United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 13, 2017

Decided February 15, 2017

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 16‐2468

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

QUBID M. COLEMAN,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 12‐cr‐40031‐006

Sara Darrow,

Judge.

O R D E R

Qubid Coleman pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C.

§§ 846, 841(a)(1), and was sentenced in 2014 to 324 months’ imprisonment and 10 years

of supervised release. Coleman appealed, and we affirmed his conviction but remanded

for resentencing after the government conceded error concerning his conditions of

supervised release. See United States v. Coleman, 806 F.3d 941 (7th Cir. 2015). On remand

the district court resentenced Coleman to the same periods of imprisonment and

supervised release.   

Coleman again filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed counsel asserts that the

appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

We invited Coleman to reply to counsel’s motion, but he has not responded. See 7TH CIR.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 16‐2468    Page 2

R. 51(b). Counsel’s supporting brief explains the nature of the case and addresses issues

that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve, and because the analysis

appears to be thorough, we limit our review to the subjects that counsel discusses.

See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d

551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).

Counsel first discusses whether the appeal waiver that Coleman accepted as part

of his plea agreement makes this appeal frivolous. Counsel concludes that it does, but

we are less certain. In Coleman’s previous appeal, the government waived reliance on

his appeal waiver, and because we have not asked the government for its views about

counsel’s Anders motion, we hesitate to presume that this time the government would

seek to enforce the waiver to prevent consideration of appellate claims arising from the

resentencing.   

We need not resolve the waiver issue since we agree with counsel that the only

possible appellate claims are frivolous. Because of the amount of crack (at least

280 grams) and his prior drug convictions, Coleman faced statutory minimums of life

imprisonment and 10 years of supervised release. The district court was authorized to

impose terms below those minimums only because the government had filed a motion

under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 to reward Coleman’s substantial

assistance in the prosecution of another suspect. And in exercising authority under

§ 3553(e), a district court cannot deviate from a statutory minimum except for reasons

related to the defendant’s cooperation. United States v. Spann, 682 F.3d 565, 566 (7th Cir.

2012); United States v. Johnson, 580 F.3d 666, 672–73 (7th Cir. 2009). Thus we would not

have appellate jurisdiction to review a contention that the sentencing court should have

been more generous in rewarding Coleman’s substantial assistance. Spann, 682 F.3d at

566. Moreover, as relates to the conditions of supervised release that prompted

Coleman’s resentencing, Coleman, 806 F.3d at 946, the district judge adequately justified

the revised conditions under the pertinent sentencing factors. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d),

3553(a). The revised conditions had been disclosed to Coleman in advance of sentencing,

and as counsel recognizes, Coleman waived any appellate challenge by not objecting to

them. See United States v. Gabriel, 831 F.3d 811, 814 (7th Cir. 2016). And none of the

conditions imposed at resentencing are phrased in language we have criticized.

See, e.g., United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 848–51 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v.

Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 376–80 (7th Cir. 2015).

The motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED.