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S. HRG. 111–1195 

NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE AND 

FLOOD PROTECTION AND COASTAL LOUISIANA 

RESTORATION: STATUS AND PROGRESS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JUNE 16, 2009 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

BARBARA BOXER, California, Chairman 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon 

KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MIKE CRAPO, Idaho 

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

BETTINA POIRIER, Staff Director 

RUTH VAN MARK, Minority Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

JUNE 16, 2009 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from the State of California ........................ 1 

Vitter, Hon. David, U.S. Senator from the State of Louisiana ............................ 3 

Landrieu, Hon. Mary L., U.S. Senator from the State of Louisiana ................... 4 

Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma, prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 140 

WITNESSES 

Walsh, Michael, Brigadier General, Commander, Division Engineer, Mississippi Valley Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ................................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 11 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Boxer ................................ 22 

Response to an additional question from Senator Klobuchar ....................... 26 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Inhofe ............................... 26 

Jacobs, Jeffrey, Scholar, National Research Council and Study Director, Committee on New Orleans Regional Hurricane Protection Projects ..................... 46 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 49 

Response to an additional question from Senator Inhofe ............................. 55 

Rault, Joseph M., Executive Committee Board Member, Pump to the River .... 56 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 59 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Inhofe ............................... 73 

Peyronnin, Steven, Executive Director of the Coalition to Restore Coastal 

Louisiana .............................................................................................................. 78 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 81 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Inhofe ............................... 88 

Twilley, Robert R., Professor, Department of Oceanography and Coastal 

Sciences, Vice Chancellor, Research and Economic Development, Louisiana 

State University ................................................................................................... 92 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 95 

Jackson, Thomas L., P.E., D.WRE, Commissioner and Past President, Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority—East ............................................. 105 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 108 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Inhofe ............................... 119 

(1) 

NEW ORLEANS HURRICANE AND FLOOD PROTECTION AND COASTAL LOUISIANA RESTORATION: STATUS AND PROGRESS 

TUESDAY, JUNE 16, 2009 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 

Washington, DC. 

The full Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in room 

406, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Barbara Boxer (chairman of the full Committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Boxer, Vitter, and Udall. 

Also present: Senator Landrieu. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. Welcome everybody. We are going to 

get started with my opening statement. Then, as soon as Senator 

Landrieu and Senator Vitter arrive, I assume—Senator Vitter is 

here. Great. So, next we will turn to them and their opening statements and then we will turn to the Corps. 

Good afternoon. We are meeting today to examine progress made 

on hurricane protection and coastal restoration since the devastating hurricanes that struck Louisiana in 2005. 

After becoming Chair of this Committee, the very first field hearing that I held was in New Orleans to address post-hurricane clean 

up, hurricane protection and restoration of the wetlands. These 

issues remain top priorities of this Committee, and I want to thank 

Senators Landrieu and Vitter for making sure that we keep our eye 

on the ball here because nothing is going to be done unless we keep 

our eye on the ball. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were a wake-up call about the life 

and death role played by our flood control systems and the dire 

consequences of not properly designing this critical infrastructure, 

and also the consequences of not executing well in the aftermath 

of a hurricane or any natural disaster. 

In my State, obviously we do not deal with hurricanes. We deal 

with earthquakes, flood, fire, and anything else that you can imagine. So, I think the wake-up call to America, regardless of political 

party, was A, are we doing enough to prevent, in this case, the 

flooding, and B, if we have an emergency and we need to evacuate 

folks and we need to do the job right, we better make sure we are 

prepared. 
2 

To me, these storms showed why we must invest in restoring 

Louisiana’s natural hurricane protection system, the wetlands. For 

centuries, the protective wetlands of the Louisiana coast blunted 

the force of countless storms, absorbing their energy and softening 

their impact. But those wetlands have been rapidly disappearing 

and they require our constant attention. 

We have learned a great deal over the past few years about why 

the New Orleans Hurricane Protection System failed. Groups of experts have identified important lessons from the disaster so that 

we are better prepared for the next hurricane, the next storm, the 

next flood. So, I think we are making progress in improving protections. 

In 2007, we took a major step forward. 

Senator Landrieu, please sit right there and then we will invite 

you to join us on the dais. Senator, sit right there. You are our first 

witness once I am finished and Senator Vitter is finished. They we 

turn to you. 

I was just saying that my very first field hearing, Madam Senator, was in New Orleans and it was just a few months after I took 

the gavel, so it must have been about March. 

Senator LANDRIEU. It was February. 

Senator BOXER. It was February, actually, after I took the gavel. 

And I was telling everybody that your constant pressure, your constant concern, along with Senator Vitter’s, certainly has ensured 

everyone in this Country that I am not going to take my eye off 

of this. And I stated that we are making some progress. But we 

have a long, long, long way to go. You know, when the cameras are 

all there, it is one thing. When the cameras leave, we have got to 

do the rest of the hard work. 

In 2007, we took a major step forward in this Committee. We 

passed out of the Committee the Water Resources Development 

Act, for the first time in 7 years. This landmark legislation authorized critical water resources projects around the Country, including 

a comprehensive program to restore Louisiana wetlands and other 

important hurricane protection projects. 

Congress has invested nearly $14.5 billion for hurricane protection projects in Louisiana over the past 3 years. Because of this investment, there has been great progress to upgrade the New Orleans Hurricane Protection System. Nearly 4 years after Hurricane 

Katrina, we can take some comfort in that. But I think the three 

of us know, and lots of others know and they will be here coming 

forward, the experts who have come here from your home State, 

Senators, we know there is a lot more to do. 

Now, I understand that the Corps has stated that some hurricane protection projects preferred by local citizens are too costly 

and they have not been adequately studied. We are here to examine those decisions and to make sure the right choice is made that 

puts the safety of the citizenry first. 

And let me point this out. We know what the American people 

saw when they saw the mishandling in the aftermath of Katrina. 

It is in our minds until the day that we die. We see those images. 

And we know how we felt. Would it not be tragic if, at this moment, we chose the wrong fix? And I think it is very important, and 

I commend both Senators, for working together on this. It is essen-
3 

tial that we do the right thing at this stage. Frankly, I am not into 

wasting hundreds of millions of dollars. I would rather spend more 

and get a project that I know meets the need. 

So, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about the 

progress that has been made and the steps that we must take to 

be prepared in the future. 

My time is expired, so I will call on Senator Vitter and then Senator Landrieu. 

Senator Vitter. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID VITTER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 

Senator VITTER. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. 

Several months ago, I asked for this update hearing and you 

were very kind and generous to immediately agree. Thank you for 

that. Thank you for this hearing. You agreed to a similar request 

for that field hearing in early 2007 in the New Orleans area, and 

thank you very much for that, and for all of your continuing interest. 

Katrina certainly was, as we all know, a historic event. But I 

think it is important that we refocus about why it was. 

First of all, it is the only instance in our history that involved 

the complete and total evacuation of a major metropolitan area and 

the complete cessation, for some significant period of time, of all 

life and economic activity there. 

Second, we talk about it as a natural disaster. Of course, a hurricane is. But it was also a manmade disaster because most of the 

flooding we are talking about in the New Orleans area was directly 

due to design failures in the levee system, most notably the walls 

of the outflow canals, which we are going to talk a lot about today. 

So that is why it is so important that we get the fix right, as you 

said, so that we never have to repeat that sort of history. 

Now, I do want to say at the beginning that there is a lot that 

is good and there is a lot that is right that is going on in terms 

of the Corps’ work and our overall recovery. Since Katrina, and 

then Rita, and more recently Gustav and Ike, we have had a truly 

unprecedented level of taxpayer support and that has come through 

this Committee and through this Congress, and everyone in Louisiana wants to say thank you. It has been absolutely unprecedented. It matched an unprecedented event. They have been unbelievably generous and unprecedented. And that is leading to important work that is moving forward, most notably building true what 

we call 100-year protection in the greater New Orleans area in 

time for the 2011 hurricane season. So that is good and that is very 

important. 

But I do want to underscore two big concerns I have as that very 

important work moves forward. First, Congress asked the Corps, 

mandated that the Corps look at and issue clear reports about 

what the next step might look like after we finish the 100-year 

level of protection and asked them to be very focused and quite 

specific in coming up with project ideas for something called the 

Louisiana Coastal Area Study. 

My first big concern, and disappointment, is that in responding 

to that mandate, the Corps has been exceedingly general and ex-
4 

ceedingly vague with their analysis rather than giving us the much 

more specific, project specific list of ideas that we asked for. That, 

obviously, is a big impediment to moving forward in terms of active 

consideration for the next step and that impacts all of coastal Louisiana. 

My second big, big concern is the one I think we are going to 

focus on in discussions with the witnesses today. That is that we 

are in the process of perhaps moving forward, I hope not, but perhaps moving forward with the wrong fix for the outfall canals. 

Madam Chair, you have been there. You know that what we are 

talking about is three what we call outfall canals, 17th Street 

Canal, Orleans Avenue Canal and London Avenue Canal. Most of 

the flooding of New Orleans after Katrina was a result of breaches 

in these canals. All of the flooding in New Orleans west of the Industrial Canal was essentially the result of that. 

These breaches were manmade in the sense that we now have 

the engineering analysis that says there were design flaws. These 

walls breached from below. They gave in from below. They were 

not over-topped, except in some limited instances. They gave way 

because they were not deep enough and they were not strong 

enough. 

The Corps right now is moving forward with Option 1 in terms 

of addressing that situation, rather than Option 2 or 2a. Option 1 

is to close off the canals at the lake so that storm surge does not 

come into the canals and lead to a breach as it did with Katrina. 

But then, to artificially keep at a low level the water level in the 

canals rather than rebuilding the walls so that they are strong 

enough to accommodate a normal water level, which you can get 

in events. 

In contrast, Option 2, and 2a, is to actually fix the problem, 

which is the poorly designed walls, and rebuild those correctly. And 

so my second big concern, which will be the subject of at least most 

of my questions, I think of lot of our overall discussion, is that we 

are choosing the wrong fix for the biggest thing that went wrong, 

that caused catastrophic flooding in New Orleans. 

I do not want to repeat the mistakes of history. After Hurricane 

Betsy, all of us, the Country, made a big mistake and chose the 

wrong path forward in terms of our protection system in greater 

New Orleans. And that led to the devastation of Katrina. The 

Country chose that, basically, because it was the cheaper alternative. 

Right now, the Corps wants to move forward with Option 1 and 

I think there is a push in that direction basically because it is a 

cheaper alternative. I do not want to repeat that grave mistake in 

history and save pennies on the front end and pay hundreds of billions of dollars on the back end with another catastrophic event. 

So, thank you for your leadership on this and I also thank my 

colleague, Senator Landrieu, for all of her leadership on these 

issues. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Senator. Senator Landrieu. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARY L. LANDRIEU, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Madam Chair. 
5 

I have a long and very detailed report for the Committee. I would 

like to submit it to the record. 

Senator BOXER. Without objection. 

[The referenced material was not received at time of print.] 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you. I will summarize my remarks in 

the 5 minutes provided. 

I want to thank you, Madam Chair, for your continued focus on 

this very critical issue, not just for Louisiana and South Louisiana, 

but for the whole Gulf Coast and in many coastal areas in America. 

The fact that you, at the request of Senator Vitter and me, have 

continued this focus and others, is truly commendable. Thank you 

for your visits, thank you for flying over the wetlands, thank you 

for walking the levees, and that hands-on approach, I think, will 

be very valuable as we move forward. 

I want to speak, just for a moment, about the bigger picture, as 

Senator Vitter has outlined some of the specifics about the project 

before us. I want to say that discussing the status of hurricane protection and critical coastal restoration underway in South Louisiana is of extreme importance. 

This area, Madam Chair, is one of the most unique and fragile 

delta landscapes in the world, a landscape that drains over 40 percent of the North American continent. Positioned at the mouth of 

one of the largest and most powerful rivers in the world, Coastal 

Louisiana and the delta hold a tremendous bounty of natural and 

human resources. Our coast is a working coast that contributes 90 

percent of America’s off-shore energy production, 30 percent of 

overall oil and gas supply, and 30 percent of its seafood in the 

lower 48 States. And that is not counting the navigation that comes 

into this as well. 

But the coast is in a state of crisis, losing 25 to 35 square miles 

of wetlands per year and, as we pointed out a number of times on 

the maps, Madam Chair, putting dozens of cities, not just New Orleans, but dozens of cities, suburban areas, mid-size cities, and villages and agricultural communities at risk. 

This Committee bears an immense responsibility to the Nation 

as it relates to flood control and the ecosystem. I thank this Committee for its work, primarily through the WRDA bills, and we look 

forward to working with you on WRDA bills in the future. 

But as you said, Madam Chair, we have a long way to go. We 

are not nearly where we need to be. We have got to change our direction. We have a long way to go to ensure that the entire coast 

of Louisiana can thrive with safer cities, vibrant communities and 

more sustainable landscapes. 

Of particular concern today, as Senator Vitter pointed out, is the 

decision by the Corps of Engineers to proceed with a plan for storm 

surge protection that will neglect a critical piece of the puzzle, in 

my opinion. 

The Greater New Orleans Area averages one of the rainiest cities 

in the United States. The heaviest and most intense rainfalls occur 

during hurricane season. If Hurricane Katrina taught us anything, 

we must coordinate and manage our outer hurricane protection 

with the interior drainage and flood control of the city. If we fail 

to properly design the system, we will fail the people of New Orleans and the region again and likely repeat the same mistake that 
6 

killed over 1,400 people in Louisiana and brought a major American city to the brink of collapse. 

I urge this Committee to take swift action to address the concerns of our State, the city of New Orleans, Jefferson Parish and 

the New Orleans Sewage and Water Board. You will hear from 

them later. But let me go on. 

While the subject today is focused on this project, I want to say 

that we need a new direction. The piecemeal approach that we 

have used for over the last really 40 or 50 years is what I now call 

a patch and pray model. Madam Chair, this model has failed our 

Nation. It failed the people of New Orleans and our region, it has 

failed South Louisiana. Our coastal communities can no longer afford the backlogs, the delays, the inefficient process of overlapping 

and confusing Federal authorization, and delayed appropriations. 

