FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V EN T H C IR C U IT FEB RUARY 20, 2008 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK

Honora ble K. Micha el Moore, United States District J udg e for the Southern District of * Florida , sitti ngby

desig nation. [ PUBLISH]

IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 06- 1491 8

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 04-00072 -CR- HL M-4 UNITED STAT ES OF AMERIC A, Pl ai nt iff -Ap pe ll ee, ve rs us CHRIS TOPHER MICHAEL DEAN, RICAR DO CURTIS LOPEZ, Defen da nt s- App el la nt s.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ Appeals fr om

the United State s District Court fo r the N orthe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ (F eb ru ar y 20 , 200 8) Before HU LL and PRY OR, Circuit Judges, and MOO RE , District Judge. *2

MOO RE , D istrict Judg e: The re ar e two m ai n i ss ue s i nv ol ve d i n t hi s ap pe al . Firs t, t hi s C ou rt r ev ie ws whether there w as sufficient evidence to convict codefendants Christop her Michael D ean and Ricar do Curtis Lopez (“ Appellants”) for conspiracy to interfere wit h i nt ers ta te co m

m erce by rob be ry

in vi ol at io n o f th e Hob bs Act, 1 8 U.S.C. § 1951 (a). Sec ond, this Court also exam ines whether 18 U .S .C. § 924(c)(1)(A )(iii), a se nt en ci ng en ha nc em en t fo r di sc ha rg e o f a fi rearm , in cl ud es an in te ntele m en t. L ope z al so r ai se s se parate iss ue s in vol vin g ac la im ed e rr one ous j ur

y ins tr uc tio n an d t he co ns ol id at io n o f hi s ju ve ni le off en se s. Ap p el l an t s cl ai m

i n s u ff i ci en tev i d en ce wa s p re s en t edas t o th e v i ct i m b an k ’s Fed eral Depo si t In su ran ce Co rp or at io n i ns ur edst atus . Howev er, 1 8 U.S.C. § 1951 (a ), unl ike 18 U . S. C. § 21 13, r equir es no s uc h pr oof . Co nse que ntl y , the governm ent needed to prove onl y that De an and Lopez c omm itted a robbery that ha d an e ff

ec t onint er state c om

m er ce . T he gov er

nm en t m et

thi s burd enthr ough the testim ony

of an A m South Bank branch m anager; consequently , w e deny De an an d Lo pe z's § 1 95 1( a) i ns uf fic ie ntev id en ce ar gu m en t. Furthe r, giv enthat § 924( c) is a se nte nc ing e nhanc em en t, not an e le m en t of anof fe nse , thi s C ourt ho lds that § 924( c) (1 )( A )( iii ) doe s no t c ont ai n ase parate intent requirem ent. T he m ere discharge of a f irear m during anycrim e of violence or dr ug tra ff ic kin g, e ve n a cc ide nta l, is subj ec t t o th e se nte nc ing e nhanc em en t3

requiring a m inim

um of ten additional y ears of im prisonm ent. T herefor e, App el la nt s’ di sc ha rg e o f fi rearm arg um en t i s l ik ewis e d en ie d. I.B ACKGROUND De an and Lopez w ere brothers-in-law who cohabitated at the Hidden G len co m ple x, w hic h is loc at ed

in or aro und Ro m e, G eo rg ia . A cc or din g to the testim ony of Jim m y Tanner, the f

orm er m anager of A m South Bank's Rom e, G eo rg iabr an ch , on N ove m be r 10, 200 4, am as ke d m an e nte re d th e bank aro und 10: 00 a . m . T he ind ivi dua l, late r ide nti fi ed a s C hr ist ophe r Mi ch ae l D ean, thr ough hi s o wn co nf

es si on , carri eda pi st ol an d yell edat e ve ry on e to ge t o n t he gro un d. D ean a ppr oa ch ed

the te lle r statio ns, ope ne d th e se curi ty ga te , and g ai ne d a cc es s to the te lle r ar ea . O nc e ins ide the te lle r ar ea , D ean r em ove d bi lls of c ur re nc y f ro m the dr ive -thr oughte lle r dr aw er w ithhis le ft

