DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS 

FOR 2011 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington, Chairman 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York 

CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking 

Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees. 

PAUL JUOLA, GREG LANKLER, SARAH YOUNG, PAUL TERRY, KRIS MALLARD, ADAM HARRIS, 

ANN REESE, BROOKE BOYER, TIM PRINCE, B G WRIGHT, CHRIS WHITE, 

CELES HUGHES, and ADRIENNE RAMSAY, Staff Assistants 

SHERRY L. YOUNG, and TRACEY LATURNER, Administrative Aides 

PART 1 

Page 

Acquisition Contracting ......................................................... 1 

Combat Aircraft Requirements ............................................ 69 

Fort Hood ................................................................................... 119 

Air Force Posture .................................................................... 231 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
PART 1—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2011 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS 

FOR 2011 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE A 

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DEFENSE 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington, Chairman 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York 

CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Obey, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mr. Lewis, as Ranking 

Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees. 

PAUL JUOLA, GREG LANKLER, SARAH YOUNG, PAUL TERRY, KRIS MALLARD, ADAM HARRIS, 

ANN REESE, BROOKE BOYER, TIM PRINCE, B G WRIGHT, CHRIS WHITE, 

CELES HUGHES, and ADRIENNE RAMSAY, Staff Assistants 

SHERRY L. YOUNG, and TRACEY LATURNER, Administrative Aides 

PART 1 

Page 

Acquisition Contracting ......................................................... 1 

Combat Aircraft Requirements ............................................ 69 

Fort Hood ................................................................................... 119 

Air Force Posture .................................................................... 231 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

65–007 WASHINGTON : 2011 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
2 

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS 

DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin, Chairman 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

JOSE ́ E. SERRANO, New York 

ROSA L. DELAURO, Connecticut 

JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia 

JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts 

ED PASTOR, Arizona 

DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina 

CHET EDWARDS, Texas 

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island 

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York 

LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California 

SAM FARR, California 

JESSE L. JACKSON, JR., Illinois 

CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania 

STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey 

SANFORD D. BISHOP, JR., Georgia 

MARION BERRY, Arkansas 

BARBARA LEE, California 

ADAM SCHIFF, California 

MICHAEL HONDA, California 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

STEVE ISRAEL, New York 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. ‘‘DUTCH’’ RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

CIRO RODRIGUEZ, Texas 

LINCOLN DAVIS, Tennessee 

JOHN T. SALAZAR, Colorado 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

JERRY LEWIS, California 

C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia 

JACK KINGSTON, Georgia 

RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New 

Jersey 

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas 

ZACH WAMP, Tennessee 

TOM LATHAM, Iowa 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

JO ANN EMERSON, Missouri 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho 

JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas 

MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois 

ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida 

DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana 

JOHN R. CARTER, Texas 

RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana 

KEN CALVERT, California 

JO BONNER, Alabama 

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio 

TOM COLE, Oklahoma 

BEVERLY PHETO, Clerk and Staff Director 

(II)


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
(1) 

DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2011 

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 20, 2010. 

ACQUISITION CONTRACTING 

WITNESSES 

PAUL FRANCIS, MANAGING DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND SOURCING 

MANAGEMENT TEAM, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

MICHAEL GOLDEN, MANAGING ASSOCIATE GENERAL COUNSEL FOR 

PROCUREMENT LAW, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

BILL WOODS, DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT 

TEAM, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

CHAIRMAN MURTHA’S OPENING STATEMENT

Mr. MURTHA. The hearing will come to order. We welcome the 

witnesses, and I want to say that the problem we have been having 

is the acquisition process. I don’t say it is broken, but the bigger 

contracts that we have had, we have had some real problems with 

them. We talked a little bit before the hearing started about some 

of the protests that have been sustained. 

You have got to go into some detail with us about what you see 

if there is something we can do to help this situation. You made 

some suggestions that I would like you to make officially about the 

problems you see in this area so that we can try to resolve them 

from a fiscal standpoint. 

Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

COMMENTS OF MR. FRELINGHUYSEN

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, gentlemen. 

Would you like a motion, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. MURTHA. I would like a motion. 

MOTION TO HOLD EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I move that those portions of the hearing 

today which involve proprietary material be held in executive session because of the sensitivity of the material to be discussed. 

Mr. MURTHA. All in favor will say aye. Without objection, aye. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF MR. FRANCIS

Mr. FRANCIS. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Frelinghuysen. I 

appreciate the opportunity to be here today to talk about a wide 

range of topics: weapons systems, contracts, workforce, bid protests. I have with me Mike Golden on my right, who is the head 

of GAO’s bid protest unit. On my left is Mr. Bill Woods, who is a 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
2 

contracting expert. I think among us we must have pretty close to 

100 years of experience. 

PURSUIT OF VERY HIGH CAPABILITY

I just have a couple of remarks to make in the beginning, and 

we will get very quickly to the questions. The condition that we 

have today has been decades in the making. I think in the area of 

weapons systems, we are looking at the effect of cumulative commitments to pursue very high capabilities, and we have accepted 

the high risk associated with those. We have also vastly expanded 

our capability to meet near-term commitments, but we have done 

that largely through contracting out for services. 

I think you could describe what we have been doing in the near 

term as institutionalizing expediency, and that is something that 

we have to look at. 

We have had, over time, the money and the flexibility to do so, 

but the question we ask ourselves today is, are we where we want 

to be? And I think the answer is, no, I don’t think it is a sustainable path that we are on. 

If you look at weapons systems Mr. Chairman, cost growth and 

schedule delays associated with high-risk weapons are denying the 

warfighters the capabilities they need on time, and certainly in the 

quantities they need. 

CONTRACTOR WORK FORCE

When we have done contingency contracting and service contracting to expand our near-term capabilities, we have done so 

through the process of thousands of decisions. So what we have 

today is a very large contractor workforce that is largely been put 

together on an ad hoc basis. It hasn’t been strategic at all. 

Today it is still hard for the Department of Defense to say how 

many contractors it has, where they are, and there are a lot of 

questions about what roles we play. 

Our own organic government acquisition workforce has stayed 

relatively stable in the past few years, and if you go back in history, has declined significantly. 

There is a move afoot to increase the acquisition workforce, but 

I think a key decision—— 

FEDERAL ACQUISITION WORK FORCE

Mr. MURTHA. Go over that again, because this committee has 

been stressing direct hires. It is cheaper, and the contracting has 

gotten out of control. So go over that one point again as you go 

along here. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Sure. I think if you go back to the 1990s, the acquisition workforce was probably cut in half during that decade and 

there was a big movement to contract out for a lot of that activity. 

During the last 10 years, I think the workforce is down to around 

130,000. I am trying to remember the numbers, but it may have 

been as high as 300,000 to 400,000 20 years ago. What we don’t 

have a good number on today is how much that has been augmented by the contractor workforce in acquisition. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
3 

But be that as it may, as we have hired more contractors to do 

work, our acquisition workforce has stayed the same. So our people 

are having to do a lot more oversight than they used to, and there 

is a real question there. 

Mr. MURTHA. How do you define our acquisition workforce in the 

Defense Department? 

KNOWLEDGE OF WORKFORCE CAPABILITY GAPS

Mr. FRANCIS. Defense Department, military and civilian. 

I think even more important, even as we are looking at increasing that workforce, the Department of Defense today does not really know the skill sets it needs in its acquisition workforce, so it 

doesn’t really know what gaps are most pressing to fill. So as we 

in-source, it is hard to in-source smartness, so these are real challenges for the Department of Defense. It does not have good data 

on its own workforce. 

Another factor we have to consider is we are not going to have 

the money to sustain the way we have been conducting business 

over the last 10 years. So I don’t think, again, we are where we 

want to be. 

OPPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE ACQUISITION

But I do think we are in a really great period of opportunity, and 

there is a lot of momentum for change. I think of a number of 

things. One is what the Congress has done with acquisition reform 

legislation and the Department of Defense in changing its policies. 

I look at what the President has done in his memo on contracting, 

and the tough decisions the Secretary of Defense has made on 

weapons systems. 

I also look at the continuity in acquisition executives from the 

last administration to this administration. I think it is unprecedented, and there is a level of experience there that I don’t think 

we have had. We also have a QDR coming up as well, so there is 

a real opportunity and momentum for change here. I would say, 

having been around a fairly long time, there have been opportunities in the past that have been missed. 

Coming back to your point, Mr. Chairman, we have to think 

about programs that have gone wrong, and why they went wrong. 

If requirements were poorly conceived, perhaps too ambitious, then 

the subsequent acquisition program can’t fix that. That acquisition 

program is going to be in trouble. 

If the acquisition program isn’t laid out soundly, then no contracting type is going to fix it, so we have to go back and work it 

all the way through. It takes a lot of things to go right. 

Things that have been challenges in the past is when programs 

have come forward—we talked about Future Combat Systems—and 

don’t measure up, yet the Department approves it and submits it 

for funding, and then it gets funding. We are actually reinforcing 

some of the things that we don’t want to happen. 

So for us to capitalize on this opportunity that we have now, the 

key thing to sustain momentum is we have got to make sure our 

money decisions reinforce the practices and principles that we are 

espousing today. That is the most important thing for us. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
4 

That is all I have to say in the beginning. We would be glad to 

answer any questions. 

[The statement of Mr. Francis follows:] 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
5 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 8 here 65007A.001
6 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 9 here 65007A.002
7 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 10 here 65007A.003
8 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 11 here 65007A.004
9 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 12 here 65007A.005
10 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 13 here 65007A.006
11 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 14 here 65007A.007
12 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 15 here 65007A.008
13 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 16 here 65007A.009
14 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 17 here 65007A.010
15 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 18 here 65007A.011
16 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 19 here 65007A.012
17 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 20 here 65007A.013
18 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 21 here 65007A.014
19 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 22 here 65007A.015
20 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 23 here 65007A.016
21 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 24 here 65007A.017
22 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 25 here 65007A.018
23 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 26 here 65007A.019
24 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 27 here 65007A.020
25 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 28 here 65007A.021
26 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 29 here 65007A.022
27 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 30 here 65007A.023
28 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 31 here 65007A.024
29 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 32 here 65007A.025
30 

AIR FORCE REFUELING TANKER

Mr. MURTHA. You go into some detail about the programs that 

have been overturned. For instance, you have got the refueling 

tanker. We have gone through this over and over and over again. 

What was the basic problem in overturning the tanker RFP? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Okay, I will turn to Mr. Golden on the bid protest. 

TANKER AWARD PROTEST

Mr. GOLDEN. In our written testimony, we identified six or seven 

major programs which were protested, and those cases were sustained. One of the common threads, I think, in all of them if you 

analyze it, is a situation where the agency sets out in their request 

for proposals certain ground rules, promises that they have made 

to the vendors. The vendors propose to those requirements. Ultimately, for reasons from our record we can’t divine, the agency 

doesn’t evaluate proposals consistent with those ground rules. 

TRICARE PROTEST

Some of the explanation may be with respect to requirements. 

But one of the examples we are talking about was TRICARE. In 

both TRICARE cases, where we sustained the protest and found in 

favor of the protester, there was a common issue and it involved 

how to evaluate the network provider discounts, which are discounts that the vendor negotiates. The company that ultimately 

gets the contract negotiates with doctors and the hospitals, and 

those discounts result in a lower overall health care cost. 

The agency basically promised to evaluate the network provider 

discount—which was a way to evaluate the savings—but had difficulty doing it and ultimately didn’t really follow through in what 

they had promised in the solicitation. I am not sure why that happened, but clearly from an acquisition planning standpoint, it 

seems to me you have got to make a decision about what you are 

going to do with something like that. 

It is savings, and it is therefore something you want to consider. 

You have got to figure out where to consider it. Let people know, 

let the companies know where you are going to evaluate it so they 

can address it in their proposal. And then you have got to evaluate 

it and follow through. 

One of the reasons we sustained the protests and sent them back 

to the agency to take corrective action was to force it to determine 

how to evaluate that. 

DEVELOPMENT CONCURRENT WITH PRODUCTION

Mr. MURTHA. You gave me some examples before the hearing 

started about programs where they started the production at the 

same time they started the research. Explain that to the committee 

and explain what we can do as a committee where we provide all 

the funding, so that doesn’t happen in the future. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Certainly. I think the examples we talked about, 

Mr. Chairman, were the B–1 bomber, going back a long time; the 

VH–71 Presidential helicopter and the littoral combat ship. I think 

in all three cases the Department of Defense made the start of development and the start of production decisions the same day. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
31 

That is not a strategy for any program that requires development, by which I mean engineering and testing and proving out. 

It is not something that can work, because you can’t work on a production design when you don’t know if the basic design works. In 

the B–1, everything got done on time, but we had to do a lot of 

work afterward to bring that aircraft up to snuff. The VH–71 never 

was able to deliver, and there were a lot of requirements, increases, 

over/time, but it was not executable from the start even if there 

hadn’t been any increases. 

The littoral combat ship the same way. When it got started, the 

yards that the contracts were awarded to didn’t have any design 

capability. Yet the ship had to be designed and built at the same 

time. Not an executable strategy. 

REQUIREMENT FOR TRAINED PEOPLE

So getting to your question of what can we do about it, one, we 

have got to make sure the Department has the people with the 

technical skills who can recognize those requirements that are 

unachievable. 

You can do something like this as long as you are not developing 

a system. An example we have talked about was the MRAP vehicles. 

If they are off the shelf, you can go into production pretty quickly. But if you have to develop them, you have to develop first, then 

produce. So the Department needs the people to make sure that 

when programs are brought forth, that those schedules are executable. 

I think on your part, the obligation would be if they bring something forward that isn’t ready, then you have to say no to the funding. 

PRESIDENTIAL HELICOPTER

Mr. MURTHA. So if they come forward with a plan where they are 

going to research it and produce it at the same time, we should 

say, ‘‘Wait a minute, you research it first.’’ Always the problem we 

run into at the Defense Department, they have to have it now, 

there is this policy decision by the Defense Department, it is a national security issue. 

But we can deal with that. There are enough instances where it 

has cost so much more money, it hasn’t worked out—and the VH– 

71 is a perfect example of that; if we stop at 22 aircraft as an example, where we had to stop it for a while, how do we measure 

that? We ask you guys to look at it or how do we measure when 

they come forward with both? 

I mean, our budget is $636 billion. You know, you lose sight. The 

VH–71, I admit I lost sight of the thing. I didn’t realize it was escalating so much until somebody told me it was going to cost $500 

million apiece. So how do we watch that? 

KEY MILESTONE DECISIONS

Mr. FRANCIS. There are a couple of things, Mr. Chairman. Right 

now because of the legislation that has been passed over the past 

couple of years, there are two key milestone points in any kind of 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
32 

a developmental acquisition. I won’t get into the details, but the 

milestone A and the milestone B decisions are key program start 

decisions. And the Department of Defense must now offer to the 

Congress certifications that certain things are done at those milestones. So that is one thing, to make sure those are done. 

The next thing is, anytime there is a new start proposed in the 

budget, that has got to get flagged and it has got to get reviewed, 

particularly on the Hill. And I think I would hold the Under Secretary of Defense for AT&L accountable for doing all the things 

they need to do for bringing that forward for funding. 

In the meantime, we look at all major acquisitions once a year 

in an annual report that we prepare for you. So we are keeping 

tabs on everything. And then we are in a position for individual 

programs where you want us to do detail work. We can put a team 

on that. So I think there are enough mechanisms out there to capture these programs. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE PERSPECTIVE

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. From the outset you said that among the 

three of you, you have 100 years of experience. So I assume you 

have been involved in, shall we say, the life cycle of going up and 

down. Could you put a little more meat on the bones in terms of 

what did the landscape looked like when you first joined the ranks 

of those that you head up now where we are working—you sort of 

mentioned, were there 300,000 or 400,000 people, both military and 

civilian that had these responsibilities? 

I remember reinventing government and as we go from administration to administration, everybody tries to put their mark on it. 

Now we are into sort of a direct hire mode, you know, more people 

that you need that are government employees. What was the picture like, let us say, 30 years ago? Because then you have to map 

it to far more complicated military equipment platforms. You point 

out it is about 150,000. 

What did it look like, let us say, 30 years ago? 

Mr. FRANCIS. I think when you go back in time you did see a 

larger government workforce. And some things that you did see 

particularly was in the area of developmental testing, where the 

Department of Defense had a very big developmental test organization. And then when you did work in individual program offices, 

the military and civilian personnel there actually directly managed 

a lot of the testing and engineering. 

If you look in the Navy, the Navy was design—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And this is at a time, obviously, when we 

had a lot more military installations. This was sort of preBRAC, 

right? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Where, you know every State had some sort 

of an arsenal or a depot; is that correct? 

Mr. FRANCIS. That is correct. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So you had quite a different landscape. 

Mr. FRANCIS. It was, and there were a lot more programs, I 

think, at that time. But, for example, the Navy was designing its 

own ships. It would come up with the design by the naval archiVerDate Mar 15 2010 20:50 Mar 17, 2011 Jkt 065007 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A007P2.XXX A007P2

Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
33 

tects, and then the yards would build to the designs. So over time 

we have made decisions through reinventing government and so 

forth to off-load. 

COST OF OUT-SOURCING ACQUISITION

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. But not to irritate anybody. But to some extent if you closed down whatever was out there 30 years ago in the 

way of depots and different types of R&D facilities, you would have 

to call upon somebody to do that type of design and testing work; 

is that correct? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Sure. The other thing that was going on was the 

belief that contracting out these functions would be less expensive 

than doing them in-house, so the thought was that it would be 

cheaper. 

I think the data supported that for the first 10 or 15 years, but 

we found in the last 5 years, when we have looked at a particular 

case, we found that now contracting out can be more expensive 

than doing it in-house. 

But we can’t go back to those days. We can’t pull all that back 

in. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Most of that military-industrial complex is 

not there, either in our hands or even in the hands of many of the 

contractors that are doing the types of reviews that they have been 

doing; is that correct? 

Mr. FRANCIS. That is right. So I think we are looking at a reality 

where we will have a blended workforce. We will have a mixture 

of contractor and government personnel. The question is where 

does the government really need to have its people to manage that 

kind of workforce? 

FREQUENCY OF PROTESTS

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Just one question. There is a public perception, we are lay people here, that there seem to be more protests 

than there used to be. Is that public perception correct or is it because—what’s going on out there? I know sometimes people plan 

to protest even before anything is done. 

Mr. GOLDEN. Well, I am not sure of that, but the protest numbers have been up the last 2 years. About 50 percent of the increase is related to expanded jurisdiction that we received with respect to task-order procurements. And we talk about the landscape 

change; in the mid-1990s, the government authorized IDIQs, Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity, multiple-award contracting, 

a more efficient method of contracting. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The government being, for example, us or 

our predecessors? 

Mr. GOLDEN. That was part of the trade-off, I think, for the reduction in personnel that the Chairman was referring to before. 

But as a result, GAO lost jurisdiction of protests of task orders. 

That has now been restored because a lot of money went through 

the task orders in the last 4 or 5 years. And the jurisdiction has 

been restored for 3 years with a sunset provision. But that is a 

change. That accounts for virtually 50 percent of the increase in 

protests. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
34 

But having said that, the protests last year went up 10 percent, 

and the year before went up about 10 or 12 percent. 

Before that, the numbers were down from the mid-1990s when 

there were, say, 3,000 protests. It is really at historical lows, relatively. I can explain a little bit why there were more protests then 

but it had to do with lack of debriefings and some other reasons 

which Congress fixed. Debriefings actually provided more information to the companies. They had less reason to protest, so it 

worked. 

But the rise is partly driven by the expanded jurisdiction that we 

have. 

Now, I will qualify also that the cases the Committee identified 

involve high contract values. And, frankly, I can remember in mid1990s, we had our first $1 billion procurement, the Army radar 

procurement, and I didn’t see one for another 7 years or 8 years. 

Now we seem to be hitting a billion dollars more often than that. 

That is due to the nature of what the government is buying, the 

way they are procuring, the types of things, the bundling. So it is 

not unusual, but that is what we are seeing and those are the ones 

that we identified for the committee. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

BALANCE BETWEEN DIRECT HIRE AND CONTRACT EMPLOYEES

Mr. MURTHA. I got the impression that there was a balance that 

you see between direct hires and contractors. Do we know what 

that balance is? 

Mr. FRANCIS. We don’t, Mr. Chairman. I don’t think it is strictly 

numbers; I think it is skill sets and then roles. And I don’t think 

the Department knows that yet either. 

Mr. MURTHA. So you said earlier, one of the problems with contractors is they come and go, versus the direct hires; they gain experience and there is more stability. Is that accurate? 

Mr. FRANCIS. I think that is accurate for civilian personnel. I 

think the military personnel rotate pretty frequently through the 

acquisition workforce. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Visclosky. 

WORK FORCE SIZE AND SKILLS

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Now, on the issue of 

the size of the contracting force in your 2008 report, you talked 

about DOD’s efforts to increase their in-house personnel by 20,000 

in 2015. Would you want to comment, is that the right number, is 

it in the ballpark, and how are they proceeding? And the Chairman 

alluded to the skill sets, I believe, and your response did. Are the 

skills commensurate as opposed to just filling slots? Getting back 

to the balance, is that a good number? 

Mr. FRANCIS. It is hard to say. I think there is a consensus, if 

you look at the studies, including the Gansler Commission, that the 

number needs to be higher. But what number is the right one, I 

don’t know. The more difficult question is where do those 20,000 

people go? And that is where we found the data that the Department has just isn’t going to tell the Department where to make 

those investments. So I don’t see where they have a good plan at 

this point for where to invest those people. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
35 

I think on the one hand, you would want a really good inventory, 

but that could take years to do. I think the Department has to do 

enough analysis to find out what is really hurting it now. So, for 

example, I might suggest in program offices for really complex acquisitions, that might be a place where you want to look right away 

and do a skill set analysis there and then decide how much of that 

20,000 to invest in those program offices. But I don’t think the Department is in a position to know that right now. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. What analysis did they base that number on in 

2008 or prior to that; do you know? 

Mr. FRANCIS. I don’t know. 

Mr. WOODS. I am not real-sure where that number comes from 

either, except I think there is some desire in terms of the mix of 

contractor versus in-house personnel to return to a number that existed in the early 2,000s, to bring it back to the ratio that existed 

perhaps 10 years ago. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Do you have a sense they are having success at 

matching up those skills? You talk about radar systems and things. 

If I was a contract officer, I would be dangerous. People with the 

requisite technical skills and business skills, are those matching up 

from your analysis today? 

Mr. FRANCIS. I think the Department is just beginning to do 

that. We don’t have any independent analysis right now to know 

how well they are doing the matching, but our understanding is 

they are just in the beginning stages of trying to decide that. And 

the Defense Acquisition University is playing a lead role in that. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. One last question. Then it is my generic sense 

that they do need additional people in-house before we start appropriating money for 2011. What are the best steps we can take to 

figure out a good solid number for 2011 with the commensurate 

skill sets? 

Mr. FRANCIS. I think you would, one, have to press the Department on how it is going to go about the plan of hiring those people 

and what skill sets. Then you might think about what problems 

you think are most pressing that the Committee faces. So, for example, we are talking about weapons system cost growth and use 

of contract types. So you might think about cost estimating. 

For example, the Department, because of acquisition reform legislation, just created a new position, Director of Cost Analysis and 

Program Evaluation. They set up a new office, Director of Development, Tests and Evaluation, and an Office of Director for Systems 

Engineering, all really important skill sets. 

So I think perhaps the first question is are those offices going to 

be adequately supported with new people? 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Gentlemen, thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank 

you. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Kingston. 

AWARD FEES

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Francis, the GAO estimates that the DoD can save are those 

offices over $450 million a year, just in 2011 alone, by limiting second chances at award fees. Can you explain that to me? 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
36 

Mr. WOODS. Do you mind if I take that? Sure, first of all, award 

fee contracting is a device to motivate excellent and superior contractor performance where the agency will decide on a base fee, 

often relatively low, such as 1 or 2 percent of estimated contract 

value, and then to incentivize good contractor performance, they 

will add a percentage on top of that, perhaps 5, 6, 7 percent, to result in a total fee. 

We started some work a few years ago to take a look at how that 

award fee process was really working, and we were not pleased 

with what we found. 

We found that officials were not tying those awards to actual 

performance; in other words, providing the award amount, even 

though performance by the contractor was not excellent but only 

merely satisfactory, or, in some cases, even unsatisfactory performance, and the contractor was still earning the award fee. 

AWARD FEE ROLLOVER

Mr. KINGSTON. But there is an OMB guideline on it—— 

Mr. WOODS. We have seen a series of improvements over the years since we started this work. And you mentioned the $450 million figure; let me identify what that is. That deals with the issues 

of rollover. 

Rollover involves a situation where the government might decide 

not to grant the award fee in a given period because the contractor’s performance didn’t measure up to expectations; but they 

would allow, in a subsequent period, the contractor to earn that 

fee. So they would roll it over to a subsequent evaluation period, 

and a lot of people questioned whether that was really an effective 

mechanism. 

Now we have a regulation, an interim regulation issued by the 

administration, which prohibits the use of rollover. 

In our latest report on award fees, where we looked at DoD, we 

did identify that the Department, just on the eight contracts that 

we looked at, could have saved that $400 million. 

Mr. KINGSTON. So has that then been addressed, or should this 

Committee put in some report language or something in the bill 

saying that we need to continue this? 

Mr. WOODS. I think on that issue of rollover that we have 

reached a resolution of that with the new regulation, the interim 

regulation issued by the administration. 

Mr. KINGSTON. But the fee system as a general rule still is a productive incentive when used properly? 

Mr. WOODS. Absolutely it is, yes, sir. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Dicks. 

Mr. DICKS. No questions at this time. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Moran. 

INHERENTLY GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If we are going to 

achieve that, the kind of balance that has been referenced, it seems 

to me the first step is to determine what is an inherently governmental function and what is not. There has been some rough assumption that we would know it if we looked at it. But DoD, for 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
37 

example, has contractors as the lead system integrator for ballistic 

missiles or the future combat system. It seems to me that is an inherently governmental function, which ought not to be performed 

by a contractor. 

For a lot of the cost estimating for a contract, contractors ought 

not be estimating what the government should be charging contractors. We have even read about situations where contractors were 

evaluating the bids of other contractors. So we have gone much too 

far in terms of what kinds of functions have been contracted. 

Now, it seems to me that one of the things that the subcommittee has emphasized is, it is time, not just for DoD, but governmentwide, for OMB to step in and give us a clearer definition 

of what is an inherently governmental function. 

Now, I get the sense that some of that is up to the program manager, and that is not good either because we have inconsistent policies which aren’t even fair to the contractors. 

But I would like to know if you feel that OMB has made a reasonable effort or any effort in terms of better defining what is an 

inherently governmental function. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Well, I am going to ask Mr. Woods to comment on 

that. But I would say there is pretty good guidance on inherently 

governmental. I think an area we find of increasing concern, however, is an area called closely supporting inherently governmental, 

which is a gray area which is not being very well managed. 

LEAD SYSTEM INTEGRATORS

Mr. Moran, you brought up a lead system integrator, which really is a category in and of itself. We have seen that in the Army, 

we have seen it in missile defense, we have seen it in the Deep 

Water acquisition, we have even seen it in one of the Navy acquisitions. And we haven’t seen it work yet. 

So regardless of what the definition is of inherently governmental, I think when an acquisition is proposed using a lead system integrator, it is almost saying right up front the government 

doesn’t have the capacity to manage this program. That is a red 

flag right at the beginning. I don’t think it means don’t do it. But 

if the government is trying to do something it can’t manage, that 

is a risky project right off the start. 

Mr. MORAN. The taxpayers are at risk as a result, I would assume. So in the absence of clear definitions in the areas that I 

think we would assume common sense would say this ought to be 

done by the government, it appears that they are taking the most 

simplistic approach and, for example, to in-source it, pulling back 

some of these functions. 

It appears that much of it is just on the basis of cost comparison. 

Of course, if that is the case, then you miss a lot. You miss elements of quality, of experience, various skill sets and so on. But 

isn’t it true that much of the in-sourcing that is now being done 

to achieve that balance just seems to be on the basis of cost comparison rather than the ability to perform the mission most effectively? 

Mr. WOODS. Do you mind if I take that? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Sure, go ahead. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
38 

IN-SOURCING ACQUISITION FUNCTIONS

Mr. WOODS. We are still in, the early stages of in-sourcing. That 

is a term that is of recent vintage. The Department of Defense, 

largely at the urging of the Congress, has been reviewing activities 

that it could possibly bring back in-house through in-sourcing. Cost 

is one issue, but there are many, many other issues that have to 

factor in there, expertise being one of the primary factors. But cost 

is on the list, but not a high priority item for in-sourcing. 

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT FUND

Mr. MORAN. Well, are they using that acquisition workforce development fund? That would enable us to better make these kinds 

of decisions. There is 700 million dollars in there. 

Mr. WOODS. That was an initiative that the Congress passed a 

couple of years ago to actually create a funding stream to improve 

the contract workforce—the in-house government contracting government workforce. 

We have an effort underway in response to a congressional mandate to look at how the Department of Defense is using that fund. 

We look forward to reporting on that sometime this year. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Mr. Moran, I think you raise a very good question. 

Even with the 20,000 positions, that would not be enough to replace all of the contractor people. So the government really has to 

look at those as investments. The government has to be really judicious about what highly leveraged positions it puts those people in 

and it just can’t be a cost comparison. 

FEDERAL ACQUISITION WORKFORCE SKILLS

Mr. MORAN. DOD needs to give us a better sense of what skill 

sets they really need. It is not just the numbers and the dollars, 

but we need to know where they are best needed. DOD needs to 

understand that, so they can use effectively the additional resources provided. 

You need to move on to other members, Mr. Chairman, tut 

thanks for having this hearing. This is a terribly important hearing. Thank you. 

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Rogers. 

LEAD SYSTEMS INTEGRATORS

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for being here. 

Back to the management of these large programs, the lead systems integrator, did I hear you say that you have not found an instance where the lead system integrator project worked? 

Mr. FRANCIS. That is correct. In every case that I am familiar 

with, the government decided to abandon that approach. 

Mr. WOODS. That is true, not only with respect to the Department of Defense, but also in other agencies where we review the 

use of that concept like the Department of Homeland Security and 

its Secure Border Initiative and the Coast Guard’s Deep Water program are also examples where it has not worked out as expected. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I was going to bring those two up because I 

am familiar somewhat with them, more than others. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
39 

What drives the government to go that route in the first place, 

the lead system? 

Mr. FRANCIS. I will use the Future Combat Systems as an example. That was a case where what the Army wanted to do was extremely ambitious, technically. It also was trying to cut across its 

own organizational stovepipes, and it felt it did not have the people 

to manage that kind of a project with those skill sets. 

So it went to a lead system integrator in the belief that the lead 

system integrator would have the skills and be able to do the contract management needed to bring in the entire project. 

But I will go back to what I had said in the beginning, that the 

government was starting off with something it knew it couldn’t 

manage, and so the lead system integrator was thought to be 

bringing something the government didn’t have. But I think that 

is at the crux of what we are talking about. If those are the things 

the government wants to do, it should have the workforce to do 

them. 

Mr. ROGERS. Yet the workforce is shrinking, correct? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Certainly it has shrunk absolutely, and then relatively, to the volume of business. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, in the case of the border contract and Deep 

Water, Coast Guard; am I correct that the lead systems integrator 

in one or both of those cases also was a subcontractor, a contractor 

for services; is that correct? 

Mr. WOODS. They did a substantial amount of the work. For example, in the Deep Water program, both of the contractors that 

formed the joint team that served as the lead systems integrator 

also got work—production work under that contract as well. 

Mr. ROGERS. Is there a conflict of interest there? 

Mr. WOODS. One could argue that there might be. There are provisions in place to prevent organizational conflicts of interest. Certainly the agencies in both of those instances would tell you that 

they reviewed and paid careful attention to the possibility that contractors may be favoring their own designs, their own capabilities, 

as opposed to others. 

Mr. ROGERS. Surely not. Surely not. 

Mr. MORAN. That would be wrong. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Mr. Rogers, on the Future Combat System, they 

did try to set that lead system integrator up differently, where they 

went to a contractor, Boeing, whom in the beginning they prevented, precluded from winning any subcontracts or winning anything in production. So the idea was that Boeing was to be a developer but not a producer. Now, over time, the Army got away from 

that strategy, but up front they did recognize the organizational 

conflict of interest. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, are we still using lead systems integrators? 

Mr. FRANCIS. I don’t know of any projects right now where there 

is a lead system integrator. 

Mr. WOODS. Nor do I. In fact, the Congress enacted legislation 

to greatly curtail the use of lead systems integrators a couple of 

years ago. 

Mr. ROGERS. Do we need to do anything in this bill? 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
40 

Mr. FRANCIS. I don’t think so. I don’t know of any projects that 

are operating that way. As I think Mr. Woods said, the legislation 

kicks in in 2011; am I correct? 

Mr. WOODS. There are already prohibitions in place for new 

starts using the lead systems integrator. 

Mr. MURTHA. The time of the gentleman has expired. Let me announce to the committee there are three or four votes. There will 

be a 15-minute vote, which always takes a half hour. We will adjourn when it gets down to 100, vote for two or three, and then 

come back. 

I think this is so important, I think it is necessary to come back 

if you folks have the time. We will be gone about 15 or 20 minutes. 

We will adjourn and come right back when it gets down to 100, to 

give you some time after that. 

Ms. Kaptur. 

COST OF FEDERAL VERSUS CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, gentlemen. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. I am a member of the Budget Committee, and we were struggling this morning 

with how to put the accounts of this Nation back in order. In looking at each department, I am struck by the fact that—how important Defense is, obviously; and by the authorization, Defense Authorization Act of 2008, the Department has to report back to Congress on various contracts that it has and the activities that it is 

performing. 

The only department that has reported back to us, according to 

the information I have, is Army, where one of the lessons they have 

learned, they say, is on average to take total cost of a Federal civilian employee as opposed to a contractor. The cost is $44,000 less 

costly. That is just one person, $44,000. 

When I look at page 13 of your report, you have a very instructive chart where you show the number, the share of programs that 

DoD administers in acquisition—in the acquisition unit, with cost 

growth of over 25 percent more than originally projected. Forty, 

over 40 percent every single year. That is nearly half. When one 

looks at the costs associated with that, they are staggering. 

Then you have a line there on total acquisition cost growth from 

2003 going up from $183 billion to $296.4 billion. My question really is, if you look at the whole Department and what has happened 

with Defense spending, if we want to establish some fiscal rigor 

within this budget, how much could we save by in-sourcing? What 

is the whole? 

If Navy and if Air Force hadn’t reported back to us, if we don’t 

have accurate figures on contractors in the two war zones in which 

we are engaged, their costs versus costs of regular force, what data 

do you have that could instruct us as to how large this number potentially is of outsourcing versus in-sourcing? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Very hard to say, Ms. Kaptur. I have seen the 

$44,000 number. When we have done individual analyses we have 

found it is 25 percent cheaper to bring on a government person to 

do the job versus a contractor, which wasn’t always the case. 

Now the question becomes, Does that scale up? In other words, 

could you bring in a government workforce at those savings? I 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
41 

think a lot of that would depend on what skill sets you are looking 

at. 

But I wonder—I think in the near term, when we expanded the 

contractor workforce, we did so by government people being hired 

by the contractors. So I have wondered personally. If you look at 

somebody who was working for DoD making $130,000 a year, then 

they retire, and if the government pays a pension, say, of $100,000 

a year, and they work for a contractor and for the government to 

hire that contractor back, it is $200,000 a year. Now the government is paying the $200,000 plus the pension, $300,000 for somebody that used to cost them $130,000. 

So it hasn’t been a good deal. But I don’t know how to scale that 

up, to be honest with you, and say how much of that we possibly 

could save. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say that is my major 

concern. With the importance of the Defense budget as a percent 

of the entire Federal budget, it seems to me that we should be asking DoD to help get us these numbers so that we can make better 

choices here. 

Mr. MURTHA. Well, if you remember, Ms. Kaptur, he said it 

would probably take 2 years to find out where the contractors are, 

what we need. 

I remember in Iraq we couldn’t find out how many for months 

and months. The Under Secretary couldn’t figure it out. No, this 

is a real problem. 

I don’t even know where the 44,000 came from, because you have 

got people who are service contractors, who, you know, deliver, cut 

grass and things like that, versus somebody that is highly skilled. 

So I guess it is an average between each of them. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Right. It is. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you. 

UNDEFINITIZED CONTRACTS

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your 

service, gentlemen. Thank you for being here. 

Undefinitized contracts. This memo says that as of October 2009, 

the DoD had 429 contracts that were undefinitized. Do you think 

that is an appropriate number? Do you think the DoD overutilizes 

these kinds of contracts? 

Mr. FRANCIS. I will ask Mr. Woods. 

Mr. WOODS. First of all, just for everyone’s benefit, an 

undefinitized contract action is merely a technique, a mechanism, 

that an agency is permitted to use, not just DoD, but across government, when they are not in a position to fully define all of the 

terms and conditions of a contract but they need to move forward 

anyway. So they will enter into an agreement with the contractor 

without all of the details, including price, fully spelled out. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Do you think, though, that given all of the disappointments that everyone acknowledges, in terms of cost overruns and time delays, that undefinitized contracts with regards to 

DoD have been utilized properly, excessively, underutilized? 

Mr. WOODS. What we have found is that based on the controls 

that are in place, they are required by regulation to definitize those 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
42 

undefinitized actions within 180 days. We find very, very often they 

fail to measure up to that. They are permitted to—— 

Mr. MURTHA. How can we assure that it falls within the 180 

days? 

Mr. WOODS. How can we be sure? 

Mr. MURTHA. Yes, how can this Committee be sure? 

Mr. WOODS. Not sure. We can think about that and give you 

some guidance if you wish. But that requirement has been in place 

for a while. And every time we have looked at their use of 

undefinitized contract actions we consistently find that they fail to 

hit that. 

COST GROWTH OF PRESIDENTIAL HELICOPTER

Mr. ROTHMAN. I won’t pursue that because my Chairman has 

just asked the definitive question, and frankly we need you to come 

up with the answer. 

Also following up with something that the Chairman alluded to 

earlier, just for my edification, the explosion of costs on the President’s helicopter, the President’s future helicopter. How does something like that happen? How does it spin so wildly out of control? 

Mr. FRANCIS. No pun intended. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. No pun intended. We hope ours would spin under 

control, though. 

Mr. FRANCIS. I think it goes back to signing a contract when you 

don’t know enough. So I don’t think the requirements and cost had 

any realism brought to them. So when we started the program, we 

had really no legitimate idea of how much that was going to cost. 

When the contractor got into it—— 

Mr. ROTHMAN. I apologize for interrupting because I know my 

time is limited. But are we going to make sure that doesn’t happen 

again? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes. There have been actions taken so that doesn’t 

happen again, in terms of putting more people in place, more processes, the acquisition reform. But it is not a guarantee. So, again, 

when it comes here, you have to be looking at these things to see 

if they measure up to those principles. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Okay. But the lesson learned would be we don’t 

allow carte blanche to the designers and the contractors to come up 

with something and guarantee we are going to pay for it. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Right. There is a place to do that, and that is in 

science and technology. So you expect experimentation, discovery. 

Do it there. But when we go to a contract for a program, we need 

confidence. 

ACQUISITION OF UAVS

Mr. ROTHMAN. Finally, real fast, UAVs and Predators. Is there 

any reason why any theater should not have as many Predators 

and UAVs at they want after all these years? 

Mr. FRANCIS. I think there is no operational reason they 

shouldn’t, other than you have to manage the airspace. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. But in terms of acquisition? 

Mr. FRANCIS. In terms of numbers, I think we should be giving 

the warfighter what they need. Part of the problem is there are 

now three variants of that aircraft, and the services are all purVerDate Mar 15 2010 20:50 Mar 17, 2011 Jkt 065007 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A007P2.XXX A007P2

Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
43 

suing different ones. DOD could do something more consolidated 

and get more aircraft out there for less money. 

Mr. MURTHA. The time of the gentleman has expired. 

Mr. Dicks. 

SOLE-SOURCE CONTRACTS

Mr. DICKS. Let me ask you about sole-source contracts. Are we 

supposed to have these in here today? They would have caught me 

at the door—how often or how seldom do we use sole-source contracts? 

Mr. WOODS. I don’t have a precise number on that. It is a permitted technique. The overwhelming number of contract actions 

and contract dollars are awarded competitively every year. But 

there are circumstances where for a variety of reasons, urgency or 

other reasons, the Congress has provided in legislation that sole 

source contracts are permitted. 

Mr. MURTHA. What is the largest sole-source contract ever 

awarded? 

Mr. WOODS. I am not sure I know that, sir. 

Mr. MURTHA. Will you find out for us? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Okay, we will do that. 

[The information follows:] 

Response to Mr. Dicks’ question: How often or how seldom does the government 

use sole source contracts? 

According to information available in the Federal Procurement Data System-Next 

Generation and USA Spending.gov, about 68 percent of obligations were under contracts awarded competitively in fiscal year 2009. Of this amount, about 10 percent 

of obligations were under contracts awarded competitively where only one bid was 

received. 

Response to Mr. Murtha’s question: What is the largest sole source-contract? 

According to fiscal year 2008 obligations reported in the Federal Procurement 

Data System-Next Generation (FPDS–NG), the largest non-competitive contract was 

awarded by the Army’s Tank and Automotive Command (TACOM) to AM General 

for HMMWVs in November 2000. $4.2 billion was obligated under this contract in 

fiscal year 2008, and $14.3 billion has been obligated over the life of the contract, 

based on the latest available information in FPDS–NG. 

Mr. DICKS. You could have a sole-source contract and still do a 

should-cost analysis so that the government is protected. 

Mr. WOODS. Absolutely. And they are required to do that. If they 

don’t have market forces at work that are providing some assurance that the price you pay is a reasonable price, they are required 

in most instances to get cost or pricing data and to do a very, very 

detailed analysis of what it is costing the contractor to produce the 

item, so that the government has some assurance that what it is 

paying is a fair price. 

Mr. DICKS. The contractor can help in this regard by allowing 

transparency into their cost structure, right? 

Mr. WOODS. Not only can they help, they are required to help. 

They are required to produce that data for the government’s analysis. 

PROGRAM MANAGERS

Mr. DICKS. I won’t go any further. Just laying the groundwork, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Now, we have been doing this for many years, okay, having these 

hearings. I can remember the retired generals of the Air Force had 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
44 

their acquisition. Doesn’t it get down to people, the quality of the 

program managers? I mean, you almost—every good program, you 

finally have had a good program manager; there has been good people at the contractor, they have had good management of the subcontractors. 

Then when you see a program that fails, normally the government had bad oversight and the program managers for the companies weren’t very good and the subcontractors fail. I think a lot of 

this gets down to the quality of the people. 

And when we kind of diminish the value of people who were— 

I can remember the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, on the floor of the House, calling these, the acquisition people, ‘‘shoppers.’’ He said these people are nothing but shoppers, and 

went ahead and cut 50 percent of the people out of the acquisition 

program in the 1990s. 

You know, to me, now we are still trying to recover from that, 

to get the people back, make sure they are well trained. What do 

you think? It says a lot about the people and the training of these 

people and the experience of the people that are running these individual programs. 

Mr. FRANCIS. I would agree completely. In fact, even though GA 

is a critic and we find a lot of fault with programs, when we get 

in the program offices we generally find the people are outstanding. 

So I think you are exactly right. The people have to be high quality. 

And the second thing, Mr. Dicks, is we have to put them in a position to succeed. So a lot of times we take excellent people and we 

deal them a bad hand. So I don’t think there was any program 

manager who could have made the Presidential helicopter succeed. 

