n52268
This publication presents a historical perspective 

for informational and educational purposes, is 

the result of independent research, and does not 

necessarily reflect a position of NSA/CSS or any 

other U.S. government entity.

This publication is distributed FREE by the National 

Security Agency. If you would like additional copies, 

please submit your request to:

Center for Cryptologic History

National Security Agency

9800 Savage Road, Suite 6886

Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6886

Cover Photos: 

1) The headquarters of the Reich Security Administration’s foreign 

intelligence operations (Department VI), Berlin

2) The ENIGMA served as the standard cipher machine for Germany’s 

military, its agents, and its secret police.
UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY

Series IV

World War II

Volume 11

Cryptologic Aspects 

of 

German Intelligence Activities

in South America 

during World War II

David P. Mowry

Center for Cryptologic History

National Security Agency

2011
Page ii

EDITOR'S NOTE: This publication joins two cryptologic History 

monographs that were published separately in 1989.
Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

PART I–GERMAN CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES

Table of Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Chapter 1: The German Intelligence Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

 Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

 The Abwehr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

 The Reich Security Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Chapter 2: Axis Agent Operations in Latin America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

 SARGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

 The Brazilian Nets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

 Regrouping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

 The Chilean Nets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

 Operation JOLLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

 MERCATOR I and MERCATOR II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

 The Planning for Operation JOLLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

 The End of Operation JOLLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

 The Benefits Derived . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Chapter 3: Allied Organizations Concerned

 with the Intelligence Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

 U.S. Navy (1917-1941) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

 The U.S. Coast Guard (1931-1941) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

 The Federal Communications Commission (1911-1941) . . . . . . . 17

 The British Effort: GC&CS and the RSS (1919-1941) . . . . . . . . . . 18

 The Reorganization of the U.S. SIGINT Effort (1939-1942) . . . . 20

 Initial Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

 Security Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

 The FBI Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

 The Army Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

 The Radio Intelligence Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Chapter 4: Counterclandestine DF Operations in Latin America . . 31

 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

 The U.S. Navy in Colombia and Ecuador (1940-1941) . . . . . . . . . 31

 Other Latin American Nations before the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

 Establishment of the AIS Clandestine Radio Locator Net . . . . . 39

 Creation of the Concept: December 1941-January 1943 . . . . . . . 40

 Implementation of the Concept: 

 January 1943 to the War’s End . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

 Cuba–Graft and Corruption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

 Chile–Nazis and Mountains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

 Argentina–More Nazis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

 Ecuador–Mañana Land . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

 Colombia–Everything in Place . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

 Brazil–Full Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

 The AIS Takes Over . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

 Disposition of the AIS Net . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

 Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

FOREWORD

This is the first of a two-part history of German clandestine activities in South America in World 

War II. In this first volume, the author, Mr. David Mowry, identifies and presents a thorough account 

of German intelligence organizations engaged in clandestine work in South America, and a wellresearched, detailed report of the U.S. response to the perceived threat. This perception was, as Mr. 

Mowry alludes to in his conclusions, far greater than any actual danger.

Mr. Mowry’s conclusions, in general, are somewhat understated. It seems fairly clear from the 

evidence that the Germans never expected a great deal from their agents in South America or even 

in the United States in World War II. The lack of German espionage activity in these areas in WWII 

stands in stark contrast to the bombings and other activities which occurred during WWI. Perhaps 

these WWI experiences influenced U.S. policy makers to the extent that they overestimated the 

danger in WWII. In fact, it might be suggested that South America and the United States were not 

the major threats of German clandestine activity in WW II, but that Europe, England, North Africa, 

and the Middle East offered far more potential for beneficial results. An examination of clandestine activities in these areas might produce different conclusions. One might also comment on the 

extraordinary activity that took place between and among U.S. intelligence organizations in the face 

of so small and unsuccessful a German effort. In addition to concluding that it had little effect on 

the outcome of the war, one might also have noted the similarities characterizing the nature of the 

relationships. Specifically, this includes the relationships in the broader COMINT field during and 

after the war.

Part two of this history deals with the cryptographic systems used by the various German intelligence organizations engaged in clandestine activities. It is a much more technically oriented work 

than this volume and an excellent companion piece.

Henry F. Schorreck

NSA Historian

[1989]

 Page v
Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

 Page vi
Page 1

Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

Chapter 1

The German Intelligence Services

Perspective

The fall of the Batista government in Cuba in 

1959 and the subsequent rise of Castro’s Cuba as a 

Soviet ally in the Western Hemisphere marked the 

beginning of Russian success in obtaining a foothold in an area that had been the exclusive sphere 

of influence of the United States.

The concept of carving out a piece of the 

Western Hemisphere did not originate with the 

Soviet Union. Since 1823, the year the Monroe 

Doctrine was enunciated, most of the major 

European powers tried at one time or another to 

subvert it. Germany tried twice. The first time, in 

1917, Germany planned to attack the United States 

through Mexico. This plan was foiled by Britain 

when it provided the United States with a decrypted copy of the famous Zimmermann Telegram. 

Germany’s second attempt was more complex, but 

in the end, just as unsuccessful.1

By 1939, large groups of German nationals had 

settled in the various countries of Latin America, 

particularly Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. Germany 

maintained close contact with these expatriates 

through commerce, German diplomatic representatives, and pro-Nazi social organizations. German 

commercial interests in Latin America depended 

to a large extent on trade with Germany, and various business organizations were brought into the 

National Socialist fold by appeals to patriotism 

and by threats of interruption of trade. This large 

pro-German, if not necessarily pro-Nazi, expatriate community provided a fertile ground for the 

planting of espionage organizations by the German 

intelligence services–the Abwehr and, later on, the 

Reich Security Administration. These two organizations, separately and in combination, were 

responsible for Germany’s espionage operations 

before and during World War II. Latin America 

was probably their major theater of operations, but 

similar espionage organizations were established 

all over the world–organizations that would be the 

objects of considerable scrutiny by Allied intelligence and counterintelligence agencies.2

The Abwehr

After the demobilization of the German Army 

at the end of World War I, the Intelligence 0ffice 

of the General Staff, or IIIb, became an intelligence group attached to the Foreign Armies 

Branch of the General Staff. Later, with the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, the General Staff 

itself became the Troops Department, and the 

Foreign Armies Branch became the Third Branch, 

or T3, of the Troops Department. The Intelligence 

Group became the Abwehr Group of T3. The name 

“Abwehr” (literally, “defense”) was the covername 

given to the counterintelligence group in order to 

disguise its espionage functions.3

On 1 April 1928. the Abwehr Group and the 

German Navy’s espionage unit were combined as 

the Abwehr Branch, directly subordinate to the 

Ministry of Defense. In March 1929 this branch 

was combined with several other offices into a 

Minister’s Department, which later became the 

High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW). Thus 

the Abwehr became the military espionage agency 

it was to be in World War II.4

After the Nazi Party came to power, there was 

considerable friction between the Abwehr and the 

agencies of the Party, in particular the Security 

Service (SO). On 1 January 1935 German Navy 

captain Wilhelm Franz Canaris became the head of 

the Abwehr and instituted a policy of cooperation 

which was reciprocated by Reinhardt Heydrich, the 
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

head of the SO. This resulted, in December 1936, in 

an official agreement on division of effort known as 

the “Ten Commandments,” signed by both Canaris 

and Heydrich, which defined espionage abroad as 

an Abwehr responsibility.5

When Canaris assumed command, the Abwehr 

consisted of six groups: (I) Army Espionage; (II) 

the Cipher Center; (III) Counterespionage; (IV) 

Sabotage and Uprisings; (V) Naval Espionage, with 

liaison with the Navy’s intercept service; and (VI) 

Air Force Espionage. Canaris made the Abwehr an 

agency concerned purely with espionage by removing the Cipher Center from its jurisdiction. In the 

years 1936-1938, the service espionage groups 

were combined as Abwehr I, Military Espionage; 

Sabotage and Uprisings became Abwehr II; and 

Counterespionage became Abwehr III. The Naval 

Intercept Service was added to the Foreign Branch 

of OKW, which was transferred to the Abwehr, 

retaining its branch title. In addition, the Abwehr 

itself was raised to the level of a division of OKW.6

Abwehr I, the largest of the branches, consisted of nine groups: Army East; Army West; 

Army Technical; Marine; Air Force; Technical/Air 

Force; Economic; Secret (document forgery and 

espionage paraphernalia); and Communications. 

Abwehr headquarters in Berlin delegated its functions extensively to AAA posts in other cities, and 

as it took up any job or entered a new geographical area, it expanded by creating new geographical subdivisions. Principal posts of the Abwehr in 

important cities were called Abwehr Posts (Ast). 

In the Reich there was one Ast to each Military 

District headquarters.

Known Asts in the Reich, designated by Roman 

numerals, were as shown in the chart below.

Underneath and reporting to the Asts were 

Branch Posts (abbreviated Nest or Anst, which were 

located in the less important cities. Subordinate to 

the Nests were the Message Centers (abbreviated 

MK), established in small particular Asts inside 

the Reich. They were given the task of controlling 

certain enterprises outside the Reich. Thus, the 

Hamburg Ast was concerned chiefly with naval 

activity against England and America and was 

active in South America, in the Iberian Peninsula, 

and in Greece. Muenster dealt with roads and communications in enemy territory; Dresden specialized in targets for aerial bombing. Stettin handled 

naval activity against Russia in the Baltic and also 

Group I left in Norway. Breslau handled action in 

Czechoslovakia, Wiesbaden in France and Belgium, 

and Vienna in the Balkans and the Near East. An 

Ast was designated an Abwehr Control Post (Alst) 

to take over control of Abwehr operations for specific purposes, as was Wiesbaden in 1940 for the 

invasion of France.

There were also Abwehr units called Combat 

Organizations (KO), which were similar to Asts 

but operated in neutral and unfriendly countries, 

including Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, Bulgaria, 

Turkey, Spain, Portugal, and briefly, North Africa. 

I Koenigsberg X Hamburg

II Stettin XI Hanover

III Berlin XII Wiesbaden

IV Dresden XIII Nuremberg

V Stuttgart XIV TO XVI (probably did not exist)

VI Muenster XVII Vienna

VII Munich XVIII Salzburg

VII Breslau XIX (probably did not exiat)

IX Kassel XX Danzig

 XXI Posen

Admiral Wilhelm Franz Canaris 

commanded the Abwehr from 1935 

to 1944, when his 

espionage functions were 

transferred to the Reich Security 

Administration.
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

Personnel of the KO used embassies and legations as 

cover. The first of these were established in Madrid 

and Shanghai in 1937 and in the Netherlands in 

1938. The KOs were attached to the German embassies and ran agent nets in the respective countries. 

By May 1942, there were KOs in Portugal, Spain, 

Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Bulgaria, Spanish 

Morocco (Casablanca), Yugoslavia (Zagreb), China 

(Shanghai), and Turkey.7

The Reich Security Administration

The Security Service was originally a part of the 

organization called the General Protection Squad 

(the infamous Blackshirts or SS). Its mission was 

to gather intelligence about people hostile to Hitler 

and the Nazi Party. It was the intelligence organ of 

the Nazi Party. In June 1936 Himmler was made 

Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police. 

One of his first acts was the appointment of the first 

important figure in the history of the Reich Security 

Administration (RSHA), Reinhard Heydrich, the 

first chief of the Sicherheitspolizei or Security 

Police (SiPo) and the SD. Heydrich and Himmler 

were responsible for combining the security services of the SS and the State Police into the RSHA in 

1939. As the head of the RSHA, Heydrich concentrated almost entirely on eliminating opposition to 

the Third Reich. Since the “Ten Commandments” 

defined espionage abroad as largely the function of 

the Abwehr, Department VI (Foreign Intelligence) 

of the RSHA was an insignificant unit before 1942. 

Although Himmler had given orders that he must 

have a foreign intelligence service of his own, the 

RSHA did not have the right kind of personnel for 

this work; very few of its officers had any knowledge of foreign countries or languages.8

The character of the RSHA changed after the 

assassination of Heydrich in 1942 with the rise to 

power of two new figures, Ernst Kaltenbrunner and 

Walter Schellenberg. Kaltenbrunner succeeded 

Heydrich as head of the RSHA, and Schellenberg 

became the chief of Department VI in the same 

year. Continual competition between Department 

VI and the Abwehr eroded the latter’s authority until Schellenberg took over its espionage 

and sabotage sections in May 1944. At that time, 

Canaris was demoted to head of a special staff for 

economic warfare. He was arrested on 23 July 1944 

for complicity in the bomb attempt on Hitler and 

was executed on 8 April 1945.9

Reinhard Heydrich headed the Reich Security 

Administration from its creation in 1939 until 

his assassination in 1942.

Walter Schellenberg, chief of the Reich 

Security Administration’s Department VI, 

assumed control of the Abwehr’s espionage 

sections in May 1944.
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

After taking over the Abwehr, the RSHA was 

divided into eight departments, only two of which, 

Department VI (Foreign Intelligence) and Military 

Intelligence, ran espionage agents in the field. 

Military Intelligence assumed responsibility for 

espionage in the frontline combat areas, formerly 

the responsibility of Abwehr I, while Department 

VI absorbed the Asts’ responsibilities (or espionage 

in foreign countries. The following was the organization of Department VI as late as January 1945:

This was the opposition. Its story and the story 

of the Allied organizations involved in counterespionage SIGINT in World War II follow.

The headquarters of the Reich Security Administration’s foreign intelligence operations 

(Department VI), Berlin

 Department Function

 Amt VIA Organization

 Amt VIB West Europe (neutral, allied, and occupied countries)

 Amt VIC Russia, Near East, Far East (including Japan) 

 Amt VID Western Hemisphere, Great Britain, Scandinavia

 Amt VIE Southeast Europe (including allied and occupied areas) 

 Amt VIF Technical Support

 Amt VIG Scientific-Methodic Research Service

 Amt VI Wi/T Economics and Technology

 Amt VIS Sabotage

 Amt VI Kult Nonscientific Domestic Acquisition Service

 Amt VIZ Military Counterespionage and Personnel Checks

 Abwehr Civilian Counterespionage and Personnel Checks10
Page 5

Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

Chapter 2

Axis Agent Operations in Latin America

In his report on his trip to England in 1943, 

Colonel Alfred McCormack stated that the Coast 

Guard had abdicated to the British Government 

Code & Cipher School (GC&CS) its responsibility for all clandestine communications other than 

those concerning the Western Hemisphere. While 

McCormack was certainly overstating the case, with 

equal certainty the Coast Guard’s primary interest 

was in agent communications between Germany 

and Latin America. These communications were primarily the responsibility of Operation BOLIVAR,11 

the code name for an espionage project carried out 

by Department VID4 of the SD. It was active in 

Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina, with ramifications 

reaching into the official circles of those countries.12

SARGO

Johannes Siegfried Becker (SARGO) was the 

main figure in the project and the person responsible 

for most of the organizing of espionage operations in 

South America. Becker 

was first sent to Buenos 

Aires by the SD in May 

1940. His original mission, and that of Heinz 

Lange (JANSEN), who 

followed him shortly 

after, was sabotage. 

In August, because of 

protests by the German 

embassy, this was 

revised to one of espionage only. Becker and 

Lange were soon identified by the authorities as agents, and 

in September 1940 

moved to Brazil where Becker made contact with 

Gustav Albrecht Engels.

Gustav Albrecht Engels (ALFREDO) had originally been recruited by Jobst Raven of Abwehr 

IW in 1939 to provide economic intelligence on the 

Western Hemisphere to the Abwehr. He had established an economic espionage organization, reporting to Germany via the radio transmitter owned 

by his company, the Allgemeine Elektrizitaets 

Gesellschaft (General Electric Company), headquartered in Krefeld. Becker transformed Engels’s organization into an espionage organization reporting 

on all subjects of interest to German intelligence. 

By mid-1941, Engels’s radio station, CEL, which 

was located in Sao Paulo, Brazil, was functioning 

smoothly with agents in both Brazil and the United 

States. It provided information on shipping, economic and industrial affairs, war production, and 

military movements in the United States, and political and military developments in Brazil. One of the 

agents in the United States who frequently came to 

Brazil to talk to Engels was Dusko Popov (IVAN), 

known to the British as TRICYCLE–one of the most 

successful double agents of World War II.13

Operation BOLIVAR agents included the naval 

and air attaché in Chile, Ludwig von Bohlen (BACH); 

the naval attaché in Rio de Janeiro, Hermann Bohny 

(UNCLE ERNEST); the military attaché in Buenos 

Aires and Rio de Janeiro, General Niedefuhr; and 

the naval attaché in Buenos Aires, Captain Dietrich 

Niebuhr (DIEGO), who headed the espionage organization in Argentina. In mid-1941 Herbert von 

Heyer (HUMBERTO) joined the organization, providing maritime intelligence.14

Johannes Siegfried 

Becker (SARGO)
Page 6

Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

The Brazilian Nets

Engels’s organization was not the only one 

operating in Brazil. Three other clandestine radio 

stations, each serving a different spy net, had started operating in 1941. Radio station LIR, in Rio de 

Janeiro, had started communications with MAX, 

in Germany, in May. The LIRMAX group operated in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Ecuador 

and was centered on a commercial information 

service, the Informadora Rapida Limitada (RITA), 

run by Heribert O. J. Muller (PRINZ). The radio 

station was run by Friedrich Kempter (KOENIG). 

Von Heyer, HUMBERTO in the CELALD organization, was VESTA in the LIRMAX group. There 

were other overlaps in personnel, with the two 

groups cooperating extensively. Von Heyer was an 

employee of the Theodor Wille Company, several 

of whose employees were involved in another net 

centered on station CIT in Recife, Brazil. The CIT 

net began operation in June 1941 and was located 

entirely in Brazil. A third group, consisting of only 

two agents, Fritz Noak and Herbert Winterstein, 

was located between Santos and Rio de Janeiro 

and communicated with LFS in Germany from 

September 1941 to January 1942. It was not connected with the CELALD-LIRMAX-CIT group.15

Regrouping

At the end of November 1941, Becker had 

returned to Germany for a conference with his 

superiors and was thus out of harm’s way when 

Brazilian police rounded up enemy agents on 18 

March 1942. During this conference it was decided 

that Becker would be in charge of South American 

operations (all of which were to be connected by 

radio) with Buenos Aires acting as the control station for the net and reporting directly to Berlin.

Lange was to organize an espionage net in Chile, 

and Johnny Hartmuth (GUAPO), a Department 

VID 2 agent who had elected to remain in South 

America, would organize a net in Paraguay. An 

agent named Franczok (LUNA) would control the 

radio network which was to be established. Lange, 

Hartmuth, and Franczok were all in Paraguay, having fled from Brazil in March.16

In February 1943, after considerable difficulty, 

Becker managed to return to Buenos Aires as 

a stowaway on a ship traveling from Spain to 

Argentina. Lange, Hartmuth, and Franczok had 

managed to airmail one transmitter to Paraguay 

before they left Brazil and, setting up a temporary 

headquarters near Asunción, had reestablished 

contact with Berlin. Upon Becker’s orders, this 

station was transferred to Buenos Aires in May, 

leaving Hartmuth in Paraguay. Lange proceeded 

to Chile.

Once the transfer to Buenos Aires had taken 

place, Becker and Franczok immediately began 

establishing the planned radio network. Becker 

wanted to establish a transmitter in every South 

American republic, but was successful only in 

Paraguay, Chile, and Argentina, where he was at 

this time establishing an espionage organization.17

The Chilean Nets

When Lange went to Chile, there was already 

an agent organization and radio station in operation and Lange fitted himself into it as an independent operator with his own sources. The station, using callsign PYL to communicate with 

REW in Germany, had been established in April 

or May 1941, apparently by Ludwig von Bohlen 

and Friedrich von Schulz Hausman (CASERO). 

By February 1942, reports were being passed 

from agents in Chile, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, 

Guatemala, Mexico, and the United States. The 

major figures in the organization were von Bohlen 

in Santiago; Bruno Dittman (DINTERIN), the 

actual head of the net, in Valparaiso; Friedrich von 

Schulz Hausman, who had relocated to Buenos 

Aires; and George Nicolaus (MAX) in Mexico.18

The PYLREW net’s tie with Project BOLIVAR 

was revealed through intercept, particularly in July 

1941, when von Bohlen was instructed by radio 

to contact von Heyer in Rio de Janeiro to obtain 
Page 7

Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

a supply of secret inks and developers which von 

Bohlen had ordered from Germany.

The PYLREW organization was centered on 

the Compania Transportes Maritimos (COTRAS), 

formerly a branch of Norddeutscher Lloyd. Von 

Schulz Hausman had been the manager of the 

Norddeutscher Lloyd Shipping Agency in Chile 

before moving to Argentina, and had been succeeded in that job by Dittman. Other PYLREW personnel who had been associated with Norddeutscher 

Lloyd were Hans Blume (FLOR), a radio technician 

at PYL, and Heinrich Reiners (TOM), who had 

worked for Norddeutscher Lloyd in Panama before 

opening a maritime freight office in Valparaiso. 

Reiners’s sister was married to Blume, and Reiners’s 

wife was the drop for the agents of the net.19

Operation JOLLE

The first traffic passed from Buenos Aires concerned finances, the organization of the South 

American net, Argentine politics, and the establishment of a courier system between Argentina and 

Spain using crewmen aboard Spanish merchant 

vessels. Once the network got into full operation, 

traffic volume increased to as much as fifteen messages a day. In January 1944, the Argentine government arrested a number of German and Spanish 

espionage agents, and Becker and Franczok were 

forced into hiding. Communications were interrupted for about a month and never again resumed 

the former level. When communications were reestablished, Becker asked Berlin for radio equipment, 

money, and secret ink materials. This request 

resulted in Operation JOLLE.20

It had become increasingly difficult to keep 

the agent organizations in South America supplied 

with funds and cryptomaterial. As with Comintern 

agents between the wars, a primary method of 

financing agent operations was through the smuggling of precious gems which could then be sold 

to obtain operating funds. To this the Germans 

added the smuggling of expensive pharmaceuticals 

which could readily be sold on the black market. 

The gems and the pharmaceuticals could be transmitted via couriers (“wolves”) who travelled as 

crewmen aboard Spanish ships. This was not, however, a satisfactory method for transporting cryptoequipment and keying materials, for moving agents 

in and out of target countries, or for shipping bulky 

reports back to Germany. Up to that time, the normal method used by Department VI to introduce 

agents into neutral or hostile countries had been 

to land them from submarines. This had not been 

particularly successful and, with increasing Allied 

dominance of the sea, was becoming an even more 

problematical method of transport. Likewise, the 

courier system was in danger because of Spanish 

awareness that Germany was losing the war. It was 

as a result of these circumstances, and of the difficulty of evading Allied patrols in the Atlantic that 

operations such as MERCATOR and JOLLE were 

conceived.21

Kurt Gross, the Chief of Department VI D4, 

had been looking for other methods, and Becker’s 

request gave him an opening. He decided to send 

not only supplies and money, but also personnel. 

Two men were to be sent to Argentina initially. 

Hansen (COBIJA) was a trained radio operator 

who spoke fluent Spanish, having lived in South 

America for twenty years. Schroell (VALIENTE), a 

native of Luxembourg, was a sailor by profession 

and spoke English; he also had had some radio 

experience. The mission, as planned, involved the 

two agents being transported to Argentina, where 

they would eventually separate from Becker and 

make their way northward. Ultimately, Hansen 

was supposed to settle in Mexico and Schroell in 

the United States, obtaining a position in a war 

plant there. Hansen was instructed to set up a radio 

transmitter in Mexico and send in reports of information both he and Schroell had obtained concerning the United States. The two were to maintain a 

channel of communication. Further, they were to 

recruit new agents and establish an espionage net 

covering Central America and the United States.

In preparation for their mission, Hansen and 

Schroell were given a course of training which 
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

included the use of secret inks, ciphers, and the 

microdot camera. They were also given suicide 

pills, two each, for use in an emergency. False identification papers were provided by Department VIF. 

They were given no persons to contact other than 

Becker, either in North or South America, since 

Department VID had no one there who could assist 

the project. They were also not given any cover 

addresses for use in establishing communications 

with Germany, as it was assumed that they would 

be successful in their radio endeavors. As a supplementary method of transmitting information, they 

were instructed to develop a courier system which 

could be coordinated with the organization in 

Spain run by Karl Arnold (THEO or ARNOLD). In 

using couriers, it was planned that they would use 

both secret writing and microdots.

Although Gross had given them the broad goals 

of their mission, he emphasized that they would be 

expected to use their own initiative to a great extent 

and capitalize on any opportunity which presented 

itself to make the project more effective. How they 

were to proceed from Argentina, up through South 

America to Mexico and the United States, would be 

up to them. It was expected, however, that Becker 

would be able to help them in getting started.22

Allied intelligence, reading the exchanges 

between Berlin and Buenos Aires, was convinced 

that a submarine was to be used for the transfer 

and that the German term “Jolle” (English “yawl”) 

was simply a cover term. It appeared from his 

messages that Becker thought the same, but on 30 

March 1944, Berlin told Argentina that the vessel to be used was “not a yawl, but a cutter,” and 

that planning was continuing. This was the first 

specific indication that a submarine was not to be 

involved.23

MERCATOR I and MERCATOR II

In fact, the Abwehr had used a small sailing 

boat in August 1942 to land agents in Southwest 

Africa and again, in May-June 1943, to land agents 

in Brazil. The vessel used was a thirty-six-ton ketch 

named Passim. On her first voyage, codenamed 

MERCATOR I, Passim had sailed from Brest to 

Southwest Africa carrying three agents. Two of 

them had been landed north of Hollams Bird 

Island, and the third near Sao Paulo de Loanda. 

She then returned to Bayonne after 142 days at sea 

and was sent on to Arcachon for repairs.24

On her second voyage, codenamed MERCATOR 

II, Passim sailed from Arcachon on 9 June 1943 and 

delivered two agents, Wilhelm Koepff (HEDWIG) 

and William Baarn, to Brazil. Wilhelm Heinrich 

Koepff was a German small businessman who 

had settled in Peru after World War I, in which 

he had served in the infantry. He was an ardent 

Nazi, and his reputation as a Nazi activist resulted 

in his firm being blacklisted by the British and the 

Americans in 1941. This had a disastrous effect on 

his finances, and he took to drink. When the countries of the Western Hemisphere broke off relations 

with Germany in 1942, he arranged to have himself 

repatriated and in Germany he volunteered for 

service in the Abwehr as an espionage agent. After 

intensive training he reported aboard Passim on 

15 May 1943 to meet his partner, William Marcus 

Baarn. Baarn was a black from Dutch Guiana with 

a reputation as a troublemaker. During the thirties 

he had worked as a merchant seaman in American 

waters and then went to Amsterdam as a stowaway on a Dutch ship. He had worked at various 

jobs in Holland and for some reason had made no 

attempt to get out when Germany invaded the Low 

Countries. He was recruited by the Abwehr, whom 

he was in no position to refuse, and trained in radio 

operation and cryptography for four months.25

Passim sailed from Arcachon on 23 May 1943. 

The two agents were put ashore on Gargahu Beach, 

near Sao Joao da Barra, Brazil, on the night of 

9/10 August 1943. Despite the high hopes of the 

Abwehr, both men surrendered to Brazilian police 

within twenty-four hours. The Brazilian authorities “turned” Koepff and used him as a controlled 

agent until March 1944. He and Baarn were tried 

in March 1945 and sentenced to twenty-five years 

in prison.26
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

The Planning for Operation JOLLE

Gross had determined that Passim was still in 

Arcachon and that naval captain Heinz Garbers, 

who had commanded her on her first two voyages, 

was available. Garbers was a well-known sportsman who had crossed the Atlantic in a sailboat in 

1938. The justification for using a vessel such as 

Passim was that although slower than submarines 

or merchant vessels, a regular route could be established and such a boat could easily be mistaken for 

a Portuguese, Spanish, or South American fishing 

lugger, and thus be ignored by Allied patrol vessels. Arrangements were made, and Hansen and 

Schroell sailed aboard Passim on 27 April 1944 with 

quite a large cargo, the bulk of which consisted of 

items sent for resale. Siemens, Telefunken, Merck 

Chemical, and a pharmaceutical company (probably Bayer) had sent orders through Franczok for 

radio and other electrical equipment, as well as for 

chemical and medical supplies. In this way, these 

companies would be aided and the money received 

from them would contribute considerably to the 

finances of the spy ring. The latter purpose was 

also served by the shipment of a stock of needles 

used in the weaving or mending of silk stockings 

to be resold by the agency. Berlin also sent along 

plans for a device to make wood gas generators. 

An attempt was to be made to sell a license for the 

manufacture of these generators.

In all, they took some fifty tons of material 

with them, including complete radio sets, parts for 

use by Becker and for the new project, a microdot camera, and a supply of diamonds which had 

been obtained in Holland. Hansen and Schroell 

also took with them foreign currency in the form 

of Argentine pesos, British pounds, and American 

dollars which totalled some $100,000 in value. 

This money was to be shared with Becker. It was 

meant that Hansen and Schroell would remain 

in the Western Hemisphere indefinitely, and the 

money given to them was to last over two years.27

At this point, the plans for the landing in 

Argentina were extremely confused. The original 

plans had been cancelled, and Becker did not 

understand what Berlin wanted. Finally, three possible landing points had been picked: Necochea, 

Miramar, and Mar del Plata. Berlin considered 

Necochea to be the preferable one, particularly 

since Becker had reported that both sea and coast 

were unacceptable at Miramar. Becker was insisting on four weeks’ advance notice of the landing; 

three days forewarning from Passim; a communications plan for contacting Passim; and instructions on loading and unloading.28

The communications plan was sent on 6 June. 

Becker complained on 9 June about the short 

notice and about the lack of internal serialization 

on Berlin’s messages, which sometimes made it difficult to understand references. As a consequence 

of the latter, apparently, several of Berlin’s messages went unanswered, and Becker was instructed 

to contact Passim on his own and set up a communications plan.29

At this point, it would seem that Franczok (who 

was in charge of communications at the Argentine 

end) complained about the preparations, or lack 

thereof, because Berlin responded: Microdots taped inside the label of an 

envelope sent by German agents in Mexico

to Lisbon
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

Save your Criticism For

Yourselves When You Do Not

Know Full Details; It Only 

Indicates That Through Your

Clever Conduct The Originally Contemplated Landing

Has Already Been Discovered. 

JOLLE Has Received Your

Instructions On Miramar

Preparations And Will, If

Possible, Carry Them Out. 

[The] Matter Will Be Settled

By Red [Berlin] Center. 30

Franczok sent communications and landing 

instructions to Passim on 21 June, setting Mogotes 

as the place and 0200 as the time of day for 

the landing. Garbers preferred Punta Indio, but 

Becker would not accept the suggestion, insisting on Mogotes. After some further delays, the 

operation was finally carried out on the night of 30 

June/1 July, and Passim set sail for Europe, taking 

Philip Imhoff (BIENE), Heinz Lange, and Juergen 

Sievers (SANTOS) as passengers.31

Shortly after Hansen and Schroell arrived in 

Argentina, most of the members of Operation 

BOLIVAR were arrested, breaking up the ring 

once and for all, and effective espionage activity by 

Department VID 4 in the Western Hemisphere was 

ended.32

The End of Operation JOLLE

Garbers had intended to put into port at 

Bordeaux upon Passim’s return to France, but the 

Normandy invasion had made that inadvisable. 

Lange wanted the boat to return to South America 

and succeeded in convincing some of the crew to 

agree with him, but Garbers threatened to have 

him prosecuted for incitement to mutiny and treason. Berlin ordered Passim to Vigo, Spain, where 

she docked the night of 17 September, posing as the 

French ship St. Barbara, a name she had carried 

on her voyage to Brazil in 1943. Garbers, accompanied by Lange, went ashore the next day to visit the 

German consulate. Garbers returned later, alone 

and wearing civilian clothes. He had found that 

Karl Arnold had been advised of their coming and 

had made some preparations to care for them. For 

the next three or four days, all the men remained 

aboard Passim with a Spanish police boat alongside. They were then issued passes giving them 

freedom of movement in Vigo. They were allowed 

to move to the Hotel Central, but both captain 

and crew had to report every morning aboard the 

Spanish cruiser Navarra, which was lying in the 

harbor. When the cruiser sailed, they then reported 

to the Spanish police each morning.

After a month under loose arrest, the men were 

released by the Spanish and traveled to Madrid, 

leaving Passim lying at Vigo under Spanish guard. 

In Madrid they stayed at the German-owned Hotel 

Aragon for four to six days. From Madrid, Garbers 

went on to Barcelona, followed by the others, who 

arrived on 7-8 November. They then left Barcelona 

by air in groups of two or three. It took ten days for 

the entire party to reach Berlin. Garbers did attempt 

to have Lange prosecuted, but Gross arranged for 

the charges to be dropped.33

The Benefits Derived

Commander L. T. Jones, the head of the Coast 

Guard cryptologic operation, wrote an evaluation of the Allied Sigint effort against BOLIVAR 

in 1944. He pointed out that, basically, the type 

of information transmitted by an enemy agent 

depends largely on what happens to be available 

where he is located. BOLIVAR agents were able 

to provide reports on the movements of merchant 

shipping and on local political developments. The 

traffic was probably more useful to the Allies than 

it was to the Germans, because it did reveal the 

identities of collaborators in the South American 

countries, including a former Argentine minister of 

marine and the head of the Paraguayan Air Force. 

