NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________ No. 17-1396

________________ ALFRED N. AREZZO, Appellant

v. CITY OF HOBOKEN; NEW JERSEY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION; DAWN ZIMMER; ARCH LISTON; ROBERT M. CZECH

________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil No. 2-16-cv-04318) District Judge: Honorable Jose L. Linares

________________ Submitted Pursuant to Thir d Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) September 20, 2017 Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges (Filed: January 17, 2018)

________________ OPINION *

________________

* This disposition is not an op inion of the full Court and pu rsuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2 SCIRICA , Circuit Judge Alfred N. Arezzo appeals from the dismi ssal of his suit alleging the City of Hoboken, the New Jersey Civil Service Co mmission, and their officials removed him from office without due proce ss. The trial court held Arezzo’s suit was barred by, inter alia , state sovereign immunity and the stat ute of limitations. We will affirm.
I. A. 1 For 34 years, Arezzo was employed as a Construction Official for the City of Hoboken. In this capacity, Arezzo was re sponsible for the inspection of construction projects in Hoboken and for construction co de enforcement. Arezzo’s duties were governed by New Jersey’s Uniform Cons truction Code Act and were carried out independently from any oversight or control by the City. In 2010, Hoboken Ma yor Dawn Zimmer appointed Ar ch Liston as the City’s Business Administrator. A dispute arose betw een Arezzo and Liston over the scheduling of “harassment training” for Arezzo and his subordinates. Arezzo apparently believed that because his office was i ndependent from the City for the purposes of construction project inspection and code enforcemen t, it was also independent for other,

1 The following facts are drawn from Arezzo ’s Amended Complaint, all of which we must assume to be true for purposes of this appeal. See In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig. , 868 F.3d 231, 249 (3d Cir. 2017). We also rely upon the undisputedly authentic New Jersey administrative and judicial decisions that Arezzo submitted in the trial court. See Schmidt v. Skolas , 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) (matters of public record and “document[s] integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to dism iss into one for summary judgment” (internal quotation marks, citations, and emphasis omitted)).3 administrative purposes. Arezzo was not wi lling to attend one of the scheduled morning seminars, stating that he and his officials w ould attend the training only if it were held in the afternoon. Liston challe nged Arezzo’s declaration of i ndependence and his decision not to attend the scheduled morning traini ng seminars. On Dece mber 30, 2010, the dispute culminated in Arezzo’s sending a letter to Liston that the City deemed “overtly hostile and openly defiant. ” A27. Liston then suspended Arezzo for his alleged refusal to attend the harassment training. Arezzo was suspended effectiv e January 5, 2011, when he was served with notice of the suspension. The suspen sion notice required that Arezzo return any City property in his possession, including electronic equipmen t. Arezzo returned his City-issued laptop and cell phone, but had replaced the laptop’s hard drive a nd the cell phone’s SIM card. The City then removed Arezzo from office, ef fective February 17, 2011, for his alleged destruction of the City property. No hearing was held before the City respecting either di sciplinary action. Rather, Arezzo appealed his suspension and removal to the New Jersey Office of Administrative Law. On July 24, 2012, after conducting ei ght hearings over the span of eight months, the NJOAL Administrative Law Judge reco mmended increasing Arezzo’s suspension from 30 days to six months, but modifying th e penalty of removal to an additional sixmonth suspension. Both Arezzo and the City filed exceptions to the New Jersey Civil4 Service Commission, which did not hold a hearing. On September 19, 2012, 2 the Commission, in an opinion si gned by Chair Robert M. Czech , approved and adopted the ALJ’s factual findings and his recommendation that Arezzo’s suspension be increased from 30 days to six months, but rejected the ALJ’s recommended modification of Arezzo’s removal, instead upholding th e City’s imposition of that penalty. 3 Arezzo appealed the Commission’s deci sion to the New Jersey Appellate Division, which affirmed on November 21, 20 14. The New Jersey Supreme Court denied review on June 19, 2015.
B. On July 15, 2016, Ar ezzo filed the Complaint in th is action against the City of Hoboken and the New Jersey Civil Service Commission. On October 5, 2016, Arezzo filed an Amended Complaint, adding as defe ndants Zimmer, Liston, Czech, and ten John Does, all in their individual and official capacities.

2 Although Arezzo alleged in his Amende d Complaint that the Civil Service Commission’s Decision and Order were issued on September 5, 2012, the Decision is dated September 19, 2012.