We must build a better model. We must move in a new direction. 

We must find a new way to focus our efforts at the Federal, State 

and local levels so we can construct the best water infrastructure 

and a more natural landscape that keeps communities safe and 

strong. 

I went in search of a new model, Madam Chair, and I believe 

that I found one, not in its identical form, but in The Netherlands, 

with EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson and members of your own 

staff. What we learned from the Dutch model, I believe we can 

learn a great deal. 

I will not go into the details. They suffered a catastrophic flood, 

but through reorganization, professional water management districts, by securing a permanent funding source and the gathering 

of political will and planning, Madam Chair, not just for 6 months 

or a year, but for decades. They are now planning almost for centuries. How refreshing. This is what our Government needs to aspire to. 

I know that my time is at end, but let me just—— 

Senator BOXER. I will give you another minute to close. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you. 

Let me just conclude with this. What I learned in The Netherlands is that people can live, safely and securely, below sea level 

and near the water. What a novel idea. Because many people in 

America, Madam Chair, including maybe some members of this 

Committee, do not believe that people can live safely below sea 

level and near the water. Well, we have a problem since we have 

20 million or more people living below sea level in America, maybe 

more, it is a rough estimate, including in the Sacramento Valley, 

as well as 50 percent of the American people living within 50 miles 

of the coast. We need a new model. 

So that is what my testimony is about today. I am going to supply some more materials from the ongoing dialogs with the Dutch. 

The Dutch Deltaurus Institute, I believe, is the finest in the world. 

And I believe this Committee, under your leadership, Madam 

Chair, can provide the extraordinary leadership necessary to 

change direction, to seek a new model, a safe model, not just for 

Louisiana and the Gulf Coast, but for coastal communities throughout this Nation. I pledge to work with you and your Committee 

every step of the way in a bipartisan manner to accomplish this. 
7 

Again, I thank you very, very much and look forward to the testimony and I will be staying to hear the specifics on the proposal 

Pump to the River today. 

Senator BOXER. Please join us right up here. 

At this time, we call to the table Brigadier General Michael 

Walsh, Commander, Division Engineer, Mississippi Valley Division, 

U.S. Army Corps. Welcome, Commander. I should say General. 

Welcome, General, and please read your statement or place it in 

the record and summarize it and then we will ask questions. 

STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL MICHAEL WALSH, COMMANDER, DIVISION ENGINEER, MISSISSIPPI VALLEY DIVISION, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 

General WALSH. Thank you, Madam Chair and members of the 

Committee. 

I am Brigadier General Mike Walsh, Commander of the Mississippi Valley Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and also 

the President-Designee of the Mississippi River Commission. 

Thank you for this opportunity to discuss the Corps’ ongoing reconstruction, restoration and improvement efforts on the Hurricane 

and Storm Damage Risk Reduction System for the Greater New 

Orleans area. 

Just a quick pause. We are engaged in multiple fronts, from supporting engineering work for our armed forces here in the United 

States as well as overseas, to water resource engineering from Canada to the Gulf Coast. We have recently been reminded by our sacrifice of some of our teammates when we lost three civilians during 

Memorial Day to an IED that hit one of our convoys in Fallujah. 

Our civilians and soldiers are engaged in harm’s way today. 

The Federal projects for Greater New Orleans were extensively 

damaged, as you mentioned, by Hurricane Katrina in 2005. With 

quick action from Congress to provide authority and appropriations, the Corps repaired and restored 220 miles of the system to 

the pre-Katrina level of protection. 

Our immediate operational goal is to provide risk reduction from 

hurricanes and storm surge that have a 1 percent chance of occurring in any given year by June 1, 2011. We are using the overall 

resources of the entire Mississippi Valley Division and other Corps 

expertise across the Nation to deliver, including the Engineer Research and Development Center, also known as ERDC. It is an 

award winning research facility recognized worldwide. We are also 

using folks from the Northwest Division, Walla Walla District, 

Kansas City District, Portland, North Atlantic Division, the Baltimore and Philadelphia Districts, the Great Lakes and Ohio River 

Division, the Chicago District, and many others. 

But even beyond this internal effort, we are also leveraging the 

knowledge and capabilities of our partners in industry, architectural firms, members of academia, and international counterparts 

to develop and apply state-of-the-art engineering solutions. 

Our overarching goal is to provide a reliable Storm Surge Risk 

Reduction System that will deliver in compliance to authorities and 

appropriations to meet the needs of Southeast Louisiana. I plan to 

highlight a few to date and provide an overview of the ongoing efforts to restore the coastal ecosystem of Louisiana. 
8 

More details are provided in my written testimony, Madam 

Chair, and I will be happy to answer questions afterwards. 

With regard to the Hurricane Storm Damage Risk Reduction 

System status, the risk reduction systems in the New Orleans area 

include about 350 miles of levees and floodwalls, navigable floodgates, canal closure structures, pump stations and other structures. 

The threat of a 100-year storm surge is being addressed through 

improvements to the perimeter system composed of the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity and the West Bank and Vicinity projects 

that protect major areas of Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. 

Bernard and St. Charles parishes. 

There are also interior drainage systems that provide for the removal of rainfall that is being addressed through improvements on 

the Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Damage Reduction Project, 

also known as SELA. 

Major features of the work include erecting surge protection barriers, building levees and floodwalls, replacing I-walls with stronger T-walls, adding scour protection, making repairs to existing 

pump stations, storm proofing pump stations, improving interior 

drainage, and restoring, completing and improving components of 

the existing perimeter protection system. 

The authorized and funded work also includes incorporating the 

Plaquemines Parish non-Federal levee system into the existing 

New Orleans to Venice hurricane risk reduction project and improving levees in Terrebonne Parish and work in Grand Isle as 

well. 

Today, we are more than one-third through with the construction 

of improvements. The system is stronger and more resilient than 

prior to Katrina or at any other time in history. Extensive modeling, lessons learned and risk informed processes have enhanced 

our design criteria for on-the-ground construction and the progress 

continues. 

The contracting effort to accomplish this massive construction 

project in a short timeframe is immense. We are maintaining our 

aggressive obligation schedule originally laid out in 2007, and we 

have awarded over 190 contracts and obligated $4.2 billion for the 

program. 

The majority of the funds are planned for obligation by the end 

of year 2009. Current obligations include over $1.2 billion directly 

to small and disadvantaged businesses. About 37 percent of the obligations are going directly to small and disadvantaged businesses. 

With the assistance of the Office of the Federal Coordinator for 

the Gulf Coast Rebuilding and in close partnership with Governor 

Jindal, we have signed all three major partnership agreements 

with the State of Louisiana necessary to proceed with construction. 

We have also signed all deferred payment agreements with the 

State of Louisiana that extend the State’s payments for cost-shared 

portions of the work over a 30-year period, supporting the policy 

announced by the Federal Government in the State of Louisiana in 

August 2008. 

We have implemented a robust independent external peer review 

of the Hurricane Storm Damage Risk Reduction System. This includes the overall design criteria and their application during design and construction, the armoring manual and the quality man-
9 

agement plan. The most complex projects will receive additional 

peer review during construction and the design process. 

Recognizing the need and the fundamental responsibility to 

reach out to stakeholders and to inform our decisionmaking with 

the public’s input, the Corps has hosted more than 110 public 

meetings in Jefferson, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard and St. 

Charles parishes to listen and to consider public comment and include critical information into the development of the system. 

Last year during Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, we coordinated 

with the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans to close the 

gates of the Interim Closure Structure at the outfall canals of Lake 

Pontchartrain, and then pumped the storm water out of the canals. 

The 12-foot surge from Hurricane Gustav tested the system and 

the Nation watched as waves overlapped the flood walls on the 

Inner Harbor Navigation Canal. The system performed as designed. No damages to the floodwalls occurred due to the new Twall designs and the armoring and splash pads installed at the existing I-walls. 

In regard to other efforts in addition to the previously described 

ecosystem restoration, higher levels of storm risk reduction measures are also being studied in coastal Louisiana as part of the authorized Louisiana Coastal Area Program and the ongoing Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Study. 

The ecosystem restoration activities are conducted under multiple authorities with funding from various sources and several different cost-sharing formulas. They include the Coastal Wetlands 

Planning, Protection and Restoration Act, also known as CWPPRA, 

the Louisiana Coastal Area ecosystem restoration program, a related effort to restore wetlands affected by the Mississippi River 

Gulf Outlet, and the science that is needed to support all of these 

related restoration efforts. 

The Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Final Technical Report is currently undergoing agency and public review and 

is scheduled to be provided to the Assistant Secretary of the Army 

in August 2009. This report contains an analysis of Category 5 risk 

reduction and identifies an array of viable comprehensive plans 

that include structural, non-structural and coastal restoration 

measures. The report also establishes the opportunity to move forward on report components for our State partner, the Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority. 

In addition, regarding the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, the 

comprehensive plan for deauthorizing the deep draft navigation 

was completed in 2008. The MRGO channel was officially closed to 

all navigation on April 22, 2009 and construction crews are in the 

final stages of placing over 300,000 tons of rock to complete the 

MRGO closure structure by July of this year. 

We are in the process of constructing an 18,500-foot long rock 

dike along the bank of the eastern lobe of Lake Borgne to help 

maintain the lake as a separate ecosystem. A study to identify the 

best way to restore wetlands affected by the MRGO is also ongoing. 

Feasibility scoping meetings for this study were held in April and 

May of this year, and we plan to release the draft to public comment and external review by May 2010. 
10 

Madam Chair, this concludes my testimony and I thank you for 

allowing me to present the ongoing efforts of the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers in the New Orleans area. It is my pleasure to serve 

the Army and the Nation. I am prepared to take your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Walsh follows:] 
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Senator BOXER. Thank you, General. 

General, I am going to ask you a big favor. If you could, after 

we have asked you our questions, is it possible for you to stay and 

hear the panel? Senator Landrieu had suggested that would be a 

good idea. Is that possible? 

General WALSH. Yes, Madam Chair. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much. Because I think it is important. 

General, how long have you been on this particular beat? 

General WALSH. I took over about 14 months ago. Previous to 

that, I was General Petraeus’ engineer in Iraq. 

Senator BOXER. Oh, boy. So you took over 14 months ago. And 

how long will this assignment run, if it runs its normal course? 

General WALSH. I work at the pleasure of the Chief, Ma’am. 

Senator BOXER. So, you never know. 

General WALSH. Yes, Ma’am. 

Senator BOXER. The reason I ask this is, I found in my own 

State, when I work on major flood control projects, one of the problems is we have great people and then you look over your shoulder, 

they have the whole history and they are gone. So, I mean I am 

hoping for some stability here because it makes it really difficult. 

That is not in your control, but let the record reflect that it is a 

concern that I have in any of these big projects. I think we really 

need to have consistency. 

General, while the Corps has made significant progress in rebuilding the hurricane protection system of New Orleans, important issues need to be resolved. As we have heard today, local interests, we are going to hear that, object, and so do my two colleagues here, object to the Corps’ current plans for the replacement 

of pumps in the New Orleans outfall canal known as Option 1. The 

Corps claims other options will need additional study and authorization. 

Could you describe to us why the Corps is proceeding with Option 1 and what actions the Corps will take to determine if other 

options are feasible and to determine which option provides the 

greatest protection for New Orleans? 

General WALSH. Ma’am, we have put together a technical report 

that we submitted to Congress in 2007 and we had put together 

a team of both locals and people from academia that laid out a 

number of different options on how to address the closure structure. They came up with a number of options for us to look at. We 

have looked at them and there are three options that currently—— 

Senator BOXER. I am just asking you, why did you pick Option 

1 and, in the face of all the disagreement, it seems to me from the 

two Senators here and, I do not know about the congressional delegation, but it looks unanimous. Plus, the community. Do not give 

the whole history. Explain to me why you picked Option 1. Is it because it was the cheapest? 

General WALSH. No, Ma’am—— 

Senator BOXER. So what reason? 

General WALSH. We are looking at Option 1 as it meets the intent of the authorization and looking at reducing the risk due to 

storm surges. 
34 

Senator BOXER. OK. Well, I am going to let my two colleagues 

go forward on this in a minute. Not yet, David. David’s ready to 

go. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator BOXER. Just wait. I want to ask a couple of other questions. And I am going to give my colleagues more time than I have 

taken because they are the true experts here. 

General Walsh, following the hurricanes of 2005, there was a recognition that coastal wetlands work in tandem with levees and 

other infrastructure to provide hurricane protection. There was a 

need to do that. Congress directed the Corps to complete a study 

of how to provide Category 5 hurricane protection that includes but 

structural elements and wetlands restoration. This study has not 

been submitted to Congress, as required. Is this the study that is 

coming to us in August 2009 that you referred to? 

General WALSH. Ma’am, we will be submitting it to the Assistant 

Secretary of the Army for Civil Works in August 2009. 

Senator BOXER. When it is going to come here? 

General WALSH. I do not know if I can answer that, Ma’am. 

Senator BOXER. Well, we need an answer because this is a very, 

very critical report dealing with the coastal wetlands. So, who is 

going to make the decision as to when we get to see that report? 

General WALSH. The report is being reviewed now by the public 

and by the National Academy of Sciences. We will be addressing 

those comments and sending it back through my office and the 

Chief of Engineers’ Office to make sure of its technical completeness and then we will be sending it over to the Assistant Secretary. 

Senator BOXER. OK. Now, is that the report that you referred to 

when you said we will see a report in 2009, or that someone will 

get a report. Was that the report that you were referring to? 

General WALSH. Yes, Ma’am. 

Senator BOXER. OK. Well, why has it been delayed? 

General WALSH. Ma’am, The LACPR—— 

Senator BOXER. Do me a favor. Could you say Senator instead of 

Ma’am? 

General WALSH. Yes, Senator. 

Senator BOXER. It is just a thing. I worked so hard to get that 

title, so I would appreciate it. Thank you. 

General WALSH. Yes, Senator. The LACPR is an unprecedented 

and complex study in looking at that much of a coastal area. What 

we looked at was breaking down the 26 coastal parishes into five 

planning units, and we spent a large amount of time working with 

the public and academia on coming up with solutions in those five 

areas. We have gone through one National Academy of Science review of that draft report and we continue to submit and work with 

the public and make some changes to that report. We have completed that report and left about four or five options in each one 

of the five planning units on the way to move forward. 