hand, w hil e hol din g th e pis tol w ithhis ri ght hand. N ex t, D ean a

ppr oa ch ed

the he ad te lle r statio n. T he he ad

te lle r w as on he r kne es be lowthe statio n. D ean r ea ch ed ove r the c ro uc he d te lle r an d w ithhis le ft hand s tart ed

takin g m one y

f ro m the te lle r dr aw er . A s he w as gr ab bin g th e m one y , D ean di sc harg ed

the gunin his r igh t hand, le av ing abul le t ho le in the partition between the two teller work stations. Upon d ischarge, De an cursed him self as if the shot wa s inadvertent. Im m ediately after the shot, De an grabbed as m uc h m on ey

as h e co ul d fr om

th e h eadtel le r dr awer an d ra n o utof t he ba nk .4

Mana ge r T anne r obse rv ed D ean e xit

the bank and e nte r a sil ve r Fo rd T auru s wit ho utli cen ce p la te s. In all , Dean st ol e $ 3,6 42 .00 . T hr oughf

urthe r tr ia l t es tim ony , it

w as e sta bli she d th at

A m So uthBank i s he ad quart er ed

out sid e of

G eo rg iain Bi rm ing ham , A la bam a. A ft er

the r obbe ry , the Ro m e, G eo rg iabr an chr em ai ne d c los ed f or the r em ai nde r of

the day . A lso dur ing the c our se of

T anne r' s tr ia l t es tim ony , the gov er nm en t m ove d f

or a dm iss ionof A m So uth ' s F D IC c er

tif ic at ion , w hic h r ev ea le d th at A m So uthope rate d in num erous states and was F DI C insured. D efense c ouns el obje cted and argued that the certific ate w as testim onial and no t self-authenticating. T he docum ent was ad m it te d o ve r ob

jecti on . Af ter their arrest, both Lopez and De an, at differe nt tim es, c laim ed responsib ility

for the r obbery . The governm ent m aintained that the evidence supp orte d f

ind ing that D ean and L ope z co nspi re d to r ob A m So uthba se d up on ( 1) their cohabitation ; (2) j oint d rug debt; (3) Lopez' s knowledge of the robbery 's fact ua l d et ai ls ; (4 ) an d Lo pe z's po ss es si on of t he fir earm us edin th e b an k ro bb ery. Ultim ately , the j ury

found bo th Dean and Lopez guilty of conspiring to interfere wit h i nt ers ta te co m

m erce by rob be ry , in vi ol at io n o f th e Hob bs Act, 1 8 U.S.C. § 1951 (a ) (c ount

one ); and a idi ng and a

be tti ng e ac h othe r in the dis ch ar ge of apis tol dur ing an arm ed

r obbe ry , in vio la tio n of

18 U . S. C. § 92 4( c) (1 )( A )( iii ) an d 18 U . S. C. § 2 (c ount

tw o) . T he dis tr ic t c ourt se nte nc ed D ean to 100 m onths a s to5

count on e and 120 m onth s as to count two, consecutive to countone, whereas L ope z w as se nte nc ed

to 78 m onths o n c ount

one and 1 20 m onths a s to c ount tw o, co ns ecu ti ve to co un t o ne .

II. ST A N D A RD S OF REV IE W T his Co urt r ev ie w s th e fi rs t i ssu e, suf fi ci en cy of the e vid en ce f

or Appellants' H obbs Ac t violatio ns, under a de novo standard of review. See United St at es v. Y at es , 438 F . 3d 1 307, 131 1 ( 11th C ir . 200 6) . T he Co urt a lso e m plo y s a de novo standard of reviewin analy zing the dist rict court's le gal conclusio n that 18 U.S.C. § 9 24 (c)( 1) (A)(i ii ) di d n otco nt ai n asep arat e m en s re a req ui rem en t. Kin g v . Mo or e, 31 2 F .3d13 65 , 13 66 (11 th Cir . 20 02 ). II I.DI SCUSSI ON Appellants each contend that the gov ernm ent failed to prove that A m So uth ’ s de posi ts w er e ins ur ed by the F D IC , w hic h th ey

m ai nta in r equir es thi s Co urt t o va cate the ir

c onvi ct ion s. I n su

ppor t of the ir arg um en t, Appe llants c la im that e xhi bit

6, w hic h is the F D IC c er tif ic at ionand a ff

idavit of the A ssi stant Se cr et ar y of the F D IC , w as te sti m oni al e vid en ce a dm itt ed in vio la tio n of