3 The Commission agreed with the ALJ that an increased si x-month suspension on the insubordination charge was appropriate beca use Arezzo “was more concerned with winning his power struggle with the new administrator than with working out a reasonable timetable for . . . the sexual ha rassment training,” conduct the Commission found “worthy of a severe sanction.” A72. Regarding Arezzo’s destruction of City property, the Commission disagreed with s ubstituting an additional six-month suspension for removal, holding that willful destructi on “by a long term employee in a position of public trust cannot be tolerated and is worthy of removal.” Id. Because Arezzo had already been removed from office, however, the Commission’s imposition of the longer, six-month suspension had no practical effect. See, e.g. , N.J. Admin. Code § 4A:2-2.10(d) (back pay available “during the period of improper suspension or removal” (emphasis added)).5 Arezzo alleged that Defendants denied him due process in terminating his employment, challenging both his removal a nd the New Jersey statutory scheme under Section 1983, the Fourteenth Amendment, a nd the Declaratory Judgment Act. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2202–2202. Arezzo’s Section 1983 claim alleged that the City and Commission violated his due proc ess rights by imposing the penalty of removal without a hearing. Hi s other claims asserted facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to New Jersey ’s statutory and regulatory scheme, see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 11A:2-19; N.J. Admin. Code § 4A:2-2.9(d), alleging that it violates due process because it allows the Commission to disregard the ALJ’ s recommendation and thus does not provide for meaningful review of the a ppointing authority’s impos ition of discipline. In addition to damages, he requested th at the trial court vacate the Commission’s decision, order a rehearing, and declare N.J. Stat. Ann. § 11A:2-19 and N.J. Admin. Code § 4A:2-2.9(d) unco nstitutional. The City Defendants moved for dismissa l under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the State Defendants moved for dismissal under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). On January 24, 2017 , the trial court dismissed th e entire Amended Complaint, explaining that Arezzo’s Section 1983 claim was barred by state sovereign immunity as to the Commission and Czech in his official capacity, see U.S. Const. amend. XI, and by the statute of limitations as to the City Defend ants and Czech in his individual capacity. The trial court further identified the Rooker-Feldman and entire-controversy doctrines as alternative bases for dismissa l. Arezzo timely appealed.6 II. 4
A. Arezzo contends the trial court erred in deciding that his Section 1983 claim was barred by the statute of limitations, and in not addressing his as-applied and facial constitutional challenges. We disagree and w ill affirm the dismissal of Arezzo’s entire Amended Complaint. Arezzo’s Section 1983 claim accrued, at the latest, on September 19, 2012, when the Commission issued its final administrative decision. See Wallace v. Kato , 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (holding that a Section 1983 claim accrues “when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action, that is , when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief” (internal quotation marks and citati ons omitted)). After the Commission took final administrative action, Arezzo could have f iled his Section 1983 claim alleging that the City and State removed him without pr oviding sufficient due process. Arezzo argues that his procedural due pr ocess claim did not accrue until June 19, 2015, when the New Jersey Supreme Court de nied review. Relying on our decision in Alvin v. Suzuki , 227 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2000), he conte nds that he was required to pursue an appeal in New Jersey state court in order to have suffered the alleged harm and so to

4 The trial court had federal question jurisd iction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our re view of the trial judge’s dismissal of the Amended Complaint on Rule 12(b )(6) grounds is de novo. See Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny , 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008). “[B] ecause our review is plenary, ‘we may affirm on any grounds sup ported by the record.’” Hassen v. Gov’t of V.I. , 861 F.3d 108, 114 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Maher Terminals, LLC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. , 805 F.3d 98, 105 n.4 (3d Cir. 2015)).7 state a procedural due process claim—a requi rement distinct from simple exhaustion. We disagree. In Alvin , we held that a tenured professo r could not state a procedural due process claim against a state university wher e the professor failed to utilize adequately the university’s grievance procedures. See id. at 116. This is because “a procedural due process violation cannot have occurred when th e governmental actor provides apparently adequate procedural remedies and the pl aintiff has not availed himself of those remedies.” See id. (citing Zinermon v. Burch , 494 U.S. 113, 126 (1990)). Here, however, Arezzo challenges the adequacy of th e procedures available to challenge his removal, procedures he properly utilized in taking appeals to the NJOAL and the Commission. In any event, Arezzo’s argument that he was required to first seek redress in the New Jersey state cour ts is belied by his repeated concessions that “[t]he New Jersey Appellate Division’s decision does not address any procedural due process claim and the issue was not addressed in the briefs to the New Jersey Appellate Division.” Appellant’s Br. at 18 (emphasis added); see also Appellant’s Br. at 25 (conceding that “Arezzo’s claims for procedural due process violations . . . were not made below” and “[t]he procedural due process issues raised in the District Court are different from the issues raised in the State Court”). 5
Because Arezzo’s Section 1983 claim ac crued no later than September 19, 2012, we will affirm the trial court’ s ruling that this action—file d almost four years later, on July 25, 2016—was untimely under the two-ye ar statute of limitations for Section 1983

5 Indeed, if Arezzo were required to first pres ent his claim to the New Jersey courts, he would likely fail to state a claim because he neglected to present the due process issue and properly avail himself of state remedies.8 actions in New Jersey. See Wilson v. Garcia , 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1 985) (holding that the statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim is borrowed from the state’s personal injury statute of limitations); Cito v. Bridgewater Twp. Police Dep’t , 892 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that New Jersey’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions governs Section 1983 claims ); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2.
B. Arezzo also argues that the trial cour t erred in not addressing his facial and as-applied constitutional challenges seeking d eclaratory and injunctive relief. Although the trial court did not address the statute of limitations applicable to these claims, it implicitly addressed these claims in its altern ative holding that the action is barred by the Rooker

- Feldman doctrine. Even were we to disa gree with that conclusion, however, dismissal was nonetheless proper under the st atute of limitations. As we have held, “when plaintiffs’ claims are barred by a statut e of limitations applicable to a concurrent legal remedy, then a court w ill withhold declaratory judgme nt relief in an independent suit essentially predicated upon the same cause of action. Otherwise, the statute of limitations can be circumvented merely by ‘[d ]raping their claim in the raiment of the Declaratory Judgment Act.’” Algrant v. Evergreen Valley Nurseries Ltd. P’ship , 126 F.3d 178, 184–85 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Gilbert v. City of Cambridge , 932 F.2d 51, 58 (1st Cir. 1991)). Arezzo cannot evad e the statute of limitations by recharacterizing his Section 1983 claim as claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. Similarly, “[i]f a statutory limitations period that would bar legal relief has expi red, then the defendant in an action for equitable relief enjoys the benef it of a presumption of inexcusable delay and9 prejudice,” and “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to justify its delay and negate prejudice.” In re Mushroom Transp. Co. , 382 F.3d 325, 337 (3d Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 735 F.2d 69, 80 (3d Cir. 1984)). Arezzo has not met that burden, and thus his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are time-barred as well.
III. For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the trial court’s Janua ry 24, 2017 Order dismissing the entire Amended Complaint.