III 

Calendar No. 136 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. CON. RES. 10 

Recognizing that Chinese telecommunications companies such as Huawei and 

ZTE pose serious threats to the national security of the United States 

and its allies. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 28, 2019 

Mr. GARDNER (for himself, Mr. COONS, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. CRUZ, and Mr. 

RUBIO) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred 

to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

JULY 9, 2019 

Reported by Mr. RISCH, with an amendment and an amendment to the 

preamble 

[Strike out all after the resolving clause and insert the part printed in italic] 

[Strike the preamble and insert the part printed in italic] 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

Recognizing that Chinese telecommunications companies such 

as Huawei and ZTE pose serious threats to the national 

security of the United States and its allies. 

Whereas fifth generation (5G) wireless technology promises 

greater speed and capacity and will provide the backbone 

for the next generation of digital technologies; 

Whereas fifth generation wireless technology will be a revolutionary advancement in telecommunications with the poVerDate Sep 11 2014 22:30 Jul 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6300 E:\BILLS\SC10.RS SC10

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tential to create millions of jobs and billions of dollars in 

economic opportunity; 

Whereas Chinese companies, including Huawei, have invested 

substantial resources in advancing fifth generation wireless technology and other telecommunications services 

around the globe, including subsidies provided directly by 

the Government of the People’s Republic of China; 

Whereas Chinese officials have increased leadership roles at 

the International Telecommunications Union, where 

international telecommunications standards are set, and 

companies such as Huawei have increased their influence 

at the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), 

whose work informs global technology standards; 

Whereas Huawei and ZTE have aggressively sought to enter 

into contracts throughout the developing world, including 

throughout Latin America and Africa in countries such 

as Venezuela and Kenya; 

Whereas, in 2012, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives released a bipartisan report naming Huawei and ZTE as national security threats; 

Whereas, in 2013, the United States restricted Federal procurement of certain products produced by Huawei and 

ZTE and has since expanded restrictions on Federal procurement of those products; 

Whereas, in 2016, the national legislature of the People’s Republic of China passed the Cyber Security Law of the 

People’s Republic of China, article 28 of which requires 

‘‘network operators’’, including companies like Huawei, 

to ‘‘provide technical support and assistance’’ to Chinese 

authorities involved in national security efforts; 


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Whereas, in 2017, the national legislature of the People’s Republic of China passed the National Intelligence Law of 

the People’s Republic of China, article 7 of which requires ‘‘all organizations and citizens’’—including companies like Huawei and ZTE—to ‘‘support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence efforts’’ undertaken by 

the People’s Republic of China; 

Whereas, in August 2018, the Government of Australia 

banned Huawei and ZTE from building the fifth generation wireless networks of Australia; 

Whereas, in August 2018, Congress restricted the heads of 

Federal agencies from procuring certain covered telecommunications equipment and services, which included 

Huawei and ZTE equipment; 

Whereas, in December 2018, the Government of Japan issued 

instructions effectively banning Huawei and ZTE from 

official contracts in the country; 

Whereas, on December 7, 2018, a Vice-President of the European Commission expressed concern that Huawei and 

other Chinese companies may be forced to cooperate with 

China’s intelligence services to install ‘‘mandatory 

backdoors’’ to allow access to encrypted data; 

Whereas, in January 2019, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a Worldwide Threat Assessment 

that describes concerns ‘‘about the potential for Chinese 

intelligence and security services to use Chinese information technology firms as routine and systemic espionage 

platforms against the United States and allies’’; 

Whereas, in February 2019, the Government of New Zealand 

expressed serious concern about Huawei building the fifth 

generation wireless networks of New Zealand; 


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Whereas the Department of Justice has charged Huawei with 

the theft of trade secrets, obstruction of justice, and 

other serious crimes; 

Whereas, against the strong advice of the United States and 

a number of the security partners of the United States, 

the governments of countries such as Germany have indicated that they may permit Huawei to build out the fifth 

generation wireless networks of those countries; 

Whereas installation of Huawei equipment in the communications infrastructure of countries that are allies of the 

United States would jeopardize the security of communication lines between the United States and those allies; 

Whereas secure communications systems are critical to ensure the safety and defense of the United States and allies of the United States; 

Whereas the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

and other vital international security arrangements depend on strong and secure communications, which could 

be put at risk through the use of Huawei and ZTE 

equipment; and 

Whereas there has been broad bipartisan consensus in Congress for years that Chinese companies like Huawei and 

ZTE present serious threats to national and global security: Now, therefore, be it 

Whereas fifth-generation (in this preamble referred to as ‘‘5G’’) 

wireless technology promises greater speed and capacity 

and will provide the backbone for the next generation of 

digital technologies; 

Whereas 5G wireless technology will be a revolutionary advancement in telecommunications with the potential to 


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create millions of jobs and billions of dollars in economic 

opportunity; 

Whereas Chinese companies, including Huawei, have invested 

substantial resources in advancing 5G wireless technology 

and other telecommunications services around the globe, 

including subsidies provided directly by the Government of 

the People’s Republic of China; 

Whereas Chinese officials have assumed a greater number of 

leadership roles at the International Telecommunications 

Union, where international telecommunications standards 

are set, and Chinese companies such as Huawei have increased their influence at the 3rd Generation Partnership 

Project (3GPP), whose work informs global telecommunications network technology standards; 

Whereas Huawei and ZTE have rapidly expanded their market share throughout the developing world, including in 

Latin America and Africa, in countries such as Venezuela 

and Kenya; 

Whereas, in 2018, Huawei increased its penetration to approximately 29 percent of the global telecommunications 

equipment market and 43 percent of the market in the 

Asia-Pacific, according to Dell’Oro Group; 