the Co nf ro nt at io n C laus e as set for th in Crawfo rdv. Wash in gt on , 54 1 U.S. 3 6 (2 00 4) . To obtain a conviction for conspiring to in terfe re w ith interstate com m erce thr oughr obbe ry , in vio latio n of the H obbs A ct , 18 U . S. C. § 19 51( a) , the6

gove rn m en t ne ed

onl y pr ove ar obbe ry

and e ff ec t onc om

m er ce . U nit ed

S ta te s v. Rodriguez, 218 F. 3d 12 43, 1244 (11t h Cir. 2000 ) (holding “ [t] wo elem ents are es se nt ia l fo r a Ho bb s ActPro se cu ti on : ro bb ery an d a n e ffec t o n c omm erce ”). At tr ia l, D ean a dm itt ed

to co m m itt ing the r obbe ry ; thus, the onl y r em ai nin g is sue is whe th er t he go ve rn m en t s uf fic ie nt ly pro ve d t ha t t he rob be ry affe ct edco m

m erce . Appellants argue that the governm ent did no t m eet its burden in prov ing an effec t on comm erce because the FD IC c ertificate and supp orting affidavit wer e im pr op erl y ad m it te d. Be fo re tur

nin g to the iss ue of

it s a dm iss ibi lity , w e ad dr es s whe the r the FD IC c ertificate w as even necessar y to prove a Hobbs Act violation. A s discuss ed supr a, aH obbs A ct

vio la tio n r equir es pr oof

of ar obbe ry

and an e ff

ec t on co m m er ce . I d. T o pr ove an e ff ec t onc om

m er ce , how ev er , the gov er nm en t i s on ly required to establish “ a m inim al eff ect on interstate com

m erce .” Id. T his Court ha s he ld tha t a

“ m er e de ple tio n of

a sse ts” is suf

fi ci en t pr oof

of an e ff ec t on in te rs ta te co m

m erce . Id. Am South Branch Manager T anner testified that A m South’s hea dquarters w er e loc at ed

out sid e the state of

G eo rg iain Bi rm ing ham , A la bam a. T anne r al so s t a t e dth e R o me , G e o r g i ab r an c h r e ma i n e dc l o s e df o l l o w i n g D e an ’s 1 0 : 0 0 a . m. robbery of $3,642.00. T he robbery force d the Rom e branch to close and prevented an y ad di ti on al pa tro ns fro m

tra ns act in g b us in es s fo r th e rem ai nd er o f th e d ay .7

T his c as e is s im ilar to Unit ed S ta te s v. G ue rr a, w he re an in div idu al sto le $30 0 do ll ars fro m

a se rv ic e st at io n, wh ic h was subs eque nt ly force d t o c lo se fortwo hour s. T he re , thi s C ourt f ound an e ff ec t onint er state c om

m er ce and l ab el ed

the case a “ classic ‘ depletion of assets’ scenario. ” 164 F.3d 1358, 1361 (11th Cir. 1999 ). I n R odr igu ez , thi s C ourt f ound an e ff ec t onc om

m er ce w he re the pe rp etrator

ha d r obbe d am ote l be ca use som e of

the m ote l gu es ts w er e fr om out of state. 218 F. 3d at 1244. Given our H obbs Ac t sufficiency of evidence j ur isp ru de nc e, the gov er

nm en t’ s e vid en ce , w hic h in cl ude d th e ste al ing of $3, 642. 00 f

ro m abank w ithint er state br an ch es and tha t i s op ento out of state cu sto m er s, w as suf

fi ci en t t o e sta

bli sh an e ff

ec t onc om

m er ce . F urthe r, the ste al ing of th e m on ey

de pl et edAm So ut h’s ca sh res erv e an d t he reb y affe ct edco m

m erce . T his e vid en ce w as suf

fi ci en t t o su sta in Appe llants ' c onvi ct ion s f or vio la tio n of

18 U. S. C. § 195 1(a). Appellants argue that the FD IC c ertificate and accom pany ing affidavit wer e im pr ope rl y a dm itt ed in vio la tio n of