Yet we put great people in those positions, and my concern in the 

long run is we grind them up, and you wonder why they would stay 

in the position. 

Mr. WOODS. Could I add one thing to that? You mention quality 

o the people and that is absolutely correct; but it is also people 

with tenure. And what we found is that even good people are being 

moved around at a rate—— 

Mr. MURTHA. We are going to have to recess for about 15 minutes. They have got 80 people that haven’t voted. 

[Recess.] 

COST ESTIMATES

Mr. DICKS [presiding]. The Committee will come to order. The 

Committee will resume. On these cost estimates that we were talking about, you said that they are required to do these. This is done 

by the CAIG, the Cost Analysis Improvement Group, is that what 

they call it. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes. 

Mr. DICKS. But is this just on the major weapons systems or is 

it on everything? 

Mr. FRANCIS. There are independent cost estimates done on all 

weapons systems, but only the really big ones are done independently by the Cost Analysis Improvement Group. The other ones are 

done by the services, so the Army would have its own independent 

cost estimate, for example. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
45 

Mr. DICKS. How accurate have these things been over the years? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Well, the independent estimates are more accurate 

than the program office estimate, but we find they all underestimate by a significant amount. So even if every cost estimate 

aligned with the CAIG estimate, we would still have overruns. 

COST OVERRUNS

Mr. DICKS. And what are the major causes of the overruns? 

Mr. FRANCIS. I would say, Mr. Dicks, some of the things that we 

talked about in the beginning: not knowing enough about the acquisition, not knowing enough about the technology and the systems engineering to make an informed cost estimate. And when 

you don’t have the information, then you are more or less susceptible to optimistic assumptions. So I don’t think it is discoveries 

that were unanticipated that occurred suddenly in the program. I 

think it is reality playing out. 

Mr. DICKS. A lot of times, do the departments just understate, 

knowing full well they only have so much money to go into the 

budget, and they are trying to make the budget fit with all the various systems? It is wishful thinking. It has to be, right? Isn’t that 

part of this problem? 

Mr. FRANCIS. I remember years ago talking to John Betti, who 

was one of the first undersecretaries of AT&L. And he said, in his 

view, programs didn’t necessarily know a number was going to be 

X and then subtract from it. But he said many cost estimates are 

based on the hope of hitting seven home runs in the bottom of the 

ninth, very unlikely. But that pressure is there. And what we find 

is our budget process makes amends for that once a program is underway. 

Now, we have seen a couple of examples, Armed Reconnaissance 

Helicopter is one, where the unit cost was established by taking 

what the money was in the budget and dividing it by the number 

of units, and that is what we said the unit cost was. We have seen 

some instances of that. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Bishop. 

PAST PERFORMANCE INFORMATION RETRIEVAL SYSTEM

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. I apologize. Has the question been asked 

about the Past Performance Information Retrieval System? 

Mr. FRANCIS. No, it hasn’t. 

Mr. WOODS. Not today. 

Mr. BISHOP. The history of prior performance obviously helps to 

inform contract award decisions, and that information is generally 

made available through the Past Performance Information Retrieval System. And your reviews of past solicitations indicate that 

factors other than past performance, such as technical approach or 

cost were the primary factors in awarding the contract, in making 

the decisions. And I understand that the doubts about the accuracy 

of the historical information and the difficulties in linking that past 

performance to specific new acquisitions causes the agencies to be 

reluctant to rely too much on past performance. 

So what I would like to know is what your assessment is of the 

utilization of that Past Performance Information Retrieval System 

and what actions DoD can take to improve the utility of it in the 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
46 

selection process, and whether or not funding is a function of that, 

if lack of discipline is a function of it. And how do you assure that 

contracting officers and managers enter the contract performance 

information correctly and in a timely manner into that information 

system? 

Mr. WOODS. Sure. Let me respond to that if I can. We issued a 

report in April of last year that touched on a number of the issues 

that you’ve talked about. It is extremely important to have a good 

past performance information system because when we don’t have 

a system that contracting officers can rely on, they are not going 

to use past performance as a discriminator in picking contractors. 

And what we were told is that the hallmark of a good past performance system is it has to be documented, the past performance 

has to be relevant, and the information has to be reliable. And in 

all three of those areas there were shortcomings, shortfalls in that 

information which led contracting officers to downplay the significance of past performance. 

Of the causes that you mentioned, I would say lack of discipline 

is critical. There was a requirement for documenting past performance, where contracting officers were required to go into the system 

after the completion of a contract and make judgments and assessments about how well the contractor did. And we found time after 

time those assessments were simply not done, particularly, when 

contractors performed on orders issued under the General Services 

Administration schedule program, which is for commodities and for 

commercial items and that sort of thing. The contractor officers 

were failing to enter that information into the system. There has 

to be more discipline in the system in order for it to work. 

Mr. BISHOP. How do you assure that, that discipline? 

Mr. WOODS. That has been an issue across the board. In some 

cases, it is workload where contracting officers need to get on to 

the next award so that wrapping up the paperwork on the prior 

contract doesn’t have the same priority as moving on to the next 

award. We have got to find a way to instill that discipline into everybody in the system. 

Mr. BISHOP. You think, it is workload, then that has to work do 

with the acquisition workforce and the contract officers, the number of them, and the additional 10- to 11,000 that we are trying 

to put in place. 

Mr. WOODS. That would help. It would help to have more people 

to share the ever increasing workload that we have seen. If we had 

more people doing those functions that would go a long way to easing some of that workload burden. 

Mr. BISHOP. Do we have contractors performing those functions 

now? 

Mr. WOODS. We have contractors that are supporting the acquisition function. 

Mr. BISHOP. No, no, I mean doing the past performance evaluations. 

Mr. WOODS. We didn’t see contractors actually doing those assessments, but we saw contractors that were heavily engaged in 

various support functions at contract offices, and that caused us 

some concern. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
47 

Mr. BISHOP. So obviously, if we reduce the number of contractors 

and had that in-sourced, we could save a tremendous amount of 

money? 

Mr. WOODS. Well, if we had more people doing the acquisition 

function on the government side and a more manageable workload, 

we would see greater attention paid to some of these details like 

completing the past performance information system assessments. 

Mr. BISHOP. By the way, with regard to downsizing, making government smaller, that philosophy, when it comes to contracting and 

acquisition, in the Department of Defense, that has a reverse benefit in terms of not helping us efficiently and effectively manage 

the taxpayers’ dollars. 

Mr. WOODS. There were definitely some down sides to that 

downsizing of the workforce. You are right. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Hinchey. 

OMB CIRCULAR A–76

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you know, there has 

been a lot of concern here about the Department of Defense use of 

the OMB circular A–76 process. And thanks to the chairman’s leadership, we were able to include in the fiscal year 2010 defense appropriations bill a provision which effectively suspended the A–76 

studies that started during the previous administration. So it is my 

understanding that now, all but two of those A–76 studies have 

been eliminated, been cancelled except for two that remain in the 

Navy. And I was just wondering if you could tell us what would 

be the process of those two that are remaining. Are they going to 

be cancelled? Does the Navy intend to finish those A–76 operations 

at some time in the near future, or do we know? 

Mr. WOODS. We certainly can’t speak to the Navy’s intention 

with respect to those two. A couple of points though. One is, we 

have looked at that A–76 process over the course of many years, 

and we have identified a number of problems with how that is 

working. One of the problems is the lack of good data about the 

system. For example, you mentioned two remaining studies. We recently went into that system and found that there were actually 

seven that were in progress. The two that you mentioned in the 

Navy were included. But whether it is two or whether it is seven, 

DoD is going to have to make some decisions about what to do with 

those. Anecdotally, we can tell you that when we talked to the folks 

over at DoD, they haven’t quite figured that one out yet. 

As you point out, there is legislation in the appropriations bill, 

and there also are various provisions in the defense authorization 

bill that speak to the issue about completing ongoing studies within 

a set period of time, about providing reports to the Congress on 

how they plan to approach the issue of outsourcing as well as insourcing. And frankly, they are still trying to match up all of those 

requirements and figure out where they stand with respect to specific ongoing studies. 

Mr. HINCHEY. So you think that is the situation. They are not 

really certain where they are or what they want to do. 

Mr. WOODS. Just anecdotally, from our discussion, they tell us 

that they are still looking at and figuring out what to do. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
48 

Mr. HINCHEY. I can understand that. The seven that you said, 

where are they? 

Mr. WOODS. I am not sure of the exact locations. Three of them 

were in the Army, two were Navy. And this is a system called the 

defense commercial activities management information system, and 

it is available to folks that need to manage this process. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Okay. On this issue a little bit further, the GAO 

issued two reports back in 2008, one for the Forest Service, one for 

the Labor Department. They were highly critical of the A–76 process, essentially saying that the costs of conducting the A–76 studies 

were understated, and that the savings that were alleged were 

overstated. GAO also offered a series of recommendations for reforming that A–76 process. So can you tell us, is it correct that the 

A–76 problems GAO identified and the recommendations that were 

put forth for reforms, that was offered by GAO are relevant for 

other agencies, including the Department of Defense? Or only the 

Department of Defense? 

Mr. WOODS. The recommendations that we made in the two instances that you cited were specific to those particular agencies. 

But the problems that we found are by no means confined to those 

two agencies, and DoD is probably one of the best examples. They 

have the most experience of any other agency in conducting A–76 

studies. They have been at it longer. Most of our work, frankly, 

over the course of the last couple of decades looking at the implementation of the A–76 process has been at the Department of Defense. So there is no question that they have lots of experience, but 

we have also identified lots of issues there as well. 

Mr. HINCHEY. If the Department of Defense does, in fact, try to 

jump start those two A–76 studies after this suspension expires, if 

they do that, try to jump start that after the suspension expires, 

is there any indication that the Department of Defense will have 

corrected the problems that the GAO identified and that they will 

have begun at least to implement the reforms that were recommended by GAO prior to the award decisions? 

Mr. WOODS. The suspensions that you are referring to I don’t 

think were as a result of GAO recommendations. They were as a 

result of the legislation that the Congress enacted that told them 

they have to suspend A–76 activity. So it wasn’t that we identified 

specific problems that needed to be corrected. It was that there was 

a prohibition on moving forward. 

Mr. HINCHEY. It was the overall circumstances of that situation 

that were dealt with basically. 

Mr. WOODS. Well, there are a couple of issues at play. One is the 

departmentwide bar on moving forward with A–76 studies. But 

there has also been some isolated instances where Mike and his 

team have identified flaws in specific studies, and made recommendations on how best to move forward, if they can, with 

those. 

Mr. HINCHEY. What is your assessment, basically of the future 

of this? What is likely to happen? Do you have any idea? 

Mr. WOODS. Well, Congress has been pretty direct over the 

course of the last couple of years, whether it is the authorizers or 

the appropriators, in making it very difficult for agencies to move 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
49 

forward, not just at defense but at agencies across the Federal Government. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Okay. Well, thank you very much. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

HISTORY OF A–76 PROCESS

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. A–76 has been around for a long time. How 

long has it been around? 

Mr. WOODS. I believe since the mid 50s. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And how long have you been weighing in 

on the A–76 process? And I am sure it is since not 1950, but—— 

Mr. WOODS. Well, my memory does not go back that far, but 

probably in the 1960s and 1970s, DoD was moving forward for example, at the depots. The workload between the in-house depot 

workforce and contractors has always been an issue about what the 

right allocation is of workforce, and as long as that debate has been 

going on we have been in there providing oversight. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Part of it was to make sure that the work 

force was concentrating on what was actually important. 

Mr. WOODS. Absolutely. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And somehow we got away from that. I 

know we are not going back to A–76 because people want to hire 

up people and promises have been made. But overall when it was 

initially rolled out and I have been around in government for a 

long time, people saw some pretty positive effects from it. So it is 

not an all-negative history. Would you agree? 

Mr. WOODS. It is not all negative history. And, in fact, the Congress asked GAO to chair a panel looking at the A–76 process back 

in 2001, and GAO spent a year doing that. We pulled in folks from 

all sides of the debate, from the unions, from the administration, 

from industry, and that is the story that we heard, that it is not 

all negative. There are positive aspects to that. It does force the 

government to sharpen its pencil and it forces contractors to sharpen their pencil when they have to compete for the work. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Well, that is sort of what the GAO is all 

about isn’t it, sharpening the pencil, taking a look? 

Mr. WOODS. We want to see the best bang for the buck, yes, sir. 

SKILL SETS NEEDED IN THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Francis, you said earlier that we don’t 

know what gaps there are. You referred to, either in response to 

Chairman Murtha or maybe in your general comments in Department of Defense work force. Could you sort of elaborate a little 

more on that. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Sure. We have done some work to show that the 

Department of Defense does not know what skill sets it really 

needs in its acquisition workforce. And our understanding right 

now of the in-sourcing of the 20,000 people that will take place 

through 2015 is the department is inventorying what it has, looking at its current skill sets, where it has the work—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Are they actually doing it or have they 

outsourced a group to do it? I mean, I don’t mean to be totally facetious here, but in reality, sometimes people are so busy over there 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
50 

doing what they are doing relative to the war they might well turn 

it over to somebody to do it. 

Mr. FRANCIS. I don’t know but I will hope that—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Might be good to get an answer from you 

on that. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes. Okay. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So the gap issue. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes. So they are working first on what they have 

now. The hard part is the normative, where do they need to be. 

And they haven’t identified the skill sets they really need to have. 

So you need both pieces, where we are and what we need to be to 

identify those gaps. They are not there. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. So you have gaps. We had somebody testify 

in here that it is difficult to find young men and women who are 

willing to go into, I won’t say your line of work, but, you know, either to serve the military or to serve the military in a civilian capacity because they can do a lot better working at some other job. 

So they have not identified the skill sets they need, you are saying? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes, that is correct. 

TIME LINE FOR HIRING ADDITIONAL ACQUISITION PERSONNEL

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And so what would you anticipate would be 

the time period for them to be able to do that? Assuming they can 

incentivize these people to, shall we say, join up. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes, they say they are going to bring the people in 

by 2015. I am not sure what a good number is, but you’d like to 

think they’d want to start doing that as soon as possible. So I 

would say, a reasonable period would be within a year they ought 

to be able to start identifying where they really need people. And 

speaking from experience at our own agency, we are getting a lot 

of people applying for positions. I would say 200 to one. For every 

vacancy there might be 200 applications. So I actually think very 

positively about the government’s ability to attract good people. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. This is like our intelligence agencies who 

are now hearing because the economy is so poor so many people 

are out of work that they are getting a flood of applications. You 

don’t think there will be any deficits in this area. 

Mr. FRANCIS. I think the supply of talent is pretty good. And I 

think the economy is one thing, but we noticed in our agency, post– 

9/11, a lot more people want to do public service. So my prognostication would be optimistic. 

WEB SITE FOR HIRING

Mr. DICKS. Would the gentleman yield on that point? I happened 

to be involved in something in my State, and it was a company 

working with Lockheed, and one of the ways they hire these people 

is through a Web site. Are you familiar with this? The Defense Department now I am talking about. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Yes. 

Mr. DICKS. So if they get into a competition on who’s going to do 

the website, how expensive it is, if they don’t get this Web site set 

up, nobody gets hired. I mean, I think there is a huge number of 

jobs, probably in the acquisition area that are just not, nothing’s 

happening. Do you have any evidence to that? 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
51 

Mr. FRANCIS. We have got anecdotal evidence on how difficult it 

is, if you will, to try to work through a Web site like that and then 

how quickly the government can respond and going through applications and then setting up interviews. So the government has 

technically been slower in doing that than private industry. 

Mr. DICKS. And just so I can get another point on the A–76. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And of course we need to know who they 

are hiring up. I mean, obviously you just can’t hire anybody up. 

You can get people planted in there. 

Mr. DICKS. But the situation here was that the company that 

was going to do the website got into a big dispute with OPM, the 

Office of Personnel Management and the Department, and it didn’t 

happen. So instead of being set up and starting to bring people in 

for interviews, it went on for a year or so. So I am worried about 

the way they are handling this. You would think that the Defense 

Department would bring these people in and interview them. But 

instead they do it through a Web site. And if the website doesn’t 

get set up you don’t get the people. 

A–76 POST AWARD AUDIT

So that is worrisome to me. On the A–76, I agree with what has 

been said earlier, that there was a positive aspect of this. Now, way 

back, maybe 20 years ago, I put language in that said you would 

have to have a post audit on A–76. So if something was contracted 

out, then, a year or so afterwards, you’d go back and audit again 

when they started to renew these things to see if, in fact, you kept 

the prices down or did they start to escalate. 

And somehow this thing got knocked out at some point in the 

process. But I think, on the A–76, something like that, where you 

have a post contract audit to see whether, in fact, you achieved the 

savings you wanted or not. If you are going to do A–76 you’ve got 

to have something like that or else they’ll bid low, get the work 

away from the government, and then they’ll start increasing the 

cost of this in the out years. I yield back. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I yield back. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Moran. 

OUTSOURCING QUOTAS

Mr. MORAN. Norm, you bring up a history that I think many of 

us have been involved in. One of the things that happened during 

the Bush administration, it wasn’t just DoD, it was Interior Department, you will recall, that there were quotas given to managers, and that they would get a green light if they outsourced a 

certain percentage of their work force. And then they’d get a yellow 

light or a red light if they didn’t and so on. The problem was it was 

a cookie cutter approach. Some missions are more inherently governmental than others. But there was this attitude that a certain 

percentage of your work force, whatever, that whatever skills and 

whatever the mission is, we want you to contract out. And so it was 

done in kind of a willy nilly fashion, it appeared. And so the Congress, I think it was a bipartisan vote, just put it into it. Now, we 

are in a situation where outsourcing, contracting out, we think, has 

gone too far in many agencies, particularly defense, and so now we 

want to do some more in-sourcing. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
52 

HIRING CONTRACTORS TO BE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES

Unfortunately, some of the initial reports I am getting is that, 

again, in some cases it is being done in an arbitrary fashion and 

there are some contracts, for example, where the contractor has invested a great deal of capital, has trained their personnel, has acquired quite a fair amount of experience, and has been judged to 

have been effective in carrying out the mission, but the program 

manager, wanting to comply with this new approach, goes in, hires 

the people that the contractor has trained, pulls them back into the 

government, pays them as much as they can, of course, but the employees have no option because they are told we are going to close 

down this program; we are bringing it in house. If you want to 

keep your job, you become a Federal employee. 

And we are bringing you on. So they bring on almost everybody, 

but you know, the top manager or whoever is the—representing the 

contractor. That doesn’t seem fair either. And it doesn’t recognize 

the investment that some of the better contractors have clearly 

made in meeting the mission of the agency. 

So I want to get your reaction to that. Is this just anecdotal, or 

does this seem to also be taking place from your perspective and 

looking at the contracting community? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Well, Mr. Moran, I haven’t heard of that particular 

instance where the government might be taking employees back 

from a contractor. 

Mr. MORAN. I have got dozens of examples that I have been told. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Okay. But you raise a very good point, because 

what we have been talking about the past 20 years is the pendulum swinging one way to out source. We don’t just want the pendulum to swing back to in source. It has to be thoughtful, and I 

think the guiding principle has to be what is in the best interests 

of the government. So it can’t just be a numbers game. So the instances that you describe, these are things the government has to 

be thoughtful about because just taking what you said, you raised 

the question, is it in the government’s best interest to reverse that? 

Mr. MORAN. Yeah. Now, let me ask you—— 

Mr. DICKS. Would you yield just for a second. 

Mr. MORAN. Yeah, sure. 

Mr. DICKS. The thing that worries me is that the government 

could abuse its power here. This is what I saw in this website deal. 

This company, a small little company from Tacoma, Washington, 

spent a couple of million dollars getting ready to do this Web site, 

to hire, to bring all these people in. And they had already done it 

for the forest service down in Albuquerque, New Mexico and done 

it very successfully. But they got into a big to-do with the Federal 

agencies, and all of a sudden they cancelled. They just cancelled it. 

And so nobody gets hired. Nothing happens, and the government, 

I think, has abused this company. And I don’t know what their recourse is, maybe a lawsuit or something. But again, we are not getting the people hired, we are not getting the work done. 

So I am concerned about this too and I am sympathetic with 

what the gentleman’s saying because I had this example and it was 

very painful for this small company. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
53 

Mr. MORAN. And lawsuits take forever and the government can 

outlast any private contractor. 

Mr. DICKS. Right. 

STUDY OF INSOURCING

Mr. MORAN. Let me now ask you about the study that DOD has 

done, maybe it is GAO has done it of DOD, in terms of the implementation of this in-sourcing initiative. I understand that there is 

a study that is ready. I don’t know whether it is finalized. I don’t 

think we have seen it on the subcommittee, but I would like to 

know what the status of it is and what is the content of it. 

Mr. WOODS. The latest that we have seen, sir, is a December 

2009 report. 

Mr. MORAN. That is pretty timely. 

Mr. WOODS. It is a report by DOD. The House of Representatives 

required DOD to report on the status of their in-sourcing initiatives. We have seen that report. We haven’t thoroughly analyzed 

all of its contents, but we are trying to stay as close as we can to 

that issue. 

Mr. MORAN. Well, do you know, since you have seen it, what does 

it say just roughly? 

Mr. WOODS. What I drew from it is they are trying to focus first 

on those positions that are inherently governmental, that never 

should have been contracted out in the first place. Secondly, they 

want to focus on positions that may not be in the inherently governmental arena, but are, nevertheless, critically important to keep 

in house to enable the government to have capacity to carry out its 

functions. And then thirdly, cost, to focus on areas where the government could save money by in-sourcing certain positions. 

Mr. MORAN. Does our staff have a copy of that? 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—The report is printed at the end of the hearing.] 

Mr. WOODS. We will certainly get that to the Committee. We will 

get that in PDF format and send it up. 

Mr. FRANCIS. It has got some of our writing on it, is that okay? 

CONTRACT AWARD PROTESTS

Mr. MORAN. All the better. As long as it is not profane or anything. One other question, Mr. Chair, if I could. One of the things 

that has troubled me, and it has been brought to my attention as 

well in this general area, is that when a smaller contractor wins 

a contract on the basis of, you know, quality, or oftentimes innovation, using new technology, they can do it less expensively, and 

they claim more effectively, they win the contract. 

If they win it against a larger contractor who was either bidding 

or has been the incumbent bidder, that contractor, if they are large 

enough, they have a whole division of litigators, so they automatically protest, knowing that the smaller contractor can only go so 

far in terms of litigating these protests and, oftentimes, will have 

to drop out, and then, in some cases, the larger contractors just 

bought them up or, you know, they will subcontract with you, we 

keep the profit, you do the work. And this is the best you can get. 

I know that has happened. Are there many examples of that, or is 

this just an aberration that I have seen more than once? 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
54 

Mr. GOLDEN. From my standpoint in the protest area, we do get 

incumbents who protest to hold onto the contract. 

Mr. MORAN. There are some that protest automatically. 

Mr. GOLDEN. I can’t say that. If you look through our database 

you’d see names of a wide variety. You wouldn’t see that many repeats. There are companies that you would see repeating. But I 

don’t think it is clear cut that that is going on, although I have to 

admit I have heard that once or twice as well, that a larger company just files a protest and they are hoping the small businesses—— 

Mr. MORAN. Well, there are some who are notorious among the 

industry. 

Mr. GOLDEN. And the small businesses obviously don’t have the 

same resources, but, on the other hand, the small businesses do 

have a tot of preferences, set asides, rules that help protect them 

and safeguard them in the Federal procurement system as well, 

which does help. But from our standpoint and obviously, from a 

protest standpoint, we haven’t studied this. It is not something we 

necessarily know about. But I think ultimately, companies protest 

because it is in their interest, but they are also concerned about 

suing the customer. And it is something they think about before 

they protest because it does have implications ultimately on their 

relationship with the agencies, and so I think there’s some balance. 

And I think the system is rational in that sense, at least I hope 

so. 

Mr. MORAN. Okay. 

Mr. DICKS. Any other questions? 

Mr. HINCHEY. Just one brief one. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Hinchey. 

INCREASE IN CONTRACTS FOR SERVICES

Mr. HINCHEY. Just about 10 months ago, you did a report about 

goods and services and the amount of money that was being spent 

on goods and services and how, since 2001 to then, it had gone up 

by almost $400 billion. I think the number was $388 billion. Was 

there an analysis as to what was causing that? Was it regarded as 

being significant? Was there any indication that that wasn’t the 

only area where that cost had gone up so substantially? Were there 

other indications of anything similar to that? 

Mr. WOODS. The biggest growth area we are seeing is services. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Goods and services? 

Mr. WOODS. The numbers that we always cite are total goods 

and services. But the differences that we are seeing over the course 

of 10, 15 years is the significant increase in services. That is where 

we are seeing most of the growth. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Significant increase in services? 

Mr. WOODS. Absolutely, sir. It used to be that not many years 

ago the government bought mostly hardware items and not services, and now we have seen that trend reverse where well over 60 

percent of what the government buys is services and the rest are 

hardware items. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
55 

INCREASE IN CONTRACTING WORKLOAD

Mr. HINCHEY. The report said the number of government personnel remained the same in spite of the fact of that increase. 

Mr. WOODS. That is right. And that causes a couple of problems. 

Number one is we have seen the number of contract actions, just 

the workload that they have to handle go up in the face of a relatively stable workforce. But secondly, the complexity of those acquisitions has increased because buying services is more difficult 

than buying hardware. On hardware items you’ve got a list of specifications, and it is relatively easy, or at least easier than buying 

services. Where you are trying to define the outcome that you are 

trying to achieve, to establish metrics for how you are going to 

measure the contractor’s performance, it is much more difficult 

than buying goods. 

Mr. FRANCIS. I am trying to remember which year it was, but in 

that data, at some point in the past few years, the amount of 

money we spent on services began to exceed what we spent on 

weapons. So the Department’s major acquisitions are services. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Well, that is interesting. I, mean, it is interesting 

that the amount of money that is being spent on it has gone up 

so much and what those services are would be an interesting piece 

of information. Why is that cost going up so much? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Well, a fair amount of it is to build the capacity we 

needed for the near term operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. So 

a lot of that has been subcontracted. I think there’s been a large 

growth in the LOGCAP contract. So a lot has been to augment the 

government’s capacity to handle current operations. 

HIRING CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL AS FEDERAL EMPLOYEES

Mr. HINCHEY. Is there some progress being made to convert the 

kind of contractor personnel to government service? 

Mr. WOODS. Well, there is the in-sourcing initiative that we have 

talked about where the Congress has directed agencies to, first of 

all, do inventories of their contractors to know what the contractor 

workforce is; and then secondly, to use those inventories to make 

the kinds of decisions you are talking about, of how many of those, 

if any, can we bring back in house. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Frelinghuysen? All right. The Committee will 

stand adjourned. And we appreciate your testimony. We appreciate 

your good work. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Murtha and the answers thereto follow:] 

UNDEFINITIZED CONTRACTS

Question. To meet urgent needs, the Department of Defense can authorize contractors to begin work and incur costs before reaching a final agreement on the contract terms and conditions—known as undefinitized contract actions (UCAs), or letter contracts. As of October 2009, the Department of Defense had 429 contracts that 

were undefinitized. This type of contracting may not be in the best interests of the 

taxpayer since the contractors lack incentives to control costs while the contract is 

being definitized. 

• In your experience, does the benefit of starting work sooner outweigh the loss 

of control experienced in a UCA? 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
56 

1GAO, Defense Contracting: DOD Has Enhanced Insight into Undefinitized Contract Action 

Use, but Management at Local Commands Needs Improvement, GA0–10–299 (Washington, 

D.C.: January 28, 2010). 

Answer. In some circumstances, a UCA is needed to meet an urgent need; in those 

cases, the benefits of starting work sooner may be in DOD’s best interest (if appropriate attention is paid to definitizing as soon as practicable). However, based on 

some of the contract actions we have reviewed, it is not clear that DoD is using 

UCAs only in urgent situations. In some cases, UCAs may have been avoided with 

better acquisition planning. Further, we found that work is not always done sooner, 

as had been anticipated under the justification for a UCA. For example, in one case 

we reviewed, during the 13-month undefinitized period the contractor incurred costs 

equal to 2.4 percent of the total not-to-exceed amount, compared to the 50 percent 

obligated at award. In another case, permission was granted to obligate 100 percent 

of the not-to-exceed amount at award, however the contractor incurred costs of only 

slightly more than 1 percent of the not-to-exceed amount during the 11-month 

undefinitized period. 

Question. 

• Does the shortage of contracting officers within the DoD impact the Department’s ability to definitize UCAs? 

Answers. Contracting officers have pointed to numerous reasons for delays in 

definitization, and shortages in the acquisition work force are certainly among them. 

Contracting officers cite their heavy workloads, stating that once the UCA is awarded, they must turn to other pressing needs rather than going through the 

definitization process. They have also cited shortfalls in the government’s ability to 

perform price analysis of contractor proposals. Other reasons cited for delays in definitizing UCAs include • untimely or inadequate contractor proposals, • the program offices’ changing requirements (either because the requirement 

was not adequately described when the UCA was awarded or was subsequently 

changed after award), which leads contractors to revise their proposals, and 

• delays in obtaining necessary audits of contractors’ proposed pricing structure. 

Question. 

• For cost type contracts, does DOD have a policy that encourages contracting officers to reduce fees when UCAs are not definitized in a timely manner, and thus 

unknowns become known and risk is lessened? 

Answer. DoD does have a policy requiring contracting officers to consider any reduced cost risk to the contractor for costs incurred during contractor performance 

before negotiating the final price. While there may be a requirement to consider reduced costs risks and make an adjustment in the profit or fee, if necessary, GAO 

recently reported that in about half the definitized UCAs we reviewed (both cost 

type and fixed price contracts)—34 of 66—contracting officers did not document consideration of any reduced cost risk to the contractor during the undefinitized period 

when establishing profit or fee negotiation objectives.1 For the 12 cost-plus-award 

fee contracts included in this review, we did not see any evidence in the contract 

files that there was any consideration of reduced cost risk. GAO noted that defense 

regulations do not provide a procedure for how to consider any reduced cost risk for 

cost-plus-award-fee type contracts and recommended the Secretary of Defense revise 

the defense federal acquisition regulation supplement (DFARS) to provide specific 

guidance on how to perform an assessment of any reduced cost risk for profit or fee 

during the undefinitized period for cost-plus-award-fee UCAs. DOD agreed with this 

recommendation and plans to revise the DFARS Procedures, Guidance, and Instruction to provide specific guidance on how to perform an assessment of any reduced 

cost risk during the undefinitized period for cost-plus-award-fee UCAs. 

DEFINITIZATION PERIODS AND OBLIGATION AMOUNTS ON UNDEFINITIZED CONTRACT

ACTIONS

Question. The Federal Acquisition Regulation states that undefinitized contract 

actions (UCAs) should be definitized within 180 days of signing the UCA or before 

completion of 40 percent of the work to be performed, whichever occurs first. However, many of these contracts are not definitized within the required 180 day time 

period. In some cases years have passed with still no definitization and oftentimes 

funds are obligated in excess of the limits normally allowed. 

• What can be done to address these issues? 

Answer. GAO found that leadership emphasis and management insight into and 

oversight of the use of UCAs can be an important tool. DoD centralized reporting 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
57 

is a good step for senior leaders to gain an understanding of the extent to which 

UCAs are being used and when they are being definitized. GAO reported in 2007, 

that DoD does not track whether it meets the Federal Acquisition Regulation requirement to definitize letter contracts (one type of UCA) before 40 percent of the 

work is complete. To improve oversight of UCAs, GAO recommended at that time 

that the Secretary of Defense issue guidance to program and contracting officials on 

how to comply with the FAR requirement to definitize when 40 percent of the work 

is complete. DoD has proposed an amendment to the Defense Federal Acquisition 

Regulation Supplement (Case 2007–D011) to clarify that DoD letter contracts will 

be definitized using the DFARS procedures (before 180 days or prior to 50 percent 

or more of the not-to-exceed amount is obligated) applicable to all other 

undefinitized contract actions. The rule was still pending as of January 21, 2010. 

SUSTAINED CONTRACT PROTESTS

Question. It appears to this Committee that the number of sustained contract protests has increased in recent years. While certainly fair and equitable to the losing 

contractor, sustained protests have the effect of disrupting the fielding of critical 

weapons systems both in terms of cost and schedule. • In your review and adjudication of acquisition contract protests, have you found 

a common thread or theme in the Department’s awarding of these contracts that 

have caused the protests to be sustained? 

Answer. Generally, our Office sustains a relatively small number of protests a 

year. Last year, government wide, we sustained 18% of the fully developed protests 

that we decided on the merits. For DOD, in FY 2009, we sustained 12% of the fully 

developed merit cases. The percentage of sustains decreases significantly if all protests filed, including the ones that are dismissed before a decision is issued, are 

counted. This means that agencies generally are doing a good job in conducting their 

procurements. However, there are areas where we continue to see errors being 

made. These include instances where agencies do not follow the ground rules of the 

competition set forth in the solicitation; do not adequately document their evaluations; hold misleading or inadequate discussions; or conduct the competition in a 

manner that is inconsistent among offerors. I should note that these errors exist 

across the government; no one agency or department experiences problems significantly more than others. 

Question. 

• Is there any one cause that you have seen that seems more common when reviewing these acquisition contract protests? 

Answer. The one ground that appears to seem more common in GAO decisions, 

including the DoD procurements identified in the written testimony, is where the 

agency has not followed, or has misapplied, the ground rules for the competition as 

stated in the solicitation. Again, this observation applies to civilian as well as defense acquisitions protested. 

INVENTORY OF CONTRACT SERVICES

Question. The law (10 U.S.C. 2330, Section 807 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, and codified in 10 U.S.C. 2330a) requires the Secretary of Defense 

to submit to Congress (and make available to the public) an annual inventory of activities performed pursuant to contracts for services. The Department of the Army 

promptly complied. The Army examined (and continues to examine) the inventory 

of contracted services and has discovered inherently governmental functions which 

had been contracted out, and is now in the process of in sourcing these functions. 

One of the lessons learned thus far by the Army is that on average to total cost 

(pay and benefits) of a federal civilian is $44,000 less costly than a contractor. The 

Navy and Air Force supplied the inventory of contracted services in August of 2009 

and do not appear to have attempted to ascertain the inherently governmental functions being performed by contractors. The Defense Agencies have yet to comply with 

the law to supply an inventory of contracted services. • What is your assessment of DoD’s efforts to inventory contracted services and 

identify functions which are inherently governmental? 

Answer. We assessed the methodologies used by the Departments of the Army, 

Navy, and Air Force to compile service contract inventories for fiscal year 2008 and 

reported in January 2010 (GAO–10–350R) that the methodologies used by the military departments differed in key ways, including how each identified service contracts, which categories of services were included, and how each determined the 

number of contractor full-time equivalents. Further, we reported that all three of 

the military departments’ inventories were missing data. We noted that the differences in each of the methodologies make comparisons across the military departVerDate Mar 15 2010 20:50 Mar 17, 2011 Jkt 065007 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A007P2.XXX A007P2

Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
58 

2GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Managing Risk to Achieve Better Outcomes, GAO–10–374T 

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 20, 2010). 3GAO, Department of Defense: Additional Actions and Data Are Needed to Effectively Manage and Oversee DOD’s Acquisition Workforce, GAO–09–342 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 25, 2009). 

ments difficult and that DOD currently has an effort underway to develop a new, 

more consistent approach for compiling future inventories. We did not assess the 

methodologies used by the defense agencies to compile the inventories that the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology submitted in September 2009, nor did we assess DOD’s efforts to use the fiscal year 

2008 inventories to identify inherently governmental functions. Section 803 of the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires GAO to continue 

to report on DOD’s service contract inventories in 2010, 2011, and 2012. 

SIZE OF THE ACQUISITION CONTRACTING WORKFORCE

Question. The Department of Defense downsized the acquisition contracting workforce for many years without ensuring that it retained an adequate in-house workforce with the specific skills and competencies needed to accomplish the acquisition 

contracting mission. The DoD plans to more rigorously oversee additional hiring and 

to improve retention. In the Spring of 2008, the GAO reported on the Department’s 

plans to convert 11,000 contractor personnel to government positions, and hire an 

additional 9,000 government personnel by 2015. • Please assess the utility of the authority in Section 832 of the National Defense 

Authorization Act, 2010, which provides for the use of certain unobligated balances 

to assist recruitment and retention of the DoD acquisition workforce. 

Answer. We have not evaluated the utility of the authorities provided in Section 

832 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. We do note, 

however, that in order for such funds to be expended wisely, decisions on how and 

where that money should be spent need to be informed by data and analyses. As 

discussed in our testimony 2 and our March 2009 report,3 DOD lacks key data and 

analyses on its acquisition workforce that could be used to inform such decisions 

and how best to focus resources on where the greatest benefits are expected. 

CONTRACT MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL

Question. The Department of Defense’s acquisition contracting workforce is losing 

many of its most talented and experienced personnel to retirement. In some cases 

the personnel that remain do not match up well with the types of major acquisition 

programs to be contracted. • What is your evaluation of the personnel management effort in the DoD to find, 

recruit, hire, and develop the needed acquisition contracting professionals? 

Answer. According to DOD, its contracting workforce grew by almost 6 percent 

from fiscal year 2008 to the end of fiscal year 2009. DOD has announced plans to 

further grow its contracting workforce over the next 5 years. 

However, as we reported in March 2009, DOD lacks critical information in several 

areas necessary to assess, manage, and oversee its acquisition workforce, including 

those responsible for contracting, and ensure that its workforce is sufficient—both 

in numbers and skill sets—to meet DOD’s current and future needs. We noted that 

DOD and the military services had a number of initiatives underway to respond to 

legislative requirements aimed at improving the management and oversight of its 

workforce, including developing data and processes to more fully assess the workforce. However, it was too early at that time to determine the extent to which these 

efforts will improve management and oversight of the workforce, but we questioned 

whether DOD would have the information necessary to assess and oversee the acquisition workforce. 

GAO is currently conducting a mandated review of the nature and efficacy of the 

acquisition workforce’s training. The results of that review are expected by October 

2010. Additionally, once DOD issues its human capital plan for its acquisition workforce, GAO will initiate a mandated review of that plan, which is to include recruiting and retention goals and specific strategies for developing and training the workforce. That review is to be completed 180 days after the plan’s submission. These 

reviews will provide additional information regarding DOD’s efforts to find, recruit, 

hire, and develop contracting professionals. 

Question. 

• Are certification requirements rigorously enforced in the DoD? 

Answer. We have not assessed DOD’s enforcement of certification requirements or 

whether the acquisition workforce is achieving the appropriate levels of certifications. Our mandated reviews of DOD’s training for the acquisition workforce and 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
59 

the human capital plan for that workforce should provide additional insights regarding certification. 

Question. 

• As private contractors increasingly are intertwined into the work that federal 

military and civilian personnel perform in managing acquisition contracts, how can 

the Department ensure these private contractors have adequate skills to meet the 

demands of the work? 

Answer. As we reported in March 2009, DOD has not collected departmentwide 

data on contractor personnel supporting the acquisition function, either in terms of 

their number or skill sets. While DOD has efforts underway to collect information 

on the number of contractor personnel supporting the acquisition function and to 

assess the competency of its government workforce, these efforts will not provide information on contractors’ skills sets or detailed information on the services they perform to support the acquisition function. In response to our March 2009 recommendation that it collect data, such as that related to skill sets and functions 

performed, on contractor personnel supporting the acquisition function, DOD agreed 

that such data are needed but stated that establishing a contractual requirement 

to capture more detailed information on its contractor workforce would need to be 

carefully considered. Until DOD begins to collect and analyze data on the contractor 

workforce supporting the acquisition function, it is not clear how the Department 

can ensure that private contractors have the necessary skills to meet the demands 

of the work. 

It should also be noted that DOD has not determined as a whole what skills its 

total acquisition workforce—both government and contractor—need to meet the demands of the work both currently and in the near future. It is only by identifying 

its needs and conducting a thorough gap analysis of what it currently has versus 

what it needs that DOD can determine the appropriate size, composition, and skill 

set of its acquisition workforce. 

Question. 

• How do you rate the Department’s acquisition contracting work force in achieving the appropriate levels of skill certification? 

Answer. We have not assessed DOD’s enforcement of certification requirements or 

whether the acquisition workforce is achieving the appropriate levels of certifications. Our mandated reviews of DOD’s training for the acquisition workforce and 

the human capital plan for that workforce should provide additional insights regarding certification. 

IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ACQUISITION CONTRACTING WORKFORCE

In a March 2009 report, the Government Accountability Office noted that since 

2001, the amount contracted for goods and services had more than doubled to $388 

billion but the number of government acquisition personnel was approximately stable. The Department of Defense (DoD) has begun an effort to strengthen the acquisition workforce by converting 11,000 contractors to government positions in the near 

term, and by hiring an additional 9,000 Government personnel by 2015. However, 

the DoD lacks the information needed to identify capability gaps in the workforce 

which may impact mission accomplishment. The DoD has incomplete information on 

the skill sets of in-house personnel and the Navy, the Air Force and Defense Agencies have little information on contractor personnel. The Army has made progress 

in this area. 

Question. 

• Please provide for the Committee an update on the progress being made by the 

DoD to convert contractor personnel to government service, and hire the additional 

9,000 personnel? 

Answer. Given that DOD’s efforts to convert and hire additional acquisition workforce personnel have only recently gotten underway, we have not had an opportunity 

to go in to assess what progress has been made. However, information regarding 

DOD’s efforts to grow its acquisition workforce should be included in the department’s human capital plan for the acquisition workforce. Once DOD issues its plan, 

GAO will initiate a mandated review of that plan is to be completed 180 days after 

the plan’s submission. 

Additionally, according to a December 2009 DOD report on the department’s insourcing initiative, DOD plans to establish approximately 17,000 new manpower authorizations in fiscal year 2010 to perform work and services currently under contract. Of the 17,000, DOD estimated that approximately 3,400 authorizations will 

be for the acquisition workforce. 

Question. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
60 

• Has the DoD improved the collection and cataloging of information that is available on acquisition contracting personnel? 

Answer. We recently assessed DOD’s efforts to collect and catalog information on 

the acquisition workforce for our March 2009 report. At that time, we reported that 

the department was hindered by the lack of key data to determine gaps in the number and skill sets of acquisition personnel. We noted that DOD had a number of 

initiatives underway to improve its oversight of the acquisition workforce. For example, DOD was conducting competency assessments to identify the skill sets of its 

current acquisition workforce. According to DOD, assessments have been completed 

for 3 of the 13 career acquisition career fields—including contracting—and there are 

plans to conduct assessments of the remaining career fields. However, while these 

assessments will provide useful information regarding the skill sets of the current 

in-house acquisition workforce, they were not designed to determine the size, composition, and skills sets of an acquisition workforce needed to meet the department’s 

mission. 

TYPES OF CONTRACTS

Question. Some types of contracts are: 

Cost Reimbursement—Utilized for acquisitions when uncertainties in contract 

performance do not permit costs to be estimated with sufficient accuracy: 

Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF) 

Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) 

Fixed Price—Optimal for acquiring commercial items or other equipment with 

reasonably definite functions or detailed specifications: 

Firm Fixed Price 

Fixed Price Incentive 

• What are the advantages and disadvantages of each type and how frequently 

are they used? 

Answer. The principal advantage of cost-type contacts is that agencies can engage 

the services of contractors even though expected costs cannot be estimated with 

enough accuracy to permit the use of fixed-price arrangements. The main disadvantage of cost-type contracts is that the risk of cost growth is primarily on the government. In addition, this contract type requires that the contractor have an adequate 

system in place to accurately track contract costs. 