The Allies also were able to obtain from clandestine 

traffic the details of planning for the 20 December 

1943 revolution in Bolivia and another in Chile 

which was nipped in the bud. Both of these were 
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

backed by Germans working through the Argentine 

government.

In addition, the intercept of clandestine traffic 

allowed the Allies to maintain continuity on the 

agents operating in the Western Hemisphere. This 

information led to a number of arrests, the most 

celebrated at the time being that of Osmar Alberto 

Hellmuth on 4 November 1943.34

An Argentine naval officer, Hellmuth, unbeknownst to Argentina, was a German collaborator. 

His control, Hans Harnisch (BOSS), claimed to be 

the personal representative of Heinrich Himmler 

and had extensive contacts in the highest reaches 

of the Argentine government. As a result of negotiations between Harnisch and various Argentine 

officials, including President Ramirez and various cabinet ministers, Hellmuth was appointed 

Argentine consul in Barcelona. This appointment 

served to cover his actual mission: to proceed to 

Germany to ensure that country that Argentina 

had no intention of severing relations with her. He 

was also to confer with the SD and other German 

officials on matters of mutual interest and was 

to obtain German permission for the return to 

Argentina from Sweden of the Argentine tanker 

Buenos Aires, carrying a load of German-supplied 

arms.35

Most of the details of this planning were known 

to the Allies through BOLIVAR traffic. As a consequence, when the Cabo de Hornos, aboard which 

Hellmuth was traveling to Spain, made a routine stop at Trinidad, British authorities removed 

him from the ship and placed him under arrest. 

Argentina made a formal protest to Britain. When 

the ramifications of the affair were learned, however, there was a change in position. The Argentine 

minister of foreign affairs instructed his ambassador in London on 17 December to inform Great 

Britain that Hellmuth’s appointment had been 

cancelled and that if the British would release 

Hellmuth, his letters patent would also be cancelled and the British could then do with him as 

they saw fit.36

In early 1946, when the State Department was 

preparing a case against the Peronista government 

of Argentina regarding its wartime support of the 

Axis, it requested permission to use clandestine 

intercept as part of its evidence. Although the Navy 

refused to give blanket approval for such usage, 

an accommodation was reached, and information 

from clandestine communications was fused with 

information from other sources in preparing the 

indictment. This was Operation BOLIVAR’s final 

contribution to the Allied war effort.37
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II
Page 13

Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

Chapter 3

Allied Operations Concerned with the Clandestine Problem

U.S. Navy (1917-1941)

During World War I, the U.S. Navy had built 

up an integrated organization (the Code and Signal 

Section of the Office of Naval Communications) 

for the compilation, production, distribution, 

and accounting of codes and ciphers. This section, also known as OP-58, was established as 

a part of the Division of Operations sometime 

between 2 January and 1 April 1917. Its first head 

was Lieutenant Russell Willson (USN), who was 

ordered to Washington, D.C., on the former date. 

The Confidential Publications Section (as the Code 

and Signal Section was called before October 1917) 

had originally been intended to centralize the Navy's 

storage, accounting, and distribution of confidential publications, while the Bureau of Navigation 

(BUNAV) was responsible for the preparation of 

codes and ciphers. BUNAV’s Signal Office had published the Telegraphic Dictionaries since at least 

1848 and the Navy General Signal Books since the 

Civil War. By 1894 the dictionaries and the signal 

books had been combined, and in 1913 there was a 

section in the General Signal Book providing fiveletter code groups that were used for secret communications until the Navy “A-Code” was constructed 

by the Code and Signal Section.38

By 1 December 1917, the OIC of the Code and 

Signal Section, Lieutenant Commander Milo F. 

Draemel, had been made Assistant to the Director 

of Naval Communications (DNC) for Codes and 

Signals. The section had been made a part of the 

Naval Communication Service, but since it was 

not performing a staff function, it was not part of 

the Director’s office. The section was redesignated 

OP-18 on or about January 1920 but remained in 

the same command status until July 1922, when it 

became OP-20-G.39

The Registered Publications Section was created 

on 31 March 1923 to standardize and centralize the 

issuance of and accounting for classified publications. As originally conceived in May 1921, this section was to be a part of OP-20-G, but there is no 

record of its OP-number until 1 July 1926, when it 

was listed as OP-20-P, with Lieutenant E. K. Jett, 

later Chief Engineer of the Federal Communications 

Commission (FCC), as OIC.40

In January 1924 Lieutenant Laurance F. Safford 

was ordered to OP-20-G to take over the newly 

established Research Desk in that section. “Research 

Desk” was the covername for the newly formed 

communications intelligence activity. This marked 

the entry of the Navy into communications intelligence, aside from an interim effort begun by the 

Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) in 1917, when 

a Cipher Room was established to decrypt enemy 

messages. The Cipher Room was absorbed by the 

War Department’s Bureau of Military Intelligence 

in 1918. The initial staff or the Research Desk consisted of Lieutenant Safford and four civilians, later 

supplemented by two enlisted radiomen.41

According to U.S. Navy captain Joseph N. 

Wenger, there were two factors that governed the 

placing of communications intelligence activities 

in the Office of Naval Communications (ONC) 

rather than in ONI. First of all, the Director of Naval 

Communications (DNC) showed interest and initiative in getting them placed under his jurisdiction. 

Secondly, over a period of time, the cognizant naval 

authorities recognized that this was the proper 

location, as they realized that the highly technical 

business of intercept and direction finding would 

be most effectively and economically operated in 

conjunction with other technical activities. The 

collection and production of SIGINT involved the 

same skills, training, equipment, and techniques as 
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

communications, and thus belonged in that branch 

of the Navy. In addition, from both a security and 

a budgetary viewpoint, it made sense to collocate 

SIGINT sites with communications stations.

Eventually OP-20-G would have control 

over communications intelligence, communications security, and registered publications. The 

Registered Publications Section continued to carry 

the designation OP-20-P, but by 1932 it was included as a subunit of the Code and Signal Section. 

Letters were assigned to the subordinate desks by 

1926, the year in which Lieutenant Safford was 

relieved by Lieutenant Joseph J. Rochefort as 

head of the Research Desk. In June 1932 OP-20-G 

consisted of the OIC and his office staff; OP-20-P, 

Registered Publications; OP-20-GC, the Codes and 

Ciphers Desk; OP-20-GS, the Visual Signals Desk; 

and OP-20-GX, the Research Desk.42

The Research Desk was renamed the Research 

and Radio Intelligence Desk in 1933. In June 1934 

these functions were split between two desks: the 

Research Desk, OP-20-GY, and the Radio Intercept 

Desk, OP-20-GX; and OP-20-P was removed from 

OP-20-G cognizance and supervision. A new section, the Language Section, was created in October 

1934, with the designation OP-20-GZ. On 11 March 

1935, OP-20-G was reorganized to consist of the 

Cryptographic Section (GC), headed by Lieutenant 

Chester C. Wood; the Security Section (GS), headed by Lieutenant Lee W. Parke; the Intercept 

and Tracking Section (GX), headed by Lieutenant 

Commander John S. Harper; the Cryptanalytic 

Section (GY), headed by Lieutenant Commander 

Joseph N. Wenger; and the Translation Section 

(GZ), headed by Lieutenant Commander Thomas 

B. Birtley, Jr. In this reorganization, OP-20-G was 

renamed the Communications Security Group, 

with Lieutenant Commander Laurance F. Safford 

in command after March 1936.43

In the early days the Navy’s SIGINT activity 

in Washington was so small that no formal organization other than that mentioned above was 

necessary. However, with the beginning of Navy 

success against the Japanese naval ciphers in the 

early 1930s and the production of operational intelligence on Japanese naval maneuvers, it became 

obvious that expansion was necessary to exploit 

the possibilities that had appeared. Even so, in 

1936 the total strength of the Communications 

Security Group was only eleven officers, eightyeight enlisted men, and fifteen civilians, a total of 

147. Lieutenant Joseph N. Wenger’s 1937 planning study, “Military Study–Communications 

Intelligence Research Activities,” was the first serious attempt at defining the course to be pursued. 

The organization conceptualized by this paper 

consisted of a main analysis, administration, and 

coordinating center in Washington, D.C., with 

subordinate area analysis centers, advance processing units at intercept sites, and mobile units 

for close support of major operating commanders. 

The study also defined the need for fast and secure 

communications within the naval organization and 

for liaison with the Army and the Coast Guard. All 

of these ideas would eventually be implemented.44

OP-20-G underwent two more renamings 

before the beginning of World War II. On 15 March 

1939 it became the Radio Intelligence Section of the 

Office of Naval Communications, and on 1 October 

1939 it became the Communications Security 

Section. The Cryptanalytic Section was relieved of 

its responsibility for training and research in 1939, 

and these functions were combined in the Research 

and Training Section, OP-20-GR. By January 1941 

OP-20-G consisted of some sixty persons plus 

a few small field activities. On 7 December 1941 

the strength was 75 officers, 645 enlisted men, 

and 10 civilians: a total of 730. It continued to be 

headed by Commander Safford, who, at his own 

request, was redesignated from “General Line” to 

“Engineering (i.e., cryptographic) Duty Only” on 12 

September 1941. He was promoted to captain on 1 

December 1941.45

The U.S. Coast Guard (1931-1941)

The Coast Guard Communications Intelligence 

Section was established in 1931 to solve the illicit 
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

shortwave radio traffic exchanged between groups 

of smugglers and other criminals violating the 

laws enforced by the six enforcement bureaus of 

the Treasury Department. Through the monitoring of illegal radio networks during the time when 

smuggling was at its height, Coast Guard intercept 

operators developed a specialized technique which 

proved most effective in identifying and following 

illicit stations.46

Until late 1935 eighty percent of the work 

done by the Cryptanalytic Unit had been cryptanalytic. After October of that year, there was a heavy 

increase in cryptographic duties when the secretary of the treasury tasked the unit with creating a 

Treasury Department cryptosystem. At that time, 

he also tasked the unit with cooperating with the 

Bureau of Customs and Narcotics to suppress the 

smuggling of illegal drugs into the United States 

and with certain responsibilities in the field of foreign exchange.47

As a result of these tasks, the end of prohibition did not reduce to any appreciable degree the 

duties of the Intelligence Division. The division 

remained the assembly and distribution agent 

for information of every kind pertaining to the 

phases of law enforcement with which the entire 

Treasury Department was charged and in which 

State, Justice, Commerce, and other departments 

of the government were interested. In spite of this, 

its strength decreased by a third between March 

1936 and March 1937 because of budget restrictions brought on by the depression. In 1937 only 

the five persons listed below were left.

According to Lieutenant Frank E. Pollio, the 

acting chief of the Intelligence Division at the time, 

similar organizations in the Army and Navy were 

composed of twelve to twenty-five persons and 

were considered a necessary adjunct to national 

security. In the Treasury Department, cryptanalytic personnel were necessary both for military 

security as it pertained to the Coast Guard and for 

law enforcement as it pertained to the department. 

The strength of five was maintained through 1940. 

At the end of that year, two billets were added to 

bring the strength up to seven: four professional 

grade cryptanalysts, one IBM operator, and two 

typists.48

After the establishment of the Money Stabilization Board under the Treasury Department, the 

Cryptanalytic Unit provided this Board with information in connection with foreign exchange control; and after 1938 it maintained a close watch for 

any clues in radio traffic pointing to sudden changes in the international situation. In August 1939 

the unit was transferred to the Communications 

Division of the Coast Guard, where it operated in 

response to requests from the Intelligence Division 

and other Treasury bureaus.49

Organized smuggling had practically disappeared by 1939, and for several months before 

the German invasion of Poland, the Coast Guard 

had been given assignments monitoring the shipborne communications of potential belligerents 

and watching for, among other things, indications 

of possible entry into a war by other nations. This 

was done to forewarn Treasury, which could then 

take appropriate actions concerning the freezing of 

funds.50

With the outbreak of war in Europe, the 

Treasury Department’s statutory responsibility for 

enforcement of U.S. neutrality brought on a number of new responsibilities for the Coast Guard. 

Among these were the sealing of communications 

equipment on all belligerent vessels entering U.S. 

ports and the prevention of nonneutral communications concerning shipping or the movement of 

belligerent ships.

In monitoring communications pursuant to 

this latter responsibility, USCG monitoring stations 

Mrs. Elizebeth S. Friedman, P-4, Cryptanalyst in Charge

Mr. Vernon E. Cooley, P-2, Assistant Cryptanalyst

Mr. Robert E. Gordon, P-2, Assistant Cryptanalyst

Mr. Robert J. Fenn, P-1, Junior Cryptanalyst

Mr. Charles H. Withers, CAF-3. Cryptographic Clerk
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

reported late in 1940 that they were intercepting 

traffic similar to that of the old rumrunner transmissions. When these messages were solved, they 

proved to contain military information from somewhere in England (apparently the transmissions of 

agent SNOW, see following), These solutions were 

sent to ONI, G-2, State Department, and the FBI; 

and work was continued on additional related circuits which were found while monitoring the first 

one. Intercept and analysis of these communications were to constitute a major part of the Coast 

Guard’s contribution to intelligence during World 

War II.51

In late 1940, Lieutenant Commander Pollio, by 

then Intelligence Officer of the Coast Guard, and 

Lieutenant L.T. Jones, who as a lieutenant commander and then commander, would be in charge 

of the wartime Cryptanalytic Unit, had submitted 

their recommendations for improving the communications and intelligence postures of the Coast 

Guard. Among other things, they had recommended the establishment of permanent radio intercept stations in the New York, Jacksonville, New 

Orleans, San Francisco, and Honolulu Districts. 

These stations would be organized along the lines 

of regular Coast Guard radio stations but for technical reasons would be kept totally separate from 

regular communications stations. Pollio and Jones 

also recommended that the officers in charge of 

these stations have a knowledge of cryptanalysis. 

The stations would copy traffic from known illicit 

stations and search for new ones. By having officers 

qualified in cryptanalysis in charge, it was expected 

that there would be little difficulty in distinguishing 

illicit transmissions from other traffic of no interest.52

The Coast Guard (and the Navy) considered 

the term “clandestine radio intelligence” to include 

transmissions from all stations operating on radio 

nets which handled communications for enemy 

agents. Often these nets included stations within 

Axis or Axis-occupied territory, where they were 

certainly not clandestine. For the most part, these 

nets passed Abwehr and SD traffic, but they also 

sometimes passed diplomatic or even military 

communications. However, agent traffic could be, 

and often was, passed over commercial or diplomatic facilities. As a consequence, Commander L.T. 

Jones considered the cryptosystem used to be the 

only valid standard for discrimination.53

On 26 June 1939, a memorandum from 

President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the members 

of his cabinet ordered the investigation of all 

espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage matters centralized in ONI, the Military Intelligence 

Division (MID) of the War Department, and the 

FBI. On that date all government agencies other 

than the Army and Navy intelligence organizations had been ordered to turn over to the FBI all 

“data, information, or material bearing directly or 

indirectly on espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage.” Since the Coast Guard was a Treasury agency 

until late 1941, all clandestine material intercepted 

was thus forwarded to the FBI. In January 1941 the 

FBI began requesting Coast Guard assistance in 

the solution of this traffic. In the spring of the same 

year, the Coast Guard asked for and received permission from the secretary of the treasury to distribute information to the Treasury Department, 

State Department, ONI, and Army Intelligence 

in addition to the FBI. It thus developed more or 

less by a sequence of events rather than by any 

definite plan that the Coast Guard worked more 

closely with ONI than with ONC from June 1941 to 

February 1942.54

During 1940 and 1941, the Coast Guard also 

received miscellaneous intercepted traffic from 

the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). 

The FCC, in addition to performing its statutory 

regulatory duties, began in 1940 to be active in 

providing the armed forces with copies of the traffic 

of “suspect” transmitters. In late July of that year, 

Commander J. F. Farley, the Communications 

Officer of the Coast Guard, requested FCC monitoring of certain unidentified transmitters operating 

on the high frequency band; those using callsigns 

with the pattern “1TLE,” “2TLE,” etc., and possibly 

sending five-letter encrypted traffic. The tasking 
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

was implemented, and in October Farley expressed 

the Coast Guard's appreciation and requested that 

the assignment be continued.55

The Federal Communications Commission 

(1911-1941)

The earliest known attempts by the United States 

to monitor radio communications had their inception in 1911. Under the Radio Act of 24 June 1910, 

radio jurisdiction was placed in the Department 

of Commerce and Labor, and a Radio Service was 

organized in that department on 1 July 1911. When 

the department was split in 1913, supervision of the 

provisions of the Radio Acts of 1910 and 1912 went 

to the Department of Commerce. The duties of the 

Radio Division included inspecting radio stations, 

examining radio operators, determining the power 

of radio stations, and conducting investigations 

of interstation interference. The Radio Division 

maintained a central monitoring station at Grand 

Island, Nebraska; nine secondary monitoring stations; and six mobile units’ mounted on trucks, for 

field investigations. These mobile units were capable of acting as mobile direction finding (DF) units.

In 1932 Congress proposed that the president be authorized to transfer the duties, powers, and functions of the Radio Division of the 

Department of Commerce to the Federal Radio 

Commission, where it became the Division of Field 

Operations. When the Federal Communications 

Commission assumed the property of the Federal 

Radio Commission in 1934, the Division of Field 

Operations became the Field Division. Under the 

FCC, radio monitoring activities were expanded. The number of mobile monitoring stations 

designed primarily for measuring the field strength 

of stations but adaptable for DF and other field 

work, was raised to nine. Monitoring transmissions, identifying stations, and supplying intercepts to interested government agencies continued. 

Various changes, extensions, and improvements 

in FCC radio monitoring activities were made in 

ensuing years, and the Department of Justice, the 

Coast Guard, the State Department, and the Army 

and Navy came to place varying degrees of reliance 

upon the FCC in matters involving illicit use of 

radio.56

In September 1940, J. Edgar Hoover queried 

the possibility of the FCC monitoring all longdistance telephone calls between New York and 

Germany, France, and Italy. He also suggested 

that since Japanese, French, Italian, German, and 

Soviet officials were sending both foreign language 

and encrypted communications via cable, it might 

be well for the FCC to obtain copies of all encrypted 

and unencrypted communications which might 

have a bearing on our national defense problems. 

These suggestions created legal and administrative 

problems for the FCC, and at Chairman James L. 

Fly’s request, a meeting was held in January 1941 

between the FBI and the FCC’s Chief Engineer and 

General Counsel to iron out the problems.57

The FBI was interested in all communications 

between the Western Hemisphere and Germany, 

and in December 1940 requested that the FCC 

cover the Chapultepec, Mexico, commercial transmitter for ten days as “information [had] been 

received from a confidential source that the station [was) communicating with Germany.” Fly 

apparently wanted to drop the assignment after 

ten days, but FBI director Hoover informed him 

that “the continued submission of this material is 

important to the national defense investigations 

being pursued by this Bureau.” The FCC continued 

the assignment, and on 8 February 1941, Hoover 

requested another sixty-day extension of the mission. On 28 February, Hoover informed Fly that 

collection of Chapultepec could be limited to its 

communications with Germany, New York, and 

Rocky Point, Long Island. In April the Coast Guard 

requested that the FCC collect the communications 

between Chapultepec and Nauen, Germany. This 

was later expanded to include all ChapultepecGermany communications, an assignment modification in which the FBI concurred.58

In January 1941, the FCC, which had been 

tasked by the Defense Communications Board 
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

with monitoring foreign press and propaganda 

broadcasts, sought an additional fund allotment 

of $304,120 for the remainder of fiscal year 1941. 

These funds were to be used by the FCC’s National 

Defense Organization (NDO) to establish the 

Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service (FBMS), 

including the purchase of additional technical 

equipment and the hiring of translators and political analysts.59

The additional appropriation was approved 

and the FBMS was established. The FCC appropriation request for fiscal year 1942 exceeded the 

total fiscal year 1941 request by $300,000. Of this 

increase, $150,000 was requested for modernization of monitoring equipment, and $150,000 was 

requested for additional personnel. In modern 

terms such an increase is infinitesimal, but in 1941, 

$300,000 represented a sixteen percent increase 

in the FCC appropriation.60

The British Effort: GC&CS and the RSS (1919-

1941)

The British cryptanalytic effort in World War 

II was centralized in the Government Code and 

Cipher School (GC&CS) which had been established by the British government in 1919 to study 

foreign cryptosystems and to advise on the security 

of British cryptosystems. It was originally made up 

of twenty-five officers recruited from the remnants 

of the World War I Admiralty and War Office 

cryptanalytic sections and was placed administratively under the Admiralty. In 1922 GC&CS, 

together with the Special Intelligence Service (SIS), 

was transferred to the Foreign Office, and in 1923 

the head of the SIS was redesignated “Chief of the 

Secret Service and Director of GC&CS.”61

When GC&CS was established, the War Office 

and the Admiralty reserved the right to remove 

their personnel at need to man their own SIGINT 

centers. By 1935, however, it was realized that the 

production of SIGINT was a continuum of processes which could not be separated. This, together 

with the earlier decisions to centralize peacetime 

cryptanalysis, was a strong argument in favor 

of maintaining the same organizational structure 

in wartime. The Cryptography and Interception 

Committee of GC&CS, which included representatives of the three services, had a standing subcommittee, the Y Subcommittee, which coordinated the 

services’ radio intercept activities.62

During World War II, the British intercept 

effort against Axis clandestine communications 

was conducted by the Radio Security Service (RSS). 

This organization was tasked with identifying and 

performing the initial intercept of Axis illicit stations communicating with Germany. The original 

intention was that the intercept organizations of 

the various services would assume the burden 

of intercept after the nets had been identified by 

the RSS. In practice, because of the intercept load 

already being carried by the services, the RSS 

became the organization responsible for the intercept of Abwehr communications, by far the most 

extensive of the illicit nets.63

The origins of the RSS extend back to 1928, 

when the Committee of Imperial Defence charged 

the War Office with the responsibility for creating 

an organization for detecting illicit radio transmissions within the British Isles. The original concept 

was that such an organization would be directed 

and financed by the War Office, with personnel 

and equipment provided by the Government Post 

Office (GPO). This concept received official approval in 1933.64

The normal responsibilities of the GPO with 

regard to radio communications were very similar to those of the FCC in the United States, i.e., 

enforcement of the laws concerning radio operation; overseeing amateur radio operation; policing 

frequency usage; and investigating the causes of 

radio interference. In a paper written in 1938 for 

MI-5, Lieutenant Colonel Adrian F.H.S. Simpson 

pointed out that the GPO’s effort against illicit 

transmissions was merely an offshoot of its primary operations, and any economies achieved 

through the use of the GPO would be false ones 
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

from a military point of view. MI-5’s objectives 

were to prevent unauthorized transmissions; to 

collect transmitted messages for examination and 

decryption; to locate the transmitting stations; to 

prevent, in some cases, the receipt of unauthorized 

signals within the country; to conduct research 

into new or unusual methods of transmission; and, 

above all, to watch over a much larger range of 

frequencies than that proposed by the GPO. The 

GPO’s objective, on the other hand, was to wait 

until the law was broken and then to determine the 

cause. This difference in philosophies was to plague 

the British effort for some time.65

The new organization for the Interception of 

Illicit Wireless Communications (IWI) was tasked 

with intercepting illicit signals originating in, or 

directed toward, the British Isles. It was soon 

recognized, however, that there were also illicit 

signals which were originating abroad and were 

directed toward Germany. The War Office decided 

in July 1939 to establish intercept sites abroad to 

collect these signals. Three sites each were to be 

established in Egypt and Tanganyika; two each in 

Palestine, Malaya, and Gibraltar; and one each in 

Malta, The Cameroons, Aden, and Hong Kong. All 

sites were all under service auspices.66

MI-5, as the organization responsible for the 

defense of the realm, was not involved in the work 

of IWI (redesignated MI-1(g) in 1939) until after an 

illicit transmitter had been located. At this point, 

MI-5 became responsible for coordinating seizure 

and arrest. It was decided, therefore, that in cases 

of suspected espionage, MI-5 would control procedure and all liaison with the police. In such cases, 

the police would be given no details concerning 

MI-1(g) organization and would be impressed with 

the need for delicacy and discretion in their inquiries.67

In an attempt to tighten collaboration between 

MI-5 and MI-1(g), the War Office intercept organization was revised in September 1939. MI-1(b), the 

department responsible for military intercept, was 

reconstituted as MI-8, under the jurisdiction of the 

War Office and the Director of Military Intelligence 

(DMI), and MI-1(g) became MI-8(c). That part of 

MI-8(c) concerned with the intercept and identification of illicit transmissions was renamed the 

Radio Security Service (RSS).68

At first, the only illicit signals originating from 

the British Isles were the transmissions made by an 

MI-5 double agent codenamed SNOW. By January 

1940, three radio groups had been identified and 

were ready to be turned over to the armed forces 

intercept services, better known as the “Y” services. 

One of these, a shipboard station anchored near 

Bergen, Norway, was identified through its communications with SNOW, and was taken over by 

the Admiralty “Y” service. Another group was of 

interest to the French. The third, the worldwide 

Abwehr net, appeared to be too large a task for any 

of the already overloaded “Y” services, and in the 

end, the RSS assumed responsibility for its intercept. Traffic was forwarded to GC&CS at Bletchley 

Park, Bedfordshire, where a special section was 

established for handling the cryptanalysis of illicit 

systems. This section was known as Intelligence 

Services, Oliver Strachey (ISOS), after its chief. 

In a later division of responsibility, ISOS was 

made responsible for the analysis of hand systems. 

Intelligence Services, [Dillwyn] Knox (ISK), was 

made responsible for the analysis of the higher level 

machine systems. The small amount of Abwehr 

traffic encrypted on the TUNNY system, referred to 

as ISTUN, was decrypted by the TUNNY Section.69

In May 1941 the headquarters organization of 

the RSS was transferred to MI-6, and the overseas 

intercept units followed in August. Operations 

were directed by a steering committee made up 

of representatives of MI-5, MI-6, GC&CS, and the 

three armed services. This organization remained 

essentially unchanged for the remainder of the war. 

The mission of the RSS was recognized as consisting of the detection, collection, location, control, 

and suppression of all Axis clandestine radio operations, worldwide.70
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

The Reorganization of the U.S. SIGINT Effort 

(1939-1942)

Executive memoranda of 1939 had ordered the 

centralization of SIGINT in the Army, Navy, and 

FBI. The cabinet secretaries were instructed to see 

to it that any such activities in their departments 

were handed over to these three organizations, the 

directors of which were to function as a committee 

for coordination of intelligence activities.71

Later in 1939 Roosevelt ordered that all cryptanalytic efforts likewise be centralized: those in 

ONC, the United States Army Signal Corps, and 

the FBI. He also directed that a communications 

intelligence committee–the CI Committee–be constituted with one representative from each of these 

organizations, to serve in an advisory capacity to 

the Intelligence Committee designated in the 26 

June memorandum.72

Although the committees were formed, little of the centralization appears to have been 

accomplished, and it took an outside event to 

stimulate a change. On 2 April 1942, a conference was held at the State Department, chaired 

by Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle and 

attended by representatives of the Army, Navy, 

State Department, FBI, and FCC. The direct occasion for the meeting was a Brazilian police roundup 

of enemy agents in Rio de Janeiro on 18 March. 

The arrests were premature but were apparently 

made at the suggestion of the U.S. embassy, which 

had promised to provide the police with decrypted 

messages as evidence. The next day, the U.S. naval 

attaché in Rio de Janeiro requested copies of all 

intercepted and decrypted messages relating to the 

CELALD group of agents, so-called because of their 

radio callsigns.

The Navy considered it dangerous to release 

such information. However, since the embassy 

was deeply involved, the Navy agreed to supply the 

evidence with certain caveats. Since the attaché 

already had decrypts, no more would be sent until 

a decision was made on the releasability of the 

information, and the attaché was to withhold those 

in his possession until then. A check was to be 

made to determine whether the police had seized 

any messages in their raids, as that would simplify 

Bletchley Park’s Victorian mansion, which housed Great Britain’s cryptologic efforts
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

cover. In any case, the only messages to be supplied 

would be those in a cryptosystem which had been 

superseded on 18 September 1941. As will be seen 

later, these precautions went for naught.73

Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, the CNO, asked Berle 

to call the conference in order to establish a general 

policy for such disclosures. In his letter to Berle, 

Wilkinson expressed a fear that any of the agencies handling such traffic could, in the absence 

of a general policy, take unilateral action detrimental to the interests of the United States or to 

the other agencies involved, including British and 

Canadian authorities. Wilkinson believed that the 

Department of State should be the determining 

authority as to the action to be taken with regard to 

information derived from intercept, since inaction 

could result in continued receipt of information 

and would avoid the risk of enemy knowledge that 

their cryptosystem had been broken.74

The participanta at the meeting decided that 

the danger of closing down a vulnerable source of 

intelligence precluded revelation of radio intercept 

except in the most serious cases and tasked Major 

General George V. Strong, the Assistant Chief of 

Staff, G-2 (A.C. of S., G-2) with drafting a statement 

to serve as the basis of an Executive Order. He forwarded the following text to Berle on 3 April.

No action toward the closure of international clandestine radio stations or 

apprehension of individuals engaged 

in clandestine radio communications 

in which there is any military or 

naval interest, or actions requiring 

disclosure of intercepted communications, shall be initiated without the 

joint approval of the Chief of Staff 

of the Army and the Chief of Naval 

Operations, or their designated representatives.75

At the 2 April meeting, FCC Chairman Fly called 

attention to the duplication of effort and incomplete 

coverage resulting from improper coordination 

of the efforts of several cryptographic bureaus. At 

that time, in addition to the Army, Navy (including 

Coast Guard), and FBI organizations, there were 

cryptanalytic units, existing or planned, in the FCC, 

the 0ffice of Censorship, the Weather Bureau, and 

the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI) 

(later the Office of Strategic Services–OSS). The 

Navy representative at the meeting, Commander 

John R. Redman, recommended that the Coast 

Guard assume responsibility for all cryptanalysis 

not performed by the Army and Navy, but no unanimity of opinion could be reached and the matter 

was referred to the Intelligence Committee.76

At an Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference on 8 April, it was agreed that there would be 

a conference on the subject of intercept responsibility. Representatives at the conference were to 

be Mr. D. M. Ladd (FBI), Colonel John T. Bissell 

(MID), Commander John R. Redman (ONC), and 

Lieutenant Commander Alwin D. Kramer (ONI). 

Late in April, this subcommittee, augmented by 

Colonel Carter W. Clarke (MID), Commander 

Joseph N. Wenger (ONC), and Mr. E. P. Coffey 

(FBI), took up the question of coordination, and 

cooperation in the cryptanalytic work of the three 

services and the question of the processing of 

coded intercepts.77

The division of effort at this time was as follows:

•	 Navy (including Coast Guard)–enemy 

naval, enemy diplomatic, enemy clandestine, and potential enemy naval and diplomatic;

•	 Army–enemy field military, enemy diplomatic, enemy commercial, and potential 

enemy military and diplomatic; and

•	 FBI–enemy diplomatic, enemy commercial, enemy clandestine, espionage, shoreto-ship, and U. S. criminal.

In addition, the FCC had attempted some elementary cryptanalyis to guide collection.78
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

Taking into acccount the recommendation of 

the subcommittee, Admiral Wilkinson, as chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on 18 

June 1942 that presidential approval be obtained to 

eliminate all cryptanalytic efforts in agencies other 

than Army, Navy, and FBI.79

Another coference subcommittee was appointed, made up of Colonel Carter W. Clarke, Colonel 

Frank W. Bullock, and Mr. William F. Friedman 

for the Army; Commander John R. Redman, 

Commander Joseph N. Wenger, Lieutenant 

Commander Alwin D. Kramer, and Lieutenant 

Commander L.T. Jones (USCG) for the Navy; and 

Messrs. E. P. Coffey and D. M. Ladd for the FBI. 