Whereas, in 2012, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives released a bipartisan report naming Huawei and ZTE as national security threats; 

Whereas, in 2013, the United States restricted Federal procurement of certain products produced by Huawei and ZTE 

and has since expanded these restrictions; 

Whereas, in 2016, the national legislature of the People’s Republic of China passed the Cyber Security Law of the PeoVerDate Sep 11 2014 22:30 Jul 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6300 E:\BILLS\SC10.RS SC10

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ple’s Republic of China, Article 28 of which requires ‘‘network operators’’, including companies like Huawei, to 

‘‘provide technical support and assistance’’ to Chinese authorities involved in national security efforts; 

Whereas, in 2017, the national legislature of the People’s Republic of China passed the National Intelligence Law of 

the People’s Republic of China, Article 7 of which requires 

‘‘all organizations and citizens’’, including companies like 

Huawei and ZTE, to ‘‘support, assist, and cooperate with 

national intelligence efforts’’ undertaken by the People’s 

Republic of China; 

Whereas, in August 2018, the Government of Australia banned 

Huawei and ZTE from building the 5G wireless networks 

of Australia; 

Whereas, in August 2018, Congress restricted the heads of Federal agencies from procuring certain telecommunications 

equipment and services, which included Huawei and ZTE 

equipment; 

Whereas, in December 2018, the Government of Japan issued 

a directive barring procurement by the government and the 

Japan Self-Defense Forces of telecommunications equipment that would undermine national security; 

Whereas, on December 7, 2018, a Vice President of the European Commission expressed concern that Huawei and 

other Chinese companies may be forced to cooperate with 

China’s intelligence services to install ‘‘mandatory 

backdoors’’; 

Whereas, in January 2019, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a Worldwide Threat Assessment 

that describes concerns ‘‘about the potential for Chinese intelligence and security services to use Chinese information 


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technology firms as routine and systemic espionage platforms against the United States and allies’’; 

Whereas, in February 2019, the Government of New Zealand 

expressed serious concern about Huawei building the 5G 

wireless networks of New Zealand; 

Whereas, on May 3, 2019, the Prague 5G Security Conference, 

which was widely attended by representatives from the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO), including the United States, produced the Prague 

Proposals, which state that ‘‘communication networks and 

services should be designed with resilience and security in 

mind’’; 

Whereas the Department of Justice has charged Huawei with 

the theft of trade secrets, obstruction of justice, and other 

serious crimes; 

Whereas, against the strong advice of the United States, the 

governments of some countries, including United States security partners such as Germany, have indicated they may 

permit the involvement of Huawei in building 5G wireless 

networks in those countries; 

Whereas installation of Huawei equipment in the communications infrastructure of United States allies would jeopardize the security of communication lines between the 

United States and those allies; 

Whereas secure communications systems are critical to ensure 

the safety and defense of the United States and allies of 

the United States; 

Whereas the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other 

vital international security arrangements, including the 

Five Eyes partnership, depend on strong and secure comVerDate Sep 11 2014 22:30 Jul 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6300 E:\BILLS\SC10.RS SC10

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munications, which could be at risk through the use of 

Huawei and ZTE equipment; and 

Whereas there has been broad bipartisan consensus in Congress 

for years that Chinese companies like Huawei and ZTE 

present serious threats to national and global security: 

Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives 

2 concurring), That— 

3 (1) Chinese telecommunications companies such 

4 as Huawei and ZTE pose serious threats to the na5 tional security of the United States and allies of the 

6 United States; 

7 (2) the United States should reiterate to coun8 tries that are choosing to incorporate Huawei or 

9 ZTE products in their new telecommunications in10 frastructure that the United States will consider all 

11 necessary measures to limit the risks incurred by en12 tities of the United States Government or Armed 

13 Forces from use of such compromised networks; 

14 (3) the United States should continue to make 

15 allies of the United States aware of the ongoing and 

16 future risks to telecommunications networks shared 

17 between the United States and such allies; and 

18 (4) the United States should work with the pri19 vate sector and allies and partners of the United 

20 States, including the European Union, in a regularVerDate Sep 11 2014 22:30 Jul 09, 2019 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6401 E:\BILLS\SC10.RS SC10

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1 ized bilateral or multilateral format, to identify se2 cure, cost-effective, and reliable alternatives to 

3 Huawei or ZTE products. 

4 That— 

5 (1) Chinese telecommunications companies such 

6 as Huawei and ZTE pose serious threats to the na7 tional security of the United States and allies of the 

8 United States; 

9 (2) the United States should reiterate to coun10 tries choosing to incorporate Huawei or ZTE prod11 ucts into their new telecommunications infrastructure 

12 that the United States will seek to limit the risks 

13 posed to the United States Government or Armed 

14 Forces from use of such compromised networks; 

15 (3) the United States should continue to make 

16 allies of the United States aware of the ongoing and 

17 future risks to telecommunications networks shared by 

18 the United States and such allies; 

19 (4) the United States should work with the pri20 vate sector and allies and partners, including the Eu21 ropean Union, in regularized bilateral or multilateral 

22 formats, to identify secure, cost-effective, and reliable 

23 alternatives to Huawei or ZTE products; and 

24 (5) the United States should accelerate its efforts 

25 to increase its leadership and participation in the 


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1 international fora responsible for global telecommuni2 cations standards, and work with allies and partners 

3 as well as the private sector to also increase their en4 gagement. 


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Calendar No. 136 

116TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. CON. RES. 10 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

Recognizing that Chinese telecommunications comStates and its allies. threats to the national security of the United panies such as Huawei and ZTE pose serious 

JULY 9, 2019 

Reported with an amendment and an amendment to the 

preamble 


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