the Co nf ro ntatio n C lause . P ro of

of aH obbs Ac t violatio n does no t require proof of F DI C insurance. FD IC insured status is an el em en t o f arm edba nkrob be ry un de r 18 U.S.C. § 2 11 3, b utno t o f 18 U.S.C. § 19 51 (a). See Po ol e v . Uni te d S ta te s, 8 32 F.2d56 1, 5 64 -6 5 (1 1t h C ir. 1 98 7) . Appe llants c la im

that Unit ed

S tate s v. S an dle s r equir es r ev er sa l ba se d up on the gove rn m en t’ s a lle ge d e rr one ous use of the F D IC c er

tif ic at e an d a cc om

pany ing8

af fi davit . 469 F . 3d 5 08 ( 6thCi r. 200 6) . T he sit ua tio n inS an dle s is ina

ppos ite because there the defendant was c harged with ar m ed bank robbery , which, as state d a bove , r equir es pr oof

of F D IC ins ur an ce . T he re fo re , it is not ne ce ssary

f or thi s C ourt t o a ddr es s Appe llants ' Co nf ro ntatio n C lause c la im

sur ro undi ng adm iss ionof

the F D IC c er

tif ic at e an d a ff

idavit . E ve n if

the F D IC c er

tif ic at e an d affidavit w ere adm itted in error, the err or wa s harm less, as no proof of FD IC insured status wa s needed and the gov ernm ent providedseparate evidence es ta bli shi ng the H obbs A ct

vio la tio n. S ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. N diay e, 434 F . 3d 1 270, 1286 ( 11th C ir . 200 6) ( statin g “ de nia l of ade fe ndant’ s C onf

ro ntatio n C lause r igh t to cro ss -ex am in at io n i s ex am in edforha rm le ss erro r”). Furthe rm or e, Appe llant L ope z ar gue s th at pr oof of F D IC ins ur ed

status w as ne ce ssary f or the gov er

nm en t t o m ee t i ts b ur de n w ithr es pe ct to the H obbs A ct ' s ef fe ct on c om m er ce pr ong. Abank' s F D IC status c oul d be r el ev an t t o th e ef fe ct on co m m erce in qu iry, see Un it edSta te s v . Spi ne ll o, 2 65 F.3d15 0, 1 56 -5 7 (3 d C ir. 2001 ) (bank robbery

case) , but it is not required here. A s discuss ed above, a m ere depletion of assets is sufficient to prove an effe ct on com m erce . He re, the de ple tio n w as pr ove n; c onse que ntl y , pr oof of F D IC ins ur ed

status w as not ne ces sa ry be cau se th e tr ia l t es ti m on y est ab li sh edde pl et io n o f as se ts , ban k c lo su re, an d o utof s ta te bra nc he s, wh ic h p ro ve d t he requi si te effe cton co m m erce . Appe llants ne xt c la im

that 18 U . S. C. § 92 4( c) (1 )( A )( iii ) re qui re s th at the9

sentencing enh ancem ent for discharge of a firearm applies onlyto intenti onal fi re ar m dis ch ar ge s. T es tim ony

a t tri al sup ports D ea

n’ s a sse rt ionthat the dis ch ar ge of the f ir earm ins ide the bank w as asur pr ise e ve n to D ean and, thu s, w as li ke ly ac ci de nta l. O ur

Co urt ha s no t square ly

a ddr es se d inany

pub lis he d op ini on w he the r a fi re ar

m dis ch ar ge m

ust be int en de d be fo re the se nte nc ing e nhanc em en t is applicable. W e now hold that not hing in the language of the statute requires se pa rat e p ro of

of i nt en t b efo re ap pl y in g t he sen te nc in g e nh an cem en t. Se ct ion924 (c )( 1) (A )( iii ) is a se nte nc e enhanc em en t and m er el y r ef le ct s factors that w ill enhance sentencing, not elem ents of an offense. H arris v. United St at es , 536 U . S. 545 , 556 ( 2002 ). S ec tio n 92 4( c) (1 )( A )( iii ) state s inpe rt ine nt p ar t,

“ any pe rs on who . . . use s or

c ar ri es af ir earm . . . sha ll, in ad dit ionto the puni shm en t pr ovi de d f

or suc h c ri m e of

vio le nc e or

dr ug tra ff ic kin g c ri m e[ , ] – ( iii ) if the f ir earm is dis ch ar ge d, be se nte nc ed to a te rm of im pr iso nm en t of

not le ss than 10 y ears . ” T he pla in l an gua ge of § 92 4( c) (1 )( A )( iii ) re qui re s on ly ape rs on t o