This subcommittee recommended the following 

allocation of work:80

Diplomatic Navy

Enemy Naval Operations Navy

Enemy Military Operations Army

Western Hemisphere 

 Clandestine FBI/Navy

Other Clandestine Navy

Trade Codes as assigned 

 by the

committee

Army Weather Army

Navy Weather Navy

Domestic Criminal FBI

Voice Broadcast FBI

Cover Text Communication FBI

Miscellaneous as assigned

 by the

committee

The recommendation was forwarded to the 

president on 8 July by the JCS, and by the president to the director of the budget on 8 July with 

instructions to implement. A memoraadum to 

Mr. B. L. Gladieux of the Bureau of the Budget on 

18 July stated that neither the OSS nor the State 

Department was conducting cryptanalytic activities, but that there were small units in the office of 

Censorship aad the War Communications Board 

(part of the FCC), both of which were reluctant 

to turn staff and equipment over to the Army aad 

Navy. After the application of some pressure by 

the Bureau of the Budget, the Office of Censorship 

informed the Director of Budget on 12 August that 

Censorship’s cryptanalytic unit had been abolished 

and fourteen persons were being transferred to 

the Navy Department to continue their work. On 

1 September, the Director of Budget informed the 

president that with the FCC agreeing to discontinue 

plans for employing cryptanalysts, all responsibility for cryptanalysis had been vested in the Army, 

the Navy, and the FBI.81

Initial Operations

From July 1940 to May 1941, the FCC had provided the State Department with copy from clandestine stations in Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, 

and Iceland. On 15 July Chairman Fly had forwarded to the DNC a number of encrypted messages which had been copied and sent in to the FCC 

by amateur radio operators. In return, the Navy 

was forwarding traffic the FCC had intercepted by 

naval radio stations which appeared to fall under 

the cognizance of the FCC. Among these was an 

encrypted message intercepted at Jupiter, Florida, 

on 8 August as it was traasmitted from an unidentified station to “AOR.” The latter was to be one of 

the major “controlled” Axis agent transmitters.82

As far as the Coast Guard was concerned, the 

FCC intercept was useful at first only for collation purposes and for filling in some of the gaps 

in Coast Guard collection. As FCC operator efficiency improved, however, it became a valuable 

source of original material. An agreement was 

reached between the two organizations in April 

1942, whereby the FCC began to provide traffic 

from all clandestine circuits, particularly those 

operating out of Argentina.83

As a result of the declaration of a state of emergency, the Coast Guard was resubordinated to 

the United States Navy on 1 November 1941 and 

after some discussion, the Cryptanalytic Unit fol-
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

lowed in March 1942. It did not, however, become 

a part of OP-20-6 until 1 March 1943, when it 

was moved from Coast Guard Headquarters to 

the Naval Communications Annex and designated 

OP-20-GU. In this guise, and with a staff of twelve, 

it continued the work on German clandestine systems which it had started in 1940. By July 1943 the 

unit had been enlarged to twenty-three persons 

and, as a part of the Navy cryptologic organization, 

was tasked with the reception, identification, and 

collation of clandestine transmissions; the analysis 

and solution of clandestine cryptographic systems; 

the translation and editing of decrypted clandestine material and the preparation of this translated 

material for dissemination; and liaison with the 

British intercept and cryptanalytic organizations in 

connection with clandestine traffic.84

The Coast Guard was receiving all of the intercepted clandestine traffic passing to and from 

South America, but had little or no DF capability, 

relying on the FCC and the Navy for this service as 

well as for assistance in intercept. After decryption 

and translation by the Coast Guard, copies of the 

translations were disseminated to the Navy, the 

Army, the State Department, the FBI, the FCC, and 

the COI. The FCC, acting on information received 

from the Coast Guard, obtained DF bearings on 

the clandestine transmitters. In accordance with 

the April 1942 agreement, the FCC furnished the 

Coast Guard with intercepted traffic from all clandestine and suspected clandestine circuits. U.S. 

Navy DF stations in the Caribbean also collected 

German clandestine traffic, obtained DF bearings 

on terminals in the Western Hemisphere, and conducted continual search for other clandestine stations. This information was then passed on to the 

Coast Guard. The FBI, which performed little or no 

intercept on its own, assembled data from both the 

Coast Guard and the FCC, added information from 

its own files, and prepared reports for the State 

Department.85

The Coast Guard was operating three intercept 

stations on the East Coast when the war began, 

and these, together with the Navy sites at Toro 

Point, C.Z.; Winter Harbor, Maine; and Jupiter, 

Florida, were its main sources of clandestine traffic. Unfortunately, because the Navy operators 

were unfamiliar with the problems of copying 

clandestine transmissions, the material furnished 

by the Navy stations was of little or no value to 

the Cryptanalytic Unit. Commander Jones was 

convinced that if the Navy operators were indoctrinated in proper collection procedures at the Coast 

Guard station on Long Island, and if OP-20-G were 

to decide to make a real contribution, the situation 

would change. In the meantime, FCC traffic was 

“only fair,” traffic from the British was weeks late 

in arriving, and the Army exchanged traffic only 

out of courtesy and not regularly. As a result, the 

Cryptanalytic Unit was left with the task of performing cryptanalysis on traffic from nets which 

were very incompletely covered.86

Security Problems

In mid-July 1940, ONC informed the FCC 

that “somewhere in the United States a station on 

approximately 14,370 kc. is transmitting information to agents in Europe regarding the departure 

of vessels from the port of New York.” Two stations 

were involved in the communications: one using 

the fixed callsign “AOR,” and the other using dailychanging calls. The latter was referred to throughout the ensuing events as “UK” (unknown) or, from 

its call-up procedure, "VVV TEST.”87

George Sterling, as chief of the FCC’s Radio 

Intelligence Division (RID), immediately instituted 

a conference call with the FCC’s primary monitoring stations at Baltimore, Maryland; Hingham, 

Massachusetts; Grand Island, Nebraska; Portland, 

Oregon; and San Pedro, California, requesting 

that they be alert for such transmissions. The first 

FCC intercept of the link was accomplished at the 

Portland monitoring station on 2 August 1940.

The science of HF direction finding was still in 

its infancy, and the FCC was further handicapped 

in locating these stations by a lack of Adcock-type 

direction finders. Navy DF “fixes” were confused by 
Page 24

Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

the Navy’s inability to distinguish between the two 

ends of the link. Thus, on 8 August 1940, the Navy 

reported that the clandestine station was located 

in west central New England or New York State. 

Subsequent inconclusive DF reports giving bearings of 42 degrees from Pensacola, Florida, and 49 

degrees from Amagansett, New York, and a report 

on 6 September placing AOR near St. John, New 

Brunswick, were of little help.88

On 17 September, Admiral Noyes informed the 

FCC that both AOR and N7Z had been identified 

and no further intercept was required. (N7Z was a 

British cruiser in U.S. waters, completely unrelated 

to AOR.) Since the Army, which had been given 

copies of the messages, was also uninterested in 

the traffic, this left only the FBI as a user of the FCC 

intercept on this link, and the FBI was providing no 

feedback.89

It was becoming increasingly apparent to the 

FCC that VVV TEST was located in the United 

States, probably in New York State, but the FBI 

denied this possibility. Sterling, therefore, again 

approached the Navy in November and provided 

them with intercept of more than 100 messages. 

Navy interest was reawakened, and OP-20-G began 

a cryptanalytic attack on the traffic and began providing additional DF. These bearings, combined 

with FCC bearings, placed the station near New 

Haven, Connecticut. An FCC team was placed in 

the area with mobile DF units, and on 7 December 

1940 the station’s location was pinpointed in 

Centerport, Long Island.90

Earlier in the year, the FBI had requested 

an unlisted, confidential, amateur radio station 

callsign assignment for a station to be located in 

Centerport. Consequently, on 9 December Sterling 

notified Hoover of the clandestine station’s location. The FBI denied that there was anything special about the Centerport station but admitted later 

in the day that the clandestine station was part of a 

highly successful counterespionage operation.

At this point, the FCC officially closed the case 

on VVV TEST-AOR but continued to copy all transmissions and forward the intercept to the FBI for 

record purposes. In January 1941 the FBI tasked 

the FCC with collecting another station, GLENN, 

located just outside Mexico City, which was using 

the Centerport station as a relay to communicate 

with AOR.

The FBI could not decrypt the trafflc from the 

Mexican station and passed it on to the Coast Guard 

for analysis. Since the traffic passed to the Coast 

Guard was from Mexico to Germany, with a relay 

through the United States, the Coast Guard instituted its own collection of the group pursuant to its 

duties with regard to the monitoring of unneutral 

communications in the Western Hemisphere. The 

Coast Guard also asked the Army for copies of back 

traffic from the VVV TEST-AOR circuit as an aid 

to analysis. When the Army replied that all of the 

traffic had been returned to the FCC, the Coast 

Guard queried that agency. The FCC replied that it 

would search its records and immediately notified 

the FBI, which gave assurances that the situation 

would be explained to the Coast Guard.91

In fact, the Coast Guard was told merely that 

the station in Centerport was being covered by 

the FBI, with no mention that the station was 

FBI-controlled. This did not become known to the 

Coast Guard until July 1941, when thirty-three Axis 

agents were arrested by the FBI and the story of 

the FBI-controlled spy station was released to the 

press. According to Captain J. F. Farley, the Chief 

Communications Officer of the Coast Guard,

Up to that time the information 

transmitted by this station had been 

found suffciently accurate that we 

had no suspicion that it originated 

from other than genuine espionage 

agents. The accuracy of ship information transmitted by this station 

was as high or possibly higher than 

would be expected from diligent and 

faithful espionage agents.92
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

In fact, the Coast Guard was of the opinion that 

the information supplied to the Germans by the 

FBI via the VVV TEST-AOR circuit was so accurate that its value to Germany could not be overestimated. Captain Farley pointed out specifically 

that a message concerning the ship Ville de Liege

named only the one vessel and stated that she was 

sailing without convoy. After the Ville de Liege was 

sunk, the sailing date named in the message was 

one of the most important features in the trial of 

the German agent Kurt Ludwig. The FBI agents 

involved asserted that they had decrypted and 

read every message sent by TEST; thus they were 

responsible for having transmitted that one. Farley 

considered the fact that the VVV TEST-AOR circuit 

was operated for nearly eighteen months, until its 

termination by the FBI, to be proof of its value to 

the Germans.93

The Coast Guard Cryptanalytic Section was able 

to solve most of the messages sent from Mexico to. 

AOR via VVV TEST. These messages provided 

considerable information concerning the activities 

of Axis agents in Latin America and links to other 

communications groups which were being studied 

at the time. As a result, the Coast Guard continued 

monitoring the group, although VVV TEST was, of 

course, no longer operative.94

From a security point of view, just as important 

as the information provided to the Germans by 

the FBI was that information concerning the readability of the cryptosystems used on this circuit 

had been released to the press. This was not to be 

the last time that the service SIGINT organizations 

would protest against FBI procedures in handling 

communications intelligence. As time went on, 

the Coast Guard became convinced that some of 

the agencies receiving verbatim texts of clandestine messages, particularly the FBI and the State 

Department, were too free in their use of this information. In February 1942, as a result, the Coast 

Guard ceased distribution of verbatim texts to all 

agencies other than ONI and the British Security 

Coordinator (BSC–the British Intelligence liaison 

office in New York City), sending free translations 

to the others. This measure was, unfortunately, 

taken too late. The Navy attempt to reduce the 

impact of the release of clandestine SIGINT in connection with the round-up of Axis spies in Brazil 

was futile because the Department of State had 

already provided the Brazilian government with 

voluminous files of verbatim texts, including copies 

of all the messages from Brazilian circuits which 

were in the possession of the FBI.

The messages provided to the Brazilians by the 

FBI through State Department included hundreds 

of decrypts provided to that agency by the Coast 

Guard from the Rio de Janeiro-Hamburg circuit. 

The FBI’s only source of intercepted traffic at that 

time was the monitoring network of the FCC. As it 

happened, the South American end of the circuit 

could not be heard in the United States, where all 

of the FCC stations were located. About 500 messages originating in Rio de Janeiro had been copied by U.S. Army monitors in Brazil and had then 

been forwarded to the Coast Guard for decryption 

and translation, making the Coast Guard the only 

source for this material. To a certain extent, this 

was true of all the information supplied by the 

FBI on South American circuits, since material 

decrypted by the FBI was usually worked on the 

basis of cryptologic information supplied by the 

Coast Guard.

Providing this information to the Brazilian 

authorities resulted in Brazilian officials showing decrypted verbatim texts to German agents 

during interrogation. In one instance, a prisoner 

was asked to assist in the translation of obscurely 

worded messages. The fact that the systems used 

on all clandestine circuits were completely changed 

almost immediately indicates that the Germans 

had thus been informed that their cryptosecurity 

had been breached.95

The FBI Connection

Initially, Coast Guard relations with the FBI 

were cordial. Under the original 1942 agreement, 

OP-20-GU continued working on the systems then 
Page 26

Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

being read by the Coast Guard; the FBI continued 

working on the systems they were reading, and the 

two consulted before beginning work on new systems. In addition. to ensure some measure of control over FBI cryptanalysis, it was agreed that the 

Navy and the FBI were to confer on coordination 

of work on Western Hemisphere clandestine material. The Navy had made no commitments on anything other than Western Hemisphere clandestine.

When in February 1942 the FBI, MID, and 

ONI signed a secret agreement concerning the 

establishment of a DF network to locate clandestine radio stations in Latin America, MID assumed 

responsibility for location of clandestine stations in 

Latin American countries and dissemination of the 

clandestine information obtained to the FBI and 

ONI. The Navy, therefore, no longer considered 

itself bound to supply FBI with any clandestine 

information at all. Not only did the Navy consider 

that its relationship with FBI had netted practically 

nothing, but as time went on it became increasingly apparent that while the FBI was demanding 

everything that OP-20-GU had, it was withholding 

potentially valuable information from that organization. Relations continued to deteriorate, beginning with the New York spy trials and the Brazilian 

spy roundup.96

In January 1942 representatives of BSC met 

with U.S. naval officers to discuss clandestine 

intercept. The British attitude was that since these 

stations could never be completely suppressed, 

it was better to allow them to operate so that 

they could be monitored. At this meeting it was 

decided to hold weekly conferences at the Coast 

Guard Communications Office, the participants 

being representatives of OP-20-G (after 2 February 

1943), the RSS, and the Coast Guard Cryptanalytic 

Unit, with occasional attendance by representatives from Canada and from the Radio Intelligence 

Service (RIS) of the U.S. Army.97

Shortly after Pearl Harbor. the RSS asked 

to exchange information with the Coast Guard 

Cryptanalytic Unit. As a result, weekly exchanges 

were made with the RSS representative in the 

United States. Somewhat later a similar arrangement was made with GC&CS.98

The FBI objected to the RSS-Coast Guard 

exchanges. They cited their agreement with BSC, 

to which the RSS representative was attached for 

administrative purposes, and demanded that the 

RSS deal with American agencies only via the FBI. 

The British were forced to agree and the exchanges 

were terminated. The GC&CS representative, however, was not included in the agreement, and Coast 

Guard exchanges with him continued.99

Prior to the 1942 conferences assigning SIGINT 

responsibilities to specific agencies, the Army and 

Navy had hoped that the FBI could be persuaded to 

retire from the cryptanalytic business and agree to 

turn that duty over to the services. They hoped in 

vain, however. Because of Hoover’s reputation and 

power, the best result that could be obtained was to 

confine the FBI to domestic criminal and Western 

Hemisphere clandestine communications.100

Several months after the termination of the 

RSS-Coast Guard liaison, the British expressed 

dissatisfaction with the accuracy of the information they were receiving from the FBI, implying 

that they would be forced to resume liaison with 

the Coast Guard. The FBI then proposed that 

the Coast Guard, RSS, FCC, and FBI hold weekly 

discussions of clandestine monitoring problems. 

The other agencies agreed, with the proviso that 

they were free to contact one another outside 

of the weekly meetings. These meetings, to discuss Western Hemisphere monitoring problems, 

were conducted for several months; the RSS and 

Coast Guard representatives met later to discuss 

the clandestine problem outside of the Western 

Hemisphere. There were relatively few Western 

Hemisphere circuits, and their communications 

were relatively unchanging, so there was little to 

discuss at the FBI meetings. After a few months the 

meetings appeared to be a waste of time, and the 

Coast Guard and RSS ceased attending. From then 

on, the FCC was notified of any communications 
Page 27

Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

changes, allowing them to keep their logs current 

for the Western Hemisphere. The RSS and Coast 

Guard weekly meetings continued, and FCC logs 

were sent to all parties.101

In 1943 the Coast Guard solved the Enigma system used by a clandestine station in Argentina, and 

began working other Enigma links whose setups 

had been provided by the Signal Security Agency 

(SSA). In view of the poor security procedures of 

the FBI, which received copies of the Coast Guard 

solutions, the nature of this system was brought to 

the attention of OP-20-G. As a result of the MIDFBI-ONI Agreement, Colonel Carter Clarke of G-2 

had said that the FBI should no longer be supplied 

intelligence resulting from clandestine communications except through G-2, and the Army and 

the Navy agreed that the messages were not to be 

provided to the FBI. Instead, ONI would provide 

the FBI with summarized information which would 

conceal the source. Immediately after this decision 

was reached, an urgent message was received from 

the British expressing their fears for the security of 

Enigma solutions if they were provided to the FBI. 

They were reassured that the FBI would not receive 

any intelligence that would compromise the work 

being done on Enigma.102

By the end of 1943, the presence of information in the ONI summary which had not been 

received by the FBI as individual decrypts indicated to Hoover that there was a quantity of Western 

Hemisphere SIGINT to which his organization was 

not privy. He complained to Rear Admiral R. E. 

Schuirman, the DNI, that the Navy, by withholding 

verbatim translations, was interfering with the FBI 

in the accomplishment of its mission of controlling the operations of enemy agents in the Western 

Hemisphere. He claimed that the FBI had been 

providing the Navy with intercepted messages, but 

the product from these intercepts had not been 

furnished to the FBI.

Hoover’s attitude was that the Navy’s refusal to 

provide the FBI with this material would force him 

to close down the operations of the Argentine and 

Mexican agent nets. He realized that this was not as 

desirable as allowing them to operate in a “supervised” fashion, but he could see no alternative. If 

this action became necessary through the failure 

of the Navy department to make the messages 

available to the FBI, he would, “of course,” have to 

“explain to the proper authority why such action 

must be taken.”103

The DNI replied to Hoover that the information 

which the Navy was producing from communication intelligence activities was being used to the 

greatest extent possible, bearing in mind the necessity of avoiding revelation of Allied cryptanalytic 

success. The use made of such information had to 

be secondary to the safeguarding of such success. 

As a consequence, the verbatim text of messages 

solved by the Navy were not being given to anyone 

who did not have an urgent need for them and who 

was not also subject to control by the Navy as far 

as enforcement of necessary regulations for safeguarding the information was concerned. The DNI 

further stated that if Hoover decided that it was 

necessary to seize foreign agents who were transmitting information from Argentina to Germany, 

he requested that Hoover advise him before taking such action. He pointed out that if the FBI did 

this, it would be necessary to inform Argentinian 

The Enigma served as the standard cipher 

machine for Germany’s military, its agents, 

and its secret police.
Page 28

Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

authorities and such information would certainly 

find its way to Germany. He concluded with the 

statement that if the FBI, in negotiating with the 

Argentine authorities, revealed or even suggested 

that messages currently being transmitted from 

clandestine stations were being solved, then the 

FBI would have furnished Germany with information of such value as to seriously conflict with the 

national interest. The Navy did not back down from 

this position, and, fortunately for everyone, Hoover 

did not carry out his threat.104

The Army Connection

Early in 1942, the SIS started a traffic analytic study of German clandestine communications, 

using traffic received from the FCC; the Army’s 

intercept stations at Ft. Hancock, New Jersey, 

and Rio de Janeiro; the Brazilian government’s 

intercept service; the 120th SRI Company in the 

Canal Zone; and the 123rd SRI Company in Cocoa, 

Florida.

The Army’s effort consisted primarily of circuit 

identification and the solution of preamble keys. 

No effort was made, apparently, to perform cryptanalysis on the message texts.

The reasons for this work were presumably to 

keep the Army abreast of developments in clandestine radio communications in order to correlate 

them with other traffic analytic and intercept control problems and to furnish a nucleus in the event 

the Army had to take over the problem.105

In late 1942, GC&CS agreed to provide the SIS 

with the “Schedule” and the “RSS New Services and 

Amendments,” the two documents published by 

the RSS to keep their intercept operators informed 

of changes in Abwehr communications. The Navy 

called G-2’s attention to the fact that clandestine 

communications were a Navy responsibility under 

the terms of the Army-Navy-FBI agreement. G-2 

agreed but stated that the Army did not consider 

that Abwehr communications between Berlin and 

Rome, for example, were clandestine. The Army 

view did not take into account the fact that the 

Berlin-Rome link was part of a net that included 

Turkey, Spain, and Portugal, but since G-2 stated 

that the Army was engaged in only research, the 

Navy did not press the matter. On or about 15 July 

1943, the Army operation was abandoned and 

records were no longer maintained.106

As a result of the decisions made after June 

1939, all analysis of the clandestine problem was 

the responsibility of the Coast Guard and the FBI 

until the end of the war. Analysis is, however, only 

one phase of the SIGINT process. Intercept and 

location of the Axis stations were performed by 

not only the Coast Guard and the FBI, but also 

the Navy, the Army, and the FCC; and coordination of the various efforts was to remain a problem 

throughout the war. One of the attempts at this was 

the creation of the Joint Radio Intelligence Centers, 

of which only the first, in San Francisco, had any 

real connection with the clandestine problem.

The Radio Intelligence Center

On 9 and 10 January 1942, a series of meetings was held at Headquarters, Western Defense 

Command and Fourth Army (WDC), at the Presidio 

of San Francisco. These meetings were attended by 

representatives of WDC, 12th Naval District, the 

FCC, and the FBI. Their purpose was to plan a joint 

facility for the coordination of radio intelligence 

information.

This Radio Intelligence Center (RIC), as the 

facility was to be called, was created to collect, 

evaluate, and disseminate intelligence related to 

the identification and location of radio stations; 

for surveillance of radio transmissions; and for 

interservice exchange of radio security information. It was to be totally operated by the FCC with 

the services having tasking authority and providing 

liaison personnel. All information obtained was to 

be provided to the services and to other FCC customers.
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

The initial planning called for direct teletype 

communications between the RIC and the NDO, 

the FCC’s primary stations in Portland and Santa 

Ana, the Office of Naval Communications, and 

the Signal Intelligence Service of WDC. In addition, there was to be teletype exchange (TWX) 

service for other stations and direct telephone 

service to the Joint Command Post, the Office of 

Naval Communications, and the Signal Intelligence 

Service. An emergency radio station was also to be 

installed.107

The major incentive for creating such a center appears to have been provided by Lieutenant 

General John L. DeWitt, commanding WDC. On 14 

January, DeWitt called Colonel Freeman Raymond 

in Washington, D.C., to request Raymond’s assistance in expediting the funding for the center. 

DeWitt told Raymond that he intended that the 

Army should fund the operation for at least the 

first eighteen months, because going to the Navy 

for money would slow things down. He commented 

that the Navy was, along with the Army, concerned 

with the DF fixes that were being obtained on 

shortwave stations that the Japanese were using all 

along the coast to communicate with their submarines and surface ships.108

Although DeWitt was demanding immediate 

action, there ensued a delay while everyone in 

the chain of command avoided making a decision. Although the. Chief' Signal Officer and G-2 

appeared to be in favor of the operation, the War 

Department wanted more Navy cooperation and 

expressed the belief that DeWitt’s problems could 

be solved by providing him with a direct telephone link to the FCC in Washington. Finally, on 5 

February 1942, an affirmative decision was made by 

G-2 and the War Department was asked to approve 

the funds. The requests for direct teletype circuits 

and an emergency radio station, however, were to 

be reviewed after it had been determined whether 

or not such installations were justified. In the 

meantime, TWX circuits would be used, although 

WDC felt they would be unsatisfactory. After the 

funding approval by the War Department, implementation of the decision was rapid. And the RIC, 

located in the Federal Building in San Francisco, 

was placed in operation on 1 March 1942.109
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

Introduction

In addition to the cryptanalytic and reporting 

effort directed against Axis agent communications, 

continuing attempts were made to determine the 

location of enemy agent transmitters through high 

frequency direction finding (DF). Interest was 

particularly high in finding these stations in Latin 

America, and two major attempts were made, first 

by the U.S. Navy and then by the FCC and the U.S. 

Army, to establish DF operations in that area. As it 

happens, the documentation of the history of these 

two attempts is far more complete than is the documentation of the history of the cryptanalytic effort. 

In both cases, the operation was based on the training of indigenous personnel to man the sites with 

U.S. personnel serving as advisors. The success of 

these two operations was mixed.

The U.S. Navy in Colombia and Ecuador 

(1940-1941)

The Navy’s first experience with Axis clandestine communications started in 1940. In May and 

June of that year, Ecuadoran authorities intercepted a number of transmissions from unidentified stations, apparently within Ecuador, passing 

four-letter and two-figure encrypted traffic and 

some apparent German plain text. Fearing Axis 

clandestine operations, Ecuador asked the United 

States for technical aid in locating illegal radio 

transmitters in their country. This request was for 

equipment only, but Boaz Long, the U.S. ambassador to Ecuador, recommended (probably with 

Ecuadoran government approval) that in addition 

to the Adcock DF (direction finding) equipment 

requested, two radio receivers and nine radio personnel be sent.

At about the same time, Colombia made a similar request as a result of a conference early in 1940 

between the American minister at Bogotá, the U.S. 

Army mission in Colombia, and the Colombian 

government. In this case the request was for two 

U.S. radio operators, two Adcock DF systems, a 

portable DF, and a high-frequency receiver, with 

the idea that Colombian personnel would man one 

of the Adcocks and the portable DF with the U.S. 

personnel manning the remaining Adcock and HF 

receiver and training the Colombian operators. 

This request was referred to the Navy Department, 

as no other branch of the U.S. government had 

any high frequency direction finding equipment or 

technical knowledge of the subject.

The Ecuadoran intercept had been the first tangible evidence of the existence of a Nazi radio net in 

Latin America. Commander Safford of OP-20-G, 

to whom the request had been referred, concluded 

that on the basis of the frequency information provided by Ecuador, it was possible that there was a 

continent-wide radio net in direct communication 

with Germany. Safford did not believe that the 

Adcock direction finders were suitable to the terrain found in Colombia and Ecuador unless highly 

trained operators were also provided. The Navy 

offered to help find the transmitters, using direction finders located in U.S. possessions, if information were provided concerning the schedules 

and frequencies of the clandestine stations. Such 

information was not provided, but the American 

minister repeated his recommendation and the 

Colombian government made a direct request for 

the assistance. Upon the recommendation of the 

State Department and the approval of the president, the Navy Department agreed to furnish the 

equipment requested in order to show token cooperation with the Latin American republics.

Chapter 4

Counterclandestine DF Operations

in Latin America
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

Since he had been ordered to comply, Safford 

suggested following the Communications War 

Plan, already carefully worked out and approved. 

He recommended that a small-scale operation be 

initiated, using such personnel and equipment as 

were available, and that this operation be placed 

under the direct control of the U.S. naval attachés 

in the two countries and the Commandant, 15th 

Naval District, Canal Zone. The Navy would make 

up existing deficiencies and issue the necessary 

directives. Safford recommended that one Model 

DT high-frequency DF and one RAS high-frequency receiver be transferred to 15th Naval District, 

to be manned by U.S. naval personnel in Bogotá; 

that four loop¬antenna portable direction finders 

be obtained commercially and shipped to the same 

command for loan to the Colombian and Ecuadoran 

governments; and that the Navigational Direction 

Finder Station at Bethany Beach, Delaware, be 

closed and decommissioned, thereby making personnel available so that four radiomen could be 

sent to 15th Naval District for detail to Bogotá and 

the high-frequency DF at Balboa, C.Z. Safford reckoned that the Adcocks at Bogotá and Balboa could 

get cross bearings on targets for general location 

and the mobile DFs, manned by local military personnel, could then determine the exact location of 

the transmitters.110

Safford’s concept of operations was for the most 

part rejected by the U.S. ambassador in Bogotá, 

who thought that the use of mobile DFs manned 

by U.S. Navy operators in Colombia might prove 

an embarrassment to the Colombian government. 

The ambassador suggested that a fixed site be 

established within the U.S. chancellory, using one 

receiver, and that the other receiver and the DF be 

loaned to Colombia to be mounted in government 

trucks and operated by Colombian operators under 

U.S. Navy guidance.111

Safford argued that he had assumed that the 

original request for assistance had come from the 

Colombian authorities, but that it now appeared 

that they had not given approval. He insisted that 

the plan be implemented as proposed on 25 June, 

stating that neither Colombia, the U.S. ambassador, nor the U.S. Army mission had sufficient experience with high-frequency DF to make intelligent 

changes to that plan. Furthermore, no equipment 

should be landed in Colombia until a qualified 

officer from 15th Naval District had gone to Bogotá 

and made all the necessary arrangements with 

both Colombia and the U.S. naval attaché. These 

arrangements would include such things as the 

licensing of both truck and transmitter, detailing 

of Colombian support and operating personnel, 

legalization of the status of the U.S. operators, and 

arrangements for funding. After the Colombian 

government was assured that it would have full 

authority and full responsibility for the equipment, that the United States would not infringe on 

Colombian sovereignty, and that the Navy operators would be evacuated as soon as they had taught 

Colombian operators to use the equipment, the 

plan was approved.112

The CNO ordered the equipment assembled 

on 16 July for shipment to 15th Naval District. All 

major items except the RAS receiver were to be 

provided by the U.S. Coast Guard, which was to 

be appropriately reimbursed. On the same day, 

the CNO ordered the Commandant, 15th Naval 

District, to send a qualified officer to Bogotá to 

make arrangements and to activate the Balboa DF 

Portable radio used by Nazi agents

in South America
Page 33

Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

station. Once arrangements with Colombia were 

made, similar arrangements were to be made with 

Ecuador.113

In return, the commandant reported that the 

Balboa DF could not be activated as there was no 

site suitable for its location. As a result of his suggestions, navigational service was suspended at the 

Toro Point and Cape Mala intermediate frequency 

direction finders; the operating personnel were 

sent to the Coco Solo Naval Air Station to man the 

Type DT-1 DF there for “strategic” purposes, and 

the Type DT direction finder at Balboa was resited 

at the David Naval Air Station. Later, the Coco Solo 

DT-1 was relocated at Toro Point and a Type DY 

direction finder was sent to 15th Naval District to 

be used for strategic high frequency DF. This last 

equipment was sited at Farfan Radio Station and 

assigned a staff of fifteen.114

Pursuant to the CNO’s orders, the 15th Naval 

District Communications Officer, Lieutenant 

Commander F. K. McElroy, reported to the U.S. 

ambassador in Bogotá on 7 August 1940, and 

met with Sr. Castro y Martinez, the Colombian 

minister of war, the next day. Castro desired that 

the U.S. naval operators be assigned to the U.S. 

Naval Mission at Cartagena and then detailed 

to Bogotá as instructors and that the equipment 

also be transferred to Cartagena and carried on 

the naval mission books. Somewhat earlier, on 4 

August, the ambassador had informed the State 

Department that it was essential for the radiomen 

to be technically assigned to the naval mission, not 

only because this was in accordance with his verbal 

agreement with President Santos but also because 

it would have a tendency to prevent undesirable 

publicity. As additional cover, the Navy radiomen 

would wear civilian clothes and live on the economy near the embassy. Communications would be 

by daily cable schedules between Cartagena and 

Balboa and between Bogotá and Quarry Heights, 

C.Z., with direct communications between Bogotá 

and Balboa to be arranged later. The truck would 

be licensed as a Colombian government vehicle 

and painted to resemble other Colombian Army 

Air Corps trucks, with gasoline, oil, and repairs 

taken care of by the Colombian Army Air Corps. 

Two Colombian Army Air Corps officers, Colonel 

Ernesto Buenaventura and Captain Alvaro Roldan, 

had been assigned as supervisors and had completed most of the preparations.

After his arrival, McElroy informed the 

Commandant, 15th Naval District, that the 

Colombian Army Air Corps had four French D.M.T. 

Type RC-7 portable DF equipments which were 

inoperative. McElroy had arranged for the Balboa 

radio station to repair one set and recommended 

that all four sets be put in working order, as he 

thought it would improve cooperation if Colombian 

equipment could be used as part of the operation.115 

The radio trucks were shipped to Panama on 

20 August aboard S.S. Santa Clara, out of New 

York. One truck, accompanied by RM1/C Jones 

Atkins, Jr., and RM2/C Thomas C. Warren, arrived 

in Bogotá in early October. On 8 October Atkins 

and Warren informed OP-20-GX of initial hitches 

resulting from dilatoriness on the part of Colombian 

authorities and also complained that they had 

not been paid. In the meantime, Lieutenant (j.g.) 

Joseph E. Johnson had reported to OP-20-GX for 

temporary duty while awaiting orders to proceed to 

15th Naval District to supervise the operation.116

The operations in Ecuador and Colombia never 

really got off the ground. The Navy was determined 

that its personnel would be assigned as teachers 

only, in spite of McElroy’s insistence that the personnel provided by the local authorities were not 

competent to operate or maintain the equipment. 

McElroy was firmly of the opinion that the only 

way the operation could be productive was to have 

all the work done by U.S. operators. Ambassador 

Long concurred in this opinion.117

McElroy’s reports were not well received in 

Washington and on 2 January 1941, the CNO stated that the Navy had agreed to supply equipment 

to both Ecuador and Colombia together with two 
Page 34

Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

naval personnel each to train the native operators, 

and that the Navy intended to follow the official 

agreements to the letter and had not authorized any 

encroachments on the rights and responsibilities of 

the two countries. When the Navy subsequently 

received a report that the Ecuadoran minister of 

war wanted the DF equipment in the country to be 

operated entirely by U.S. Navy operators, Captain 

Schuirmann requested that State Department ask 

the Ecuadoran government to take over the operation of the DF and to provide Ecuadoran operators 

for training since the use of U.S. operators alone 

was considered undesirable by the Navy.

As to intercept of the clandestine net, there 

was some question in Washington about the validity of the intercept coming from the DF operation 

in Ecuador, inasmuch as the traffic logs received 

appeared to consist of rebroadcasts of code messages originating at the German naval radio stations at Kiel and Nauen. In some cases the naval 

transmissions were repeated verbatim; in others 

various prefixes, suffixes, and internal numeric 

groups were added. In addition, it was not possible 

to match the intercept logs with any entries on the 

DF logs. These Latin American stations could not 

be heard at Cheltenham, Maryland, or Jupiter, 

Florida; and when it was discovered that 15th 

Naval District had not attempted to monitor this 

traffic, the DNI ordered such tasking to be implemented straightaway.118

On 7 January Lieutenant Commander 

Greenacre, the naval attaché in Quito, made a trip 

to Guayaquil, where the DF operation had been set 

up, to investigate the situation there. The ostensible 

reason for this trip was to investigate an attempt on 

the life of Radioman Smith, who had been shot on 2 

January while operating a mobile DF in the jungle 

about ten miles from Guayaquil.