Senator BOXER. Well, I can just say, these deadlines that are 

asked of you are not just pulled out of the air. There are reasons 

for it. Do you know how long it takes us to make a case to our colleagues that we need to take action? We need these reports or we 

are just going to lose time, time, time. 
35 

General Walsh, my last question. I am sure you are happy to 

know. While the Corps has made great progress, I give you that for 

sure, on rebuilding much of the hurricane protection system in 

New Orleans, progress has been significantly slower in coastal Louisiana restoration projects that were authorized in WRDA, the 

Water Resources Development Act of 2007. We had important milestones required in WRDA, such as establishment of a task force to 

guide restoration and completion of a comprehensive restoration 

plan. That has not begun. Why are those projects not moving forward more rapidly and what needs to be done to expedite these 

projects? 

General WALSH. Senator, I think we are talking about LCA and 

we just signed the final four partnership agreement letters with 

the State. We are proceeding forward and should have those, at 

least six of those LCA reports completed by December 2010. 

Senator BOXER. And you will have that task force appointed to 

guide the restoration? That was a milestone that we laid out. We 

said an establishment of a task force to guide restoration and completion of a comprehensive restoration plan. Our understanding is 

that you have not done that, and it is 2009. We passed this is 2007. 

General WALSH. The recommendation for what to do with that 

task force has been submitted through the Chief’s Office and is at 

the Assistant Secretary’s Office—— 

Senator BOXER. Well, it looks like we are going to have to go up 

a little higher—— 

General WALSH. In the timeframe, we have put together a 

science and technology board and we have hired a science and technology director to help look at some of the science needed to inform 

those projects as they come due. 

Senator BOXER. Well, we are going to stay on it because when 

we pass a law here we expect the law to be followed. This is not 

a blame thing. It is just that we need to move forward. We cannot 

wait until another disaster strikes. You know, if anything I have 

learned from these two Senators here, and I know from my own 

State of California and Sacramento, you know, we do not control 

Mother Nature. We are trying to, but we had better do a better job 

because no one in this Country wants to see so many thousands 

and hundreds and millions of people be dislocated. 

So, here is the thing. I am going to give Senator Vitter 12 minutes. I am going to give Senator Landrieu 12 minutes. So, they can 

go unimpeded for that long. 

General WALSH. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Senator VITTER. Thanks, Madam Chair, and thank you again 

General for your leadership. 

As I said in my opening statement, I want to focus a lot on the 

outfall canal issues and Pump to the River, which is critically important to getting this fixed right. 

Now, I just want to point out. This is greater New Orleans. 

These are the three outfall canals we are talking about. These 

three stars are the breaches in the outfall canals that caused most 

of the catastrophic flooding east of the Industrial Canal. 

Now, General, those walls of the outfall canals were part of a 

Federal Corps-led project, correct? 
36 

General WALSH. Some of those walls were designed and constructed by the Corps of Engineers and some were done by the 

local Levee Board. 

Senator VITTER. They were all, either originally or made part of, 

a Federal Corps project, right? 

General WALSH. Yes, Senator. 

Senator VITTER. OK. With about a 70 Federal, 30 local cost split. 

Correct? 

General WALSH. Yes, Senator. 

Senator VITTER. Now, where those breaches occurred, the walls 

have obviously been repaired, correct? 

General WALSH. Yes, sir. 

Senator VITTER. And a completely new, better design was used. 

Is that right? 

General WALSH. That is right. 

Senator VITTER. Where there were not breaches, the walls have 

not been redesigned or rebuilt. Correct? 

General WALSH. That is correct. 

Senator VITTER. So, wherever there is not a breach, which is 99 

percent of the walls we are talking about, there is the same old 

faulty design that led to the breaches. Is that fair to say? 

General WALSH. Design of those walls was based upon a standard hurricane coming through. Hurricane Katrina was much larger 

than what the walls were designed for and so what you see was 

the original designs are showing at about 12 to 14 feet on what 

those walls were originally designed for on a standard hurricane. 

We are now looking at something larger than a standard hurricane 

and, therefore, you hear the discussion of a water elevation that we 

have agreed to with the Sewerage and Water Board as to where 

we should allow the water to rise. 

Senator VITTER. OK. So, those walls where it did not breach are 

not being redesigned or not being rebuilt under Option 1. Is that 

correct? 

General WALSH. Right now, Senator, we have an engineer study 

going on and looking at the walls in all three canals and—— 

Senator VITTER. But under Option 1, which you want to move 

forward with, they would not be redesigned, they would not be rebuilt? 

General WALSH. That is right. Yes, sir. 

Senator VITTER. They would be under Option 2? 

General WALSH. They would be redesigned, sir. 

Senator VITTER. And I assume rebuilt? We would not just redesign them? We would build them that way? 

General WALSH. Yes, sir. 

Senator VITTER. OK. So, under Option 1, the solution is to lower 

the water level allowed in the canal to a lower ‘‘safe water level.’’ 

Is that right? 

General WALSH. Right now, as we have worked with the Sewerage and Water Board, certainly with Gustav, they are evacuating 

the rainwater out of the city, they will put it into the canal, and 

it will run freely into Lake Pontchartrain. And so, those few times 

when the water level of the lake gets high enough, we will be working with the Sewerage and Water Board, we will close the gates 
37 

and, as they continue to put water into the outlets, we will pump 

that into Lake Pontchartrain. 

Senator VITTER. And you will monitor the water so that it is 

below this new ‘‘safe water level.’’ Correct? 

General WALSH. That is correct. And we worked very closely with 

the Sewerage and Water Board. We had our canal captains work 

very closely with the very professional staff that they have at the 

Sewerage and Water Board during Gustav and—— 

Senator VITTER. In the case of the 17th Street Canal, that ‘‘safe 

water level’’ is seven or eight feet below the top of the wall. Is that 

correct? 

General WALSH. It is seven or eight feet below the top of the 

wall. Yes, sir. 

Senator VITTER. Now, General, just a real sort of common sense 

question. Let us say you hired a carpenter to build a bookcase for 

your home, a tall bookcase, and he builds it and moves it into your 

home. It looked beautiful and you started putting books on it. Once 

you put books above, say, the fourth shelf from the floor, it started 

careening over on you and you could not do that. So you called the 

carpenter up and explained the problem and he came into your 

home and took measurements and looked at the design and called 

in experts. Then a week later he said we figured out what is wrong 

and we figured out the solution, and the solution is do not put any 

books above the fourth shelf from the floor. Would that be a satisfying answer to you? 

General WALSH. Sir, I would be looking at what the design was. 

Certainly, the 12-foot wall was built and designed off of a standard 

hurricane scenario. What happened was a much larger scenario 

than what we looked at. So during the process, with IPET and others, we looked at multiple, thousands of hurricanes, that could 

come into that particular area, which would require us to look at 

that design and reestablish what the safe water levels—— 

Senator VITTER. Let me just underscore. The safe level is seven 

or eight feet below the top of the wall. Clearly, that is diminished 

capacity from the original design. Clearly, you all did not build a 

wall eight feet higher than you needed to for no good reason, right? 

General WALSH. Yes, sir, it was built toward the standard hurricane design and not to what we learned after Katrina. And certainly we would want to use what we learned from Katrina. Again, 

to use an analogy, it would be taking a bag that could hold 12 

pounds of apples and then putting 15 in it. What we are looking 

for is not putting 12 into that bag. We are looking at putting eight 

into that bag because we now know that bag can only hold eight 

pounds of apples. 

Senator VITTER. Your August 30, 2007 report to Congress asked 

you to look at these different options and report on them. It concluded ‘‘Option 2 is generally more technically advantageous and 

may be more effective operationally over Option 1 because it would 

have greater reliability and further reduces risk of flooding.’’ 

And more recently, just on May 20, 2009, Chris Accardo, your 

Chief of Operations in New Orleans, at a public meeting said very 

forthrightly at the public meeting, ‘‘So when you compare Option 

1 to Option 2, this is a no brainer, folks. I heard one politician after 
38 

another come up and say they want Option 2 over Option 1. Well, 

that is obvious. We all want Option 2 over Option 1.’’ 

So the Corps, in two different instances, clearly has said Option 

2 and 2a is better than Option 1. What do we tell the residents in 

the area why you want to move forward with Option 1? 

General WALSH. Senator, in the same report it shows that Option 

1 could be more advantageous considering the engineering challenge and the construction complexities of Option 2. 

Senator VITTER. OK, to me that means it is cheaper. What am 

I missing? 

General WALSH. What I think it means to me is that it meets the 

criteria in regards to providing perimeter protection to what we 

learned from Katrina. 

Senator VITTER. Do Options 2 and 2a not meet that criteria, provide that protection? 

General WALSH. Neither 2 nor 2a provide any additional protection from surge. 

Senator VITTER. But they provide a heck of a lot more protection 

from flooding. 

General WALSH. From interior drainage, you may be able to get 

some more benefits out of 2 or 2a. What we are looking at from the 

authorizations and the funding that is set aside for it is for storm 

surge. 

Senator VITTER. Well, I just point out that the initial program included the canal walls and that was a Federal program under 

Corps leadership and that was about both. So you cannot just ignore one whole side of the equation now. 

General WALSH. And that is why, sir, we established safe water 

elevations in working with our partners so that as they evacuate 

the water out of the city from normal rain events, it will pump directly into Lake Pontchartrain. 

Senator VITTER. Now, General, as you know, one of the things 

you all are arguing is that Option 2 and 2a are not authorized. I 

never understood this. I continue not to understand this. This is 

authorization language, the language and the only language that 

Congress passed. And it says the relevant part is used to modify 

the 17th Street, Orleans Avenue and London Avenue drainage canals and install pumps and closure structures at or near the lakefront. Why does that not describe 2 as well as it describes 1? 

General WALSH. Sir, I believe we have the authority to do the 

study to see if that is a feasible option, but we are not funded to 

do the study. 

Senator VITTER. This is the authorization language to do it. This 

is the authorization language to actually do the permanent fix. My 

question is: Does this language not cover Option 2 just as surely 

as it covers Option 1? 

General WALSH. We believe that it covers a study but the study 

is not funded. 

Senator VITTER. OK, can you point to the language that says 

that? Because I am missing it. I have read this about 100 times 

and I do not know what you are talking about in terms of study 

does not cover Option 2. I mean, the language is pretty simple and 

I do not understand why it does not cover Option 2. 
39 

General WALSH. Yes, sir, I would have to answer that for the 

record. I am certainly not trained as a lawyer to give you that 

background. 

Senator VITTER. OK. Well, I just point out that, in fact, I believe 

this language covers Option 2 more clearly than it covers Option 

1 because it says you can modify the drainage canal. Right? Option 

1 does not modify the drainage canals. You just said that a few 

minutes ago. How does Option 1 modify the drainage canals? 

General WALSH. Option 1 is looking at perimeter protection, sir. 

Senator VITTER. So, is it not correct that Option 1 does not modify the drainage canals? 

General WALSH. Option 1, at this point, does not modify the 

canal, but as I—— 

Senator VITTER. Option 2 does modify the drainage canals. Correct? 

General WALSH. Option 2 does modify the drainage canal. 

Senator VITTER. The authorization language says modify the canals. Now to me, this fits Option 2 better than it fits Option 1 because of that word. What am I missing? 

General WALSH. Sir, I would have to have the legal counsel give 

you that discussion. 

Senator VITTER. Well they have and I still do not understand it. 

I went to 3 years of law school and maybe I need to go back. But 

it is useful to focus on the plain language and, again, modify is not 

even a part of Option 1. 

Senator BOXER. Senator Landrieu. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you. I would like to follow up on that 

excellent line of questioning by Senator Vitter because it is not just 

puzzling, but it is aggravating, frustrating and frightening, actually, General, to the people that we represent that whether you are 

a lawyer or not, this is written in pretty plain vanilla English. And 

we are having a hard time understanding, as you can just see, why 

the language that we have read and re-read continues to be 

blocked by the Corps of Engineers when clearly the language says 

that Option 2 is legal. 

Now, I think Senator Vitter, in his line of questioning, proved 

that point or as authorized. But let me ask you this question. What 

amount of study funding do you think is standing between you and 

doing Option 2? What is the general amount of study funding? 

General WALSH. To study Option 2 or 2a would be about $15.8 

million. 

Senator LANDRIEU. $15 million to do a study? 

General WALSH. That is correct. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK. Now, we are spending $14 billion on a 

project. So, relatively speaking, $15 million would not be that much 

money. But I think that people would argue greatly with you that 

it would cost that much money. But, even if it did, even if it did 

cost $15 million, in light of the billions of dollars that we are 

spending, it might be wise to conduct such a study, particularly because we think we have already authorized a different approach. 

Would you agree to that? 

General WALSH. No, Ma’am. I believe that the funding that was 

set aside by Congress was to look at surge—— 
40 

Senator LANDRIEU. I did not ask you that. I said, would you op- pose additional funding? Let us not get focused on whether it is $5 

million, or $10 million or $15 million to do the study. Would you 

or the Corps oppose an additional study if it was required to try 

to reach a better option? 

General WALSH. Senator, if it was funded by Congress, we would 

proceed with the study. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK. I want to say that I believe the language 

is very clear. And I believe that we have already authorized you 

to choose Option 2. I believe that is very clear. But if it is not, 

Madam Chair, one way forward if it is determined ultimately that 

it is not, one way forward is to reauthorize a study, fund it and 

move past this issue. 

Let me get to the heart of the matter. Senator Vitter used the 

bookcase analogy. I would like to use a brake analogy on an automobile. If my family and friends were in a fatal automobile accident and it was brought in for review, the automobile, and it was 

told to me that the reason is that the brake system did not work, 

there was something wrong with it, and then the company proceeded to install the same brake system in the automobile, do you 

think that I would let one member of my family step in that automobile again? I do not think so. 