“ use [] or c ar r[ y ] af ir earm ” to b e subj ec t t o th e se nte nc e enhanc em en t; the re is no re fe re nc e to any

m en s r ea r equir em en t. L ooki ng t o our ca se law , w e an al y ze d a sim ilar m en s r ea

se nte nc ing e nhanc em en t c la im in U nit ed

S ta te s v. Br an tle y , 68 F.3 d 1 28 3, 1 29 0 (1 1t h C ir. 1 99 5) . Br an tle y inv olv ed pos se ssi on o f a se m i- au tom at ic f ir earm that, unbe knownst

to its c ar ri er , ha d be enil le ga lly

a lte re d in to a

f ull y auto m at ic10

w ea pon. I d. a t 12 89. T his Co urt he ld tha t the c ar ri er ha d to have kno w n of

the fi re ar m ’ s a lte re d st at

us t o be f ound gui lty of c ar ry ing an il le ga l f

ir earm und er 26 U.S .C . § 5 8 6 1 (d ). Id . a t1 2 9 0 . We, h o we v er , f o u n dth atth e d ef

en d an t ’s convictio n und er § 924(c) did not require any separate intent. Id. T his Court differe ntiated the intentrequirem ents of § 5861 and § 924 (c) because it w as concerned that rem ovin g the m ens rea r equirem ent from § 5861 could pu nish an inn oc en t i ndi vid

ua l who d id n ot r ea liz e the f ir earm w as pr ohi bit ed . W e did

not have the sam e fe ar

of pun ish ing an un know ing ind ivi dua l un de r § 92 4( c) be ca use im posi tio n of

that se nte nc e enhanc em en t f ir st d em an ds the gov er

nm en t pr ove the de fe ndant e nga ge d inan un de rl y ing vio le nt o r dr ug tra ff ic kin g c ri m e, w hic h w ill have it s own m en s r ea

r equir em en t. I d. a t 12 89- 90 ( statin g “unl ike the lawabid ing ind ivi dua l who unkno w ing ly c om es int o po sse ssi on o f anil le ga l f ir earm , the §924 (c ) de fe ndant whose se nte nc e is e nhanc ed ba se d up on the ty

pe of w ea pon he carr ie d h as de m on st rat eda ‘vic io us wil l’ by co m m it ti ng th e p rin ci pa l o ffen se ”). Ina ddi tio n to our

Br an tle y de ci sio n, thi s C ourt i s a lso pe rs ua de d by the T en th C ir cu it’ s r ea soni ng i n U nit ed S ta te s v. N av a- So te lo, 354 F . 3d 1 202 (1 0th Ci r. 200 3) . I n th at

c as e, the br oth er

of an in m at e atte m

pte d to r es cu e the inm at e on his way back from

rec eiving d ental treatm ent outsi de of the prison. Id. at 1203. In a str uggl e be tw ee n th e de fe ndant and o ne of the pr iso n tr an spor

tin g of fi ce rs , the pr iso n of fi ce r gr ab be d th e de fe ndant’ s gun and a s th e tw o w er e fi ght ing ove r it, the11

de fe ndant a cc ide nta lly

dis ch ar ge d th e w ea

pon int o th e gr ound . I d. T he T en th Circuit suppo rted its finding that § 924 (c)( 1)(A )(iii) did not have an additio nal m en s r ea r equir em en t by

f ind ing the pla in l an gua ge of the statut e did

not inc lud e any r equir em en t of

int en t. I d. a t 12 07. F urthe r, the T en th C ir cu it state d § 924( c) (1 )( A )( iii ) lis ts s en te nc ing e nhanc em en ts, not e le m en ts o f anof

fe nse , and w he n th e unde rl y ing of

fe nse r equir es avic iou s w ill the dange r of im posi ng puni shm ent upon an innocent party is absent. Id. G iven this rea sonin g, the N avaSo te lo C ourt su cc inc tly

c onc lud ed

“ [a ] cc ount ab ili ty

is str ic t; the m er e fa ct

that the weap on di sc ha rg edis co nt ro ll in g.” Id. at12 06 . Appellants urge this Court to ado pt the D. C. Circuit’ s reasoning in United St at es v. Br ow n, 449 F . 3d 1 54 ( D . C. Ci r. 200 6) , w hic h f ound § 92 4( c) (1 )( A )( iii ) did require intent to d ischarge in order for a defe ndant to rec eive the ten y ear sentencing enh ancem ent. T he D. C. Circuit found that the three subsection s of § 924( c) w orke d inc onc er

t t o im pose inc re as ing ly

he av ie r pe na lti es a s th e de fe ndant' s c ondu ct

be cam e m or e eg re gio us. I d. a t 15 6. T he D . C. Ci rc uit , the re fo re , r ea sone d th at

