the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a. Such a request must be made in writing and addressed to the FOIA Officer, Office of the General Counsel, Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency, 633 Indiana Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20004. The requester should clearly mark on the face of the letter and the envelope “Privacy Act Request.”
( 2 ) Your request will be considered received as of the date it is received by the Office of the General Counsel. For quickest possible handling, you should mark both your request letter and the envelope “Privacy Act Request.”
( 3 ) You must describe the records that you seek in enough detail to enable Agency personnel to locate them with a reasonable amount of effort. Whenever possible, your request should include specific information about each record sought, such as the date, title or name, author, recipient and subject matter of the record. As a general rule, the more specific you are about the records or type of records that you want, the more likely the Agency will be able to locate the records in response to your request. If a determination is made that your request does not reasonably describe records, the Agency will tell you either what additional information is needed or why your request is otherwise insufficient. You will be given the opportunity to discuss your request so that you may modify it to meet the requirements of this section.
( b ) *Release and review procedures.* Upon written request by an individual to gain access to his or her records which are not otherwise exempted, CSOSA shall permit the individual and, upon the individual's request, a person of his or her choosing to accompany him or her, to review the record and have a copy of all or any portion of the record. If a document contains information exempt from disclosure under the Privacy Act, any reasonably segregable portion of the record will be provided to the requester after deletion of the exempt portions. ( 2 ) A requester will be notified of the decision on the request in writing.
( 3 ) Generally, all Privacy Act requests will be processed in the approximate order of receipt, unless the requester shows exceptional circumstances exist to justify an expedited response (*see* § 802.8).
#### Metropolitan Museum of Art, Appellant, v. Arthur W. Clement, Respondent, et al., Defendants.

Present — Cars-well, Johnston, Adel, Taylor and Lewis, JJ.
§ 71.8 Service of complaint. ( a ) Service of a complaint must be made by certified or registered mail or by delivery in any manner authorized by Rule 4(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Service is complete upon receipt.
( b ) Proof of service, stating the name and address of the person on whom the complaint was served, and the manner and date of service, may be made by ( 1 ) Affidavit of the individual serving the complaint by delivery;
( 2 ) A United States Postal Service return receipt card acknowledging receipt; or
( 3 ) Written acknowledgment of receipt by the defendant or his or her representative.
### §444a. Ascertainment of value of lands offered for exchange; evidence of title

The value of all patented lands within said monument offered for exchange, and the value of the lands of the United States to be given in exchange therefor, shall be ascertained in such manner as the Secretary of the Interior may direct; and the owners of such privately owned lands within said monument shall, before any exchange is effective, furnish the Secretary of the Interior evidence satisfactory to him of title to the patented lands offered in exchange; and lands conveyed to the United States under section 444 of this title shall be and remain a part of the Petrified Forest National Monument.

(May 14, 1930, ch. 271, §2, 46 Stat. 278.)

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Disestablishment of Petrified Forest National Monument

Disestablishment of Petrified Forest National Monument upon establishment of Petrified Forest National Park, see section 119 of this title.
#### § 1200.10 General.

Beginning with grants authorized in fiscal year 2014, to apply for any highway safety grant under 23 U.S.C. Chapter 4, a State shall submit a Highway Safety Plan meeting the requirements of this subpart.
Exhibit 32

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT BY
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Equality Investments,  Inc.,
on Form 10-QSB for the period ending June 30, 2001 as filed with the  Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),  the undersigned,  B.
Stephen Bailey,  Chief Executive Officer and Principal Accounting Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss.
906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,  that to the best of my  knowledge  and
belief:

         1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13 (a) or
15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2. The  information  contained in the Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and result of  operations of the
Company.


Date: April 19, 2004

/s/ B. Stephen Bailey
B. Stephen Bailey
President
(Principal Executive & Accounting Officer)


A signed  original of this written  statement  required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the  electronic  version of this written  statement
has been  provided  to the  Company  and will be  retained  by the  Company  and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
§ 551.162 Smoking generally prohibited. Smoking is generally prohibited in and on the grounds of Bureau institutions and offices, with the following two exceptions: ( a ) Smoking is permitted as part of an authorized inmate religious activity; and
( b ) For Bureau staff and official visitors, smoking is permitted only in smoking areas designated by the Warden.
(No. 78-CC-1181

#### Geraldine Blevins, Claimant, *v.*The State of Illinois, Respondent.

*Opinion filed May 5, 1982.*

Shearer, O’Brien, Blood, Agrella & Boose (Michael O’Brien, of counsel), for Claimant.

William J. Scott, Attorney General (Richard Grossman and Paul Sengpiehl, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for Respondent.

Roe, C.J.

Claimant has brought this action alleging injury to herself as a result of an attack upon her by two inmates of the St. Charles Boys School who escaped from that school immediately prior to the attack and were arrested by the St. Charles Police immediately thereafter.

Shortly after 11:00 p.m. on December 15, 1977, Claimant was attacked in the vestibule of her apartment building by two escapees from the St. Charles School for Boys in an attempted robbery. She was struck on the head a few times with an object wrapped in a towel. She fell to the floor and was then hit in the neck. After that the boys fled.

