alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
SCWC-22-0000349

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI

________________________________________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE TAX APPEAL OF HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC., 

Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION, 

Respondent/Defendant-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

(CAAP-22-0000349; CIV. NO. 1CTX-21-0000493)

ORDER ACCEPTING APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

(By: Recktenwald, C.J., McKenna, Eddins, Ginoza, and Devens JJ.)

The application for writ of certiorari filed on May 13, 

2024, by Petitioner/Plaintiff-Appellant Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.,

is hereby accepted and will be scheduled for oral argument. The 

parties will be notified by the appellate clerk regarding 

scheduling.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, July 8, 2024.

/s/ Mark E. Recktenwald

/s/ Sabrina S. McKenna 

/s/ Todd W. Eddins

/s/ Lisa M. Ginoza

/s/ Vladimir P. Devens

Electronically Filed

Supreme Court

SCWC-22-0000349

08-JUL-2024

12:28 PM

Dkt. 17 OGAC
§ 230.202 Definitions. ( a ) *Minority Business Enterprise,* as used in this subpart, refers to all small businesses which participate in the Federal-aid highway program as a minority business enterprise (MBE), women business enterprise (WBE), or disadvantaged business enterprise (DBE), all defined under 49 CFR part 23. This expanded definition is used only in this subpart as a simplified way of defining the firms eligible to benefit from this supportive services program.
( b ) *Supportive Services* means those services and activities provided in connection with minority business enterprise programs which are designed to increase the total number of minority businesses active in the highway program and contribute to the growth and eventual self-sufficiency of individual minority businesses so that such businesses may achieve proficiency to compete, on an equal basis, for contracts and subcontracts.
( c ) *State highway agency* means that department, commission, board, or official of any State charged by its laws with the responsibility for highway construction. The term *State* is considered equivalent to *State highway agency* if the context so implies.
### Appliances & Commercial Equipment Standards: Small Electric Motors

U.S, 0epastment of Energy 

## Energy Efficiency and Page I of I

EERE Home

Appliances Home About Standards Laws & Regulations EPACT 2005 Test Procedures Peer Review Information Resources Notices & Rules Schedule Setting Public Workshops & Hearings State Petitions Useful Links Commercial Equipment ASHRAE Products Clothes washers Distribution Transformers Electric Motors Furnaces & Boilers High Intensity Discharge Lamps Refrigerated Beverage vending Machines Refrigeration Equipment Small Electric Motors Unitary Air Conditioners & Heat Pumps Water Heaters Residential Products Search Help' More Search Options n EERE Information Center 

## Small Electric Motors The Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) of 1975 established an energy conservation program for major household appliances. The National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978 amended EPCA to add Part C of Title III, which established an energy conservation program for certain industrial equipment. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT) also amended EPCA, and included amendments that expanded title III to include small electric motors. The Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Building Technologies Program conducts the program that develops equipment energy conservation standards and has overall responsibility for rulemaking activities for small electric motors in fulfillment of the law.

I acuments are available as Adobe Acrobat PDFs, 

### Energy Conservation Standard • Notice of public meeting and availability of4ramework Document (PDF 80 KB) o Framework Document (PD>r 321_KB) 

## Determination Analysis • Departmental Determination Concerning the Potential for Energy Conservation Standards forrSSpoII Electric Motors, Federal Register, July 10, 2006, (PDF 112 KB) r=13 • Technical Support Document : Analysis of Energy --.oot, ;don Standards for Small Electric Motors, June 200 1:3) o Draft Report: "Analysis of Energy Conservation $frindards for Small Electric Motors," June 2003 , (PDF 256 KB)


### Contact Information Antonio Bouza Project Manager (202) 586-4563

t5 Printable Version
Webmaster I Security & POivacy

_ I Builder Technologies Program 1-Lome I EERE Home U.S. Department of Energy Content Last Updated: 08/14/2007



### http://www.eere.energy.gov/buildings/appliance_standards/commercial/small_electric_niotors.html 8/14/2007

# Summary of Comments on EERE-2007-BTSTD-0007_CO M M E NT_02.2. pdf Page: 1 Number: 1 Author: DOE Subject: Comment Date: 10/24/2007 12:12:09 PM See Comment Number 01.3 Number: 2 Author: DOE Subject: Comment Date: 10/24/2007 12:12:45 PM See Comment Number 013 Number: 3 Author: DOE Subject: Comment Date: 10/24/2007 12:13:31 PM See Comment Number 02.1 Number: 4 Author: DOE Subject: Comment Date: 10/24/2007 12:14:04 PM See Comment Number 02.1 Number: 5 Author: DOE Subject: Comment Date: 10/24/2007 12:14:38 PM See Comment Number 02.1
### §410a. Acceptance of title to lands