There are numerous variations of cost-type contracts. For example, a cost-plusaward-fee contact may be used when the government is seeking to motivate excellent performance by the contractor. It provides for a fee to the contractor consisting 

of a base amount (which may be zero) plus an award amount determined on the 

basis of a judgmental evaluation by the government. We have reported on the use 

of cost-plus-award-fee contracts at the Department of Defense, and have made several recommendations for improvement. Defense Acquisitions: DOD Has Paid Billions in Award and Incentive Fees Regardless of Acquisition Outcomes, GA0–06–66, 

December 19, 2005. In fiscal year 2009, the total value of award-fee contracts used 

by all federal agencies was more than $60 billion. 

Another example of a cost-type contract is cost-plus-incentive-fee. This type of contract provides for an initial negotiated fee, which is then adjusted later in accordance with a formula based on the relationship of total allowable costs to total target 

costs. The intent is to provide an incentive for the contractor to manage the contract 

effectively. In fiscal year 2009, agencies obligated more than $24 billion on cost-plusincentive-fee contracts. 

Fixed-price contracts are the lowest risk to the government because they place the 

cost risk on the contractor. This contract type best utilizes the basic profit motive 

of business enterprises. It is used when the risk involved is minimal or can be predicted with an acceptable degree of certainty. 

There are several types of fixed-price contracts. For example, a firm, fixed-price 

contract provides for a price that is not subject to any adjustment based on the contractor’s cost experience in performing the contract. It provides maximum incentive 

for the contractor to control costs and perform effectively. It imposes the minimum 

administrative burden on the contracting parties. It requires reasonably definite 

functional or detailed specifications, however, and the contracting officer must be 

able to establish a fair and reasonable price at the outset of the contract. In fiscal 

year 2009, agencies obligated nearly $218 billion on firm, fixed-price contracts, by 

far the highest of all the contract types. 

Another type of fixed-price contract is fixed price incentive. This type of contract 

provides for adjusting profit and establishing the final contract price by a formula 

based on the relationship of final negotiated cost to total target cost. The final price 

is subject to a price ceiling negotiated at the outset. This type of contract is used 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
61 

when the contractor’s assumption of a degree of cost responsibility will provide a 

positive profit incentive for effective cost control. In fiscal year 2009, agencies obligated just over $8 billion on fixed-price-incentive contracts. 

Question. 

• Is ‘‘Best Value’’ contracting more difficult to accomplish than ‘‘Lowest Cost’’ contracting? 

Answer. The Federal Acquisition Regulation defines best value as the expected 

outcome of an acquisition that provides the greatest overall benefit. An agency can 

obtain best value by using any of a number of source selection approaches. One approach is known as the tradeoff process, which permits an agency to make award 

to other than the lowest priced offer or. This process requires that the perceived 

benefit of a higher priced proposal that merits paying the higher price be documented in the contract file. Another approach is known as lowest price, technically 

acceptable process. Under this approach, proposals are evaluated for acceptability, 

but not ranked under the non-cost factors. No tradeoffs are permitted. These two 

differences may make the lowest price, technically acceptable approach somewhat 

easier to implement than the tradeoff process. 

USE OF COMMERCIAL ACQUISITION PROCESSES

Question. Many urge that commercial acquisition practices be applied to DoD programs. However, the GAO conducted an analysis on Commercial and Department 

of Defense Space System Requirements and Acquisition Practices and concluded 

that there are key differences in requirements, and unique technology needs, that 

separate DoD acquisitions from the commercial sector. Further, the DoD has in the 

past tried to adopt commercial acquisition processes. In the mid-1990’s the acquisition methodology called Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR) was implemented on several major system acquisitions including Space Based Infrared Satellite (SBIRS) system and the Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) and has been subsequently blamed for severe cost overruns and schedule delays due to poor program 

oversight, poor cost estimating, overestimation of technology readiness and poor 

workmanship issues. • When are commercial acquisition processes applicable to DoD system acquisitions? 

Answer. While commercial and DOD space system missions, requirements, and 

technology development differ in key ways, the commercial sector has adopted practices that could be applied to DOD space system acquisitions to improve cost, schedule, and performance outcomes. For instance, commercial firms define their requirements before initiating development programs, which helps to close resource gaps 

prior to program start and limit requirements growth. They tie contractor award 

and incentive fees to acquisition outcomes. They follow evolutionary product development approaches that enable them to achieve gradual gains in capability in relatively short periods while limiting the extent of technology risk they take on in any 

one increment. The commercial approach, overall, emphasizes gaining critical 

knowledge before making long-term commitments. GAO has already recommended 

these practices for DOD adoption. DOD, in fact, has recognized a need to adopt several of these practices and initiated efforts to do so. 

At the same time, some acquisition practices adopted by the commercial sector, 

including exclusive use of firm, fixed-price contracts and developing highly accurate 

cost estimates, may not be successfully applied to DOD in its current acquisition environment because of factors such as unique requirements and immature technologies at program start. For instance, the use of firm, fixed-price contracts for procuring satellites would require a change in paradigm for DOD space programs—a 

much higher level of knowledge, including mature technologies and mature design— 

prior to the start of a program. Currently, however, DOD accepts greater technology 

and development risks and typically uses cost-reimbursement contracts for the first 

two satellites to be developed and produced. Some programs use fixed-price contracts for any additional satellites. Using fixed-price contracts for the development 

phase of a program has not worked well, partly due to the high level of unknowns 

accepted at program start. In addition, other factors, such as launch delays, program funding instability, changing needs, and the diverse array of organizations involved in DOD space programs pose additional challenges to the use of firm, fixedprice contracts. 

AWARD FEES

Question. A recent GAO report on award fees indicate that from 2004 to 2008 federal agencies spent over $300 billion on contracts that include monetary incentives 

for performance measured against subjective criteria. Office of Management and 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
62 

Budget (OMB) guidance on using award fees provides for limiting opportunities for 

earning unearned fee in subsequent periods; linking award fees to acquisition outcomes; designing evaluation criteria to motivate excellent performance; and not paying for unsatisfactory performance. Notwithstanding that the guidance has been incorporated into the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the application of this 

OMB guidance is uneven across federal agencies including the DoD. Most agencies 

continue to allow contractors second chances to earn fee. The GAO estimates that 

the DoD will save over $450 million through fiscal year 2010 by limiting second 

chances at award fee. 

• What are the difficulties in linking fee to outcomes? 

Answer. There are two primary difficulties in linking award fees to acquisition 

outcomes. First, achieving desired program outcomes is a responsibility shared between DOD and its contractors. As a result, assigning responsibility for a particular 

outcome can be challenging. However, DOD’s past difficulties in linking award fees 

to acquisition outcomes such as cost, schedule, and performance were largely based 

on poorly defined or inappropriate evaluation criteria. Criteria used in these evaluations did not consistently reflect a contractor’s ability to achieve desired outcomes 

and the fees awarded were not always commensurate with a contractor’s performance. For example, rather than focusing on acquisition outcomes, such as delivering 

a fielded capability within established cost and schedule baselines, DOD often 

placed emphasis on such things as the responsiveness of contractor management to 

feedback from DOD officials, quality of contractor proposals, or timeliness of contract data requirements. Current DOD guidance emphasizes the importance of linking award fees to outcomes such as cost, schedule, and technical performance, and 

establishes guidelines for evaluating contractor performance based on these outcomes. 

Question. 

• How effectively do DoD organizations use award fee to motivate improved performance? 

DOD has not been able to measure how well its organizations use award fees to 

motivate improved performance. In 2005, we reported that DOD had not compiled 

data, conducted analyses, or developed performance measures to evaluate the effectiveness of award fees. DOD has taken a number of steps to address this issue. 

Since 2007, DOD has collected data on the use of award fees and identified a link 

between cost and schedule data and the amount of fee earned. However, it has not 

been able to establish metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of award fees in terms 

of performance. Additionally, individual programs are unable to determine the extent to which successful outcomes were attributable to incentives provided by award 

fees versus external factors, such as a contractor’s desire to maintain a good reputation. In our 2009 report, GAO recommended that DOD form an interagency working 

group to determine how best to evaluate the effectiveness of award fees as a tool 

for improving contractor performance and achieving desired program outcomes. In 

response, DOD has partnered with the Departments of Energy, Health and Human 

Services, Homeland Security, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to form the Incentive Contracting Working Group to discuss how best to evaluate award fee data. 

SOLE-SOURCE CONTRACTS

Question. We know that the government in some cases, based on analysis and justification, awards a sole-source contract. 

• Under what circumstances is a sole-source contract appropriate? 

Answer. Acquisition regulations allow government agencies to contract without 

providing for full and open competition in situations where: 

Æ only one responsible source is available and no other supplies or services 

will satisfy, agency requirements 

Æ the agency’s need for the supplies or services is of such an unusual and 

compelling urgency that the government would be seriously injured unless the 

agency was permitted to limit the number of sources from which it solicits 

Æ the government needs to maintain a facility or manufacturer in case of a 

national emergency or to achieve industrial mobilization; to establish or maintain an essential engineering, research, or development capability to be provided by an educational or other nonprofit institution or a federally funded research and development center; or to acquire the services of an expert or neutral person for any current or anticipated litigation or dispute. 

Æ full and open competition is precluded by the terms of an international 

agreement or a treaty between the U.S. and a foreign government such as when 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
63 

a contemplated acquisition is to be reimbursed by a foreign country that requires that the product be obtained from a particular firm. Æ a statute expressly authorizes or requires that the acquisition be made 

from a specified source or through another agency. Examples are statues pertaining to the Federal Prison Industries; Qualified Nonprofit Agencies for the 

Blind or other Severely Disabled; Government Printing and Binding; as well as 

sole source awards under the Small Business Administration’s 8(a) program (including 8(a) subsidiaries of Alaska Native Corporations). Æ the disclosure of the agency’s needs would compromise the national security 

unless the agency is permitted to limit the number of sources from which it solicits bids or proposals. 

Æ the agency head determines that it is not in the public interest to provide 

for full and open competition for a particular acquisition. In this case, Congress 

is to be notified in writing of such a determination not less than 30 days before 

contract award. 

Question. 

• Is it likely that a product that is procured under a sole-source contract will cost 

more than if the contract was competed? 

Answer. Competition is the cornerstone of the acquisition system, and the benefits 

of competition in acquiring goods and services from the private sector are well established. Promoting competition—as opposed to sole-source contracts, where the 

government negotiates with only one source—can help save the taxpayer money, improve contractor performance, curb fraud, and promote accountability for results. 

Agencies are required to perform acquisition planning and conduct market research 

for all acquisitions in order to promote and provide for, among other things, full and 

open competition. 

However, GAO’s work has identified situations where the government has not 

taken advantage of opportunities to compete work. For example, our recent review 

of federal agencies’ use of blanket purchase agreements (BPAs) awarded under General Services Administration (GSA) Federal Supply Schedule contracts showed that 

agencies did not always consider more than one vendor when establishing these 

agreements. In some cases, the rationales for awarding a BPA directly to one vendor 

did not appear to conform to sound procurement policy. Furthermore, agencies rarely took advantage of additional opportunities for competition when placing orders 

under BPAs, reducing the potential to realize additional savings for the taxpayer. 

GAO recommended that the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) take steps 

to clarify the circumstances under which it is appropriate to award a BPA using the 

limited source justifications of the FAR and consider opportunities for enhancing 

competition when placing orders. OFPP concurred with our recommendations and 

is taking steps to implement them. In other reviews, we found that the Army had 

issued contracts for security guards at U.S. military installations on a sole-source 

basis, and the State Department had issued a sole-source contract for installation 

and maintenance of security equipment at U.S. embassies worldwide. Based on 

GAO’s recommendations, the contracts were put out for competition, which resulted 

in cost savings. 

Question. 

• What is a No-Bid contract? 

Answer. This term is sometimes used to refer to a sole source contract. However, 

it is not an official term in acquisition regulations and is somewhat inaccurate since 

even in sole-source situations, the government solicits and receives a single bid or 

offer. 

REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION

Question. The Department of Defense and its contractors need to agree on and 

understand the acquisition objective and how that is translated into the contracts 

terms and conditions. Contracting officials write requests for proposals, analyze 

bids, and write contracts but everything the contracting official does depends on an 

accurate description of the requirement. 

• To what extent is the difficulty and waste in contracting due to poorly defined 

requirements? 

Answer. Poorly defined requirements are a key factor leading to cost, schedule, 

and performance problems in major weapon programs. Programs often start system 

development with inadequate knowledge about the requirements and resources— 

funding, time, technologies, and people—needed to execute them. The knowledge 

gaps are largely the result of a lack of early systems engineering activities—requirements analysis, design, and testing—which is needed to ensure that a weapon system program’s requirements are achievable and designable given available reVerDate Mar 15 2010 20:50 Mar 17, 2011 Jkt 065007 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A007P2.XXX A007P2

Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
64 

sources, such as technologies. Systems engineering helps to resolve performance and 

resource gaps before system development starts by either reducing requirements, 

deferring them to the future, or increasing the estimated cost for the weapon system’s development. Because the government often does not perform the proper upfront requirements analysis to determine whether the program will meet its needs, 

significant contract cost increases can and do occur as the scope of requirements becomes better understood by the government and contractor. 

Question. 

• Please discuss the desired balance between changing requirements in the contract and fielding an obsolete design. For example one of the reasons given for termination of the FCS Manned Ground Vehicles was that the vehicles had low ground 

clearance and flat bottomed hulls despite lessons learned in Iraq that a high ground 

clearance and v-hull offered much better force protection. 

Answer. DOD could achieve a better balance between changing requirements and 

avoiding obsolete weapon system designs by resisting the urge to achieve revolutionary and lengthy product developments and using an incremental approach to developing and fielding capabilities. In addition, constraining development cycle times 

to 5 or 6 years will force more manageable commitments, make cost and schedules 

more predictable, and facilitate the delivery of capabilities in a timely manner. To 

improve product development outcomes, a key best practice is to ensure that system 

requirements are properly defined from the outset and that significant requirement 

changes or additions are avoided after system development has begun. In the case 

of FCS, the Army never arrived at a stable set of system level requirements. The 

FCS development effort began about the same time as the start of the Iraq war and 

the escalation of improvised explosive device attacks. The manned ground vehicles 

were designed based on a concept where the information network was expected to 

compensate for the vehicles lower weight armor. Ultimately, the Secretary of Defense determined that the manned ground vehicles did not sufficiently incorporate 

lessons learned from operations in Iraq and the program was cancelled. 

JOINT CAPABILITIES IDENTIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM

Question. In a September 2008 Report on Defense Acquisitions, the Government 

Accountability Office stated ‘‘The Joint Capabilities Identification and Development 

System or JCIDS has not yet met its objective to identify and prioritize war fighting 

needs from a joint capabilities perspective. Instead, capabilities continue to be driven primarily by the individual services—which sponsored 67 percent of initial capabilities proposals submitted since 2003—with little involvement from the combatant 

commanders which are largely responsible for planning and carrying out military 

operations.’’ 

• The Joint Capabilities Identification and Development System was implemented 

in 2003 and yet most acquisitions are still driven by the needs and perspectives of 

a single military department. Why has JCIDS not been more fully implemented? 

Answer. As we reported in 2008, the military services drive the determination of 

capability needs, in part because they retain most of DOD’s analytical capacity and 

resources for requirements development. The functional capabilities boards, which 

were established to manage the JCIDS process and facilitate the prioritization of 

needs, have not been staffed or resourced to effectively carry out these duties. Furthermore, the Combatant Commands (COCOMs), which are responsible for carrying 

out military missions, have not played a significant role in determining requirements in part because they also lacked the analytic capacity and resources to become more fully engaged in JCIDS. GAO has recommended that DOD should determine and allocate appropriate resources for more effective joint capabilities development planning. DOD has taken steps to get the COCOMs more involved in determining requirements. For example, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council has 

been doing more to seek out and consider input from the COCOMs through regular 

trips and meetings to discuss capability needs and resource issues. 

Question. The GAO report indicated that the JCIDS process is lengthy, taking on 

average up to 10 months to validate a need. Why does the validation process take 

so long and what is the impact on the war fighter? 

Answer. The development of a capability proposal that may lead to a new major 

weapon system and its review and validation through the JCIDS process can take 

a significant amount of time. Prior to submitting a capability proposal to JCIDS, 

it can take a service sponsor a year or more to conduct the analyses necessary to 

support the proposal and get it approved within the service organization. A proposal 

submitted to JCIDS can go through several review stages before it gets validated 

or approved. Given the size and complexity and level of funding that will be committed to a major weapon system program, it may be warranted to invest considerVerDate Mar 15 2010 20:50 Mar 17, 2011 Jkt 065007 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A007P2.XXX A007P2

Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
65 

able time and effort in developing and reviewing the capability proposal. However, 

a lengthy process to identify and validate requirements can undermine the department’s efforts to effectively respond to the needs of the warfighter, especially those 

that are near term. In one case, the Army used extraordinary measures, going outside DOD’s normal process to acquire and field the Joint Network Node-Network 

(JNN–N)—a $2 billion, commercial-based system designed to improve satellite capabilities for the warfighter. While JNN–N provided enhanced capability for the 

warfighter, the work-around allowed the Army to bypass the management and oversight typically required of DOD programs of this magnitude. Recently, DOD has 

taken steps to streamline the JCIDS process, by reducing the analyses required for 

submitting initial capability proposals, shortening the review cycle for proposals, 

and delegating approval authority for some proposals. 

ACQUISITION PROCESS IMPROVEMENTS

Question. The acquisition environment in the DoD encourages ambitious product 

developments that include many technological unknowns. DoD organizations enter 

into weapons systems development contracts prior to having developed sound requirements. Programs are exposed to technology, design and production risk resulting in cost growth and schedule delays. Uncertainties about technology, design, requirements and cost lead to contract revision and eventual failure with wasted resources and delay in providing needed assets to the war fighters. • Do you see any evidence that the Department is changing this practice for the 

better? 

Answer. Yes. In our 2009 assessment of selected weapon programs, we found that 

while most programs still proceed with far less technology, design, and manufacturing knowledge than best practices suggest, the amount of knowledge that programs attained by key decision points has increased in recent years. For example, 

since 2003, there has been a significant increase in the percentage of technologies 

demonstrated in at least a relevant environment by the start of system development. Further, all five programs in our assessment that entered system development since 2006 reported that all their critical technologies had at least been demonstrated in a relevant environment, in accordance with the DOD and statutory criteria. 

In addition, DOD has revised its acquisition policy and Congress put in place statutory requirements to improve the knowledge that weapon programs must have before they begin, such as more robust systems engineering, and cost and technology 

assessments. If DOD follows the letter and spirit of these reforms, they should increase the chances of weapons programs being completed on-time and at the anticipated cost. Specifically, DOD’s December 2008 revision to its acquisition policy increased the rigor and discipline expected upfront and throughout the acquisition 

process. Key elements include the following: • A mandatory Materiel Development Decision for all programs, regardless of 

where they intend to enter the acquisition process. This review is designed to 

ensure programs are based on approved requirements and a rigorous assessment of alternatives. • A requirement for programs in the technology development phase to implement acquisition strategies with two or more competing teams producing prototypes of the system or key components. This should help to reduce technical 

risk, validate designs and cost estimates, evaluate manufacturing processes, 

and refine requirements. • An additional milestone decision authority assessment of program progress 

at preliminary design review (PDR). PDR is an important early systems engineering event that informs requirements trades, improves cost estimation, and 

identifies remaining design, integration and manufacturing risks. 

CONTRACT CLOSEOUT AND END OF PRODUCTION COSTS

Question. Several Air Force aircraft procurement programs (F–22 and C–17) are 

nearing the end of their production run at the same time. In examining the possibility of closing the production line, an interesting contract clause has come to light. 

These contracts contain a clause that takes effect if the ordered quantity drops 

below a certain level or if the ordered aircraft are anticipated to be the final aircraft 

ordered. These costs (referred to as ‘‘tail-up costs’’) are pre-negotiated well before the 

end of the production run, seemingly before the actual costs would even be known. 

The contractor states that these costs are in place to offset the impact of lower aircraft quantities moving through the production line. 

• The Committee has recently been made aware of a clause in aircraft procurement contracts referred to as ‘‘tail-up clauses’’ that are in place to cover reduced or 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
66 

final production lots. During reviews conducted by your agency, do you come across 

this type of clause frequently? How widespread is the use of this type of clause? • In your opinion, does it make sense to put a price tag on rate impact well before 

the actual cost of any reduced production quantity may be known? • Would it not make more sense for the cost of any reduced production quantities 

or end of production costs be negotiated at the same time those production lots are 

negotiated instead of years ahead of time before actual costs are known? • What explanation was given by the Department of Defense during your reviews 

for why they structure procurement contracts in this manner? 

Answer. We have conducted extensive reviews of aircraft programs over many 

years, including the F–22 and C–17, but we have not evaluated ‘‘tail-up’’ clauses in 

connection with those reviews. Our understanding from program officials, however, 

is that although the F–22 multiyear contract contained a tail-up clause, the clause 

was not invoked because the Air Force is proceeding with the next lot of aircraft. 

The officials told us that the contract for that lot does not contain a tail-up clause. 

For the C–17 program, officials told us that the agency is still in negotiation with 

the contractor. 

Our understanding is that tail up clauses may operate in a manner very similar 

to termination clauses in multiyear contracts. A multi-year contract is used to purchase supplies or services for up to 5 program years. Multiyear contracts typically 

are used in some of the larger programs, such as the F–22 and C–17. Performance 

during the second and subsequent years of a multiyear contract is contingent upon 

the appropriation of funds, and may provide for a cancellation payment if appropriations are not made. The cancellation payment is established at the start of the contract, and must be reduced each year in direct proportion to the remaining requirements. The Federal Acquisition Regulation specifies the types of costs that should 

be included in a cancellation payment. 

RAPID ACQUISITION OF MRAP VEHICLES

Question. On October 8, 2009, Mr. Michael J. Sullivan, Director, Acquisition and 

Sourcing Management, Government Accountability Office, and one of our witnesses 

today, testified before the House Armed Services Committee, Defense Acquisition 

Reform Panel on the tailored acquisition approach used to rapidly acquire and field 

MRAP vehicles. Mr. Sullivan briefed that, the factors contributing to success in the 

MRAP program that may be transferable to other programs were: (1) use proven 

technologies, (2) keep requirements to a minimum, (3) infuse competition, and (4) 

keep final integration responsibility with the government. 

• Please comment on the use of proven technologies. Specifically, describe the balance that the program must achieve between including the latest technology and 

using proven technology. 

Answer. We have long advocated as part of our best acquisition practices that 

proven technologies are a key element to successful acquisition programs. We do not 

deny that this is a conservative approach and by using it, an acquisition program 

may not be able to use the latest technologies. However, the latest technologies tend 

to be less mature. This presents problems for acquisition programs because the pace 

of technological maturity is often unpredictable, and maturing technologies to acceptable levels can take much longer than originally anticipated. Furthermore, 

starting a program without proven technologies almost always results in cost and 

schedule problems later in the program. When the Army launched the Future Combat System program, Army officials wanted technically sophisticated systems to deliver desired performance characteristics. DOD approved the FCS program for system development in spite of the immature technologies. The Army believed it could 

mature all FCS technologies to Technology Readiness Level 6 in three years. This 

did not happen. It took the Army six years and an estimated $18 billion to mature 

FCS technologies to the point where they were ready to be incorporated into an acquisition program. Due to the FCS termination, it is uncertain when or if many of 

these technologies will be incorporated into fieldable systems. We also suggest that 

the better long term approach would be to adopt an incremental development strategy where the first increment would be designed to be readily upgradeable as more 

advanced technologies are matured. 

Question. 

• Discuss the strategy of having multiple prototype vehicles and multiple vendors 

selected to produce the vehicle. 

Answer. According to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics, lessons of the past, and recommendations of multiple reviews, emphasize the need for, and benefits of quality prototyping. During development, teams should be producing detailed manufacturing designs—not solving myrVerDate Mar 15 2010 20:50 Mar 17, 2011 Jkt 065007 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 E:\HR\OC\A007P2.XXX A007P2

Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
67 

iad technical issues. An acquisition strategy involving multiple prototype vehicles 

and multiple vendors has the advantage of reducing technical risk, validating designs, validating cost estimates, evaluating manufacturing processes, and refining 

requirements. A goal for development efforts should be a working relationship between government and industry that demonstrates key knowledge elements that 

can inform future development and budget decisions. This key knowledge reflects 

knowledge-based acquisition elements that GAO has promoted for years and that 

serve as key enablers for the best practices used by successful commercial companies. 

TRICARE CONTRACT RECOMPETITION PROTEST

Question. The following errors were cited as the basis for GAO sustaining the protest of this contract award: 

The Department of Defense failed to responsibly evaluate the awardee’s past performance information as contemplated by the solicitation; 

The Department of Defense failed to perform a reasonable price/cost realism assessment, and failed to consider, as part of the technical evaluation or best value 

selection decision, the cost savings associated with the protester’s proposed network 

provider discounts; and 

DOD failed to consider, in light of the agency’s obligation to avoid even the appearance of impropriety in government procurement, issues stemming from the 

awardee’s use of a high-level TRICARE Management Agency (TMA) employee in the 

preparation of its proposal, where the record demonstrates that this individual had 

access to the protester’s non-public proprietary information. 

What was the basis for sustaining the protest in TRICARE Region North? 

Answer. As reflected in our decision, B–401652.3, B–40165425, we sustained the 

protest on a number of grounds: the agency performed a flawed past performance 

evaluation, price realism evaluation, risk assessment, and failed to adequately consider network provider discounts. 

Question. What was the basis for sustaining the protest in TRICARE Region 

South? 

Answer. As reflected in our decision, B–401652.2, B–401652.4, B–401652.6, we 

sustained the protest because the agency failed to adequately consider network provider discounts. 

Question. What was the basis for sustaining the protest in TRICARE Region 

West? 

Answer. A protest was not filed at GAO concerning the West region; however, 

there was a protest filed directly with the agency. 

Question. How long do you estimate it will take for DOD to resolve these protests? 

Answer. The length of time to implement corrective action depends on a variety 

of factors, including the complexity of the procurement, the urgency of the needed 

services, and internal agency decisions. We do not have any information on the 

length of time that it will take DOD to implement corrective action in response to 

the sustained protests. 

What are the time frames for determining what skill sets DoD has in its acquisition workforce? 

DoD has a competency assessment initiative underway that is intended to define 

the critical skills and competencies of its acquisition workforce. The assessments 

consist of five phases—from identifying competencies for successful performance to 

assessing the proficiency of career field members against each of the field’s competencies. To date, assessments have been completed for 3 of the 13 acquisition career fields. Specifically, over 20,000 members of the contracting career field have 

completed assessments. In addition, assessments based on a statistical sample, have 

been completed for the program management and life cycle logistics career fields. 

Competency assessments for two additional career fields—(1) System Planning, Research, Development and Engineering and (2) business (cost estimating, and financial management) are projected to begin in spring 2010. The start of these assessments was placed on hold to allow completion of DoD survey quality and process 

reviews. Upon completion of these reviews DoD will update its schedule for completing assessments and has committed to providing the updated schedule to us as 

soon as available. 

Who is conducting the competency assessments of DoD’s acquisition workforce? 

What role if any do contractors have in conducting the assessments? 

DoD’s acquisition workforce competency assessments are being conducted under 

the direction of the Director, Human Capital Initiatives (HCI) of the Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense (USD) for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

(AT&L), who also serves as the President of the Defense Acquisition University 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
68 

(DAU). The Center for Naval Analysis (CNA), a Federally Funded Research and Development Center, provides support to DoD’s efforts. According to DoD, CNA staff, 

which include technical experts on organizational behavior and competency management, provide technical and process support for both updating the models and conducting assessments. However, it is the responsibility of senior DoD functional leaders, appointed by the USD (AT&L), to ensure that the competency models are updated and workforce members, through the assessment process, provide inputs on 

proficiency, frequency, and mission criticality of competencies. 

How many A–76 competitions are in progress and what are the locations of the 

competitions? 

At the time of our hearing, January 20, 2010, there were seven A–76 competitions 

being reported as in progress in the DoD Commercial Activities Management Information System. Two were located in Fort Jackson, one was located at Fort Benning, 

one was located in Puerto Rico, and three were at multiple locations. A current update of the data on March 2, 2010, shows only two A–76 competitions, both being 

conducted by the Navy and involving multiple locations, reported as in progress in 

the DoD Commercial Activities Management Information System. 

How can Congress get DoD to comply with the 180-day definitization requirement 

for UCAs? 

As previously noted, our work has shown that contracting officers have pointed 

to numerous reasons for delays in definitization. Contracting officers cite their 

heavy workloads, stating that once the UCA is awarded, they must turn to other 

pressing needs rather than going through the definitization process. They have also 

cited other reasons such as shortfalls in the government’s ability to perform price 

analysis of contractor proposals. Continued congressional attention to enhancing the 

size and capabilities of the defense acquisition workforce would help to address 

these issues. 

However, we have found that management attention and oversight, from DoD to 

the local command level, also can be effective in managing the use of UCAs. For 

example, we found a contracting command emphasizing timely definitization by decreasing the 180–day requirement for definitization to 150 days. According to local 

command officials, if 150 days from UCA award is surpassed, management expects 

continuous updates on the status of definitization. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Murtha.] 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
(69) 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2010. 

COMBAT AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS 

WITNESSES 

REAR ADMIRAL DAVID L. PHILMAN, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR, AIR WARFARE DIVISION 

MAJOR GENERAL DAVID J. SCOTT, U.S. AIR FORCE, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF 

FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS AND REQUIREMENTS 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. DICKS

Mr. DICKS. The committee will come to order. 

This is maybe a little bit out of sync here, but I just would like 

us to have a moment of silence in remembrance of the chairman, 

Mr. Murtha. 

[moment of silence.] 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

This morning the committee will hold an open hearing on the 

state of the Defense Department’s combat aircraft programs. We 

are pleased to welcome Rear Admiral David L. Philman, U.S. Navy, 

Director, Air Warfare Division, and Major General David J. Scott, 

U.S. Air Force, Director, Operational Capability Requirements, 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Requirements. 

Admiral Philman and General Scott, we find ourselves at an interesting crossroads in the history of combat aircraft acquisition. 

The production lines for the Nation’s legacy tactical aircraft, the F– 

18 and the F–22, are either shutting down or on the verge of shutting down. The replacement jet, the F–35 Lightning 2 Joint Strike 

Fighter aircraft is still in development and testing and on the verge 

of ramping up to high production numbers. However, just last 

month, the Department announced a 13-month delay in the program. This delay is especially worrisome for the Navy and the Marine Corps, which is already forecasting a Strike Fighter shortfall 

in excess of 100 to 150 jets in 2014. 

The committee is anxious to hear updates on other combat aircraft acquisition programs, such as the Navy’s E–2D Advanced 

Hawkeye early warning aircraft and the PA–8 Poseidon multi-mission aircraft and the Air Force next generation bomber, as well as 

how the Air Force plans to satisfy future electronic attack aircraft 

requirements that are currently being satisfied by the Navy EA– 

6B Prowlers. 

Admiral Philman and General Scott, we are looking forward to 

your testimony and a spirited and informative question and answer 

session. 

Before we hear your testimony, I would like to call on the ranking member and our former chairman, my good friend Bill Young, 

for his comments. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
70 

REMARKS OF MR. YOUNG

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I look forward to this extremely important hearing. But I wanted to make 

a comment to follow yours about Jack Murtha. 

Jack and I worked together on this committee for nearly 30 

years. I was chairman twice, he was chairman twice. But when we 

produced a bill, the bill was basically the same, no matter which 

one of us signed on as chairman. We just had that tremendous relationship. I am sure we will have that same relationship with you 

because of the long time that we have spent together. 

Anyway, thank you for recognizing a moment of silence. 

Mr. DICKS. If you would yield for one brief second, that is a tradition that has been on this committee. I have been on the committee 

for 31 years. That has always been the tradition, of working on a 

bipartisan basis. And at a time when that is difficult in some other 

places, I think that is something we really need to maintain and 

continue here on the defense committee. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, you know I have a tremendous respect for you 

and all of the members on our side have that same respect for you 

as well. 

But thank you very much, and thank you all for being here 

today. We look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL PHILMAN

Mr. DICKS. Admiral Philman. 

Admiral PHILMAN. Good morning, Acting Chairman Dicks, Ranking Member Young, and distinguished members of the committee. 

Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the 

Navy combat aircraft requirements. 

Before I make my opening statement, I would like to convey to 

you my sincere condolences to the Murtha family. The United 

States Navy is grateful for the lifelong dedication of this true public servant. 

Chairman Murtha exemplified dedication to duty during his time 

in the Marine Corps as well as in the United States Congress. His 

patriotism and heartfelt concern for soldiers, sailors, airmen and 

marines helped define his life of service. In this time of sorrow, we 

will all be comforted in knowing that although we lost a great 

friend to the Navy and the country, his legacy will continue, as you 

have mentioned. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

Admiral PHILMAN. I am pleased to share this time with my counterpart and good friend from the Air Force, Dave Scott. I am proud 

to report that the Navy’s aviation community, comprised of aircraft, 

ships and weapons systems, continues to be a stabilizing force in 

the flexibility and capacity to span the globe. 

With last year’s commissioning of the USS George H.W. Bush 

and the inactivation of our last conventionally-powered aircraft carrier, the USS KITTYHAWK, we now have an all nuclear powered 

carrier force. Currently comprised of ENTERPRISE and 10 NIMITZ class ships, the Navy remains committed to maintaining a 

force of 11 aircraft carriers over the next 30 years. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
71 

Our modern all-nuclear force provides an unmatched capacity to 

meet the Navy’s core competencies; forward presence, deterrence, 

sea control, power projection, maritime security, and humanitarian 

assistance and disaster response. The Navy can execute these competencies quickly and decisively while operating in international 

waters without imposing unnecessarily political or logistical burdens on our allies and potential partners. 

Right now, Navy and Marine Corps carrier-based F–18 aircraft 

are providing precision strike and support of forces on the ground 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Hornet and its brother, the Super 

Hornet, are the backbone of our Navy’s ability to project power at 

shore. And without question, the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter is essential to addressing our future Strike Fighter needs. 

Sustaining the Hornet fleet and transitioning to the F–35C, our 

first true fifth generation fighter, are critical to meet the Navy’s 

national maritime strategies. We are recapitalizing the EA–6B 

Prowler with EA–18G Growler aircraft to perform rotational support to carrier strike groups and ashore in an expeditionary role. 

The Navy is procuring a total of 114 EA–18Gs to recapitalize the 

10 fleet Prowler squadrons or 10 missile carriers and four in the 

expeditionary role. The first transition squadron at NAS Whidbey 

Island reached IOC last September, and full rate production was 

approved by OSD in December of 2009. 

While we continue to advance our platforms to face the current 

and future threats, we have also made great strides to improve our 

air-to-ground and air-to-air weapons systems. Joint weapons like 

the joint air-ground missile, the small diameter bomb, AIM–9X and 

AIM–120D are critical, not only to the Navy, but to the combatant 

commander’s future warfighting capability and capacity. 

Acting Chairman Dicks, I thank you and the committee for allowing me to appear today. The committee’s untiring commitment 

to the Navy is evident, and I thank you for your support today and 

into the future. 

I respectfully request that my statement be submitted for the 

record. 

Mr. DICKS. Without objection, it will be entered into the record. 

[The statement of Admiral Philman follows:] 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
72 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 138 here 65007A.026
73 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 139 here 65007A.027
74 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 140 here 65007A.028
75 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 141 here 65007A.029
76 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 142 here 65007A.030
77 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 143 here 65007A.031
78 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL SCOTT

Mr. DICKS. General Scott. 

General SCOTT. Good morning, Chairman Dicks, Ranking Member, and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity 

to address this committee regarding your United States Air Force 

combat requirements. Before I give my opening statement, I would 

also like to convey my condolences to the Murtha family in this 

time of sorrow. His dedication and service to the Nation will always 

be remembered. His patriotism and special concern for combat 

troops touched those of us in uniform, no matter what service profoundly, and he will be missed. 

The Air Force remains fully committed to support today’s global 

operations. Today’s complex strategic environment requires Air 

Force capabilities to support the joint team across the full spectrum 

of operations. 

As you know, it is vital to remain a relevant force and acquire 

future capabilities necessary to underpin our Nation’s long-term security. The Air Force believes the most cost-effective plan is to accelerate the retirement of some older fighters to enable and reinvest into the remainder of the legacy fighters and bomber fleet, 

preferred munitions, and other key enablers as a bridge to the fifth 

generation fighter force, capabilities that are absolutely essential to 

counter advanced and highly lethal emerging threats. 

Our recapitalization strategy seeks to balance requirements for 

today and tomorrow. Our belief is we must improve our existing capabilities and pursue new, more capable systems to meet future 

threats. 

I thank you for the opportunity to address this committee and I 

look forward to your questions. 

[The statement of General Scott follows:] 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
79 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 146 here 65007A.032
80 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 147 here 65007A.033
81 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 148 here 65007A.034
82 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 149 here 65007A.035
83 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 150 here 65007A.036
84 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 151 here 65007A.037
85 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 152 here 65007A.038
86 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 153 here 65007A.039
87 

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER COST ESTIMATE

Mr. DICKS. Admiral Philman and General Scott, the cost estimate done by the Joint Estimating Team for the Joint Strike Fighter program shows a development shortfall of $3 billion over the 

previous estimate. What is being done to address these updated 

cost estimates with regard to funding the program? Will this funding shortfall impact the near term production quantities? 

General SCOTT. Sir, as you well know from the estimate and as 

we looked at what we need to do to reduce the risk in the program 

through the OSD and the Department and Air Force and Navy 

through the Joint Program Office, what we have looked at is how 

we can take this schedule with the funds that we have and move 

it to the position as well. 

We are taking $2.8 billion, putting it into RDT&E in the System 

Design and Development (SDD) phase, to enable us to take that 

schedule and get it further along. We are also taking that procurement ramp that was probably a little too aggressive and we are 

slowing it down. And what that is doing for the Air Force in particular is it will take about 67 aircraft out of our inventory, but in 

our mitigation plan, we are working that with all of our other plans 

with other fighters. But it will take us as we look at it, it will slip 

the ramp to 2016 before we will go from 48 to 80 fighters, and it 

also slips us to about 2016 for the timeframe for that. 

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER PROGRAM DELAY

Mr. DICKS. Admiral Philman and General Scott, the Department 

recently announced a 13-month delay to the program to account for 

the findings of the Joint Estimating Team. How is it that the initial operating capability date in the program has not changed? 

Admiral PHILMAN. Sir, the restructuring program is actually 

good for Navy. Since we put that procurement, those numbers are 

coming down. In the case of the Navy, or the Department of Navy, 

55 aircraft will go back into fully funding that part of the program. 

The Navy has been on record for a 2014 IOC. Certainly a 13- 

month slip is going to pressurize that. So with delaying delivery of 

aircraft, making it more concurrent so we have test aircraft delivered at the right time so we can test them on time and then delivered later on, I think is good, but will push our IOC out toward 

2015, maybe later. 

CNO is tying IOC to specifically having adequate numbers of aircraft, having the right capability, in our case Block 3 capability, 

and that testing has been done. 

Mr. DICKS. Give us a little flavor of what the reason is for this 

13-month delay. I think we talked about modeling, the modeling 

that had been done. 

Admiral PHILMAN. Yes, sir. The traditional development and testing of aircraft, you fly down data points, bring them down, so to 

speak. This program has been more advanced where we are using 

extreme amounts or large amounts of modeling so that we could 

build the aircraft and then be more predictive of the flight characteristics without actually having to fly the aircraft. 

That modeling is two things. The delivery of the aircraft has 

been slower than expected, and then what we are seeing in the acVerDate Mar 15 2010 20:50 Mar 17, 2011 Jkt 065007 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A007P2.XXX A007P2

Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
88 

tual flight hasn’t necessarily validated the model. So now we are 

continuing to press back and have to go back and do more traditional testing for some time until we can get the aircraft mature 

enough to be more in line with a validated model. 

Mr. DICKS. Is this a software problem? 

Admiral PHILMAN. Not within the aircraft. Now, there are software programs with the aircraft that continue to be drivers—— 

Mr. DICKS. Sometimes in the past you put an aircraft there and 

do a software test for the program. Has that been done here on the 

Joint Strike Fighter? Where you have a test? 

General SCOTT. Sir, if I understand the question, when we do 

software modifications with an aircraft, sometimes the software 

modifications are behind the actual in the simulation piece, and 

they are behind. In this phase, they are concurrent with each other 

so they are working together. So the software as we do in the modeling and the software within the aircraft are the same. So if that 

answers your question—— 

Mr. DICKS. But there are software issues, right? In the testing 

here—— 

General SCOTT. Yes, sir, as with every phase of every aircraft we 

have done, there are software issues. As we go through the test 

phase, that is part of the Software Design Description (SDD) phase 

where Lockheed Martin with their subcontractors are looking at 

what those are and fixing them so that it can progress into the 

RDT&E and then into the Initial Operational Test (IOT) phase 

where the services will pick up the testing. 

Mr. DICKS. In the testing thus far, are there any serious defects 

in this aircraft that we have found that are a cause of concern? 

Admiral PHILMAN. None to my knowledge, sir. 

General SCOTT. None to my knowledge in the Air Force either, 

but we will get back to you if there are any. 

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER PROCUREMENT COST

Mr. DICKS. Admiral Philman and General Scott, while the committee applauds the attempt by the Department of Defense to fully 

fund the development portion of the program, it is not clear that 

a similar attempt has been made to properly price the procurement 

side of the program. 

Does the President’s request for the Joint Strike Fighter program 

properly fund the procurement costs of the aircraft to include all 

components, such as the airframe, engine, government-furnished 

equipment, et cetera? 

General SCOTT. Sir, currently in the President’s budget request 

for Fiscal Year 2011, yes, it does, as we look out and as we go 

across that particular time period with that. So we are satisfied 

with what we have requested in our budget from an Air Force perspective. I can’t speak for the Navy or the Marines, but we are 

okay with that. 

Admiral PHILMAN. Yes, sir, it is so for the Navy. It will be a 

problem in 12, and future issues are service integration, whether 

on the ships or in the training centers. That part we still have 

work to do. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Young. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
89 

AIR GUARD TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I suspect you 

are going to get a lot of questions about the Joint Strike Fighter 

today, so I am going to go in a little different direction. I want to 

talk about the Air Guard and the assets, fighter assets, that the 

Air Guard has and will have. But we understand that the Air 

Guard will begin to decommission its F–16s in 2011. General, is 

that correct? 

General SCOTT. Sir, there is a plan for the retirement of aircraft 

starting in 2011 as we look out, and part of those aircraft are the 

older aircraft. I am sure you have heard in the Combat Air Forces 

(CAF) restructure, about 250-plus aircraft is what we are looking 

at. But in that reduction of aircraft, as we reduce the older fleet 

of aircraft, Block 25s and Block 30s and the F–16s, there is a plan 

to slide other aircraft into those. 

There is an Air Force plan as we work our redux, as we work 

our F–35 ramp-up, on how we will enable the Guard to maintain 

the capabilities that they have currently today. Obviously, as we go 

through a process, if we shrink the force, the force will shrink equitably between the active component and the Air Reserve component. But right now, with General Wyatt and the Air National 

Guard, they will have the capabilities. 

The other thing we are doing with aircraft as we look at them 

to mitigate some of issues if the F–35 slips further, is to do some 

modernizations in Service Life Extension Program (SLEP). We believe in the 2530 realm that we can increase their flight hours, and 

we call it equivalent flight hours versus actual flight hours, and increase their economic service life to about 10,800 hours, which will 

take them just to the outside of 2017 and the capability with their 

Block 25s and Block 30s. So we are looking at that mitigation plan 

also and how to incorporate that into our program. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, it sounds like you have given considerable 

thought to this, but the information that we have had is that we 

could have as many as half of the Air Guard fighter units without 

aircraft by 2022. 

