Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

DONALD J. BERGER GREGORY F. ZOELLER

South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

MICHAEL GENE WORDEN

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

CARLOS A. SMITH, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 71A03-1211-CR-466

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE SAINT JOSEPH SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Jane Woodward Miller, Judge

Cause No. 71D01-1112-FD-1161

July 3, 2013

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

FRIEDLANDER, Judge
Carlos A. Smith appeals his conviction of Possession of Marijuana With a Prior 

Conviction of Possession of Marijuana,1 a class D felony. Smith challenges the sufficiency 

of the evidence as the sole issue on appeal.

We affirm.

The facts favorable to the conviction are that United States Marshal Aaron Castle was 

actively seeking Hakeen Hogan, who was wanted on an arrest warrant. At approximately 8 

p.m. on December 8, 2011, Marshal Castle learned of a local police dispatch targeting 

Hogan. Marshal Castle contacted other law enforcement officers who responded to the 

dispatch and then met with them several blocks from Hogan’s suspected location. They 

formulated a plan to apprehend Hogan, and then traveled to the house where Hogan was 

reported to be located. Marshal Castle was at the front door with police officers Christopher 

Houser and Rufino Guyton, while other officers and a K-9 unit went to the rear of the house. 

The officers knocked on the front door and Jehad Davis, a resident of the house, opened the 

door far enough for the officers to see two other people – Smith and Hogan – standing behind 

Davis in the living room. Marshal Castle said “that’s who we’re looking for.” Transcript at 

46. Officer Houser said “police” and Smith and Hogan “got the deer in the headlights look 

and bolted toward the back of the house.” Id. After securing the living room,2 Officers 

Houser and Guyton pursued the two fleeing men into the adjacent dining room. With his gun 

drawn, Officer Guyton ordered Smith to put his hands in the air. As Smith began to raise his 

1

 Ind. Code Ann. § 35-48-4-11 (West, Westlaw current through June 29, 2013, excluding P.L. 205-2013).

2

 Officer Guyton estimated there were eight to ten other people in the living room when they entered the 

house.

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hands, Officer Guyton observed a baggie fall out of his hand and hit the bar’s counter top; 

Smith then raised his hands. Officer Guyton saw several smaller baggies spill out of the 

baggie Smith had dropped. Subsequent tests confirmed Officer Guyton’s opinion at the 

scene that the baggies contained marijuana. 

Smith was subsequently charged with possession of marijuana as a class A 

misdemeanor and possession of marijuana with a prior conviction of possession of marijuana 

as a class D felony. Following a bench trial, Smith was found guilty as charged. The trial 

court determined that the misdemeanor charge was an included offense of the felony charge 

and entered conviction only on the latter.

Smith contends the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction. Our 

standard of reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal 

conviction is well settled.

When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a 

criminal conviction, we neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility 

of witnesses. The evidence—even if conflicting—and all reasonable inferences 

drawn from it are viewed in a light most favorable to the conviction. “[W]e 

affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each 

element of the crime from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found 

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Davis v. State, 813 N.E.2d 

1176, 1178 (Ind. 2004). A conviction can be sustained on only the 

uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, even when that witness is the 

victim.

Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012) (some citations omitted).

Smith’s challenge to the evidence centers squarely upon the credibility of Officer 

Guyton’s testimony that he saw Smith drop the baggie that contained marijuana. Smith 

claims this was the “sole base’s [sic] for the State’s charge of the possession of marijuana.” 

3
Appellant’s Brief at 8. Smith contends this testimony was discredited by the testimonies of 

Officer Houser and Marshal Castle, who “specifically den[ied] that Smith possessed or held 

any marijuana when they cornered Smith in the area of the bar.” Id. According to Smith, this 

aspect of Officer Houser’s and Marshal Castle’s testimonies “at least seriously compromises 

the creditability [sic] of Guyton’s testimony ... and at least sheds doubt on that proof.” Id. 

Smith mischaracterizes the nature and import of Officer Houser’s and Marshal 

Castle’s testimonies. Officer Houser testified that he did not have Smith under constant 

observation during this entire incident, including the first few seconds that Smith ran into the 

dining room. He also stated, upon pointed questioning by defense counsel, “I don’t recall if 

he was holding anything out, but I know he didn’t have a weapon.” Transcript at 58. 

Marshal Castle testified that his attention was fixed upon Hogan as he chased Hogan into the 

dining room. When asked about Smith, Marshal Castle replied, “Yes. I did see him running. 

Yes. But I didn’t see his hands.” Id. at 27. As the foregoing illustrates, Officer Houser and 

Marshal Castle testified that they did not see Smith drop a baggie; they did not testify that 

they observed that Smith did not drop a baggie. There is a significant difference between 

these two statements. The former statement – which is a fair characterization of their 

testimonies – means merely that Officer Houser and Marshal Castle could not corroborate

Officer Guyton’s testimony that Smith dropped a baggie. The latter statement – which would 

support Smith’s argument, but finds no support in the record – would mean that their 

testimonies contradicted Officer Guyton’s testimony. 

The trial court was charged with the task of determining whether Officer Guyton’s 

4
testimony was credible. See Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133. Smith offers no valid reason 

for us to question the trial court’s determination in that respect.

Judgment affirmed.

ROBB, C.J., and CRONE, J., concur.

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