As a result of his investigation, Greenacre 

reported that the U.S. operators were in a dangerously exposed position and recommended that 

the operation be closed down until more adequate 

quarters for both men and equipment could be 

obtained.

A far more serious matter than the attempted 

shooting was the problem of the validity of the 

material being collected. Although circumstantial 

evidence indicated that the messages intercepted 

in Guayaquil were invalid, intercepts submitted by 

RMI/C Harrison in July 1940 in Quito indicated 

they were genuine. (Harrison had been detailed to 

Quito in July from the U.S. Special Service squadron and had been commended for his work in 

Ecuador by the squadron commander.) In Ecuador, 

the connection between DF and intercept was, to 

say the least, tenuous. The DF operation, while it 

performed some tasks as required by 15th Naval 

District, was largely self-directed, with reports 

apparently being passed to Washington via the 

naval attaché and the 15th Naval District. Morale of 

the operators was low, and their dedication to their 

work left a great deal to be desired. Administrative 

procedures were poor, logs were not properly kept, 

and working hours were vaguely defined.

The situation with regard to intercept was, 

if anything, worse. Intercept duties were performed by an ensign of the Ecuadoran Navy, Jorge 

Washington Castillo, who operated receivers both 

at home and at the office of the Captain of the 

Port. The traffic logs were passed from Castillo to 

a Frenchman resident in Guayaquil who turned 

them over to the British consul. The British consul, 

in turn, furnished copies to the American consul, 

who forwarded them to the American legation in 

Quito, which turned them over to the naval attaché, while forwarding a copy to State Department. 

The attaché forwarded his copy to 15th Naval 

District and made and forwarded a copy to ONC in 

Washington.

Monitoring at Cheltenham, Maryland, and 

Jupiter, Florida, over a period of eight months and 

the observations of the DF trucks had failed to substantiate the Guayaquil messages. In an attempt to 

resolve the situation, Greenacre sat “side-saddle”on 

the intercept position with Castillo long enough to 
Page 35

Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

convince himself that the ensign’s logs and traffic 

bore little resemblance to what was actually being 

heard. When Castillo claimed he was copying local 

stations in South America, he was actually copying 

high-powered naval stations in Germany. In addition, his log for 10 January showed him recording 

the three-letter U.S. Navy calls, NPM and NPG, as 

three two-letter calls, NP, MN, and PG, of unknown 

stations. Harrison, the previous year, had apparently also copied the German naval stations, altered 

the copy, and claimed it to be from local stations.

In spite of all this, Greenacre felt that the 

reports of clandestine radio stations came so consistently and from such varied sources, that this, 

together with the shooting of Smith, indicated that 

there was a clandestine operation in Ecuador, possibly either in very limited operation or on standby 

status.

Greenacre added his recommendation to previous ones from McElroy and various intercept 

operators, stating that he believed that turning the 

DF equipment over to Ecuadoran operators with 

U.S. operators as instructors would mean the end 

of all secrecy and chances of success in the project. 

He said that every American and Ecuadoran official who was aware of the project and with whom 

he had discussed the point had concurred in this 

opinion. He believed that if Ecuadoran operators 

were allowed to handle the gear except under the 

direct and immediate supervision of a qualified 

American operator, it would soon be beyond repair. 

He did think that continuing on the basis of direct 

and open instruction of Ecuadoran operators on 

the chance of stumbling upon a clandestine station 

might be worthwhile for (1) the good will value 

involved and (2) the possible value of having U.S. 

personnel on the spot in the event that a change in 

the international or internal situation might bring 

the clandestine stations into greater activity.119

As a result of Greenacre’s investigation, Safford 

recommended on 27 January that the Ecuadoran 

unit be disbanded and evacuated from Ecuador. 

Safford felt that most of the Navy’s problems 

in Ecuador were due to the interference of the 

American minister, Boaz Long, who had submitted 

Castillo’s intercept logs as evidence supporting the 

need for a DF unit and had pressured McElroy to 

accept an arrangement that was decidedly disadvantageous to the Navy. Greenacre’s investigation 

had shown that the intercept logs submitted by 

Long were false, and thus there was no evidence of 

clandestine radio in Ecuador. On 2 February 1941, 

U.S. DF operations in Ecuador were suspended and 

the volume of intercept, apparently from Castillo, 

increased markedly. Although the attaché considered this to be suspicious, Colonel Rodriguez, the 

Ecuadoran Zone Commander, placed full credence 

in the intercepted material.120

On 5 February the Commandant, 15th Naval 

District, informed CNO that Radioman Smith 

had forwarded a “coded intercept” intercepted by 

Castillo. The translated text of the message which 

had been transmitted by station “HC” read:

CODE DESTROYED STOP RADIO WILL BE 

DISMANTLED AFTER THIS TRANSMISSION 

TOMORROW READY FOR TRANSPORTATION 

SANTA ELEANA PENINSULA OBSERVATIONS 

NEXT WEEK. DAYBREAK YESTERDAY NAUEN 

RECEIVED BULLET RIGHT LUNG DIED THIS 

AFTERNOON STOP TRIED TO INTIMIDATE 

NAVY OPR. HC COOPERATING WITH US 

AGAINST THIS SHOOTING BELIEVE MAN 

NOT LIABLE TO BRIBERY ONLY REPRISAL.121

In the absence of other information regarding 

this message, two questions come to mind. Since it 

apparently refers to the Smith shooting (Smith had 

managed to wound one of his attackers), why did 

Castillo not mention it to Greenacre during his visit 

to Guayaquil? The memorandum from 15th Naval 

District states that Balboa’s translation, shown 

above, was slightly different from Guayaquil’s. 

If, as the memorandum states, this was a “coded 

intercept,” how was Guayaquil, or for that matter 

Balboa, able to read it? One possible answer is that 

the Americans never saw the coded version, but 

only Castillo’s plaintext version, which may or may 
Page 36

Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

not have had any validity. Certainly, the next day 

Safford informed OP-20-A that OP-20-G was thoroughly convinced that not only were the Guayaquil 

intercepts fraudulent but Harrison’s intercepts 

were also suspicious. On 4 April Safford requested 

that radiomen Smith and Chance be transferred 

back to 15th Naval District and two high-frequency 

DF operators be sent TAD to Quito.122

Smith and Chance were transferred, but it was 

some time before they were replaced. On 11 August 

1941, the chief of the U.S. Naval Mission to Ecuador 

recommended to CNO that the equipment be 

turned over to the Ecuadoran Navy and located in 

Quito; that the two radiomen due to be transferred 

to Ecuador be instructors only, assigned to the 

Naval mission and able to speak Spanish; that it be 

publicly stated that the equipment had been loaned 

to Ecuador for the instruction of naval personnel; 

that the U.S. Navy write off the equipment; and 

that Ecuador be made to understand that any information received regarding clandestine radio was to 

be made available to the U.S. Navy Department. In 

October the DNC commented that he was willing to 

turn the equipment over to Ecuador as soon as that 

country qualified for lend-lease and requested the 

transfer. If this qualification did not materialize, he 

was then willing to write off the equipment when 

appropriate. The DNC concurred in the other recommendations made by the Chief of the Mission, 

noting that he assumed that since U.S. operators 

would know what was being intercepted, the information would be available to the U.S. Navy. 123

In contrast to the situation in Ecuador, the 

Colombian unit was functioning in a satisfactory 

manner by late January 1941, although no clandestine radio stations had been verified. McElroy considered that the lack of success in Colombia was a 

result of the determination of the Navy Department 

that the U.S. operators be used only as instructors.

Another explanation was provided by the FBI 

on 1 February when Director Hoover informed 

Assistant Secretary of State Berle that he had 

information that a German radio station had been 

operating in Bogotá during the first three weeks 

in January. He told Berle that the reason for the 

lack of success of the American radio operators in 

Bogotá who were trying to locate this station was 

the fact that the Colombian Army officer in charge 

of the operation was in the pay of the Nazis and was 

reporting all of their actions to the German minister to Colombia. (Note that this apparently referred 

to Captain Roldan.)

Hoover’s letter was passed on to OP-20-G, 

where Safford stated that it was so vague that comment was impossible and requested the FBI to provide more complete information and a copy of the 

original report. After considerable delay, the DNI 

answered Hoover’s letter on 11 June. He noted that 

the detail of U.S. Navy operators and equipment 

to Colombia was not an attempt to encroach on 

an FBI preserve, but had been done at the request 

of the Colombian government, with the personal 

approval of President Roosevelt. He pointed out to 

Hoover that in the formal analysis, the responsibility for suppressing clandestine broadcasts rested 

with the local authorities and not with either the 

U.S. Navy or the FBI. As for Captain Roldan, he 

had been placed in charge of the operation by the 

Colombian authorities. The charge made by Hoover 

was a serious one and, if substantiated, should have 

been made known to the Colombian authorities via 

the State Department.

As of 11 March, Captain Roldan had detailed 

only one operator for training. McElroy informed 

U.S. ambassador Spruille Braden that even if 

Roldan detailed the three additional radio operators he had promised, it would take several months 

to train them. In addition, he questioned whether 

the Colombians would ever learn to operate or 

maintain the equipment properly. He recommended the assignment of a sufficient number of U.S. 

and Colombian operators to permit continuous 

watch standing on the DF and the receiver; continuous manning of the portable DF when a specific 

station was being investigated; and assignment of 

an experienced chief radioman to handle training and overall supervision. This would mean an 
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

establishment of twelve men, six of whom would be 

Colombian. He also recommended an increase in 

the number of personnel assigned to the Balboa DF 

to provide for three continuous intercept watches 

there.

McElroy considered the use of Colombian operators, all of whom were civilian, to be dangerous 

from the point of view of security. This, combined 

with the necessity for the U.S. to exercise indirect 

control over airport and aircraft communications, 

made it advisable to exert pressure on Avianca, 

the Colombian national airline, to have its eligible personnel enlisted in the U.S. Naval Reserve, 

and to have a communications officer attached 

to the embassy for liaison with the Colombian 

Communications Section and with Avianca and 

Panagra (Pan-American Grace Airways).124

Orders were sent to the Bureau of Navigation 

on 4 April to effect the paper transfer of radiomen 

Atkins and Warren from the 15th Naval District to 

temporary duty at the Office of the Naval Attaché

in Bogotá. Atkins, however, had become involved 

in a drunken brawl in Bogatá on 27 May and was 

sent back to Balboa on the 29th by request of 

the ambassador and the Colombian government. 

Warren had been sent back to Balboa on or about 

3 April, apparently because of personal differences 

with Captain Roldan.125

The Colombian government requested that 

both operators be replaced and that a “trained 

crew” be transferred to Bogatá. Safford recommended that Colombia be informed that the Navy 

Department would prefer not to replace its DF 

operators at Bogatá. This reaction was occasioned 

by several factors, primarily the fact that the duty 

was undesirable from the point of view of the operators because of living expenses, low pay, and lack 

of companionship. Added to this was the anomalous status of the operators and the overall lack of 

cooperation by Colombian authorities in establishing a DF operation controlled by Colombians.126

The Colombian foreign minister had expressed 

to the United States ambassador his regrets that 

nothing had been accomplished by the operators and equipment and his conviction that part 

of the information possessed by the totalitarian 

legations could not have been obtained through 

ordinary channels. In his comments on this conversation, Safford pointed out that inasmuch as 

only one Colombian had ever been assigned to 

the DF (and he did not learn to operate it) and the 

U.S. operators had been withdrawn at the request 

of the Colombian government, there was no one 

in Colombia who could operate the equipment to 

produce the desired results. As to the foreign minister’s conviction, the possession of extraordinary 

information by the totalitarian legations merely 

proved that they had radio receivers through which 

they received information from transmitters in 

Europe, and the DF equipment could not track 

down receivers. The Navy had no evidence of illicit 

transmitters in Colombia.

Once again, Safford would, if ordered, detail 

replacement personnel, but he was unalterably 

opposed to increasing the size of the detachment or 

including an officer in the unit. If sent, the operators were to be attached to the Office of the Naval 

Attaché. In any case, the Navy was agreeable to 

leaving the equipment in Bogatá on a loan basis.127

Atkins and Warren were replaced by Chief 

Radiomen Thomas R. Cullen and Everette G. 

Fowlkes, who were directly subordinated to Ensign 

Joseph Fox, of the Office of the Naval Attaché. As 

of 27 October 1941, the DF operation was housed 

in a satisfactory location near the Avianca Air Field 

and the RAS receiver was installed in the house 

occupied by Cullen and Fowlkes. Roldan had again 

promised to provide five operators for training, but 

had actually assigned only one man, the operator 

trained by Atkins and Warren. Cullen and Fowlkes 

informed the Communications Security Section 

of CNO on 27 October that the naval attaché had 

been ordered by the ambassador to actively engage 

in tracking down clandestine stations and that 

that was what they had been doing. The two chiefs 
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

noted that if results from that part of their assignment were desired, then additional qualified men 

should be assigned, since the operators Captain 

Roldan would provide would not be qualified for 

such a task. The CNO noted, once again, on 23 

December, that the naval radiomen were sent to 

Colombia as a political gesture for duty as instructors, and that the DF in Colombia was intended 

to operate independently under the control of the 

local government and not as a part of any DF net 

under U.S. control.128

After his inspection trip to Colombia in October 

1940, McElroy had gone on to Ecuador. At that 

time he had predicted to Lieutenant Commander 

Greenleaf that the Ecuadoran government wanted 

to pay for nothing in connection with the DF 

operation and it would be necessary to provide 

U.S. funds for expenses connected with the truck. 

McElroy had also advised that cash should be 

advanced to Atkins and Warren in Colombia to 

minimize overt Navy involvement, but Bureau of 

Ships stated that such expenses were chargeable 

to radio station maintenance funds in 15th Naval 

District. Such funds could not be advanced on the 

basis of an estimate, but issued only after a determination had been made of the amount required 

for the remainder of the fiscal year. Such a request 

had to originate with the Commandant, 15th Naval 

District, and be forwarded to Bureau of Navigation 

for CNO approval.129

McElroy thought that handling the project 

through the Supply Department of the Bureau 

of Navigation had already made it “known to the 

whole world.” Furthermore, the poor mail service 

made the forwarding of the required vouchers 

quite difficult. Apparently the problem was never 

resolved.130

In August 1941 DNC had requested that orders 

be issued transferring Chief Radiomen Harry I. 

Maltz and Raymond H. Bradford to Ecuador. 

During the interval between Smith’s departure 

and the arrival of the new team, there had been 

an extensive shakeup in the Ecuadoran military 

high command, with the consequence that none 

of the new incumbents knew about the DF operation. Since the new command was pro-American, 

Greenacre did not consider this to be any great 

problem. He was worried, however, about the 

wording of the team’s transfer orders, which said 

that Maltz and Bradford were to “report to the 

Chief of the Naval Mission for duty under the naval 

attaché.” Greenacre noted that this was akin to 

“reporting to the USS Misouri for duty on the USS 

Idaho” and requested clarification.131

For some not readily understandable reason, 

there was strong opposition in Washington to any 

change in the wording of the orders or clarification thereof. A memorandum from Bradford to the 

Communications Security Branch of CNO on 31 

October recommended that the unit be assigned 

to the mission and that the chief of the mission 

be authorized to issue travel orders. On the copy 

of this memorandum received by OP-20-G there 

is an underlined “NO!” written in next to this recommendation. Bradford’s request had been occasioned by the fact that the team, which had been in 

Ecuador for nearly a month, had not yet been able 

to commence operations, as its status had not been 

cleared by CNO.132

As of 2 December, the Navy was still maintaining its position regarding the duties of the 

team, the respective responsibilities of the U.S. 

and Ecuadoran governments, and its desire to pull 

the operators from Ecuador for reassignment. As 

of the same date, Bradford had reported to CNO 

that the team had done no DF work since arrival. 

The equipment was in satisfactory condition but 

could not be tested because all the batteries were 

dead. Bradford and Maltz had reported to the 

assistant naval attaché, Lieutenant E. J. Beall, and 

had stood watch in Beall’s house for approximately 

eleven days, from 21 November to 2 December, to 

try to intercept clandestine transmissions, with no 

result. Ensign Castillo had intercepted clandestine 

traffic on 15 November, for the first time in many 

weeks.133
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

Safford did not get around to answering 

Greenacre’s earnest request for clarification of 

orders until 17 December 1941. His letter simply 

reiterated the rules under which the operation was 

to be conducted and stated that the Navy was trying to get the DF operators transferred to the naval 

mission with the intent of moving them back to 

the United States as soon as possible. He closed 

by commenting that since the United States was 

now at war, the matter of the Ecuadoran DF team 

was far from being a first priority consideration. 

In January 1942 the decision was made to return 

Bradford to the United States and to leave the 

equipment in Ecuador to be turned over to the local 

authorities as lend-lease as soon as Ecuador qualified and so requested.134

Other Latin American Nations before the War

Aside from the DF operations in Colombia and 

Ecuador, and occasional DF of clandestine radio 

at Balboa and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, there was 

very little Navy involvement in the Nazi clandestine 

radio problem preceding World War II.

While the Navy was implementing its plans 

for operations in Colombia and Ecuador, the U.S. 

legation in San Jose, Costa Rica, reported that the 

Costa Rican Ministry of Security had requested 

equipment and an expert to find secret radio broadcasting stations believed to be operating in that 

country. This request was passed on to OP-20-G, 

which stated that the DF equipment that was being 

relocated in the Canal Zone would be able to cover 

Costa Rica and that the Navy’s long-distance radio 

direction finder stations would eventually be able 

to establish the general locality of all clandestine 

radio stations operating in Central and South 

America. The Navy, of course, would inform Costa 

Rica of stations determined to be within its borders, and these could then be tracked down with 

locally manned loop-type DF. The Navy said they 

would try to provide such equipment to Costa Rica 

within about six months.135

In Cuba, Major Juan V. Govea, Director of Public 

Radio, Cuban Department of Communications, had 

stated informally on 2 December 1940 that Cuba 

urgently needed equipment to detect the presence 

of foreign aircraft, to watch radio and telegraph 

communications, and to set up radio beacons for 

air control. His primary aim seemed to have been 

to control propaganda coming from outside the 

country. Much later, in September 1941, the State 

Department suggested that the Navy establish 

some intercept sites in Cuba, apparently to aid that 

government as the Navy was doing in Colombia and 

Ecuador. The Navy informed the State Department 

that the idea of setting up intercept stations in 

Cuba was overambitious, since Navy Department 

requirements were being met by present and prospective U.S. stations in the area. However, the 

Cuban authorities could, on their own, set up an 

FCC-type operation. This would benefit the United 

States by helping suppress Nazi clandestine radio 

stations in Cuba, but the project would have little 

additional value to the United States, since the U.S. 

Navy radio station at Guantanamo Bay adequately 

served U.S. requirements.136

In the case of other Latin American countries, 

the only SIGINT-related activities prior to the entry 

of the United States into the war were conducted 

either through the U.S. establishment in the Canal 

Zone or through reports to U.S. naval attachés. This 

situation would change radically with Pearl Harbor 

and the declaration of war against Germany and 

Japan.137

Establishment of the AIS Clandestine Radio 

Locator Net

The American Intelligence Service (AIS) was 

an agency of the Intelligence Group, Military 

Intelligence Service, charged with the collection, 

completion, and primary evaluation of military, 

political, economic, and psychological information 

pertaining to the Western Hemisphere south of 

the United States. One of its specific tasks was to 

maintain a branch for Special Intelligence, including dossiers on known subversive suspects in Latin 
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

America and studies and analyses of enemy espionage systems in Latin America. It was under this 

charge that U.S. Army intercept and DF operations 

directed against Axis clandestine radio operations 

fell.138

After the fall of France and the Netherlands, 

American authorities began to worry that Dutch or 

French possessions in the Western Hemisphere, 

or some isolated area such as the upper Amazon, 

might be used as military bases from which to 

launch a surprise attack on the Panama Canal or 

the United States. There was also a fear that with 

the initial Axis successes in North Africa, a military landing of some size might be attempted on 

the northeast coast of Brazil. Such actions might 

be augmented by an Axis “fifth column” in Latin 

America.139

Creation of the Concept, December 1941- 

January 1943

With U.S. entry into the war, increased fears 

of Axis clandestine operations in the Americas 

resulted in a 30 December meeting at the State 

Department to discuss suppressing clandestine 

radio. At that meeting, State Department representatives pointed out that the problem of clandestine radio was serious, involving a chain of 

communications all over the Western Hemisphere 

routed to the Axis countries through Martinique 

and Dakar. Any attempt to identify, locate, and 

close down illicit transmitters would thus have to 

be a hemisphere-wide one. This would require the 

cooperation of local authorities, since although DF 

operations could be conducted from the United 

States, the bearings obtained would not be sufficiently accurate for the purpose. Location of the 

transmitters would require the establishment of 

local DF units.

Admiral S. C. Hooper, Director of the Radio 

Liaison Division within the Office of the CNO, 

proposed that a resolution be introduced at the Rio 

Conference, to be held 15-28 January 1942. This 

resolution proposed that the countries of Central 

and South America agree to suppress clandestine 

radios and to cooperate with other countries to that 

end; to create a committee of representatives from 

the countries involved for the exchange of technical information; and to create a technical committee for planning purposes. Implementing such 

an operation would require purchasing portable 

direction finding equipment to be used in each 

country and ten fixed-site, long-range direction 

finders to be placed as needed. The resolution also 

called for each country to send one or more representatives to the United States for training by the 

FCC in direction finding and intercept. The meeting also accepted the suggestion by Thomas Burke, 

of State Department’s Division of International 

Communications, that a committee be created 

composed of representatives of the FCC and the 

War and Navy Departments under the chairmanship of Admiral Hooper, to determine all the necessary technical details concerning the equipment 

to be purchased. This committee met in Admiral 

Hooper’s office on 1 January 1942.140

Resources had already been mobilized within 

the United States for the purpose of suppressing clandestine radio operations in the Western 

Hemisphere. Both the Coast Guard Intelligence 

Unit and the FBI were, as we have seen, tasked 

with the cryptanalytic side of the problem. And 

the FCC was actively intercepting clandestine circuits. By the end of 1941, the National Defense 

Operations Section (NDO) of the FCC was intercepting Axis clandestine circuits operating between 

Lisbon and Portuguese Guinea and between Lisbon 

and Mozambique, as well as transmitters operating 

with Rio de Janeiro and Valparaiso. The NDO had 

located seventy-five individual clandestine stations, 

four of them in Brazil. The Navy had noted clandestine cipher transmissions from South America to 

Germany, beginning around the middle of 1941. By 

mid-February 1942, five distinct groups had been 

noted, two of them operating out of Brazil and one 

out of Chile. As a result of conversations with representatives of the BSC, the British Army, and the 

British government, the Navy had concluded that 

the British were intercepting the same traffic.141
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

After the 1 January meeting, Admiral Hooper 

informed the State Department of the DF equipment necessary to carry out the counterclandestine 

operation. At a minimum, any organization that 

would be established would require fifty automobile-mounted mobile DF units, four airborne units, 

and ten fixed-site DFs to be used as base stations. 

The rationale for the estimate was that the base stations would initially detect and locate target transmitters within a circle of 50-100 miles. A more 

accurate determination could then be made by an 

airborne unit, with ground-mobile units providing 

the final “pin-down.” Hooper suggested suitcasetype DF units with a 1,600-18,000 kHz capability 

and a range of twenty to fifty miles for the automobile units and aircraft receivers with carrier level 

meters and a 200-30,000 kHz capability for the 

aircraft. Purchase prices for these systems would 

be approximately $400 each for the automobile 

units and $1,000 each for the airborne units. The 

fixed-site DFs would be Adcock-type direction 

finders loaned by the Navy and built by the Collins 

Radio Corporation. They would have an effective 

frequency range of 2,500 to 18,000 kHz. In addition to the DF equipment, each airplane would be 

equipped with ordinary transmitting and receiving equipment. Each base station would require 

a two-kilowatt high frequency transmitter costing 

$7,000, a receiver costing $1,000, and auxiliary 

equipment for frequency determination and communications with the associated intercept site.142

The ten Collins DFs would cost $45,000 each 

and were of the newest and best type of Adcock DF 

equipment. On 2 January, Lieutenant Commander 

George W. Welker of OP-20-GX pointed out to 

Lieutenant Commander F. C. S. Jordan that none 

was available at the time since first deliveries were 

not expected until February and that Navy requirements would probably absorb the first year’s production. The Army was also in no position to provide the equipment required. Welker considered 

DT and DY direction finders to be quite adequate 

for the purpose envisioned, and in the end these 

were the types deployed.143

The FCC’s initial concept of personnel and 

equipment requirements for the operation were, as 

it turned out, ridiculously small. On 25 February 

S. W. Norman, the Acting Chief of the NDO while 

George Sterling was on TDY to Hawaii, informed 

the State Department that the requirement would 

be for two monitoring officers skilled in DF, two 

portable loop DFs with azimuthal scales and tripods, two Hallicrafter B-29 receivers, two aperiodic 

receivers, and two “body receivers.” Norman did 

say that more men would possibly be needed later, 

up to a total of eight or ten, but that the additional 

personnel would probably be provided by the Coast 

Guard.144

The desired resolution was introduced at the 

Rio Conference and was adopted as Resolution XL 

(Elimination of Clandestine Stations). Brazil and 

Chile stated that they considered the situation to 

be serious and urgent, and requested U.S. aid. The 

State Department replied that two men with equipment would be sent by the FCC as soon as the two 

countries agreed to the U.S. proposal. Although 

there were objections within the Signal Corps to 

FCC involvement, these were apparently not voiced 

at subsequent planning sessions.145

As a result of the adoption of Resolution XL, a 

committee was organized under the chairmanship 

of Thomas Burke. This committee was charged 

with designing a program to cope with clandestine 

radio stations in Latin America. The committee 

included representatives of the Signal Corps, the 

Army Air Force, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the 

FCC, the State Department, and the Director of 

Inter-American Affairs. The committee met on 11 

March to define the problems to be solved.146

The Technical Committee, which was appointed at this meeting, met on 16 March and prepared 

recommendations on the technical aspects of the 

problem and on the desirable locations for the ten 

base stations.

The recommendations were presente to a meeting held in Burke’s office at the State Department 
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

on 19 March. Norman, as chairman of the Technical 

Committee, presented its report recommending 

placing base stations in the vicinities of Bahia de 

Salinas, Rio Grande do Sul, and Rio de Janeiro, 

Brazil; Valdevia, Arica, and Santiago, Chile; Callao, 

Peru; Santa Elena (Salinas), Ecuador; and the 

Falkland Islands. The Navy would provide Adcock 

DFs for these sites, as well as the fifty suitcase equipments that were required. Commander Jordan suggested that since transmitters for interstation communication would be difficult to obtain, the organization could buy Hallicrafter 100-watt transmitters 

for $200 apiece. Lieutenant Commander Joseph 

W. Fowler stated that ONI was in favor of sending 

U.S. personnel to man the stations but pointed out 

that actually getting rid of clandestine stations was 

a problem for the local authorities. Commander 

Welker suggested that the organization should 

take advantage of the equipment left in Colombia 

and Ecuador by the Navy in 1941. As a final note, 

the representatives of the Coordinator of InterAmerican Affairs (CIAA) stated that if a complete 

plan were developed and presented, CIAA would be 

willing to finance the entire operation.147

On 22 May Burke called a meeting at his office 

for the purpose of discussing the FCC training 

course for the South American technicians which 

was to start 8 June at the FCC Monitoring Station 

at Laurel, Maryland. Ten Latin American republics 

were sending a total of eighteen men for training 

(Guatemala, Mexico, and Ecuador did not participate). The State Department had informed the governments of the American republics that the U.S. 

would pay all expenses incurred by nominees to the 

course, including travel and maintenance, and that 

the United States would provide all the republics 

with the equipment necessary to accomplish the 

objective.148

Vice Admiral A. W. Johnson of the InterAmerican Defense Board had called an informal 

meeting of Army and Navy representatives on 10 

April. They had discussed the fact that no agency 

seemed to be in charge of the Latin American operation. The conferees agreed that one agency should 

take over responsibility and one man should direct 

the operation.149

The FCC representatives at the 22 May meeting 

were caught by surprise when Admiral Johnson 

suggested that the FCC’s NDO administer the 

Latin American project, as their understanding 

was that the FCC was responsible only for training; 

but they abstained from comment. Burke agreed 

with Johnson that the program should be administered by someone who was technically qualified and agreed to call a meeting of the FCC, War 

Department, and Navy Department to obtain their 

recommendations.

The Navy had already started a program of 

modifying their DY direction finders to improve 

their design, but at this meeting Admirals Hooper 

and Johnson suggested that the FCC should make 

the modifications to the DYs destined for South 

America. Norman stated that since these were 

Navy improvements to a Navy design, the Navy was 

better equipped to do the job.

Upon being informed of the above, Chief 

Engineer Jett approved of FCC running the program, suggesting that George Sterling and Philip 

F. Siting attend the forthcoming meeting and that 

Sterling administer the program.150

Another meeting was held on 7 July, with only 

War and State Departments participating, in which 

it was decided that the War Department would 

undertake the direction of the project, under the 

general supervision of the G-2, Major General 

George V. Strong. At about the same time, the DNC 

agreed that the project should be under State/

Army control.151

By 18 July the training course was well underway, although Sterling considered that a large part 

of it was being wasted since the portable DF units 

being supplied by the Navy were nothing like the 

sets the FCC was using for training and the Navy 

sets would have to be modified.152
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

At this point, Sterling estimated that the FCC 

would have to send ten engineers to Latin America 

to assist in setting up the project. Sterling also 

informed Jett that additional personnel would be 

required in the United States to handle the projected receipts of traffic from the Latin American 

net. It is evident from Sterling’s memorandum 

to Jett on 18 July that the FCC had agreed to 

accept the additional responsibilities suggested by 

Admirals Hooper and Johnson. That this was most 

acceptable to everyone is evidenced by a letter from 

Assistant Secretary of State Breckenridge Long to 

Chairman Fly giving effusive thanks for the work 

being done by the FCC. As a result of a meeting 

held on 14 July, it had been decided that the project 

would be administered by an interdepartmental 

board composed of representatives from State, 

FCC, CIAA, and the Navy, under the general direction of the War Department’s MID. It had also been 

decided that the headquarters for the operation 

would be located in Mexico City. Fly rejected the 

concept of a Mexico City headquarters, suggesting 

instead that Mexico City be the reporting center 

and Washington, D.C., the administrative center 

for the organization.153

Colonel S. P. Collins, the MIS liaison officer 

for the Latin American program, called a meeting 

on 20 August at which equipment and personnel 

were the primary subjects of discussion. Collins 

reported that three Adcock DFs were available for 

shipment, and one each had already been installed 

in Colombia and Ecuador (apparently the DFs 

left behind by the Navy). Five others were in the 

process of being overhauled and would be shipped 

about 1 September. At that time, ten 100-watt 

transmitters, thirty Hammarlund receivers, several 

frequency meters, and other equipment would be 

shipped. Each shipment would be addressed to the 

U.S. mission in the country of destination and the 

FCC engineers would be scheduled to arrive soon 

after their equipment.

Although the plan called for the shipment of 

fifty portable direction finders, it was up to the 

countries concerned to provide the vehicles for 

installation. In fact, the two trucks which had been 

left behind in Colombia and Ecuador should be 

returned to Panama and not turned over to the host 

governments. It was feared that if the trucks were 

given to Colombia and Ecuador, other countries 

would find out and resent not receiving similar 

treatment.

It was noted that on 15 August, Sr. Banegas of 

the Honduran Department of Investigation had 

requested DF assistance. The FCC stated that two 

Finch loop DFs were available, but that DF in 

Honduras was highly impractical since the country 

had no roads.

In marginal notes on Norman’s memorandum 

concerning this meeting, Jett indicated approval 

of the statements concerning equipment and the 

request to retain Robert Linx in Brazil (see below). 

He also agreed that it would be necessary to send 

one man to each country after the equipment had 

been delivered and suggested letting the Hondurans 

buy their own loop DFs; otherwise, every country 

would expect the FCC to provide them gratis.154

On 13 October Colonel Collins and Commander 

Jordan called on Sterling to discuss the project. As 

a result of this meeting, the concept of the plan, at 

least as far as FCC thinking was concerned, was 

rather thoroughly revised.

In his memorandum to Jett on the meeting, 

Sterling made a number of complaints about the 

way things were going. Primarily, he felt that 

Collins and the State Department had not been 

keeping the FCC aware of their thinking and planning. Collins had explained to him that the FCC 

was to have no part in processing intercepted 

material and was not to provide any coordination 

in the operation of the Latin American monitoring 

stations. The War Department was establishing a 

DF station in Miami for this purpose, and Collins 

had already set up his headquarters in a hotel 

there. The MID was training Army personnel in 

traffic identification and would send them to the 

Latin American stations. The FCC was expected to 
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

send engineers to set up the stations and render 

engineering assistance. This would, apparently, 

end the FCC obligation. Sterling thought that the 

FCC engineers were going to have considerable 

problems as far as equipment was concerned, and 

that if the Army was going to run everything else, it 

should also be responsible for the engineering. He 

particularly objected to the Army making the FCC 

responsible for the installation and operation of 

the DY direction finders, which the FCC considered 

deficient and unreliable.