General SCOTT. Sir, if you look at the flow plan with the Block 

40s, Block 50s and the F–35s, I do not believe that is true. I will 

get back and get you the exact numbers on how that will occur. 

[The information follows:] 

The Air Force believes strongly in the Air National Guard, and its warriors are 

a valuable part of that Air Force total war-fighting capability. The Air Force plans 

to retain as many Air National Guard units as possible; however, the future composition of Air Force fighter forces is changing and will continue to evolve. New missions are emerging that will require commitments from both Active Duty and Reserve components. The Air Force may transition Air National Guard units that are 

losing older F–16s to a different more relevant mission set. 

As you know, there has recently been a restructure to the F–35 program to overcome challenges in production and test. These may cause the Air Force’s initial operating capability to potentially slip until 2016. For those Air National Guard units 

that may receive F–35s, this will impact aircraft availability and will also cause us 

to adjust our timeline to transition from the F–16. Until we have greater clarity in 

the F–35 program, we will not be able to fully detail this transition. 

But there is a plan as Operations (OPS)–1 for the F–35 stands 

up, which is an F–16 base, those aircraft, which are Block 40s, will 

transition to the Air National Guard, which will then enable us to 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
90 

transition older fighters and retire them out. So there is a plan as 

we move the dominoes and aircraft around, to allow both the Air 

Reserve component and the active component to have the right 

number of aircraft to enable them until their missions. 

Mr. YOUNG. General, does it appear that the Air Guard will be 

without a substantial number of aircraft until that program—— 

General SCOTT. No, sir, it does not. 

Mr. YOUNG. That is good news, because we were sort of led to 

believe that that might be the case. 

General SCOTT. Sir, as you well know, there are five reports coming to Congress totally covering the fighter structure, the CAF restructure, and different parts of that. Those will start coming over 

here on 1 March through 1 April. Those go into a lot greater depth 

and detail of the plans we are looking in the CAF restructure, 

things that we are doing with the F–22 and other fighter force 

structure. 

Mr. YOUNG. That will be good. One more question on the Air 

Guard. What about the F–15s? 

General SCOTT. Sir, what we are doing with the F–15s is called 

a long-term program. There are 176 of those aircraft that we will 

upgrade with the Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars. We will also give them some electronic warfare and Infrared 

Search and Track (IRST) capabilities that will enable them to extend their service life out to a much longer period of time. And in 

the F–15, what you will probably see, which you will see, is those 

will transition mostly to the Air National Guard as the F–22 aircraft stand up in the active component. 

Mr. YOUNG. So you say that there will be no downgrading of the 

Air National Guard’s capability to go to war with the regular Air 

Force? 

General SCOTT. No, sir. The F–15 long-term Eagle will have 

much better capability than the current F–15 does, and as they 

transition from Block 25–30 to 40s and 50s, they will have the capabilities in those aircraft also. And part of the plan as we look at 

the 40s and 50s, again looking at the F–35 program, there are 

things that we need to do to that. And there is in study and analysis a long time Viper F–16 program on what we need to do with 

the AESA radars, with the IRST capabilities and with Digital 

Radio Frequency Modulations capabilities. 

Mr. YOUNG. General, thank you very much. I appreciate that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Moran. 

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIAL BASE

Mr. MORAN. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you 

for your comments about our chairman. As you know, we wish you 

all the best and look forward to working with you. But I know you 

share all of our sentiments. This is the last way you would have 

wanted this to happen. So it is nice to recognize Jack. We appreciate that. 

What I would like to ask you about right now, Admiral Philman 

and General Scott, is our industrial base. After we complete the F– 

18 program, which is going to be in a few years, there will be one 

single contractor providing virtually all tactical aircraft, and I wonVerDate Mar 15 2010 20:50 Mar 17, 2011 Jkt 065007 PO 00000 Frm 00090 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A007P2.XXX A007P2

Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
91 

der if you have a concern. The committee has expressed its concern, for example, in the need we thought to have an alternative 

engine so you can have some measure of competition with the F– 

35, because we are going to build over 2,000 of them, we are going 

to be selling them overseas, yet we are relying upon one contractor. 

Would you address this issue, which has been of continuing concern to the committee, our over-reliance upon a single contractor, 

even as effective as they may be? 

Admiral PHILMAN. Certainly that is how our economy is established, for competition. In the case of the fighter world, the folks 

in Lockheed Martin are building the F–35, and that is coming 

along nicely. We talked about some of the issues, but I predict we 

are going to work our way out of that. 

The Hornet line in St. Louis is there. I am comfortable that we 

are buying enough airplanes now and into the near future that 

that line will remain hot so that we can understand better the production capability of the Joint Strike Fighter and not shut that 

down before we have a full understanding that that production line 

is going to meet our Strike Fighter needs. 

In the case of the Navy, we are buying airplanes, F–18Es, Fs and 

Gs, through fiscal year 2013, with a delivery in 2015. So that gives 

us some flexibility, I believe. 

Mr. MORAN. I hear your response, but, you know, I think the best 

example of the committee’s concern was the need for an alternative 

engine. Now you say no, you don’t need two, we can have total reliance, even though we are talking about more than 2,000 F–35s. We 

are not critical of the single contractor, but it is kind of a philosophical issue. It really goes to the heart of what we are about, 

competition, trying to keep costs low, trying to ensure that there 

is that monitor, that we don’t have monopolistic control. 

I suspect I know what we are going to hear, but I think it is important to share the concern with the committee. Did you have 

anything you wanted to say? 

General SCOTT. Sir, I would agree with you that, one, competition is extremely good, and two, we are worried about the industrial base. I am sure when we start talking about long-range persistent strike and platforms in that area, as we look at the funding 

of the industrial base. So we are concerned about that. 

One thing I will tell you, Admiral Philman and myself sit on an 

organization called the Joint Air Dominance Organization where 

we look at the Navy, the Air Force and the Marines and where we 

are today and where we are going in the future. 

For a tactical aircraft, we are already looking at what is the next 

generation air dominance platform. If you look at economic service 

life (ESL) timelines, we have to start understanding service life on 

the F–22 and the F–35: what are their economic service lives? In 

addition, with the F–18 and the F–16 and the F–15, and their ESL 

will approach quicker. 

So I believe that you will see, not in the very near future, but 

pretty close, you will start seeing us talking about where we are 

going in the tactical fighter realm from an air dominance, and what 

we need to look at in the future if you want to call it a sixth generation fighter, I will just call it the next generation air dominance 

fighter, whether it is manned or unmanned, will help the industrial 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
92 

base. I also believe the long-range persistent strike will help that, 

too. 

LONG RANGE STRIKE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIAL BASE

Mr. MORAN. Well, that is a good point, and in that context, after 

terminating the next generation bomber this past fiscal year, the 

one we are still in, really, this next year’s budget includes $200 

million to support a long range strike industrial base. We don’t 

really have any idea. What are you going to do with that $200 million? What is your plan for that? 

General SCOTT. Sir, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force Acquisition staff are actually the folks that will be monitoring that. 

But what we are looking at is the technology we started in the next 

generation bomber. We want to make sure that base of knowledge, 

that industrial piece, and those folks that were working that, are 

still in place if we go in a similar mode as we do this next study 

and figure out where we are going with what I will call long-range 

strike, long-range strike being an umbrella, a family of systems 

where you have a penetrating capability or you have a standoff capability or you have what we will call a conventional prompt global 

strike capability. But those are the things we will be looking at the 

industry to look at for us through our SAF/AQ folks in monitoring 

that $200 million. 

COUNTERING ELECTRONIC ATTACK

Mr. MORAN. Okay. Thank you. Just one last, I hope we can make 

it a quick one. But there also seems to be an over-reliance, at least 

the Chief of Staff of the Air Force has cited an over-reliance on the 

GPS system in countering electronic attack. Do you share those 

concerns? 

General SCOTT. Sir, obviously in the environment we are in and 

at a level we can talk now, yes, we are very concerned with the denial of Global Positioning System (GPS). We are looking at that. I 

think you all know that we have a space adversary squadron that 

helps us in exercises so that we can exercise in those environments 

with the platforms both across all services, not just the Air Force 

as we go into the Red Flags and up in Alaska and down there at 

Nellis. 

So we understand that. We are exercising to that capability. We 

are looking at ways that we can improve our inertial navigation 

systems, or doing some encryptions with different things we have 

with our impact GPS capability. 

So we understand that. And it is not just a platform sensor. 

There is also the weapons piece of that. So as you tie those two together to make sure that you are working those in congruence, so 

that at the endgame, in the environment that could be out there, 

that the weapon does what it needs to do. 

Mr. MORAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. Again, we look forward to following 

your leadership on this committee. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Frelinghuysen. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
93 

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT OPERATION COST

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, we 

all salute the combat pilots and crews and all those who do the remarkable work that they do each and every day. Certainly I believe 

hopefully we still have what used to be called overwhelming superiority. But the second comment is I worry about what the Russians 

are doing, the Chinese are doing, the Indians are doing, the collaboration between those military forces. 

But I would like to focus on what was described a few minutes 

ago as the economic service life issue, particularly as we look at the 

Joint Strike Fighter. 

It is my understanding that the Navy has developed a report, 

and I think the report’s name is the Joint Program’s Total Operating Cost Affordability Report, that indicates that each flight 

flown by the Navy and the Marines F–35s will cost $31,000 in 

2029. This compares with $19,000 in current flight hour operating 

costs for the F–18s and Harriers. 

Admiral, can you outline or elaborate on these numbers and explain to the committee how worried we should be about these figures? 

Admiral PHILMAN. Sir, it is a valid worry. We are looking very 

closely at that. The CNO is very, very captured by the total ownership cost in all of its platforms, end to end, manpower, flight hours, 

all the pieces and parts that go into that calculus. But that is being 

developed, the report you are talking about is being developed by 

Navair Systems Command, and I don’t think I can address it directly for you, but I will get you that answer. 

[The information follows:] 

The Navy encourages its program managers to study the total ownership costs of 

new and existing systems, and the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) estimate of JSF cost per flight hour is consistent with goal. It is not prudent to make 

conclusions on the total ownership costs of JSF based on the NAVAIR study alone. 

Navy has not yet completed operational testing of the carrier variant and flight hour 

costs are only one aspect of JSF total ownership costs. Understanding and controlling total ownership costs is a priority for the US Navy and we will continue to pursue ways to reduce our long-term operations and support costs for all our ships and 

aircraft. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Well, I assume the Air Force is familiar 

with this study. 

General SCOTT. Sir, from a requirements perspective, no, I am 

not. I would probably say that our AF/A8, General Miller, is probably more aware of it, but I will get involved with it. I do understand the O&M costs and the significant increase that we have gotten when we go into the F–22, F–35. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I am not setting up a potential dispute, but 

I understand there is some difference of opinion between the services on some of the conclusions of this report. What worries me is 

that obviously we talk about delay here, and there has been some 

delay and cost overruns. We have international partners. Don’t 

they have a piece of this game here, and they have some anticipation? 

Admiral PHILMAN. They do. They are watching us very closely. 

Part of the cornerstone of the Joint Strike Fighter program is affordability, and we are watching that very closely. I don’t think 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
94 

there is a separation between the Air Force and the Navy on this 

regard, but there is—— 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. But Congress is of the view that this is 

joint, that maybe somebody will get it earlier than the other, but 

that the carrying costs are pretty heavy here. We are all for it. 

Admiral PHILMAN. Sir, I want to reiterate, it is a valid question 

and we owe you an answer. I will get you the right people to answer it for you. 

General SCOTT. Sir, if I could comment on the joint piece, I will 

tell you that the CNO, the Chief, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, went down to the Lighthouse, which is a large facility 

down in Suffolk that enables us to do things. And the things that 

they have seen to make sure that we are working on all things 

joint was that the three four-stars went down there to learn about 

the F–35, all things that were working with the umbrella, dealing 

with the connectivity, with the data links, with the weapons systems and how we will interact. 

We are really working very closely, both through the Joint Program Office, both through the requirements piece and through the 

acquisition piece to make sure that we get this right and do these 

things together. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Well, I think we are reassured in hearing 

that. You don’t have many options out here. You have a shrinking 

industrial base, one basic line that you are going to be dependent 

on. We need to get it right and we need to expedite whatever we 

are doing. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Rothman. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me echo everyone’s sentiments about the appropriateness of acknowledging the 

passing of our friend and great chairman, Jack Murtha, a truly 

great man, great patriot, great American, and he will be missed at 

many levels. 

I also want to associate myself with the remarks of those who 

say how much they are looking forward to working with you, Mr. 

Chairman, not only because of your experience, but also because of 

your commitment to the kind of nonpartisan approach to our work 

here, as well as the kind of accessibility that has been afforded to 

each of the members to make a contribution and to learn. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

JOINT STRIKEFIGHTER CAPABILITIES

Mr. ROTHMAN. Admiral and General, thank you for being here. 

Thank you for your distinguished careers of service, really remarkable. I have said this before in other hearings, we hope that your 

present service will be the best work of your careers until the next 

level. But we need you to be operating at your best as well. So, 

good luck to you and all of those who work with you and under you. 

A couple of general questions, and I do understand the nature of 

this being an open hearing. Can you respond though generally to 

the capabilities of the Joint Strike Fighter versus the kinds of comparable aircraft that are coming out of Russia and China, in general terms? Will our aircraft be superior? Will we have a qualitative military edge? 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
95 

Admiral PHILMAN. Yes, sir. I believe that to be true. It is designed from the very beginning to work into what we call an antiaccess environment. So all the things that are resident in the aircraft, designed in, the sensors, the weapons systems, the 

interconnectivity that was mentioned by General Scott earlier, all 

enable this aircraft to go deep and do this work at all odds. 

So, the other countries are building aircraft that are very capable 

and we keep our eye on that with good reason. So the whole system 

of systems, not only the F–35, but the Enabler, the E–2D and the 

Airborne Command Control that the Air Force has, our ships, our 

command and control over the ground, I think it all plays in. 

So from a greater standpoint, the F–35 fits into it to accommodate our ability to work unimpeded in almost any environment. 

General SCOTT. Sir, what I will give you is an example. The F– 

35 is very complementary to the F–22, different missions, but capability-wise and what that does. I have been a fourth generation 

kind of fighter pilot. I have flown against the F–22, and there is 

no aircraft today that matches that aircraft. And the F–35, for the 

complementary missions that it does today, will be very similar to 

that. So I am very, very satisfied that today and where we are, that 

where we can fight and do the things, we are the best. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Obviously we are projecting the use of the Joint 

Strike Fighter many years out into the future, and I am certain 

that you have considered our potential adversary’s work in the future as well. So they are not going to be staying at home just 

twiddling their thumbs. They are working on ways to match or 

overcome our Joint Strike Fighter. 

ELECTRONIC ATTACK AIRCRAFT

But I know my time is limited, and it fits in with the general 

pattern and what the Admiral was saying about how it fits into the 

general whole of our air superiority. But I am very concerned about 

electronic warfare and the jamming of their systems by us and the 

acquisition of our superior aircraft at early times by our enemies 

sufficient enough to give them the opportunity to deny us air superiority. That concerns me a lot. 

Are you worried about that enough, and are we doing enough to 

address what I consider to be in a way an asymmetrical threat, 

folks who don’t have aircraft like ours and other capabilities like 

ours, but can acquire us far away and at great heights and then 

knock us out? 

Admiral PHILMAN. Yes, sir. Without question the adversaries 

continue to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum at much reduced 

costs of what we do to counter their efforts. Right now, I mentioned 

that we are recapitalizing our Prowler squadrons the EA–18G. 

That is going to be 10 squadrons on the ships and four expeditionary squadrons, plus the Marines. That is an excellent platform 

and has great capability. But it is only a piece of the puzzle. 

There are other parts. The Joint Strike Fighter will have resident capability to be able to work within that and contribute that 

system, as will almost every other airplane we have. We have gone 

to places. We have some very good modeling centers. The question 

was asked earlier how is this working, are you worried about this 

developmentally. We worry about what the adversary is building, 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
96 

how they can counter us. We are trying to model their capabilities 

and then we will work our way through countering those before 

they ever even fly, making those capabilities resident in not only 

the F–35 and the EA–18G, but the rest of the force as well. I believe that is true for the Air Force. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. And your budget request for fiscal year 11 is sufficient to pursue those capabilities to your satisfaction? 

Admiral PHILMAN. Yes, sir, for the Navy. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. For the Air Force as well? 

General SCOTT. Yes, sir. I will pile on to what Admiral Philman 

said. It is a family of systems. It is not one system, as you said, 

like with the fighter itself. It is how you cover that entire spectrum, that electronic magnetic spectrum. What we don’t want to do 

between the two and three services is to be redundant. There will 

be overlap in how we cover that spectrum. But we want to make 

sure that between the three services and the fiscal realities that 

are out there, that we have got it all covered. And I think we do 

a very good job of that with the organization that I previously mentioned on how we want to spend our funds to make sure that we 

are covering the spectrum today and as we look into the future. 

And in a closed session, Mr. Chairman, we could actually get into 

a lot more details about those capabilities. 

MISSION CAPABILITY RATES

Mr. ROTHMAN. One last thing about the maintenance. You were, 

General, comparing the superior qualities of the F–22 in a certain 

way to the Joint Strike Fighter. It has been said that the low observable maintenance for the F–22 has led to substantial decreases 

in mission capability rates and that there is the same low observable maintenance proposed for the F–35 and there is some concern 

about decreases in mission capability rates for the Strike Fighter. 

Do you share that view? 

General SCOTT. What I will share with you is that if you look at 

all our stealth capabilities starting with the F–117 and the B–2 

and now the F–22 and working our way to the F–35, we have always started off with lower rates. We look at it from four areas. 

We look at it from the material, the system, the management of 

that system and the manpower. And part of it just is how are we 

teaching these young men and women, these young Airmen that 

are out there that are working on this material, to enable them to 

make sure that they are doing the right things. 

We have made great strides. If you go back and look at the F– 

117 and look at the mission capable (MC) rates and the ability that 

we learned from low observable (LO) maintenance and now we are 

applying it to the F–22 and we will also apply it to the F–35, and 

we are handing those lessons learned both to the Marines and the 

Navy to make sure we don’t reinvent the wheel. 

I will tell you that the MC rates were low in the F–22. If you 

look at the trends, they have trended up. They do not currently 

meet what I will call the threshold and objectives or the Air Combat Command’s MC rates. They are probably in the mid-60s. But 

they were well below that and the trend is up, and we believe we 

have reached that knee in the curve with the different places that 

we are working as we work those things. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
97 

There will be different issues with different places that you place 

this aircraft. Obviously Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico is a 

great place to have these kinds of aircraft because of the environment. And there are other things we are learning from, such as the 

environment and how that dictates to the things that happened to 

those kinds of materials. 

Admiral PHILMAN. Sir, as was mentioned, the Navy is early to 

this game. The Super Hornet has some LO characteristics, but it 

is not a durable aircraft. So we are taking the lessons learned from 

the Air Force and applying it to the Navy’s F–35C. Of course we 

are going to operate in a different environment, in the maritime, 

close to the water always. We will probably see some challenges 

that weren’t there before, but we are capitalizing on every opportunity to learn from what has been done before. 

Mr. ROTHMAN. Thank you, chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Ms. Granger. 

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER QUANTITY

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you very much. Thank you for your service 

and thank you for your appearance today. 

You have talked about the changes in the F–35 and that you are 

planning to buy 43 for 2011. My question is, the total requirement, 

it was at 2,443. Is that still the number, or has that changed? 

General SCOTT. Ma’am, I don’t know the total requirement across 

the entire F–35. 1,763 is still the Air Force’s program of record, 

and we are planning on buying 1,763. Across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) and where we are sitting right now, we are 

67 less, but with the ramp up and where we are going to end up. 

As you well know, this is critical to the backbone of our Air 

Force. This is the replacement of the A–10 and the F–16. And as 

our Chief has said, this is the future of the fighter force of the 

United States Air Force from the global precision attack mode that 

we will be using this aircraft for. So we haven’t changed the number. 

Admiral PHILMAN. Likewise, ma’am, the F–35C in the case of the 

Navy is going to carry the water for us well into the next few decades. Our legacy aircraft will be supportive. But our program is 

680 airplanes. That has not changed in quite some time. The actual 

mix has yet to be determined. The Commandant of the Marine 

Corps and the CNO have an agreement that we will address that 

when we have enough data to make that decision. When I say the 

mix—— 

Mr. DICKS. That is both the Navy variant and the Marine Corps 

variant? 

Admiral PHILMAN. Yes, sir, that is correct. So the Department of 

the Navy is 680 aircraft. They will be divided up between the Navy 

and the Marine Corps, the F–35B, which is the STOVL version, 

and the F–35C, which is the CV version. That decision is yet to be 

made. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you very much. I know that the previous 

plan called for as many as 80 Air Force versions and 50 NavyMarine Corps versions. Do you know when you will have a steady 

state annual production number? 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
98 

General SCOTT. What we are being told is that in 2016, the ramp 

will go from 48 to 80. That was the initial ramp, the initial procurement buy. And that in 2016, initially prior to the restructure 

it was 2015, and we are looking at the ramp now in 2016 to be at 

the 80 buy. 

Admiral PHILMAN. Likewise, ma’am, the restructure will cause 

some perturbation and move it to the right to some extent, but the 

steady state I think is 50 for the Navy. 

Ms. GRANGER. I am sorry, what did you say? 

Admiral PHILMAN. The steady state I think is 50, but when that 

will occur we will have to see, where there is uncertainty now with 

the restructure. But for us, for the Navy anyway, the restructure 

does allow for more logical ramp-up. So we are taking the ones that 

we are taking now in a more logical step so they can flow into testing and then delivery for a fleet of airplanes in a more logical way. 

So the restructure comes at a pretty good time for the Navy. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you both. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Ms. Kilpatrick. 

AIR DOMINANCE

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to add my 

remarks in terms of just you, who you are. I have been to your district. I know the commitment. For 30 years you have been on this 

committee. I am sure we will continue the legacy of our chairman. 

It is heavy for me this morning, I am sure it is heavy for everybody. But thank you for your service. 

Admiral, General, good morning. It has been very instructive, 

and I have been reading yesterday evening and this morning still 

to a word, and you both have said it, air dominance. General, are 

we number one or not? 

General SCOTT. Yes, Ma’am, by far. No one comes close. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. That is what I want to hear. Admiral? 

Admiral PHILMAN. Yes, Ma’am. No question. No one else comes 

close. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. That is important, particularly in the world 

today and how we are going in Afghanistan. It is totally different, 

as you well know. 

General SCOTT. And Ma’am, I will tell you why that is important. 

Not since 1953, the Korean War, has a Soldier, Sailor, Marine or 

Airman on the ground been attacked from the air, and that is the 

air superiority that these three services give the folks on the 

ground. And it is not just soldiers. There are, as you well know, 

in Afghanistan and Iraq, all four services, to include the Coast 

Guard, are on the ground there. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. And that is important, this whole joint effort. 

And being new on the committee, just learning that and how you 

work together is awesome in my opinion. I have been to, as I mentioned, a few of the districts and in Iraq. I have seen the young 

men and women, 75 percent of them between 17 and 25. They are 

babies. I am a grandmom. So that is something for me, totally committed, doing their mission. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
99 

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER ALTERNATE ENGINE

I want to go back to the second engine thing of the F–35. General, I heard you say that F–22 was what you like for what it does. 

That is the aircraft you have flown and is superior. 

General SCOTT. I have never had the opportunity. If you can find 

a way to get me into an F–22. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Oh, you haven’t done it. I misunderstood. 

General SCOTT. No, Ma’am. I have flown against the F–22. What 

I will tell you, having flown against many a different aircraft 

across the inventory, the F–22 is without a doubt the air dominance aircraft that you want supporting your troops. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. So the F–35 we are moving to in terms of the 

Joint Striker effort? 

General SCOTT. It is a complementary aircraft. If you look at 

when we take the two missions and the mission sets, the two of 

them complement each other to enable them for the joint commander that is running the campaign to be able to do different 

things with the different fighters. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. I see. And together they increase that dominance? 

General SCOTT. Yes, Ma’am, they do. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Chairman Murtha always talked about the second engine. I think this committee has put in I think it is over $1.7 

billion to begin development of that. The Department has always 

said no, they are not going to do it and really have not moved. Inasmuch as we are in combat, it looks like forever, unfortunately, 

why? Can you speak to that? If that is over your head, if it is, just 

say that. 

Admiral PHILMAN. Ma’am, there are two different models of the 

engine. With it comes your basic sustainment, your logistics, the 

expertise to install or remove the engine and all the things that go 

with that. 

In the case of the Navy, within a very large population of airplanes that are going to be out there for the F–35, but for us 680 

airplanes, and the way that we envision and we do operate them 

on the amphibious ships and the aircraft carriers. So keeping a 

smaller pipeline so that we can have a more skinny down logistics 

at sea, the sustainment and the types of engines we would have 

to store on the aircraft carrier, it makes the most sense for us to 

have one engine type. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. So then should this committee withdraw its 1.7 

billion in that effort and rely on you guys who we think we don’t 

know anything to move forward? 

Admiral PHILMAN. I don’t mean to insult the committee. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. I don’t mean that facetiously. I am serious. Because one thing about this Congress, they don’t understand $630 

billion to defense when we don’t have housing, health care, and 

education and other things properly funded. So we have to rearrange dollars. I want the most. 

I am totally committed to the national defense of this country 

and to the young men and women and their superiors who protect 

us, but I think we have to be smarter as we move forward. And 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
100 

what you just said, Admiral, and that was like a nice little 30 second something, that was good. I am a former teacher. I received it. 

But I am concerned. I don’t know that we keep appropriating 

this if you are not going to use it. Chairman Murtha didn’t get here 

by happenstance. He was a decorated Marine, an intelligence officer. So I mean he had to have some reason to continue the funding, 

and I am wondering if we ought to continue it. 

General SCOTT. Ma’am, from the Air Force perspective, and the 

Chief talked about this with the Secretary yesterday at his hearing, as we look at the cost of the second engine and we look at the 

cost of the aircraft, what we don’t want to do is decrease the 

amount of aircraft that we buy. Competition is good. But the fact 

if you look at the F–22 is a single engine, if you look at the F–18, 

it is a single engine, we have over the last 30 years done a lot of 

work with engines, and currently with what we have done with 

this particular engine, we are satisfied through the tests and where 

it is at, that this will be the engine that we want. And it is in the 

low rate initial production (LRIP) right now for the first ones that 

are coming out. 

Mr. DICKS. Will the gentlelady yield just for a second? Our staff 

has been told repeatedly by the former program manager that the 

biggest problem they had was with the engine of record. Now, I am 

new to this issue, but is that true? Are most of the problems with 

the Joint Strike Fighter with the engine? 

Admiral PHILMAN. There were issues with the engine early on, 

sir. But right now, we are beyond that. We are already receiving 

LRIP engines to be delivered to production aircraft. It is on the 

ground. The total test on the engine exceeds I believe 13,000 hours. 

So I believe the manufacturer and the program has gotten beyond 

that point. So we have a reliable engine that we can use right now. 

Mr. MORAN. The chairman is absolutely right. The program manager testified to this committee it was the engine that was the 

cause of the delay. 

Admiral PHILMAN. Yes, sir. I am not sure when that testimony 

occurred. But—— 

Mr. DICKS. We are glad to hear that. We don’t want this not to 

work. But we want to know what the facts are. 

Admiral PHILMAN. To my knowledge, this engine is performing, 

and we haven’t had any airborne emergencies with the engine, and 

on-the-ground testing—— 

Mr. DICKS. Maybe that is the reason the program manager is no 

longer the program manager. Anyway, I yield back to Ms. Kilpatrick. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. That was a good way to end that. And why is 

he not the program manager any longer? Don’t answer that. 

I will just go back and I am finished. Chairman Young mentioned, do we have enough fleet? Are we going to be short? Do we 

have enough war fleet to do the job? We are in a war and a half 

right now. I mean, the F–35 sounds like it is a good one, but you 

don’t want another engine. Air dominance, can we sustain it? 

General SCOTT. Yes, Ma’am. We currently have and in the plan 

with mitigation from an Air Force perspective, if you are looking 

at our fighter force structure, we are right now at what we will call 

a 2,000 number for a total aircraft inventory, approximately 1,200 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
101 

combat coded aircraft. If you look out in the outyears, there is, as 

the Chairman has mentioned, with the Navy, there is a bathtub, 

if you want to call it that, in about 2024 of about 185 aircraft. 

There is mitigation that we are working right now. One of them 

is with the 176 F–15s to increase their length. One of them is with 

the Block 40s and Block 50s to modernize that fleet. But we look 

yearly if not daily at where we sit today and where we want to be 

in different segments of our force structure. 

We also want to make sure we have the right balance. Today we 

have eight percent fifth generation aircraft. In 2024, which is the 

segment we look at, we have 51 percent fifth generation aircraft. 

As we start looking at that capability, the fleet size, because if you 

look at what those aircraft can do compared to the fourth generation, they can do a little bit more. So do we need 4.5 F–16s? And 

we are working those analyses with our folks that do that kind of 

stuff. 

But we are trying to make sure we have the right balance in the 

fleet. And that goes with manned and unmanned as we look out 

to the outyears. But there is work that we are doing. We are at 

a medium risk, but we are satisfied that we can support the Nation 

with the fleet that we have in the United States Air Force. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. We rely on you experts, who have given your 

life and dedication to your current positions and before, to make 

those determinations. That is not what we do here at this committee. But we certainly want to be in the realm of appropriating 

what is appropriate and at the same time safe for the country. 

Thank you very much for your testimony. 

Admiral PHILMAN. Ma’am, if I could add to that from the Navy 

perspective, we have enough aircraft now to conduct our missions, 

but there is looming out there with the delay of the Joint Strike 

Fighter and as we are using up the life of our legacy Hornets, we 

are concerned about that. So we are doing everything we can to 

make sure we extend the life, use our aircraft appropriately, and 

in the case of the legacy Hornets, the A through D, down to the 

squadron level, we have a service life and management program 

where the squadron commanding officer actually allocates how the 

aircraft will be used, how many catapults and arrested landings it 

will have, what kind of particular mission they would be used on, 

so we can work our way through potential shortfalls. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Visclosky. 

NEXT GENERATION BOMBER

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I apologize for being late and simply would make the personal 

observation that I find myself saddened that Mr. Murtha is not 

with us obviously. It is a fundamental change as far as the work 

of the committee. 

But I appreciate your long work, your expertise, and you will do 

an excellent job, and I certainly want to be supportive in any way 

because I know also we will continue in the bipartisan fashion and 

the diligence that we have in the past, so I appreciate that very 

much. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
102 

I have particular concerns, gentlemen, with the alternative engine. It is my understanding, and obviously the gentlewoman from 

Michigan has discussed it with you as well, that that has been covered, so I will not have specific questions except to reiterate my 

concern that I do think there is a value in competition. 

Having a concern generally about the industrial base in this 

country and the fact that some day we are not going to make anything here. And whether it is the Pentagon or the Department of 

Transportation or any other agency of the government, if we only 

make one of everything, pretty soon we are not going to make anything here. And I certainly want to add my voice of concern and 

to note for the record that over the last 4 years, the subcommittee 

has provided $1.7 billion for an alternative engine because of the 

importance we attach to it. 

What I would want to focus on at this point is the next generation bomber. And, General, I would like to know what the requirements and capability you would be looking for in that next generation. Would you anticipate it would be manned or unmanned as far 

as the vehicle? 

General SCOTT. Sir, in the manned and unmanned requirement 

that will be part of the subject that OSD is looking at. Right now, 

I would say—I don’t want to say we are agnostic, but we are waiting. We believe that, other than personally, depending on what we 

do the capabilities of that aircraft, if that aircraft ends up with 

some type of nuclear mission, then I agree that it ought to be 

manned. And those will be things and those will be in the study 

as we look at it. 

But as you look at what is the capability, whether manned or unmanned, in the realm of possibility, sir, either one of those could 

work if you start to look at those kinds of technical maturations 

and where we are at. It just depends on what we do with it. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. What is your time frame and acquisition costs? 

General SCOTT. Sir, we don’t have any acquisition costs right 

now. As you, know, you all helped us and we put some money in 

the industrial base for 2011. We are looking at this study to affect 

2012, but we are looking at fiscal 2013 to start working the aegis 

of where we are going to go with this particular program and the 

requirements that we have looked at. 

MODERNIZATION OF LEGACY BOMBERS

Mr. VISCLOSKY. And can I ask you about modernization requirements for the existing bomber fleet and what you anticipate that 

looks like over the coming 2 to 5 years? 

General SCOTT. Because of the ability to continue the B–1 and 

the B–2 and the B–52, we kind of look at it in four realms: how 

are we going to sustain it; the lethality of the aircraft; the responsiveness of the aircraft; and the survivability of the aircraft. Of 

those three aircraft, bomber sustainment and modernization funding over the FYDP totals $5.8 billion with approximately $1.2 billion for both the B-1 and B-52 and $3.4 billion for the B-2. 

As we look at the different things as we sustain lethality, one of 

the things we want to look at on these bombers is advanced targeting pods. Can we put those kinds of things on these bombers? 

Greater modernization on the B–2. The defense management sysVerDate Mar 15 2010 20:50 Mar 17, 2011 Jkt 065007 PO 00000 Frm 00102 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A007P2.XXX A007P2

Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
103 

tems on the B–2. Some of the connectivity as we look at analogue 

versus digital, the B–52, the B–1, and those three bomber fleet that 

we are looking at, we want them to have that beyond-line-of-sight 

capability as so they are sitting here working with the satellites, 

they can talk with the different aircraft that are in the air. 

So we are aggressively looking at those three aircraft in the modernization program across the FYDP. That is part of our phase, because we look at the phase of what I will call long-range strike. We 

want to sustain the legacy fleet that we have as we start looking 

at the tech maturization of what will be. And then we also want 

to start looking at the standoff capabilities. 

In phase two, then, we are hopefully into a long-range strike capability standoff bombers. We might start looking at that point, is 

there a possibility of retiring? And then we get into the phase three 

where we have the long-range persistent strike platform. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you very much. 

And again, I do have a serious concern about that alternative engine issue. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Mr. DICKS [presiding]. I will yield to Mr. Hinchey. But let me ask 

one question. The B–2 can penetrate. And the others basically have 

to stand off. You use long-range cruise missiles. In looking at the 

next generation, wouldn’t the ability to penetrate still be an important issue whether it is manned or unmanned? 

General SCOTT. Sir, from the Air Force perspective, we believe 

that this aircraft needs to be a long-range persistent and anti-access environment platform. In other words, it needs to penetrate 

into the anti-access environment. That is the requirement. We 

want it to be survivable. We want it to have the right range and 

payload to be able to get into the environment of the anti-access 

environment. Those are the requirements we have stated. 

Mr. DICKS. Is $200 million enough money to get it together doing 

the work that they have been doing, or should there be additional 

money added by the Congress? 

General SCOTT. Sir, currently talking with the industrial base, $200 million will cover that. I would say any additional amount 

will—— 

Mr. DICKS. How much did we have in 2010? 

General SCOTT. Sir, can’t get into that. 

Mr. DICKS. That is right. It is classified. 

General SCOTT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Hinchey. 

COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE HELICOPTER

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to express my appreciation and gratitude to you for 

taking over the responsibility of this very important subcommittee 

here. And it is a great pleasure for me to be with you, and I thank 

you for everything that you are doing. 

Gentlemen, I thank you also very much. 

I wanted to just mention the combat search-and-rescue helicopter 

program which was terminated by Secretary Gates sometime late 

last year as I remember. And I am wondering if there is any understanding of the need for that program. Is there going to be any iniVerDate Mar 15 2010 20:50 Mar 17, 2011 Jkt 065007 PO 00000 Frm 00103 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A007P2.XXX A007P2

Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
104 

tiatives that are going to be reinvigorating it? Starting it up again? 

The context of its use presently, as I understand it, there are a 

number of these that are being used for rescue operations in the 

context of Afghanistan right now. 

And I just wonder if you have any insight on this and what you 

think the next move is going to be. 

General SCOTT. Sir, you are right. The Resource Management 

Decision (RMD) 800 terminated CSAR-X. What it did not terminate 

is the mission itself. There are studies that are being done by Joint 

Forces Command on combat search and rescue. The Air Force has 

the combat search and rescue piece of that. All services have the 

search and rescue capabilities out there. It is the ability that the 

Air Force has to go into a lethal environment and hostile environment. 

The program of record is 112. There are currently, as of today, 

I believe it is 96. We are going to buy back to the 112, get our operational loss aircraft and get ourselves—there are four in the 2010 

budget, and we are planning on in the program to continue that 

to get ourselves back to 112. 

With that Air Combat Command, is relooking at the analysis of 

alternatives, and what is the next generation helicopter if we are 

going to look at that? We are also working with AT&L through an 

acquisition decision memorandum to recapitalize the fleet with the 

current aircraft that we are getting, which is the HH–60M, which 

is a current line that the Army has with their Blackhawks. 

So we are working very closely with AT&L through the AQ folks, 

Major General Randy Fullhart and myself. And we are working 

with ACC on the requirements. But you are right. The dwell time 

on these young men and women, and it is not just the aviators in 

the front; it is the guardian angels in the back that are doing God’s 

work is what I will tell you. Because it really isn’t right now just 

all search and rescue. It is medivacs. It is that golden hour rule 

that we live by to make sure that we can get that young man and 

young woman on the ground to a facility within 60 minutes, and 

they are meeting that requirement and doing that job superbly. 

Mr. HINCHEY. So the content of this material is available readily 

now, and it is in enough—— 

Mr. DICKS. Congressman Hinchey, would you pull your mike up 

closer? 

Mr. HINCHEY. The availability of these are standard now, and 

there is a level that is meeting the necessities, the requirements 

and specifically with regard to the circumstances that we are experiencing in Afghanistan, but also in Iraq to some extent. I assume 

that there are enough of these now, and there is a study going on 

I assume to figure out what is going to be the next move on this 

issue? 

General SCOTT. Yes, sir, we are meeting the requirement. What 

I will tell you, though, is the dwell time for these young men and 

women is as high as any dwell time we have in the Air Force. It 

is about a one-to-one dwell time. For some of them, it is even a little worse, about .98, and others it is about 1:2. But that doesn’t 

count those at the 1:2 dwell time that deploy to Korea and other 

places that they do. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
105 

We are looking at, is there a need, or do we restructure and rebalance this force structure in a way that the active component and 

the ARC component how we share that wealth with the dwell time. 

So we are working that. ACC is working the new AOA, the analysis 

of alternatives, to see if the requirement is better. And the R&D 

left, I believe, about $2.6 billion in it to get us operational. And we 

are also working on the recapitalization on the rest of the fleet. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you very much. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Tiahrt. 

LIGHT ATTACK AIRCRAFT

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You look good in that suit. You got my vote. 

I have one concern. I picked up in the light attack platform, ISR 

platform, that currently, we have the TA6—T6A, excuse me, which 

has over a million hours on the airframe. We are in flight test 

starting in the first week of March. It has a light attack platform 

with ISR capabilities. 

But I found out that there is a program now where the Navy is 

leasing a Super Tucano; in fact, they are leasing four of them for 

$11 million a year. And the T6A platform only costs $10 million. 

So why are we spending a million dollars more to lease the aircraft 

for 1 year when we could purchase an American aircraft for less 

money? 

And I have to tell you, Wichita, where I come from, is the air 

capital of the world. We have over 20,000 aircraft workers laid off. 

This platform would get about 800 of them back to work. I am 

hard-pressed to find it acceptable for us to lease aircraft from Brazilians, from Embraer, when we have an American platform that 

exceeds the capability. And I am very concerned about the way this 

is progressing with the lease. The lease goes outside the competitive process. And I think we would have a better chance based on 

the lease cost of winning a competitive bid. 

I guess what I would like to know is, why are we pursuing this 

lease when we have an American capability available? And why are 

we going outside the procurement process and using a lease when 

we could have a fair and open competition? 

Admiral PHILMAN. Thank you, sir. 

I have actually toured all of those lines out there, and I commend 

the people in Wichita. That is very impressive. You are speaking 

of Imminent Fury, which was a project that started I think in 

2007. The Secretary of the Navy was touring the Middle East, and 

he asked the Special Operations Forces, what is it that you need 

that you don’t have now? And they roughly defined the characteristics of a light attack airplane with some sort of ISR and special 

configurations. That became what is known as Imminent Fury, and 

phase one, which is a CONUS-based testing, and we are about to 

go into what is called phase two, which is combat verification. 

Those airplanes are leased, because that was the airplane that 

was available at the time. The T6B certainly is a very nice airplane, but it wasn’t quite ready just yet. 

As they go into the combat verification, that will be competed. 

That doesn’t exclude any capable aircraft from being considered for 

that combat validation, sir. So I don’t have any—right now those 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
106 

aircraft are on lease, and that will be the plan, but that does not 

mean it will not be competed. As a matter of fact, we insist that 

it be competed. 

General SCOTT. And when he says ‘‘those aircraft’’—the aircraft. 

There is currently only one aircraft on lease. The other four right 

now are not on lease. Those will compete with the Navy Acquisition 

Program. The initial Imminent Fury aircraft back in 2008 time 

frame basically for what they needed to validate the mission as 

they were going forward, the particular aircraft that met that was 

the Super Tucano. 

Mr. TIAHRT. So you were trying to validate the mission, not the 

aircraft? Or the capability, not the aircraft? 

Admiral PHILMAN. That is correct, sir. What is it that can bring 

instant command and control or instant support to the Special Operations Forces? What kind of equipment would be on the aircraft? 

And you figure out this would work; this would not work. Make a 

different modification. That is the concept, sir. 

Mr. TIAHRT. And it is your intent to competitively bid the followon? 

Admiral PHILMAN. The follow-on will be competitively bid in the 

acquisition process. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER ALTERNATE ENGINE

Mr. DICKS. The famous JSF Stealth business case analysis, is it 

finally here? Do we have a case on the alternate engine much touted by Secretary Gates? We understand that it may have arrived. 

Can you summarize or tell us what is in this business case analysis 

on the alternate engine. 

General SCOTT. No, sir, but I will get it for the record for you. 

I have not seen it, but we will make sure that I get it for you. 

[The information follows:] 

The Joint Strike Fighter Engine cost/Benefit Analysis update was provided by 

Deputy Secretary of Defense to Chairman Dicks on February 23, 2010. 

Mr. DICKS. Do we know who did it? 

General SCOTT. No, sir, I do not. 

Mr. DICKS. Was it a contractor, or somebody in the government, 

or do you know? 

Admiral PHILMAN. We will have to get that. I don’t know who did 

it. 

Mr. DICKS. Do you know about this if there was a business case? 

The question fundamental—one of the major issues between the 

administration and the Congress, wouldn’t you know about this? 

General SCOTT. I don’t know if we would know it from the requirements perspective, because as we state and we work through 

the Joint Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS) 

process, I would believe that Major General Jay Lindell, who is the 

SAF/AQP who works the acquisition piece of the F–35, would have 

a better idea, and I can get with Jay and talk to him. 

Mr. DICKS. We want you to look at this. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
107 

General SCOTT. Yes, sir, we will look at this, and we will get you 

the information we know that that has been brought up by several 

members. 

[The information follows:] 

Yes, a cost analysis was conducted by the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E), now called Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation (CAPE), within 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 

The analysis concluded that there would be no net cost benefits/savings from dual 

source competition. Specifically, the analysis considered three categories of costs associated with maintaining two engine producers: 

1. Non-recurring development: The non-recurring Research & Development investment required for a second engine source is approximately $2.5 billion. 

