No. 84-59 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1984 

IN RE THE lJlARRLAGE OF 

ALICE BURKART SUMMERFELT, 

Petitioner and Appellant, 

and 

DONALD A. SUMMERFELT, 

Respondent and Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial ilistrict, 

In and for the County of Lewis & Clark, 

The Honorable Arnold Olsen, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Skedd, Ashley, McCabe, Weingartner & Graveley; 

Charles Graveley, Helena, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Harlen, Thompson & Parish; Shaun R. Thompson, 

Helena, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: May 17, 1984 

Decided: September 18, 1984 

Filed: $EP 1 6 1904 

---- Clerk 
Mr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the 

Court. 

This case comes on appeal from a decree of the 

District Court of the First Judicial District, Lewis and 

Clark County, distributing the parties' marital assets. We 

reverse. 

The parties to this action were married on May 11, 

1963, at Townsend, Montana. At the time of the marriage, 

the wife owned a ranch near Townsend (hereinafter referred 

to as the Townsend ranch) consisting of 3,880 acres which 

the parties have stipulated was worth $185,000. In 

addition, the wife had purchased 120 acres of additional 

ranchland, known as the Cooney property, for $8,000. Also, 

at the time of the marriage, the wife owned approximately 

170 head of various livestock, a 1/3 interest in three 

rental houses in Billings valued at $7,000, household 

furniture and crops in storage. 

Prior to the marriage, the husband had worked as a 

heavy equipment operator and at the time of the marriage he 

was employed as a business manager for the International 

Union of Operating Engineers at Butte. At the time of the 

marriage, the husband owned a house in Helena valued at 

$13,500, subject to a debt of $7,791.07, other vehicles and 

a trailer collectively valued at $4,900. The District Court 

found that the husband and wife mutually decided that the 

husband quit his employment as a business manager for the 

union and that they would operate the wife's Townsend ranch, 

although the wife testified that the husband quit his job 

after the lessee of the ranch surrendered his lease a year 

early due to a dispute with the husband. 
The wife asserts that her net worth at the time of the 

marriage was $425,618 and the husband's was $12,355.07. 

Although the husband disagrees with the amount the wife 

asserts was her net worth, the record clearly indicates the 

wife brought substantially more property into the marriage 

than did the husband. 

On January 23, 1975, the Townsend ranch was sold under 

a contract for deed to the wife's daughter and son-in-law, 

the Henleys, for $100,000 with a life estate reserved for 

the husband and wife. The wife also reserved the right to 

run fifty head of cattle on the ranch. The parties also 

accumulated funds in various bank accounts during the 

marriage which are not at issue in this appeal. 

In 1977, the parties separated when the wife filed a 

petition for dissolution which was subsequently dismissed. 

Thgreafter, the wife, in an effort towards reconciliation, 

added the husband as a joint tenant owner of the Cooney 

property. 

On May 16, 1980, the wife petitioned the District 

Court for a decree of dissolution. At that time the wife 

was 68 and the husband 60. On November 18, 1982, the 

District Court determined that the Townsend ranch was not a 

marital asset but that the value of the contract for deed 

and the life estate reserved under the contract were marital 

assets to be distributed. On July 12, 1983, the District 

Court granted the decree of dissolution and on November 23, 

1983, it entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law 

and decree regarding distribution of the marital assets. In 

its findings of fact the District Court stated, in pertinent 

part: that both parties worked hard during the marriage and 
made numerous improvements to the ranch; that the value of 

the contract for deed was the principal balance owing in the 

sum of $100,000 and the current value of the partiesg life 

estate was $90,000 for a total of $190,000; the Henleygs 

contract was a sham and void if they could not be required 

to pay $100,000 immediately or at a very early date; the 

current market value of the Cooney property was $38,000; 

that the total marital assets amounted to $358,490.74; that 

the wife was currently 72 years of age and receiving $229 

per month in Social Security; and that the husband was 64 

years of age and had little likelihood of securing 

significant assets for retirement. 

In its conclusions of law the District Court 

distributed the marital assets as follows: the husband 

received a total of $163,094.24 in assets which included 1/3 

of the principal balance remaining on the contract for deed 

($33,330), the Summerfelt house in Helena ($43,000), the 

Cooney property ($38,300), twenty-five cows with calves 

($13,750) and several other assets that were added to the 

husband's total award. The wife received a total of 

$196,406.50 in assets which included the life estate 

reserved under the contract for deed ($90,000), 2/3 of the 

principal balance remaining on the contract for deed 

($66,670), 1/2 of all bank accounts ($16,309.50), and the 

wife's personal property excluding cattle ($22,017). 