But that is what you are asking the people of Louisiana and 

South Louisiana. You are just fixing the same system that broke 

in the first place, General. And you are only fixing the parts of the 

canal that broke. There are other parts of the canal that were basically at the same level. And that is what has us angry and more 

than befuddled. 

Let me ask you to clarify this. This Committee, as you know, 

that you are testifying before, is responsible for climate change 

issues and regardless of the debate about what is causing it, we all 

know storms are going to intensify and levels of sea level are rising. When you said that the people of New Orleans were now building a system for the region and Jefferson, St. Bernard, 

Plaquemines and Southeast Louisiana, under the system that you 

plan to build with the money that we have given you, there is a 

1 percent chance per year. What does that mean for someone’s lifetime? Can you translate that to lifetime, assuming someone lives 

80 years? Is that an 80 percent probability that they are going to 

be, in their lifetime, catastrophically—what is the 1 percent a year? 

Explain that in a lifetime for me. 

General WALSH. Yes, Ma’am, if I could just go back to the brake 

analogy and then I will get to that. Certainly, what we have put 

together in the past was parallel protection for the city. What we 

are looking at now is perimeter protection for the city. So, we are 

putting in a different type of brake system to follow the same analogy. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Well, I do not necessarily agree with that, a 

different kind of brake system. You are putting in the same canals. 

You are basically building, because you testified that you are not 

modifying. You have testified that you are basically constructing 

the same system and you are just hoping that the coordination that 

you might put into place with the Sewer and Water Board, or in 

the process of putting into place, works. But if you backed up from 
41 

it, talk about this 1 percent chance in a year. What comfort does 

that give the people of our region, that there will be no catastrophic 

flooding in someone’s lifetime? 

General WALSH. Yes, Ma’am, we are putting closures out in front 

of the canals which were not in place prior to—I do not know what 

an 80-year plan is, but I do know roughly what it is on a 30-year 

mortgage and you have a 25 percent chance of flooding in a 30-year 

mortgage. It is 1 percent chance of flooding in any given year. 

Senator LANDRIEU. It is a 25 percent chance on a 30-year mortgage. Now, you know that people in St. Bernard Parish have lost 

their homes, in some instances three times in the last 40 years. So, 

I am not sure that standard is necessarily accurate or something 

that we would agree with that you have outlined. But the point is 

that we want to build a better, stronger system with integrated 

flood control, not just on our canals, but the interior drainage of 

this low-lying area. And the coastal restoration that is necessary to 

protect people from catastrophic flooding. 

So, you have testified that the language for the option that we 

choose is language that will modify according to what our language 

says in this document here, and you have testified that you would 

not oppose the funding of a study if it came to that issue. Is that 

correct? 

General WALSH. That is correct, Ma’am. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you. 

General WALSH. And as we proceed with Option 1, we are looking at putting in adaptable features, a heavier foundation, a lower 

sill, so that if there is an opportunity for Congress to do something 

in the future, it will not frustrate those changes in the future. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Let me just, as I have a few minutes left, I 

just want to go over this particular point again because this has 

been what has frustrated our delegation. Your staff has indicated 

that the Corps lacks the authorization to implement Options 2 and 

2a. Would you specify the exact legislative language that is missing? 

General WALSH. Ma’am, I will have to add that for the record 

and have our folks who work on legislative language submit that. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. Before I take it back to Senator 

Vitter, I have given him another 5 minutes and you, Senator 

Landrieu if you want additional time. Senator Udall, would you 

like to make a comment or two? 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Madam Chair, very much. I just 

wanted to come by and support my colleague, Senator Landrieu, on 

her efforts here. I know that she is very interested in seeing that 

restoration is done in such a way that it is environmentally sensitive and takes into consideration all of the industries in the area. 

I toured this area when I was in the House with Representative 

Toussaint, who is very familiar with the problems down there. We 

spent several days, flew over the area in a helicopter and got to see 

things on the ground also. So I know that we have some real, real 

serious issues. 

I have had several visits with my good friend, Mary Landrieu, 

and I know she takes this very seriously. General Walsh, I hope 

that I can be here for all of your testimony but I have got a couple 
42 

of other things to do. I hope that I will be able to get back. But 

I wanted to say I think this is an important hearing and it is something that I know that she has worked hard at. And I think part 

of this has to do, Senator Landrieu, does it not, with your trip that 

you just took to The Netherlands with the Staff Director, trying to 

collect information and see what the best way is to tackle this problem, looking for solutions that are out there. 

So with that, thank you, Madam Chair. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Well, I appreciate that. And I want to say, 

not to take up too much more time, but the attention that members 

of this Committee, Madam Chair, have given, both Democrats and 

Republicans as well, has been so encouraging to the people of our 

State because we do not think that this is just about Louisiana. We 

think this is about looking for a new engineering model that will 

work for the whole Country, of which we happen to be basically the 

canaries in the mine at this particular point. 

It is only going to be a matter of time until a major storm hits 

Florida or some catastrophic flooding occurs in California and I am 

waiting for the Corps of Engineers to get to the point where they 

admit that the model that we have, Senator, is not sufficient in any 

way to protect people from catastrophic flooding in this Nation. 

Thank you for being here. 

Senator BOXER. OK, so we are going to close this panel by asking 

Senator Vitter to ask his remaining questions. Then we will move 

on and hear from the people of New Orleans. 

Senator VITTER. Thanks, Madam Chair. 

General, you said in your statement that all of your important 

work in South Louisiana has gone through extensive peer review 

and similar review. Has the analysis of Option 1 versus Option 2 

and 2a gone through any sort of outside peer review? 

General WALSH. Yes, sir. As we were putting together the report 

that we submitted to Congress in 2007, it goes through the evaluation process and the methods that we are looking at and getting 

multiple comments from many different people. Then we put together a senior review panel that looked at the documents in 2007. 

That senior peer review had members not only from the Corps of 

Engineers, but we had members from academia and six members 

from private architect-engineer firms. Many folks provided input to 

this report. 

Senator VITTER. So, presumably, they validated the comparative 

analysis I referenced a few minutes ago? 

General WALSH. As I understand your question, yes. Yes, sir. 

Senator VITTER. OK. Go back to this frustrating authorization, 

General. You all are now modifying Option 1 to lower the sills, to 

do other things that would be required if Option 2 is built in the 

future. Correct? 

General WALSH. We are reviewing that, yes, sir. 

Senator VITTER. The Corps has told me that is the new Option 

1, that Option 1 is modified for that. My question is simple. If you 

do not have the authority to do all of Option 2, how do you have 

authority to do part of Option 2 which is modifying the sills and 

doing what you are talking about doing to be consistent with Option 2? Because that is not necessary for Option 1. 
43 

General WALSH. Sir, what we are looking at is for Option 1 to 

protect the city from perimeter protection and surge. 

Senator VITTER. Right, but the modifications I am talking about 

would only be required for Option 2. So how do you not have authority for Option 2, but have authority to do that, which is part 

of Option 2? 

General WALSH. Sir, the Chief has some minor discretionary authority to make those changes. 

Senator VITTER. OK. To me, that means because you all can do 

what you want. In terms of the dollars, you have also said you 

have only been given the dollars to do Option 1. Did Congress not 

give you the dollars, the Corps and the then Bush administration, 

asked for? 

General WALSH. Yes, sir. 

Senator VITTER. And the Corps did not say, Congress you have 

a choice. Option 1 costs this much. Option 2 costs this much. The 

Corps said, we want these dollars. 

General WALSH. What we were looking for is to provide perimeter protection again surge. Yes, sir. 

Senator VITTER. I am just pointing out that when you say you 

only have the money to do Option 1, it is because you only asked 

for the money to do Option 1. There was no discussion with this 

Committee or Congress about those choices. Certainly, serving on 

this Committee, if I had understood at the time that your position 

2 years later would be this authorization, this money, excludes Option 2, I would have thrown a fit. But there was no discussion 

about that. I just put that for the record. 

Finally, Pump to the River is a very important component of all 

of this. That is the a of 2a. It would send a lot of important drainage that goes into the 17th Street Canal in a whole other direction 

so we do not impact and further stress the 17th Street Canal. Is 

that a fair statement? A fair description? 

General WALSH. As I understand it, yes, Senator. 

Senator VITTER. Well, this is a statement, not a question. I think 

that is very reasonable, given that we are artificially lowering the 

capacity of the outfall canals with this safe water level. We are saying that the water cannot be allowed to get above seven feet lower 

than the top of the wall, which is way lower than what it was built 

for. So, would it not be reasonable, in light of that, to build a supplementary project like Pump to the River that sends some volume 

of water in another direction to compensate for that lowering of capacity? 

General WALSH. Right now, Senator, the Sewerage and Water 

Board pumps the water out of the city for rain events and tropical 

events. We do not need to close the gates and provide perimeter 

protection unless Lake Pontchartrain gets within one foot of the 

safe water elevation. That did happen in Gustav and Ike, and we 

sent our canal captains to work with them and we were able to provide just the right amount, or more than the right amount, of coordination to make that happen. 

Senator VITTER. General, let me just end with a statement. 

Again, my big overarching concern is that we could be repeating a 

grave mistake of history. 
44 

After Hurricane Betsy, all of us moved forward and built a protection system that was the cheapest but not the best. And we disregarded the Wrigley’s—[phonetically]-protection system that 

would have prevented water from coming into the lake and we 

built this system instead. I do not want to repeat that mistake of 

building something because it is cheaper, but not better. 

And again, in this regard, Chris Accardo of the Corps agrees with 

me. He said at that May 20, 2009 public hearing, referring to that 

previous episode in the 1950s and 1960s, ‘‘That is why you do not 

have it place today. And if you would have had it in place for 

Katrina, you would not have had the mess that we have.’’ So, that 

is what I want to avoid for the future. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Senator BOXER. OK. Well, Senator Vitter’s questioning has 

brought some other questions to our Senator Landrieu. So, why do 

you not take 5 minutes? 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you. It will really only be 2 minutes. 

Are you aware that in expert testimony before the Courts, General, on the issue of damage related to the storm, that it has been 

identified that there was $40 billion worth of damage caused by the 

failure of this system? 

General WALSH. I am not familiar with that. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Well, the record will reflect that, and perhaps 

it may be in the testimony, but $40 billion of additional damage 

was created by the failure of this levee system. So, when Senator 

Vitter and I keep pressing for the best project, this is why. We cannot afford another $40 billion or $50 billion or $80 billion mistake. 

Pinching pennies to be penny wise but pound foolish is the point 

here. 

I just want to ask the final question. You say you talked with 

the Sewage and Water Board. We are at a point, middle of the 

storm, storm surge, perimeter protection, the gates come down. 

What amount of flooding do you think is acceptable in the city? 

Have you talked with the Sewage and Water Board about the 

rain event? How much rain can be absorbed when your gates are 

closed for your perimeter? Do you know that? Can you testify on 

that to the record? Is it two feet in Broadmoor or is it five feet in 

Broadmoor? Or is it three feet in Mid-City? How much rain can we 

absorb with your gates closed if the storm sits over the city as it 

has not done in either Katrina or Gustav but it has done in other 

lifetime in other storms? 

General WALSH. Senator, the pumps are built so they can handle 

the water as the city pumps it out. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Currently. At any level of rainfall? 

General WALSH. Yes, Ma’am. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK. I am looking forward to the testimony, 

Madam Chair, of the next panel because that is the issue here. 

With the canals closed under this plan and a storm sitting over the 

city dropping heavy rainfall, Orleans and Jefferson, which is about 

1 million people roughly, close to 1 million people, are at risk of 

catastrophic flooding not from the perimeter, but from the rain internal flooding, which is what we are trying to point out here in 

this testimony. 
45 

I thank the Chair. She has been very gracious. And thank you, 

General, for agreeing to stay because I think it is important for you 

to hear this next panel. 

Senator BOXER. General, I want to thank you. I know this has 

not been very pleasant but, again, I have to say the Corps works 

so hard. But I get frustrated sometimes because you have a turnover and one individual finally learns everything, like today you 

learned about the $40 billion in damages. That is an important 

piece of information because that should drive what we spend to 

fix this. 

It does not make any sense, it seems to me, to choose an option that is like $1 billion instead of $2 billion, I am just throwing a 

number out, when you could spend $1 billion and have $40 billion 

worth of damages and spend $2 billion and not have any damage. 

I am just pointing this out. 

And I think my colleagues have used very important examples, 

the carpenter example and the brakes example. You know, fool me 

once, OK, but do not fool us twice here. I do not mean you personally. I mean the Corps as an institution has got to work with us. 

And I just would beg you to, at some point, think about this. We 

need to know if you are picking, and I believe you are picking, an 

option because it is less money. I do believe that. I really do believe 

that. 

We are all in a terrible bind here because we have so much of 

a problem with our budget, with our debt. But we have to be honest. Look, if you told us that and we decided that is all we can do, 

then it is on us. But it is so hard for me to accept the fact that 

this option, in light of what I have been told by my colleagues who 

have nothing to gain by having to push us for more money, this is 

their worst nightmare in the world. They have had to push so hard. 

They do not want to. 

But if they, and the next panel, and again you are very gracious 

to stay, if they are really clear on it, all I can say is do not rush 

to fund an inadequate project. I am concerned. Senator Vitter has 

said you may be in the process of signing some agreements to move 

forward with this. That is a terrible idea. 

I would think that you would think enough of this Committee, 

these colleagues here, and the community, as well as the 

congressionals, to at least take a pause here and take another look. 

If I have a message for you, even before hearing the panel, it is 

that. Do not rush to undertake the expenditure of a lot of funds 

that might not be adequate for the task. 

So, I know it has not been a very pleasant experience for you but 

I am appreciative of your time and appreciative that you will stay. 

With that, we will call up our panel. Jeff Jacobs, Scholar, National Research Council, Committee on New Orleans Regional Hurricane Protection. Steven Peyronnin, I know I did not say that 

right. Did say that badly? How do I pronounce it? Executive Director, Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana. Dr. Robert Twilley, 

Vice Chancellor of Research and Economic Development, Professor, 

Department of Oceanography and Coastal Sciences, Louisiana 

State University. Joseph Rault, President, Rault Resources Group 

of New Orleans, Executive Committee Board Member, Pump to the 

River. Thomas L. Jackson, Commissioner and Past President, 
46 

Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority—East, retired civil 

engineer and Past National President of the American Society of 

Civil Engineers. 