2. Production cost: The analysis concluded that splitting the production buys between two sources would result in an increase in production costs. This is due to 

3 factors: (1) learning curve effect is reduced when significantly fewer units are produced by each source, resulting in production cost increases of approximately $700 

million; (2) fixed costs are amortized over fewer units for each source: (3) cost of 

outsourced items increases due to fewer units for each source. The PA&E (CAPE) 

analysis concluded that more than a 20% competition cost benefit would be required 

to recover the non-recurring development cost and the additional production cost. 

This is consistent with the 1998 Program Management Advisory Group (PMAG) assessment that savings of 16% to 22% would be required to recover the added costs 

of maintaining two sources. PA&E (CAPE) found that Department of Defense experience does not support this magnitude of savings. 

3. Support cost: The analysis concluded that maintaining two engine suppliers 

would result in an increase in support costs. These engines are not build-to-print 

designs. Although both engines are designed to have identical external interfaces to 

the aircraft that make them interchangeable, the two internal designs are almost 

completely different. Additional support costs would fall into 4 primary categories: 

(1) Spare parts—Most of the engine parts are unique, including the fans, turbines, 

combustors and compressors. This requires establishment of two separate spare 

pipelines both in the fleet and at the depots. (2) Organization (Fleet) level repair— 

The configuration differences drive additional training and tools for fleet maintenance personnel. (3) Depot level repair—Two separate depot capabilities would need 

to be stood up. This drives additional non-recurring costs and additional recurring 

unit repair costs since each repair line would handle fewer units. (4) Engine upgrades and imporvenents—Future modifications for reliability improvements, safety 

enhancements and obsolescence management would need to be done on two different 

engines, driving additional recurring and non-recurring costs. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
108 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 203 65007A.040
109 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 204 65007A.041
110 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 205/400 65007A.042
111 

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER STATUS

Mr. DICKS. Tell us about the Navy variant and the Marine Corps 

variant. How they are doing on Joint Strike Fighter? We have been 

getting the review of each of these programs, and General Scott 

can talk about the Air Force variant. 

Admiral PHILMAN. Okay, sir. For the Marine Corps the F–35B, 

known as the STOVL version, we have three of those aircraft at 

Pax River right now, and they are beginning the test. So we are 

learning more. You might have heard issues about the exhaust or 

the downward plume, because it has—not only does the exhaust 

turn down, it has a lift fan in the center of the aircraft so it can 

do the vertical landings. There was some concern about the heat 

and how it might affect the flight deck of the amphibious ships. So 

that testing is being done. 

It is called the hover pit testing where they strap the airplane 

down and simulate the landing. Early report is that it is going to 

be okay. We have tested with coated and noncoated surfaces and 

various combinations to make sure that we understand how this 

aircraft would perform on the amphibious ships. We are also going 

to look at the blast and other aspects of the environmentals. 

We believe that is going to be okay. The Marines are holding to 

their 2012 IOC. The testing will come and prove that out. 

For the Navy version, it is the F–35C. A little bigger airplane, 

it has folding wings, tail hook, and launches and recovers from the 

aircraft carrier. A larger bomb bay. By comparison, because of the 

configuration of the airplane, the B is a little bit smaller, and of 

course, it has other mechanisms in there which is the lift fan and 

the other nozzles. So it has less fuel capacity. So if you want to 

compare the F–35B range one way and then back, is about 450 

miles, whereas the Navy version, the C model, is 650 miles. 

So we only have one C that has been constructed just now, so 

we are the last in line. The Air Force—actually the B, the Marines 

are first, then the Air Force and then the Navy. And so we have 

a little bit of a luxury of gaining the learning that has been done 

before we build into the Navy aircraft. The downside is that we are 

last, so we are having a struggle with our existing fleet. 

General SCOTT. Sir, we are very similar with our testing. As you 

know, in the testing phase, you will do some pull testing, where 

you are sitting there checking all the qualities and capabilities. 

And then we will work into the ground testing phase of the program, where we complete specifically designed ground tests for the 

aircraft. Some of it is just taxiing, and some of it is working 

around. And then the air testing, and we have just gotten into the 

air portion of that. I think we are about six months into that. 

So as you look at the capabilities of the aircraft, it is meeting all 

of the timelines. The unfortunate piece goes back to what we talked 

about, is that the schedule of those aircraft has not been as fast. 

So we are not as far along as we would like to be in the SDD phase 

of testing for the aircraft. But with the portions of the testing that 

we have done on the air and the ground, we are satisfied with 

where we are at. This is where we are sitting today as we look at 

those kinds of things and where we are at. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
112 

Mr. DICKS. That is exactly what I wanted you to do. And is 

there—I would assume that some people are going to say, shouldn’t 

you slow this down and take more time in development? I think 

that is exactly what you are going to do, and then slow down the 

acquisition of—— 

General SCOTT. Sir, I think that is exactly what the restructuring has done, is when we took the ramp, and we streamlined it 

down from 2015 at 80 and the other things we were doing and we 

decreased the number over the FYDP of 122 aircraft, we have said 

we are going to do in the RDT&E phase and the SDD phase; we 

are going to get through this. We are going to add aircraft to this 

phase to make sure that we get this part right. Obviously, if you 

don’t get that right and you just push it into the next phase, it just 

dominoes. 

So there is lots of concurrency in this program. We will, prior to 

milestone C, have started LRIP, and we will start having aircraft 

because we are able to do that with the ability of this particular 

aircraft. But we have slowed it down to make sure we are on the 

right track through the OSD’s restructuring. 

Mr. DICKS. I am going to give another chance, but I want to go 

to Mr. Bishop, who has not had a chance to question. 

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIAL BASE

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I apologize, I had some conflicting meetings this morning. But let 

me go back. I understand that you already touched on the question 

of whether or not the tactical aircraft industrial base might be compromised with the trend that we are going with the tactical aircraft 

residing in the hands of just the Joint Strike Fighter Program that 

our industrial base might arguably be shrinking, which might jeopardize our future. 

Admiral Philman, we just got with a single contractor, which I 

understand where we are now, provided virtually all the tactical 

aircraft after completion of the F–18 program, in a few years, are 

you really concerned or don’t you think it is logical that our industrial base will shrink to the point that we might be in jeopardy? 

General SCOTT. Sir, I think, as we look across where we are 

going, and as we talked earlier with the sixth generation, next generation air dominance aircraft, and that is out there in the future, 

and that will compete. The other thing is to realize that the industrial base, the prime contractor is only one piece of that. Within 

that prime contractor, there are major subcontractors that are 

doing many of the different parts on the F–35. So as they work— 

as the industrial base has changed with numerous contractors that 

we used to have, a lot of them have been subsumed by the larger 

contractors. 

So we are concerned. We are working that with a long-range persistent strike with the funds that you all gave us to enable us to 

keep moving on those kinds of things. And many of the things that 

are in the long-range persistent strike platform industrial base will 

apply because of the qualities of low deliverable and what we are 

looking at across the spectrum. So I think there is concern, but I 

think we are working with the industry partners to make sure that 

we are doing the right thing. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
113 

Admiral PHILMAN. Likewise, sir, for the F–18, our last aircraft 

that we are buying Es, Fs and Gs through fiscal year 2013 for delivery in 2015. That is a line that is hot, and we can capitalize on 

it. 

As the Joint Strike Fighter line matures and as we understand 

it better, and as was mentioned by General Scott, what is the next 

generation? The sixth generation of the air dominance platform 

and those people who design aircraft, who know how to build them, 

I believe they will be focusing on that with some confidence. 

AIRCRAFT OPEN SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. 

I want to ask you something about open systems architecture. 

The combat systems on the surface combatant ships and submarines, we are moving toward an open systems architecture, and 

we are told some advantages, such as cost, capability, and ease of 

modernization. 

Admiral Philman, the majority of the Navy’s sea-based combat 

systems are moving into an open architecture environment. Do you 

see the same thing in your combat aircraft systems? If not, does 

the Navy have a plan for moving towards open architecture for the 

combat aircraft? And would this save money in the long run? 

General Scott, are the Air Force’s combat aircraft operating 

under open systems architecture? If so, tell us. If not, why not? 

Mr. DICKS. Would the gentleman yield? Tell us what an open 

system architecture is first and then answer his question. 

Admiral PHILMAN. Well, that specific term is probably open for 

debate as well. But the way I understand it is that you have a 

sphere of where we move information around, and anybody can 

enter it through whatever system. Eventually, we will have to have 

more modern and sophisticated systems that are already plug and 

play. In the meantime, we need to understand better how existing 

systems can plug in. 

I like to use a three-prong plug-in to be an example. UL verifies 

it, and you plug it in, and you have electricity. So if the systems 

that we have today, which we are already invested in and are important to our warfighting capability, as we build this larger architecture, they have to be compatible. As a matter of fact, for the F– 

35 specifically, the three services, the Chief of Staff of the Air 

Force, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Marine Corps all collectively went down to the center for—known as the Lighthouse, 

the Center For Innovation in Chesapeake specifically to better understand how the F–35, which is going to be the best sensor that 

we have right now, at least from the aviation platform; how does 

it integrate into the rest of the system, the ships, other aircraft, 

and all the things that are involved in land and space? So they are 

very, very focused on it. 

Now, I will tell you that the CNO has restructured the staff, our 

new N2N6, which is the Deputy Chief of Operations for Information Dominance; that is his focus area. That is what he and his 

whole staff do. 

Anyway, a little bit of a definition and where we are, I think the 

Navy has certainly devoted itself to open architecture. It will have 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
114 

to be in the future. And as you alluded to, if we do it correctly, we 

will be able to be more efficient and save money in the long run. 

General SCOTT. Sir, and it is not just an Air Force system and 

a Navy system and a Marine system and an Army system. The one 

thing that—we were very involved in setting this meeting up down 

at the Lighthouse. We did bring the Army in, too. And the Army 

is part of this systems of systems and the open architecture so, as 

we look at this umbrella, we can end up all talking to each other 

without anybody listening to us. And we can do it in an anti-access 

environment, and we can do it in a passive environment. 

If you start looking at where we could be with our aircraft, if you 

are active and you transmit in this architecture, you no longer are 

invisible. And no one is invisible, but you just radiated. We have 

got to figure that out, and that is one of the things that the three 

Chiefs went down to the Lighthouse, working with the industry 

partner there, is, how do we create this umbrella of open architecture enabling what I call the kill chain? And the kill chain does not 

start with a missile hitting an aircraft or a bomb hitting the 

ground; it starts well before that as you start working through this 

with these wave forms through these platforms to enable that individual. 

The lucky guy that gets to fly that aircraft really is involved in 

a whole lot of architecture out there that is making those kinds of 

things happen. And we are really involved in it, because we have 

seen that we haven’t been as interoperable as we needed to be. A 

platform can’t talk to a platform, so we build a gateway enabling 

them to talk to each other. We need to get away from gateways. 

We will probably have them for a while, but we need to make sure 

that F–35s talk to F–18s, talk to F–16s, talk to Aegis Cruisers, talk 

to the AOC Air Operations Center, talk to the entire systems of 

systems so that, as I need to pass information to you, I have the 

ability to do that as quickly as the speed of light so you can then 

prosecute the attack. 

And I hope that makes sense, but we are working really hard 

jointly to do this in a correct manner through all four services, because the ground guy needs to have this information. 

COUNTERING ELECTRONIC ATTACK

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. Mr. Young. 

Oh, let me go back to this countering electronic attack. 

Admiral Philman, does the Department have a requirement to 

address these issues? This isn’t just about our aircraft but also our 

munitions. What is the Department doing to address electronic attack on our munitions? GPS, you know, the whole thing. 

Admiral PHILMAN. Through the satellites or the systems that the 

Air Force have, we are working closely with them in the information dominance. I mentioned earlier our N2N6, they are taking this 

on so that we understand better what those jamming possibilities 

are, how they affect individual weapons or the system of weapons. 

So it is very serious. The adversary is able to take our very sophisticated weapons and negate them with a very small investment, 

and we don’t like that. I think we are moving forward. I don’t have 

the—— 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
115 

Mr. DICKS. Do you think we are overly reliant on GPS weapons 

systems? 

Admiral PHILMAN. I don’t believe so. Those are complementary 

weapons systems. They get us into the ballpark in certain situations. But terminal guidance is part and parcel of many of our 

more sophisticated weapons. You put more than one seeker on it. 

You have a GPS that gets you into the targeting area, and then 

there is more refined targeting, either through imaging or other 

ways to get the final solution. 

Mr. DICKS. General Scott, do you have anything on this? 

General SCOTT. Nothing to add. In another venue, I would like 

to bring back to you at a higher level some of the capabilities that 

we do have in that environment. 

EA–18G GROWLER AIRCRAFT

Mr. DICKS. How is the Growler doing? The F–18 Growler? 

Admiral PHILMAN. It is doing great, sir. The first two squadrons 

have transitioned. We IOC-ed last year, and they are on schedule. 

They are delivering on time, and they are performing very well. 

As you might know, we were plussed up by 26 aircraft this year 

because we were going to take the expeditionary squadrons and decommission them, but it was determined that that mission was 

very, very important to not only the Navy but to the whole Joint 

Force and to the country. So we are extending the life of the Prowlers for about 2 more years as we transition those four expeditionary squadrons into the 18G. And then we will have 10 on the 

aircraft carrier. But they are performing well. 

P–8A POSEIDON AIRCRAFT

Mr. DICKS. What about the P–8A? How is that doing? 

Admiral PHILMAN. That is doing well, too. We rolled the first airplane last June. And we have two—well, it is going to be three flying test articles and two that are stress articles. We are looking for 

an IOC in 2013, and looking at milestone C sometime this summer, 

and then we will go on contract. 

Mr. DICKS. There has been a lot of discussion about replacing 

AWACS, JSTARS, a whole series of airplanes. Would this aircraft 

we are using for the P–8A be a candidate aircraft for a replacement 

of these other systems? 

General SCOTT. Sir, currently the Air Combat Command is doing 

what I will call a Ground Moving Target Indicator, Analysis of Alternatives. The Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) came through 

the Air Force Requirements Oversight Council (AFROC), proved 

through the studies down at Capes, and we are looking at all capabilities to look at that particular platform from a GMTI. 

Subsequently, while we go through that, and that will take probably into the summer of 2011, we have a study going on through 

a partner that is looking at other capabilities that we can do in the 

interim. As we look at MQ–9s, can we put a pod on an MQ–9? Because one of the Combatant Commander’s needs in Afghanistan 

and Iraq is a dismount capability. A slower speed as we look at 

those capabilities and being able to pick up you or me walking on 

the ground. We are working closely with that from an urgent operVerDate Mar 15 2010 20:50 Mar 17, 2011 Jkt 065007 PO 00000 Frm 00115 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A007P2.XXX A007P2

Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
116 

ational need on an MQ–9 or a platform of that sort to enable us 

in the interim. 

If you ask, is the P–8 Analysis of Alternatives in the study that 

ACC is doing, I am sure that will be part of the analysis. We will 

look at the current E–8 and what we need do with that. We will 

look at the P–8. We will look at, is there something that we can 

do with Global Hawk and all the other things they will bring to us? 

F–22 RELIABILITY

Mr. DICKS. On the reliability on the F–22. The F–22 was to have 

at least 3 hours meantime between maintenance. What is the time 

now? 

General SCOTT. Sir, that is going to change a KPP, a Key Performance Parameter, in the document. And to do that, they are 

looking at changing that. And I don’t want to get into exactly what 

they are going to do, but it is probably going to decrease. But they 

will bring that to the Air Force Requirement Oversight Council because that is a change. It will probably decrease. They are looking 

at somewhere between 1.5 and 3. And I will bring that back to you. 

That will come to the March AFROC, which I will chair, and I will 

get that back to you. 

Mr. DICKS. This is still improving, right? We are getting better? 

General SCOTT. Yes, sir, we are getting better. 

Mr. DICKS. Any other questions? 

Mr. Tiahrt. 

LIGHT ATTACK AIRCRAFT

Mr. TIAHRT. Going back to the Imminent Fury, there is an existing program going on now that the National Guard is doing for a 

light attack aircraft. And I want to look at combining those efforts. 

So I just wanted you to be aware of that, because I think we may 

have a program that is already ongoing that is similar to what you 

are pursuing under this Imminent Fury. 

General SCOTT. Sir, not from the Imminent Fury, but from the 

Air National Guard piece, since that runs with the Air Force, we 

know that, and we are working congruently on all things light-attack armed reconnaissance. Whether it is the Imminent Fury, the 

A–26B demonstration that the Air National Guard is working, as 

you know, and we briefed your delegation yesterday on the lightattack armed reconnaissance the Air Force is looking at for building partnership capacity and the Afghan, the light air support aircraft that they need, and they are looking forward to increase their 

capability in their Air Force. 

Mr. TIAHRT. What I am picking up is some of the folks in the 

Navy, Admiral, are sort of stiff-arming one company and embracing 

the other. And I am not—I am very concerned about American 

workers right now, and I think all of us are. And I just want to 

make sure, as this moves forward, why don’t we look at the joint 

capability and what we are already doing with the Guard and 

make sure that we don’t exclude somebody from the whole process. 

Admiral PHILMAN. No, sir. And we want to learn from any 

projects that are going on that can inform the process needs to be 

used. And if I can find out who is being noncooperative, I would 

take care of that and follow up on that, sir. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
117 

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you very much. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you gentlemen. This was a very good and productive hearing. 

And the Committee stands adjourned until 2 o’clock tomorrow 

when we will have a closed hearing on Fort Hood. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Mr. Dicks and the answers thereto follow:] 

ACES 5 EJECTION SEAT

Question. Congress provided $5.6 million in FY09 and $1.6 million in FY10 to 

qualify and test the ACES 5 seat. The FY10 National Defense Authorization Act 

conference report encourages the Air Force to consider the ACES 5 as a second 

source for the F–35 program. 

Please provide the committee with the current status of the appropriated funds 

intended for this purpose, including your estimated timetable for putting this funding on contract to qualify the seat? 

Answer. For the Fiscal Year 2009 Advanced Concept Ejection Seat (ACES) $5.6M 

Congressional add, the Air Force executed approximately $1.1M for testing and an 

ejection seat cost benefit analysis that compared the ACES II and ACES 5. A second 

analysis to study cost savings and benefits of ACES 5 for the F–35 is being considered and will cost an additional $500,000. Finally, the Air Force is planning to move 

the remaining Fiscal Year 2009 and Fiscal Year 2010 funds to an existing Navy contract. Once complete, the Fiscal Year 2009 funds should be obligated and on contract within two months and the Fiscal Year 2010 funds shortly thereafter. These 

funds would be used to conduct ACES 5 qualification and testing. 

Question. Please describe the substantial savings and benefits associated with 

qualifying and testing the ACES 5 ejection seat, including any acquisition and lifecycle maintenance savings, as well as any readiness, training, and safety benefits 

to the Air Force? 

Answer. While a recently completed cost benefit analysis showed the cost benefit 

of an ACES 5 would not overcome upfront costs, ACES 5 would provide several benefits. An increased safe ejection envelope over the ACES II is the most substantial 

benefit. The safety improvements would result from key updates such as integrated 

limb restraints and passive head and neck protection. With these enhancements, the 

ACES 5 could effectively prevent injuries, especially those caused by limb flail. 

Other benefits of the ACES 5 include reduced maintenance burden and improved 

aircraft availability. All aircraft that use ACES II would realize savings with an 

ACES 5 due to reduced maintenance, but upfront costs required for ACES 5 development, qualification, and procurement are not recovered by maintenance savings. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Mr. Dicks.] 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING

Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
(119) 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2010. 

FORT HOOD 

WITNESSES 

GENERAL CARTER HAM, UNITED STATES ARMY, ADVISOR TO THE 

INDEPENDENT REVIEW 

BRIGADIER GENERAL RICHARD W. THOMAS, ASSISTANT SURGEON 

GENERAL (FORCE PROTECTION) OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. DICKS. The committee will come to order. I would like to recognize the Ranking Member, Congressman Young, for a motion. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I move that those portions of the 

hearing today which involve sensitive material be held in executive 

session because of the sensitivity of the material to be discussed. 

Mr. DICKS. All those in favor, say aye. 

Those opposed. 

The ayes have it. The motion is agreed to. So ordered. Thank you 

Mr. Young. 

CHAIRMAN DICKS’ OPENING STATEMENT

Today the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee will receive testimony from General Carter Ham, U.S. Army, Advisor to the Independent Review of the Fort Hood shooting, and Brigadier General 

Richard W. Thomas, an Army physician who serves as the Assistant Surgeon General, Force Protection, Office of the Surgeon General. 

On November 5, 2009, Major Nadal Malik Hasan, U.S. Army, entered the Army base at Fort Hood, Texas and opened fire on a 

group of fellow soldiers. Before he could be stopped by law enforcement officers, Hasan fatally shot 13 members of the U.S. Army and 

injured 43 others, most of them military personnel. The alleged 

gunman, Army Major Nadal Hasan, is an Active Duty Army psychiatrist. He has been charged under article 118 of the Uniform 

Code of Military Justice with 13 counts of premeditated murder, 

and, under article 80 of the Uniform Code, with 43 counts of attempted premeditated murder. 

I am troubled by the circumstances that led to the shooting. In 

part, it appears that this may have been the result of military officers not following existing policies and procedures. Specifically, 

there are numerous stories in the press that the alleged shooter’s 

superiors failed to document and take action because of the negative information in his official record. 

We have questions. Why did it happen? Could it have been prevented? Was the response adequate? Are the needed resources 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
120 

available to care for the Fort Hood community? More importantly, 

we all share the same intent to ensure that everything possible is 

done so that this does not happen again. 

Gentlemen, we look forward to your testimony and to a spirited, 

informative question-and-answer question. 

Now, before we hear your testimony, I would like to call on the 

Ranking Member, Mr. Young, for his comments. 

OPENING REMARKS OF MR. YOUNG

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I want to 

welcome our very distinguished guests. I usually am very pleased 

with the hearings that we have and the information that we gain 

about the defense of our Nation and the support of our troops. 

Today, I am not sure that we are going to be really happy to hear 

what we are going to hear, because we are dealing with a tragic 

incident, discussing one of our own servicemen who took the lives 

of 13 of his fellow soldiers. I know that weighs heavily on your 

mind, as it does all of us, and we are not suggesting or pointing 

the blame at anybody at this point, but we do have questions. 

The facts surrounding the incident appear to be clear, but the 

breakdowns and the gaps that allowed it to happen are still being 

examined, and I am sure you are anxious to get to the bottom of 

that, as we are, and whatever steps that should be taken to prevent a tragedy like from this happening again. 

So I thank you for your efforts and look forward to your testimony. We are anxious to learn as much as we can about this. So 

thank you very much. 

Mr. DICKS. General Ham, you may proceed with your statement. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL HAM

General HAM. Thank you Mr. Chairman and Congressman 

Young. Members of the committee, it is indeed an honor to appear 

before you today to discuss the findings and recommendations of 

the Department of Defense Independent Review relating to Fort 

Hood. Joining me today is Brigadier General Thomas, Army Assistant Surgeon General for Force Protection. 

As the Chairman indicated, on November 5, 2009, a gunman 

opened fire at Fort Hood. Thirteen people were killed, 43 others 

wounded. It is important to remember that we extend our deepest 

sympathy to the families of the fallen, to those wounded, to their 

families, and all those touched by this tragic event. Indeed, one of 

the underlying principles guiding our efforts in conducting the review that we are here to discuss was that those of who are privileged to participate in this process felt an obligation to speak for 

the 13 fallen who are no longer here to speak for themselves. 

Following the shooting, Secretary Gates established the Department of Defense Independent Review related to Fort Hood and appointed Admiral Vern Clark, United States Navy, Retired, and the 

Honorable Togo West to co-chair this effort. Since Admiral Clark 

and Secretary West could not be with you here today, as one of the 

senior military officers who participated in the review, I am 

pleased to be here as their representative. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
121 

Events such as the Fort Hood shooting raise questions about how 

best to defend against threats posed by the external influences operating on members of our military community. The challenge for 

the Department of Defense is to prepare more effectively in a constantly changing security environment. It is with this challenge in 

mind that Secretary Gates directed the Independent Review to assess whether there are programs, policies, or procedural weaknesses within the Department of Defense that create 

vulnerabilities to the health and safety of our service members, our 

DoD civilians, and their families. 

Secretary Gates directed the review panel to take a careful look 

at personnel policies, force protection measures, emergency response procedures, and support to our military health care providers. He also tasked the Independent Review to evaluate the 

Army’s application of its policies, programs, and processes as applied to the alleged perpetrator. The review focused on the noncriminal aspects of the shooting. 

Secretary Gates gave very clear direction that the panel not 

interfere with the intelligence and military justice investigations 

related to the Fort Hood incident. Secretary Gates stated that he 

intends to call upon the military departments to conduct an indepth follow-on review in certain areas addressed in our report, 

and indeed that effort has already begun. 

The Independent Review’s report to the Secretary of Defense was 

released to Congress and to the public on January 15 of this year. 

The detailed results and findings associated with the alleged perpetrator are found in a restricted annex that is not publicly released 

at this time. It is my understanding that you have been afforded 

the opportunity to review the restricted annex. 

The overall report was much broader than the assessment of the 

alleged perpetrator, however. The report includes recommendations 

to strengthen the Department of Defense’s ability to prepare for 

and respond to potential threats. Before discussing the findings, I 

would like to highlight some observations from the co-chairs concerning the events of November 5. 

First, as Secretary West stated, no amount of preparation is ever 

too much. Leaders at Fort Hood had anticipated mass casualty 

events in their emergency response plans and exercises. The initial 

response to the incident demonstrated this. It was prompt and effective. However, DoD must be prepared to more diligently plan 

and to seek to envision the next incident. 

Second, the Department must be attentive to today’s hazards. 

One of the most significant emerging concerns in the protection of 

our force is the internal threat. The review concluded that DoD 

needs to develop a better understanding of the forces that cause a 

person to become self-radicalized and to commit violent acts. 

Third, courage and presence of mind in the face of crisis can 

carry the day. This happened at Fort Hood. Courageous acts were 

key to preventing greater losses that day. And as the report reveals, these attributes alone are not enough to protect our force. 

DoD must exercise the foresight necessary to identify the menace 

of self-radicalization and its often resultant violence and to act preemptively. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
122 

The review revealed shortcomings in the way DoD is prepared to 

deal with internal threats and, in particular, the threat posed by 

troubled and potentially dangerous individuals and groups. We 

found that commanders are essential to this effort. Existing policies 

within the Department are not optimized for countering these 

threats. The policies reflect insufficient knowledge and awareness 

required to help identify and address individuals likely to commit 

violence. And while DoD focuses very effectively on many things, 

guidance concerning workplace violence and the potential for selfradicalization is insufficient. 

DoD policy on prohibited activities is limited and only addresses 

active and physical participation in groups that may pose threats 

to good order and discipline. This lack of clarity for comprehensive 

indicators limits commanders’ ability to recognize potential threats. 

Complicating the force protection challenge is the diverse nature 

of responsibilities that have evolved within DoD since 9/11. Because no senior DoD official is assigned overall responsibility for 

force protection, synchronization is difficult. Moreover, there is a 

lack of DoD policy integration. This has resulted in a lack of wellintegrated means to gather, evaluate, and disseminate the wide 

range of behavioral indicators that could signal an insider threat. 

While leaders at Fort Hood responded well under the stress of 

a rapidly evolving crisis, we are fortunate that we faced only one 

incident and at only one location. Real-time information will be 

critical should we face a situation of multiple events. Synchronizing 

the DoD Emergency Management Program with the Federal requirements for the National Incident Management System will ensure the Department can integrate effectively with all partners in 

response to any and all emergencies. 

Following the release of the panel’s review report on January 15, 

Secretary Gates directed the Honorable Paul Stockton, Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and America’s Security 

Affairs, to assess the review’s findings and to make recommendations for implementation. Secretary Gates established a March 

deadline for the immediate fixes recommended in the review, and 

major institutional changes should be identified by June. 

The Secretary of Defense also forwarded the individual review 

panel report to Army Secretary John McHugh to address recommendations concerning holding Army personnel responsible for 

supervising Major Hasan accountable. On January 15, that same 

day, the Secretary of the Army directed me to conduct an accountability review to identify whether any personnel were responsible 

for failures or deficiencies in applying Army programs, policies, and 

procedures to the alleged assailant. 

The response by the Fort Hood community in the aftermath of 

this tragedy serves as a reminder of the strength, resiliency and 

character of our people. The Independent Review Panel was very 

impressed with the military civilian response. In a community 

where we may have expected the fabric of trust to fray, it remained 

intact and indeed grew stronger through mutual support. The 

thrust of the review effort is to identify all the possible steps that 

the Department of Defense can take to prevent similar tragedies in 

the future. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
123 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. Again, I thank you 

for the opportunity to appear before you today. General Thomas 

and I look forward to your questions. 

[The statement of General Ham and DoD Independent Review 

report follow:] 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
124 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 411 here 65007B.001
125 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 412 here 65007B.002
126 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 413 here 65007B.003
127 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 414 here 65007B.004
128 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 415 here 65007B.005
129 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 416 here 65007B.006
130 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 417 here 65007B.007
131 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 418 here 65007B.008
132 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 419 here 65007B.009
133 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 420 here 65007B.010
134 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 421 here 65007B.011
135 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 422 here 65007B.012
136 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 423 here 65007B.013
137 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 424 here 65007B.014
138 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 425 here 65007B.015
139 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 426 here 65007B.016
140 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 427 here 65007B.017
141 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 428 here 65007B.018
142 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 429 here 65007B.019
143 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 430 here 65007B.020
144 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 431 here 65007B.021
145 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 432 here 65007B.022
146 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 433 here 65007B.023
147 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 434 here 65007B.024
148 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 435 here 65007B.025
149 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 436 here 65007B.026
150 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 437 here 65007B.027
151 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 438 here 65007B.028
152 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 439 here 65007B.029
153 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 440 here 65007B.030
154 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 441 here 65007B.031
155 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 442 here 65007B.032
156 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 443 here 65007B.033
157 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 444 here 65007B.034
158 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 445 here 65007B.035
159 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 446 here 65007B.036
160 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 447 here 65007B.037
161 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 448 here 65007B.038
162 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 449 here 65007B.039
163 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 450 here 65007B.040
164 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 451 here 65007B.041
165 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 452 here 65007B.042
166 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 453 here 65007B.043
167 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 454 here 65007B.044
168 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 455 here 65007B.045
169 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 456 here 65007B.046
170 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 457 here 65007B.047
171 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 458 here 65007B.048
172 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 459 here 65007B.049
173 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 460 here 65007B.050
174 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 461 here 65007B.051
175 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 462 here 65007B.052
176 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 463 here 65007B.053
177 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 464 here 65007B.054
178 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 465 here 65007B.055
179 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 466 here 65007B.056
180 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 467 here 65007B.057
181 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 468 here 65007B.058
182 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 469 here 65007B.059
183 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 470 here 65007B.060
184 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 471 here 65007B.061
185 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 472 here 65007B.062
186 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 473 here 65007B.063
187 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 474 here 65007B.064
188 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 475 here 65007B.065
189 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 476 here 65007B.066
190 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 477 here 65007B.067
191 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 478 here 65007B.068
192 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 479 here 65007B.069
193 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 480 here 65007B.070
194 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 481 here 65007B.071
195 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 482 here 65007B.072
196 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 483 here 65007B.073
197 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 484 here 65007B.074
198 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 485 here 65007B.075
199 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 486 here 65007B.076
200 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 487 here 65007B.077
201 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 488 here 65007B.078
202 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 489 here 65007B.079
203 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 490 here 65007B.080
204 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 491 here 65007B.081
205 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 492 here 65007B.082
206 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 493 here 65007B.083
207 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 494 here 65007B.084
208 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert offset folio 495 here 65007B.085
209 

SELF-RADICALIZATION

Mr. DICKS. General, thank you for a very comprehensive report. 

We, too, salute those people who dealt with this emergency, came 

in so quickly and stopped the violence. We only wish they could 

have gotten there sooner. We, too, sympathize with the families 

and the friends of all of the fallen victims and those that are injured and hopefully recovering. 

For a few years I served on the Homeland Security Committee 

and one of the topics that we discussed in our committee deliberations were self-radicalization—efforts in the United States where 

certain people become radicalized. I think that your report is very 

balanced here, saying, Should people have recognized this, and especially those people who were in a supervisory position and had 

to make various reports on fitness of Major Hasan? That is the 

question I have. 

When you went back and looked at this, were there any indications? I understand from some press reports that he was very outspoken in his opposition to the war in Iraq, to the war in Afghanistan, and made other statements that, had people been properly 

trained, they might have picked up on the fact that this sounds like 

somebody has been radicalized, and should there be concern by his 

supervisors and superiors about the potential things he might do. 

Now can you tell us anything about that, about the people who 

were in charge of his supervision; and did they make reports, or 

what happened? 

General HAM. Yes, sir, I can. If I may speak first more generally. 

It is clear in our findings that identifying the indicators that someone within our Department, in uniform or civilian, or a family 

member, is trending toward violent activity, those indicators are 

not well identified nor well understood across the force. So we have 

not adequately equipped our commanders and supervisors with the 

information or things that they ought be looking for in an individual who may be starting to travel on a path toward selfradicalization. 

Already, the services have taken some of that under advisement. 

The Army has already published a list that says these are some of 

the indicators that commanders and supervisors should be attentive to in members of their force so that they can then intervene, 

correct that behavior, and try to prevent someone from progressing 

down a path of self-radicalization. 

With regard to the specifics of Major Hasan, first, I would advise 

that, as indicated in my opening statement, the Secretary of the 

Army has charged me with the conduct of an Army investigation 

to determine measures of accountability. That investigation has not 

yet been received by Secretary McHugh. So it would be inappropriate at this time for me to talk about the individual aspects of 

accountability. 

But what I would tell you, Mr. Chairman, it is very clear in the 

DoD report that there were individuals in supervisory positions 

who had the responsibility to educate, train, and develop Major 

Hasan, who did not do that effectively. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
210 

POLICIES FOR SELF-PROTECTION

Mr. DICKS. Now if you are going to have policies for self-protection, and there has been somebody named—I guess you are going 

to have somebody who is going to be in charge of force protection. 

Wouldn’t this be part of every base, every unit, having some discussion about self-protection? 

General HAM. It would, Mr. Chairman. But I think it has to 

begin at the Department of Defense level, with adequate policies 

and guidelines to the services and the services within their structure, so that we have consistency of understanding and of application from top to bottom. And what we found is that is not the case. 

There is not at the Department of Defense any particular individual or office that has overall responsibility for force protection. 

But, rather, those responsibilities are divided amongst several of 

the Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries. That is probably 

not conducive to a coherent and effective system. 

Mr. DICKS. Has that been changed? Has that been changed yet, 

or is it in the process of being changed? 

General HAM. It is, Mr. Chairman. One of the recommendations 

that the co-chairs submitted to Secretary Gates, that he do just 

that; that he identify a particular office to lead that effort. To the 

best of my knowledge, that final determination has not been made, 

but I think it is instructive that the Secretary of Defense has appointed the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security Defense to 

lead the follow-on effort of the issues that were identified of the 

Fort Hood investigation. So perhaps that is an office where those 

responsibilities might preside. But to the best of my knowledge, 

that has not been a final determination. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Young. 

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, in this case we 

were dealing with an officer who had served at Walter Reed, a 

medical institution. A similar situation could possibly exist in some 

other part of the military, not just medical, in a hospital or a doctor. Is that correct? 

General HAM. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

IDENTIFYING TRIGGERS

Mr. YOUNG. So anything that we do on the basis of determining 

what type of trigger we might look for, what type of activity we 

might look for, should not only be limited to Walter Reed or medical facilities, but other levels of the United States Military. 

General HAM. Congressman, that is exactly right. The recommendation from this review is that there be a Department of 

Defense-Wide effort so that all of the services, all the branches of 

service and the DoD civilians are all covered by whatever policy is 

resultant from this. It is a Department-wide issue. 

ESTABLISHING APPROPRIATE OFFICE FOR POLICY

Mr. YOUNG. I don’t think we want to go on a witch hunt, and just 

because somebody has a bad day and grumbles about something, 

I don’t think we necessarily want to hold them up to scorn. But we 

do have to have an effective system for creating a real suspicion. 

I assume that eventually we are going to come up with a list of 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
211 

items that should be watched for, should be reported, that would 

indicate the possibility of someone becoming a radical anti-American or anti-military. I assume that is part of the work that you 

are doing. 

General HAM. It is, Congressman. The recommendation in the report is that the Department seek to establish indicators of tendency 

toward violence, self-radicalization, extremist behavior, however 

motivated, whether that is religious or ideological, or other. But the 

report also acknowledges that while such an effort is helpful and 

instructive to commanders, it is not in and of itself satisfactory to 

completely identify the risks that might be developing within our 

force. 

It gets to the issue of judgment and officership. I think that is 

where in this report to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary West, 

and Admiral Clark focused heavily on the judgment or, in some 

cases, lack of judgment as applied by officers who were in supervisory positions with regard to Major Hasan. 

REVIEW OF SOLDIERS COMMUNICATIONS

Mr. YOUNG. General, in that review leading up to that report, did 

you identify some of these people that should have been alarmed 

by some of Hasan’s activities and some of his words and statements, some of the connections that we have found out about, email communications with Islamic leaders? Do you know some of 

the people that saw these things and sort of reported them? 

General HAM. Sir, we did. But there were a couple of cautions. 

First, again we were reminded by the Secretary of Defense that we 

were not to tread into or interfere with the Presidentially directed 

review of intelligence matters. So when we would bump up, for example, the e-mails that had been discussed in the public domain 

where Major Hasan had at least attempted e-mail contact with a 

radical imam in Yemen, we did not pursue that, based upon the 

Secretary of Defense’s guidance. 

Mr. YOUNG. Where did the Secretary of Defense get that guidance? 

General HAM. Sir, I don’t know. The guidance in the terms of reference that the Secretary of Defense issued to the co-chairs—to 

Secretary West and Admiral Clark—was explicit so as to not interfere with the intelligence investigation. 

Mr. Dicks. Would you yield for one second? 

Mr. Young. Sure, Mr. Chairman. 

MAJOR HASAN’S BEHAVIOR

Mr. DICKS. Did anybody receive a complaint about Hasan? Was 

there anyone who made a complaint about his activities? 

General HAM. Sir—— 

Mr. DICKS. Chain of command or his supervisors. Did anyone 

come forward prior to this all happening and say, We think there’s 

something wrong here? 

General HAM. Sir, yes. In the terms of reference and in discussion with the Secretary of Defense, the purpose of the Department 

of Defense review, the review we are here to discuss, was specifically not intended to identify individual accountability. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
212 

Mr. DICKS. We are not asking you to identify it, we are just asking you to tell us did someone connect the dots and say, this person 

has a problem, and then other people didn’t respond to that and 

didn’t take appropriate action. That is what we want to know. 

ARMY INVESTIGATION

General HAM. That is correct. ’There were individuals who saw 

that Major Hasan’s behavior at various stages was not consistent 

with what we expect of a military professional and identified that, 

in some cases to superiors, and subsequent to the Army investigation which I have been charged by Secretary McHugh to conduct, 

that was a matter for that investigation. 

Mr. DICKS. Were there any prior investigations? Did anybody do 

anything when these reports were initially made before the incident? 

General HAM. We found no evidence of prior investigations. 

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In fact, that was my last 

question. But then I will just ask one more question. 

Did any of those superiors who were told that there was some 

interesting behavioral practices by Hasan, did any of those superiors do anything about it? 

General HAM. Congressman, yes, some did. But some did not. It 

is I think clear now, from information that is widely known, that 

the actions that were taken were ineffective in modifying Major 

Hasan’s behavior. 

Mr. YOUNG. General, thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, 

thank you. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Visclosky. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Generals, thank you 

very much. 

POST-DEPLOYMENT MEDICAL ASSESSMENTS

In your testimony and report, it mentions that the pre- and postdeployment medical assessments do not provide a comprehensive 

assessment of violent behavior and indicators. What policies and 

procedures do need updating or broadening to have that positive effect? 

General, also for the 2011 budget, do you have moneys included 

in your request to pay for any changes in updating that you may 

need? 

General HAM. Sir, if it is acceptable, I will defer to General 

Thomas. 

General THOMAS. Good afternoon, sir. Sir, initially with the postdeployment health assessment and post-deployment reassessments, 

we found over time that the questions that are comprised in that 

questionnaire are inadequate to give us the full scope of measure 

we believe is going to give us an adequate picture for the mental 

or behavioral health states of returning soldiers; in this case, redeploying soldiers. What we have done is we are actually undertaking 

a comprehensive overview. We have modified the questionnaires, 

the 2900s, added some additional questions. 

We have also instituted a policy where we are doing more faceto-face behavioral health interviews with returning soldiers, specifically those returning from Iraq and Afghanistan, in this case. And 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
213 

we have initiated, in addition to that, some virtual capabilities, 

which is quite exciting for us. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Is part of the problem when they fill the assessment out that, I want to get out, and if I cause concern, this is 

going to delay my departure from the military. Is that part of the 

problem here? 

General THOMAS. Sir, that is accurate. We found that initially 

the timing of administering the post-deployment health assessments is key. If we do it immediately upon return of a unit, individuals oftentimes will blow through that, as you described, and try 

to get home as quickly as possible. If we delay that for a period of 

time, 7 to 14 days, perhaps, we found also a statistically significant 

increase in improvement in the accuracy of the answers soldiers 

will provide you. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. So that has been part of the program adjustment 

as well, the timing of the questionnaire and the assessment? 

General THOMAS. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Is there a monetary issue here that you may 

need help on, or this has been essentially addressed at this point? 

General THOMAS. I think we are adequately funded to make all 

those adjustments that you describe. 

General HAM. Sir, if I can add. From my perspective as a currently serving Commander of the U.S. Army in Europe, one of the 

valuable tools that the Congress has allowed us to execute are 

these military family life consultants. And we have had a significant increase in the availability of those personnel that are available in our military communities to counsel redeploying soldiers 

and their family members. That has been a tremendous benefit. In 

my anecdotal assessment, it has been more beneficial to have that 

face-to-face discussion in a secure, confidential setting, than it has 

been the answering of the postdeployment surveys. 

INFORMATION-SHARING AGREEMENTS AMONG VARIOUS AGENCIES

Mr. VISCLOSKY. One other question, if I could, Mr. Chairman. On 

the criminal investigation and organizations, apparently there is 

limited ability to search and analyze information outside of DoD’s 

own databases. What new standards are being put into place to establish information-sharing agreements with Federal, State and 

local law enforcement organizations; and, again, would there be a 

money issue for you in your 2011 budget to accomplish that? 

General HAM. Sir, two issues. First, there is a challenge inside 

the Department of Defense with information sharing as well. For 

example, there is no DoD-wide criminal database. The Navy’s 

criminal—— 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. When you say that, Army would have a data 

base; Navy. 

General HAM. Yes, sir, that is correct. What we identified 

through the DoD review is that the Navy’s Criminal Investigative 

Service has a pretty good model, and our recommendation to Secretary Gates is that he look at that for application across the Department so as to get intradepartment sharing for that database. 

I am not an expert, but my expectation is that there would be some 

resource implications should the Secretary of Defense wish to implement that particular recommendation of the review. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
214 

To your larger question of interagency information sharing, it is 

also clear that the Department of Defense’s ability to share information and to access information from outside of the Department 

of Defense is also somewhat limited. In the Intelligence Community 

there are protocols in place, but fairly narrowly defined. 