Respondent produced no evidence to show that it was not negligent in permitting the escape. Therefore, under the rulings of this court in *Kendrick v. State*(1969), 5735, *U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Company v. State,*23 Ill. Ct. Cl. 188, and *Devore v. State*(1979), 76-CC-0195, *166the presumption of negligence arising from the escape stands unrebutted.

Total medical expenses were $170.00 of which Claimant paid $45.00. As a result of the incident she sustained severe pain and suffering. At the time of the hearing two years later she testified she was still experiencing headaches which she attributed to the blows to her head. As a result of the beating Claimant’s ear and jaw were swollen. She suffered severe pain and was unable to work for a week. However, she suffered no loss of income as a result. No doctor, neurologist, psychologist, or other expert testified as to the extent of the injuries. Based on the record, we hereby award Claimant the sum of $1,000.00 (one thousand dollars and no cents).
§ 51.41 Notification of decision not to object. ( a ) The Attorney General shall within the 60-day period allowed notify the submitting authority of a decision to interpose no objection to a submitted change affecting voting.
( b ) The notification shall state that the failure of the Attorney General to object does not bar subsequent litigation to enjoin the enforcement of the change.
( c ) A copy of the notification shall be sent to any party who has commented on the submission or has requested notice of the Attorney General's action thereon.
§ 811.6 Duration of the obligation to register. ( a ) *Lifetime registration.* The registration period for a sex offender who is required to register for life shall end upon the sex offender's death.
( b ) *Term of years registration.* ( 1 ) The registration period for any other sex offender shall end upon the expiration of the sex offender's probation, parole, supervised release, conditional release, or convalescent leave, or ten years after the sex offender is placed on probation, parole, supervised release, conditional release, or convalescent leave, or is unconditionally released from a correctional facility, prison, hospital or other place of confinement, whichever is latest.
( 2 ) In computing ten years, CSOSA will not count: ( i ) Any time in which the sex offender has failed to register or otherwise failed to comply with requirements of the Act or any procedures, requirements, rules, or regulations promulgated under the Act, including these regulations and the District of Columbia regulations;
( ii ) Any time in which a sex offender is detained, incarcerated, confined, civilly committed, or hospitalized in a mental health facility; and
( iii ) Any time in which a sex offender was registered prior to a revocation of probation, parole, supervised release, conditional release, or convalescent leave.
( 3 ) In computing ten years, CSOSA will count any time in which a sex offender was registered in another jurisdiction unless that time is not counted because of a circumstance set forth in paragraph (b)(2) of this section.
( c ) *Reversal, vacation, or pardon.* A person's obligation to register terminates if the person's conviction, finding of not guilty by reason of insanity, or finding that the person is a sexual psychopath is reversed or vacated, or if the person has been pardoned for the offense on the ground of innocence, and the person has committed no other offenses for which registration is required.
( d ) *Termination of obligation to register in the District of Columbia under other circumstances.* A sex offender's obligation to register in the District of Columbia terminates if the sex offender no longer lives, resides, works or attends school in the District of Columbia. However, the obligation to register in the District of Columbia resumes if the sex offender re-enters the District of Columbia within the registration period to live, reside, work or attend school.
§ 71.29 Sanctions. ( a ) The ALJ may sanction a person, including any party or representative, for the following reasons: ( 1 ) Failure to comply with an order, rule, or procedure governing the proceeding;
( 2 ) Failure to prosecute or defend an action; or
( 3 ) Engaging in other misconduct that interferes with the speedy, orderly, or fair conduct of the proceeding.
( b ) Any such sanction, including but not limited to those listed in paragraphs (c), (d), and (e) of this section, shall reasonably relate to the severity and nature of the failure or misconduct.
( c ) When a party fails to comply with an order, including an order for taking a deposition, the production of evidence within the party's control, or a request for admission, the ALJ may ( 1 ) Draw an inference in favor of the requesting party with regard to the information sought;
( 2 ) In the case of requests for admission, deem each matter of which an admission is requested to be admitted;
( 3 ) Prohibit the party failing to comply with such order from introducing evidence concerning, or otherwise relying upon, testimony relating to the information sought; and
( 4 ) Strike any part of the pleadings or other submissions of the party failing to comply with such request.
( d ) If a party fails to prosecute or defend an action under this part commenced by service of a notice of hearing, the ALJ may dismiss the action or may issue an initial decision imposing penalties and assessments.
( e ) The ALJ may refuse to consider any motion, request, response, brief or other document which is not filed in a timely fashion.
§ 630.110 Modification of original agreement. ( a ) When changes are needed to the original project agreement, a modification of agreement shall be prepared. Agreements should not be modified to replace one Federal fund category with another unless specifically authorized by statute.
( b ) The State DOT may develop the modification of project agreement in a format acceptable to both the State DOT and the FHWA provided the following are included: ( 1 ) The Federal-aid project number and State;
( 2 ) A sequential number identifying the modification;
( 3 ) A reference to the date of the original project agreement to be modified;
( 4 ) The original total project cost and the original amount of Federal funds under agreement;
( 5 ) The revised total project cost and the revised amount of Federal funds under agreement;
( 6 ) The reason for the modifications; and,
( 7 ) Signatures of officials from both the State and the FHWA and date executed.
( c ) The State DOT may use an electronic version of the modification of project agreement as provided by the FHWA.