§ 92 4( c) (1 )( A )( iii ) [d isc harg e] m ust c ont ai n an in te nt re qui re m en t be ca

use it c ont ai ns a

hars he r pe na lty

than § 9 24( c) (1 )( A )( ii) [ b r an d i s h i n g ]. I d . T h i s r e a s o n i n g i s n o tp e r s u a s i v e b e c au s e d i s c h ar g i n g af i r e arm, re gard le ss o f int en t, pr es en ts a gr eate r ri sk o f harm

than si m ply br an dis hin g a we apon withoutdischarging it . The penalty is an enhancem ent for conduct that12

oc curr ed , not

int en t. T he D . C. Ci rc uit a lso f ound am en s r ea

r equir em en t be ca

use of the ge ne ra l pr es um

pti on a ga ins t stri ct

li ab ili ty in cr im ina l st at

ute s. T his r ea son is e qua lly unp er sua siv e as the re is a dis tin ct ionbe tw ee n e le m en ts o f anof fe nse and sentencing enhancem ents for conduct during perpetration of a violent crim inal act . H er e, de spi te the e vid en ce that D ean a cc ide nta lly dis ch ar ge d hi s pi sto l duri ng the A m So uthr obbe ry , the dis tr ic t c ourt c or re ct ly f ound that he r em ai ne d su

bj ec t t o the § 92 4( c) (1 )( A )( iii ) se nte nc ing e nhanc em en t. C onsi ste nt w ithour r ea soni ng i n Br an tle y , Appe lla

nts ha d th e vic iou s w ill to co nspi re to co m m it the und er ly ing cr im e of r obbe ry in vio latio n of

the H obbs A ct , w hic h e nsur es that the y are not inn oc en t i ndi vid

ua ls unf ai rl y he ld t o astr ic t l ia

bil ity of fe nse . F ina lly , a dopt ing the Ten th Cir cu it ’s reas on in g, Dea n’s m ere d is ch arg e o f th e p is to l i s co nt ro ll in g. T he re fo re , the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t e rr in hol din g th at

§ 9 24( c) (1 )( A )( iii ) la ck s a se pa rat e m en s re a req ui rem en t. O n a ppe al , L ope z le vie d tw o a ddi tio na l arg um ents n ot r ai se d by his codefendant. F irst, L opez claim s that the dist rict court’ s jur y instruction cre ated an uncons titutio nal m andatory presum ption . Second, he argues that the district co urt e rr one ousl y

f ound that hi s pr ior

j uve nil e ar

m ed r obbe ry c onvi ct ion s w er e not fu nc ti on al ly con so li da te d. L ope z ra ise s hi s ob

j ec tio n to the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s j ur y ins tr uc tio n f or the f ir st13

ti m e o n app eal ; co ns eque nt ly, th is Co ur t re vi ews th e in st ru ct io n fo r pl ai n e rro r. U nit ed S ta te s v. V as que z, 53 F . 3d 1 216, 122 1 ( 11th C ir . 199 5) . F urthe r, w e m ust re vie wthe c ha lle nge d j ur y ins tr uc tio n init s e nti re ty . U nit ed S ta te s v. My er s, 972 F.2 d 1 56 6, 1 57 3 (1 1t h C ir. 1 99 2) . Lopez f inds error w ith the dis trict court’ s following ins truction: “ You m ay fi nd the r equis ite e ff

ec t up on i nte rs ta te c om

m er ce ha s be enpr ove n if y ou f ind bey ond a reasonable doub t that the bank described in th e indictm ent was e ngaged in d oin g bu sin es s bo th w ith in and w ith out the state of