The Secretary of the Interior is authorized, in his discretion and upon submission of evidence of title satisfactory to him, to accept on behalf of the United States, title to the lands referred to in section 410 of this title as may be deemed by him necessary or desirable for national-park purposes: Provided, That no land for said park shall be accepted until exclusive jurisdiction over the entire park area, in form satisfactory to the Secretary of the Interior, shall have been ceded by the State of Florida to the United States.

(May 30, 1934, ch. 371, §2, 48 Stat. 816.)
_________________________________________________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

Before the 

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 

SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 

Release No. 97524 / May 18, 2023 

WHISTLEBLOWER AWARD PROCEEDING 

File No. 2023-58 

_________________________________________________________________________ 

In the Matter of the Claim for an Award 

in connection with 

Notice of Covered Action 

Redacted Redacted

ORDER DETERMINING WHISTLEBLOWER AWARD CLAIM 

The Claims Review Staff (“CRS”) issued a Preliminary Determination recommending 

that (“Claimant”) receive a whistleblower award of more than $3,000, or thirty 

Redacted

percent (30%) of the monetary sanctions collected, or to be collected, in the above-referenced 

Covered Action (the “Covered Action”). 

The recommendation of the CRS is adopted. The record demonstrates that Claimant 

voluntarily provided original information to the Commission that caused the staff to open the 

investigation, and that the Commission’s charges in the successful enforcement action, were 

based, in part, on Claimant’s information.1

Rule 21F-6(c) establishes a presumption of a statutory maximum award of 30% where (1) 

the maximum award would be $5 million or less; (2) none of the negative award factors under 

Rule 21F-6(b)—i.e., culpability, unreasonable reporting delay, or interference with an internal 

compliance and reporting system—are present; and (3) the award claim does not trigger Rule 

21F-16.2 The Commission may depart from the presumption if (1) the assistance provided by the 

1 See Exchange Act Rule 21F-4(c)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(c)(1). 

2 Rule 21F-16 concerns whistleblowers who engage in culpable conduct. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-16. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

whistleblower was, “under the relevant facts and circumstances, limited,” or (2) a maximum 

award “would be inconsistent with the public interest, the promotion of investor protection, or 

the objectives of the whistleblower program.”3 

The presumption applies here because a maximum award would not exceed $5 million, 

no negative factors under Rule 21F-6(b) are present with respect to the award application, and 

the award claim does not trigger Rule 21F-16. Further, Claimant provided more than limited 

assistance, as Claimant provided significant information and details about the fraudulent scheme 

and relevant individuals and gave multiple interviews to Commission staff. Application of the 

presumption would not be inconsistent with the public interest, the promotion of investor 

protection, or the objectives of the whistleblower program. 

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that Claimant shall receive an award of thirty 

percent (30%) of the monetary sanctions collected or to be collected in the Covered Action. 

By the Commission. 

Vanessa A. Countryman 

Secretary 

Rule 21F-6(c)(1)(iv); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(c)(1)(iv). 3
### §460fff. Establishment

(a) In order to—

(1) provide for public outdoor recreation use and enjoyment of the lands and waters associated with the United States portion of the reservoir known as Lake Amistad, located on the boundary between the State of Texas and Mexico, and

(2) protect the scenic, scientific, cultural, and other value contributing to the public enjoyment of such lands and waters,

there is hereby established the Amistad National Recreation Area (hereafter in this section and section 460fff–1 of this title referred to as the "recreation area").

(b) The recreation area shall consist of the Federal lands, waters, and interests therein within the area generally depicted on the map entitled "Boundary Map, Proposed Amistad National Recreation Area", numbered 621/20,013–B, and dated July 1969. The map shall be on file and available for public inspection in the offices of the National Park Service, Department of the Interior. The Secretary of the Interior (hereafter in this Act referred to as the "Secretary") may from time to time make minor revisions in the boundary of the recreation area, but the total acreage of the recreation area may not exceed 58,500 acres. Within the boundary of the recreation area, the Secretary may acquire lands and interests in lands by purchase with donated or appropriated funds, exchange, or transfer without reimbursement from any Federal agency.