Sterling told Jett that a few days previously 

H.E. Otterman had brought him a memorandum 

that Collins had sent Francis de Wolfe describing 

the proposed distribution of equipment. Otterman 

had been quite surprised to find that neither 

Sterling nor Norman had been advised of this 

proposal, which was at variance with the original 

plan. Otterman informed de Wolfe of the situation 

and the latter got in touch with Collins, who said 

he would be receptive to any suggestions the FCC 

might make. Collins had then accepted an FCC plan 

that had “due regard for the base lines required 

in order to secure proper cuts.” (The final locations of these base stations were Bello Horizonte, 

Brazil; Talcahuano, Chile; Bogotá, Colombia; 

Ciudad Trujillo, Dominican Republic; Quito, 

Ecuador; Yucatan Peninsula, Mexico; Callao, Peru; 

Montevideo, Uruguay; Puerto Cabello, Venezuela; 

and Miami, Florida.)

In conclusion, Sterling recommended that the 

FCC withdraw its offer to lend engineering services, 

since it appeared that none of the essential elements of the project would be under FCC control. 

“If it works out well, Army and Navy will get all the 

credit; if it comes out bad, we will take the rap.” The 

next day an article appeared in the Baltimore Sun 

concerning Argentina’s inability to get equipment 

to detect illegal radio stations. Sterling’s comment 

to Jett was

It is rather distastefuI for me to be 

associated with a group who has 

such little comprehension of' the 

problem and knowledge of' equipment with which to accomplish it, 

and [with] the dillydallying in trying 

to get organized for the purpose of 

doing something about it.155

He went on to say that if the FCC had had 

full responsibility, the equipment would be in 

Argentina and operational.

After selecting the first four men to go to South 

America, Sterling had discussed the assignment 

with a number of others through early September. 

At that time he had predicted that the assignment 

would involve a sixty- to ninety-day tour of duty 

abroad. On that basis, a number of monitoring 

officers had expressed interest in the assignment. 

When in mid-September he informed them that 

it would be at least a six-month detail, several 

changed their minds.

Three men had been dispatched in March. 

In answer to a request from Assistant Secretary 

of State Berle, Robert D. Linx and John F. de 

Bardeleben had been ordered to proceed to Miami 

on 16 March for onward transport to Rio de Janeiro 

and Santiago, respectively. (It had been decided 

that Brazil’s request for aid in suppressing clandestine stations within that country was not in 

pursuance of the overall goals of the project.) On 21 

March Sumner Welles, the acting secretary of state, 

had transmitted to the FCC a request from the 

Cuban Government for the loan of technical equipment for the detection and suppression of clandestine radio. Fly had informed Welles that only a limited supply of equipment was available, but that the 

FCC would try to accommodate the request. The 

Navy had also met with the Cubans on 20 March 

in regard to the same request and had agreed to 

lend equipment until the Latin American project 

became a reality. Welles repeated the request to 

the FCC on 6 April, noting that he understood that 

Charles B. Hogg of the FCC had been designated 

for assignment to Cuba and requesting that he be 

sent as soon as possible. Hogg arrived in Havana 

with the equipment on 10 April.
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

Later in the year, Sterling picked eight more 

volunteers and notified them on 10 October that 

they had been selected, but that he could not tell 

them when they would leave. The men selected 

were George W. Earnhart for Mexico, John W. 

Cruise for the Dominican Republic, S. R. Lines for 

Venezuela, Donald E. Strong for Colombia, W.N. 

Fellows for Uruguay, Dale B. Dorothy for Peru, and 

Charles R. Weeks for Ecuador. On 2 November 

Fellows’ assignment was changed to Chile, to free 

de Bardeleben for other duties in that country, and 

Paul Means was assigned to Uruguay.156

Two factors were responsible for delaying the 

transfers and the implementation of the program. 

As of 17 November, the communications equipment had not been delivered to Miami for forwarding to the various U.S. missions, and the CIAA had 

not yet come up with the funds to pay travel and 

per diem costs for the FCC personnel. The delay 

in supply had been caused by a shortage of essential materials used in the manufacture of some of 

the equipment. The equipment arrived in Miami 

at the end of November, and after strenuous FCC 

representations to the CIAA, the State Department, 

and the American Intelligence Corps (AIC), as the 

headquarters in Miami had been designated, the 

engineers were ordered to depart their current 

duty stations for Washington, D.C., on 3/4 January 

1943. After spending four days in Washington and 

three days in Miami, they were to leave for their 

duty assignments on 12 January. A final meeting 

was held in Washington on 7 January to give the 

engineers a send-off. In addition to the men themselves, the meeting was attended by representatives of the FBI, the State Department, the FCC, the 

CIAA, and the War Department. The Navy was not 

represented.157

In December MID and the FBI had reached 

agreement with regard to the operation of the 

network and the responsibilities of the two agencies. MID was to be responsible for establishment 

of the network by lending DF and communications equipment to the countries involved; furnishing technical assistance and coordinating the stations involved; and disseminating the information 

obtained to representatives of the FBI, ONI, and 

the appropriate agency of the host country. The FBI 

was to be responsible for taking the most advisable 

action against clandestine stations after conferring 

with MID, keeping MID representatives supplied 

with all-source information regarding clandestine 

stations, and the transmission of material through 

controlled stations as requested by MID.158

Implementation of the Concept: January 

1943 to the War’s End

In most of the countries where FCC personnel were sent, only minor difficulties, usually of a 

technical nature, were encountered. The men sent 

to Cuba, Chile, and Argentina, however, met with 

active opposition to their work.

Cuba–Graft and Corruption

During his tour in Cuba, Charles Hogg encountered considerable obstruction from the Director of 

Cuban Public Radio, Commandante Juan Govea. 

Govea had been responsible for the organization of 

an “Auxiliary Corps of Radio Amateurs,” who were 

to patrol the radio spectrum listening for suspicious signals. When Hogg advocated closing down 

amateur radio communications, Govea registered 

strong opposition. Up to the time Hogg left Cuba 

on 11 July 1942, Govea had refused to give him an 

accurate list of the radio transmitters in Cuba. Even 

after amateur broadcasting was closed down on 21 

July, many transmitters continued to operate, taking advantage of loopholes in the law.

Up to his departure, Hogg had found no evidence of clandestine radio activity. Ambassador 

Braden interpreted this as meaning that such 

activity had ceased upon Hogg’s publicized arrival, 

and with this in mind, suggested to the State 

Department that Hogg be reassigned to Havana for 

another ninety days. The FCC concurred and Hogg 

returned to Havana on 12 September.159
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

Upon his return, Hogg determined that Govea 

was involved in graft, illegal confiscation of equipment, and other questionable practices. More 

important to Hogg was the discovery that Govea 

was operating the control transmitter of a net 

made up of nine unlicensed stations whose operators had unsavory reputations. Apparently Govea 

was trying to establish his own commercial net for 

ship-to-shore and paid message operation. Hogg 

considered any one of the men involved capable of 

causing damage to the war effort with the proper 

monetary encouragement.

Ambassador Braden explained to the Foreign 

Ministry that Govea was using his illicit net to transmit information detrimental to the Allied Nations 

war effort, and Govea was relieved of his post on 

6 November 1942. He continued to receive his salary until April 1943, when the Radio Directorate 

was combined with Postal Censorship and Cable 

Censorship under Dr. Eugenio Castillo, who was 

designated Coordinator of War Information. 

Castillo, who was directly subordinate to the Chief 

of the Cuban Police, reorganized all departments, 

to the benefit of both efficiency and morale.

Hogg had constructed an Adcock-type DF in 

December 1942 but had been unable to interest 

Govea or his interim successors in its operation, 

even though one of those successors, Lieutenant 

Jose Gata, had attended the FCC course in Laurel. A 

new U.S. military attaché, Major Charles Youmans, 

added his backing to Hogg’s efforts, and in June 

1943 this equipment went into twenty-four-hour 

operation and became part of the Latin American 

Direction-Finding Network. After establishing this 

station, callsign CLQ, Hogg conducted a survey 

of radio transmitters in Cuba and returned to the 

United States in October 1943.160

Chile–Nazis and Mountains

From the beginning of his tour in Chile, John de 

Bardeleban was hindered by two factors: the enormous influence wielded by the Nazis in Chilean 

governmental, military, and police circles; and 

the topography of Chile. It was evident immediately that local Nazis were keeping close tabs on 

his movements and activities, to the extent that 

when he would leave the city for the countryside 

with his equipment, the agent transmitter would 

cease operation. As a result, most of his operations 

were performed undercover with only a very limited number of local officials being informed. At one 

point, he was smuggled into a private home on the 

outskirts of Valparaiso and remained there for two 

months, attempting to get bearings on PYL, the 

agent station. As it happened, the agent transmitter was in storage for the entire period and was not 

being used.

The topography of the country created its own 

set of problems. There were no accurate maps, few 

good roads, and massive underground deposits of 

metallic ores that caused unpredictable errors in 

bearings by either shielding or reflecting target signals. One time, to reach a useful DF site location, it 

was necessary for de Bardeleben and an associate 

from the embassy to backpack the DF equipment 

five miles over three hills that were from 600 to 

2,000 feet high. It was then necessary to wait two 

or three hours, in mid-winter, until transmission 

began.

De Bardeleban did receive full cooperation 

from the U.S. embassy and the attachés, although 

in most cases they were not sure what he was supposed to be doing.161

W. N. Fellows was notified on 31 October 1942 

to prepare for a six-month TDY to Chile. As a result 

of the usual problems in getting the CIAA to make 

arrangements for transportation, Fellows did not 

arrive on station until January 1943. Sterling felt 

that a two-week overlap was sufficient for bringing 

Fellows into the operation in Chile. Fellows was 

told that it was understood that upon the completion of the communications facility reports and the 

installation of the technical equipment that had 

been sent to Chile, the communications and DF 

facilities would be taken over and operated by AIS 

personnel assigned to that duty by Colonel Collins. 
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

After that, neither his nor de Bardeleban’s presence would be required. Sterling and Fly had the 

impression that de Bardeleban wanted to return to 

the United States because of family problems, and 

ordered him to return home in March 1943. A cable 

from de Bardeleban on 30 March and a followup letter sent the next day, however, contained a 

request that he remain in Chile on an accompanied 

tour. He also asked about the possibility of a pay 

increase and an in-grade pay raise for serving in a 

foreign assignment. His request was turned down 

on 5 April.162

Argentina–More Nazis

Despite Norman’s and Sterling’s reservations 

on sending de Bardeleban abroad again, he and 

Francis M. McDermott left for Buenos Aires on 

4 July 1943. Unfortunately, there was a revolution in Argentina that day which resulted in the 

installation of a thoroughly anti-U.S. government. 

Consequently, there were difficulties in accomplishing the mission.

The clandestine net in Argentina consisted 

of several terminals, each of which could employ 

several frequencies and shift among them with 

ease. This net operated in a country thickly populated with pro-Nazi Germans. The Abwehr, which 

initially controlled the net, had seen others of its 

nets in South America closed down by U.S. and 

local governmental action and wanted to avoid a 

repeat in Argentina. It appeared that the Abwehr 

would stop at nothing to guarantee maintenance of 

their last channel of rapid communication between 

Argentina and the Fatherland. As a consequence of 

these circumstances, and the fact that there were 

large numbers of Argentine nationals working in 

the U.S. embassy, security was a major problem. 

Although the original concept of AIS stations was 

that they would work overtly training local personnel, the station in Buenos Aires appears to have 

been covert from the start. De Bardeleban and 

McDermott worked only with the first secretary of 

the embassy, Hugh Milliard, and one vice consul, 

Clifton English. Milliard was kept fully aware of 

all activities and results, but retained no copies of 

any paperwork shown to him. English appears to 

have been in charge of administrative details, such 

as travel pay, per diem, housing, etc., for the team.

The attaché staffs could not be used for support 

purposes as they were in other South American 

countries. The naval attaché’s office was considered 

to be particularly insecure, as most of the personnel 

had been employed by the Argentine shipping companies in peacetime. The problem with the military 

attaché’s office was it was not connected with security. Since the AIS was under Army control, the 

military attaché, Colonel John Lang, assumed that 

the Argentine DF station was to be under his control. Lang also believed that any tip coming from 

his office should be investigated thoroughly. Once 

administrative channels had been made clear, howFrom this shed at Quilpe, a small town 18 

miles east of Valparaiso, a German spy ring 

in Chile operated a radio transmitter with 

callsign PYL to send information to the 

Abwehr radio station in Hamburg.
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

ever, Lang cooperated with de Bardeleban and 

McDermott.

After six months, the team had determined 

that it was not possible to locate the clandestine 

stations with only two DF units operating under 

the conditions prevailing in Argentina. The stations were moving frequently, in some cases every 

two or three days; and it was nearly impossible 

for the DF units to move, communicate, and operate without being spotted. As a result, the team 

recommended that at least four additional mobile 

units be provided to continue the search. This 

would, of course, require additional automobiles, 

equipment, housing, and personnel. The embassy 

frowned on this recommendation both because of 

the increased expense and because of the implied 

heightening of the team’s profile. The latter was 

particularly important because the Argentinian 

government was believed to be itching for a chance 

to pin anything even resembling espionage on the 

U.S. embassy.

An alternative to the above was to try to arrange 

to get bearings from the Adcock DFs in Montevideo, 

Santiago, and Lima. This was considered to be a 

very weak alternative because the distances over 

which the bearings would be taken would not permit sufficient accuracy to locate the targets.

Since the embassy was so opposed to the first 

solution, McDermott thought that the entire project should be held at a standstill pending further 

developments, particularly possible changes in the 

attitude of the Argentine government.163 

Not all of the teams ran into the sort of difficulties that de Bardeleban encountered in Chile 

and Argentina. Many of the Latin American republics were resolute in their efforts to aid the allied 

nations. Others had an attitude problem.

Ecuador–Mañana Land

Charles Weeks arrived in Quito on 13 January 

1943, and contacted the chargé d’affaires, Alfred T. 

Neslen, and the U.S. military attaché, Colonel W. E. 

Shipp, who arranged a meeting with the Ecuadoran 

minister of public works, Sr. Alberto Wright.

When Weeks arrived, Chief Radiomen Bradford 

and Maltz, who had been sent to Ecuador in 1941, 

were conducting a school in direction finding for 

local military officers, and seven Ecuadoran officers were standing research and monitoring watches. Bradford and Maltz were also assisting the naval 

attaché in his investigation of clandestine radio 

stations. Upon Week’s arrival, they were detailed 

to help him in his work. The Adcock-type DT direction finder which had been left in Ecuador by the 

U.S. Navy when the war started was housed in an 

adobe building on the grounds of the Ecuadoran 

Military College and was being used by Bradford 

and Maltz in their classes. In addition, one of the 

DF trucks sent to Ecuador by the Navy in 1940 was 

on hand with its associated equipment.

The three Americans made numerous trips 

out of Quito in all directions, performing a series 

of tests to find a new location for the equipment 

while the Ecuadoran watch standers took special 

check bearings as directed by Weeks to check the 

accuracy of the equipment. Weeks determined that 

while the present DF site was the best in Quito, 

the surrounding mountains and the building itself 

were inducing considerable error in the bearings 

obtained.164

Weeks found that Guayaquil was the ideal location for the DF and so notified AIS, but was told by 

them that the equipment was to stay in Quito. AIS 

did, however, provide funds for a circular wooden 

building to house the equipment. New construction and alterations to the old building for use as 

an intercept site were completed by 28 April. The 

equipment, including a shipment from the United 

States that had arrived on 12 March, was installed 

and antennas erected by 2 May.

AIS took over physical control, via the U.S. 

military attaché, as of 26 March 1943. Maltz and 

Bradford were transferred to the Naval Radio 
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

Station, Chatham, Massachussetts, on 15 March. 

They were replaced by three U.S. Army personnel, Sergeant Arthur Swarz and Corporals Charles 

Catrona and Jose Perez. These three, with Navy 

permission, took custody of the Navy DF equipment. The only Ecuadoran personnel with any background in DF were the military personnel trained 

by Bradford and Maltz. The Ministry of Public 

Works official appointed to direct the Ecuadoran 

personnel, Sr. Alfonso Zabala, was urged to obtain 

a number of these men to work at the site. The 

minister of public works, however, pointed out that 

his appropriation for this work had run out and 

suggested that the Ministry of Defense take over. 

This was done. On 11 May eight Ecuadoran Army 

officers and one Ministry of Communications civilian reported rather unenthusiastically for duty.

Weeks reported that throughout this period 

he had received little or no aid from Ecuadoran 

authorities, who seemed to have little interest in 

the project and little ambition to locate and close 

clandestine stations in Ecuador.

After having his TDY extended thirty days on 

15 April and forty-five days on 15 May, Weeks 

returned to the United States in July 1943.166

Colombia–Everything in Place

The equipment that the U.S. Navy had taken 

into Colombia had also been left there and in late 

1942 was being used by Chief Radioman Everett 

Fowlkes to train Colombian Army personnel. This 

equipment was turned over to the military attaché

in February 1943. According to the military attaché, writing in November 1942, Captain Roldan of 

the Colombian Army Air Corps deserved the credit 

for maintaining the equipment and for continuing 

to improve the Colombian radio intelligence service.166

The Colombian Ministry of War and the U.S. 

missions in Colombia were anxious to have all of 

the radio locator equipment in Bogotá because that 

city was the capital and because it had the only 

reliable electrical supply in the country. After his 

arrival in early January, Donald Strong managed 

to balance the type DY direction finder so that the 

minima were acceptable. The original site chosen 

for installation of the DF was Techo, six miles west 

of Bogotá, but in March it was decided to construct 

an airfield on that site.

Strong’s tour of duty was extended in April, 

and he managed to find an excellent site for the 

DF, complete with a ten-room house. On 12 April 

he predicted that his job would be completed by 1 

May. However, by 26 April there had been an abortive coup d’état, official visits by (among others) 

U.S. vice president Henry Wallace, and Holy Week. 

So the minister of war did not get around to signing 

the lease. Strong’s tour was extended again on 14 

May, and he brought the monitoring station into 

active operation on 13 June. He left for the United 

States five or six days later.167

Brazil–Full Cooperation

The FCC officer selected for duty in Brazil was 

Robert D. Linx, monitoring officer at Austin, Texas, 

who was ordered to Miami in March 1942, at the 

same time as de Bardeleben. He arrived in Rio 

on 20 March, and after surveying the situation, 

requested additional equipment, including a complete automobile DF assembly. His primary job was 

to help Brazil organize a radio monitoring service. 

Within a month of his arrival, the Brazilians had 

been persuaded to establish six monitoring posts 

along the coast, with more to come. Linx spent 

the first two weeks of May preparing the Rio de 

Janeiro station of the service, which was titled 

Posto Radio Escuto (PRE) and headed by Ezequiel 

Martims. As of 10 May there were sixty-three cases 

on file at PRE RIO, most of them clandestine. Linx 

noted that it had been necessary to instruct the six 

secondary stations in their duties by mail, a task 

that was made doubly hard because the average 

Brazilian technician had to be given a reason for 

everything he did. By the end of the month, Linx 

was able to report to Theodore A. Xanthaki at the 

U.S. embassy that the first phase of the operation 
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

was complete. Seven stations were in operation 

and fully supplied, and an Adcock DF was under 

construction. Linx estimated that as soon as these 

were installed and he had the mobile DF he had 

ordered, most of the known clandestine stations 

could be located. In August he added the mobile DF 

to the operation.168

At this point, PRE’s seven stations (Rio de 

Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Porto Alegro, Belo Horizonte, 

Natal, Recife, and Belem) employed sixty-three 

first-class operators and seven chief operators. 

Each PRE station was operating twenty-four hours 

a day, with four operators on duty at PRE RIO and 

two each at each of the subordinate stations during 

the heavy traffic hours of 2100-0300Z. PRE RIO 

was able to issue instructions to the other stations 

by radio, transmitting either in the clear or using 

a five-letter code to which only the chief operators 

had access. Three additional secondary stations 

were planned, to be located at Manaus, Baia, and 

between Natal and Belem. PRE RIO’s mobile unit 

was received from the United States and was ready 

for operation by the end of July. Also in July, the 

Ministry of Aviation turned over its Rio radio post 

to PRE, where it received the designation PRE 

MAE. The same month, Lieutenant Commander 

A. Pinheiro de Andrade, who was retired from the 

Brazilian Navy, was added to the staff as a cryptanalyst.169

The Brazilians were extremely proud of the 

PRE. The FBI’s Jack West called it the best in 

South America. At the end of July, Major Landry 

Salles Goncalves, the director-general of Posts 

and Telegraphs, and Major Lauro Medeiros, the 

director of the Brazilian Telegraph System, spoke 

to the U.S. ambassador about Linx, praising him 

fulsomely and referring to him as the “Father of the 

Brazilian Monitoring Service.”170

The Adcocks were completed in September 

and placed in Rio (outside the city), Porto Allegro. 

Belem, Recife, and Campo Grande. PRE had been 

asked (it is not clear by whom) to cooperate with 

the British DF system in Africa. In his report on 

this, Linx stated that “the party in charge of this 

system is an employee of the Marconi Company in 

Brazil.” Since Linx had information that the head of 

the Marconi Company in Brazil was a well-known 

Fascist, he intended to have a complete investigation made before taking action on the request. 

Since he did not mention the subject again, it may 

be assumed that the British net passed the security 

investigation.171

Linx had been due to return to the United States 

in August 1942, but the U.S. ambassador strongly 

opposed moving him until PRE was fully viable. 

Linx was extended for another six months. In the 

end, he remained in Brazil until November 1945. At 

that point there seemingly was no one left in FCC 

or State who remembered how he had been sent to 

Brazil or how he was to be returned home. When he 

was notified that FCC had no place for him because 

of the high grade he had attained, he transferred to 

the State Department to become communications 

attaché in Rio de Janeiro.172

The AIS Takes Over

The tours of the other men sent to Latin America 

were considerably less eventful; and the attitudes of 

the countries involved fell somewhere in between 

Chile and Argentina, on the one hand, and Brazil, 

on the other. Earnhart and Crews returned home 

after ninety days, and Means and Dorothy after 120 

days, their tasks completed. Lines was extended 

until August 1942 and then returned. Upon the 

conclusion of their tours, de Bardeleben, Crews, 

Fellows, Hogg, Linx, and Strong received letters 

of commendation from the State Department for 

their work in Latin America.173

As the men returned home, the stations were 

taken over by either local military personnel, AIS 

personnel, or some combination of the two. In 1943 

or 1944, de Bardeleben and McDermott visited 

the stations in Chile and Uruguay, respectively. 

What they found does not seem to have been very 

encouraging. According to de Bardeleben, the U.S. 

Army operators at the Chilean site were incom-
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

petent and unable to copy Morse code at reasonable speeds. The Chilean Air Force operators were 

superior to the U.S. operators, who were supposed 

to be instructing the Chileans in DF operations and 

intercept. Transmissions on the Argentine clandestine net were too fast for the U.S. operators to copy. 

The U.S. operators in Chile lacked 

coordination from Miami and spent 

most of their time chatting on their 

radio circuits or with each other 

about the living conditions and what 

a hard life they bad. They monitored 

very little and left most of the work 

for the local operators, who had no 

training in signal recognition at all. 

Even the Army operators appeared 

to have complete faith in the call letters used and if they sounded legal 

made no other attempt to copy the 

traffic. In short, they didn’t recognize 

legal from clandestine stations when 

heard, and had no radio background 

or knowledge. They had no idea at 

all of radio fundamentals and frequency differences from day to night. 

In addition, there was no officer at 

the Adcock, so the men worked only 

when they felt like it.

174

McDermott found similar conditions in 

Uruguay and made the additional comment that 

the inefficiency and poor administration of the South American Adcock 

system demands that they be eliminated from participation in this 

case. Particularly in view of the high 

degree of security required.175

The Army tried to turn the Bogotá, Quito, and 

Montevideo intercept and DF sites over to the 

Coast Guard, since most of their operation had 

been for the benefit of the Coast Guard. The Army 

also wanted the Coast Guard to assume control of 

the hemisphere radio direction finding net.176

The hemisphere network, controlled by WVSM, 

consisted of Station HKU3, Bogotá, Colombia, 

manned by six enlisted men of the 2nd Signal 

Service Battalion; Station HC1YZ, Quito. Ecuador, 

manned by five enlisted men of the 2nd Signal 

Service Battalion, working in conjunction with 

six or seven natives; Station CXW, Montevideo, 

Uruguay, manned by six enlisted men of the 2nd 

Signal Service Battalion, assisted by eight or nine 

natives; Station CBA2, Quintero, Chile, manned 

by eight men from the United States Coast Guard 

and six or eight men from the Chilean Air Force; 

Station OBC, Callao, Peru, manned by six United 

States Coast Guardsmen and ten members of the 

Peruvian Navy; Station HIQG, Ciudad Trujillo, 

Dominican Republic, manned by six United States 

Coast Guardsmen and two or three members of the 

Dominican Republic Army; Station XBTW, Merida, 

Yucatan, Mexico, manned by about twelve men 

from the Mexican Army; Station WL2, Rio Hato, 

Panama Canal Zone, until recently operated by a 

detachment of the 120th Signal Radio Intelligence 

Company, and thereafter by local United States 

Army units under Colonel Tatom; Station CLQ, 

Havana, Cuba, manned by Cuban military, naval, 

and civilian personnel; and Station PPG, Posto 

Radio Escuta, which was a Brazilian radio intelligence network operated in its entirety by the 

Brazilian Department of Post and Telegraphs.177

A comment made by the U.S. naval attaché in 

Bogotá could serve as a characterization of most of 

the AIS DF operation, Brazil always excluded:

The operation in Colombia was 

never successful, because of the lack 

of Colombian Government cooperation. There is no reason to believe 

that it would be successful in the 

future, because there is no reason 

to believe that the Colombians will 

cooperate in the future. The reasons 

for the latter statement are (a) the 

belief that German submarine warfare in the Caribbean is a thing of 

the past and therefore Colombia is 
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

under no direct threat from the Axis; 

(b) Captain Alvaro ROLDAN, would 

undoubtedly again be in charge; and 

(c) Colonel Arturo LEMA Posada, 

Director-General of the Colombian 

Air Force, is less effective and cooperative than was Colonel Ernesto 

BUENA VENTURA, who was in charge 

in 1940 but was relieved by LEMA in 

February 1942. The military attaché

would like to turn everything over to 

tbe naval attaché as of January 1945; 

but the naval attaché does not have 

radio technical personnel under his 

command.178

Disposition of the AIS Net

As of 28 December 1944, the U.S. naval attaché, 

Montevideo, had taken responsibility for the clandestine intercept and DF station there. The Cuban 

portion of the DF system was destroyed by a hurricane in the autumn of 1944. In February 1945, 

in answer to a query from the secretary of state 

about whether the Cuban site was to be rebuilt, 

Admiral Ralph Bard, the assistant secretary of the 

navy, replied that the network was adequate for full 

coverage of clandestine radio in Latin America and 

should be maintained until it was no longer useful. 

However, no increase in personnel or equipment 

would be profitable. Therefore, if the Colombians 

did not want to provide personnel to work the station in Bogotá, the station could be closed down, 

and there was no need to rebuild the Cuban station. At this time there were no USCG operators in 

Bogotá, Montevideo, or Merida.179

The last of the elements of the network to survive was the PRE, since it had never been under 

U.S. government control. On 18 January 1946, 

however, the secretary of the navy informed the 

secretary of state that

The Navy Department has no interest in the continuation, by Brazilian 

authorities, of the monitoring in 

Brazil of clandestine radio stations. 

. . .

. . .In view of tbe possibility that tbe 

U.S. Coast Guard may be interested 

in the Brazilian monitoring, it is suggested that the question of its continuation be referred to the Secretary 

of the Treasury, under whom that 

service now operates.180

Conclusion

Did the Axis clandestine effort in the Western 

Hemisphere have any effect on the conduct of 

the war? Probably not. It appears that most of 

the intelligence passed to Germany was of little 

significance. Station AOR, run by the FBI, probably passed more useful, valid intelligence to the 

Germans than all the rest of the German nets put 

together, and according to the Coast Guard, was 

responsible for the sinking of several Allied ships. 

But this was a minor contribution to the Battle of 

the Atlantic.

The answer to the question, “Did the U.S. cryptanalytic effort against the Axis spies have any effect 

on the conduct of the war?” is also, “probably not.” 

But because most clandestine communications 

operations are more alike than they are different, it 

was a useful exercise that provided valuable experience for the postwar years.

Notes

1. Barbara W. Tuchman, The Zimmermann 

Telegram (New York: Viking Press), 1958.

2. “Axis Aspirations through South America,” FBI 

monograph (April 1942).

3. David Kahn, Hitler’s Spies (New York: MacMillan, 

1978), 32, 51, 224.

4. Ibid., 225.

5. Ibid., 229, 231-32.

6. GC&CS publication, Amt Auslandsnachrichten 

and Abwehr, as excerpted in COL Alfred McCormack’s 

report on his trip to London, May-June 1943, 51; Lauren 

Paine, German Military Intelligence in World War II: 
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

The Abwehr (New York: Stein and Day, 1984), 11-13; 

and Ladislas Farago, The Game of the Foxes (New York: 

David McKay, 1971), 1.

7. McCormack Trip Report, 53-55, “Epitome of 

the German Intelligence Service,” SHAEF, CounterIntelligence War Room (April 1946; and Kahn, Hitler’s 

Spies, 243-48).

8. McCormack Trip Report, 58; Kahn, Hitler’s 

Spies, 231-32; and “Epitome of the German Intelligence 

Services.”

9. “Epitome of the German Intelligence Services.”

10. Ibid.

11. McCormack’s Trip Report, 1-2.

12. The Interrogation of Hedwig Elisabeth 

Weigelmayer Sommer, FBI File No. 65-118 (10 May 

1945), 15.

13. Ibid., 15-16; “Latin America: Clandestine Radio 

Stations Utilized by the German Espionage System,” 

an FBI report dated February 1942; and “Radio ‘CEL‘–

Albrecht Gustav Engela, WAS: et al–Brazil Espionage,” 

3-8. This 194-page document describing the entire 

operations of the CELALD espionage net is of unknown 

authorship, but was possibly originated by OP-20-GL.

14. “Radio CEL,” 4.

15. FBI Report of February 1942.

16. Sommer interrogation, 21.

17. Ibid., 24.

18. FBI Report of February 1942.

19. Ibid; and FBI memorandum, “Individuals 

Operating in Connection with Clandestine Radio Station 

PYL, Valparaiso” (10 March 1942).

20. Ibid., 27, 28; and a 22 March 1944 message from 

Argentina to Berlin (CG4-3895).

21. Sommer interrogation, 29; and Op-20-GI-A 

memorandum, “The JOLLE Operation” (25 August 

1944).

22. Sommer interrogation, 26; OP-20-GI-A memorandum of 25 August 1944; letter from Vice Chief 

of Naval Operations, “Sub Contact in Argentina” (16 

September 1943); and LUNA’s 22 March 1944 message 

to Berlin (CG4-3891).

23. Berlin’s 30 March 1944 message to Argentina 

(CG4-4014).

24. Extract from BAD Summary #117, date unknown, 

detailing information received from four prisoners of 

war who had served aboard Passim; and OP-20-GI-A’s 

25 August 1944.

25. Stanley E. Hilton, Hitler’s Secret War in South 

America, 1939-1946 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 

University Press, 1981), 288-93.

26. Ibid., 293-303; and OP-20-GI-A memorandum 

to F-21 (27 July 1944).

27. OP-20-GI-A memorandum of 25 August 1944.

28. 10 May 1944 mesaage from Berlin to Argentina 

(CG4-4579); Argentina’s 24 May 1944 (CG4-????), and 3 

June 1944 (CG4-4938); and Hilton, Hitler’s Secret War 

in South America, 1939-1945, 293.

29. Berlin’s 6 June 1944 (CG4-4929); Argentina’s 

9 June 1944 (CG4-4964-A); and Berlin’s 18 June 1944 

(CG4-4987).

30. Berlin’s 15 June 1944 to Franczok, quoted in R.I. 

Summary, Part I (21 June 1944).

31. Argentina’s 21 June 1944 to Passim (CG4-

5006-A); Passim’s, 21 June 1944 to Argentina (CG4-

5007-A); Argentina’s 23 June 1944 to Passim (CG4-

5050-A); and Argentina’s 4 July 1944 to Berlin (CG4-

5134).

32. Sommer interrogation, 31-32.

33. Ibid., 33; BAD Summary #117 of POW 

Interrogation; and Intelligence Summary–Blue (ISB), 

No. 10 (10 October 1944), and No. 12 (24 October 1944). 

(The Intelligence Summary–Blue was an all-source 

intelligence report, apparently British, issued approximately weekly from 7 July 1944 to 21 December 1945.)

34. CDR L.T. Jones’s 7 September 1944 memorandum to OP-20-G.

35. CG3-1411 (1 July 1943); CG3-2125 (7 October 

1945); CG3-2364 (1 November 1943); and CG4-3065 (17 

January 1944).