From the decree of the District Court distributing the 

marital assets the wife appeals, raising four issues: 

(1) Whether the District Court erred in its 

determination of "total marital assets" because it failed to 

accept present day net values on the contract for sale of 
the ranch and on the reserved life estate. 

(2) Whether the District Court erred in its wholesale 

adoption of the husband's proposed findings and conclusions. 

(3) Whether the award to the wife was ins-dequate in 

light of the financial condition of each of the parties at 

the outset of the marriage. 

(4) Whether the District Court erred in failing to 

recognize the property inherited by the wife as her seperate 

property. 

Initially, we note that the well-established rule in 

Montana is: 

"The apportionment made by the District 

Court will. not be disturbed on review 

unless there has been a clear abuse of 

discretion as manifested by a substantial 

inequitable division of the marital 

assets resulting in substantial 

injustices." In re the Marriage of Brown 

(1978), 179 Mont. 417, 587 P.2d 361. 

In the present case, the distribution of the marital 

assets by the District Court resulted in substantial 

injustices to the wife. In Glasser v. Glasser (Mont. 1983), 

669 P.2d 685, 40 St.Rep. 1518, this Court stated: "In - Kis, 

supra, we stated that, '[plresent value is the "proper test" 

for determination of marital interest.'" Similarly, in Popp 

v. Popp (Mont. 1983), 671 P.2d 24, 40 St. Rep. 1747, this 

Court said : 

"It is also clear from a thorough review 

of the file on this matter that the court 

valued some assets at their depreciated 

value as listed on the parties income tax 

returns instead of their fair market 

value. Yet there is no finding stating 

that the depreciated value is equal to 

fair market value of certain items of 

equipment. Without such a finding we 

hold that the District Court's decision 

was 'clearly erroneous. ' " 

Here, the District Court erred in its determination of 
marital assets to be distributed because it accepted the 

balance remaining due on the real estate contract for sale 

of the ranch, rather than discounting it to its present fair 

market value, and it erred in setting the value on the life 

estate reserved to the wife. The contract for sale of the 

ranch required the buyers to pay the interest on a yearly 

basis and allowed them to retire the principal amount as 

they were able to do so. The ranch contract contained no 

language allowing the seller to demand full payment of the 

principal balance owing at anytime she desired. It is 

elementary that the present day fair market value of a 

contract for deed, rarely, if ever, equals the principal 

balance due thereon. Although the husband asserts the 

parties stipulated to the present day value of the contract 

for deed in a pretrial order, that contention is without 

merit. The pretrial order indicates the husband and wife 

only agreed that $100,000 was the principal balance 

remaining on the contract for deed. In short, the District 

Court did not properly determine the present market value of 

the contract for deed. 

Similarly, the District Court erred in its valuation 

of the life estate reserved by the wife. At trial, an 

expert testified the present day market value of the life 

estate to be thirty percent of the stated amount of the life 

estate. Thirty percent amounted to a $57,493.80 valuation 

of the life estate. However, the District Court, without 

explanation, assigned a value of $90,000 to the life estate. 

In, In re Marriage of Wolfe (Mont. 1983), 659 P.2d 259, 40 

St.Rep. 211, this Court stated: "Where there are widely 

conflicting valuations between different appraisers, the 
District Court shall give reasons why one value is selected 

over others. " 

Moreover, the award to the wife was inadequate in 

light of the financial condition of each of the parties at 

the outset of the marriage. Although the District Court did 

not determine the financial condition of the parties at the 

outset of the marriage, the record clearly indicates the 

wife brought substantially more net worth into the marriage 

than did the husband. The wife asserts her net worth at the 

time of the marriage was $425,615 and the husband's was, at 

the most, $12,355.07. We held in In re Marriage - of Herron 

396 

(1980), 185 Mont. %, 608 P.2d 97, that the source of the 

property was a major factor to be considered by the District 

Court dividing property under section 40-4-202, MCA. See 

'Ml4el-5 

also, In re Marriage of #& (Mont. 1984), P.2d 

, 41 St.Rep. 990. In this case, the amount the District 

Court awarded the husband was an abuse of discretion when 

considered in light of the parties' financial condition at 

the outset of the marriage. 

Since the issues discussed above are dispositive of 

this appeal, we need not consider the other issues raised by 

the wife. 

Reversed and remanded for a new trial on the issue of 4 

division of marital assets. 

-. 

Justice 

We concur: 
Justices 

Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr., dissents and will file a 

written dissent later.