So one of the major findings of the DoD review was that information sharing, both within the Department of Defense and external, 

within the broader whole of government, are issues that need to be 

studied, and will be part of this follow-on review that is currently 

ongoing within the Department of Defense and, again, not part of 

this review. But I could not see how you could implement those 

measures without there being at least some resource implications. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I would close on this. If there is an identification 

as to what those dollar amounts might be, if that could be shared 

with this subcommittee in anticipation of markup, that would be 

terrific. 

Gentlemen, thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Has anybody been separated from the service as a result of this tragedy? 

General HAM. I am sorry? 

Mr. FRELINGHUVSEN. Has anybody been separated from the service as a result of this tragedy 

General HAM. Not to my knowledge. 

General THOMAS. No, sir, I am not aware of any. I could check 

on that. But there may be some folks who have medical separation 

related to injuries. I think it is premature. I don’t think we have 

any, that I know of. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Nobody in the chain of command here. 

General THOMAS. Not that I am aware of. 

Mr. DICKS. Is this because the investigations aren’t complete? 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Ongoing. 

General HAM. I am sorry. Perhaps I misunderstood you. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I wasn’t talking about the injured. I am 

talking about those who were in the chain of command who should 

have known before somebody was sent to Fort Hood that this gentleman was sent to Fort Hood. 

General HAM. Sir, that is precisely the direction that Secretary 

McHugh gave to me, to conduct an Army investigation into matters 

of accountability. The Secretary of the Army has not yet received 

my report or recommendations. I expect he will soon and that he 

will make a decision. But to date, no, sir. 

DOD POLICY REGARDING RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I want to focus on page 16, finding 2.7, 

‘‘DoD policy regarding religious accommodation lacks the clarity 

necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate religious 

practices from those that might indicate a potential for violence or 

self-radicalization.’’ That is all within quotation marks. 

Going on to the Discussion, which is of interest I think to the 

members, if requests—and this is in quotation, ‘‘If requests for religious accommodation that compete with mission requirements were 

recorded and shared among commanders, supervisors and chaplains, it would likely establish a baseline from which to identify deVerDate Mar 15 2010 20:50 Mar 17, 2011 Jkt 065007 PO 00000 Frm 00214 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A007P2.XXX A007P2

Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
215 

viation within the services and the Department of Defense. At 

present, there is confusion about what is acceptable.’’ 

The recommendation in this section is, ‘‘Promptly establish 

standards and reporting procedures to clarify guidelines for religious accommodation.’’ 

Where do we stand relative to those recommendations? Are they 

so recent that nobody’s got around to committing enough time and 

effort to sort of rewrite the whole standard operating procedure 

here? 

General HAM. Sir, a two-part answer. First, when Secretary 

Gates announced the receipt of this review, one of the first things 

he said in his public statement was a reminder to those of us in 

the service that those of us who are privileged to command and exercise the supervision of our servicemembers and DoD civilians, we 

must make hard decisions and we must be accountable, and we 

must hold our servicemembers accountable for their actions. I 

think that was a clear reminder to us that we have authorities now 

to take action when we think someone’s behavior, conduct, is outside the norm. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The public perception here, and this is a 

closed hearing, is that there is sort of a political correctness here. 

That people were afraid to invade that because they didn’t want to 

be sort of identified with, shall we say, profiling, which is obviously 

a loaded word. 

General HAM. Sir, we did not find a culture of that, but we did 

find related to this specific finding, confusion. For example, there 

were some individuals with whom we spoke, both peers and supervisors of Major Hasan’s, that were confused about First Amendment rights and the free practice of religion. And that is the essence of this finding. 

We owe commanders and supervisors some clearer guidance as 

to what is acceptable and what is not acceptable with regard to religious accommodation across the Department of Defense. 

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. On that point, and then I yield to Mr. Moran, what 

would have been the appropriate thing to have done if somebody 

who was a supervisor, commanding officer, whatever, had made a 

judgment that this behavior was not acceptable; what should they 

have done? 

SUPERVISOR’S RESPONSIBILITY

General HAM. Sir, my experience as a commander, when you 

have a servicemember who is out of bounds, whose behavior, conduct, and other activities are seemingly at odds with the service 

values and with programs and procedures that are well established, it is that commander’s responsibility or that individual supervisor’s responsibility, to call them on that and to counsel them 

and to say, Listen, soldier, this is not what we do in the service, 

you cannot do this. 

This occurs all the time across all services, when individuals, 

particularly young individuals—and it is important to remember 

that though at the time of the incident Major Hasan was a major, 

he had really not had any operational experience. He had been exclusively in the training and education realm. But supervisors have 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
216 

a responsibility to make sure that those under our charge understand our values, understand our policies and procedures, and 

apply them in their daily life. And when they don’t, we have adequate remedies to deal with that. That did not occur. 

Mr. DICKS. Is that like court martial or something like that? 

General HAM. Mr. Chairman, in extreme cases, yes, if we have 

such. But more often we have, particularly, again, with our younger servicemembers, both officer and enlisted, it is a more senior 

member’s responsibility to guide them and to counsel them and to 

try to shape their behavior in a more productive way so as to prevent this from getting to the level where more drastic measures 

such as nonjudicial punishment or court martial or separation may 

be appropriate. 

Mr. DICKS. Is there any indication that anybody counseled him? 

General HAM. There is, yes, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, let me make a quick follow-up on 

your subject here. General, if a member of the military advocates 

Islamic jihad against the United States, is that considered religious 

freedom, or is that something—what I think it is, which is a threat 

to the United States? 

General HAM. Congressman, what we found in this situation 

was, again, confusion. Adding to that confusion, as mentioned 

about the confusion about religious freedoms, is compounded in 

this academic setting of what is allowable within academic freedom 

dialogue. Again, it is relatively easy now to look back in hindsight 

at some of the things we know in the public domain that occurred 

and say, This is beyond the bounds of acceptable behavior. But my 

sense is we owe better guidance to our personnel to allow them to 

make those calls. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Moran. 

ACTIONS OF MAJOR HASAN PRIOR TO ATTACK

Mr. MORAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Generals, I have read 

through the actions that Major Hasan took in the last several 

hours—actually, last 24 hours before this violent act. He was hardly being secretive. He was sending out messages. I don’t know 

whether he wanted to be stopped or not, but he indicated to someone, ‘‘Everything’s going to change after tomorrow,’’ and other 

statements like that. Even the things that he did immediately prior 

to the shooting. 

Would you go through some of that, that might have been indications of something dramatic to come? It is not in any of the stuff 

that you provided the committee, but I think the committee members might be interested. I am sure you are aware of his immediate 

actions in the hours before he murdered these people. 

General HAM. Congressman, actually that was beyond the scope 

of this review. Again, with the specific direction by the Secretary 

of Defense that we not interfere with the criminal investigation, 

those activities which immediately preceded the 5th of November 

incident were not matters with which this review dealt. And so my 

familiarity with them, frankly, is what I have seen in the public 

domain, not anything that we conducted reviews of here. 

Mr. MORAN. Well, the problem I have with that is that here we 

are talking about implementing all of these systemic changes and 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
217 

processes and procedures and policies, when the best way to deal 

with this might be something more direct and specific. I think this 

was something of an aberration. I don’t know that it needs systemic change to the procedures that we are currently undergoing. 

I do think there was laxity in terms of his immediate superiors 

identifying a problem and dealing with it. That was missing. But 

he gave out lots of warning signs. They should have been picked 

up. 

Before we go transforming the way in which we conduct ourselves throughout the force, I think it is useful to consider whether 

there aren’t more immediate things that could have been done. 

Sometimes it seems like we have a horrible violent act, and so we 

declare war, when there may be other ways that are more direct 

that would deal more appropriately with it. 

What do you think, General? 

Let me ask the Brigadier General. 

General THOMAS. Sir, I agree with your comments. And specifically in relation to Major Hasan’s case, I am not privy to the details of the investigations, other than what has been in the public 

domain, as General Ham mentioned, in the media. I don’t have any 

information beyond that. But I think in general, your comments absolutely hold merit. I think it is an emerging science, and if you 

take a look at indicators that are out there that may give you some 

sense of whether someone is going to be dangerous or commit 

workplace violence, there is a lot of research that is ongoing out 

there now. And, quite frankly, it will leave you unsatisfied, Congressman. 

There is just not a lot of I think tangible evidence that would 

point to you definitively that some individual may commit an act. 

There are a lot of indicators whether someone is going to commit 

suicide or violence in the workplace, but it is an really an inexact 

science. 

Mr. MORAN. Well, I appreciate that. But I would like to just suggest, Mr. Chairman, that before we go pursuing expensive transformational measures to deal with something like that, we really 

ought to consider when an individual acts in an abhorrent fashion, 

throws out signals that he is going to do something dramatic, indicates that everything is going to be different after tomorrow, he 

buys weapons, he acts strange in his house, he gives indications to 

his neighbors, it seems to me we ought to be at least privy enough 

to that information so as to consider whether this could not have 

been dealt with in a more direct, efficient manner, than considering 

force transformation policies that I don’t think really apply. 

Of all the Muslims in the military, we have one guy. He was 

messed up. He had no business communicating with al-Awlaki in 

Yemen. That should have been detected. But within the 24 hours 

he committed this crime, there were so many indications for a superior to have gone to see him and say, Hey, Hasan, what’s going 

on here, Major? What are you up to? I think he clearly would have 

gotten an indication that something was extraordinarily wrong and 

somebody needed to intervene. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General HAM. Mr. Chairman, may I? Congressman, I am absolutely in agreement with what you said. The co-chairs of this report 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
218 

made it clear that leading up to the incident, over the course of 

Major Hasan’s development there were indications, there were 

signs, some of which were missed, some of which were ignored, 

that could have altered what happened on the 5th of November. 

But I think it is important also—and the accountability, again, the 

Army accountability investigation is focused especially on that aspect of it: Did people not do what they were supposed to do in that 

regard? 

But, secondly, in a broader sense this is a threat. Our programs 

and procedures are largely relics of our subversion and espionage, 

looking for spies. Looking for spies is still important. We ought to 

continue to look for spies. But we now also have to look for a different kind of threat that is emerging within the forces. I am confident we are good enough to do both. 

I agree with you, some of this is individual level responsibility— 

people who knew or should have known and should have taken actions that did not, and folks ought to be held accountable for that. 

Mr. MORAN. That was a very good observation. I appreciate that. 

Both at Walter Reed and Fort Hood there were people who should 

have acted. And then within those 24 hours before this incident occurred, there were clear indications that should have been followed 

up on. But I thank you very much for your testimony. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Kingston. 

PREVIOUS INCIDENTS

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to associate 

myself with the comments of Mr. Moran. 

It does seem to me, General, that this is a little bit politics, a 

little bit public relations, and also an act of good will towards the 

families, which is very proper to do. But at the same time, it 

doesn’t seem to me that we have to have new programs, new 

spending, new procedures. It seems to me—I think Mr. Moran has 

really hit something that is a concern of mine. Historically, how 

often has this sort of thing happened? We know there was an incident in Iraq several years ago with a man with a grenade. But historically, tell me about World War II, World War I. Certainly there 

were acts of soldiers that had some instability and they turned on 

their own men. What was done with it? How many incidents were 

there out there? 

General HAM. Sir, I don’t know exactly how many incidents there 

are, but I know that one where 13 individuals were killed is unacceptable. And we have got to do all that we can to prevent a subsequent incident of this nature. 

Your point is well taken, that much of this is fundamental to 

good leadership. And good leadership, effective leadership, may 

have made a difference and probably would have made a difference 

in this individual’s progress through his education, training, and 

development. But having said that, I think it is important for us 

to recognize that we do have a changed security environment. 

Again, individual acts of violence, whether they be motivated by Islamic extremism or other motivations, is something we need to better understand. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
219 

Mr. KINGSTON. General, that is why I am asking you what the 

history was, Vietnam War, Korean War. Certainly, there have been 

instances of soldiers cracking, turning on their own troops. Correct? 

General HAM. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Wouldn’t that be relevant to this? Because I think 

on one hand we are saying—and Mr. Frelinghuysen went up to the 

water’s edge on profiling—but on one hand we are saying, and I am 

hearing you say, that it is evolving. General, you said it is an 

emerging science. But there is an insinuation that there is an Islamic extremist issue here. But maybe there isn’t. Maybe you just 

have a soldier that went berserk. And couldn’t there be some lessons from Vietnam or the Korean War or World War II that there 

were other soldiers that went berserk and was dealt with? 

RADICALIZATION

Mr. DICKS. Would the gentleman yield? I think there are plenty 

of examples of radicalization of individuals in the United States. 

We have already discovered in Homeland Security that should 

make this an issue of concern. The best way to deal with 

radicalization is training so people perceive it. Police officers went 

into these four or five guys’ apartment and found all this literature. 

Now, had they not had training in radicalization, they would have 

just dismissed this, and these people would have gone and done 

some violent thing. But they saw this literature, and then there 

were police officers who had been trained, and they acted and prevented these people from taking violent action against others. 

So I do think there is—this is a different situation. You are not 

talking about other state actors. These are nonstate actors that 

were in the midst of trying to radicalize people in this country to 

take action against other Americans. I think what they are doing 

here, you have to train people to be aware of this, in my judgment. 

Mr. KINGSTON. That being the case, are you not profiling? Is that 

not a relevant piece of this puzzle? Are you going to watch somebody a little bit closer if he comes from some background than 

somebody else? 

General HAM. One of the points identified in the DoD review is 

the challenge of balance of security; balancing that with our longstanding appreciation for civil liberties and individual privacy. 

That is a difficult balance. 

This will be an issue that will be addressed in now the ongoing 

review of these findings and the recommendations. It is difficult. 

And this is why I think we owe our commanders the best guidance 

that we can give them in terms of indicators of things to look for 

of folks who may be tending toward violence. And while religious 

extremism, Islamic extremism in this case, is a motivation, it certainly is not the only motivation that might drive someone to violent behavior. We have got to look at those other aspects as well. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Just in plain English, give me an example, being 

very specific. Under the new guidelines what would I do before I 

got on the list or got pulled aside and say, Hey, what’s going on 

here? How would you know when I got radicalized? 

General HAM. In this particular case—again, in the public domain it has been widely reported that Major Hasan attempted and 

maybe had some successful e-mail contact with a known or susVerDate Mar 15 2010 20:50 Mar 17, 2011 Jkt 065007 PO 00000 Frm 00219 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A007P2.XXX A007P2

Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
220 

pected terrorist individual. Well, that has got to be item number 

one. The barrier that we have is that that information, while 

known to some in the government, was not known to his immediate 

commanders and supervisors. They didn’t know he was doing that. 

Had they known, we would argue—— 

Mr. KINGSTON. DHS knew, right? 

General HAM. I guess because we were not—we were prohibited 

from going into the intelligence investigation—I knew that happened, but I don’t know the details of who knew what, when. 

Mr. KINGSTON. If DHS or whomever knows now, they would now 

tell DoD? 

PROCEDURES FOR INFORMATION SHARING

General HAM. That is what we have recommended, is that the 

Department of Defense revise its procedures for information sharing; again, focusing on the centrality of the commander, that person who is charge of making those tough decisions. We have also 

got to give that person the information upon which to base their 

actions. 

Mr. DICKS. If the gentleman would yield, this should have gone 

to the FBI and the National Counterterrorism Center. They should 

have been brought into this as soon as they found out that this 

gentleman had contact with a known terrorist, there should have 

been action taken. I don’t know if people know they are supposed 

to do that. 

Again, I would argue this means we have to do more training so 

people know when somebody does that. But if it is a known terrorist, they have to take it to the FBI and take it to the National 

Counterterrorism Center. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Bishop. 

PRE- AND POST-DEPLOYMENT MEDICAL ASSESSMENTS

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, gentlemen. I have listened with great interest. The radicalization of people who are associated and a part 

of our military is very, very important and very relevant. But even 

more basic than that is the pre- and postdeployment medical assessments that even soldiers who are not radicalized, who suffer 

from PTSD, who come back with various other kinds of mental 

problems, still are not properly assessed. 

Of course, this subcommittee and the Congress has time and 

again over the last 4 years mandated the pre-deployment and 

postdeployment assessments. Several Surgeon Generals from the 

Army Department of Defense have come forward and said, Well, we 

use a self-administered form. We have technicians that go and review those forms postdeployment, and if anything stands out, then 

we will call the individual in for an interview. 

Well, I have always over the last 4 or 5 years questioned the sufficiency of that self-administered assessment in identifying soldiers 

who could pose a potential risk to themselves, to other soldiers, or 

to their families, pre- and postdeployment. Pre-deployment, particularly in the case of National Guard and Reserve units, they are 

going into theater. They may have some medical condition that is 

not obvious that might cause them to go into a coma of some sort, 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
221 

or some other mental disability that would endanger their fellow 

soldiers which, without a hands-on examination, would not be revealed when they come back from the first, second, or multiple deployments, being able to assess what changes have been made to 

that individual in a way that could pose a threat. That is separate 

and apart from radicalization. 

I think the Independent Review has made it pretty clear that the 

policies and procedures of the government governing the assessment of the pre- and post-deployments do not provide comprehensive assessment of violence indicators. 

So what kinds of reviews are necessary to assure that we have 

that sufficient information and that the people who need to have 

it are given that information and that the information is good? 

RESOURCES FOR ADDITIONAL ASSESSMENTS

Mr. BISHOP. What kind of training and education do we need to 

make sure that you have resources to provide to make sure that 

happens, and what other kinds of policies and procedures need to 

be updated or broadened to look at these assessments? 

General THOMAS. Congressman, I will respond to that. Thank 

you for that question. 

The behavioral health care of our force is of tantamount importance to us. As a physician, I can’t overemphasize that. I also have 

to say that in the course of my military medical career, I have 

never been in the position where I have been able to take care of 

patients as well as we are right now, and thanks in large part to 

what Congress has provided to us. 

What we get, in my experience, is we have a lot of policies that 

come out there. The postdeployment health assessment, as you 

mentioned, is an example of one. Once that is fielded, the practical 

application of that is something else. 

So what we have done is we have taken, in my experience here 

in the Army, for example, we have seen the overall policy, but we 

know that it is inadequate. And that is a clinical determination. 

We are not identifying all these soldiers with PTSD, posttraumatic 

stress disorder, for example, or traumatic brain injuries. 

We have taken a panel of experts that have worked through the 

Defense Centers of Excellence, and this is civilian and military experts across the Nation. We have taken some protocols that they 

have been working for a period of time and we have operationalized 

those to do exactly what you described, Congressman, to address 

the need of the force. 

Our traumatic brain injury and PTS training we just fielded— 

there is a directive-type memo, as a matter of fact, in staff and 

with the DoD. We have done this as a collaborative effort with all 

the services, the joint services, the Defense Center of Excellence, civilian and military centers, and we have rolled that out to the 

force. 

We went ahead and stepped it ahead of the time, because the 

Army is leading the way on this, but the Navy is in lockstep with 

us, as is the Marines. The Marines are training and modeling their 

program after ours. This will enable us to identify early indicators 

of behavioral health injuries to soldiers. 

There is a face-to-face portion of this, too, where we have—— 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
222 

Mr. BISHOP. Is this the post-deployment assessment? 

General THOMAS. Yes, sir. In the post-deployment assessment, 

actually that phase of this comprehensive plan includes a virtual 

behavioral health interview. We did a pilot on that in Alaska. It 

is actually ongoing right now. Prior to Alaska, we did a whole returning battalion in Hawaii, and that was very successful. So we 

have expanded it to an entire brigade combat team, the 4th Brigade of the 24th Infantry returning to Alaska, and that is ongoing 

at this time. We intend to expand that even more. 

Mr. BISHOP. Ultimately you want to expand that to every soldier 

that is deployed and comes back? 

General THOMAS. Yes, sir, Congressman. We are doing that now, 

100 percent contact. If I could back up a little bit—— 

Mr. BISHOP. Contact virtually? 

General THOMAS. Yes, sir. Well, virtual and/or face-to-face, if you 

have the assets on the ground. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. I am glad to hear that, because this has 

been a concern for the last 4 or 5 years, and it was really, really 

frustrating to have the Surgeon General come and sit there and 

say, Well, we test too much anyway; we do too many medical examinations anyway. 

General THOMAS. Sir, I think that this is a good indication of 

how we can actually identify those folks that are most at risk. We 

have already found, our preliminary findings in this 100 percent 

contact has more than doubled our referral rates, which is a positive thing because we are getting the soldiers the care that they 

need. 

Again, I have to thank Congress for allowing us to have the 

funds to implement these programs and to expand them. 

General HAM. Mr. Chairman, may I? 

Chairman DICKS. Go ahead. 

FACE-TO-FACE VIRTUAL ENCOUNTER

General HAM. Congressman, in my role as a serving commander, 

I would say we are far more sophisticated than we were just a few 

years ago, as General Thomas has indicated, because of the support 

you all have provided to us. We know that the initial survey is in 

and of itself inadequate. So as General Thomas has indicated, we 

now mandate either face-to-face or virtual encounter for every servicemember. 

Mr. BISHOP. That is now protocol. 

General HAM. I would just tell you, in my command in Europe 

that is what we are doing. We are requiring every returning soldier 

to interact face-to-face with somebody. And, not surprisingly, those 

who didn’t indicate anything, reveal anything in their survey, may 

do so when they are face-to-face, if we have the right person doing 

that counseling. 

We have also learned that the immediate survey in a face-to-face 

encounter immediately following redeployment is not sufficient to 

indicate what might occur 60, 90, 120 days post-deployment, because there is a bit of euphoria, frankly, upon being reunited with 

friends and family that may mask some underlying issue. So a follow-on assessment is necessary, and we are doing that with great 

effect. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
223 

Mr. BISHOP. Does that involve the family members? I am involved with the Military Family Caucus. Of course, family members are directly and indirectly impacted by that. They are closest 

to the soldiers when they come back from deployments, and they 

probably could pick up on differences in behaviors almost immediately, but may or may not know with whom they should speak 

about it, or what the protocol for them to do that without offending 

their spouse. 

General HAM. Congressman, may I give you a personal example? 

When I redeployed, I was pretty happy and going about my business, and about 30 to 45 days after redeployment, my wife said, 

You need to go see somebody. And I did. 

You are exactly right; informing, educating family members and 

including them in this process. And this is, again thanks to you, 

the value of the military family life consultants has been extraordinarily beneficial in that regard. 

Mr. DICKS. Mrs. Kilpatrick. 

PUBLIC DOMAIN

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon, 

Generals. 

Let’s see how to start this. I highly respect your work, what you 

do, your service, your career, and in this meeting, I love this last 

chair here. 

Just a few things: 13 dead, 32 wounded; someone had information that the major had contacted the Yemen man. It is in the public domain. You said a couple times, General Ham, today, that you 

aren’t doing that part; that is the other investigation. I think I 

wrote down Army accountability investigation. They are doing the 

criminal part of it, I guess. I came today, I thought I was going to 

hear the criminal part. So I have a few questions here. How long 

had the major been a major when the incident occurred? 

General HAM. He was promoted in 2008. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. 2008. What month of 2008? Any idea? The incident was in 2008, or 2009. 

General HAM. In 2009, November 5, 2009. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Over a year he had been a major? 

General HAM. I would have to double-check, Congresswoman. 

[The information follows:] 

Major Hasan was promoted to rank of Major on May 17, 2009. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. For a while. You kept referring to in the public 

domain, but we can’t get much of that here in the record today. So 

you were alluding to it, and it says in the public domain that supervisors and fellow students continually expressed concern about 

his behavior. 

Mr. Chairman just asked, well, okay, he is contacting the guy 

overseas, we are in two wars, his supervisors and students continually reported him. I mean, you all are doing—I feel I am at the 

University of Michigan in a class with the 101 thing. You are doing 

an excellent job teaching me procedures and what needs to happen. 

But I kind of agree with Mr. Moran down there. We only have 

so much money. We have got to spend it wisely. Our men and 

women have to be protected. Fort Hood, actually the facility itself, 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
224 

they had been deployed, two, three, four times, some of them. So 

if anybody is supposed to be protected, those people should be. He 

went there; he was acting crazy. 

I mean, you don’t have to get permission from Homeland Security and Secretary Gates, who I have the highest respect for, to 

know that something is wrong with this gentleman. The 3 or 4 

days—and we don’t have that today, I think Mr. Moran also alluded to that, it was a dossier of things. And I am just a school 

teacher and a grandmother, and I know he is crazy, after reading 

it. 

We can’t let that happen to the men and women who serve and 

protect us. As good as you guys are, and I appreciate all that you 

do, it was too big of a hole—12 dead, 32 injured, and countless families and children who will never be the same. 

I am not blaming you, but I don’t need another dossier or term 

paper to tell me we need to do something. A phone call, the IT that 

we put all the money in? I am not blaming you. I am just one little 

member here. But it can’t happen. And if we don’t close it up today, 

it is going to happen again and again. It could be anybody. 

We are just fortunate that nothing happens. We are in two wars. 

These young people are being deployed two, three, four times. I 

have got two of them that went five, and back home looking the 

same, but they probably need some PTSD counseling as well. 

So I don’t know that I have questions. I am just concerned when 

we have supervisors and other persons who say to you that this 

guy is crazy, that he is doing something in a foreign land that is 

not friends with us—on their face, sometimes they act like they 

are—we don’t need Homeland Security to know the major should 

have been removed. He should have been, what do you call it, put 

in something by himself and counseled face to face, how he got to 

that. He has a career. 

The other part of it, I come from Michigan, where the largest 

population of Arabs live outside of the Middle East. I have grown 

up with Arabs all my life. But whenever you get one like this, it 

continues the stereotype that they are all crazy and bad. 

I want us to be smarter. I want to know more, Mr. Chairman, 

about the Army accountability investigation. How can he continue 

to get promoted, killing 12 and wounding 32, and countless children will never see their parents? It is not acceptable. It is just not 

acceptable. I don’t have the answer for it. I believe if Jack Murtha 

was here, he would give you a wringing. I can hear him in my ear. 

So we want to work with you; certainly I do, and I know my 

counterparts do. But I am not willing to give you millions more dollars for papers and studies and all that unless you come back and 

rearrange your budget and what is important. It probably needs a 

whole overhaul. It probably needs a comprehensive overall. 

The budget, we only have limited dollars. This is the biggest and 

the best budget. It is the best committee I have been on in 30 

years. We have to do better, because the world is different. We 

have to do better because our young men and women who risk 

their lives for us every day require that. 

Fort Hood? And that he picked Fort Hood? It was more than the 

13 and the 32. It was the image that Fort Hood has to the rest of 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
225 

the world, and he penetrated it on the inside. I connect it to the 

Oklahoma bombing and something similar to that. 

Mr. Chairman, I don’t have any questions per se. Thank you very 

much. 

Chairman DICKS. We appreciate your comments. Do you want to 

say anything? 

General HAM. Yes, ma’am, I agree with you. What happened was 

unacceptable, and we lost 13 and 43 were wounded. That is unacceptable. And it is very clear in this review that there are some individuals who did not do their duty. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Who can tell us if they are still on the job or 

not? 

General HAM. To the best of my knowledge, no one has been separated. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. Why? 

Chairman DICKS. Because the investigations have not been completed yet. You have to give them a chance to do their job. 

Ms. KILPATRICK. That is probably coming from the Army accountability study. It is not your problem. 

General HAM. Yes, ma’am, it is; but in a different role. I participated in this DoD review we are here to discuss. When that was 

concluded, Secretary Gates passed allegations about individual accountability to the Secretary of the Army. The Secretary of the 

Army then, on that same day, appointed me to do that accountability investigation that does name names and identify individuals 

that I recommend to the Secretary of the Army be held accountable. 

That process is ongoing. The Secretary of the Army has not yet 

received that report, but he will soon and he will make some decisions. I am confident that when he makes those decisions and those 

actions are taken, that the Secretary of the Army would be glad to 

have me come over and talk with you about that process. But because it is underway, I am not at liberty to do that. 

Mr. DICKS. We will bring you back for another hearing to report 

to the committee. 

Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. I pass, for the moment. 

QUESTIONS BY CONGRESSMAN CARTER

Mr. DICKS. We are going to let Judge Carter, who represents 

Fort Hood, ask a few questions. He is a valued member of the Appropriations Committee and serves on Military Construction, and 

it is his district that was affected by this. 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member. 

I really appreciate being allowed to be here as part of this hearing. 

This has been a very active part of my life since November 5th. 

Just as a little background, the day this happened, my field director, a retired colonel from the Chaplain Corps, Gregg Schannep— 

you may know Gregg—was actually at the site when the shooting 

started. He called the CO’s office, one of multiples who called the 

CO to say that if you are not having a training exercise, there is 

firing going on over here. So my office is right in the middle of this 

terrible situation. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
226 

I have visited with quite a few of the wounded soldiers. In fact 

we have a soldier right now presently in south Austin who just rejected a plate in his skull and they had to go in and refix him. 

By the way, let me say, every soldier I have met is a credit to 

the uniform, including this young man. His attitude is fabulous. 

But his mom and dad asked me the question, Shouldn’t we expect 

more than our child to get this severely injured, or others dead, by 

somebody in our own uniform on our own base where they should 

be safe? 

So this is a critical situation. And because I happened to be there 

and to be in the middle of it, we have become the subject of an 

awful lot of Internet traffic with people, mostly veterans who live 

in the Fort Hood area, who are making comments to me. Not Active Duty soldiers. The Active Duty soldiers, they do their duty, 

and you should be very proud of them. And, by the way, I will fight 

anybody who says we didn’t respond well once this thing happened. 

I don’t think it could have been done any better. 

But getting back to this, the one thing I keep hearing overriding 

is that the ordinary soldier—you have been talking to us about the 

chain of command and the duty of the commander to recognize behavior and how we need to get them trained to learn to recognize 

behavior. I don’t have any argument with that. 

What I am hearing from Gulf War soldiers, soldiers that have 

just gotten out, they believe there is an attitude that the ordinary 

soldier who might be coming in contact with the major and have 

him either proselytize them or just criticize the war or talk about 

the goodness of jihad, which it is my understanding happened a lot, 

they felt it was not—it would be detrimental to their career in the 

Army for them to go to their commanding officer or others to report 

this, and it was an issue of political correctness. 

As one former sergeant reported to me, he said, We have got a 

shortage of medical personnel, we need Arab speakers. These are 

prioritized people. And even General Casey, upon hearing of this, 

made the comment, Let’s hope this doesn’t hurt our diversity program. 

All those things tend to make us think that the ordinary soldier, 

we might have a culture in the Army that would make him think 

that making a report to someone of what he would consider bizarre 

behavior, might be detrimental to his career in the Army. 

First, I would like to know if you have run across anything along 

those lines. I recognize this is trifurcated, so you are just one of at 

least three routes that I know we are looking into this. But I think 

that is the underlying question that we have to ask ourselves: 

Would a soldier feel uncomfortable because of political correctness 

to making a report? Not an officer looking into someone under his 

command, but just a soldier who serves alongside, or the nurse 

that might serve alongside the mental health professional. Have 

you run into that, and can you answer that question? 

General HAM. Congressman, thanks for that question. I would 

just say at the outset, the co-chairs and I traveled to Fort Hood the 

day after Secretary Gates appointed this panel, and what the Corps 

Commander and all those at Fort Hood and the greater Fort Hood 

community, what they did to pull together was extraordinary. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
227 

There were in fact, Congressman, allegations of inappropriate religious remarks conducted by Major Hasan. He was then a captain 

in residency. He was at this time in Walter Reed. And Secretary 

Gates directed us to look into that, and we did. And what we found 

is in fact patients had made a few comments to others, to supervisory personnel, that said, Hey, this guy, he said some things that 

made me uncomfortable. 

And this is, frankly, an instance where supervisors, at least as 

far as we can tell, did what they were supposed to do. There are 

records that indicate that he was counseled and advised as to the 

inappropriateness of making religious comments in a counseling 

session. Again, he was a resident at that point at Walter Reed, and 

there were no further instances of that. 

We specifically asked that question of the patients that he saw 

at Fort Hood, and similarly there were no indications from patients 

that he saw that he made inappropriate religious comments in his 

provision of medical care to them. 

Mr. CARTER. Well, I am just telling you what has been reported 

to me. Also I have actually had someone who has been in medical 

school with him that said he did the same thing in medical school. 

So it is hearsay. And I am an old judge, I take hearsay for what 

it is worth. But we are in the business of looking into what is going 

on with soldiers. 

I will tell you something that I experienced on the 6th of November when I was there at Darnall. A nurse came up to me and said, 

‘‘There is something underlying this that the Army better remember.’’ And I am sure you know this. She said, ‘‘I just got an e-mail 

from Australia from a nurse that I served with in Australia, in Afghanistan, and I had just come back. And that nurse said, ‘Our soldiers are asking in Australia, Can we trust everybody that is wearing our uniform? Because the Americans can’t trust everybody that 

is wearing their uniform.’ ’’ 

That is a psychological barrier to fitness for our soldiers. And I 

hope and pray that we can get past having soldiers have those 

kinds of feelings about what happened, because the parents are 

feeling that way and I am sure the soldiers are feeling that way. 

So you guys have got a big responsibility. I am on your side, but 

I want everybody to be straight. For the first time since this happened, yesterday Secretary Napolitano, and again today in a hearing where I talked to her, acknowledged that as far as the homeland was concerned, that was an Islamic terrorist act. To this 

point, I haven’t heard the Army say that. I think it would help a 

lot when they finish their investigation if they put political correctness aside and make truthful statements. 

Thank you. 

General HAM. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I think you are exactly 

right. There is tremendous concern. One of the reasons this attack 

is so important to us is that it is one of our own. It is inside the 

family, and a field grade officer on top of that. So one of the great 

concerns is what is that effect inside the service? Again, do we 

start to rip apart this fabric of trust that is so essential within the 

Department? 

Secondly, there is a great concern, a very valid concern, that 

says—you now say am I concerned? Do I feel comfortable? Am I 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
228 

going to go to an Army mental health provider, behavioral health 

specialist, and be open and forthright? This guy came from that 

community. 

The good news is that we haven’t seen, at least in the conduct 

of the DoD review, any significant negative consequences from 

that. And I defer to General Thomas from a broader Army medical 

standpoint. 

But I think you have hit exactly the point of why this one is so 

different. This was someone who was in a position of trust and confidence who killed 13 of our own, and that is absolutely unacceptable and we must do all that we can to prevent reoccurrence. 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am interested in the conversation—you mentioned or, when he 

was at Walter Reed that there had been complaints. Were those by 

enlisted people? 

General HAM. Sir, I don’t know off the top of my head. All I 

know, without doing a fair amount of research, is patients that he 

was seeing. 

Mr. ROGERS. What was the nature—— 

General THOMAS. Sir, no, I don’t have that information. 

Mr. ROGERS. What was the nature of what they were complaining about? 

General HAM. The essence of it, sir, was that in his counsel to 

the patients, that the supervisors felt that he focused inappropriately on religion as an underlying cause—as an example to say, 

Well, if you had stronger faith in God, then maybe you would not 

be experiencing these kinds of problems. It wasn’t outright advocacy of Islam, but it was clearly inappropriate to insert that conversation into the treatment of a patient. 

Mr. ROGERS. I wouldn’t think that would be altogether unusual 

though, would it be? 

General HAM. It was deemed by his supervisors—remember, he 

was now in residency. It was deemed by his supervisors at that 

point that those comments were inappropriate to the patient that 

he was seeing at that time. 

Mr. ROGERS. And these people that complained, I am interested 

in the process. What was done with their complaints? 

General HAM. Twofold. First, the supervising physicians of Captain Hasan counseled him, advised him, that that was not appropriate and how he could better, more effectively provide mental 

health advice to the patients he was seeing. 

Secondly, there was an effort to go back to those patients to ensure that they were satisfied and were receiving the care that was 

necessary by a different provider. 

Mr. ROGERS. But who did they complain to? 

General HAM. It was the supervising physicians that were overseeing his residency. 

Mr. ROGERS. And then what did they do with the information? 

General HAM. Twofold. Counseled Major Hasan as to why he 

should not do that and why it was inappropriate to do so; and, secondly, to assure those patients were afforded the opportunity for 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
229 

care by another physician, to ensure they got the care and treatment that they required. 

Mr. ROGERS. And that was the end of it, then? 

General HAM. Yes, sir. But we did again, post-November 5th, 

when Major Hasan’s patients were interviewed at Fort Hood and 

also other patients that he had seen at Walter Reed, that specific 

question was asked as to whether or not they felt that he had made 

inappropriate religious comments. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, have there been changes made since Fort 

Hood about how inappropriate things that are said are reported 

and handled? 

General HAM. Within the medical community, I am unsure. I 

defer to General Thomas. 

General THOMAS. No, sir. That I am aware of, there are no 

changes with respect to the training programs instituted at this 

time post the 5th of November incident. And just having trained 

residents and having been a military medical resident myself, typically what would happen, in general terms, if a patient had a complaint against me or another provider, another doctor, they would 

report it to my supervising physician, in this case the fully 

credentialed staff physician over me as a resident. And then, having been a supervising staff surgeon, patients would commonly ask 

to see me if they had an issue with one of my residents. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I am not as much interested in the doctor-patient matter as I am just in the military generally. If a soldier sees 

or observes something that is suspicious, like this, have we 

changed the procedures about how he or she can go about reporting 

that and having it looked into? 

General HAM. Not to my knowledge, sir. I think instructive here 

are Major Hasan’s peers as he was going through residency, and 

then in the 2 years he participated in a fellowship also at Walter 

Reed. Peers of his did, in fact, make reports to supervisors that 

said, Hey, this guy is making inappropriate comments. 

And that is what we want them to do. They confronted him also, 

but they also went to his supervisors. So I think the process was 

okay. In my view, what we found was that some of those supervisors failed to execute their duties. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

Mr. DICKS. All right, thank you, General. This was a very good 

hearing. We may ask you to come back after the decisions are 

made by the Secretary. We appreciate your candor and your good 

work and your service, both of you. Thank you. 

The subcommittee was adjourned. 

[CLERK’S NOTE.—Questions submitted by Ms. Granger and the 

answers thereto follow:] 

Question. The ‘‘Protecting the Force’’ report praises the Active Shooter Response 

model that helped in this horrible scenario. Those first responders were trained at 

The Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT) Center at 

Texas State University. The report also stated that current Pentagon policy does not 

currently take advantage of successful models for active shooter response for civilian 

and military law enforcement on DoD installations and facilities. What efforts are 

being made by the Department of Defense to seek out and partner with this existing 

successful training program? 

Answer. The Independent Review Related to Fort Hood found that responding officers attributed their actions to relatively new training on Active Shooter Response 

instituted by the Fort Hood Department of Emergency Services. In the wake of the 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
230 

Fort Hood incident, the Department has taken a more systematic approach to ensure that military and civilian police, as well as all Service members, are familiar 

with ‘‘Active Shooter’’ scenario best practices. To that end, the Department recommended two forms of Active Shooter Training. First, in March 2010, DoD will incorporate a new training module addressing ‘‘Active Shooter’’ threats into the 

Antiterrorism Level 1 online training. This training will be standard across all Services and mandatory for all uniformed Service members, as well as for all General 

Schedule and contractor employees who are on TDY orders to deploy. By June 2010, 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics will issue 

changes to DoD Instruction 6055.17, DoD Installation Emergency Management 

(IEM) Program, directing commanders to incorporate the ‘‘Active Shooter’’ scenario, 

lessons learned from Fort Hood, and other workplace violence case studies into their 

Installation Emergency Management training programs. 

The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness will update DoD Instruction 5210.90, Minimum Training, Certification, and Physical Fitness Standards 

for Civilian Policy and Security Guards (CP/SGs) in the Department of Defense, or 

issue a new instruction to ensure that ‘‘Active Shooter’’ training tasks will become 

part of the minimum law enforcement training standards for DoD military and civilian police. The Under Secretary will also seek ‘‘Active Shooter’’ best practices to provide DoD law enforcement elements with the up-to-date practices and protocols for 

that operational requirement. 

Question. Does the Department intend on implementing a standard active shooter 

response training program? Or will it be left to the independent Services to develop 

their own programs? 

Answer. The Department implemented a standard training program. The new 

training module addressing ‘‘Active Shooter’’ response protocols is standard across 

all Services. It is mandatory training for all Service members, as well as for General 

Schedule and contract employees on TDY orders to deploy. Overseas adult dependents are also encouraged to receive AT Level 1 training. 

Question. It would seem logical that any active shooter training, curriculum and 

response protocol developed by the Pentagon would be consistent and shared with 

other area law enforcement stakeholders. Will the Department be working with the 

neighboring civilian law enforcement stakeholders in the development of active 

shooter training and response protocols? 

Answer. It has been common practice for years for installation commanders to engage with local law enforcement stakeholders to establish memoranda of agreement 

and understanding on force protection and law enforcement issues. At the operational level, commanders exercise discretion as to how best to work with local law 

enforcement stakeholders. Often, as was the case with ‘‘Active Shooter’’ training at 

the Fort Hood Department of Emergency Services, installations go above and beyond the DoD instruction to ensure best practices are shared between DoD and nonDoD law enforcement practitioners and first responders. 

[CLERKS NOTE.—End of questions submitted by Ms. Granger.] 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
(231) 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 10, 2010. 

AIR FORCE POSTURE 

WITNESSES 

HON. MICHAEL B. DONLEY, SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 

GENERAL NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES 

AIR FORCE 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. DICKS. The subcommittee will come to order. 

This afternoon, the committee will hold an open hearing concerning the current posture of the Air Force as well as the fiscal 

year 2011 budget request. 

We are pleased to welcome two distinguished witnesses, the Honorable Michael B. Donley, Secretary of the Air Force, and General 

Norton A. Schwartz, Chief of Staff of the Air Force. These gentlemen are very well qualified to discuss all aspects of the fiscal year 

2011 budget request and answer questions the committee has regarding the Air Force. 

Secretary Donley, General Schwartz, thank you for being here 

this afternoon. The committee is very interested in hearing what 

you have to say about the Air Force’s fiscal year 2011 budget. 

Specifically, as you are well aware, some of us on the committee 

are anxious to hear about the status of the KC-X program with the 

announcement on Monday that one of the companies will not bid 

on the program. The Department had planned on a summer award, 

so we are interested to hear how this decision will affect a contract 

award and how such an award will be negotiated with the remaining company. 

Additionally, the committee is looking forward to a discussion on 

the status of the Joint Strike Fighter. The review conducted by the 

revised joint estimating team this fall predicted at least a 13- 

month schedule slip and the need for additional funding. To address these concerns, the Department of Defense has significantly 

decreased the number of aircraft it had planned to procure over the 

next 5 years and added funding to the development program. Only 

time will tell if the added time and funds will fully address the 

problems with this vital program or if the taxpayer will once again 

be forced to add additional resources. 

Another topic of concern is the continued delay in the development of our next long-range strike platform. The Quadrennial Defense Review directed further study of long-range strike capabilities. 

The Department of Defense initiated a next-generation bomber 

program several years ago. However, Secretary Gates terminated 

the effort last year. With the time required to fully develop a penetrating bomber to be in excess of a decade, if we were lucky, it is 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
232 

concerning that the Department continues to delay the needed investment in recapitalizing our current fleet of bomber aircraft. Our 

current bomber fleet consists of 163 aircraft, ranging in age from 

50 years for the B–52 to 13 years for the B–2. While we applaud 

the plan to provide $199 million for the bomber-related industrial 

base, we are truly concerned that it is not enough. 

A continuing area of concern is the overuse of undefinitized contract actions by the Air Force. While these types of contracts are 

useful to satisfy critical time-sensitive and urgent warfighter requirements in a timely manner, they should not be used for routine 

acquisition or as a result of poor planning. Further, the inability 

of the Air Force and industry to definitize the contracts in a timely 

manner hinders cost control efforts, which ultimately leads to increasing costs for multibillion dollar acquisition programs. We applaud the efforts you have made over the last 6 months, but the 

committee will continue to provide stringent oversight to ensure 

the Air Force continues to reform its contracting procedures. 