(Pub. L. 101–628, title V, §505, Nov. 28, 1990, 104 Stat. 4494.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

This Act, referred to in subsec. (b), is Pub. L. 101–628, Nov. 28, 1990, 104 Stat. 4469, which enacted this subchapter, subchapters CXV (§460ddd) and CXVI (§460eee et seq.) of this chapter, chapter 65 (§4601 et seq.) of this title, and former sections 1a–9 to 1a–13 of this title, amended section 410ee, former section 463, and sections 1274 and 1276 of this title, enacted provisions set out as notes under sections 1132 and 1271 of this title and section 1522 of Title 43, Public Lands, and formerly set out as notes under section 1a–5 of this title, and enacted provisions listed in a table of Wilderness Areas set out under section 1132 of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Tables.
### §403c–3. Criminal offenses concerning hunting, fishing, and property

All hunting or the killing, wounding, or capturing at any time of any wild bird or animal, except dangerous animals when it is necessary to prevent them from destroying human lives or inflicting personal injury, is prohibited within the limits of said park; nor shall any fish be taken out of any of the waters of the said park, in any other way than by hook and line, and then only at such seasons and at such times and in such manner as may be directed by the Secretary of the Interior. The Secretary of the Interior shall make and publish such general rules and regulations as he may deem necessary and proper for the management and care of the park and for the protection of the property therein, especially for the preservation from injury or spoliation of all timber, mineral deposits, natural curiosities, or wonderful objects within said park, and for the protection of the animals and birds in the park from capture or destruction, and to prevent their being frightened or driven from the said park; and he shall make rules and regulations governing the taking of fish from the streams or lakes in the said park. Possession within said park of the dead bodies or any part thereof of any wild bird or animal shall be prima facie evidence that the person or persons having same are guilty of violating this Act. Any person or persons, or stage or express company, or railway company, who knows or has reason to believe that they were taken or killed contrary to the provisions of this Act, and who receives for transportation any of said animals, birds, or fish so killed, caught, or taken, or who shall violate any of the other provisions of this Act, or any rule or regulation that may be promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior, with reference to the management and care of the said park, or for the protection of the property therein for the preservation from injury or spoliation of timber, mineral deposits, natural curiosities, or wonderful objects within said park, or for the protection of the animals, birds, or fish in the said park, or who shall within said park commit any damage, injury or spoliation to or upon any building, fence, sign, hedge, gate, guide post, tree, wood, underwood, timber, garden, crops, vegetables, plants, land, springs, mineral deposits, natural curiosities, or other matter or thing growing or being thereon, or situated therein, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be subject to a fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both, and be adjudged to pay all the costs of the proceedings.

(Aug. 19, 1937, ch. 703, §3, 50 Stat. 701.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

This Act, referred to in text, is act Aug. 19, 1937, which is classified to sections 403c–1 to 403c–11 of this title. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Tables.
## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 99-1762

___________ Matthew Joseph Sikora, Jr., * * Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the District * of Nebraska. Internal Revenue Service; Commissioner * of Internal Revenue Service; Nebraska * [UNPUBLISHED] Department of Revenue, * * Appellees. *

___________ Submitted: April 7, 1999

Filed: April 9, 1999

___________ Before FAGG, HANSEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM. Matthew Joseph Sikora, Jr. appeals the dismissal without prejudice of his complaint for failure to effect proper service of process within 120 days under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion. Although over 120 days passed after Sikora filed his complaint, and the courtgave Sikora an extension of time to effect proper service, see Bullock v. United States , 160 F.3d 441, 442 (8th Cir. 1998) (per curiam); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a)-(c), 4(i), 4(m), Sikora failed to show good cause for his continuing failure to effect service, see-2-

Lujano v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist. , 30 F.3d 1032, 1035 (8th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47A(a). A true copy.
Attest: CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
§ 1200.35 Annual Report. Within 90 days after the end of the fiscal year, each State shall submit an Annual Report describing— ( a ) A general assessment of the State's progress in achieving highway safety performance measure targets identified in the Highway Safety Plan;
( b ) A general description of the projects and activities funded and implemented under the Highway Safety Plan;
( c ) The amount of Federal funds expended on projects from the Highway Safety Plan; and
( d ) How the projects funded during the fiscal year contributed to meeting the State's highway safety targets. Where data becomes available, a State should report progress from prior year projects that have contributed to meeting current State highway safety targets.
#### § 750.502 Applicability.