36. Memorandum from Carl B. Spaeth (Special 

Assistant to Spruille Braden) to Dean Acheson, “The 

Argentine Project” (17 January 1946).

37. Letter from ADM D. C. Ramsey to Carl B. Spaeth 

(22 January 1946); Spaeth’s 17 January 1946 to Acheson; 

and memorandum from CAPT W. R. Smedburg III 

to ADM Stone, “U.S. State Department Case against 

Argentina” (7 February 1946).

38. “Organizational Development of the Naval 

Security Group,” CAPT J. S. Holtwick, Jr., USN (Ret.), 

1-2.

39. Ibid., 2.
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

40. Ibid., 3.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., 4.

43. Ibid., 4-6.

44. “Military Study: Communications Intelligence 

Research Activities,” by LT Joseph N. Wenger, USN (30 

June 1937), 9-12, 18, 22.

45. Holtwick, Development of NSG, 5.

46. “History of OP-20-GU (Coast Guard Unit of 

NCA)” (16 October 1943), 1-2.

47. Ibid., 3; and a memorandum for the Secretary of 

the Treasury from RADM R. R. Waesche, Commandant, 

USCG (16 November 1938).

48. Memorandum from LT Frank E. Pollio to the 

Chief Personnel Officer (26 March 1937), 2-5; and 

“History of OP-20-GU,” 10.

49. Memorandum from CDR J. F. Farley, USCG, to 

CDR John R. Redman, ONC (6 March 1942).

50. Ibid.

51. Memorandum from CDR L. T. Jones (USCG) to 

OP-20-G, “Clandestine Radio Intelligence” (7 September 

1944) “History of OP-20-GU” (16 October 1943), 2.

52. Memorandum from LCDR Pollio and LT Jones to 

CAPT J. W. Chalker, Commandant, USCG (28 October 

1940).

53. Memorandum from CDR L. T. Jones to OP-20-G 

(7 September 1944).

54. “History of OP-20-GU,” 2, 3; Executive memoranda of 26 June 1939 and unknown date in 1939.

55. Memoranda from CDR Farley to FCC Chief 

Engineer Jett ( 23 July 1940); and to FCC Chairman Fly 

(21 October 1940).

56. “The Radio Intelligence Division of the Federal 

Communications Commission” (August 1943), 9-10. 

(This rather self-serving report was issued by the FCC in 

answer to the charges made by the House Committee to 

investigate the Federal Communications Commission, 

better known as the Cox Committee.)

57. Hoover’s letters to Fly on 7 Sep, 11 October, and 

23 December 1940; and Fly’s letters to Hoover on 7 

December 1940 and 18 January 1941.

58. Hoover’s letters to Fly on 14 and 23 December 

1940, and 8 February, 21 February, 28 February, 5 

March, 28 April, and 30 April 1941; and letters from 

RADM L. C. Covell, Assistant Commandant, USCG, to 

T. J. Slowie, Secretary of the FCC. on 24 April and 2 May 

1941.

59. Memorandum to the Defense Communications 

Board from E. K. Jett, Chairman of the Coordinating 

Committee (18 January 1941), with attachments: 

“Proposed Memorandum for the President from 

the Defense Communications Board” and the FCC’s 

“Justification for Estimate of Additional Funds . . .”; and 

letter from the FCC to the DNC (2 Auguat 1941).

60. Hearings, lndependent Offices Appropriations 

Bill, 1941, 893, 903-904, and 931.

61. F. H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in World War 

II, Vol. 1 (London: HMSO, 1979), 20.

62. Ibid., 22-23.

63. LCDR L. A. Griffiths, RNVR, GC&CS Secret 

Service SIGINT, Vol. I, “Organization and Evolution of 

British Secret Service SIGINT,” 20-27.

64. Ibid., 5.

65. lbid., 6-11.

66. Ibid., 13-16.

67. lbid., 16-18.

68. Ibid., 18-22.

69. Ibid., 29, 37-98 passim; and MacCormack Trip 

Report, 1-2.

70. Ibid., 30-45 and “Report by the Chief, Training 

Division, to the Director, Armed Forces Security Agency, 

on Clandestine Communications” (7 January 1952), 

10-11.

71. Memorandum from Franklin D. Roosevelt (26 

June 1939).

72. Memorandum from Franklin D. R00sevelt 

(1939).

73. Letter from RADM T. S. Wilkinson to A. A. Berle 

(28 March 1942). The story of the operations of the 

Brazilian network and its fate is covered fully in Hilton’s 

Hitler’s Secret War in South America, 1939-1945.

74. Wilkinson letter to Berle.

75. Memorandum from CDR John R. Redman to the 

DNI and the DNC, “Radio Intelligence Activities with 

Respect to Clandestine Radio Stations,” 3 April 1942; 

and letter from Gen Strong to A. A. Berle, 3 April 1942.

76. Redman memorandum to DNI and DNC.

77. Redman memorandum to DNI and DNC.

78. Memorandum from J. B. W. Waller, Office of tbe 

CNO, to CDR Redman and LCDR Kramer, “Conference 

re Radio Intercepts” (10 April 1942); “Report of 
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

Subcommittee of the Interdepartmental lntelligence 

Conference Appointed to Explore the Cryptanalytic 

Work of the War Department, Navy Department, and 

Federal Bureau of Investigation” (23 April 1942); and 

“Report of Conference Appointed to Study Processing 

and Dissemination of Radio Intelligence” (25 May 

1942).

79. Memorandum from ADM Wilkinson to the JCS, 

“Limitation of Cryptanalytic Activities” (18 June 1942).

80. 'Report of Conference Appointed to Study 

Allocation of Cryptanalysis” (30 June 1942).

81. JCS memorandum to the President (6 July 

1942); White House memorandum to the Director of 

the Budget (8 July 1942); memorandum from W.O. 

Hall to B. L. Gladieux (16 July 1942); letter from John 

H. Sorrells, Deputy Director of Office of Censorship, to 

the Director of the Budget (12 August 1942); and memorandum from the Assistant Director of the Budget to the 

President (1 September 1942).

82. Letters from Assistant Secretary of State A. A. 

Berle to Chairman Fly on 22 October 1940 and 10 April 

1941; from Assistant Secretary of State Breckenridge 

Long to Chairman Fly on 6 November 1940 and 29 

January and 12 May 1941; from Chairman Fly to the 

DNC (16 July 1940); and from CAPT E. C. Raguet, 

Acting DNC, to the FCC (19 August 1940).

83. “History of OP-20.GU,” 5-6.

84. Letter from H. Morgenthau, Secretary of the 

Treasury, to James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy 

(10 November 1941); Forrestal’s reply (3 December 

1941); memorandum from LCDR Alwin D. Kramer to 

OP-20-G, “Cryptanalysis: FBI Activities and Liaison 

with the British” (8 June 1942); “Report of Conference 

to Study Allocation of Cryptanalysis” (30 June 1942); 

and “History of OP-20-GU,” 3, 7; memorandum from 

the Commandant, USCG, to LCDR L. T. Jones, “Change 

in Location of Communications Intelligence Section,” 

4 February 1943; and memorandum from the Cbief 

Communications Officer, USCG, to DNC (4 February 

1943).

85. Memorandum from D. M. Stanier to OP-20-G. 

“Activities of Clandestine South American Stations” 

(16 February 1942); and memoranda from Officer 

in Charge, Station “U,” to CNO, “Caribbean HighFrequency Direction Finder Net–Clandestine Stations,” 

1, 9, 14, and 21 February 1942, among others.

86. Memorandum to LCDR Cross, “Clandestine 

Coverage–Conference with Lieutenant Commander 

Jones” (12 March 1942).

87. Telephone call from ADM Leigh Noyes, DNC, 

to E. K. Jett (12 July 1940), quoted in scrapbook notes 

included in the Papers of George Sterling, Box 11, 

RG173, FRC, Suitland, Maryland; and letter from DNC 

to Chairman Fly (7 August 1940).

88. Scrapbook notes; and letter from CAPT E. 

C. Raguet, Acting DNC, to Chairman Fly (19 August 

1940).

89. Scrapbook notes; and letter from DNC to 

Chairman Fly (17 September 1940).

90. Scrapbook notes; and memorandum from 

OP-20-G to OP-20 (9 December 1940).

91. Scrapbook notes.

92. Memorandum from CAPT J. F. Farley (USCG) to 

CDR J. R. Redman (USN) (28 March 1942), 1.

93. Ibid., 2-3.

94. Memorandum from CDR L.T. Chalker, USCG, 

Acting Assistant Commandant, to the Commander, New 

York District, “Headquarters Monitoring Assignment 

Group 2-A” (13 September 1941 ).

96. “History of OP-20-GU,” 5-6, 11; memorandum 

from CDR Jones to OP-20-G (7 September 1944); memorandum from OP-20-G to DNI, “Request of Claude G. 

Bowers for Certain Decoded Material” (24 September 

1942).

96. Memorandum from LT L.T. Jones to Herbert 

B. Gaston, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, 

“Communications of German Agents in the United 

States and Other Points in the Western Hemisphere” 

(23 May 1941); and memorandum from CDR Jones 

to OP-20-G (7 September 1944), 2-3; and memorandum from J. N. Wenger to OP-20-G (28 May 1943); 

and “Agreement Between FBI, MID, and ONI for the 

Operation of a Network to Locate Clandestine Radio 

Stations in Latin America, and the Action to Be Taken 

upon the Information Derived Therefrom,” signed by 

MGEN George V. Strong, RADM H. C. Train, and J. 

Edgar Hoover (6 February 1943).

97. Memorandum from D. M. Stanier to OP-20-G (16 

February 1942); “History of OP-20-GU,” 4; and memorandum from S. N. Wilson to LCDR Cross, “Suggestion 

by LCDR Jones, USCG, that the Undersigned Attend 
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

Conferences on Clandestine Intercept Operations” (28 

January 1943).

98. Memorandum from CDR Jones to OP-20-G (7 

September 1944), 3.

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid., 3-4.

101. Ibid.

102. Memorandum from CDR Jones to OP-20-G (7 

September 1944); memorandum from CAPT E. B. Stone, 

OP-20-G, to COL Carter W. Clarke, “German Clandestine 

Traffic” (6 February 1943); Cable CXG-358 from the 

Chief of the Secret Service (CSS) to CAPT Hastings, RN 

(11 February 1943); and his reply, Cable CXG-898, of 

13 February 1943; and memorandum from OP-20-G 

to ADM Schuirmann, “Communication Intelligence — 

Dissemination of Clandestine Information to FBI” (20 

October 1943).

103. Letter from J. E. Hoover to DNI (8December 

1943).

104. Letter from RADM R. E. Schuirmann, DNI, to 

J. E. Hoover (20 December 1943).

105. “History of Espionage T/A Study” undated, 

1-5.

106. “History of Espionage T/A Study,” 8-9 and 

“History of Special German Diplomatic Net” (1 June 

1943), 24-25.

107. “Report on Establishment of Radio Intelligence 

Center,” undated. This document was signed by LTC 

Laurence H. Smith, Assistant Signal Officer, WDC; 

CDR F. E. Venzel, Jr., District Communications Officer, 

Twelfth Naval District; and George E. Sterling, Chief, 

NDO.

108. Transcript of telepbone conversation between 

General DeWitt and COL Raymond (14 January 1942).

109. File #300.6 WTO(Sig). Headquarter. Western 

Defense Command and Fourth Army, undated; letter 

from the Adjutant General’s Office to the Commanding 

General, Field Forces, and the Commanding General, 

Western Defense Command, “Joint Radio Intelligence 

Center” (7 February 1942); letter from the Assistant 

Adjutant General, Western Defense Command and 

Fourth Army, to the Chief Signal Officer, “Transfer of 

Funds for Radio Intelligence Center” undated, and File 

#676.3 (Sig), Headquarters WDC, undated.

110. Memorandum from CDR Safford to CAPT 

Schuirmann, “Direction Finders for South American 

Countries” (17 June 1940); Enclosure “A” to CNO’s 

memorandum to Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District, 

“Clandestine Radio Activities in South American 

Countries” (16 July 1940); Safford’s memoranda to 

Schuirmann, “Direction Finders for South American 

Countries (19 and 26 June 1940); and OP-20-G memorandum for file, “Radio Direction Finder Unit in 

Colombia” (21 August 1941).

111. State Department message no. 179 from the U.S. 

Ambassador, Bogotá (3 July 1940).

112. Safford memorandum to Schuirmann, “Direction Finders for South American Countries” (6 July 

1940); and OP-20-G memorandum for file (21 August 

1941).

113. CNO memoranda to Bureau of Ships, “Mobile 

Direction Finding Equipment” (16 July 1940); to 

the Commandant, USCG. “Request for Coast Guard 

Equipment” (16 July 1940); and to the Commandant, 

Fifteenth Naval District, “Clandestine Radio Activities in 

South American Countries” (19 July 1940).

114. Memorandum from Commandant, Fifteenth 

Naval District, to CNO, “Clandestine Radio Activities in 

South American Countries” (17 August 1940); memorandum from CNO to Bureau of Ships, “Naval Radio 

Direction Finder Statton Toro Point, Canal Zone–Service 

Discontinued” (26 September 1940); and CNO’s memorandum to the Chief. Bureau of Navigation, “Model 

DY Direction Finder to Be Established at Farfan Radio 

Station” (31 December 1940).

115. Memorandum from LCDR McElroy to CNO, 

“Clandestine Radio Activities in South American 

Countries (16 August 1940).

116. Memorandum from LCDR E. H. Gardner. 

OP-2o-GX, to CDR Ihrig (20 August 1940), concerning 

the shipment of radio trucks; memorandum from Atkins 

and Warren to LCDR Gardner, “Report of Conditions in 

Colombia, S. A." (8 October 1940); and memorandum 

from LCDR S. A. Greenleaf, OP-20-GX to McElroy (14 

October 1940). (LCDR Gardner had left OP-2o-GX on 

1 October.)

117. Memoranda from McElroy to CNO, “Clandestine Radio Stations in Colombia” (26 October 1940); 

and to LCDR Greenleaf (1 November 1940); and from 

Greenleaf to McElroy (3 December 1940); and Telegram 

No. 8 from the U.S. Legation at Quito to State Department 

(12 January 1941).
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

118. Memorandum from CNO to Commandant, 

Fifteenth Naval District, “Clandestine Radio Station in 

South American Countries” (3 January 1941); and memorandum from CAPT Schuirmann to the Undersecretary 

of State (3 January 1940) (sic).

119. Intelligence Report 4-41 from the U.S. Naval 

Attaché, Quito (17 January 1941); memorandum 

from Commander, Special Service Squadron. to CNO, 

“Ecuador: Radio Intelligence Reports re Clandestine 

Radio Activities in South American Countries” (16 August 

1940); and memorandum from CNO to Commandant, 

Fifteenth Naval District, “Clandestine Radio Activities in 

South American Countries” (17 February 1941).

120. Memorandum from LTJG J. E. Johnson. 

Fifteenth Naval District to LCDR S. A. Greenleaf (24 

January 1941); OP-16-F-7 memorandum to OP-16-F. 

"DIF Details in Ecuador and Colombia" (215 January 

1941);OP.20.G memorandum to CAPl' Schuirmann. 

"U.S. Naval Direction Finders and U.S. Navy Radio 

Operators in Ecuador” (27 January 1941); Cable from 

ALUSNA Quito to COMFIFTEEN (27 January 1941); 

and Navy Department Intelligence Report 61.41, from 

the U.S. Naval Attaché, Quito (4 March 1941).

121. Memorandum from Commandant. Fifteenth 

Naval District. to CNO. “Clandestine Radio in South 

America” (5 February 1941).

122. Ibid.; memorandum from Safford to Op-20-A 

(6 February 1941); Navy Department Intelligence 

Report 61-41; State Department Message No. 9 from 

the American Legation, Quito (1 March 1941); memorandum from Safford to the Director, Central Division, 

'Navy Direction Finder Unit in Ecuador” (8 March 1941), 

which mentions the various recommendations made; 

and memorandum from Safford to CDR McCon, Bureau 

of Navigation, “Transfer of Enlisted Personnel” (4 April 

1941).

123. Memorandum from the Chief, U.S. Naval 

Mission to Ecuador, to the CNO, “Replacement as 

Instructors, Operation Navy Roger Dog Fox Equipment 

in Ecuador; Recommendations for” (11 August 1941); 

and memorandum from DNC to Director, Central 

Division, same subject (1 October 1941).

124. OP-16-F-7 memorandum to OP-I6-F (25 

January 1941); letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Adolf 

A. Berle (1 February 1941); OP-20-G memorandum for 

DNI, “Clandestine Radio in Colombia,” serial 043020, 

undated; letter from DNI to Hoover (11 June 1941) 

(drafted by COR. Safford); and McElroy memorandum 

to Ambassador Spruille Braden, “Clandestine Radio in 

Colombia” (11 March 1941).

125. Memorandum from OP-20-G to Bureau of 

Navigation (4 April 1941); and memorandum f'rom the 

U.S. Naval Attaché, Bogotá, to DNI, “Disorderly Conduct 

of Radioman 1cl. Jones Atkins, Jr., USNR” (29 May 

1941).

126. OP-20-G memorandum for file, “Radio Direction Finder Unit in Colombia” (21 Ausust 1941).

127. Ibid.; State Department Dispatch No. 342 from 

the U.S. Ambassador, Bogotá (11 August 1941); and a 

letter f'rom the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of 

State (23 Ausust 1941).

128. Memorandum from CRMs Cullen and Fowlkes 

to CNO, “Report on Activities in Connection with 

Instruction and Maintenance of Special Radio D/F 

Equipment” (27 October 1941); and memorandum from 

CNO to Naval Attaché, Bogotá, “Radio Direction Finder 

Operations in Colombia” (23 December 1941).

129. Memorandum from McElroy to Greenleaf 

November 1940); and Greenleaf’s answer (3 December 

1940).

130. McElroy memorandum to Greenleaf (12 

December 1940).

131. Memorandum from DNC to Director, Central 

Division, “Radiomen for Duty as Instructors in Direction 

Finding Operation in Colombia and Ecuador" (23 August 

1941); and letter from Greenacre to Safford (13 October 

1941).

132. Memorandum from the Senior Member, Naval 

Radio DF Unit, Quito, Ecuador, to CNO, “Report for 

October, 1941” (31 October 1941).

133. Memorandum from DNC to Director, Central 

Division, “Radio Direction Finder Operations in 

Ecuador” (2 December 1941); and memorandum from 

Senior Member, Ecuadoran Direction Finder Unit, to 

CNO, “Report for November, 1941” (2 December 1941).

134. Letter from Safford to Greenacre (17 December 

1941); and memorandum from Safford to CDR C. J. 

Maguire, OP-13 (25 January 1942).

135. State Department Telegram No. 110 from the 

U.S. Delegation in San Jose (5 September 1940); and 

letter f'rom Dudley G. Dwyre, Chargé d’ Affaires ad 

interim, to the Secretary of State, “Renewal of Request of 
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

the Costa Rican Government for Assistance in Detecting 

Illicit and Clandestine Radio Broadcasting Stations 

Operations in Costa Rica” (13 May 1941). With regard 

to the supplying of loop-type antennas, CDR Safford, 

in a memorandum to tbe OIC, Radio Division, Bureau 

of Ships, on 26 October 1940, said that “the President 

[had) virtually promised to provide one of these equipments to Costa Rica.”

136. Intelligence Report #4-41; and letter from the 

Navy Department to the State Department (22 October 

1941).

137. Cf. memorandum from Commandant, Fifteenth 

Naval District, to CNO, “Clandestine Radio Station 

K5BT or HP5BT, Panama City, Republic of Panama” (27 

March 1941); 30 September 1941 Intelligence Report, 

unnumbered, from the U.S. Naval Attaché, Santiago, 

Chile; and letter from the U.S. Vice-Consul, Valdevia, 

Chile, to the U.S. Ambassador, Santiago (24 December 

1941).

138. History of American Intelligence Service 

(14 February 1946), unpaginated chapter on the 

Communications Branch.

139. Ibid., 1.

140. “Suppression of Clandestine Radio Stations 

in the Other American Republics” (31 December 1941). 

This paper was dictated by George Sterling of the FCC 

from the State Department’s minutes. Attending the 

meeting were RADM S. C. Hooper and COL J. W. 

Thomason (USMC) for the Navy Department; MAJ 

Wesley Guest (USA) for the War Department; Philip F. 

Siling and George Sterling for the FCC; and a six-man 

delegation from State Department: Thomas Burke, 

Francis X. de Wolfe, H. B. Otterman, W. Handley. J. R. 

Toop, and Mr. (fnu) Halle.

141. Memorandum from E. K. Jett, FCC Chief 

Engineer, to the Chairman, FCC, “Work Performed 

by Intercept Unit of the NDO Section” (5 January 

1942); memorandum from D. M. Stoner to OP-20-G (16 

February 1942); memorandum from George Sterling 

to Jett, “Assistance Rendered the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation in the Deciphering of Messages Intercepted 

from Enemy Espionage Stations” (21 Jnly 1943); and an 

undated FCC paper, apparently written in January 1942, 

listing the traffic desired by other agencies.

142. Memorandum from RADM S. C. Hooper 

to Thomas Burke, Chief, Division of International 

Communications, State Department, “Technical 

Requirements of Equipment Necessary for South and 

Central American Countries to Locate Clandestine Radio 

Transmitters” (I) January 1942).

143. Memorandum from LCDR C. W. Welker to 

LCDR F .C. S. Jordan (2 January 1942); and a comment, attached to the Hooper-Burke memorandum of 5 

January, signed by LTC J. D. O’Connell, M-7-D-9, U.S. 

Army Signal Corps, on 28 January 1942.

144. Memorandum from S. W. Norman to J. W. 

Handley of State Department (25 February 1942).

145. Memorandum from ADM Hooper to BG 

Frank E. Stoner, Chief, Army Communications Branch, 

OCSigO, “Location of Clandestine Radio Stations in 

South and Central America” (5 March 1942).

146. Ibid. and attached note from COL W. T. Guest, 

Chief, Army Communications Branch.

147. “Report of the Technical Committee Appointed 

on March 11, 1942, to Recommend Equipment 

and Technical Procedures Relative to the Enlarged 

Inter-American Radio Surveillance Program;” State 

Department Memorandum of Conversation., “Detection 

of Clandestine Operation of Radio Stations in the Other 

American Republics” (12 March 1942); memorandum 

from MAJ T. L. Bartlett (USAAC) to COL A.W. Memner, 

Director of Communications, USAAC, ”Operation 

of Clandestine Radio Stations in Central and South 

America” (12 March 1942); and “Meeting in Burke’s 

Office Pursuant to Provisions of Resolution XL of the 

Rio Conference (Elimination of Clandestine Stations)” 

(19 March 1942). Attending the 19 March meeting were 

MAJ T. L. Bartlet (USAAC). MAJ Hayes. and CPT B.N. 

Massengale, MIS, for the War Department; RADM 

Hooper. LCDR Jordan. LCDR Welker, and LCDR 

Fowler for the Navy Department; Messrs. J. R. Troop, F. 

B. Lyon, J. D. Handley. Thomas Burke, and Francis de 

Wolfe for State Department; Messrs. Dudley B. Bonsell 

and John W. G. Ogilvie for the Office of the Coordinator 

of Inter-American Affairs; and Mr. Norman for the FCC.

148. Memorandum of the meeting on 22 May 1942; 

State Department memorandum to all American diplomatic officers in the other American republics, “Training 

Course in the Technical Procedures of Radio Detection 

and Monitoring” (1 April 1942); and ADM Hooper’s 

“Memorandum for the Army and Navy Representatives 
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

Considering the Question of Suppression of Clandestine 

Radio Stations in Latin America” (7 May 1942).

149. “Minutes of Informal Meeting on the Subject 

of the Central and South American Clandestine Radio 

Situation” (10 April 1942).

150. State Department memorandum of 1 April 

1942; Memorandum of Meeting (22 May 1942); and 

Jett’s reply to Sterling (23 May 1942). The following 

attended the 22 May meeting: VADM A. W. Johnson, 

Inter-American Defense Board; MAJ T. L. Bartlett 

(USAAC), MAJ R. E. Schukraft (Signal Corps), and CPT 

W. E. Plummer (Signal Corps) for the War Department; 

RADM S. C. Hooper, LCDR F. C. B. Jordan, LTJG Alonso 

Laidlaw. and ENS Richard Wheeler for the Navy; P. F. 

Siling and A. W. Norman for the FCC; Elliott S. Hanson 

and Townsend Munson for the CIAA; and J.R. Troop, 

J. D. Handley, Thomas Burke, F. C. de Wolfe, and H. B. 

Otterman for the State Department.

151. Memorandum of 7 July meeting at State 

Department, “Elimination of Clandestine Radio Stations 

in this Hemisphere”; and memorandum from OP-20-

WP-2 to OP-20-A, “Project of Detecting and Locating 

Clandestine Radio Transmitters in South America” (14 

October 1942).

152. Memorandum from Sterling to Jett (18 July 

1942).

153. Memorandum of the 14 July meeting at State 

Department; memorandum from Sterling to Jett (18 

July 1942); letter from Long to Fly (31 July 1942); and 

letter from Fly to Long (8 August 1942).

154. Memorandum from Norman to Jett, “South 

American Radio Intelligence Program as Sponsored by 

the State Department of the United States of America”(21 

August 1942); and memoranda from OP-20-GX to 

Op-20-G. “Trucks in Colombia and Ecuador (17 July 

1942), and "Trucks and Associated Equipment Other 

Than DT Direction Finders at Colombia and Ecuador,” 

undated. (possibly 17 July 1942). The presence at the 20 

August meeting of E. P. Coffee and R. E. Thornton of the 

FBI marked the FBI’s first participation in the program. 

Tbe FBI representatives seemed interested only as the 

program related to FBI radio activities in Latin America.

155. Memorandum from Sterling to Jett (14 October 

1942); and a memorandum from Sterling to Jett (15 

October 1942), “Supplemental Memorandum (Off-theRecord Comment) Concerning the South American 

Project.”

156. Letters to R. D. Linx: and J. F. de Bardeleban 

from S. W. Norman (7 March 1942); letter from 

Chairman Fly to A. A. Berle (13 March 1942); memorandum from LCDR Welker to OP-20-G (19 March 1942); 

Sterling memorandum of 10 October 1942 and letters to 

the selectees on the same date; Sterling letters to F. C. de 

Wolfe on 28 October and 2 November 1942; letters from 

Chairman Fly to Secretary Welles, 28 March and 6 April 

1942; letter from Ambassador Braden to the Secretary 

of State (11 July 1942); and a report of a meeting of 20 

March 1942. The 20 March meeting was attended by 

ADM Hooper, LCDR Alwin D. Kramer. LCDR G. W. 

Welker, and LCDR F. C. B. Jordan for the Navy; MAJ S. 

C. Canova (USA) for the Defense Aid Division, Office of 

the Undersecretary of War; and for the Cubans: Colonel 

Antonio B0let, Chief of the Engineering Corps, Cuban 

Army; Lieutenant Colonel Felipe Morilla, the Cuban 

Military Attaché; and Lieutenant Felipe Gadenas, the 

Cuban Naval Attaché.

157. Memorandum from MAJ Harry I. Marks, Acting 

Chief, Communications Branch, AIC. to George Sterling 

(17 November 1942); Sterling memorandum to MAJ 

Marks (4 December 1942); letter from Fly to Assistant 

Secretary of State Long, 4 December, and Long’s answer 

of 6 December 1942; COL Collins’ letter to CPT William 

Barclay Harding, Chief, Operations and Contact Section, 

AIS, undated; State Department order of 16 December 

to U.S. diplomatic officers in Latin America; letter 

orders to the selectees sent on 26 December 1942; and a 

memorandum of the 7 January 1943 meeting.

158. “Agreement between FBI and MID for the 

Operation of a Network to Locate Clandestine Radio 

Stations in Latin America, and tbe Action to Be Taken 

upon the Information Derived Therefrom” (1 December 

1942). This agreement was signed by RADM H. C. Train, 

DNI; J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI; and MG 

George V. Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

159. Memorandum from S. W. Norman (10 August 

1942); and letters from Norman to Breckenridge Long 

on 18 August and from Ambassador Braden to the 

Secretary of State on 8 September 1942.

160. Letter from Ambassador Braden to the Secretary 

of State, “Radio Transmission and Radio Monitoring in 

Cuba” (17 October 1942); and “Special Report on Caba,” 
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

a report from Charles B. Hogg to the Chief, RID, dated 

26 October 1943.

161. Report from de Bardeleban, “Review of Chilean 

Assignment, March 1942-March 1943” (20 April 1943).

162. Letters from Sterling to Fellows (31 October 

and 11 December 1942); cable from G. H. Goeman to the 

Chief, RID (20 March 1943): letter from Chairman Fly 

to the Secretary of State (26 March 1943); cable from de 

Bardeleben to Sterling (31 March 19431 and amplifying 

letter of the same date: and memorandum from Sterling 

to de Bardeleban, “Duty Assignment” (5 April 1943).

163. Memorandum from McDermott to Sterling, 

“WACA B7,” undated; and letter from de Bardeleban to 

Sterling giving a final report on the Argentinian operation, dated 12 March 1944. “WACA B7” was the FCC case 

notation for the Argentinian clandestine net.

164. Memorandum from the Chief, U.S. Naval 

Mission to Ecuador, to Vice Chief of Naval Operations, 

“Radio Direction Finder Unit — Report of Activities for 

the Month of January 1943” (31 January 1943).

165. Letters from Charles R. Week. to the Chief, 

AIS (11 May 1943): and to George Sterling (16 February 

1943); and memoranda from the Vice Chief of Naval 

Operations to the Chief, U.S. Naval Mission to Ecuador, 

“Transfer of Radio Direction Finder Equipment Presently 

Located in Ecuador to the War Department” (5 January 

1943); from OP-20-G to OP-20, “Navy High-Frequency 

Direction Finder Equipment Loaned to Ecuador and 

Colombia, Facts Concerning” (9 January 1943); cable 

from BUPERS to ALUSNA Quito (9 March 19431), cable 

from Vice Chief of Naval Operations to ALUSNA Quito 

(24 March 1943); and memorandum from U.S. Naval 

Attaché, Quito, to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, 

“Radio Direction Finder Equipment, Transfer to U.S. 

Military Attaché, Quito, Ecuador” (27 March 1943).

166. U.S. Military Attaché Report 1842, “Radio 

lntelligence Service of Colombian Ministry of War" 

(18 November 1942); and memorandum from VCNO 

to Chief, U.S. Naval Mission to Ecuador (11 January 

1943).

167. Memoranda from Strong to the Chief, RID, 

“Report of Progress in Bogotá, Colombia” (26 January 

1943 and 6 April 1943); letter from the Chairman, FCC, 

to Assistant Secretary of State C. Howland Shaw (14 

April 1943); Strong’s report to the Chief, RID (26 April 

1943); memorandum from Sterling to Jett concerning 

extension of TDYs (14 May 1943); and letter from Strong 

to COL Marks, AIS (13 June 1943).

168. Memorandum from Norman to Linx (7 March 

1942); letter from Fly to A. A. Berle (13 March 1942); 

cable from Linx to the Secretary of State (10 April 1942); 

Hilton’s Hitlers Secret War in South America, 1939-

1946, 240, 283; Linx’s “Activity Report #8” (10 May 

1942) and “Activity Report #10” (27 May 1942); and 

memorandum from Sterling to Jett (18 July 1942).

169. Linx’s Progress Reports #15 (8 July 1942) and 

#16 (12 July 1942).

170. Letter from Ambassador Caffrey to the Secretary 

of State (27 July 1942).

171. “Report of Activities, Robert D. Linx: Week 

Ending September 19, 1942” (20 September 1942).

172. Memorandum from Norman to Jett, “South 

American Radio Intelligence Program as Sponsored by 

the State Department of the United States of America” 

(21 August 1942); Linx’s Activity Report of 20 September 

1942; memorandum from Sterling, to Jett concerning 

TDY extensions (14 May 1943); and a cable from A. A. 

Berle to the Secretary of State concerning Linx’s return 

to the U.S., (28 November 1945).

173. Letter from Fly to Shaw (14 April 1943); memorandum from Sterling to Jett concerning TDY extensions (14 May 1943);memorandum from Sterling to Jett 

re State Department commendation of de Bardeleben 

(22 December 1942); letter of commendation for Robert 

D. Linx (3 August 1945); commendation for John Crewe 

from U. S. Military Attaché, Dominican Republic (21 

April 1943); letter of commendation from Fly to Strong 

(11 October 1943); and letters of commendation from 

Sterling to Fellows (8 October 1943), and from Jett to 

Fellows (11 October 1943).

174. De Bardeleben’s final report to Sterling on his 

tour in Argentina (12 March 1944).

175. McDermott’s final report to Sterling, (undated, 

but probably March 1944).

176. Memorandum from BG Frank E. Stoner, Chief 

Army Communications Service, and COL W. Preston 

Corderman, Chief, Signal Security Branch, to OIC, Naval 

Communications Annex:, “Transfer of Certain Intercept 

Installations” (24 August 19441.

177. TAB B to memorandum from BG Frank E. 

Stoner to COL W. Preston Corderman (24 August 1944).
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

178. Memorandum from U.S. Naval Attaché, Bogotá, 

to CNO, “Transfer of Clandestine Monitoring and D/F 

Station to Cognizance of U.S. Naval Attaché in Bogotá" 

(27 December 1944).