In addition to these areas, the committee remains concerned with 

the Air Force’s in-sourcing plans. The Air Force budget request includes a $1.6 billion increase for civilian compensation to support 

an additional 26,000 Federal civilians and $1 billion less for contracted services. But it is unclear to the committee what informs 

the hiring plan since the Air Force does not have an adequate inventory of contracted services. In other words, we don’t know who 

all your contractors are at this point. 

We look forward to your testimony and an informative questionand-answer session. 

Now, before we hear your testimony, I would like to call on Mr. 

Tiahrt for any comments he would like to make. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome Secretary 

Donley and General Schwartz. 

Some of you may have heard the Marines say, you can send us 

anywhere in the globe; just make sure the airplanes overhead are 

ours. And I think that is a topic that we have enjoyed, air superiority. We have enjoyed that for some time, mostly because our pilots are the best in the word and because we have given them the 

tools to do their job safely and come home to their families afterwards. 

However, I remain cautious about our ability to maintain this advantage. Certainly our pilots will continue to be trained at a level 

far exceeding anyone else, but I am concerned that they will have 

the quality and quantity of airplanes needed to do their job. 

We must also maintain our ability to move troops and equipment. We cannot fight the enemy if we can’t get to him. To accomplish this quickly and efficiently and safely, it is essential that we 

maintain the correct mix of assets for both strategic and tactical 

airlift. 

I think we have to address these issues to maintain the dominance in the sky and our global presence, and recapitalization of 

our fleet is part of that. So I am interested in your testimony. And 

thank you, Chairman, for the opportunity to open. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

Why don’t you go ahead and proceed as you wish. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
233 

Mr. DONLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; General Schwartz and 

I would like to congratulate you on your election to this seat. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. DONLEY. There has been a long, distinguished series of 

Chairmen in this position; and we are anxious to work with you 

going forward. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF SECRETARY DONLEY

Mr. DONLEY. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Tiahrt, members of the committee, it is a pleasure to be here representing almost 680,000 Active duty, Guard, and Reserve Airmen and Air Force civilians. I am 

also honored to be here with General Schwartz, who has been a 

phenomenal partner and a tireless public servant as we have 

worked together for almost the last two years. 

Today, I am pleased to report that America’s Air Force continues 

to make progress in strengthening our contributions as part of the 

joint team and in the excellence that is the hallmark of our service. 

We are requesting $150 billion in our baseline budget, and almost 

$21 billion in the overseas contingency operation supplemental to 

support this work. 

In the past year and in planning for the future, we have focused 

on balancing our resources and risk among the four priority objectives outlined by Secretary Gates in the recently released Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). 

First, we must prevail in today’s wars. Your Air Force understands the gravity of the situation in Afghanistan; and, as we continue to responsibly draw down our forces in Iraq, we are committed to rapidly fielding needed capabilities for the joint team 

such as surging Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

(ISR) assets into theater and maximizing air mobility to accelerate 

the flow of forces into Afghanistan. 

Second, we must prevent and deter conflict across the spectrum 

of warfare. As we await the results of the Nuclear Posture Review 

and the follow-on Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), we 

continue to concentrate on the safety, security, and sustainment of 

two legs of the Nation’s nuclear arsenal. Last year, we stood up Air 

Force Global Strike Command; and we have now realigned our 

Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and bomber wings under 

the control of a single commander. We also designated the Air 

Force Nuclear Weapons Center as the single point for consolidated 

management of all of our nuclear weapon sustainment activities. 

And to increase our engagement across the world, we are building 

partner capacity in Afghanistan and Iraq and developing a training 

framework that emphasizes light attack and mobility capabilities 

that can benefit other nations. 

Third, we must be prepared to defeat adversaries and succeed in 

a wide range of conflicts. We need to ensure that we are providing 

the right capabilities with our strategic airlift and ISR platforms 

and ensure our space-based assets continue to deliver needed capabilities for the future. 

In addition, the last two decades of sustained operations has 

strained our weapons systems. We continue to determine which 

aircraft we will modernize and sustain and which we must retire 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
234 

and recapitalize. One of our primary efforts includes retiring and 

recapitalizing many of our legacy fighters and tankers and replacing them respectively, with F–35s and KC-Xs. These decisions require tough choices, as well as the ability to quickly field systems 

that meet warfighter needs at an affordable price. Because acquisition underpins this effort, we are continuing our work to recapture 

excellence in this area. 

In the past year, we have made great strides in reforming our 

internal processes. We have added more program executive officers 

and are growing our acquisition workforce by several thousand professionals over the next five years. 

Finally, we must preserve and enhance the all-volunteer force. 

Airmen are our most valuable resource, and they have performed 

superbly in every mission and deployment they have undertaken. 

With the understanding that their families serve alongside them, 

in July, 2009, we began a year-long focus on our men and women 

and their families. This Year of the Air Force Family recognizes 

their sacrifices and looks to determine how we can better support, 

develop, house, and educate them. We are determining which programs are performing well and where we can do better. 

Mr. Chairman, your Air Force is performing exceptionally well in 

supporting current fights, responding to growing demands, and 

shifting personnel priorities, but we are increasingly stressed in 

the Continental United States (CONUS). Rebuilding the nuclear 

expertise we need for the future will require continued determination and patience, and we are taking more risk in non-deployed 

force readiness. Additionally, we face significant challenges in modernization and in infrastructure. 

At the same time, however, we are developing and fielding new 

technologies and capabilities that bode well for our future; and I 

can tell you after a recent trip to the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR) that we are recruiting and training some incredible Airmen. General Schwartz 

and I can again confirm that the Air Force is blessed with an outstanding civilian and military leadership team to address these 

challenges. 

Our priorities going forward are now clear. We must make the 

most of those resources available to balance capability against risk, 

balancing winning today’s wars against preparing for tomorrow’s. 

We need to prevail in today’s fights, and we continue to add capability in every way possible to help ensure success in the ongoing 

conflicts. 

We must prevent and deter future conflict where we can and continue to be prepared and succeed across the full spectrum of conflict. And we must continue to preserve our Airmen and their families. They are truly our hedge against an uncertain future. 

Mr. Chairman, we are grateful for your and the committee’s support; and we look forward to discussing these matters with the 

committee. Thank you. 

Mr. DICKS. General Schwartz. 

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF GENERAL SCHWARTZ

General SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman, I add my congratulations, sir. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
235 

And, Congressman Tiahrt, members of the committee, I am 

proud to be here representing your Air Force with Secretary 

Donley; and let me begin by reaffirming that the United States Air 

Force is fully committed to effective stewardship of the resources 

that you and the Nation have placed in our trust. Guided by integrity, service, and excellence, our core values, American Airmen are 

serving courageously every day with precision and reliability on behalf of the American people. The budget request supports these 

Airmen and continuing efforts to rebalance the force, to make difficult decisions on what and how we buy, and to sustain our needed 

contributions to the joint team. 

Secretary Donley and I established five priorities shortly after 

taking office to ensure that our entire force was focused on the 

right objectives. Most of our initial efforts centered on re-affirming 

long-established standards of excellence and recommitting ourselves in areas where our focus had waned. I am pleased to report 

to you today that our dedicated and talented Airmen understood 

our intent broadly and delivered in meaningful fashion. 

Although these initial priorities are not designed to change from 

year to year, our progress with the nuclear enterprise is such that 

we can now shift our efforts to sustaining the progress that we 

have made. 

Thus, our first priority is to continue to strengthen excellence in 

the nuclear enterprise. The rigor of our nuclear surety inspections 

demonstrates a renewed commitment to the highest levels of performance, but we must and we will do more to ensure 100 percent 

precision and reliability in our nuclear operations and logistics as 

close to 100 percent of the time as such a human endeavor will 

allow. 

For our second priority, that is partnering with our joint and coalition teammates to win today’s fight, Secretary Donley mentioned 

several of the ways in which our airmen are providing critical air 

and space power for the coalition and joint team. Your Airmen are 

performing admirably wherever and whenever our joint teammates 

require, including providing battlefield medical support and evacuation, ordnance disposal, convoy security, and much more. 

Our third priority remains to develop and care for our airmen 

and their families. We initiated the Air Force Year of the Family, 

as you just heard, in recognition of the vital role that our families 

fulfill in mission accomplishment. Although their sacrifice is perhaps less conspicuous, their efforts are certainly no less noble and 

their contributions are no less substantial. 

Modernizing our inventories and organization and training are 

fourth priorities, among the most difficult tasks that our service 

have undertaken in these last 18 months. 

In order to achieve the balance that Secretary Gates has envisioned for our force, we are compelled to decision and to action. The 

budget represents a continuation of this effort. 

We set forth on a plan last year to accelerate the retirement of 

some of our older fighter aircraft. This year we are not retiring any 

additional fighters, but we are transitioning from some of our oldest and least capable C–130s and C–5s. 

We will modernize where we can, but where modernization no 

longer is cost effective, we will pursue recapitalization. KC–X is 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
236 

certainly one such example. With the recent delivery of the requests for proposal, our top acquisition effort to procure the next 

generation of refueling aircraft passed a significant milestone. 

A similar imperative goes along with the F–35. I want to underscore Secretary Donley’s comments by noting that this weapons 

system will be the workhorse driving much of our Air Force and 

the joint force forward. 

Long-range strike is the last program among our top priorities 

and initiatives. 

The Air Force fully supports development of a family of systems 

providing both penetrating and standoff capabilities for the next 

two or three decades as described in the QDR. 

And finally, recapturing acquisition excellence, our fifth priority, 

is now only beginning to pay dividends with their acquisition improvement plan at the heart of the reform effort. While promising 

the initial successes must continue for a number of years before we 

can declare victory on this front, we are fully aware, that we must 

ring every bit of capability and value that we can from the systems 

that we procure. So this effort will require sustained focus on acquisition excellence. 

Mr. Chairman, the Air Force will continue to provide our best 

military advice and stewardship, delivering global vigilance, reach, 

and power for the Nation. Thank you for your continued support 

of the United States Air Force and particularly of our Airmen and 

their families. I look forward, sir, to your questions. 

[The joint statement of Secretary Donley and General Schwartz 

follows:] 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
237 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 65007B.086
238 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 65007B.087
239 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 65007B.088
240 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 65007B.089
241 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 65007B.090
242 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 65007B.091
243 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 65007B.092
244 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 65007B.093
245 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 65007B.094
246 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 65007B.095
247 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 65007B.096
248 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 65007B.097
249 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 65007B.098
250 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 65007B.099
251 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 65007B.100
252 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 65007B.101
253 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 65007B.102
254 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 65007B.103
255 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 65007B.104
256 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 65007B.105
257 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARINGInsert graphic folio 65007B.106
258 

Mr. DICKS. Well, I just wanted to comment that I was very 

pleased that both of you were there today for the presentation of 

the Gold Medal to the women aviators of World War II. That certainly was an amazing event. I am glad I went personally. 

And, Secretary Donley, I want to compliment you on your excellent remarks and recognition of these hundreds of great women 

who are still alive, who did so much during the World War II thing 

and were so little recognized for it. It just shows you what great 

people we have in this country. 

Mr. DONLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It was a tremendous 

day for the Nation and for our Air Force as well. 

KC–X

Mr. DICKS. Now, you have Dicks and Tiahrt today, so you know 

what the first question is going to be. Can you give us an update 

on the KC–X program? 

Mr. DONLEY. As you noted, sir, we did receive a letter from Northrop Grumman indicating their intent not to bid on the current 

Request for Proposal (RFP) which is out and also indicating that 

they did not plan to protest the current—— 

Mr. DICKS. Which was very welcomed. 

Mr. DONLEY. The Department’s plan going forward is to let this 

RFP stand. This is the best way for us to get a good proposal from 

whatever offer comes in. 

Obviously, Boeing is in that mix; and we need Boeing or other 

offerers to bid on the proposal that we have put out and that is on 

the street today. So our intent is to let that process run its course. 

Mr. DICKS. And Boeing has not yet submitted its proposal. 

Mr. DONLEY. They have not. I think we have about 62 days left 

or something close to that in the current RFP. 

Mr. DICKS. Obviously, this is a very important program, and our 

committee has been involved in this thing since 2001, and I don’t 

want to go through the history here. But it does point out one thing 

that you mentioned as your number five priority and that is what 

you are going to do about acquisition. 

I think we all recognize that the acquisition force within the Air 

Force and within the Department was cut back too far, and I know 

that you are increasing the number of people who are involved in 

acquisition. But when you look at all of the programs that are having difficulty and the Nunn-McCurdy breaches and the escalation 

in cost that represents, we really have to do this; and we have to 

get this fixed as soon as possible. Can you give us a sense of what 

you are trying to do? 

I know you are trying to bring back—increase the personnel so 

you can have more people to handle these programs, but give us 

a sense of what you are trying to do. 

Mr. DONLEY. Well, the acquisition improvement program that 

the Chief and I put in place just several months after we arrived 

has several components to it, but I won’t go into all of the details. 

But the most important element is rebuilding the workforce. We 

were able to add over 700 personnel to our acquisition workforce 

last year. We are on track I believe for over 900 [additional] this 

year. The focus is on bringing back specific expertise—contracting, 

cost estimating, and systems engineering capabilities that support 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
259 

the acquisition process—and making sure that we have them appropriately deployed across our product centers and program offices. 

In the last year, we have added nine new program executive officers. It puts us at a level roughly comparable to the Army and 

Navy in terms of numbers of Program Executive Officers (PEOs). 

But this will help spread the work across a larger number of executives so that they do not have such a broad span of control. They 

will be able to focus on the programs for which they are responsible 

and provide improved oversight. 

Mr. DICKS. General, do you have any comment on this? 

General SCHWARTZ. I would just speak to the thing for which I 

am responsible, which is the requirements. We have elevated the 

level at which requirements are validated and, to be sure, we have 

elevated the level at which changes to requirements are approved. 

And there will be much greater discipline applied in that respect, 

sir. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Tiahrt. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In the tanker program, you are going to go through the current 

schedule; you will get a bid. Do you plan on restructuring the contract itself? Will there be incentives put in place for underruns or 

anything different than what you plan to do under your current 

RFP? 

Mr. DONLEY. We do plan to incentive performance both with respect to delivery and with respect to fuel burn and performance as 

well. So it is still anticipated to be a firm fixed price at the very 

front end and then fixed price and incentive thereafter. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Have you looked at production rates? I mean, the 

optimum rate is not 12 to 15. Have you looked at 25 to 30 as far 

as a delivery rate per year? 

Mr. DONLEY. The RFP is structured to request cost and pricing 

data on a roughly 15 airplanes per year schedule. Our challenge 

with alternative approaches, which would add airplanes, is that we 

would have to budget for increased levels of acquisition. 

The good part of that would be that we would get the tanker 

fleet recapitalized faster, but we would have to spend twice as 

much money every year to do it. So instead of spending in the 

neighborhood of $31⁄2 billion per year, we would be spending closer to $7 billion a year on tankers; and that is a lot of money. So we 

have to balance the tanker acquisition with other pressing needs 

and other mission areas as well. 

Mr. TIAHRT. My only concern is that one Air Force officer told 

me—just to put it in perspective—that the mother of the last pilot 

of a KC–X hasn’t been born yet. The only way we change that is 

if we start procuring them on a more optimum rate. So perhaps 

some study will be done so we can see what kind of cost savings. 

Maybe it is not double the amount. Maybe it is some reduction because of the improvement curve. 

Mr. DONLEY. Certainly at some point in the future one might 

consider a multiyear procurement opportunity. That is still out in 

the future to be worked at some point. But bumping up procurements at the levels that you are describing requires a lot more 

budget dollars than we currently have available. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
260 

MC–12 AND LIGHT MOBILITY AIRCRAFT

Mr. TIAHRT. There are two programs I want to just briefly touch 

on, the MC–12 and the light mobility aircraft. The MC–12, Air 

Force purchased five in fiscal year 2010. My understanding is that 

the in fleet will be about 25 aircraft. 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, actually 37 total aircraft. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Thirty-seven. But there is no request for any aircraft 

in 2011. Have I got that right? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, we will complete the purchase and the 

modification of all of the platforms this year. 

Mr. TIAHRT. All 37. 

General SCHWARTZ. All 37. 

Mr. DONLEY. The last airplanes, sir, as I understand it, are an 

additional five in the fiscal year 2010 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) supplemental. 

Mr. TIAHRT. And in the light mobility, I think that is a 60-aircraft fleet. And you have requested 15 in the budget, but there is 

no RFP issued yet. Is there an RFP date for the light-mobility aircraft? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, that RFP should be issued later this calendar year. And it is not a 60-airplane fleet. It is a 15-airplane 

fleet. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Maybe I had those turned around. I apologize. 

General SCHWARTZ. No. But the key thing is that both for light 

lift and light strike, those will be 15 aircraft fleets whose primary 

focus will be not to perform missions for the United States Air 

Force or the American Armed Forces but, rather, to enable our 

partners to build partner capacity. And that will be true with a 

platform that is something that can be readily assimilated by most 

of the air forces on the planet. I just would comment, sir, that not 

every air force can afford C–17s. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Visclosky. I am going to run up and vote and 

come right back. But I am going to turn it over to Mr. Visclosky. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, I may have done this in the past, but I want to 

congratulate you on your stellar education at USC as a Notre 

Dame grad. My son finally got through USC about a year ago. So 

I want to congratulate you on that. 

Mr. DONLEY. Congratulations. I understand that would mean you 

got a pay raise in that deal. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Yes, sir. 

ALTERNATE ENGINE

Mr. Secretary, on the alternative engine, the Department has 

gone back to the committee with an analysis; and, from our perspective, it would appear to be almost a wash with some of the 

numbers used by the Department having no backup justification. 

If it is from your numbers a wash, what would be the continued 

resistance in not making sure you had a competitive basis here? 

Mr. DONLEY. Well, I think, as the Deputy Secretary’s communication indicated, this has been closely studied; and it was in some 

respects a difficult call in the Department. We have looked at this 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
261 

issue for several years from several different angles; and, in summarizing that, it is the Department’s judgment that there is still 

work to be done on the alternative engine, that the costs that need 

to be made in the near term cannot yet be seen to be recouped 

later. The near-term costs are pretty clear. The long-term savings 

are just not clear enough to warrant the investment in the second 

engine. 

I think another factor this year is the challenge that we are 

going through in restructuring the F–35 program itself, the underlying program and the fact that this would add additional costs on 

top of an already large and, to some extent, strained program. So 

that is where the Department came down on that subject. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I have to vote. I would yield my time back, but 

if I could return to this issue. 

C–5 RETIREMENTS

Mr. DICKS. Yes, of course. As soon as you come back. 

Let us talk about C–5 retirements. Where do we stand on that? 

I know it is something that the Air Force has wanted to do. I am 

strongly in support of what you are attempting to do. Give us the 

status on this. 

General SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman, we propose in 2011 to retire 

17 C–5A aircraft; and we have certain statutory requirements to 

complete before we can activate that requirement process, including, among other things, to give you the report on the C–5 reengining program operational test and evaluation (OT&E). That 

OT&E report is complete, and it will be submitted to our Office of 

the Secretary of Defense hires, and they will return that report to 

you sometime late summer or shortly after that. 

The key thing, sir, is that the mobility requirement and capability study has recently been delivered to the respective defense 

committees. It reflects that we have somewhat more capacity than 

we actually must have, and we find ourselves in the situation 

where we cannot have too much management reserve. That is the 

case now with 223 C–17s, ultimately, and the 111 C–5s that are 

currently in the inventory. The mobility study, sir, has indicated 

that we need about 32.7 million ton miles of capacity. 

Mr. DICKS. 32.7 ton miles? 

General SCHWARTZ. Million ton miles. That equates to the low 

300s of large transport aircraft, rather than the 320 plus where we 

currently are, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. I will just tell you—and you know this better than 

I do. But you get over to Ramstein and you see all of those planes 

and you realize that, since 2001, all of those air lifters have been 

moving back and forth around the world. Anything about the logistics effort just to get everything into Afghanistan and get everything out of Iraq, I mean, it is extremely impressive. 

But I think up here we worry—and this mobility study should be 

enlightening for us to take a look at, and I haven’t had a chance 

to take a look at it. But I think there has been some opposition up 

here I know on the retirement issue. But for money to buy new 

things and to operate the Air Force, I think we have to do this. 

I am going to return to Mr. Visclosky. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
262 

General SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman, if I might just say, it is not 

just the money, though. The coin of the realm is actually becoming 

manpower. 

Mr. DICKS. Personnel. 

General SCHWARTZ. Absolutely. 

Mr. DICKS. Why don’t you finish? I will go vote, and then we will 

go onto Ms. Granger. 

ALTERNATE ENGINE

Mr. VISCLOSKY [presiding]. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Secretary, if I could return. You had mentioned a shorter-term 

up front cost but without a clear idea of what the longer term savings might be. Can you quantify that as far as the additional investment in the short term? 

Mr. DONLEY. I believe the Department’s analysis which was provided to the committee indicated there was probably about a $2.6 

additional billion required in investment in the alternative engine 

ahead of us and that that had to be factored in to the total cost 

of potentially moving forward, and that is somewhat different than 

some of the analysis that the committees had looked at. That was 

performed by the Cost Assessment Program Evaluation (CAPE) office in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and I think 

that is reflected in the study that has been provided to the committee. 

And, again, there is an indication, at least for some of the assumptions made, that there wasn’t justification that was cited. I 

assume our staff could follow up with the Department and get 

those justifications. 

Mr. DONLEY. I believe the summary report provided by the Department was about three or four pages, and there were attachments behind it. What is available—I would be happy to follow up 

with the staff in terms of any additional info that would be necessary. 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, may I just offer a little—again, perhaps 

an operator’s perspective here. There are three things with regard 

to alternate engine that concern me. 

There is a good argument that competitive pressure is a valuable 

thing. It is a valid argument in my view. The question is affordability. And the reality for me is, if more engines means less airplanes, that is not a good trade for the United States Air Force. 

Point one. 

Point two is that the reality is that the alternate engine will only 

be for the United States Air Force. The Navy is not going to have 

two engines aboard ship. Our international partners are not going 

to have two engines. So the reality is that if we have an alternate 

engine and there is a mandate for that, that obligation will ride 

primarily on the Air Force. 

Finally, we are not in 1980 any longer where high performance 

engines had suspect reliability. At the moment, there are at least 

two very successful fighter programs that operate on a single engine. The F–22 and the F/A–18–E/F are a case in point. 

And so, given those three considerations, I think we need to take 

a balanced view. That is my best advice, sir. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
263 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. General, following up on the proposition that you 

would end up being unable to secure as many aircraft, is that 

quantified in the justifications that were submitted to the committee as to how much of a shortfall you would have as far as aircraft from your perspective? 

General SCHWARTZ. This is the basic argument, that if you have 

a fixed program top-lined for the F–35 and you fund the alternate 

engine out of that top line, it has the inescapable effect of reducing 

aircraft procurement. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Have you quantified that in terms of number of 

aircraft? 

General SCHWARTZ. I have not, sir. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Sir, I am an accounting major. Could I do that 

myself from the report? 

Mr. DONLEY. I think the staff would have enough data to help 

you work through that calculation. 

But, sir, I would reemphasize the comment the Chief just made. 

Our challenge with this program has been—one of the challenges 

is that the second engine dollars continue to be directed into the 

program, have to be absorbed by the program, and that is a significant concern as we are trying to add money to development to support getting back on track with the test program, et cetera. So this 

program is costing us more going forward, and we need to be careful and cautious and very deliberate about what other capabilities 

and requirements we put on the program going forward. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. And, General, if I could get back—you mentioned 

reliability, but I didn’t hear in that the question about the possible 

reliability of the engine. It was that you have at least two other 

aircraft with a single engine and that has proved reliable. 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, my point was that we have had 20-plus 

years of development since the days of the so-called engine wars; 

and engine technology and manufacturing and what have you has 

progressed during that period. So the reliability of the engines is 

improved to the extent that at least in two of our frontline fighters 

we have chosen collectively to not have an alternate engine. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. General, the last point I would make and then 

just make a brief statement here is I appreciate also the observation that the Navy has no plans to do a second engine and that our 

international partners would not either. My supposition would be 

that one of the items in their mind is that there isn’t a second engine, that there is no alternative engine permanently fixed in the 

Air Force’s program, so there is no reason to plan for a second engine. 

General SCHWARTZ. My point was, though, sir, that it would be 

one or the other. You will not find both engines in the inventory 

of those folks that we mentioned. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Secretary and General, I appreciate your comments. I just must tell you generically—and it holds true for a 

range of problems. We have had shipbuilding hearings and others—I am very concerned that if we don’t have competition in some 

of these programs, you have a hedge against risks in the future. 

I think just competition for all of us, as hard as all of us in this 

room do work, it gives you an extra edge. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
264 

And I am very concerned about our manufacturing base, that if 

we end up having that single supplier—and I understand, also, 

there is only going to be X number of engines—is why do we only 

have six shipyards of significance in this country today that are 

building warships, is to make sure we don’t lose that capacity. And 

I am very concerned about it here on the propulsion side. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS [presiding]. Ms. Granger. 

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you both for being here. 

Secretary Donley, in January, Secretary Gates announced the restructuring of the Joint Strike Fighter program. He stated there 

were no insurmountable problems, technical or otherwise, but is it 

your assessment that the measures taken so far are sufficient to 

guarantee success? 

I would ask both of you gentlemen the same thing. 

Mr. DONLEY. My judgment on this is yes, firmly. This has been 

a two-year process, and I think the committee is aware because you 

work so closely with this program. But F–35 has gotten close scrutiny for the last two years. We had an independent estimate delivered at the end of 2008 which indicated that there were challenges 

with the program, but we weren’t sure how serious they were. We 

weren’t sure how quickly the contractor might recover from those 

challenges. But, nonetheless, Secretary Gates added dollars to the 

fiscal year 2010 budget for system development. 

But we also set in motion a second series of independent estimates which delivered at the end of calendar year 2009, just at the 

end of last year; and they confirmed the results of the first estimate, that the program indeed was behind. 

So after these two years of close assessment, the Secretary settled on the independent estimates going forward, which needed to 

recognize a slip in the development program, which we have done. 

So we have taken all of the measures that you would expect us to 

take, having reached that conclusion. We have added dollars for development. We have also lowered the ramp on production by 122 

airplanes across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). 

That doesn’t mean we are stopping production. In fact, the Air 

Force is requesting 22 aircraft in our budget for procurement this 

year for the F–35. We have also taken some early production aircraft and moved them over to support a stronger test program. 

The essence of this is the production is slightly behind, and that 

has put the test program behind, and that is really what we want 

to get through. We want to get through developmental tests. We 

want to get through operational tests and wring out any potential 

issues we have with this airplane before we go to full rate production. 

So I think the Department actually has done an excellent job in 

the last six or seven months, especially in getting its arms around 

this program, and that our visibility and management oversight of 

this program is now stronger than it has ever been. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
265 

General SCHWARTZ. Ma’am, my take is that we are now in a position that we have less optimism and more realism, and that is a 

good thing. 

Ms. GRANGER. I will take that as positive. 

General SCHWARTZ. It is. 

Ms. GRANGER. General Schwartz, your long-range plan calls for 

you to replace older aircraft with the Joint Strike Fighter, the F– 

15s, the F–16s, A–10s, because of the unique capabilities of the 

Joint Strike Fighter. Would you comment on what is unique about 

that? 

General SCHWARTZ. There are several aspects of this. 

Clearly, it is a generation five fighter and what that implies is 

it does have low observable qualities which enable it to operate in 

defended air space with much less likelihood of having a successful 

intercept by either airborne threats or surface-to-air threats. 

But probably as important is that these machines will have sensor integration to the degree that we have only seen in a generation somewhat earlier in the F–22; and it is this capacity to integrate sensors with the low observable capability, in addition to having a highly maneuverable platform and one that, again, can succeed both in air-to-air and in air-to-ground role, that makes the F– 

35 the right platform on which we should base our future tactical 

aviation fleet. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you. 

I have one last question about the Joint Strike Fighter. As you 

know, I have the NAS JRB Fort Worth in my district; and I know 

that Fort Worth didn’t make the short list for the Joint Strike 

Fighters operational bases in October. Can you tell me what the 

considerations will be in choosing the maintenance centers of excellence for the Joint Strike Fighter? 

I know that Fort Worth’s location with Lockheed Martin being located there should be a strong contender. Can you tell me what 

considerations will be made? 

General SCHWARTZ. I think the primary consideration will be the 

expertise. This is both human capital consideration and prior experience with low observable maintenance and what have you, and at 

least one of our depots currently has very substantial experience in 

that respect with the F–22. 

So I think the key thing in terms of sustaining the platform will 

be the workforce considerations, as well as the capacity of the 

depot to have the right kind of approach and philosophy. Because 

low-observable maintenance is not plug and chug as it is on traditional aircraft. It is a different formula and requires different skills 

and a different management strategy. And so I think it will depend 

both on people and the level of experience that the various candidates have. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. DICKS. I may have missed this while I was out of the room, 

but I want to go back to ask this question and have you answer 

it. What are the risks of procuring over 250 aircraft, Joint Strike 

Fighters, or 14 percent of the total requirement in the low rate initial program? 

General SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman, I think the risk is that you 

discover something in tests that is very significant and requires adVerDate Mar 15 2010 20:50 Mar 17, 2011 Jkt 065007 PO 00000 Frm 00265 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A007P2.XXX A007P2

Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
266 

justments to the machines that are already produced. That is one 

of the things that the jet analyses, both one and two, I think have 

helped to smooth out. 

There is much less concurrency in this program than there was. 

It doesn’t mean there is zero. If there was zero concurrency, it 

would be a 15- or 20-year development; and that simply is unacceptable as well. But as the Secretary suggested, we have reduced 

the production ramp and we have invested in accelerated development and operations tests so that we think that the risks are 

much, much better balanced than they were previously. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

NUCLEAR SECURITY

Mr. ROGERS. Last year, I asked you about the two incidents involving nuclear security; and we made some changes in the appropriations. What can you tell us today about the accountability actions that you have taken and if the fiscal year 2011 budget adequately addresses nuclear security? 

Mr. DONLEY. Sir, we continue to work this issue. It remains a 

very high priority for us; and, as I indicated in my opening remarks, I think it is going to require determination and patience 

going forward. 

In the last roughly 1 year to 15 months or so we have had, I 

think, a total of about 33 inspections. Twelve of those have involved unsatisfactory outcomes that required retesting. That retesting has been accomplished on seven units, and I think we still 

have a handful, four or five, remaining to be done. 

But this is a continuous process, and both the Chief and I are 

very committed to this work going forward. We are not going to 

back off on the inspection process. We need to stay with it going 

forward. 

Our Airmen are doing a tremendous job out there. But being certified for nuclear operations and being inspected for nuclear operations is not a once-in-5-year or 10-year process. It is a continuous 

effort to make sure that we are maintaining the highest standards 

we can, 365 days a year. 

Mr. DICKS. Would you yield just for a second on that? 

Mr. ROGERS. Yes. 

Mr. DICKS. I assume, though it wasn’t said, that this does involve 

a lot of training of your people. Is that accurate? Are we training 

these people? Giving them the understanding of what they have to 

do to succeed in this area? 

Mr. DONLEY. I believe we are, Mr. Chairman. 

General SCHWARTZ. Absolutely. And I would say as well, just to 

amplify, that this is tough business. It is an unforgiving business. 

And so, sir, you asked about accountability. I don’t like counting 

scalps. That is not what this is about. But we have taken action 

on seven officers over this period. But that is not the measure of 

success, in my view. The measure of success is assuring that our 

folks are well led, they are well trained, as the Chairman indicated, 

and they execute. That is the name of the game. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Rogers. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
267 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, is it correct to say that over the last year you 

have had 33 nuclear security inspections and eight of them unsatisfactory? Can you tell us more about that? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, they ranged from a variety of things. For 

example, one persistent problem has to do with the personnel reliability program. That is the medical certification for our airmen to 

perform nuclear tasks. It is a paperwork-intensive process, and any 

glitch in the paperwork or the channels of communications is a 

bust. There is no middle ground. And, of course, in the technical 

operations, that is dealing with either maintenance or loading of 

weapons and so on, the demands are very stringent; and a deviation is a bust. 

So we have had both of those kinds of things occur. And the bottom line is that our inspections now are very demanding. They are 

invasive, and they do things like 100 percent sampling, which was 

not the case in the past. And so we are uncovering things that we 

overlooked before. And I don’t apologize for turning over rocks. 

That is what we have to do. 

Mr. ROGERS. So you established the Nuclear Weapons Center? 

General SCHWARTZ. We did. 

Mr. ROGERS. How is that working out? 

General SCHWARTZ. I think very well. 

The basic philosophy behind this, sir, was that we had 

sustainment in the nuclear business distributed amongst three 

major commands and other activities. The same thing was true on 

the operations side. And the basic idea here was that the Secretary 

needed to have an accountable officer on the operations side and 

on the sustainment side who was personally vested in the performance of the enterprise, and that is now the case. Lieutenant General Frank Klotz is the operational person, and Brigadier General 

Ev Thomas is the accountable party on the sustainment side. They 

are carrying a significant load, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Does your fiscal year 2011 budget adequately address nuclear security, do you think? 

General SCHWARTZ. From the Air Force point of view, it does, sir. 

I would only indicate—and this is not so much in our lane, but it 

is in the broader appropriations lane—is that there are needs there 

that really are even outside the Department of Defense (DOD) 

realm, that are in the Department of Energy realm. And it is important, if I may recommend, for this committee to watch what 

happens with regard to the nuclear infrastructure that DOE is responsible for and those programs for maintaining the weapons in 

a safe, reliable state. That that, too, is adequately funded. 

Mr. ROGERS. Briefly describe the interaction between DOE and 

the Air Force in this respect. 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, DOE fundamentally is responsible for 

the weapons, the weapon, the explosive package, if you will. We are 

responsible for the delivery systems. And that is the division of 

labor. There is some overlap there, and you have interfaces and so 

on. And, obviously, there is close collaboration. We have a brigadier 

general whose full-time job is to work these matters over at DOE 

headquarters, just an indication of the significance of this interaction. But to do this all properly requires not only resourcing the 

DOD side of this properly but, likewise, the DOE side. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
268 

Mr. ROGERS. What should we look for on DOE? 

General SCHWARTZ. I think questions about sustaining their infrastructure and whether the programs related to DOD weapons— 

for us, the B61 air delivery weapon—is properly funded. And this 

has to do with renovations. It is not a new thing. This has to do 

with replacing time-limited components that age out. 

Mr. DONLEY. These are life extension programs for nuclear weapons. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Secretary, are you satisfied with the security 

now? 

Mr. DONLEY. I am. We always look for ways to do things better, 

and we work with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency in this regard. They also oversee our inspections, and they perform the Research and Development (R&D) for the Department of Defense that 

helps identify areas where both the Air Force and the Navy can improve security. But the long-term safety and reliability of the weapons is critical as we look toward a potential start follow-on agreement and we have to make longer term choices about what we are 

going to do with our ICBM force, with our bomber forces, and the 

weapons that go with them. So this close collaboration between the 

Department of Defense and the Department of Energy on future 

choices going forward and sustaining capabilities out for another 

decade and the decade beyond is critical work for our Nation right 

now. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Rogers, if you would yield. I appreciate your 

line of questioning; and, gentlemen, I appreciate your responses. 

As most people probably understand, Mr. Frelinghuysen is ranking on the Energy Subcommittee and I chair it, and I do appreciate 

the active engagement of the Air Force and others at DOD. Because for too long, from my perspective, what has happened is it 

has been too easy in the past for DOD to simply say, here is what 

we need, because the cost is not attributable to them. 

Part of the problem we have on Energy is the inability of that 

Department to manage major construction projects; and what we 

have been, in a bipartisan fashion, pressing on is make sure we understand what that strategy is and appreciate you doing the review. What do you need with that strategy? That is, again, looking 

at the long term and now let’s define the infrastructure before we 

start building something again when we can’t manage the contract. 

So I appreciate your line of questioning. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Boyd. 

Mr. BOYD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, you look 

good and comfortable in that chair. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you very much. 

STRATEGIC BASING

Mr. BOYD. Secretary Donley, General Schwartz, great to see both 

of you. Thank you for your service and especially for your kindness 

to the people down in my area of the world and the trips you have 

made down there to try to understand a little bit better about who 

they are and what they do. They all certainly appreciate you, as 

their bosses, coming down there to visit them. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
269 

General Schwartz, in your testimony—or I guess this is a combined testimony, is what it says on the front—you talk about strategic basing and the strategic basing process to ensure basing decisions are made in a manner to support new weapon systems acquisition and delivery schedules as well as organization activation 

milestones. Can you talk to me a little bit about that or the committee a little bit about who makes up that group? Do you provide 

oversight and guidance to the group? And who makes the final 

basic decisions? 

Mr. DONLEY. The Strategic Basing Executive Group is made up 

of several offices in our Air Force headquarters. Our installations 

and environment offices lead that, but it includes the A3/5, the operations folks, the programming staff, logistics, and other folks on 

the headquarters staff. 

This process was initiated after the Chief and I came in. The previous process in the Air Force was much more decentralized. It was 

run by our major commands who tended to look at potential beddowns and basing decisions just within the framework of the bases 

under their responsibility, and we felt like we needed a much 

broader approach. We needed an Air Force-wide perspective on basing decisions. 

We also needed to bring to bear the expertise of the headquarters 

and some aspects of our work—environmental work just, for example—where we have a broad perspective of issues across the Air 

Force that perhaps a major command doesn’t have. So we set in 

motion a process at the headquarters to deliberately review our 

basing decisions and get the full corporate attention of the Air 

Force on those decisions. 

The Chief and I do oversee that process. We are briefed periodically, actually, every few weeks. We have a very busy year, with 

a calendar of issues that we are addressing. 

Mr. BOYD. So you folks provide the oversight and guidance, and 

then final basing decisions is made by you guys? 

Mr. DONLEY. We do. 

Mr. BOYD. I noticed in your testimony that you alluded to the F– 

35, using that procedure on the F–35. Now, the CAF realignment 

that we are going through, do you intend to also use it with the 

F–22 basing decisions? 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, we will. But the F–22 is a somewhat 

different situation than is a new start program like the F–35. I 

mean, we have delivered 165 or so airplanes, and we have 25 or 

so left to go, and so this is a more mature program. 

So there are other factors I think that bear on F–22 that overlay 

the question of basing which you would have with a new program, 

specifically fleet management, and that at one time the Air Force 

had in mind 700 or 381 or even 243. We end up with 187, and that 

is a different animal than a larger fleet. So we will have to make 

choices on basing for the remaining aircraft and perhaps those that 

are already bed-down. Our best judgment of how to manage that 

now smaller fleet which will be 187 aircraft. 

Mr. BOYD. But it is your intent to use that basing procedure. 

Mr. Chairman, I will save my other questions for the next round. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

Mr. Kingston. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
270 

JSTARS

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Donley, I wanted to ask a little bit about the JointSTARS system, and what I will do is kind of ask a couple of questions and then let you take it from there. 

But I know that the Air Force was studying fleet viability, and 

I was wondering what the status of that was. And then I understand two of the airplanes are grounded, and I was wondering 

what their status was. And I also wondered what other platforms 

might be a viable option, such as the Navy’s. 

And then, in terms of the engines, as you know, we have appropriated lots of money, $730 million, for reengineering on 18 aircraft. But I understand now that number is up to $1.6 billion and 

not exactly sure what the status of that is and where we are heading with that. 

So tell me about the program. 

Mr. DONLEY. Right. I appreciate this opportunity, Mr. Kingston. 

The Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System 

(JSTARS), first of all, is providing great capability in the current 

war fight. It provides ground moving target radar coverage, which 

is very valuable to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as well. So 

this is an important capability going forward. 

We faced three issues that were not necessarily connected, and 

this was the challenge that the Chief and I faced. 

The Department had set in motion several years ago a reengining program for the JSTARS aircraft. These are Boeing 707 

airframes bought used by the United States Air Force almost 20 

years ago. So they have a lot of service time on them already. In 

some cases, their provenance, where they came from and exactly 

their condition when we took possession of them, is not quite understood in all the detail that we would like. But, suffice to say, 

these are old airframes. So a re-engining program had been explored, and the Department was on a path to re-engine these airplanes. 

At the same time, however, there are new radars being developed 

on new platforms with a range of other capabilities that also do 

ground moving targets and also dismounted targets, which are of 

high interest in the current war fight. So the future radar systems 

available to the Department are actually a broad range of alternatives out there that we had yet to decide upon in terms of which 

radars we would use. 

The third issue we had in front of us was the long-term viability 

of that 707 platform. 

So the Chief and I have endeavored to slow the re-engining process down until we decide what the future of the radar capability 

is going to be and, as we decide that, also understand the future 

life span of these aircraft, and how much money are we going to 

put into these old 707 airframes. So we have an analysis of alternatives under way to assess the ground moving target indicator requirements, and the future radars that we would need, and the alternative platforms on which those radars might be housed. That 

work won’t deliver until next year, but, in the meantime, we should 

get some updates to inform our way forward. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
271 

Also, in the near term, we received direction from the Department of Defense to proceed with the re-engining, two ship sets 

originally and then two more on top, for a total of four ship sets 

of engines, new engines to re-engine airplanes. So we are in the 

process of supporting that direction as well. But it is sort of four 

ship sets on hold is sort of where we are today on that program. 

But we still have work to do to finish the development of the reengining. But we have dollars to do that. 

And in the meantime, again, we are putting dollars into sustaining the Joint STARS going forward because it is such an important capability for us now. 

I apologize for that long answer, but that is the broad overview. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Well, there are actually more questions on it, but 

I know time doesn’t allow. Do I have time, Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. DICKS. You can ask another question, certainly. 

HH–60 COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE

Mr. KINGSTON. On the combat search and rescue helicopter program, I understand that the HH–60G helicopters—we are cutting 

back on that search and rescue; and I wonder, how do you address 

that? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, you are quite right that the fleet of now 

100 available helicopters, 96 to be exact, are quite in demand. And 

just to give you a sense of that, in 2009, we had over 700 saves 

in Iraq and Afghanistan with our airplanes. And, by the way, there 

are 16 aircraft that are deployed at the moment. There are 6 in 

Iraq and 10 in Afghanistan. And they, as I said, over 700 saves. 

These are not sort of the traditional combat search and rescue 

kinds of things. These are picking up Soldiers and Marines and 

other Airmen outside the wire or coalition partners to ensure that 

that golden hour after they are wounded is kept sacrosanct as the 

Secretary of Defense has mandated. 

What happened was we were pursuing a platform, the Combat 

Search and Rescue (CSAR), which, as you are aware, the Secretary 

cancelled last year. And so what we have agreement on is to recapitalize those HH–60 aircraft not with a new start but essentially with an off-the-shelf kind of capability. We think we can get 

an airplane that is in production in a competitive fashion that will 

allow us to recap the CSAR fleet in an affordable manner. 

Mr. KINGSTON. We are looking at buying two more helicopters, 

is that correct? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, there is actually six in this budget. 

There is three in the base and three in the Overseas Contingency 

Overseas request (OCO) for combat losses. 

Mr. KINGSTON. That is enough, even with the surge? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, we need to recap to the 112 aircraft program of record. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Moran. 

Mr. MORAN. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate the fact that while all of the hullabaloo is going on 

in other parts of the Capitol you are here visiting us. 

Mr. DICKS. It is a better place to be. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
272 

CONTRACTING OUT

Mr. MORAN. This subcommittee has asked all of the services to 

provide us with an estimate of how much of their responsibilities 

were contracted out, and the Army replied fairly completely. We 

had the worst problem with the Air Force. As I understand it, we 

got only an estimate of contracted services. 