Let me just say, this is quite an amazing panel. Because we went 

so long with our first panel, but I think, I am sure you appreciate 

the fact that we did in order to get to the bottom of all of these 

issues, my own schedule means that I need to leave. I will try to 

stay for as many as I can hear. I am going to hand the gavel, when 

I leave, over to Senator Vitter and he can run this and include Senator Landrieu. I think with the two of you Senators here, we 

should be able to get a lot of clarity. 

So, why do we not start with Jeff and we will go right through 

this way. OK? 

Go ahead, Jeff Jacobs. 

STATEMENT OF JEFFREY JACOBS, SCHOLAR, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL AND STUDY DIRECTOR, COMMITTEE ON 

NEW ORLEANS REGIONAL HURRICANE PROTECTION 

PROJECTS 

Mr. JACOBS. Good afternoon, Madam Chair, members of the 

Committee, and others. 

My name is Jeffrey Jacobs. I am a Scholar with the National Research Council and I served as the Study Director for the National 

Academy of Engineering and National Research Council’s Committee on New Orleans Regional Hurricane Protection Projects. 

The Council is the operating arm of the National Academy, which 

operates under an 1863 congressional charter to provide independent advice to the Federal Government on scientific and technical matters. 

Our committee was convened in December 2005 at the request 

of Mr. J.P. Woodley, then-Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil 

Works, to review reports from the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force, or IPET. The IPET was established by the 

Corps of Engineers to evaluate the performance of the New Orleans 

hurricane protection system during Hurricane Katrina. 

Our committee’s fifth and final report was issued in April 2009 

and it reviewed the IPET draft final report and also commented on 

lessons learned during Hurricane Katrina. My comments this afternoon summarize those lessons as identified in our report. 

One lesson regards the limits of protective structures. Hurricane 

Katrina illustrated undue optimism about the ability of structures 

such as levees and floodwalls to provide absolute flood protection. 

Post-Katrina strengthening of the system has reduced some 

vulnerabilities but the risks of inundation and flooding in New Orleans never can be fully eliminated by protective structures. 

Another lesson regards the future footprint of the hurricane protection system. Many reconstruction activities apparently are taking place largely according to the system’s pre-Katrina footprint, 

without consideration of whether this configuration is optimal. We 

recommend that there should at least be some discussions of the 

pros and cons of different configurations of protective structures. 

Another lesson regards relocations. Regardless of future levee 

construction, it likely will not be possible to provide equal levels of 

flood protection across the city. Plans for system upgrades should 
47 

discourage settlement in areas most vulnerable to hurricane storm 

surge, and voluntary relocation of people and neighborhoods out of 

particularly vulnerable areas should be considered as a public policy option. 

Another lesson regards flood proofing. Where it is not feasible to 

relocate people and buildings out of vulnerable areas, significant 

improvements in flood proofing will be essential. To provide adequate protection against flooding in vulnerable areas, we recommend that the first floor of houses be elevated to at least the 

height associated with the 100-year storm event. 

Another lesson regards the 100-year level of flood protection. The 

100-year flood defines areas with a 1 percent chance of flooding. 

Each year, it is a crucial national flood insurance standard. For 

areas where levee failure is not a major safety concern, the 100- 

year standard may be appropriate for developing regulations and 

setting insurance rates. 

However, for heavily populated urban areas where failure of protective structures would be catastrophic, such as New Orleans, the 

100-year standard is inadequate. By comparison, the Association of 

State Floodplain Managers recommends that the 500-year flood be 

used as a minimum safety standard for urban areas. 

Another lesson regards evacuation. Although the disaster response plan for New Orleans successfully evacuated much of the 

city before Katrina, it was inadequate. Future plans should consider options such as improved local and regional shelters to make 

evacuations less imposing and locating facilities for the ill and elderly away from more vulnerable areas subject to frequent evacuations. 

Another lesson regards risk communication. Before Katrina, 

there unfortunately was a limited appreciation of the risk associated with living behind levees. Risks posed by hurricanes and 

storm surge to New Orleans should be more consistently and effectively communicated to residents and decisionmakers. 

And a final lesson from our report regards periodic assessment 

and independent review. The level of protection provided by the 

New Orleans hurricane protection system has changed over the 

years because of factors such as geologic subsidence. It thus is important to conduct regular assessments that evaluate environmental and other factors that affect system performance. It also is 

important to provide an independent, second opinion of major engineering and design plans to help ensure that calculations are reliable and methods employed are appropriate. 

The post-Katrina setting poses many challenges and open questions. There is no model for post-hurricane recovery for New Orleans. Building a protection system to higher standards and making 

wise choices about future development should help create a safer 

city. But there is no clear agreement about the path forward. 

What does seem clear, however, is that information regarding the 

risk of hurricane storm surge and damages to New Orleans should 

be more widely acknowledged and appreciated than in the past and 

accorded a higher priority in future development plans and decisions. 

Madam Chair and members of the Committee, that concludes my 

remarks. I thank you for inviting me to speak with you today. I 
48 

would be happy to discuss questions you may have about our committee’s report. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jacobs follows:] 
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Senator BOXER. Thank you very much. I am going to amend 

what I said before, just because I am very interested in this Pump 

to the River issue. Mr. Rault, would you mind going next? And 

then we will go to Steve. 

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH M. RAULT, EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 

BOARD MEMBER, PUMP TO THE RIVER 

Mr. RAULT. Thank you very much, Madam Chair and distinguished Members of the Committee. It is really a pleasure to be 

here on behalf of the citizens of New Orleans and Jefferson, particularly with the widespread catastrophic problems caused by the 

breaches of the 17th Street Canal. 

My name is Joseph Rault. I am a native of New Orleans. I am 

representing a non-profit citizens group of 100,00 people who live 

in the Hoey’s Basin as pointed out by Senator Vitter on the chart 

up front, 85,000 of which are in Orleans Parish or County, and 

15,000 of which are in adjoining Jefferson Parish or County. 

We have 24 neighborhood groups who are listed on the map in 

the back of my testimony and, Madam Chair, I would like to ask 

that my written testimony be introduced in the record. 

Senator BOXER. Without objection. So ordered. 

Mr. RAULT. Thank you so much. 

These 100,000 people are from all walks of life and all of them 

suffered tremendous problems. 

I am a graduate of MIT, for my background. I attended Georgetown Law here in Washington. I graduated from Tulane Law in 

New Orleans. I served in the United States Navy from 1943 until 

1946 and ended up as the commander of the USS LCI 549 at the 

Bikini atomic bomb test. I am a private businessman. I own my 

own business in medium high-rise development of office buildings, 

two of which are in Jefferson Parish. 

I have met over the last 3 years with the Corps at all of their 

partnering meetings, as described by the General. At every one of 

them where there were stakeholders involved, Pump to the River, 

Option 2 and Option 1 were all discussed and at each one, the consensus was that Option 2 was the way to go and Option 2a, known 

as Pump to the River, was an acceptable option and should be explored. 

My wife and I lived in Jefferson Parish for the last 30 years. We 

raised our children and our grandchildren in a very happy environment. We lost our home, as did thousands of others. We want to 

restore that area. And speaking for that 100,000 people, really representing the million people in the combined area, we would like 

to move forward. 

What did those people do? They immediately got on their horse 

and looked at all options and whether they could find a solution so 

we could go forward. And that was in the Corps’ own record, where 

shortly after the storm the Corps engaged a study by DMJM Harris Company. And what did it say? This was just months after the 

storm. It said Pump to the River was a feasible option and should 

be explored. 

From that point on, we, the citizens in Jefferson Parish and Orleans, agreed to engage private engineers who came, verified, studied 

and saw that this was a real option. 
57 

What is Pump to the River? As Senator Vitter said, it is very 

simple. You build a pipeline to the close-by Mississippi River, add 

a pump, and take the water from the source of where it is collecting in the lowest part of the basin. What does it do? It would 

take 25 percent of the water out of the 17th Street Canal system 

and would cost very competitively by the Corps’ own statements, 

$205 million. 

They have linked a to 2, but it is an independent, self-standing 

project that could be done with or without any other support. But 

I want to make it clear, we do support Option 2 for the safety of 

the people. The advantage of this is that $205 million is only 6 percent of what the Corps is going to spend on the pumps at the 

mouth. The $205 million is only 20 percent of what Option 2 would 

be. By reducing the water volume in the 17th Street Canal, this 

would be a significant, a significant, saving in any alterations and 

expenditures to the canal under Option 2. 

Similarly, this would reduce the costs of the pumps at the mouth 

of the canal at the Lake Pontchartrain side because there would be 

less water to handle at that end. And the most important part, as 

Senator Vitter pointed out and Senator Landrieu concurred, it is 

safer. It would simply take the water out of the system and avoid 

the huge risk of the collapse of the walls again. Again, this is independent system. It is not dependent on any other system. 

With due respect to the General’s comments about storm surge, 

while it is nice to say that we are going to do the sill deep enough 

to accommodate either 1 or 2, this is not just about storm surge, 

it is about hurricane protection, whether it is from storms, storm 

surge, heavy rain, lightning, whatever might cause flooding to the 

citizens of that area. 

Now, who is for this? Everyone in the State unanimously is with 

this. The State of Louisiana, the city of New Orleans, the City 

Council of New Orleans, represented here by Joe Sherman, Jefferson Parish, represented here by Councilman John Young who has 

handed me resolutions that I would like put in the record from Jefferson Parish, and from the Regional Planning Commission of 

seven Parishes, that is seven counties, supporting Pump to the 

River and supporting 2 or 2a. 

May I have permission—— 

Senator BOXER. Yes. Absolutely. Put it in the record. And if you 

could finish in the next minute or so. 

Mr. RAULT. Thank you very much. I appreciate, Madam 

Chair—— 

Senator BOXER. No, you are doing great. You are doing just fine. 

Mr. RAULT. Who is against this? Nobody. The Corps has admitted, as Senator Vitter pointed out twice, once in writing in the 2007 

report and again 3 weeks ago when Mr. Accardo voluntarily said 

it to a group of 400 people who were there to protest what the 

Corps was doing. I was one of them and my ears almost fell off 

when I heard it. And here today are other members of our committee who similarly were there: Lisa Ludwig, our project manager, 

John Baus, Joe Sharman and Dr. Shirley Laska of UNO, who prepared one of these. 

So, in conclusion, I can only say, Madam Chair and members of 

the Committee, thank you for seeing us. Pump to the River is the 
58 

answer. In addition to Option 2, the safety is obvious. It is a standalone project. It can be done for a very competitive price of $205 

million and it does not have to be bundled into any of the other 

options. It can stand alone and start immediately. 

We need help now, today, and not over an 8- or 10-year period 

as was suggested by the Corps as it might take for 2, which I seriously question. I also seriously question their estimate of the cost. 

Finally, the flood insurance claims paid by the U.S. Government in this area alone were $4.2 billion. Pump to the River is only 20 

percent of that. It would pay for itself over and over again, not to 

mention the redundancy of all of the problems from the private insurance companies and so forth. 

Last, the biggest hospital in the area, Ochsner, is in this area 

and would be accommodated in its security and safety during a 

storm. 

Thank you so much for this opportunity on behalf of the 100,000 

people. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rault follows:] 
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Senator BOXER. Thank you, Mr. Rault. 

I just want to take a personal privilege here as the Chair to say 

how much I appreciate our witnesses today, particularly Mr. Rault. 

Because I have to leave, I wanted to say that I have been having 

cross conversations with my two colleagues here. Having lived 

through so many floods in my area, a lot of folks say hey, why is 

Senator Boxer so interested? Because I understand what is at 

stake here. 

One of the first things I did when I was a member of the House, 

a long time ago, is to work on getting an appropriate flood control 

project for, believe it or not, a creek that would overflow to such 

a degree that it would absolutely flood many, many, many houses. 

Sometimes we actually had to have people evacuate to their rooftops. That is true. I remember that once. That was when I was on 

the County Board of Supervisors. So I get what water can do, what 

water can do. 

I am so persuaded that this Pump to the River project makes 

sense that I have asked my colleagues to work with me. We may 

not be able to wait for the next Water Resources Development Act. 

We may just have to go to our colleagues on the Committee and 

say, this is an urgent need. I think between Senator Vitter and myself, and Senator Landrieu, we can cover the Committee and see 

what they think about this. I am very worried that we are going 

to miss an opportunity here to authorize something that seems to 

make a lot of sense. 

I would just ask you, Mr. Rault, if you, working with my colleagues and the members of the community, would you see that the 

Committee gets copies of any studies that have been done that you 

are aware on Pump to the River? Studies either by the cities, the 

counties, and the flood control districts, all of the various agencies, 

the citizens. Do you have some of those? 

Senator VITTER. Madam Chair, actually Joe gave me a list of 

seven of exactly what you are talking about to submit to the record. 

Senator BOXER. Good. We have those in the record, so we will 

read those. But it seems to me if we can move forward with seven 

studies behind us with an authorization, and then have some hearings on it to just flesh it out further, and get our colleagues to go 

with us, I think we can persuade them. And then, of course, Senator Landrieu goes to her magic committee, the Appropriations 

Committee, and tries to get the thing moving. 

It just seems to me to make so much sense that if you are pumping everything into this lake, it is just common sense that if there 

is another place to put it that is deeper and wider and broader, 

then let us do that. We have got to get rid of the water and get 

rid of it fast. 

Look, obviously I respect the Corps. But I would like to say to 

the good General, without asking him to take the microphone again 

because the poor guy has done enough of that, if you would please 

respond to me in writing as to the Corps’ view on the Pump to the 

River Project. If you could write to us about what you think the 

consensus is on that project. 

Here is the thing. I think Mr. Rault makes the case. It is a stand 

alone. So, this other fight over 1 and 2 goes on. But this, to me, 
78 

it seems to me that we could do this and it does not do damage 

to our other discussion on Options 1 or 2 or 2a, or b or c or d. 

Mr. RAULT. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I offered the seven 

engineering reports and other studies for the record and the engineers are ready to roll. 