G eo rg ia . ” L ope z co nte nds that this jury

instruction lower s the standard of proof by cre ating the m andatory pr es um pti on tha t the r obbe ry

of the Ro m e, G eo rg iabr an cha ff ec te d in te rs ta te co m m erce . A j ury instruction which cr eates a burden shi fting presum ption or a co nc lus ive pr es um

pti on d ep ri ve s ade fe ndant o f his r igh t t o th e due pr oc es s of the law . S ee S an dstro m

v. Mo ntana , 442 U . S. 510 , 524 ( 1979 ). A n in str uc tio n m ust not relieve the governm ent of its burden of provi ng each and every elem ent of an of fe nse . I d. “ T he thr es hol d in qui ry in ev al ua tin g whe the r a j ur y ins tr uc tio n im pe rm iss ibl y

shi ft s th e bur de n of

pr oof is whe the r the ins tr

uc tio n is ape rm iss ive inf er en ce or am an da tor

y pr es um pti on. ” Baxte r v. T hom as , 45 F . 3d 1 501, 150 9 (11th Cir. 1995). Further, “ [a] perm issiv e presum ption m erely

allows an infer ence to be drawn and is cons titutio nal so lon g as the inference would not be irrational.”14

Id. This Court, in My ers, held a perm issiv e infere nce perm its the jury to m ake an inf er en ce f ro m the e vid en ce pr ove n by

the pr ose cu tio n, but

doe s no t m an da te any suc h f ind ing . U nit ed

S tate s v. My er s, 972 F . 2d 1 566, 157 3 ( 11th C ir . 199 2) (s ta tin g “ [t ] he dis tr ic t c ourt e xpl ic itl y inf orm ed the j ur y that i t ‘ m ay ’ inf

er that a pe rs on ord in ari ly int en ds all th e n atur al an d p ro babl e co ns eque nc es of a n a ct. . . . T his c ir cu it ha s a

ppr ove d si m ilar j ur

y ins tr uc tio ns tha t a llo wthe j ur y to inf er int en t fro m th e n atur al an d p ro babl e co ns eque nc es of a ny act.”) . Inthe ins tant c as e, the dis tr ic t c ourt si m ilarl y ins tr uc te d th e j ur

y that i t

“ m ay ” find an eff

ect upon int erstate c omm erce . Id. The c ourt did n ot create a m an da tor y pr es um pti on thr oughthe use of

unqua lif ie d langua ge suc h a s m

ust or sha ll. T he c ourt a lso did

not r el ie ve the pr ose cu tio n of it s burd enbe ca

use it sti ll re qui re d th e j ur

y to “ fi nd b ey ond a re as ona ble doubt tha t the bank d es cr ibe d inthe ind ic tm en t w as e nga ge d indoi ng b usi ne ss b othw ith in and w ith out the state of Ge orgia.” The governm ent put in to evidence the testim ony of Branch Manager Tanner that reveale d Am South’s out of state headquarter s and its half-day closure, w hic h pr ovi de d th e j ur

y w iththe opp ortun ity

to re as ona

bly inf er an e ff ec t up on int er state c om

m er ce . F urthe r, the ins tr

uc tio n r es em

ble s th e one w e pr ev iou sly uphe ld i n M y er s. A cc or din gly , thi s C ourt f ind s th at the c ha lle nge d in str

uc tio n cr eate d ape rm iss ive inf

er en ce , did

not r el ie ve the pr ose cu tio n of pr ovi ng e ac h and ev ery el em en t b ey on d areas on ab le do ub t, an d, t hu s, d idno t co ns ti tu te pl ai n e rro r.Two of the r obberie s were char g ed in a sing le petition, which made the two char g es 1 p r o p e r f o r c o n s o l i d at i o na s o n e ar

m e d r o b b e r y. 15 D ef en dant L ope z ple d gu ilty to fo ur c ount s of arm ed r obbe ry in the G eo rg ia j uve nil e co urt sy ste m . L ope z co m m itt ed f ive arm ed r obbe ri es ove r a span of

f our day s in late July , 1997. A fter the f inal robbery , L opez wa s arre sted and charged se parate ly

f or the f our c ri m es . E ac h c harg e of arm ed r obbe ry w as a ssi gne d a 1 se parate c as e num

be r, but one law y er

r ep re se nte d L ope z in e ac h c as e an d asin gle ple a ag re em en t w as r ea ch ed c ove ri ng a ll fo ur