179. Letter from ADM Ralph Bard to Secretary of 

State (28 February 19415).

180. Letter from Secretary of the Navy to the 

Secretary of State (18January 1946).

Notes on Sources

Primary Sources

Although the author cites specific documents 

in his notes, his citations are incomplete in that 

they do not include the location of the documents 

within the T54 holdings. His operational duties and 

the enormity of the task prevent him rectifying the 

omission. It may be stated that all of the primary 

sources cited are contained in the NSA Historical 

Collection (Series IV), and in the records of the 

FBI, FCC, State Department, Coast Guard, and 

Navy. Additional files consulted in the Historical 

Collection include the TICOM records, the German 

clandestine files, and the Roosevelt file. Readers 

who wish to pursue a reference should contact the 

NSA Historian for assistance.

Secondary Sources

Farago, Ladislas, The Game of Foxes, New 

York: David McKay, 1971.

Griffiths, LCDR L. A., GC&CS Secret Service 

SIGINT, Vol. 1: Organization and Evolution of 

British Secret Service SIGINT.

Hilton, Stanley E., Hitler’s Secret War in South 

America, 1939-1945, Baton Rouge: Louisiana 

State University, 1981.

Hinsley, F. H., British Intelligence in World 

War II, Vol 1, London: HMSO, 1979.

Kahn, David, Hitler’s Spies, New York: 

MacMillan, 1978.

Paine, Lauren, German Military Intelligence in 

World War II: The Abwehr, New York: Stein and 

Day, 1984.

Tuchman, Barbara W., The Zimmermann 

Telegram, New York: Viking Press, 1958.
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II
Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

Page 63

PART II–THE CRYPTOLOGY OF THE GERMAN

INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

Table of Contents

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

The Cryptology of the German Intelligence Services . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Code System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67

Monoalphabetic Substitution... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Polyalphabetic Substitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69

Digraphic Substitution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70

Single Transposition: Columnar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70

Single Transposition: Combs and Grilles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..71

Aperiodic Polyalphabetic Substitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74

Single Transposition/Substitution Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

Double Transposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....77

Double Transposition/Substitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

Page 64

The Kryha Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

The Menzer Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

The Coast Guard Solution of Enigma:

 The Commercial Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

The Coast Guard Solution of Enigma:

 The Green Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

The Coast Guard Solution of Enigma:

 The Red Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

The Coast Guard Solution of Enigma:

 The Berlin-Madrid Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

The Coast Guard Solution of Enigma:

 The Hamburg-Bordeau Stecker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

The British Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

Page 65

FOREWORD

The second part of David P. Mowry’s history of German clandestine activity in South America is 

devoted exclusively to descriptions of the cryptographic systems used by the German intelligence organizations and their agents in South America. In fact, this detailed report covers German cryptographic 

systems used on a number of agent circuits in Europe as well. Mr. Mowry’s interesting work invites 

a number of questions about German cryptography. For example, what does this collection of facts 

about these systems tell us about the state of German cryptography during World War II? Were these 

systems on a par with those of the United States, England, Japan, or more or less advanced? Were 

they new, obsolete, innovative, standard? Was there a correlation between the system and the level 

of information? And what of German security procedures and practices? Mr. Mowry has provided a 

valuable service in identifying and describing these systems. Perhaps future historians will attempt the 

challenge of answering these more general questions. It is, however, an excellent companion piece for 

his part one.

Henry F. Schorreck

NSA Historian

[1989]
Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

Introduction

Historical records concerning the exploitation of Axis clandestine traffic in World War II 

are few. The following account depends primarily 

on GC&CS Secret Service SIGINT, Volumes I-III, 

which covers 1928 to 1945; “History of OP-20-GU 

(Coast Guard Unit of the Naval Communications 

Annex),” which covers only 1941 to 30 June 1943 

and is concerned primarily with administrative 

matters rather than the cryptanalytic effort itself; 

and History of Coast Guard Unit #387, 1940-1945. 

Both the Coast Guard and the British Government 

Code & Cipher School (GC&CS) cryptanalytic histories cover the entire war, but consist of series 

of technical reports on the cryptanalytic methods 

used, with little regard for historical continuity, 

and little or no traffic analytic information. In 

addition, there is a file of over 10,000 Coast Guard 

translations of clandestine messages. Because the 

following is a synthesis of all of the above sources, 

footnotes have been omitted except for information 

derived from Colonel Alferd McCormack’s London 

trip report and for the descriptions of the cryptographic machines developed by Fritz Menzer of 

the Abwehr, which are taken from TICOM (Target 

Intelligence Committee) documents. This account 

is not to serve as a course in cryptanalysis, but 

rather as a description of German cryptology. The 

reader is referred to the appropriate histories for 

details of analysis.

Each of the cryptanalytic agencies at this time 

used its own cryptosystem titling and case notation 

conventions. Coast Guard system titles consisted of 

a letter or digraph followed by a digit. The letters 

were “S” for substitution systems, “T” for transposition systems, “ST” for substitution followed by 

transposition, and “TS” for transposition followed 

by substitution. The systems were numbered oneup by type. Case notations consisted of a digit, signifying geographic area, followed by one-up literal 

serialization within area. GC&CS broke the clandestine network down into fifteen groups, notated I to 

XV. Individual links or “services” received a digital 

notation so that, for example, Stuttgart-St. Jean 

de Luz was notated X/290 and Paris-Wiesbaden 

was notated III/20. Unfortunately, no equation 

list for the British notation system has been found. 

Cryptosystems were referred to by the link notation. In the following discussion, terminals will be 

given when known.

Code Systems

On 1 January 1940, messages encrypted with 

a dictionary code were intercepted on the MexicoNauen commercial circuit. Only eleven letters were 

used in the transmission: A, C, E, D, H, K, L, N, R, U, 

and W, with N having the highest frequency. It was 

apparent that a letter-for-number substitution was 

being used, with N as a separator. Anagramming 

the letters gave the result

Thus, the text 

became 

Three other key words were used during the 

effective period of the system. All were easily recovered. All of the 1940-1941 messages in this system were sent with the addresses SUDAMERIAT. 

WEDEKIND, SUDAMERO, or EGMARSUND.

The Cryptology of the German Intelligence Services
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

Similar traffic was sent from Chile to 

BACOCHASE in March 1942, signed by the 

German ambassador to Chile. In these messages 

ten-letter key words were used with the other sixteen letters of the alphabet serving as separators. 

Eventually it was determined that the dictionary 

used was Langenscheidt’s Spanish-German Pocket 

Dictionary. With this discovery all messages were 

completely decrypted.

With the beginning of the war in Europe, the 

Coast Guard was tasked with the collection of commercial circuits between the Western Hemisphere 

and Germany. This collection revealed that many 

Axis-dominated commercial firms in Mexico and 

Central and South America were using enciphered 

commercial codes in their communications with 

Germany.

The largest group of messages in enciphered 

commercial code used the Rudolph Mosse code 

with the letters of each code group transposed 

and a monoalphabetic substitution applied to the 

last two letters of the transposed group. These 

messages used the indicator OPALU as the first 

group of text (A1 group). Traffic was passed to and 

from SUDAMERO and SUDAMERIAT, Mexico; 

SUDAMERIAT, Hamburg; and SUDAMVORST, 

SUDAMERO, and SUDAMERIAT, Berlin.

In August 1941 traffic from SOLINGEN in 

Nauen, Germany, to BOKER in Mexico used the 

same code book with a subtracter of seven applied 

to each letter (i.e., EMUAS became XANTL). Other 

variations were noted: in 1941, MUENCHIMPO, 

Hamburg, used a mixed arrangement of Rudolph 

Mosse and Peterson codes and other links used 

Acme, Peterson, Mosse or Alpha codes either enciphered or in combination with one another.

Three other codes were intercepted, with two 

of them designed for encoding stereotyped weather 

messages. The Dago code (GC&CS terminology), 

used by German ships in the Baltic Sea, encrypted 

figures with a daily-changing key and encoded 

words with a two-letter code. A sliding code was 

used by all of the German trawlers in the Ijmuiden. 

Two sliding strips were used with clear values on 

a fixed table, with single-letter code values on one 

strip and mononome or dinome code values on 

the other. The A1 group of each message gave the 

position of each strip against an index mark and 

the number of characters in the message. Circuit 

II/405’s five-letter code used the International 

Signalbuch with a simple substitution applied to 

the first character of each group.

Monoalphabetic Substitution

Only four monoalphabetic substitution systems were used by the German agent organization. 

The first of these was initially intercepted on the 

England-Germany circuit in October 1940. The preamble consisted of two four-letter and two threeletter groups which contained the date and time 

of encryption, character count, and serial number, 

encrypted with a monoalphabetic letter-for-figure 

substitution. The alphabets used in encrypting both 

the preambles and the messages were derived from 

a disk. There were two parts to the disk, each of 

which carried an alphabet and a series of numbers 

and could be rotated relative to the other. Each 

agent was assigned a fixed key letter. This letter, on 

the inner disk, would be set against the date (mod 

26) on the outer disk. Plain values on the inner 

disk were then encrypted with cipher values from 

the outer disk. The numbers in both the preamble 

and in the text were similarly encrypted. OP-20-G 

interpreted the observed phenomena as a Vigenére 

Square with progress through the square governed 

by the date, with a separate key used to encipher 

numbers in the text. The underlying plain text was 

English. The British were notified and it was later 

learned that they had arrested the agent and taken 

over his station. (Author’s note: This was possibly 

the agent SNOW mentioned in part one.)

Circuit X/203, a ship, used a letter-for-figure 

substitution for encrypting its weather reports 

which consisted entirely of figures. Twelve different keys were used. The preamble consisted of the 

Q-signal QTT followed by a three-letter group. The 
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

first and third letters of this group were the equivalents of one and two, respectively, in the key being 

used.

A third system, referred to by the British as the 

Wigo cipher, was a dinomic substitution without 

variants sent in five-figure groups. The Z1 group 

of the message gave a character count and the Z0 

identified the substitution set. The users of this system were never identified.

The only other monoalphabetic substitution 

system noted, first intercepted on the HamburgCape Spartel circuit in January 1945, was used to 

report convoys spotted off Cape Spartel. The plain 

text was Spanish, and eight substitution systems 

were used in daily rotation.

Polyalphabetic Substitution

A number of links used variations on Gronsfeld 

polyalpbabetic substitution, where all cipher alphabets were direct standard with the offset from the 

plain component determined by a running key. The 

maximum offset, therefore, was nine.

The “French Gronsfelds” used on II/320 and 

II/321 used a fixed 20-long key; while II/335 used 

daily-changing, variable-length keys. No indicators 

were used.

One variation on Gronsfeld cipher was used by 

an agent in England to communicate with his headquarters in occupied France. The system, referred 

to by the British as the Constantinople cipher, used 

the word “Constantinople” to derive the daily key. 

A numerical key was derived in the normal way and 

then multiplied by the date. Thus, for the eighth of 

the month

In October 1941, Rio de Janeiro was intercepted 

using a seven-alphabet Gronsfeld with a key of 

3141592. Since 3141592 is the decimal equivalent 

of the mathematical constant pi, this circuit was 

dubbed “the pi circuit.”

The so-called “Dutch Gronsfelds” were not, 

strictly speaking, true Gronsfelds, since the slide of 

one alphabet against the other could exceed nine 

letters. The term is somewhat justified, however, by 

the fact that the different shifts of the slide used in 

encrypting a message never differed by more than 

nine. The key was periodic, based on the date, with 

two digits always used for the day and one or two 

digits for the month. Thus, 2 March was represented by 023 and 25 December by 2512. These figures 

were converted to letters by a daily-changing key 

to give a three- or four-letter key. In encipherment, 

the first letter of the key in the cipher component 

was aligned with A on the plain component and the 

first letter of text was enciphered; the second letter 

of the key was aligned with A and the second letter 

was enciphered, and so on, repeating the key as 

often as necessary.

All of the above used direct standard alphabets. 

Some other circuits used random mixed alphabets. 

The “Spanish Substitutions” used tables of five 

random cipher alphabets in various ways, while 

the “Bordeaux Substitutions” used tables of five or 

ten alphabets. The BF cipher used a 21-long key to 

encrypt traffic passed on the Nantes-Paris-St.-Jean

-de-Luz circuit. Keys were changed infrequently, 

and the traffic could be identified by the letters 

“BF” in the preamble. The X/203 circuit, mentioned above, used a ten-alphabet substitution for 

traffic other than weather. The starting alphabet 

was indicated by a number in the preamble. That 

alphabet was then used to encipher the first five 

letters; the next alphabet enciphered the next five 

letters, etc., cycling after the tenth alphabet.

Much later, in 1944-1945, the Shanghai-Canton 

circuit used a periodic polyalphabetic system to 

pass information concerning air traffic between 

China and India, United States aid to China, United 
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

States planes and equipment, and information and 

rumors concerning Russia. Each message used five 

alphabets taken from a twenty-four-alphabet Latin 

square. The alphabets to be used in each case were 

indicated by a five-letter A1/Z0 indicator. Each 

alphabet served as both plain and cipher component, offset according to a key derived from the date 

of the message.

Digraphic Substitution

Two digraphic substitution systems were used. 

The first, a double-square Playfair system was 

used according to normal rules. The second used 

a Playfair-like square in which any character from 

the same column as the plain letter could be used 

as a column coordinate and any character from the 

same row as the plain letter could be used as a row 

coordinate. Thus, in the square

 N A T I O

 L S E C U

 R Y G B D

 F H K M P

 O V W X Z

the letter P could be represented by sixteen different digraphs:

OF UF DF ZF OH UH DH ZH 

OK UK DK ZK OM UM DM ZM

As used on the Cologne-Maastricht circuit, the 

letter J was omitted from the square. The key was 

changed monthly, but only one key was broken 

since the traffic had no particular value. On another 

circuit, the underlying plain was in French and the 

letter K was omitted. In this case, ten nontextual 

letters at the beginning of text probably constituted 

a concealed preamble enciphered with a key.

Single Transposition: Columnar

The story of the VVV TEST-AOR circuit has 

already been told in part one. In January 1941, 

when the FBI asked the Coast Guard for assistance 

in the solution of a group of messages, examination 

revealed that they were copies of the traffic being 

relayed from GLENN to AOR through VVV TEST. 

The system was diagnosed as a simple columnar 

transposition and solved. Traffic on the VVV TESTAOR circuit used a 20-wide key. The relay traffic 

turned out to be in two systems: a simple columnar 

transposition using a 16-wide key that was later 

reversed and then replaced by a 23-wide key; and 

a grille transposition which will be described later.

In April 1941 Coast Guard intercept operators 

found another circuit with the same characteristics 

as the VVV TEST-AOR circuit, using the callsigns 

HEW and PYL. The control sounded very much 

like AOR. The A1-A4 groups of the messages, enciphered by a number key, contained date, time, 

and character count. Traffic on this circuit read as 

columnar transposition on a 20-wide key. This key 

was later reversed and still later replaced by another 20-wide key. In June 1941 Hamburg instructed 

the outstation Valparaiso to use the Albatross edition of the novel South Latitude as a key book. In 

the use of this key book, the agent was assigned a 

secret number which, when added to the date and 

the number of the month, designated the page from 

which the number key and transposition key were 

to be extracted. Dummy letters were inserted in 

the plain text according to the transposition key for 

the first 100 letters of text. For example, if the key 

began 18, 20, 15, 11, . . . ., the first dummy character 

was inserted in the 18th position, the second twenty 

letters after that, the third fifteen letters after that, 

etc. In the second 100 letters, the dummies were 

placed so as to reflect those in the first 100, making 

a symmetrical pattern.

The Belgium-France-England circuits were 

similar to the above, except that the keys varied in 

length from circuit to circuit, keys were taken from 

a line of a key page, there were no dummies, and 

the key page was given by an indicator inserted in a 

fixed position in the message.

Two Hamburg-Rio de Janeiro circuits were sister circuits that came up at approximately the 
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

same time. The key books for these circuits were 

the Albatross editions of In the Midst of Life and 

The Story of Bon Michele. On one of these circuits, the agent’s secret number was added to the 

date plus eight times the number of the month to 

determine the page from which the key was to be 

extracted. Traffic on the Bremen-Rio de Janeiro 

circuit had “buried” indicator groups at A4 and 

A6. Breaking these out with a key number gave 

the date, time, two-figure serial number, and twofigure key number.

On the Lisbon-Portuguese Guinea circuit, the 

A10 group contained the key indicator enciphered 

with the key number. Text was inscribed boustrophedonically in columns with dummies at the 

top of columns 1 and 11, in the second position 

in groups 2 and 12, in the third position in 3 and 

13, etc. Long messages were broken into 10-deep 

matrices, each separately transposed. On LisbonLourenco Marques the A8bcd (the middle three letters of the A8 group) constituted the page indicator 

to an unknown book. All columns read downward, 

with dummies at the top of columns 1 and 9, in 

second place in 2 and 10, etc. Messages were transposed in toto, not broken up into multiple matrices. 

On the Lisbon-North America circuit, the indicator 

was in the A5bcd. Key length was 17 and dummies 

were placed at the top of columns 1 and 10, in 

second position in 2 and 11, etc. The dummy pattern was reflected after nine lines. Messages from 

America began with an internal serial number. The 

messages on the Lisbon-Azores circuit carried a 

character count in the preamble with the key page 

given in A-7abc and the dummy pattern identified 

in the A-7de.

In the system used by Stettin-controlled stations, one basic key word provided all the keys. Key 

01 was derived in the normal manner. For subsequent keys the key word was permuted cyclically 

(see figure 1). Key lengths varied considerably from 

circuit to circuit. Dummies were placed according 

to the transposition key as on Hamburg-controlled 

circuits. The preamble gave the key number and 

the character count.

On the Stuttgart-Libya circuit the key word 

appeared in the cipher text inserted one letter at a 

time in prearranged positions, namely,

The preamble gave a character count, the middle or first digit of which gave the position of an 

indicator group. For the purpose of writing in the 

key word, this indicator group counted as a textual 

group, and one of its letters was a letter of the key 

word. The other four letters gave the length of the 

key word enciphered twice, each on a different key 

number.

Single Transposition: Combs and Grilles

The comb transposition system used on 

Cologne-Rio de Janeiro used the “Bluejacket” edition of the King James Version of the Bible as a key 

source. This circuit used daily changing callsigns, 

Fig. 1. Derivation of Stettin transposition keys
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

and the specific indicator for the date of encryption 

was given by including the callsign for that date in 

the preamble. This date determined the page of the 

key book from which the key was extracted.

Page = 30 x number of month x date x 10

The number “10” above was a secret agent number assigned to this agent for the year 1941. It was 

changed to “20” in 1942. This gave a page range of 

41-401 for 1941 and 51-411 for 1942.

Figure 2 illustrates the encryption process using 

Genesis 1:1 as key. Inscribed across the top of’ the 

matrix, the key phrase determined the order of’ 

transposition of columns. Odd-numbered columns 

were extracted from top to bottom, even-numbered 

columns from bottom to top. Written down the left 

side of the matrix, the position of’ each letter of the 

key phrase in the standard alphabet determined the 

length of that line in the matrix.

In the case of’ Hamburg-Sao Paulo, only the 

Hamburg terminal was ever heard, and only five 

messages were read. After the agent involved was 

arrested in 1943, it was discovered that the initial 

key had been INCONSTITUTIONALISAMENTE. 

After contact was established, keys were taken 

from the book Pagel in Glueck. When the agent 

was apprehended, he turned over a copy of The 

Martyrdom of Man, which was to have replaced 

Pagel in Glueck. The key page was determined by 

adding the agent number to the day of the year.

Only six keys were recovered on HamburgLisbon, and the key book, which was in either 

Spanish or Portuguese, was never determined.

Grilles were sheets of cardboard divided into 

squares with some of the squares cut out. Plain text 

was written into the cutout squares horizontally 

and extracted vertically by key. Dummy characters 

were inserted in prearranged squares (see fig. 3a). 

The grille could be used directly or in reverse (i.e., 

turned over) and in any one of four orientations, 

giving eight possible positions for anyone grille.

Late in the autumn of 1940, intercept operators 

collecting the Chapultepec-Nauen ILC circuit intercepted some suspicious traffic from cable address 

VOLCO in Mexico City to BRAJOB in Berlin. These 

cable addresses were later changed to GESIK and 

INTERCIALE. In contrast to the commercial code Fig. 2a. Comb transposition matrix

Fig. 2b. Test after comb transposition
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

traffic usually intercepted on ILC, this traffic was 

evidently transposed German text using low frequency letters as nulls. Further analysis determined that an overlay of some sort, with two sides 

was being used. This overlay had 135 open cells 

(twenty-seven five-letter groups) with certain cells 

marked for the insertion of nulls. In figure 3, lowercase letters are nulls; the plain text is the same as 

in figure 2. Any one of the eight corners of the grille 

(obverse or reverse) could be placed in the upper 

left-hand corner.

Although the system is technically only a single 

transposition, the method effectively prevented 

solution by the normal method of matching columns and anagramming the resulting rows. Since 

there were no stereotyped beginnings or endings in 

this traffic, the solution of single messages of fewer 

than fifty-four groups presented a problem so diff1cult that not all of the messages in this system 

were ever read.

Some traffic in this system was also sent from 

GLENN to AOR via VVV TEST. The system was 

also discovered being used in secret ink messages carried out of Mexico by couriers. These were 

labeled the Max Code by the Germans.

In September 1941 Berlin-Rio de Janeiro 

stopped using simple transposition. The system 

introduced used the same type of indicator as that 

used on the BRAJOB-VOLCO circuit: the A3abc 

identified a key page and the A3d identified the 

upper left corner of the grille. The grille used 

proved to be the same as the BRAJOB-VOLCO 

grille with 125 open cells instead of 135.

Traffic intercepted on the Madrid-West Africa 

circuit also used the 13 X 19 grille, but with 1S6 

open cells; the same size grille as used by Paris had 

140 open cells. The Las Palmas-Cisneros grille was 

only 9 x 13 with 88 open cells, while the grille used 

on the Bulogne-Ostend-Brussels-Lille circuit was 

15 x 21 with 224 open cells.

It is interesting to note the degree of security 

which the German authorities believed this system 

possessed. After the rupture in German-Brazilian 

relations and during the German spy roundup in 

Brazil, German Foreign Office dispatches were sent 

over the Madrid-West Africa circuit in this system, 

when commercial circuits could no longer be used.

Fig. 3a. Grille Transposition Matrix 

(Lower case letters are dummies.)

Fig. 3b. Sample of grille-transposed text
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

Aperiodic Polyalphabetic Substitution

These systems were encountered after the 

roundup of German spies in Brazil. Immediately 

after the Brazilian arrests, two new circuits were 

found which had the transmission characteristics of 

Hamburg-controlled agent communications: daily 

changing callsigns, slow transmission speed, and 

voluminous “ham” chatter. The cipher system used 

was “running key,” i.e., one in which the juxtaposition of two sliding alphabets is determined by a 

continuous aperiodic key, usually taken from a book 

or magazine. It was known that the Germans preferred to equip their agents with systems in which 

the elements could be memorized and used in 

combination with a popular novel or other innocent 

book; and it was hoped that either direct or reverse 

standard alphabets had been employed for the plain 

and cipher components. Such proved to be the case 

and decryption of messages revealed that the new 

circuit was a Hamburg-Chile one, which while it 

did not replace the previous Hamburg-Chile circuit, 

reported the same type of information. Intercepted 

traffic contained information on U.S. equipment 

and ship movements. It was later learned that the 

Spanish book Sonar la Vida was used for the key 

source. The A1-A4 groups contained an enciphered 

preamble, and the AS group usually contained the 

same letter repeated three times. After the system 

had been analyzed and some messages read, it was 

determined that the repeated letter was the reference letter used for sliding the plain and cipher 

components.

The other circuit which appeared in March 1942 

linked Hamburg and Lisbon and passed information concerning the movement of Allied vessels 

to and from Lisbon. The key book in this case was 

eventually identified as the Portuguese novel O 

Servo de Deus. This circuit departed from normal 

agent communications procedures in that it used 

multiple frequencies on multiple schedules. The 

Lisbon terminal was assigned as many as eight 

different frequencies. Later these were changed 

weekly for greater security.

Another user never became fully operative. For 

several months Hamburg repeatedly sent what 

appeared to be seven different encipherments of 

the same two messages. No contact was ever made 

and transmissions usually ceased. In this case the 

plain text was in German with a Portuguese running key.

A new circuit out of Rio de Janeiro began operation in June 1942 using a running-key system. 

Traffic was very irregular and was concerned primarily with administrative matters. Both key and 

plain text were in German, but the book was never 

identified.

On the Stuttgart-St.-Jean-de-Luz circuit the 

preamble gave the character count and the penultimate digit of this number gave the position of 

the indicator. The indicator was five-letter, with 

the “ab” positions giving the page and the “cd” 

positions the line, both enciphered with a letterfor-figure number key. The “e” position identified 

the index letter to be used. Messages with ER in 

the preamble used a German key book to encipher 

German text. Other messages used a Spanish key 

book to encipher Spanish and occasionally German 

text.

A running-key system used in France was sent 

with the indicator in the A1 group in January and 

July, in the A2 group in February and August, etc., 

and in the Z0 group. On some links the key was in 

French. The fixed index letter was “Z.”

Single Transposition/Substitution Systems

Around the end of 1942, the Hamburg-Bordeaux 

circuit used a 16-wide simple columnar transposition in conjunction with a trivial monoalphabetic 

substitution. Long after the fact, it was learned that 

this circuit had used the “Janowski” (see below) 

system with a 16-wide key from July to November 

1942. It had then changed over to the transposition/substitution system, which remained in effect 

until April 1943 when the Janowski encipherment 

was reintroduced, this time with a 22-wide key.
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

In the latter part of February 1943, the FCC 

provided the Coast Guard with intercept of an 

unknown circuit controlled by Hamburg. The traffic, intercepted in November and December t942, 

included three messages of eleven groups each 

which matched two eleven group messages intercepted by the Coast Guard on the same circuit in 

January and February 1943. The Coast Guard had 

already determined that a simple substitution using 

standard alphabets was involved with the resulting 

intermediate plain text transposed. Analysis of the 

five equal-length messages revealed the existence 

of a comb transposition matrix with a 21-l0ng key 

which was finally determined to be Ueb immer 

Treu und Redlichkeit (“always practice loyalty and 

integrity”). The A1 group was the indicator for the 

substitution. Two standard alphabets were juxtaposed so that the A1b was the cipher equivalent 

of the A1a. The outstation on this circuit never 

responded by radio, but was apparently in South 

America.

The system referred to by the British as the 

“Bloodhound Cipher” was used on the BremenBayonne circuit. It was a single transposition system substituted in columns.

The 26-long transposition key was made up of 

twenty-five consecutive letters from a lengthy key 

phrase. The starting point was determined by adding the date and the month.

Substitution was performed after the plain text 

had been written into the transposition matrix, and 

was based on a fixed substitution key,

that is, “G” was the key for column 1, “M” for column 2, etc.

The message key letter to be used was determined by subtracting 2 from the date; thus, on the 

sixth of the month the key letter would be “D,” the 

fourth letter of the alphabet. Two direct standard 

alphabets were used for encipherment with the 

message key letter set against the appropriate letter 

of the substitution key. In this case, “D” plain would 

be set against “G” cipher for column 1. Substitution 

for the 1st, 4th, 7th, 10th, etc. letters of the column 

was normal. For enciphering the 2nd, 5th, 8th, 

etc. letters, the plain component was moved one 

space to the right of the initial setting; and for the 

3rd, 6th, 9th, etc., and the plain component was 

moved one space to the left of the initial setting. For 

instance, if the first column read

setting “D” plain to “0” cipher would give

and the column would be enciphered

After the substitution was performed, columns 

were extracted from the bottom upward. The indicator was in the A3 group with the A3ad being the 

first two letters of the transposition key.

In December 1942 the Royal Canadian Mounted 

Police provided the Coast Guard with the record of 

a German agent named Janowski, who had been 

arrested in Canada in November. Among the materials turned over were two novels which were to be 

used to generate his encryption keys. The agent’s 

E = H

N = R 

X = Z

B = E

W = A

N = P
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

number, 28 in this case, added to the number of 

the month and date, gave the page of the book to 

be used. Messages had a five-group preamble enciphered with two keys: one for the first four groups 

which contained transmission date, time, character 

count, and serial number, and the second for the 

fifth group which contained the date of encryption. 

In this system, the Janowski method (see fig. 4), the 

text was first written horizontally into a transposition rectangle and extracted according to a 20-long 

key derived from the first twenty letters reading 

downward from the top left-hand corner of the page 

for the day (see fig. 4a). Substitution was performed 

on each column separately by means of a substitution key derived from the first twenty letters reading downward from the top left-hand comer of the 

page for the first of the month. The substitution 

key was slid against a stationary standard alphabet 

using as an index the letter in the top left-hand 

corner of the day page. Substitution was column 

by column with the key number corresponding to 

the column number set against the index. In figure 

4c, the strips are set up for enciphering column 1. 

Figure 4d shows a sample substitution.

Subsequently, seven circuits were noted using 

Janowski method with, at most, minor variations 

in indicator placement and encipherment procedure: Hamburg-Spain, Hamburg-Gijon (Spain), 

Hamburg-Madrid, Hamburg-Lisbon, HamburgVigo (Spain), Hamburg-Bordeaux, and HamburgTangier.

On the Hamburg-Spain circuit, Hamburg started by sending two messages. Two days later another two messages were sent. When compared, it was 

obvious that the second transmission was a repeat 

of the first with a different encipherment. Further 

examination revealed that both messages of the 

first transmission tested for substitution, as did the 

second message of the second transmission. The 

first message of the second transmission tested for 

transposition. When the two first messages were 

superimposed, it was found that each segment of 

the transposed version equated to a segment of the 

substituted version. This stripped off the substitution, determined the number of columns, and fixed 

the column lengths, all in one operation. All that 

remained was the anagramming of one message, 

and two keys were recovered simultaneously. This 

constituted one of the worst breaches of communications security encountered by the Coast Guard. 

Unfortunately, no further traffic was passed on this 

circuit.

Only two variations were noted in the use of 

Janowski. Hamburg-Gijon used a constant key 

for a short time before shifting to book key, and 

Fig. 4a. Janowski transposition key

Fig. 4b. Transposition rectangle

Fig. 4c. Substitution Key

Fig. 4d. Substitution
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

Hamburg-Bordeaux used a 16-long key from July to 

November 1942, at which time the circuit changed 

over to the transposition substitution system previously described. In April and May 1943, Hamburg

-Bordeaux again used Janowski, this time with a 

22-wide key.

Two versions of substitution with grille transposition were used. The simpler method used 

three simple substitution tables for the 1st to the 

10th of the month, the 11th to the 20th, and the 

21st to the 31st. Normal grilles were used, but the 

spaces for dummy letters were filled with plain 

text. On the Madrid-San Sebastian circuit, a fivealphabet periodic substitution was applied to the 

plain text which was then written into the grille 

and extracted by key. Later, the plain text was written into the grille and extracted by key, after which 

the substitution was performed. Some of the links 

that used this system used dummies, others did 

not. Indicators were the same as for normal grille 

usage; each circuit had only one substitution table.

Double Transposition

The four circuits using double transposition, 

all in late 1942, were Berlin-Madrid, Berlin-Tetuan 

(Morocco), Berlin-Teheran, and Berlin-Argentina.

The first system of this type the Coast Guard 

successfully solved was intercepted on BerlinMadrid in late 1942. Inspection revealed that the 

A1/A2 and Z1/Z0 groups contained a repeated 

enciphered indicator which deciphered as follows:

1. The first three digits ranged under 400, probably indicating the pages of a book. 

2. The next two digits ranged low enough to be 

a line indicator.

3. The next four digits consisted of two pairs, 

each ranging from 10 to 30.

4. The last digit was not significant.

It seemed obvious that the two dinomes ranging from 10 to 30 were indicators designating the 

length of keys to be selected for a double transposition. A search was made for a message in which the 

length of the text equaled the product of the two 

keys. This constitutes a classic case for solution 

since such a situation nullifies the transposition. 

After initial success in this case, various other cases 

were also solved in which the message lengths bore 

specific relationships to the products of key widths. 

In November 1943 the indicator was reduced to 

one numerical group which the British believed 

designated the page number in the first three digits 

and the line number in the last two. A constant fivefigure group was added to this indicator using noncarrying arithmetic. From the line so determined, 

the first four words were selected as first key, and 

the first four words of the next line were selected as 

second key. Since no solution for the additive was 

ever obtained, no traffic in the newer system was 

ever read.

In traffic on the Berlin-Tetuan circuit, the indicator initially consisted of a single group, giving 

only the date of encipherment. This was sufficient 

because there were only seven keys used for the 

first transposition, one for each day of the week, 

and the key for the second transposition was 

weekly changing. On 1 April 1943 the indicator was 

changed to one similar to the first system used on 

Berlin-Madrid. On 4 November 1943 the indicator was again changed, in the same fashion as 

Berlin-Madrid, and solutions ceased. Keys on this 

circuit were derived from a German translation of 

a British detective story.