Senator BOXER. Well, that is good. And at this point, I am going 

to hand the gavel over to my colleague. You know, there is a lot 

of trust in this, Senator Vitter, because Lord knows what you could 

do with me out of the room on other issues. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator BOXER. So, this is just for the purpose of this hearing. 

It is not for the purpose of writing global warming legislation, or 

Clean Air Act amendments. I have your word. 

I have really, frankly, learned so much from the people of your 

State and I have such respect for them and admiration for them 

and friendship with them. So, I hope you will consider me part of 

your team as we move forward. 

I know that things are going to get better. The reason is that you 

have people who are hearing you, are listening to you and you also 

have within your community the intelligence and the drive to save 

what James Carville says is a very special culture. And we in 

America cannot afford to lose that culture, that tradition, that history. And as long as I am Chairman of this Committee, you are not 

going to lose it. We are going to work very hard to get this done. 

I thank you and I will run on to my other meetings because California calls. I will turn the gavel over to my friend, Senator Vitter. 

Senator VITTER [presiding]. Thank you, Madam Chair, and you 

certainly have my commitment about the gavel today. We look forward to working with you, in the very near future, along the lines 

you have outlined. I would just suggest that we include in that 

clarification because I honestly do not think that this is anything 

new, that 2 is covered just as surely as 1, and then leave it up to 

the appropriators and others to study both. 

Thank you very much. Thank you for all your leadership. 

And now we will go back to the order and Mr. Steven Peyronnin. 

STATEMENT OF STEVEN PEYRONNIN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 

OF THE COALITION TO RESTORE COASTAL LOUISIANA 

Mr. PEYRONNIN. On behalf of the members and partners of the 

Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana, I thank you very much for 

the opportunity to be here today. 

I am sure it will come as no surprise to the members of this 

Committee that in the past 75 years, coastal Louisiana has lost 

more than 2,300 miles of coastal wetlands and that, without immediate and decisive action, Louisiana could potentially lose an additional 800 square miles by the year 2050. 

Decades of science and planning have made it clear that we possess the scientific, technical and engineering expertise to restore 

sustainability to this landscape, and at the same time enhance reliable hurricane protection. What is lacking is a clear sense of urgency to pursue the projects, the plans and the tools authorized by 

Congress in the LCA. 

The LCA authorized the construction of five initial projects recommended in the Chief of Engineers report because of their ad-
79 

vanced investigations and the ability to implement them expeditiously. Despite the clear path articulated in the authorization, 

only one project is scheduled to begin construction prior to 2012. 

Under the LCA, Congress also authorized the development and 

delivery of a comprehensive restoration plan by January 2008. This 

plan has not been initiated. 

Among the most critical elements of the restoration plan were 

the requirements for specific, measurable success criteria and a 

prioritized list of projects. Many scientists agree that it is not possible to restore the landscape of coastal Louisiana to historic conditions. This leads to the critical question of exactly how much of 

Louisiana’s coast can be restored and which areas are the most essential? 

Without the most basic understanding of what a successful program should achieve, and what elements or projects are the most 

important, it is nearly impossible to prioritize limited resources to 

implement an effective and efficient program. 

Without a restoration plan, there is no framework for integrating 

restoration projects with storm protection projects. Despite technical modeling that indicates that the existing coastal landscape reduces storm surge, the Corps of Engineers has not analyzed how 

expanded restoration efforts would enhance hurricane protection. 

Without a restoration plan, there also is no framework for integrating restoration projects with navigation activities. Under the 

current management priorities for the Mississippi River, levees 

harness the river to prevent flooding and then funnel the trapped 

sediment beyond the continental shelf to maintain navigation. The 

result is the elimination of desperately needed sediment and fresh 

water from the surrounding ecosystem, exposing river levees to the 

full brunt of storms and hurricanes. 

This narrow management focus has created a system that is not 

sustainable. Recognizing restoration as an equal priority is not simply a matter of economic incentive or public safety. It is a matter 

of maintaining the sustainability of the entire lower river system. 

Comprehensive restorations will have implications that expand 

across the missions and capacities of multiple Federal agencies. 

The LCA authorization addressed this in two ways. First, by requiring the comprehensive plan to describe the role of other Federal and State agencies in a long-term restoration program, and 

second by establishing a task force of Federal and State entities to 

make recommendations and contribute financial support. 

With neither a comprehensive plan nor a task force in place, the 

Federal resources concentrated in coastal Louisiana are often disconnected and isolated. The result has been a segmented process 

that lacks critical input and resources from multiple agencies, negating the full leverage of a coordinated Federal effort. 

The LCA authorization created a number of tools, as I have described, for pushing forward with a programmatic restoration plan. 

The Corps has not used these tools, and has instead relied on a traditional project development process that is ill-suited to urgently 

respond to this crisis. 

The hurricanes of 2005 demonstrated that we cannot wait until 

after a disaster to insist on accountability. Scientists estimate that 
80 

restoration efforts in coastal Louisiana have less than a decade before our chances of success are significantly reduced. 

Accountability simply must be a perpetual element of any effective program. But accountability must be balanced with the capacity to succeed. Given the shear scope and complexity of comprehensive restoration in coastal Louisiana, we must recognize that a true 

commitment will constitute the largest ecosystem restoration ever 

in the world. 

The issue before this Committee today has been described as the 

most preventable environmental crisis in America. Without a 

strong sense of urgency and commitment, we face the almost certain collapse of the largest delta on this continent, taking with it 

the very heart and soul of Louisiana. 

I thank you for your time to be here today and I welcome any 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Peyronnin follows:] 
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Senator VITTER. Thank you very much, sir. Now we will here 

from Dr. Robert Twilley, who is a professor with the Department 

of Oceanography and Coastal Sciences at LSU. 

Thank you, Doctor. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT R. TWILLEY, PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF OCEANOGRAPHY AND COASTAL SCIENCES, VICE 

CHANCELLOR, RESEARCH AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 

LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY 

Mr. TWILLEY. Thank you very much. I appreciate this opportunity of lending some comments to the Committee on the Environment and Public Works. 

Let me start out just by saying that the sustainability of coastal 

Louisiana, as we have been hearing here today, is critical to the 

Nation. However, this is not just a Louisiana issue. The challenges 

facing the Gulf Coast reflect a national inability to come to grips 

with the need to deal with neglected infrastructure, both natural 

and built, and the realization that both of these natural and built 

environments provide security to coastal communities and to the 

Nation. It will not be possible to protect and restore coastal Louisiana without significant changes in the way the Federal and 

State governments deal with these issues. 

It is alarming that, even though the Nation’s largest port and energy complex, a metropolitan area of 1 million residents, and coastal wetlands of immense value are at risk, that funds to support the 

restoration and protection of coastal Louisiana have been slow in 

coming. And I want to offer three major points around that theme. 

First, we have to, and it is urgent that, we devote our attention 

to finding solutions. There is much interest in solutions in the Gulf 

Coast that have been proposed by the Dutch in their efforts to protect The Netherlands. There are a couple of key points that the 

Dutch have learned that nearly three centuries of trying to live in 

a region largely below sea level that are relevant to our national 

priorities here in the United States. 

First and foremost, civil engineering has been replaced by the 

principles of ecological engineering. Working with nature is a first 

principle of the new Dutch system. The Dutch have learned that 

shortening the coast using hardened structures, such as barriers 

which disrupt the natural hydrology, can have major adverse environmental impacts. This includes the realities of how a changing 

climate must be part of any new design features. 

Second, water quality issues can limit the sustainable solutions 

to more comprehensive water management. Thus, strategies to reduce nutrients have to be in concert with water management solutions. 

The Gulf Coast region has been attempting to deal with similar 

comprehensive approaches to watershed management, recognizing 

that the problems of Southern Louisiana are not solely those of our 

State. 

First, sediment required to replenish the wetlands will come 

down the Mississippi River and much of the original sediment load 

of the Mississippi is trapped behind major dams in the Missouri 

River system. Thus, a more comprehensive approach to sediment 

buffers is required. 
93 

Second, a major dead zone, an area where marine life is stressed 

because of lack of oxygen, now exists in the Gulf of Mexico along 

Louisiana and parts of Texas as a result of excessive nutrients 

traveling the Mississippi from the farmland of the Midwest. Although sediments are critical to rebuilding the wetlands of the Mississippi River Delta, additional nutrients flowing through the river 

divergent structures could potentially impair inland waters of the 

State, shutting down our most critical strategy of restoring the 

Mississippi River Delta. Therefore, we must find practices and political will to reduce nutrients to the Gulf Coast hypoxic zone. 

Third, the specter of climate change is adding to the coastal and 

water management challenges. Existing projects will have to be 

modified to accomplish the purposes for which they originally were 

designed and additional attention will be required to deal with the 

already significant strain on recovering ecosystems. 

Only through rethinking how we manage the Mississippi River, 

not only to provide for navigation and flood control but also as a 

critical source of sediments to stabilize the degrading wetlands, 

will restoration be realized in a 100-year project cycle given the 

projected rates of sea level rise. 

To do this, we have to urgently look for ways to fund these solutions. The largest source of funds for dealing with major water 

projects is found in the budget of the Corps. Unfortunately, priority 

setting is tied to a rudderless system for allocating Federal funds 

and assessing national needs. 

Is it difficult to justify a national priority when objectives at the 

national level are not clear? Developing on a needs assessment is 

dependent upon national policies that are perfectly defined national 

goals for water use. Whom do we protect from flooding? What infrastructure is at risk? What losses and risks are most valuable to the 

economic, ecological and social well-being of this Nation? How important are our ports to the economy of this Country? 

Recent National Research Council studies of the Corps’ planning 

process and projects have indicated that the Corps is faced with 

conflicting laws and regulations that make prioritization and description needs difficult to manage. 

I will end with what I find to be one of the most important parts 

of this issue which is that not only do we have to find solutions, 

not only do we have to fund solutions, we have to coordinate solutions. In the past, the United States successfully established processes that deal with challenges of developing priorities and funding 

to deal with water issues of national significance. 

In 1879, Congress established the Mississippi River Commission 

with the mission of providing a navigable Mississippi and reducing 

the ravages of frequent floods. After the 1927 flood, Congress 

passed the Flood Control Act in 1928 which created the comprehensive Mississippi River and Tributaries project. This permitted the 

commission to deal with the lower valley as a whole: one mission, 

one entity and, therefore, a very successful cooperative project 

among interested parties to integrate resources to meet the challenge. 

Although times are much different today, the need to deal with 

issues in the lower Mississippi River Valley in a comprehensive 

manner remains. The continuous funding on the work of the lower 
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Mississippi River Valley for nearly 80 years and the comprehensiveness of the effort show the utility of developing a separate Federal project, similar to the MR&T, for restoring and protecting 

coastal Louisiana. 

Now, I will finish with this comment. Protection and restoration 

of coastal Louisiana should be a major priority for the United 

States. The Nation cannot live without its water resources and 

deltaic coast. It cannot continue to watch Louisiana disappear. 

Sooner or later, it will have to address the problem. The longer we 

wait, the more difficult the problem will become and the more 

money the eventual solution will cost. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Twilley follows:] 
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Senator VITTER. Thank you, Dr. Twilley. 

And now we will hear from Thomas L. Jackson. He is Commissioner and past President of the Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority East and 2003 National President of the American 

Society of Civil Engineers. 

Welcome. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS L. JACKSON, P.E., D.WRE, COMMISSIONER AND PAST PRESIDENT, SOUTHEAST LOUISIANA 

FLOOD PROTECTION AUTHORITY—EAST 

Mr. JACKSON. Thank you, Senators. 

I will skip my first part, which repeated what you just said. I 

will add that I am a registered professional civil engineer with specialty certification in water resources, was educated at Tulane University, and am also a lifelong resident of New Orleans and Jefferson Parish. So, I do have a vested interest. 

My report to you today will focus on the selection of options for 

the pumping stations planned by the Corps of Engineers for the 

three outflow canals at the lakefront in Orleans Parish. The 17th 

Street, London and Orleans outfall canals drain the central part of 

the city of New Orleans and a portion of Jefferson Parish. 

Following Hurricane Betsy flooding, the Corps raised the canal 

levees to 12.5 feet. While the Corps own engineers recommended 

T-walls to raise these canal levees, the Corps insisted that I-walls 

be used because they were cheap and within their budget for the 

project. Sound familiar? Unfortunately, during Hurricane Katrina, 

sections of these cheaper I-walls failed along the 17th Street and 

London Avenue Canals, flooding the city and a portion of Jefferson 

Parish. 

Temporary pump stations and floodgates have been built at the 

lakefront to prevent hurricane tidal surges from entering these canals at this time. Levees and floodwalls along the 17th Street 

Canal have only been declared to be safe up to a level of 6 feet, 

not 12.5 feet as built by the Corps in the 1960s, and I think that 

was brought out earlier. Rainwater pumping at local stations will 

raise these canal levels at or near these maximum water levels 

every time we have a hard rainfall. 

Permanent pumping stations and floodgates at the lakefront are 

planned by the Corps under Option 1. Local pumping stations 

would then pump directly into Lake Pontchartrain during non-hurricane events, only utilizing the new lakefront pumping stations 

when lake levels approach maximum safe water levels in the canals. 

The Corps contends that only Option 1 is within the congressional authorization and budget, even though they have admitted 

that Option 2 is technically superior to Option 1. 

Option 1 will leave the responsibility for the Corps’ defective levees and floodwalls to local interests. The bottom line is that the 

Corps built poorly designed floodwalls and now they want to put 

the responsibility for their errors on local interests. They say protection can only be provided at the lakefront in accordance with 

their congressional authorization. 

An extremely crucial consideration in this selection of options at 

issue is that safe water levels in these canals are not static. During 
106 

each rainfall, silt from urban runoff settles to the bottom of the canals every time the pumps are shut off, further restricting the canals. From time to time, the canals must be dug out to remove this 

silt. This cleaning will further deteriorate the levees and floodwalls 

and reduce the safe water levels to a point that local pumps cannot 

be operated at full capacity, resulting in flooding the city. 

In addition, the stability of the levees and I-walls will continue 

to deteriorate because of poor soil conditions beneath these levees. 