of fe nse s. I n a ddi tio n, the j uve nil e court im posed a sing le sentence for all four robberies at one procee ding . Lopez, based upo n these facts, argues his und erly ing arm ed robbery adj udication s wer e functionallyconsolid ated and the district court shou ld have treated them as related cas es un de r U.S.S.G. § 4 A1.2 , App li cat io n No te 3(C ). In calc ulating Lopez’ s crim inal histo ry score, the probation officer assessed tw o c ri m ina l hi sto ry

poi nts f or e ac h of the f our j uve nil e ar

m ed r obbe ri es . T he se eight po ints, along with a single po int for an adult battery conviction , gave L opez a total crim inal histo ry

score of nine, which establishes a crim inal histo ry category o f I V. B as edup o nh i s cr i m i n al h i s t o ry ca t eg o ry an dt o t al o ff en s e l ev el , Lo p ez ’s guid eline range, as to count on e, wa s 77-96 m onth s. O n count o ne, the district court sentenced Lopez to 78 m onth s im prisonm ent. A t sentencing, the district co urt j udge a lso state d th at he sti ll w oul d have im

pose d ate rm

of 78 m onths16

im prisonm ent as a re asonable sentence, r egardless of any guidelin es m isc al cu la tio n, be ca

use of the f ac ts o f the c as e an d de fe ndant’ s m isl ea din g and shi ft ing te sti m ony

of fe re d inan e ff

ort t o hi de the tr

uth . L ope z co nte nds that he shou ld have received only two points for the four arm ed robberies because he w as sentenced onlyonce. This one robbery charge, in additio n to the adultbattery charge, would have given him a cr im inal histo ry

score of 3, a cr im inal histo ry cat eg ory of I I, an d agu id el in e ran ge of 5 7- 71 m on th s. T his Co urt ne ed

not a ddr es s L ope z’ s sp ec if

ic arg um en ts s ur

ro undi ng the alleged failure to consolidate his juvenile offenses because, as w e held in United States v. Ke ene, wher e the district court im poses a reasonable sentence and states that i t w oul d im

pose the sam e se nte nc e ir re spe ct ive of

any se nte nc ing c al cu la tio n er ro rs , thi s C ourt w ill uph old the se nte nc e rathe r than “ se nd the c as e ba ck to the d i s tr i c tc o u rts i n c e i th a s a l r e a dy t o l du s th a ti tw o u l di mp o s e e x a c t l y t h e s a me se nte nc e, ase nte nc e w e w oul d be c om pe lle d to a ff

irm . ” 470 F . 3d 1 347, 135 0 (1 1t h C ir. 2 00 6) . H er e, li ke K ee ne , the dis tr ic t c ourt st at ed it w oul d have im

pose d 78 m onths as a re asonable sentence based on th e 18 U. S. C. § 355 3(a) im posit ion of a sentence fac tors. A ccording to ou r decision in Keene, the relevant analy sis is as follows: “ the questio n then is whether the [78-m onth ] sentence the court im posed is r ea sona ble , a ssum ing e xa ct ly

the sam e co nduc t and o the r fa ct or s inthe c as e, butThis analy sis assumes that the district court should have awa rded L opez a cr iminal 2 his tor y sc or e of 3, wh ic h w ou ld h ave g e ne rate d a c ri min a l hi sto ry

c ate g or y of I I , le avin ghim

wi th a guideline ra

ng e of 57- 71 months imprisonment. 17 using an advisory

range of [ 57-71] m onth s.” 470 F.3d at 1350. In this case, 2 L ope z’ s 78 -m onth se nte nc e w as r ea sona ble und er the § 35 53( a) f

ac tor s be ca

use his c ri m ina l r ec or d and c ur re nt o ff en se sho wadis re gard

f or the law , obs tr

uc tio n of jus ti ce an d fa ls it y , dan ge r to th e p ub li c, an d ane edto de te r fu tu re t ran sg res si on s. Ther efore, the district court’ s im posit ion of Lopez’ s 78-m onth sentence w as reas on ab le an d s ta nd s d es pi te th e d is pu te d g ui de li ne s i ss ue . IV.CONCLUS IO N T he dis tr ic t c ourt j udgm en t i s AF FIRMED .