In the Berlin-Teheran traffic, the dates were 

sent unencipbered in the preamble. The only other 

possible indicator was a number in the preamble 

which looked like a serial number, but which did 

not run in sequence. Although a few messages were 

solved individually, it was not until the German 

agent in Teheran was caught in the autumn of 1943 

and the record of his interrogation forwarded to 

the Coast Guard that the remainder of the traffic on 

this circuit could be read. The complete literal key 

was the following six-line verse:
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

The month determined the pair of lines from which 

the numerical key was derived; the date determined the number of the letter in this pair of lines 

with which the literal key started; the month then 

determined the minimum number of letters taken 

from this point for the first key; and the month 

finally determined the number or letters transposed from the beginning to the end of the first key 

to give the second key. Figure 5 shows the way in 

which the month controlled the key. It should be 

noted that if after counting the minimum number 

or letters, the end of a word had not been reached, 

the word was completed.

The Berlin-Argentina circuit was actually 

a number of circuits operating in and around 

Buenos Aires, several of them simultaneously. A 

variety of systems were employed on these circuits during the time they were intercepted, but 

double transposition was the only hand system 

used. The first such traffic was transmitted in 

November 1942, but it did not start appearing 

regularly until January 1943. The Coast Guard 

had no success with the system until GC&CS 

solved a 16 March 1943 message and passed the 

keys on to OP-2O-GU. The only apparent indicator was a preamble number similar to that found 

on Berlin-Teheran. The first key was a constant, 

of which four were used: SONDESCHLUESSEL 

(probe key), GASGESELLSCHAFT (gas company), SCHAEFFNER (conductor), and a fourth that 

apparently was the true name of the agent, NOORD. 

This last key was recovered, but the name could not 

be reconstructed. The second transposition key was 

a spell of the three-figure preamble group.

 Double Transposition/Substitution

Three systems involving both double transposition and substitution were introduced in the summer of 1943 after Chief Inspector Fritz Menzer of 

the Cipher Department of the German Army High 

Command was given the job of revamping all clandestine cryptosystems.

The first to appear was the “ABC Key” (see figure 6) which appeared on all Hamburg-controlled Fig. 5. Double transposition: Berlin-Teheran

Wer wagt es Rittersman oder Kaapp [Who will risk it, knight or squire

Zu taugen in diesen Schlund? To faithfully serve in this abyss?

Einen goldenen Becher warf ich hinab I hurl a golden chalice down,

Venrschlungen schon hat ihn der schwarse Mund A black mouth engulfs it all around

Wer mir den Becher kann wieder zigen But whoever makes it again be shown,

Er mag ihn behalten, er ist sein eigen He shall retain it, for it’s his own.]
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

circuits in Europe and Africa. The system used 

double columnar transposition and monoalphabetic substitution with variants. The substitution 

cipher alphabet was a keyword transposition mixed 

sequence and was applied after the message was 

written into the first transposition rectangle. The 

variants were introduced by placing the letter 

E between W and X in the plain component 

for German-language messages and the letter A 

between V and W in Spanish-language messages. 

These alphabets were used without change in the 

first, fifth, and ninth lines of the first transposition 

rectangle. Figure 6 shows how the cipher component was changed for the second, sixth, and tenth 

lines; the third, seventh, and eleventh lines; and the 

fourth, eighth, and twelfth lines.

Substitution alphabets

Keyword Transposition mixed sequence using keyword HIMMELBLAU (sky blue)

First transposition rectangle

Substitution

Second transposition rectangle

Transposition rectangles for December 18 (12/18). Text is inscribed horizontally into the first 

rectangle, substitution is made; the resulting text is inscribed horizontally into the second 

rectangle, and extracted according to the ABC key.

Fig. 6
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

The transposition key was 31-long, usually an 

easily remembered phrase or compound word. In 

the first rectangle, all first row squares to the left 

of the column whose key number was the same 

as the date of encipherment were blocked out and 

the plain text started in that column. In the second 

rectangle, the column corresponding to the date 

and all first row squares to the left of the column 

corresponding to the month were blocked out, and 

the text was started in the latter column. If the 

two numbers were the same, then the column was 

not blocked out in the second rectangle, and both 

rectangles were the same. Figure 6 also shows two 

rectangles prepared for the substitution and transposition.

The major weakness of the system was that 

once a message was completely solved, all traffic 

enciphered on the same basic phrase was readable 

and keys remained in effect for three to six months.

At about the same time that the ABC Key was 

introduced on the Hamburg circuits, other forms 

of combined double transposition and substitution 

were introduced on the Berlin-controlled circuits. 

Descriptions of only two of these, Procedure 62 and 

Procedure 40, are available.

Procedure 62 used a 31-long key in which the 

key phrase was written out in two lines. The first 

line of sixteen characters had a space after each 

letter, with the spaces numbered from 1 to 15. The 

second line was started in the space corresponding to the number of the month of encryption 

and wrapped around. The following illustrates 

the procedure, using the phrase LA MUJER MAS 

HERMOSA EN ESPANA DEL SUR for the month 

of April.

The two lines were then merged

and the numerical key derived in the usual manner.

In the first transposition rectangle, the column 

immediately to the left of the number corresponding to the date was blocked out, as were all squares 

to the left of this column on the first line. In the second rectangle the column was not blocked out, but 

the same first row squares were. A trivial substitution was applied to the text in the first rectangle to 

camouflage the letters A and E.

This four-line cycle was repeated throughout the 

message.

Procedure 40 was used on the Madrid-Ceuta 

circuit as a back-up system to the cipher machine 

normally used. In this procedure substitution took 

place before the first transposition. Both transposition and substitution used the same key phrase. 

For substitution, a keyword mixed sequence 

derived from the key phrase, in this example 

DONDE MENOS SEPIENSA SALTA LA LIEBRA, 

was written into a 5x5 square omiting the letter J.
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

The plain text was divided into five-letter 

groups and the following substitution was made 

group by group:

The letter J was left plain in all positions. Thus, 

MESSAGE would become ZMTLA TM....

In the first transposition rectangle all squares 

in the first line to the left of the number corresponding to the date of encipherment were blocked 

out. In the second rectangle, the same was done to 

the first line squares to the left of the number corresponding to the month of encipherment.

The Kryha Machine

The Kryha machine was a 

clockwork-powered mechanical running key encipherment 

device. Two alphabets were 

on movable tabs so that the 

sequences of the plain component and the cipher component 

could be changed at will. The 

movement of the cipher alphabet disk was controlled by a 

cogwheel with sixty-two holes 

around the edge. A plunger on 

the end of a lever served as a 

detent by dropping into each of 

the holes in succession. These 

holes could be individually covered, thus changing the wheel 

pattern, and varying the “kick” 

with each step of the wheel. The 

total kick in one full revolution 

was prime to 26 so that the period of the machine was equal 

to 26 times the total kick. The cryptovariables of 

the system were therefore the plain sequence, the 

cipher sequence, the wheel pattern, the initial setting of the cogwheel, and the initial setting of the 

cipher sequence against the plain sequence. The 

last two variables were changed with each message, 

the others less frequently.

A pair of indicators, enciphered with a multivalued number key gave the alphabet setting (the 

number of the cipher letter set against O plain) in 

the “ab” positions, and the cogwheel setting in the 

“de” positions. The “c” position was a filler.

The first letter was replaced by the letter above it in the square.

The second letter was replaced by the letter to its right in the square.

The third letter was replaced by the letter below it in the square.

The fourth letter was replaced by the letter to its left in the square.

The fifth letter was left plain.

The clockwork-driven Kryha, a popular German-made cipher 

machine that was widely used commercially in the 1930s
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

The Menzer Device

When Chief inspector Menzer had been tasked 

by Admiral Canaris with testing the security of the 

Abwehr cryptosystems in 1942, he found them 

depressingly inadequate. In addition to the ABC 

Key, Procedure 40, and Procedure 62, he introduced the cipher plate and the cipher wheel as field 

agent cipher devices, and Cipher Device 41 for use 

by Abwehr nets within Germany.1

The cipher plate was designed by Menzer specifically for agent use. It consisted of a circular 

box about the size of a shoe polish can containing 

three resettable notched wheels and a spring. On 

the top a mixed alphabet could be written with 

pencil or grease pencil, thirteen characters on the 

fixed ring and thirteen on the moveable ring. The 

disk was rotated to wind the spring for encipherment. Pressing a button on the side would release 

the disk and allow it to rotate until stopped by the 

notch rings. If the disk stopped in a position where 

its letters were in phase with those on the outer 

ring, the cipher value was read directly. If the stop 

was in an intermediate position, the number of the 

line opposite the plain value would be read, and the 

cipher value taken from the cell with that number.2

The cipher wheel was another hand-operated 

cipher device designed for agent use. It was made 

up of two disks mounted concentrically. The lower 

disk had fifty-two notches or holes around its edge 

into which a pencil or stylus could be inserted to 

turn the disk. On the face of the disk were fiftytw0 cells into which a keyword-mixed alphabet 

could be inscribed twice, clockwise. The upper 

disk had a direct standard alphabet inscribed on 

half of its periphery, next to a semicircular window 

that revealed twenty-six characters of the mixed 

sequence on the lower disk. The upper disk also 

had a notch cut into its edge which exposed ten 

of the holes on the lower disk. This notch had the 

numbers 0 to 9 inscribed next to it, in a counterclockwise direction, so that when the exposed holes 

were lined up with the numbers, the letters on the 

lower disk were lined up with the letters on the 

upper disk.

Menzer device
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

Various methods of key generation were used. 

On Chilean circuits an eleven-letter key word was 

numbered as for a transposition key, with the first 

digit of two-digit numbers dropped. The key was 

extended by appending a two-digit group count 

and a four-digit time group:

A N T O F O G A S T A

1 6 0 7 4 8 5 2 9 1 3 1 2 1 4 4 0

On other circuits a Fibonacci sequence of 100-

125 digits would be generated through various 

manipulations of the date, time, and agent number. 

If the message was longer than the key, the latter 

would be reversed as many times as necessary. Key 

generation tables were also used.

The key constituted the input to an autoclave. 

After the alphabets were aligned according to an 

indicator in the message, a stylus was inserted in 

the hole corresponding to the first key digit, and 

the lower disk was rotated clockwise until the stylus 

was stopped by the end of the notch. The plaintext 

letter was then found on the upper disk, and its 

cipher value was read off of the lower disk. The 

stylus was then placed in the hole, corresponding 

to the second digit of key, and the same procedure 

was repeated for the second letter of text. Thus the 

true key at any point in the cipher was equal to the 

sum of all the previous key inputs.3

The Cipher Device 41 was a cipher machine 

invented by Menzer in 1941 which was based on 

Menzer Device SG-41–A successful encipherment system, 

but of limited use due to its heavy weight
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

Hagelin encipherment but included a mechanism 

for variably stepping the Hagelin wheels. The 

Cipher Device 41 had six pin wheels that were 

mutually prime. The first five wheels had kicks of 1, 

2, 4, 8, and 10, respectively; the sixth wheel made 

these kicks positive or negative. The enciphering 

cycle (encipherment of one letter) consisted of 

three elements:

1. This took place if and only if the sixth key 

wheel had an active pin in the “motion index position.” If this were the case, then all of the following 

occurred: Wheel 1 moved one step, and each of the 

remaining four wheels moved one step unless the 

wheel to its left had an active pin in the “motion 

index position,” in which case it would move two 

steps.

2. A key kick was generated which was the sum 

of the kicks of wheels which had active pins in the 

“kick index position.” If, however, the sixth wheel 

had an active pin in the “kick index position,” the 

key kick would be twenty-five minus the sum of 

all of the other kicks. In other words, under such 

a circumstance, the key would complement itself.

3. This was identical to Step 1, except that it 

occurred whether or not Wheel 6 had an active pin 

in the “motion index position.” In this step, Wheel 

6 also stepped one or two positions, depending on 

the state of Wheel 5.

The original specifications called for a lightweight, durable machine to be used by military 

units forward of division. Menzer designed it to 

provide a cipher tape and to be keyboard-operated 

to improve the speed of encipherment. As a result 

of the keyboard operation, he was able to redesign 

the arrangement of letters on the print wheels to 

flatten the cipher frequency count.4

Because of the wartime shortages of aluminum 

and magnesium, the machine ended up weighing 

between twelve and fifteen kilograms, too heavy 

for field use. Removal of the keyboard would have 

lightened the machine, but the redesign of the 

print wheels prevented their being used directly for 

encipherment. Production stopped because no one 

knew what to do. About 1,000 machines had been 

constructed and were distributed to the Abwehr 

which began using them on circuits within Europe 

in 1944.5

GC&CS read a number of Cipher Device 41 

messages through depth reading techniques, but 

even after some of the machines had been captured 

and examined, no one could postulate a theory 

of cryptanalytic attack. A 1947 WDGAS-71 report 

stated that if a mechanically reliable machine 

could be built embodying the same principles as 

the Cipher Device 41, it would undoubtedly be a 

valuable asset. The report noted that because of the 

key complementing characteristic of the machine, 

statistical tests did not seem to offer any particular 

promise for solution.6

The Coast Guard Solution of Enigma: The 

Commercial Machine

In January 1940 Coast Guard intercept operators collected a suspicious circuit using the calls 

MAN V NDR, RDA V MAN, and the like, transmitting one to five encrypted messages a day. It soon 

became apparent that all messages intercepted 

were in flush depth, although the method of encipherment was as yet unknown.

Attempts to solve the first twenty or thirty messages in depth met with no success because of badly 

garbled copy and lack of any definite evidence as 

to the underlying language. By the time sixty or 

seventy messages had accumulated, however, it 

seemed certain that the language was German and 

that a word separator had been used.

In the progressive development of the plain 

cipher equivalences for each position of the depth, 

it was observed that no plain letter was represented 

by itself in the cipher text and that the plain cipher 

equivalences within each alphabet were reciprocal. 

This, together with the language, seemed ample 

justification for assuming that the traffic had been 
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

encrypted on an Enigma cipher machine. The 

Coast Guard Intelligence Unit had a model of the 

commercial version of the machine together with 

the original manufacturer’s instructions and suggestions for its use. These instructions included the 

practice of using “X” as a word separator, and of 

representing numbers by their equivalent letters as 

shown on the keyboard of the machine:

 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0

 Q W E R T Z U I O P

After almost fully recovering the first thirty-two 

alphabets, the Coast Guard cryptanalysts developed a technique for stripping off the effect of the 

reflector and then of successive wheels, resulting in 

a complete solution of the machine with all wirings. 

The wiring recovered in this solution later proved 

to be known wiring, but the Coast Guard recovery 

of wiring assumed to be unknown was achieved 

without prior knowledge of any solution or technique. This is believed to be the first instance of 

Enigma wiring recovery in the United States. It 

should be noted that the initial approach to the 

problem was an adaptation of the procedure used 

in the solution of the Hebern machine.

From the equivalent wirings of the two outside 

wheels, the Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) identified them as the actual ones furnished in the old 

commercial Enigma machine, and the Navy later 

identified the traffic as Swiss army. With respect 

to the numbers on the actual wheels, the wheel 

order used was 1-3-2 (left to right, as one faced the 

machine).

The Coast Guard Solution of Enigma: The 

Green Machine7

A station using the call TQI2 was first heard 

on 10 October 1942 on 10,415 kHz. The station 

sent calls only up to 30 October, when a message was intercepted. The message preamble was 

2910/301/66. TQI2 was believed to be linked with 

Enigma with extra rotors
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

a station using the call TIM2 on 11,310 kHz. On 

12 November 1942, it was learned from bearings 

taken by the FCC that TQI2 was in Europe and 

TIM2 was in South America. This was confirmed 

by the Radio Security Service (RSS) at a radio 

intelligence meeting on 17 November on the basis 

of Hamburg-Bordeaux traffic which was being 

read by GC&CS. The Bordeaux terminal had been 

instructed to monitor the circuit and to assist in 

case of difficulty. Station TQI2 also used the call 

RSE, which was believed to be the alternate control 

in Bordeaux.

During October and December 1942, twentyeight messages were intercepted from TQI2. This 

series of messages had several duplicate message 

numbers (two 315s, three 316s, etc.) The messages 

were tested for depth and, although the coincidence rate was definitely above random, it was 

rather poor. It was assumed, therefore, that most of 

the messages were encrypted on the same key, but 

that the duplicate message numbers were possible 

evidence of different keys. Actually, all messages 

turned out to have been encrypted on the same 

key. The poor coincidence rate was a result of the 

inclusion of several practice messages in the series. 

These practice messages contained a short text at 

the beginning and were filled out to average length 

with dummy text.

The lessons learned from solving the commercial Enigma were applied, together with the 

improved techniques learned from the British, 

and the machine was solved. Wheel motion patterns were similar to the Enigmas used by German 

agents in Europe which had been solved by the 

British prior to the appearance of TQI2. Decrypted 

texts showed that the circuit was between Berlin 

and Argentina.

On 11 January 1943 messages were transmitted with external serial numbers 322-328. It was 

possible to align these in depth by stepping each 

successive message one position to the right, producing a ten-letter repeat in messages 322 and 

327. The complete plain text was quickly reconstructed. Two later sets of messages sent in June 

and July confirmed the method used on this circuit 

for determining monthly ring settings and normal 

positions.

The Coast Guard Solution of Enigma: The 

Red Machine

The first mention of this machine appeared 

in message number 145 from Argentina to Berlin 

on 4 November 1943. This message was sent on 

the “Green” circuit and encrypted on the “Green” 

Enigma. The message read

On the same day, the “Red” section sent message number 989 stating that an additional Enigma 

machine had arrived. This message had been 

encrypted with the Kryha machine which the Coast 

Guard had solved.

On 5 November 1943, Berlin sent message 

number 585 to the “Green” section in Argentina:

RE YOUR 145: NEW ENIGMA IS INTENDED FOR 

RED ONLY.

The following day, Berlin sent message number 

917 to the “Red” section:

INTERN 86. THE NEW ENIGMA WHICH ARRIVED 

TOGETHER WITH TRUNK TRANSMITTER IS FOR 

RED. IT IS A BIRTHDAY SURPRISE FOR LUNA.

On the same day, 6 November, the “Red” 

section in Argentina sent message number 991 

requesting a key for the new Enigma, asking that 

it be sent via the “Blue” key (unsolved) and not via 

the “Red” Kryha key. The message went on to say 

THE TRUNK TRANSMITTER WITH ACCESSORIES AND 

ENIGMA ARRIVED VIA RED. THANK YOU VERY MUCH. 

FROM OUR MESSAGE 150 WE SHALL ENCIPHER 

WITH THE NEW ENIGMA. WE SHALL GIVE THE 

OLD DEVICE TO GREEN. PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE BY 

RETURN MESSAGE WITH NEW ENIGMA. 

 [s] LUNA
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

that they were constantly making a fundamental 

blunder in transmitting a new key by means of the 

old one.

Berlin replied to this message on 9 November, 

asking the “Red” section to be patient for a few 

more days until a key for the new Enigma could be 

forwarded.

At this point there ensued a considerable 

amount of confusion regarding methods of transmission of key, settings for the “Red” Enigma, 

and settings for the “Red” Kryha, all of which was 

finally resolved by 14 December. Once the Germans 

got their encryption procedures squared away, the 

Coast Guard solved the “Red” Enigma by normal 

methods.

The Coast Guard Solution of Enigma: The 

Berlin-Madrid Machine

About 5 May 1944, the Berlin-Madrid circuit 

stopped using double transposition and began 

using Enigma. An examination of the traffic on a 

single day revealed that messages from the same 

transmitting agent could be superimposed in depth 

by use of the time group. For example, a message 

having a preamble encipherment time of 1410 

would be in phase with a message encrypted at 

1400 hours from the eleventh letter of the latter 

message. This was similar to one method previously encountered on the Berlin-Argentina circuit, 

where a secret daily-changing number was added 

to the encryption time and the machine was then 

stepped that number of positions forward from the 

basic key for the day.

After determining the indicator system being 

used, the various Enigmas used by the Security 

Service group, of which the Berlin-Madrid circuit 

was a part, were considered. Only four machines 

had been employed by this group: the “Green,” 

the “Red,” a combination of “Red” wheels and a 

“Green” reflector, and the so-called “M” machine. 

Assuming that the traffic was encrypted on one 

of the known machines, a considerable time was 

expended on guesses in depth (the depth of any 

series of messages was never enough to yield a 

solution by that method alone) followed by running 

menus on the sliding GRENADE and checking the 

resulting hits in the uncribbed depth.

This method eventually read the system on a 

depth of twelve. The successful cribs were easily 

expanded and the full text recovered. The machine 

involved employed the “Red” wheels and the 

“Green” reflector. The only other time this type of 

usage was encountered was when the instructions 

for the “Red” machine were first sent to Argentina.

The Coast Guard Solution of Enigma: The 

Hamburg-Bordeaux Stecker

In the period immediately preceding the change 

from hand to machine system, several HamburgBordeaux messages were solved which proved to 

be reencipherments of unidentified cipher texts. 

These had a short plaintext internal preamble giving a serial number, letter count, and a cover name 

to identify the encrypted traffic.

An analysis of the plain texts of messages 

encrypted in the old system showed that some type 

of radio intercept activity was involved. From this 

information it was deduced that the Bordeaux end 

of the circuit acted as a sort of monitoring and relay 

station which listened in to certain outstations for 

the Hamburg control and furnished Hamburg with 

the texts of outstation messages which Hamburg 

had failed to receive.

Further information was secured through a 

reencryption sent by Bordeaux. Ten groups of a 

message were sent; the transmission was interrupted and later a message was sent which repeated 

the ten groups with some of the letters changed. 

The changed letters had been substituted in a 

manner which suggested that a stecker had been 

employed and that one or perhaps two wires had 

been improperly plugged. The combination of the 

stecker and the three-letter indicator found on the 
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

traffic strongly suggested the use of the German 

Service wheels.

The next step in the analysis was the identification of the traffic reencrypted in the last days of 

the old hand system. This proved to be traffic from 

the FBI-controlled Hamburg-New York circuit. 

By examining message lengths and transmission 

times, it was then possible to find days on which 

Bordeaux had reencrypted New York traffic by 

machine and relayed it to Hamburg. Correct message placement supplied cribs which were tried on 

the Bombe and the machine was solved. It proved 

to be using Service wheels 1, 2, and 3 with a fixed 

“Bruno” reflector and adapter.

From a security standpoint, the conditions 

under which this circuit operated exhibited an 

almost complete abandonment of good cryptographic practices. Not only did the Germans use 

their most secure cryptomachine to retransmit 

low-grade traffic, but the settings used were those 

employed on Spanish Abwehr nets. Furthermore, 

there were indications that the Germans were 

aware that the New York circuit was controlled –

yet the reencryption of this low-grade traffic was 

permitted. This was also the only example known 

to the Coast Guard of the Service machine being 

employed for clandestine traffic.

The British Effort

Clandestine traffic worked by the British fell 

into three cryptographic segments called ISK (Illicit 

Series Knox), ISOS (Illicit Services Oliver Strachey) 

and ISTUN (Illicit Series TUNNY). Two sections at 

Bletchley Park were solely engaged on clandestine: 

Section ISK was wholly cryptanalytic, and Section 

ISOS did crypt work on all traffic other than ISK 

and ISTUN. ISOS also was the intelligence and distributing center for the entire clandestine output. 

ISTUN was broken by the TUNNY Section under 

Pritchard which handled all TUNNY traffic including clandestine.8

Bletchley Park
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

As of mid-1943, the ISK Section had the use 

of one to two Bombes, but most of the work was 

done by hand, and the Bombes were used only for 

research and particularly difficult keys. The solutions were entirely based on probable word and 

cribs were frequently derived from ISOS traffic. 

The solution of a key usually took one to three days, 

but was often much faster if demanded, as in the 

case of Spanish traffic during the Mediterranean 

operations.9

The traffic intake was about 350 messages per 

day, of which about 300 were read. Much of the 

unreadable traffic was too garbled; the Norwegian 

keys were especially difficu1t. Spanish Morocco 

used the commercial type Enigma, but all the 

other ISK machines were uniform except the ParisCanaries circuit, which had its own wiring. ISK was 

used mostly by important Abwehr stations in RSS 

groups II, XIII, XIV, and VII/23. It was estimated 

that the coverage of Spanish ISK was 95 percent 

complete, Balkans 75 percent, Berlin to Turkey 80 

percent, and 90 percent for group VII/23. After the 

messages were broken, they were sent to the ISOS 

Section for translating and distribution.

The ISK machine was introduced at the end 

of 1940 and was first broken by the British on 

Christmas Day, 1941.10

The ISOS Section was established at the end of 

1939 and by mid-1943 was reading about 150 illicit 

radio circuits. The traffic consisted of a wide variety 

of transposition and substitution ciphers, with the 

traffic usually in German but including considerable Spanish and French and occasionally many 

other languages. All RSS groups, except VIII, XII, 

XIV, and XVI carried only Abwehr traffic. Groups 

VIII and XVI were Italian Secret Intelligence and 

were not handled by ISOS but by Bletchley Park’s 

The Bombe, named for the loud ticking sound it made during operation
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

Research Section. Group XIII was ISK and ISOS 

traffic of the Security Service; Group XIV carried 

Abwehr traffic, both ISK and ISOS and diplomatic 

traffic. Group XIII ISOS traffic was double transposition. Groups I and XV used simple transposition; 

Group XIV ISOS, included a variety of substitution 

and double transposition.11

In 1943 the average daily ISOS traffic intake 

was 150-200 messages per day. All incoming traffic 

was sorted in the ISOS Section Registry Room into 

RSS groups and sent to the appropriate sections, 

all three of which sent their decodes back to the 

ISOS Registry Room, which handed decodes to the 

Watch Room. The Watch Room ran twenty-four 

hours, with eight people usually on duty except on 

the graveyard shift when there was only one. The 

Watch Room translated and amended the texts, 

which were often severely garbled. Messages then 

went to typists who made sixteen English copies and also German copies for certain users. The 

Watch Room kept a file of recent back traffic in 

German, and the Registry Room kept a complete 

back file in English. As of June 1943, GC&CS had 

produced 115,000 clandestine serial numbers, of 

which a little over half were ISOS type. One serial 

number frequently contained one or several messages, averaging about two per serial number. 

During 1942 GC&CS produced 61,267 serial numbers, and the daily average rose from 101 to 209. 

ISOS, ISK, and ISTUN were circulated twice daily 

(each in a separate series) to MI6, to the three 

service ministries, to MI5 and RSS. Group XIII 

was circulated separately twice daily, under the 

title “ISOSICLE,” to the same recipients, plus the 

London Office of the Chief of the Secret Service. 

In addition, the following special series were circulated:

1. ISMEW traffic from the Bilbao-Biarritz circuit, covering the movements of ore boats, went to 

MEW in addition to usual customers;

2. ISBA, containing all messages referring to 

British agents abroad, went only to MI-6;

3. TUNNY traffic, referring to DF of British 

transmitters, went only to MI-8;

4. Paris to Stuttgart traffic, referring to White 

Russians who listened in on Paris to Russian radio 

telephone conversations, was circulated only to the 

office of CSS;

5. Norwegian traffic went to the usual customers; and

TUNNY
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

6. The Intelligence Branch of ISOS kept indexes 

of persons and places; studied organization of the 

Abwehr and Security Service, abbreviations, vocabulary, and cover names. It studied ISOS for cribs 

into ISK and both for cribs into Enigma or other 

traffic. It maintained liaison with the recipients of 

the output and studied the entire output for the 

benefit of the section as a whole.12

In 1943 most of the ISOS traffic was in Groups 

II and VII, with a considerable amount in Group I, 

and a little in Group III. The principal topics of the 

messages were13

1. Chetnik and Partisan operations in Yugoslavia;

2. Naval observations from Spain and Portugal 

of Iberian harbors, Gibraltar, and the Eastern 

Mediterranean;

3. Agents reports from Spanish Morocco on the 

situation in North Africa;

4. Military developments in Turkey and the 

Near East, including disposition of Turkish forces 

and arrivals of British missions;

5. Red Cross activities in Greece;

6. Ship movements in the North Sea and of the 

Scandinavian coast;

7. Military intelligence about Russian troop 

movements;

8. General arrangements for carrying on espionage;

9. Slipping agents through to their destination;

10. Administrative;

11. Service messages on radio communications 

and use of ciphers.

Almost all ISK traffic was in Groups II and XIV 

and occasionally Group VII. The principal subjects 

were14

1. Naval observations from Spain and Spanish 

Morocco; 

2. Administrative;

3. Naval observations in the Near East;

4. British troop movements in the Near East;

5. Military activity in Turkey;

6. Naval activity in the Black Sea;

7. Partisan and Chetnik warfare in Yugoslavia;

8. Organization of communists in Yugoslavia;

9. Slipping agents into Turkey;

10. Russian military movements;

11. Conditions in Iran;

12. Military supplies from the Allies to Turkey;

13. Inquiries about the loyalty and reliability of 

individuals.

ISTUN traffic was not intercepted by RSS but 

by the non-Morse intercept station at Knockholt 

and, therefore, did not carry RSS group numbers 

but was entirely Abwehr traffic. The great bulk of 

the messages was between Berlin and Greece and 

included much information on suspected individuals, some messages on German propaganda to Arab 

countries, and a little on enterprises of Branch 11.15

ISOSICLE messages were transmitted between 

Berlin and Lisbon, Istanbul, Sofia, Madrid, 

Bucharest, Helsinki, Switzerland, Budapest, 

Tetuan, Paris, Marseilles, and unknown locations. 

This was traffic of the Security Service, and was 
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

very different from Abwehr traffic, much more diplomatic and political. The principal topics were16

1. The Finnish political situation;

2. Finnish broadcasts to Estonia embarrassing 

to the Germans because of “underlying democratic 

ideology” and because the Germans had forbidden 

the Estonians to listen to foreign radio;

3. Italian activities in Corsica, which seemed 

to foreshadow Italian attempt at colonization and 

annexation;

4. Jewish problem in Bulgaria;

5. The troubles of the American army in Algiers;

6. Economic warfare plans;

7. Administrative;

8. Communications service.

The reliability of information contained in 

Abwehr and Security Service traffic varied widely, 

from completely inaccurate to substantially accurate. Intelligence reports were often prepared by 

paid agents and had to be assessed in that light.17

Notes

1. 79/49/TOPSEC/AS-14, TICOM DF.174, “Description of Contacts of Fritz Menzer with American and 

Soviet Authorities and Summary of Career,” 21.

2. 79/49/TOPSEC/AS-14, 33: and 33/51/TOPSEC/

AFSA-14, R-2, “Schlueuelscheibe 50” (May 1951).

3. LCDR L.A. Griffiths, RNVR, GC&CS Secret Service 

SIGINT, Vol. III, 111-15. 

4. WDGAS-14’s European Axis Signal Intelligence 

in World War II as Revealed by TICOM Investigations 

and Other Prisoner of War Interrogations and Captured 

Material, Principally German, Vol. II, 29. 

5. Ibid., 29.

6. TICOM DF-19, “Cipher Device-41” (10 January 

1944); Memorandum from Frank W. Lewis, WDGAS71, to COL Solomon Kullback, WDGAS-70, “Study of the 

C-41 Cipher Device” (4 March 1947), and GC&CS Secret 

Service SIGINT, Vol. II, 166-171.

7. The descriptives “Red” and “Green” were applied 

by traffic analysts to Enigma to designate different circuits serving two different groups of agents. In addition, 

the setups on the two machines differed.

8. COL Alfred McCormack’s report on his trip to 

London, May-June 1943, 42. 9. Ibid., 42-43.

10. Ibid., 43.

11. Ibid., 44-45.

12. Ibid., 44-47.

13. Ibid., 47-48.

14. Ibid., 48-49.

15. Ibid., 49.

16. Ibid., 49-50.

17. Ibid., 50
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

Glossary

(Applies to Parts I and II)

Abteilung Branch

Abwehr Counterintelligence

Abwehrleitstelle (A1st) Counterintelligence Control Post

Abwehrstelle (Ast) Counterintelligence Post

Allgemeine SS General SS

Amt Department

Grundstellung Setting

Gruppe Group

Hauptabteilung Bureau

Krieporganization (KO) Combat Organization

Meldekopf'(MK) Message Center

Nebenstelle (Nest or Anst) Branch Post

Oberinspektor Chief Inspector

Oberkommando Wehrmacht (OKW) High Command of the Armed Forces

Oberkommando des Heeres Army High Command

Reich The nation

Reichsfuehrer Leader of the Reich

Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) Reich Security Administration

Schluesselgeraet Crypto Device

Schluesselrad Cipher Wheel
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Cryptologic Aspects of German Intelligence Activities in South America during World War II

Schluesselscheibe Cipher Plate

Schutzstaffel (SS) The SS, Blackshirts (lit., “Protection Squad”)

Sicherheitsdienst (SD) Security Service

Sicherheitspolizei (SiPo) Security Police

Sondeschluessel Probe Key

Unternehmen (Special) Operations

Verfahren Procedure

Wehrkreis Military District

Zahlschluessel Key Number
This publication presents a historical perspective 

for informational and educational purposes, is 

the result of independent research, and does not 

necessarily reflect a position of NSA/CSS or any 

other U.S. government entity.

This publication is distributed FREE by the National 

Security Agency. If you would like additional copies, 

please submit your request to:

Center for Cryptologic History

National Security Agency

9800 Savage Road, Suite 6886

Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6886

Cover Photos: 

1) The headquarters of the Reich Security Administration’s foreign 

intelligence operations (Department VI), Berlin

2) The ENIGMA served as the standard cipher machine for Germany’s 

military, its agents, and its secret police.
n52268