It is incomprehensible that an agency of the Federal Government 

would be allowed by Congress to only partially correct such a serious error and dump the responsibility on local government as 

would happen under Option 1. 

So what is the solution? Option 2, as shown by the Corps in its 

90-day report to the Congress, would provide a full time pump station at the lakefront on each of these canals, removal of the interior 

local pump stations and conversion of the canals to low level, which 

would negate the need for the existing defective interior levees. The 

Corps has not adequately studied Option 2 and has rejected it outright saying they are not authorized to do any work that is not 

along the new hurricane protection alignment along the lakefront. 

The Corps has even publicly admitted that Option 2 is technically 

superior for overall needs. 

What are the advantages of Option 2? First and foremost, the 

elimination of the intrusion of high water levels into the heart of 

the city. Second, the elimination altogether of the need for the defective levees and floodwalls. Third, improvements to local drainage. And fourth, drainage systems in Jefferson and Orleans could 

be interconnected for use during emergency situations. 

In an attempt to reduce the volume of rainwater in the 17th 

Street Canal, Jefferson Parish suggested building a pumping station in Jefferson to pump rainwater directly into the Mississippi 

River. Option 2a would be helpful because it would decrease the 

load on the overburdened levees along the 17th Street Canal, as we 

discussed earlier. 

What are we asking the Congress to do for us today? We ask 

that, as soon as possible, the Congress re-write the authorization, 

if necessary, to provide protection along the lakefront as well as 

any work necessary to eliminate the defective and inadequate protection along these outfall canals. 

Second, we ask that the Congress authorize and require that the 

Corps conduct a thorough study of Option 2. 

Third, we ask that Congress require that the Corps include the 

services of at least two external peer review experts for this evaluation. 

Last, we ask that Congress create a panel of local interests and 

instruct the Corps and the peer review experts to provide monthly 

reports. 

The interim pump stations and gates can provide protection 

while the best solution is studied and constructed. Additional studies are necessary because this is a situation where complete studies 

have not yet been conducted and the wrong solution is underway 

post haste by the Corps. 

The people in this community deserve the best solution. Please 

do not allow the Corps to fail us again based on the Corps’ short- 
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sighted and unnecessarily restrictive interpretation of congressional authorization for hurricane protection. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jackson follows:] 
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Senator VITTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Jackson. Thanks to 

all of you. 

As we begin questions, let me just submit for the record the 

seven items, reports, petitions, engineering studies supporting 

Pump to the River, a statement of Congressman Steve Scalise on 

all of these topics, and a list of further questions for the Corps of 

Engineers which, General, I will get to you in writing and you can 

have any reasonable amount of time to submit answers in writing. 

[The referenced documents follow:] 
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Senator VITTER. The first one, I will just alert you, are 20 different significant items under the last WRDA bill which were mandated by the bill to track progress on those and, by our account, 

there has been little to no progress on those 20 items. But I will 

submit all of that for the record without objection. That is made 

part of the record. 

Senator Landrieu, why do you not start with a 12-minute round 

and I will do that and, if we need to go further, we will do that. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you, Senator Vitter. 

I think the testimony on Pump to the River has been substantial 

and quite clear. I just have a question, either to Mr. Rault or to 

Mr. Jackson. When you evaluated the Pump to the River model, 

Mr. Rault, what about the London Avenue Canal? Is that the same 

situation as the 17th Street Canal or is that different? Obviously, 

it is not the same geography exactly, but I guess it contributes to 

the draining of the city. I do not hear that mentioned at all. Is 

there a reason, Tom? 

Mr. JACKSON. Senator Landrieu, under an agreement right after 

my retirement from AECOM, the company I worked for, I was 

under a consulting agreement with that firm and that firm was 

hired by the Corps to look at all potential discharge sites other 

than what was planned for the lakefront. 

We looked and found very little, I must admit. We really kind of 

got out of the box in terms of looking at things that initially we 

would have normally dismissed. Of the two that appeared to have 

some possibility, the best possibility was Pump to the River at the 

southern end of the 17th Street Canal for the issues that Mr. Rault 

talked about. 

The London Avenue Canal, there are a couple of options that we 

offered in that report, one of which was the New Orleans Sewage 

and Water Board station which pumps its ‘‘headwaters’’ of the London Avenue Canal and also has a feature built into it right now 

that can pump into the Florida Avenue Canal, which flows east 

and is pumped into the Industrial Canal. The recommendation 

there was, while that canal was being improved under a SELA 

project, to increase the capacity so as to relieve some of the flow 

in the London Avenue Canal. 

Another alternative on the London Avenue Canal, there was a 

second pumping station, it sits on the east bank of the London Avenue Canal about halfway between its headwaters and the lake, and 

there is perhaps a potential, with further study, that that could 

also drain and then be pumped into the Industrial Canal. So, there 

are two possibilities on the Industrial Canal. 

The Orleans Avenue Canal is a very light flow by comparison to 

the other two, and we found no reason, although we did look at a 

number of options, including using Bayou St. John which, I think 

all of us who live there know that would be suicide. But we even 

looked at that and we looked at pond storage of water in the wide 

median on the Pontchartrain Expressway, at the end of the Pontchartrain Expressway, Pontchartrain Boulevard. 

So, we looked at a lot of different issues. But those three were 

the only three, one on 17 and two on London, which showed some 

potential. 
133 

Senator LANDRIEU. Well, I am glad that you mentioned that and 

I am going to submit in writing some questions to our levee boards 

because, while the focus today is really on the Pump to the River 

option and pressing the Corps of Engineers to admit that it is either in their authorization to proceed or to get them to support a 

new authorization to get that done, ultimately, and I think Senator 

Vitter and our whole delegation share this, we want a comprehensive system that keeps people in this area free from flooding to the 

greatest degree possible, regardless of whether it is from storm 

surge or rain. And it is from all of Orleans Parish, Jefferson, St. 

Bernard, Plaquemines, and, frankly, into the river parishes and ultimately to all of South Louisiana. 

So, I am going to ask the levee boards to submit for the record 

of this hearing some additional options in that regard such as the 

retaining ponds. And do you know for the record, or does anyone 

want to testify to, the number of drainage canals in this metropolitan area either exposed or buried? Do we even have a comprehensive number that we talk about to the public? When you say the 

public should be made aware, this is part of the public becoming 

aware. Do we have a universal number that we agree to? 

Mr. JACKSON. I am sure the Sewage and Water Board could give 

us a record, as well as Jefferson Parish and, of course, St. Bernard 

Parish. But it is in hundreds of miles—— 

Senator LANDRIEU. Well, I am going to ask for that to be submitted because it is important for our community but also for the 

Nation to realize that, while the focus has been on the 17th Street, 

the London and the Industrial, I do not want anyone to think there 

are just three canals in this region. That would be a huge mistake. 

I think we must get on the record the complexity and extent that 

we are talking about. So, Mr. Jackson, if you would try to do that 

in your time, I would appreciate it. And if the Corps can be of any 

help on that, even though you are not yet exactly focused on internal and we hope to get you more focused on. 

[The information follows:] 

Orleans—100 miles, Jefferson—60 miles, and St. Bernard—60 miles. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Mr. Jacobs, a question I have wanted to ask 

you for a while. The report, and I understand that you all have 

been doing this for quite some time, the National Academy of 

Sciences. I think you said it was 1860, what was it? 

Mr. JACOBS. The National Academy of Sciences was established 

in 1863. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Eighteen sixty-three. All right. Either since 

1963, or maybe to make it more relevant let us say in the last 25 

years or 30 or so years, has the United States successfully moved 

any city or small community? And if so, how small or how large? 

What is the experience that you, or the engineers, have? Because 

that is basically what you all, part of your recommendation, was 

that people would just move. So, when did we do that in the last 

25 years and to what extent? 

Mr. JACOBS. Well, it is a very good question. And, of course, the 

situation in New Orleans is very unique, it is a very vexing challenge given the number of people there and the unique hydrology 

topography—— 
134 

Senator LANDRIEU. But I want you to answer, if you can, when 

in the experience of either you, personally, or the organization that 

you are representing, has the United States relocated any significant amount of people for flooding? 

Mr. JACOBS. The best example I can think of is the city of 

Valmeyer, Illinois. Are you aware of this one? 

Senator LANDRIEU. How large was that city? 

Mr. JACOBS. I think it was about 2,000 people. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Two thousand people. And what year was it? 

Mr. JACOBS. I do not know the year of the relocation but it was 

after the 1993 Mississippi River floods. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK and it was 2,000. Do you recall if all 

2,000 of those people were relocated? 

Mr. JACOBS. To my understanding, they have not all been relocated. The vast majority of them have. 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK. Well let us, for the record, find out because this is one of the core issues that I am going to focus on. Let 

us just say 2,000 people and let us say 2 people per house. That 

is 1,000 houses. I would like to know how many of those houses 

were actually moved and if it was less, it might be 3 people per 

house, but let us say it was 1,000 homes. Do you know that we lost 

250,000 homes in Louisiana? 

Mr. JACOBS. Yes, I am aware of some of those statistics. 

Senator LANDRIEU. So, do you all want to stand on your suggestion that we just move the 250,000 people? 

Mr. JACOBS. Well, in our report we did not use that number. The 

point that we were making is that relocations, where viable, should 

just be considered. 

Senator LANDRIEU. I realize that. The reason I am pointing that 

out is, with all due respect to your very prestigious organization, 

it is really what has the people of my community quite troubled 

and anxious. If you start from throwing out just an idea that one 

of the solutions is that people can just move, and you only have 

moved 1,000 homes at the most in the last 25 years, and we have 

250,000 plus that need to be protected, it just leaves us really 

scratching our heads. 

We are searching for another more realistic, cost effective, in the 

real world solution, such as building levees and internal flood control and restoration of wetlands and diversion projects, that will 

help the people of not just this delta, but all over the coast, live 

safely. 

The other issue that you all point out in here is about reducing 

the footprint. To people that hear that, that means that they are 

going to build a levee on the wrong side of my house and I am outside the levee protection. So where is the levee going to be built? 

What neighborhoods are going to be in? What neighborhoods are 

going to be out? 

Again, in the last 25 or 30 years, has a whole system been designed that actually reduced a footprint by, let us say, 15 percent 

or 20 percent or 25 percent? To your knowledge, has this ever been 

done? 

Mr. JACOBS. No, Senator, I do not know of any other similar experience to New Orleans and Katrina. 
135 

Senator LANDRIEU. OK. Well, I would just hope that people who 

continue to refer to this study will call to this testimony that, in 

the last 25 years, this organization is only aware that one town 

was partially moved of 2,000 people or less, and they do not testify 

that at any time there was actually a smaller footprint actually 

adopted. 

I want to say that my intention is to expand the footprint of this 

city and this region. My intention is that this region will have a 

flood control protection system that is safe and secure for future 

economic growth and development. I reject the notion that either 

Jefferson Parish or Orleans Parish or St. Bernard Parish or 

Plaquemines Parish will never have a greater footprint or a higher 

density or a greater population. I realize that expanding a footprint 

is different that expanding the population. 

As the Senator from this State, I want to say that I am not going 

to lead the retreat. I will not lead the retreat. We are going to reclaim our land and reclaim our safety. 

My time is almost at an end here. But I do want to say that one 

of the startling things, and I say startling, things that I learned in 

the delta in The Netherlands is that this country does not even 

have flood insurance. Think about that. They do not even carry 

flood insurance in Amsterdam or Rotterdam. It is unavailable and 

it is unnecessary. Well, I am not sure it is unavailable but it is not 

carried by a broad number of people because their system of protection is so strong and guaranteed to such levels of safety that it is 

quite unnecessary. Instead of the money they are using to pay premiums, for better or worse, they invest in a flood control system. 

Now, I am not suggesting that we can move from where we are 

to that system entirely or that anyone should give up their insurance that they are probably happy to have. But I am suggesting 

that this retreat and pulling up is not the direction that we should 

move into. 

I am happy for the testimony today and look forward to continued questioning at a later date. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Senator. 

I want to follow up on the outfall canal and the Pump to the 

River discussion. 

As we were discussing with the General, Option 1 requires the 

artificial lowering of the water level in the 17th Street Canal, well 

below what we thought was normal and safe before Katrina. Is 

that fair to say, Mr. Rault and Mr. Jackson? 

Mr. RAULT. That is correct. We have only got 6 feet permitted out 

of a 12.5 foot levee. 

Senator VITTER. So, the wall was built 12.5 feet and now we are 

told that you cannot allow it to go higher than 6 feet. Is that right, 

Mr. Jackson? 

Mr. JACKSON. Yes. Let me try to clarify a little bit. The Corps 

has closed off and plans to, with Option 1, close off tidal surge at 

the lakefront so that the canal levels in 17, Orleans and London 

would then be maintained at what would be considered approximately normal during a non-hurricane or a non-storm or a nonstrong wind event. That may sound good if the levees on either side 

of the canals were substantial, dependable, and that we would not 
136 

have to worry about excavating the canals and removing silt and 

so forth in order to maintain that stability. 

One of the things that I have said to people is that maybe a failure of the canal wall during a hurricane would not dump Lake 

Pontchartrain and the Gulf of Mexico into the city of New Orleans. 

But if you lived anywhere in the vicinity of that breach, there is 

still a lot of water in that canal up to elevation six and it would 

ruin a whole bunch of people’s lives. It would not be as extensive 

a disaster as it would have been prior, and I give the Corps credit 

for that. 

Senator VITTER. So, part of what you are saying, let me ask it 

this way: as an engineer, are you confident that maintaining that 

safe water level or lower will avoid any chance of a breach in those 

walls as we saw after Katrina? 

Mr. JACKSON. I am absolutely not confident in the levees that are 

built, the floodwalls, the I-walls and sheet piles that were built. 

The section that failed may have been in a particularly bad soil. 

However, there has not been sufficient investigation to know if that 

was the only spot that there were terrible soils. For instance, the 

old Burried Beach Ridge, which was the primary failure point 

along London Avenue Canal, also passes across the 17th Street 

Canal south of Interstate 10. There is potential for the same kind 

of failures under the same kind of conditions there as there was on 

London. 