Now we see in your budget that you plan to do some major hiring. There is an increase of $1.6 billion for civilian compensation 

related to insourcing, but there is only a billion dollars left for contractor services. You might address that, and I hope briefly, because I have got a couple of other questions as well. 

Go ahead, general or Mr. Secretary, either way. 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, it is important to understand that the 

insourcing is not completely done with respect to the contract services. For example, there is some 1,300 spaces associated with joint 

basing where we absorb civilian workforce from other services 

which increased our population. So it isn’t exclusively related to 

contract services. 

Mr. MORAN. But how do you estimate how many contractors you 

have? 

Mr. DONLEY. This is a challenge in the sense that in some cases 

we do have good visibility into how many contractors are working 

for us on a contract. Sometimes that is just a fixed amount of dollars that we are putting against the work, and the number of contractors can fluctuate over time depending on the level of services 

that we are demanding from the contractor. 

But I will follow up, Mr. Moran, because there is something—— 

Mr. DICKS. Will the gentleman yield? Just on that point, it would 

be one thing if we could find out how many companies, but you are 

saying contractor. You are talking about every single individual, is 

that what you just said? 

Mr. DONLEY. Sir, I am not familiar with the details of the committee’s request and how it was phrased. So if there is something 

that we owe you there, we will follow up to get after it. 

[The information follows:] 

The Air Force submitted our Fiscal Year 2008 service contract inventory to the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense (DPAP) on July 1, 2009, and they forwarded the 

inclusive inventory lists for the Army, Navy, and Air Force to the House and Senate 

pursuant to section 2330a Title 10 United States Code on August 4, 2009. 

We provided approximately $21 billion worth of service contracts in this inventory. This amount was not an estimate, but rather a figure pulled from our official 

contracting system, the Federal Procurement Data System—Next Generation system. We estimated 141,000 contractor full-time equivalents (FTE) for the $21 billion 

inventory on standard factor-per-FTE applied across the total obligated amount or 

on estimates provided by Government personnel closely associated with the contract. 

We excluded $14 billion in the Product and Service Codes (PSC) for research, development, test and evaluation and military construction, consistent with the definition of contract services found in the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 806. We also excluded approximately $3 billion in the PSCs for 

lease or rental of equipment and facilities and other special services where there 

is not an FTE or person closely associated with this action. Using the same standard factor-per-FTE methodology described above on these contracts yielded another 

approximately 75,000 of estimated contractor FTEs. All together, our final estimate 

is that we had approximately 216,000 contractor FTEs on our estimated $38 billion 

worth of service contracts for Fiscal Year 2008. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Moran. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
273 

EOP TRAINING

Mr. MORAN. The authorization, the 2008 NDAA required all services, including the Air Force, to provide contractor inventory; and 

the Air Force has not done that. So that would be the best to follow 

up. 

The movie Hurt Locker just got an Oscar. I kind of was rooting— 

I thought Avatar was a little better. But, anyway, there is some 

relevance here to the Air Force. Because, as you know, we have an 

explosive ordnance disposal school; and it functions very well. And 

in fact there is only a 16 percent failure rate for the Marine Corps, 

21 percent for the Navy, but a 47 percent failure rate for the Air 

Force. There is something wrong there. Almost all of it is for academic reasons. It must be that you are not submitting the quality 

of personnel to that school that the other services are, and that 

must account for the failure rate of almost 50 percent. 

Do you want to address that, General? 

General SCHWARTZ. Congressman Moran, I would only offer this 

as sort of background. 

The Marines, for their Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), their 

entry level is at the E–5 level. So more mature, they are proven, 

at least one tour, probably more in the Marine Corps, and so on. 

We do have some entry level folks go into the EOD field. 

Secondly, with respect to the Navy, they start their EOD training 

after they complete dive training, so they have a filter in front of 

the EOD training that—I don’t know what the exact numbers 

would be, but it indicates to me that it is not quite apples and apples between us, the Marine Corps, and the Navy. 

Nonetheless, your point is that we need to scrutinize the skills 

and the potential of the folks we send to the EOD school, and we 

agree with that, and we are working that issue to make sure that 

of course they are volunteers, and they have an interest in this 

very demanding and risky discipline, but they need to have the 

academic skills in order to get there. 

Mr. MORAN. Sure. Let me just ask one last question to conclude. 

The Air Force chose not to play an integral role in the so-called 

war on extremism that the other services did. In fact, such missions were termed in lieu of traditional missions. Now, just recently 

you now referred to them as joint expeditionary tasking. 

But I think it would be useful to cite briefly and then for the 

record the scope of the Air Force’s role in this battle against extremism. Because those are the wars that are going on, not any cold 

war or a traditional role. But it would be useful to know how many 

airmen are currently deployed in the Central Command area of responsibility; of that, how many are actually serving on the joint expeditionary tasking missions. 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, we have got 30,000 in the United States 

Central Command area of responsibility. And depending on the 

time of taking the inventory, it is at 4,700 and growing and will 

be at 5,300 when the surge is complete in Afghanistan. 

By the way, when we changed the name from in lieu of to joint 

expeditionary tasking, that was very deliberate, sir. The point was 

this was—if you ask the kids whether they thought what they were 

doing was worthy, of course they do. They didn’t think what they 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
274 

were doing was in lieu of anything. So we changed the name deliberately. And we are all in, is the short answer. 

Mr. MORAN. That is what I want to hear. 

Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. That is a very good answer. I appreciate that very 

much. 

Mr. Hinchey. 

STEWART ANG BASING

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I just wanted to ask you a question about the C–5 retirements 

and the C–17s coming in. And I understand this question may have 

been asked before, but I just have a personal interest in it with regard to Newburgh. I was just wondering what the situation is there 

with regard to the changing that is going on in the context of Newburgh. 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, we have proposed to retire 17 aircraft in 

this budget submission, 17 C–5s. 

In answer to an earlier question, we are using this basing process to determine which installation specifically will lose aircraft 

and transition to the C–17. And I don’t have a specific answer to 

you whether it is Stewart or not. However, there will be one Air 

Force Reserve installation and one Air National Guard installation 

is what it looks like to me now. 

Mr. HINCHEY. So this is something that we will learn over a 

short period of time as to how this evolves? 

General SCHWARTZ. You will know that, and you will certainly 

have advance notice, not late in the game. 

ALTERNATIVE ENERGY

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you very much. I appreciate it. 

One of the things that we accomplished there recently was the 

establishment of what is called the Solar Farm. This is something 

that is going to generate about half of the energy that is needed 

there at the Newburgh Air Base, and we are now focusing on coming up with the second half at some point in the future. And I 

know this is of great interest to you, and I know it is something 

that you are engaged in. 

I wondered if you could just talk a little bit about it in a general 

way about the intentions and how we are going to be dealing with 

these energy needs and deal with them more efficiently. 

Mr. DONLEY. This is an important priority for our Air Force as 

you appreciate—I am sure the committee appreciates the Department of Defense is the largest consumer of fossil fuels in the Federal Government, and the Air Force is the largest consumer in the 

Department of Defense. So our three-pronged strategy here is to increase supplies where we can—to include looking for alternative 

sources of energy, to reduce demand where we can, and through 

operational profiles we can find ways to operate more efficiently. 

We have driven our energy requirements down over the last 5 to 

10 years deliberately. 

And the third thing, which sort of wraps it all together, really, 

is to make energy use a consideration in all that we do in peaceVerDate Mar 15 2010 20:50 Mar 17, 2011 Jkt 065007 PO 00000 Frm 00274 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A007P2.XXX A007P2

Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
275 

time and wartime operations. We can by our own behavior affect 

the requirements for energy and also identify alternative sources. 

Solar is an important part of that. It is site specific. And one of 

our most recent initiatives, especially on the solar and wind side, 

is to get a little bit more proactive in identifying the new technologies that are coming on, working with State and regional and 

county governments to identify issues early in that permitting process. Because not all of these energy initiatives take place on Air 

Force property, not all of them take place on Federal property, but 

they may influence airspace or they may influence our operations. 

So we need to get more proactive in working with local communities to work through those issues so that we can get both the 

operational effectiveness we want and the benefits of new energy 

sources along the way. 

Mr. HINCHEY. So this is an issue that is getting really the appropriate amount of attention and it is moving forward in a positive 

way. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Tiahrt. 

INSOURCING

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I guess, if I understood the inserts you write, it is going to take 

$1.6 billion increase in civilian competition to do the job that $1 

billion of contracting did. 

I think contracting is more efficient, personally. I mean, I don’t 

hire somebody full time when I need somebody to come fix my furnace or take care of the electrical in my house. It just makes sense 

to contract for some services when you need them and not have 

somebody there full time. 

So I, for one, will try to take some of this pressure off of you guys 

for insourcing everything. Because I think it is less efficient and an 

example that was given is 371⁄2 percent less efficient. 

LIGHT ATTACK AIRCRAFT

I want to talk about the light attack aircraft. There are two programs now. One is spearheaded by the Navy called Imminent Fury, 

and the other one is actually the Air National Guard doing a demo 

project. 

I think the requirement is out there for a light attack aircraft, 

but I think there could be some synergism in moving these programs in a parallel fashion, and I wondered if you would consider 

looking at that, maybe coordinating with the Navy on coming up 

with one program. There have been some great advantages shown 

in the Air National Guard program. If we could make that available for the Navy or somehow coordinate them—and I wanted to 

put that on your radar screen. 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, as you know, we are participating with 

the Navy and the Imminent Fury demonstration. That is not an acquisition program. It really is a demonstration which will occur in 

Afghanistan of that capability. And, as you suggested, there is also 

a demonstration going on in the Air National Guard, and what we 

intend to do is this—is in fiscal year 2012 start on the light strike 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
276 

side, go through the process, develop the requirements, and have 

a standard acquisition approach which will be competitive. 

Mr. TIAHRT. I think we are seeing in procurement—this is probably an age-old knowledge milestone that we seem to avoid on 

every new contract. If you look at the Presidential helicopter, we 

knew how to make a helicopter fly, but as soon as we start loading 

it up with new requirement, all of a sudden it became too heavy 

to fly in a program sense, not necessarily in an aerodynamic sense. 

STREAMLINED ACQUISITION PROCESS

The F–35, I think planned changes—you talk about concurrency, 

which I think is a good way to proceed, but it seems like we ought 

to be tighter on the base requirements with planned upgrades at 

PDM, for example, a bus. If you need a bus down to the weapons 

pylons, put the bus in. And if you get a more advanced piece of 

technology for a bus, then you would replace it at the planned program depot maintenance. 

I think one of the reasons we get into these elongated, expensive 

programs is we are not tight enough on the requirements for the 

underlying aircraft. And I may be mistaken, but aerodynamically 

it is pretty stable as far as the platform we need well into the future. The changes come from a lot of the avionics or the weapons 

capability. By holding the line on those growth ideas, we can make 

those planned upgrades without delaying the program so far and 

driving the price up. Is that part of the plan of going forward with 

F–35 and other programs? 

Mr. DONLEY. It is. There is a joint executive steering board for 

the F–35 program which represents all of the leadership, the stakeholders of the program; and they track very carefully the content 

of the program and both technical and cost trade-offs along the 

way. So this issue of controlling configuration is critical for F–35 

and other programs. It has gotten a lot more attention over the last 

couple of years, as it should. 

General SCHWARTZ. And I would only add, sir, that that approach 

is what we have in mind for long-range strike. That is to let the 

platform mature over time. We are not looking to have something 

necessarily that is 100 percent of what one might conceive of the 

need but rather to be a little bit less ambitious and then to improve 

over time. 

Mr. TIAHRT. Once the real estate is established inside the aircraft, then you can do a lot of things with—that given envelope is 

what we need to put some firm—as we go forward, I would like on 

the next generation bomber, I think that pattern would be very 

helpful for us. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, guys. 

UNDEFINITIZED CONTRACTS

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. 

To meet urgent needs, the Department of Defense can authorize 

contractors to begin work and incur costs before reaching a final 

agreement on the contract terms and conditions, known as 

undefinitized contract actions or letter contracts. As of October, 

2009, the Department of Defense had 429 contracts that were 

undefinitized. Of those, over 160 were Air Force contracts, many of 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
277 

them far exceeding the time permitted to definitize. How are 

undefinitized contracts different from normal contracts? 

Mr. DONLEY. In rough terms, Mr. Chairman, they are shorter. 

They are able to be put together in a shorter period of time. They 

still commit the government to funding a program. They still commit a contractor to delivering certain capability. But they are preliminary, and they need to be followed up with a more permanent 

contract arrangement negotiated in greater detail on both sides. So 

you could provide the flexibility we need to start contract actions 

early. 

I think our challenge, as the committee is aware, is we have let 

these Undefinitized Contract Action (UCA) persist for too long and 

we have used them too easily to bridge over the actual negotiation 

of contracts that needs to take place to get a better handle on 

deliverables. 

Mr. DICKS. Look. You answered my second question. In your experience, does the benefit of starting work sooner outweigh the loss 

of control experienced in a UCA? 

Mr. DONLEY. I do believe the Department and not just the Air 

Force, but if I can extend this to the DOD level, we do need UCAs. 

We do need the flexibility to use this tool. 

And it is true that we need to tighten up on this. We have identified the specific areas in the Air Force acquisition process where 

this is taking too long. We have elevated the approval authorities 

to undertake UCAs so we sort of staunch the bleeding up front so 

there should be less rapid growth in the use of UCAs and we 

should be working down a backlog of existing UCAs and converting 

those to contracts as quickly as we can. 

Mr. DICKS. Does a shortage of contracting officers within the Air 

Force impact the Air Force’s ability to definitize contracts? 

Mr. DONLEY. I think it is a factor. I think General Hoffman could 

provide a much more sharp perspective on this. But we are short 

on contracting personnel; and, in fact, if you look at the stressed 

career fields in the United States Air Force, contracting is near the 

top. 

Our contracting folks are operating on a one-to-one dwell in the 

(USCENTCOM) area of operations and actually were called upon 

to help the Department work contracting challenges in 

(USCENTCOM) that arose about three, four, five years ago; and 

where the Department needed some infusion of contracting expertise, they came to the Air Force to do that. So that has had an impact, and we are trying to build up the contracting workforce in our 

acquisition improvement program. But I think General Hoffman 

could provide more detail on that. 

General SCHWARTZ. And, sir, if I may just add, by the way, those 

contracting assessments are joint expeditionary taskings; and they 

are doing real work for the country. Sir, I might just say, to give 

you an example, because I know you consider us to be a bad actor 

in this regard. 

And with the Global Hawk program, for example, there are six 

undefinitized contracts all of which will be definitized before the 

end of the fiscal year. So it gives you a sense, and I know the staff 

is watching this carefully for you, but we are bird-dogging it as 

well. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
278 

Mr. DICKS. Good. Your assurance is making me feel better. 

But just for the record here, I have to establish this, because this 

is part of our oversight responsibilities. The FAR states that 

undefinitized contract actions should be definitized within 180 days 

of signing the UCA or before completion of 40 percent of the work 

to be performed, whichever occurs first. However, many of the contracts are not definitized within the required 180-day time period. 

In some cases, years have passed without definitization and sometimes funds are obligated in excess of the limits normally allowed. 

For example, at the end of January, the Air Force’s aeronautical 

systems command at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, there were 

87 open UCAs averaging 363 days open, 20 of the 87 in excess of 

600 days. 

What reasons are there for UCA to not be definitized within the 

permitted time periods? 

Mr. DONLEY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to take that for the 

record. I think each of those program, each of those contract actions has its own story; and I need to have the experts characterize 

that for you. 

[The information follows:] 

The major reasons why undefinitized contract actions are not definitized within 

the permitted time periods include late submitted or inadequate proposals, audit 

delays, changes in requirements and personnel constraints. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. Also, one final thing. Receiving a favorable 

audit from the Defense Contract Audit Agency is also an area that 

takes too long. What is the Air Force doing to enable the Defense 

Contract Audit Agency to conduct more timely audits? 

Mr. DONLEY. We continue to be in dialogue with the Defense 

Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) about how they can shorten their 

process and how we can work together to make that process more 

efficient. 

Mr. DICKS. Yeah. We have a few more questions here on that 

subject for the record. 

Mr. Tiahrt. 

LIGHT ATTACK ARMED RECONNAISSANCE

Mr. TIAHRT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This sort of relates to all of us. Gentlemen, I have requested two 

documents relating to the light attack armed reconnaissance program. Unfortunately, I have been informed that Members of Congress now have to file a Freedom of Information Act request to gain 

access to any document. Can you please provide my office and this 

committee with the capability based assessment and the component cost analysis for the LAAR program? 

Mr. DICKS. Is this true? Do we have to go—this can’t be true. 

Mr. DONLEY. Mr. Chairman, I am not aware of any new policies 

on this subject. I think the issue—and I would let the lawyers answer this more carefully for the record. I believe the issue has to 

do with requests from individual Members on matters which get 

close to or cross over into source selection sensitive information. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
279 

COMPASS CALL AIRCRAFT

Mr. DICKS. We don’t want to do anything, especially, Mr. Tiahrt 

and I, to cause any problems in that respect, but we certainly want 

the information for the committee. 

I have one more that I wanted to ask; and then if anybody else 

has a question, we will go to you. 

The committee is pleased to note that the Air Force has focused 

funds on the budget on electronic attack aircraft. But we have 

some concerns over the plans for converting of 45-year-old aircraft. 

Specifically, the request includes funds to begin the modification of 

the WC–130H aircraft into an EC–130H compass call aircraft. This 

would increase the compass call inventory to 15 aircraft. 

You may have gotten into this earlier, but I want to go back to 

it. The request states that the conversion will cost $150 million, 

but it appears the Air Force is only funding a portion of the requirement in fiscal year 2011. Why are we taking an aircraft of 

this age to do this? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, it is structurally sound. The compass call 

mission is not a mission which places great demand on the C–130 

airframe because it is in that altitude mission and so on. So this 

approach was a way to increase the electronic combat capability we 

need at minimum cost. And it is $150 million over three years. It 

is 2011, 2012, and 2013; and it is funded accordingly, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. How does the Air Force justify partial funding of the 

conversion—you are saying it is complete funding? It appears to be 

incremental funding. 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, I am saying that the program is fully 

funded. 

Mr. DICKS. It is fully funded. 

General SCHWARTZ. It is fully funded. I take your point that it 

is not in one fiscal year, and we will come back to you on the record 

for that. 

[The information follows:] 

The initiative to convert a WC–130H to an EC–130H was proposed in early Fiscal 

Year 2009 and some funding has been included in the Fiscal Year 2011 President’s 

Budget request. Execution of this conversion requires three years. The first year is 

needed for production engineering and drawings, ordering long lead components, 

and Group A kits. The second year involves Group B kit production. Actual modification/installation occur in year three. Since these tasks are viewed as distinct and 

separable, funding for the Group B kits and modification would be early to need in 

FY11. During the Fiscal Year 2011 Program Objective Memorandum process funding for the three phases is spread across Fiscal Years 2011–2013. Shown below is 

an updated program office cost estimate for the conversion of a WC–130 to an EC– 

130H. 

$35.3M—Production engineering/drawing 

$11.8M—Long lead components 

$26.6M—Group A kit production 

$48.3M—Group B kit production 

$27.9M—Aircraft modification/installation 

Production engineering, long lead items and Group A kits are funded in Fiscal 

Year 2011 ($73.7M). Group B kits are programmed in Fiscal Year 2012 ($48.3M) 

and aircraft modification/installation is programmed in Fiscal Year 2013 ($27.9M). 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
280 

COMPASS CALL VIABILITY

Mr. DICKS. This past year the Air Force conducted a fleet viability board review of the existing fleet. What were the results of the 

review? 

Mr. DONLEY. Sir, we have had several. Can I ask which airframe 

the Chairman is referring to? 

Mr. DICKS. This is the same one. This is on the WC–130H aircraft. 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, the C–130 fleet viability is a project that 

is ongoing for this year. It has not yet reported out. The most recent fleet viability that we did was on the JSTARS that was referred to earlier by Congressman Kingston. 

Mr. DICKS. Are there other questions? 

Mr. Kingston first. We will go in order. 

CYBERSECURITY

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, I wanted to ask about cybersecurity, and you may need 

to follow up if you don’t know these numbers. But generally how 

big of a problem is it? How many break-in attempts do we get each 

day and into what systems are they worst? Who is doing it? And 

how often are they successful? 

And then, partly provincial, in my hometown, Armstrong Atlantic 

University has a cybersecurity center which they started about 4 

or 5 years ago. I frequently get briefed by them; and I am always 

astounded, no matter how many times I see, the number of attacks 

that come in worldwide and the places that they come from and the 

freelance agents and the organized country effort. It just seems like 

it is all over the place. I wonder if you could—— 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, it is a major issue in our unclassified 

networks; and we work hard, very diligently, and have, no kidding, 

some of the best talent working to defend the net. In fact, we stood 

up an organization called 24th Air Force to do exactly that, to defend the net. 

Now, this is both on the unclassified side where we have—I have 

been speaking for 15 seconds. We probably had 15 attempts to 

work into the system. We are reasonably secure. 

But on the classified side, I would indicate that we are quite secure, very secure. The dilemma is that, as you suggested, there are 

all kinds of actors out there. There are nation state actors. There 

are individuals. There is criminal-related activity. There are fun 

seekers that are doing this, and they certainly take time on DOD 

networks. 

So I think if I had one comment to make to you, sir, is that the 

Secretary of Defense’s initiative to stand up the sub-unified cyber 

command is an essential undertaking for our Department to put 

the focus on this as a discipline and as a command entity. 

There is some concern that DOD might take over, might move 

outside dotmil. I don’t see that occurring. But within dotmil and 

perhaps for dotgov, we need to make the best use of all of the talent that is available in agencies within DOD like our 24th Air 

Force, like the National Security Agency and elsewhere. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
281 

Mr. KINGSTON. Aside from the attacks on your main computer 

programs, what about listening devices or trying to get into individual cell phones or BlackBerrys, that has got to be out there as 

well? 

General SCHWARTZ. It is a counter-intelligence concern and one 

that we take seriously. 

Mr. KINGSTON. How vulnerable do you think Members of Congress are, based on what you know, with our own BlackBerrys as 

we go on codels or even not leaving the United States? 

General SCHWARTZ. I would have to tell you I would say vulnerable. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Do you use a BlackBerry? 

General SCHWARTZ. I do. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Well, is that the inconsistent with what you just 

said? I am trying to figure out, should I throw mine out or not? 

General SCHWARTZ. I don’t think you should, but you need to 

think about what you are using it for, and that really is the guidance that we have provided our people. 

Now there are certain folks in the Air Force that won’t use a 

BlackBerry because of the work that they do. In my case, if I get 

a pulse from the media, it is a vehicle that I use to good effect, in 

my view. 

So we train our people and instruct our people to be judicious. 

And in some cases they don’t get to use it at all because they are 

in very sensitive positions. My hunch is that a similar sort of protocol applies here on Capitol Hill as well. Folks from the Intelligence Committee, for example, might have different rules than 

other committees. 

Mr. KINGSTON. Thank you. 

Mr. DICKS. I think that is one reason we put in this password, 

which is very annoying, but we had to do it. But it has to be done, 

and we are doing it. 

Mr. Visclosky. 

SATELLITE PROGRAMS

Mr. VISCLOSKY. With these thumbs, that password is very, very 

annoying. It is just hard. 

Mr. Secretary, on the satellite programs, you have a number of 

significant systems and, apparently, there has been some significant schedule growth, cost increases, a lot of which may have to do 

with unrealistic cost estimates in the first place, questions about 

technical maturity. Are there simply now too many systems, is 

there too much program for the monies that you have for the satellite program? 

Mr. DONLEY. Sir, again, I think each program has its own story 

and own history. We had had I think, up until a couple of years 

ago before Secretary Gates took a closer look at this, we did have 

a number of satellite systems cued up, especially in the secure Satellite Communications (SATCOM) area where we had more technology perhaps programmed than we could afford. And that resulted in the cancellation of the TSAT, the transformational satellite program. 

We have stepped back to focus on the execution of the AEHF program, but we are still looking for opportunities at some point in the 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
282 

future to insert new technology, much along the lines as Mr. Tiahrt 

described, where and when we are ready to do that and we can afford it. 

Again, each of these programs has its own story. I think, right 

now, we are most concerned with the EELV program, the evolved 

expendable launch capability that we have enjoyed success with for 

so many years now. I think it is—I want to say 65 or so. But it 

is a string of successful launches using EELV. 

And we have benefited from some early multiyear contract arrangement which has since expired. On that program, we are looking at significant cost growth, which we are not happy with; and 

we are looking for alternatives going forward. And we are looking 

at additional pressure on the solid rocket motor and the industrial 

base that goes with that. With the changes in National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration’s program, we face some significant challenges in developing an affordable funding profile for space launch 

support. So that is an area that we are looking at in particular 

right now. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. I don’t know that we will have a hearing on 

launch per se, but are there a couple of issues and any monetary 

value that we should know or be particularly concerned about on 

the launch side before we mark up our bill? 

Mr. DONLEY. We will certainly support the committee’s schedule 

as best we possibly can with the latest information that we have 

on the EELV. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. And on the satellites themselves, is there—getting back to Mr. Rogers’ line of questioning before about DOD and 

DOE—between the Intelligence Committee community and some of 

the requirements that they are asking for some of these satellites 

and in a sense overrequesting for capabilities here, given again 

technology that is available today and the dollars that are available 

today? Is there a disconnect there? 

Mr. DONLEY. Sir, I wouldn’t speak specifically to the systems 

that are procured in the national programs, although I will say 

that we have a close relationship with the National Reconnaissance 

Office that has—we have had that close relationship for many 

years, that continues, and we continue to collaborate on trade-offs 

where we can between space-based and airborne systems and also 

identifying capabilities on the DOD side that can be hosted elsewhere in either the Intelligence Community or even on commercial 

satellites as well. So we are looking for creative alternatives for 

hosting DOD-required capabilities on different kinds of platforms, 

rather than just necessarily owning and launching and operating 

everything ourselves. 

And I should add that you will see this play out in the Space 

Posture Review, which should be delivered to Congress later on 

this spring, early summertime frame. You will see the policy level 

discussions and trade-offs on sort of organic government-owned 

versus international partnerships and commercial partnerships as 

well and the kind of judgments the Administration is about to 

make, if you will, on how to strike the appropriate balance in that 

mix. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
283 

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE RECONNAISSANCE PERSONNEL

Mr. VISCLOSKY. And we would look for that late spring. 

One last line of question, if I could, Mr. Chairman. You had mentioned before, Mr. Secretary, in one of your answers about stress 

specialties; and you mentioned contracting and acquisition. I understand you also have problems as far as intelligence surveillance 

and reconnaissance, nuclear missions. What are you doing to address that issue? And again is it a resource issue? Is there something we ought to have particular concern about? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, what we have done is we have made 

major moves in the ISR area—I mean, as many as 4,700 spaces— 

to try to compensate for the demand there. We have moved 2,500 

spaces in Fiscal Year 2010 to strengthen the nuclear enterprise. 

We also moved roughly 2,000 spaces into aircraft and missile maintenance. When we went through the drawdown episode a couple of 

years ago, we overshot. So we needed to bring that back up to an 

appropriate level. 

Smaller numbers of spaces have gone to the other disciplines. 

Certainly, as you suggested, contracting, public affairs is a high-demand activity. Security forces is a high-demand activity. Believe it 

or not, the chaplaincy is a high-demand activity. 

And so we are doing the best we can, but I have to tell you, sir— 

and this is a significant matter for the appropriators—our personnel costs are a major concern to the Secretary and me. To the 

extent that if we don’t watch this and do this carefully, our personnel costs will begin to push out important content elsewhere in 

the Air Force portfolio. So we need to be judicious, and the bottom 

line is we are not going to grow because we can’t afford it. 

So if we have some areas in the Air Force that are expanding, 

like intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, we are going to 

have to shrink in others; and we are going to have to gather manpower and financial resources from within our existing portfolio. 

Mr. VISCLOSKY. Gentlemen, thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Ms. Granger. 

F–22 RAPTOR AIRCRAFT

Ms. GRANGER. Just a couple of quick questions about the F–22. 

General Schwartz, Secretary Gates described the F–22 as the 

critical hedge against new threat systems such as the Russian fifth 

generation fighter. I saw in your testimony that you invested $2 

billion in improvements to upgrade the F–22. Is this sufficient to 

continue the air superiority of the F–22? And tell me a little bit 

about long-term modernization. 

General SCHWARTZ. Ma’am, we are going to have 150 block 3 or 

block 31⁄2 quality kinds of airplanes. These will be machines at the 

very top tier of the F–22 capability. 

Training aircraft, on the other hand, so-called block 20 aircraft, 

won’t have all of the wherewithal that the operational aircraft will 

have. So there will be about 28 or so—forgive me—36 of the block 

20 airplane and the remainder will be full-up capabilities which 

will have both air-to-air, for which the airplane was primarily deVerDate Mar 15 2010 20:50 Mar 17, 2011 Jkt 065007 PO 00000 Frm 00283 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A007P2.XXX A007P2

Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
284 

signed, as well as air-to-ground capability. And that is where some 

of the advancements will come as we go down the line. 

It is very important with the smaller fleet we have that we continue to invest in sustaining the F–22, both its low observable 

qualities, its avionics. We are going to put a different data link on 

the airplane that is compatible with the F–35. The data link that 

it currently has is only F–22 specific. In the way we used to think 

about employing the airplane, that was okay. It is not anymore. It 

is a secure data link, but we need to have one that can be used 

throughout the force and particularly among generation five capable fighters. 

So those are the kinds of improvements we are making, and I 

would appeal to the committee to support us on making those 187 

airplanes as capable as they can be. 

Ms. GRANGER. Thank you very much. And thank you both for appearing and your service. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Boyd. 

F–22 BASING

Mr. BOYD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, General Schwartz, this is a follow-up to what Ms. Granger—you and I have had many discussions about the F–22, and you 

know of my parochial interest in that. I asked you earlier about the 

Strategic Basing Executive Steering Group, and you have explained 

to me that they would be involved. 

What I didn’t ask you was when, and I have asked you that before, and I felt it would be remiss and you would be very disappointed if I didn’t ask you here today. 

General SCHWARTZ. With respect to what we will do with the F– 

22 from a fleet management point of view, that is a summertime 

frame decision process. 

PERSONNEL TRAINING

Mr. BOYD. All right. Okay. Thank you very much, General. 

Now, to follow-up on Mr. Visclosky’s line of questioning relative 

to the personnel and your concern about personnel pushing folks 

out, you are trying to redesign your whole system and scheme of 

things. The CAF, your reductions there, you have, I understand, 

according to testimony, 3,600 personnel who will be reassigned, retrained, go into other fields as you do this realignment. About onesixth or about 600 of those, I think, are coming out of the F–15 

schoolhouse area that I have an interest in. There is going to be 

some retraining requirements there. And my question really is 

about how long that transition will take. And by the time these airmen are retrained, will those requirements still be available? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, there will be some retraining, clearly. 

There will be some sort of immediate transfers where the skill set 

is not weapon system specific or something along those lines, and 

it depends on the specific skill. If we are talking about F–15 pilots 

transitioning to another airplane, it might be six months. With respect to a maintainer moving to an F–16 or another aviation weapons system, it is probably less than six months. So we are talking 

about within the year basically of having people that would miVerDate Mar 15 2010 20:50 Mar 17, 2011 Jkt 065007 PO 00000 Frm 00284 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A007P2.XXX A007P2

Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
285 

grate out of their current mission assignments and be applied to 

others elsewhere in our Air Force. 

In more rare cases, you will have the kind of thing where people 

are making a hard change, maybe, for example, might go from 

maintenance to becoming a sensor operator on an unmanned or remotely piloted aircraft. That is probably a year plus to do that. 

So it depends, sir, but I would emphasize again, and reinforcing 

the comment that I made earlier, that if we are going to remain 

relevant and our capabilities are those which the joint team needs 

now in going forward, we need to begin to make these changes, as 

painful as they are, sir. 

Mr. BOYD. Thank you very much, General Schwartz, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Rogers. 

MOTHBALLED AIRCRAFT

Mr. ROGERS. Tell me, where do you store mothballed aircraft? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, it is done at Davis-Monthan Air Force 

Base in Arizona at the so-called graveyard. 

Mr. ROGERS. Are those planes useless? 

General SCHWARTZ. Not at all. In fact, there are several layers 

of storage. 

Type 1,000 storage, for example, is something that you could 

bring back quite readily. There are other levels of storage where 

you get to take spare parts off these machines and they become 

less and less—the potential of recovering them, obviously, declines 

over time. So it depends what the status of the specific kind of storage is. 

Mr. ROGERS. How many planes do we have in storage? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, I would have to take that for the record, 

but it is thousands. 

[The information follows:] 

Currently, the United States Air Force has 2,205 aircraft in Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group storage. 

Mr. ROGERS. I know the chairman may not be interested in this 

very much, but could some of those planes be reused in the modern 

day need for new aircraft? 

Mr. DONLEY. Sir, my assessment is that that would be very difficult to do and very expensive. 

As the Chief outlined, I think there are options for putting aircraft into retirement, where one can put them into storage where 

for some period of time they can be maintained at a level to be 

brought back on fairly short notice. That is an expensive proposition. I don’t recall off the top of my head—we will get you an answer for the record—whether we have actually done that. It has 

been discussed, but I am not sure we have actually exercised that 

option. 

[The information follows:] 

From Fiscal Year 2006 through Fiscal Year 2009, 109 Air Force aircraft have been 

regenerated at the Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group to support the 

United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, and foreign military sales. 

Mr. DONLEY. The more common use, as the Chief described it, is 

to cannibalize these airplanes over time for various spare parts, not 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
286 

just for the United States Air Force but also for our international 

partners who, through foreign military sales (FMS) and other programs, are operating generations of aircraft maybe one or two behind the United States and where there are no current production 

aircraft available to provide a spare parts pipeline. So this is the 

more common use of these aircraft. 

Mr. ROGERS. What would be the oldest aircraft in that fleet? 

General SCHWARTZ. Probably one of the ones that the Women’s 

Air Force Service Pilots (WASPs) flew years ago. Sir, I don’t know, 

but I will find out for you. 

[The information follows:] 

The oldest Air Force aircraft in storage by arrival date is a WB–57F (modified 

Canberra B–57), serial number 63–13295, which arrived in July 1972. 

Mr. DONLEY. They go back to the 1950s, for sure. Old B–52s, for 

example. 

Mr. DICKS. I will just say to the gentleman from Kentucky, if we 

can use these airplanes or if our allies can use them, I am for using 

them. If there is a way to do it, that makes sense. Spare parts are 

very important. 

Mr. Hinchey. 

COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE HELICOPTER

Mr. HINCHEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a couple of quick 

things. 

The Air Force I understand is considering a multibillion dollar 

sole source procurement to replace the aging HH–60G Pave Hawk 

search and rescue helicopter. How is that going to happen? Is the 

Air Force conferring a sole source procurement to recapitalize? No? 

General SCHWARTZ. No, sir. I think I can speak with authority 

and say that it will be a competitive process. But I would envision 

that will not be a development program, at least not a major development program. It will capitalize on something that is currently 

available and is modified to the combat search and rescue mission 

set. 

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

Mr. HINCHEY. Okay. Thank you very much. 

The unmanned aircraft system is something that has gotten an 

awful lot of attention and something that, frankly, is very interesting. They are serving in an expanded set of operations in both 

Iraq and Afghanistan, And I understand that some of them are located in Korea as well. I don’t know if that is a fact, but I understand that may be the case. I wondered if you would share your 

vision of the future for the unmanned aerial system, especially in 

the counterinsurgency operations but also in the regular combat 

operations as well. 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, we believe that remotely piloted aircraft 

(RPA) are a capability that will remain. It is an enduring feature 

of our Air Force, both for surveillance requirements as well as 

strike requirements in the right kind of environment. So we see the 

inventory of these assets growing. 

We currently have in the neighborhood of 200 remotely piloted 

aircraft at different classes in the Air Force that will probably douVerDate Mar 15 2010 20:50 Mar 17, 2011 Jkt 065007 PO 00000 Frm 00286 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A007P2.XXX A007P2

Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
287 

ble over time. And we will have those both for the irregular warfare mission set that you are familiar with, but it will also be useful in other applications which we haven’t completely thought 

through, for example, suppression of enemy air defenses. 

Other capable air forces in the world use these platforms in perhaps different ways than we have currently thought about and we 

need, again, as part of this growth process, to make sure that we 

have considered all of the possible applications. RPAs are not anytime, anyplace aircraft. There are certain environments where they 

simply will not survive. But that is only a part of the potential operating environment. 

Mr. DICKS. If the gentleman will yield, it is not just the Air 

Force. This is the Navy, the Army, Special Forces. Everybody is 

looking at these and in whole different sizes, shapes and capabilities, is that correct? 

Mr. DONLEY. Yes, sir. And many other nations as well. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Hinchey. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Is there a shortage? Is there enough? Do you have 

enough coming in? 

General SCHWARTZ. We are maxing production, sir. There are 48 

reapers in this budget, both in the base and in the overseas contingency operations account; and that is all that General Atomics can 

produce. 

Mr. HINCHEY. Just one more question. 

Mr. DICKS. Will the gentleman yield on this same point? 

We are working on trying to secure the Predators because there 

was some issue with their vulnerability; isn’t that correct? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, there is no vulnerability with respect to 

the air-to-air links or the space-borne links; they are all secure, 

both in terms of command and control as well as the take off sensors. 

The issue you address has to do with what is provided in an airto-ground sense directly to our troops, Airmen, Marines, and what 

have you on the ground. We are in the process of securing those 

links. 

But this, Mr. Chairman, is one of those cases where you have to 

balance risk. I would argue that it is better for our kids to know 

what is around the corner and worry less about whether somebody 

else is watching that, too. But we will be—in the next two years, 

we will move dramatically on securing the air-to-ground portion of 

those links as well. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. 

PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE

Mr. HINCHEY. If I may just ask one last question. The issue of 

prompt global strike is something that is getting more attention. 

And I can understand it because of the way things are developing 

around this planet, and it makes life a little more tense and tenuous. I wonder if you could talk to us just for a couple of minutes 

maybe about what the situation is, how it is evolving, what 

progress is being made in reviewing the prompt global strike, what 

the situation is generally. 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, let me just start, and I am sure the Secretary will have something to add. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
288 

When the Secretary mentioned the family of systems earlier with 

respect to long-range strike, prompt global strike is a part of that 

family. This is fundamentally what, at least for us, would be a conventional ICBM, something that would have a conventional warhead that we could launch and be on target in a matter of minutes, 

as opposed to hours or even longer. 

In addition, there are certain developmental kinds of capabilities 

that fall into this category like hypersonic glide vehicles. This is 

something that is new, and it is developmental, and, in fact, there 

will be a test in the coming months on the first launch of an experimental hypersonic glide vehicle. 

So this is about getting to targets very promptly with high kinetic effect, nonnuclear. There is a place, I think, for that kind of 

capability. I don’t think that that is the sort of thing you would use 

broadly because fundamentally, what you don’t want to have is a 

300—let us just say a $300 million weapon applied against a 

$30,000 target. I mean, there is balance in this. But there is a 

place for prompt global strike, and we in the Air Force will be pursuing this on behalf of DOD. 

Mr. DONLEY. I think that the Chief has hit it right on. This is 

part of this discussion in the Department about the family of systems that we are looking for. The mix of standoff and penetration, 

the mix of prompt and persistent, the mix of manned and unmanned, and the mix of platforms, weapons, ISR capabilities, and 

electronic warfare capability, all of those things together make up 

a long-range strike family, a portfolio, if you will. 

So we are taking a closer look at how and where we invest in 

that portfolio and the sequence. What should we work on first? 

Where are the threats or opportunities most pregnant that we need 

to address? What will or should take a little bit longer to decide? 

And so these are the issues the Secretary has put in motion. 

I will say, from a programmatic point of view, the prompt global 

strike work had been a little bit federated over the last couple of 

years. There have been a couple of different R&D lines and different projects under that umbrella, and Dr. Carter has asked the 

Air Force to help pull that together and manage it as a whole going 

forward. So we are in the process of assuming that responsibility. 

It started a little bit earlier this winter. So that will give the Air 

Force a little bit better visibility into the prompt global strike area. 

General SCHWARTZ. And I would just add, sir, that this is not 

just about the Air Force. There are other capabilities. Conventional 

Trident, for example, is something that is a possibility. So this is 

not just Air Force business. 

Mr. DICKS. On that point, isn’t one of the problems is how you 

would distinguish between a conventional weapon and a weapon 

that has nuclear warheads? That is one problem with this concept, 

right? 

General SCHWARTZ. Stability is an issue, and there are ways to 

address that, either by your basing mode or where these would be 

based, what kind of awareness others might have, and whether it 

is aboveground or in ground, and so on and so forth. There are a 

lot of different ways to address the ambiguity issues associated 

with prompt global strike, and this is not yet completely thought 

through. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
289 

Mr. DICKS. One thing with the B–2, we moved away from using 

it to deliver nuclear weapons and put it on smart conventional 

weapons; and I like what you said. In that respect, you have a very 

inexpensive weapon going after a target; and sometimes, as you 

well know, on one mission you can take out 26 targets. And if we 

get to the smaller weapons, even more. So that is a tremendous 

conventional capability that you have with a penetrating bomber 

and—but I do like what you said also on the UAVs and using them 

for suppression of enemy radar. That is not something I had heard 

about before. It sounds very interesting. 

I–22 AIRCRAFT RELIABILITY

I had one question on the reliability issue on the F–22. Thus far 

this year, the F–22 mission capable rate is only 62 percent. This 

is significantly below expectation. What is driving those low rates 

and what is the Air Force doing to improve the rates? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, a couple of things. This is both process. 

It is material. It is training. So there are a number of paths related 

to, in particular, low observable maintenance. There is efforts 

under way in this response to Congresswoman Granger’s question 

earlier about developing materials that are more durable for the F– 

22, certainly for the F–35. That is one aspect. 

Mr. DICKS. We had the same issue with the B–2. 

General SCHWARTZ. Exactly, sir. You understand that. 

Mr. DICKS. And then we improved as we went along. 

General SCHWARTZ. Improve it as you go along, and clearly we 

need to continue to do that. Some of this is process, and it has to 

do with the facility, to have the right kind of facilities where—to 

use the slang—where you can bake the airplane and accelerate the 

repair process. So facilities, materiel, training for our youngsters so 

that they get proficient in identifying their skill so that they stay 

in the low observable maintenance discipline and not go out as one 

young man did that I know. He was an award winner at Elmendorf 

Air Force Base, sir, and ended up going to F–16 at Hill Air Force 

Base. Probably not the best use of this very fine Airman. 

So we have personnel processes that need to attend to as well. 

Mr. DICKS. Any other questions? 

The committee is adjourned until 1:30 tomorrow, Thursday, 

March 11th. At that time, we will reconvene for a hearing on Navy 

posture. 

Thank you very much. It was a good hearing, and we appreciate 

your availability. 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING
(i) 

W I T N E S S E S 

Page 

Donley, M.B. ............................................................................................................. 231 

Francis, Paul ............................................................................................................ 1 

Golden, Michael ....................................................................................................... 1 

Ham, General Carter ............................................................................................... 119 

Philman, Rear Admiral D.L. ................................................................................... 69 

Schwartz, General N.A. ........................................................................................... 231 

Scott, Major General D.J. ........................................................................................ 69 

Thomas, Brigadier General R.W. ........................................................................... 119 

Woods, Bill ............................................................................................................... 1 


Emcdonald on DSK2BSOYB1PROD with HEARING