Senator VITTER. So, just to underscore this, where the canal 

walls breached have been replaced with a whole new design. Correct? 

Mr. JACKSON. T-walls. 

Senator VITTER. But everywhere where they did not breach, 

which is 99 percent of the length of the walls, we have the same 

design and the same walls as we had before Katrina. Is that correct? 

Mr. JACKSON. That is correct, Senator. 

Senator VITTER. And under Option 1, that would not change? 

Mr. JACKSON. That would not change. Under Option 2, there 

would be no need for either levees on the Orleans or the Jefferson 

side. I would recommend that we leave the levees on the Jefferson 

side of the canal to act as a polder separation, i.e., a safety valve. 

Senator VITTER. So again, under Option 1, that would not 

change. Under Option 2, it would completely change for the better. 

Mr. JACKSON. The system, I know you are all both familiar with 

Jefferson Parish, the system would look just like the Jefferson Parish outfall canals with a pump station at the lake. 

Senator VITTER. Right. Right. 

Mr. RAULT. Senator, if I might add to that? 

Senator VITTER. Sure, Mr. Rault. 

Mr. RAULT. Thank you. Our research and due diligence in developing our support of 2 and Pump to the River reflects that as recently as mid-March of this year, just a few months ago, the safe 

level was threatened in one of the outfall canals so much so that 

the Corps of Engineers asked the Sewage and Water Board to stop 

the pumps. Now, that was just in a rain event. It was not a hurricane, just a normal, New Orleans rain event. 
137 

So I think it underscores the problem that all of us have, including you and Senator Landrieu, as to how this choreography of 

keeping under that safe level, particularly in a hurricane event, 

could work out where you have two pump stations working together, supposedly. 

Senator VITTER. Right. Right. Let me ask you both also if under 

Option 1 we have to keep the water level at six feet instead of 12.5, 

apart from the pumping capacity, that is a huge amount of water 

storage capacity, is it not, that is essentially lost? That is water 

that is going to have to be on the street instead of being put in the 

canal. Is that not correct? 

Mr. JACKSON. Yes, Senator. However, we are under a pump system and, if we are open to the lake, we are pushing the water into 

the lake—— 

Senator VITTER. But my point is, if under Option 1 you cannot 

allow the water to get past 6 feet, you are giving up a lot of safe 

storage between 6 feet and 12.5 feet, which we thought we had, 

which the system was designed to include? 

Mr. JACKSON. What we are giving up is a tremendous amount of 

hydrologic capacity, how much water can flow through that canal. 

That is what we are giving up by lowering the water surface. 

Senator LANDRIEU. So that stays on the street? 

Mr. JACKSON. Right. Absolutely. Or in someone’s living room. 

Senator VITTER. So, given that, is not the general concept of 

Pump to the River to move a significant volume of water in a whole 

other direction and avoid the 17th Street Canal, a reasonable compensation for that enormous loss from the capacity we thought we 

had before Katrina? 

Mr. JACKSON. Yes. I would recommend strongly that both the 

Pump to the River, as well as the diversion of water off of London 

Avenue Canal, the two suggestions I made earlier, be investigated 

to reduce the flows in those outfall canals. Everything we can do 

to reduce those flows will help the whole situation and it will help 

the ultimate cost of Option 2 on each of those canals, or even Option 1 for that matter. 

Senator VITTER. Mr. Rault. 

Mr. RAULT. That is correct. I agree with Tom. We think that the 

lack of, the missing storage capacity, would end of on the streets 

and in the living rooms. It has happened before. The famous May 

15th flood was strictly from the rainfall. There was no hurricane. 

How many times have we seen that? That is why I do not understand, we thought this was for hurricane protection, not just storm 

surge. 

Senator VITTER. I guess one of the points I am trying to make 

is that the Corps will say, well, under Option 1 we are going to 

match at the lake the pumping capacity that the city has in the 

center of the city. We have some debate about whether that is true. 

But even if it is true, that ignores the storage issue, does it not? 

There is a whole lot of volume for storing water off the streets out 

of homes that we were supposed to have that is now being taken 

away from us. And that volume of water is represented by the 

length of the canal times the width of the canal times the difference between 6 feet and 12.5 feet. That is a lot of water. 
138 

Mr. RAULT. Yes, sir, it certainly is. As a homeowner would say, 

water is water. If my home is damaged by this kind of water or 

that kind of water, hurricane water, floodwater, whatever, it is still 

damaged. There is no question that the lack of using that capacity 

between 6 feet and 12.5 feet in the London Canal is going to be 

dumped on the streets in Louisiana, so much so that Jefferson Parish has already had to go and create ponding areas, like in playgrounds, in try to avoid that. 

Senator VITTER. Right. Right. 

Mr. RAULT. Pump to the River would definitely be the answer, 

as you have clearly pointed out, to eliminate that problem and at 

a very competitive price. 

Senator VITTER. Well, again, I would make the point that not 

only is it an answer, all it would be doing is compensating us for 

what is being taken away in the safe water level, for the capacity 

we were told we had. 

Mr. JACKSON. Which, in fact, we do not have in a safe way. 

Mr. RAULT. It is a replacement, that is correct. 

Mr. JACKSON. And that we paid for. We paid our local share and 

our Federal tax dollars paid for the Federal share. 

Senator VITTER. Let me ask the other witnesses. In my opening 

statement, I expressed a frustration, also, with some of the ways 

the Corps is moving forward with the overall Louisiana coastal 

plan in being very general in terms of decision matrixes and other 

things versus far more specific with regard to possible future 

projects. That obviously impedes our ability to move some specific, 

concrete project forward beyond the 100-year plan. Do you all have 

any reaction to that critique or that concern? 

Mr. PEYRONNIN. Senator, I think that it an accurate assessment. 

From a restoration perspective, our concern is that, similar to the 

levee criteria right now, there is no mechanism through which we 

can reflect the urgency of need under the traditional policy and 

guideline Corps process that has guided the Corps decisionmaking 

process for quite some time. That is currently up for revision at 

this point in time. I think a draft was submitted in 2008 and it is 

moving toward a final copy. 

I think that an essential component of looking at how the Corps 

makes decisions is recognizing that all of the decisions we need to 

make about our environmental projects, our protection projects, are 

not equal. They certainly are all very important. But clearly, in 

coastal Louisiana, we are facing projects that have severe implications for the loss of life, the protection of significant property infrastructure, and there simply must be an expedited framework. 

For example, I know that there has been an expedited framework 

for levee construction in greater New Orleans areas where the need 

for process has been reviewed. Clearly, there are opportunities 

within the Corps’ process. If we can look at NEPA, and expedite 

NEPA processes, certainly there is an opportunity within the 

Corps’ process that we could expedite absolutely critical and essential projects. 

Senator VITTER. Dr. Twilley. 

Mr. TWILLEY. I would just like to make one comment. I think it 

is critical that we focus. And the focus has to be on the river. This 

is a delta. This delta has to have its river. We have abandoned the 
139 

delta by managing the river, in the proper situation, for flood control and navigation. 

Again, as I stated in my comments, we need a national agenda, 

a national priority, by which this delta not only includes, under the 

present Mississippi River Tributary Act, the responsibilities of 

navigation and flood control, but under a multipurpose scenario, 

you have to include ecosystem restoration and protection. 

And that has to be at the national level with a commitment of 

what that region means to the Nation. Without managing the river 

and putting the river back in these flood plains, this system will 

not be able to sustain itself. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you. Senator Landrieu. 

Senator LANDRIEU. This is very final. I would just like to close 

by reading again into the record what the language clearly says 

about the $3 billion that we allocated in this Congress with a tough 

battle, a hard fought battle, $3 billion of which $530 million is focused on this project. 

But, to the Corps of Engineers that is still here, I want to read 

the controlling language. It says to provide hurricane and storm 

damage reduction and flood damage reduction in the greater New 

Orleans and surrounding areas, $530 million shall be used to modify the system that we clearly saw in front of us was not functioning correctly, resulting in the damage, catastrophic damage, in 

the loss of 250,000 homes. 

So, I think this hearing has been very good, Senator Vitter, and 

I thank you for your leadership. It is hard for me to believe we 

have to go through this hearing, though, based on the clear language that is in the law now. However, we are going to pursue 

whatever it takes to the Corps of Engineers to get this project done 

correctly. 

And Pump to the River should be included and some additional 

options, Mr. Jackson, to the London Avenue Canal and perhaps 

some other canals. Dr. Twilley, thank you for your comments about 

the coast and the urgency of moving toward better management of 

the river itself to help with this project, and Mr. Peyronnin, for 

your focus on the comprehensive nature. 

I will finally end with the requirements of a comprehensive plan. 

I would like to just ask you all, particularly Mr. Jacobs, Mr. 

Peyronnin and Dr. Twilley, are you all familiar with the Dutch 

model? While I know that are situation is somewhat different in 

many, many aspects, we are a much larger Country, they are much 

smaller, they have 16 million people, we have more, their whole 

country could fit inside of the bottom third of Louisiana. What similarities do you see and what are the one of two things that you 

think we could really appreciate from the Dutch model? I ask you 

to be very brief, 30 seconds or less. 

Mr. Jacobs. 

Mr. JACOBS. Thank you, Senator. I will be brief. I think the one 

point I would note is the higher level of flood protection for urban 

areas. 

Senator LANDRIEU. It is one every what, 10,000 years? 

Mr. JACOBS. Well, I think they have something like that in The 

Netherlands, do they not, a 10,000-year level of protection? Whereas in New Orleans and other parts of our Country, we are gen-
140 

erally using the one in 100-year level of protection. Obviously, a 

great discrepancy and I mention the Association of State Floodplain Managers and their recommendation for a minimum 500-year 

standard for urban areas. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Mr. Peyronnin. 

Mr. PEYRONNIN. Yes, Senator. While I am not immediately familiar with the entire Dutch system, I will note that my experience 

is that they have taken on a perspective that they have to live with 

water. They understand the implications of trying to necessarily 

trying to control water and in fact I believe have launched a recent 

campaign about educating their citizens and looking at that from 

a water resource perspective. 

The government structure is such that it understands that the 

commitment they have made to structural flood protection is extremely demanding from a financial perspective and has no guaranty of sustainability long into the future. They have started to 

look at other methodologies through which they can accomplish significant long-term sustainable flood protection that include better 

water resource management from a comprehensive perspective. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Dr. Twilley. 

Mr. TWILLEY. Simply, a national mandate. I mean, it is evident 

that they have a national priority of protecting the coast and with 

that, they marshal, as you saw at Deltaurus, some of the top engineering and science and coastal science related to these new principles which they call Give the River Room and in which they actually try to combine engineering design with ecological and coastal 

realities. And I think that comes from a national agenda, a national priority, and they put the fiscal resources into it to achieve 

it. 

Senator LANDRIEU. Thank you. And thank you, Senator Vitter. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you to all of our witnesses. 

Just to summarize, my personal goal coming out of this hearing, 

which I think is shared by Senator Landrieu and Chair Boxer, is 

to first urge the Corps again to reconsider their position on authorization of 2 versus 1. I believe it very clear that they are both authorized. 

But as we do that, to work with Chair Boxer and this Committee 

to pass authorization as quickly as possible for Pump to the River 

and the clarification on the 2 is included as well as 1 issue. So, we 

are going to be working in a very focused way on that in the next 

few weeks and we were literally talking to Chair Boxer about it 

during this hearing and have a clear path forward and we thank 

her for that. 

Thank you all for your very valuable testimony and the hearing 

is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m. the full Committee was adjourned.] 

[An additional statement submitted for the record follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR

FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

Thank you, Madam Chairman, for holding this hearing, and thank you to all the 

witnesses for agreeing to discuss these important issues with us today. I would also 

like to commend Senator Vitter for his tireless efforts on behalf of the people of Louisiana, particularly on issues related to the Corps of Engineers. EPW has not held 

a hearing dedicated to these Louisiana issues since a field hearing in February 
141 

2007. Both this hearing and that field hearing were prompted by Senator Vitter. He 

has worked very diligently to educate his colleagues here in the Senate on the importance of taking action, as well as on the details of what Congress needs to do 

to ensure proper protection for his State. 

The issues surrounding how to provide hurricane and flood protection for New Orleans as well as appropriate coastal restoration activities are numerous and complex. The projects themselves are also very expensive. Oversight hearings like this 

one are an important step in ensuring that these things get done right. The people 

of Louisiana are counting on it for their very existence and way of life. The American taxpayers are counting on knowing that their tax dollars are being spent wisely, and not wasted on things that won’t work technically or that won’t provide all 

the benefits promised as justification for the costs. 

This Committee previously has held several hearings establishing the reasoning 

for a Federal role in coastal restoration activities in southern Louisiana. Unlike the 

situation with the Florida Everglades in 2000, the fact that we had a Chief’s Report 

for this project meant that I was able to support the authorization included in the 

Water Resources Development Act of 2007. Since a Federal role is no longer in question, I hope our witnesses will focus more on the details of this effort. As the committee of jurisdiction, we need to hear specifics about what is proceeding well and 

what the challenges and obstacles are. We need to hear if congressional action is 

needed to better focus or prioritize the Corps’ activities in this area. My opinion is 

that the Everglades restoration effort is not going particularly well, and I hope we 

can avoid similar mistakes in coastal Louisiana restoration. 

My understanding on the pump to the river issue is that we are basically discussing two options for reducing or preventing flooding in New Orleans. The first 

option, the one that is currently authorized and the Corps is constructing, combines 

the existing interior drainage system with the ability to pump water from the city’s 

three outfall canals to Lake Pontchartrain. Previous reports from the Corps tell us 

that this component within the larger system being constructed will provide a 100- 

year level of protection for the city. 

The second option would also contribute to providing a 100-year level of protection, but it involves redesigning the interior drainage system to eliminate the need 

for interior pumps on the outfall canals, instead relying on pumping water just at 

the lakefront or in combination with pumping to the Mississippi River. Preliminary 

estimates indicate that this option may be significantly more expensive and complex 

to construct. Operationally, however, it may be more reliable than the first option. 

I look forward to the discussion with the witnesses of the pros, cons and tradeoffs 

of each option, and I again thank Senator Vitter for prompting this hearing. 

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