The provisions of this subpart apply to signs adjacent to the Interstate and primary systems which are required to be controlled under 23 U.S.C. 131.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

TERREL NOAKS,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 370 WAL 2017

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 27th day of December, 2017, the Petition for Allowance of 

Appeal is DENIED.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Juan Garrido, Appellant.

[824 NYS2d 295]

*369Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (John S. Moore, J.), rendered May 7, 2003, as amended September 28, 2005, convicting defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first degree, and sentencing him to a term of 10 years, and order, same court and Justice, entered on or about September 28, 2005, which denied defendant’s CPL article 440 motion seeking to reduce his conviction to a class A-II felony, unanimously affirmed.

The court properly denied defendant’s suppression motion. There is no basis for disturbing the court’s credibility determinations, which are supported by the record (see *People v Prochilo,*41 NY2d 759, 761 [1977]). Following an undercover officer’s negotiations with defendant, during which the officer saw a large amount of drugs in defendant’s apartment, the police lawfully approached the apartment in hopes that defendant would come out, at which point they intended to arrest him and then secure the apartment until a search warrant could be obtained. When it became clear that defendant had seen the officers, exigent circumstances existed for a warrantless entry. We do not find that the police created an artificial exigency *(see United States v MacDonald,*916 F2d 766, 770-773 [2d Cir 1990], *cert denied*498 US 1119 [1991]; *People v Kelly,*261 AD2d 133, 134 [1999], *lv denied*94 NY2d 824 [1999]; *compare People v Levan,*62 NY2d 139, 146 [1984]). Once inside, the police properly conducted a security sweep to make certain no one else was in the apartment who could present a threat *(see Maryland v Buie,*494 US 325 [1990]). As part of this sweep, it was reasonable to look in a closet to see if anyone was hiding inside, and drugs were properly discovered in plain view as a result.

Defendant was resentenced from a term of 15 years to life to a term of 10 years pursuant to the Drug Law Reform Act (L 2004, ch 738), and we perceive no basis for a further reduction. Defendant’s argument that his conviction should be reduced to second-degree possession is without merit *(People v Utsey,*7 NY3d 398 [2006]; *People v Quinones,*22 AD3d 218 [2005], *lv denied*6 NY3d 817 [2006]). Concur—Mazzarelli, J.E, Friedman, Nardelli, Gonzalez and Catterson, JJ.
JUDGMENT

Court of Appeals 

 

First District of Texas 

NO. 01-14-00109-CV

JEFFREY STEVEN MARX, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Appeal from the 33rd District Court of Burnet County. (Tr. Ct. No. 7723).

Appellant, Jeffrey Steven Marx, has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction. After inspecting the record of the court below, the Court holds that it lacks 

subject-matter jurisdiction over this appeal. Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to 

dismiss.

The Court orders that this decision be certified below for observance.

Judgment rendered December 22, 2015.

Panel consists of Justices Higley, Huddle, and Lloyd.
### §460s. Establishment

In order to preserve for the benefit, inspiration, education, recreational use, and enjoyment of the public a significant portion of the diminishing shoreline of the United States and its related geographic and scientific features, the Secretary of the Interior (hereinafter referred to as the "Secretary") is authorized to take appropriate action, as herein provided, to establish in the State of Michigan the Pictured Rocks National Lakeshore.

(Pub. L. 89–668, §1, Oct. 15, 1966, 80 Stat. 922.)
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-6406

WILLIAM TRAMPAS WIDMYER,

Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

WARDEN DAVID BALLARD,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, 

at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley, Senior District Judge. (1:10-cv-00084-IMK)

Submitted: January 31, 2019 Decided: March 12, 2019

Before WYNN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

William Trampas Widmyer, Appellant Pro Se. Lindsay Sara See, OFFICE OF THE 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WEST VIRGINIA, Charleston, West Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

William Trampas Widmyer seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the 

recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

(2012) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 

certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (2012). A certificate of 

appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the 

merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would 

find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 

336-38 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner 

must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the 

petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 

484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Widmyer has not 

made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, 

deny a certificate of appealability, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
!"#$%&'(()*+'


,			- 



    $.!/        



0	/

-123! 

"!4.52.1." 



.61- 







			- 


	,- 


	,-13 


	,- 



    !.131!/       

	






2!#7#$4.."".1//"!8!.2.1.629.4

	.1:!8!;<.2.1=/215.."3"1.279!5261-5..37"!

?2!!.51@24!."5-13@@17!!:2!67.1!13-22!$:

!4.@@.9!

%/ .2.12!$:	92#!!3$@.9/

              

.$
/1	!3@-	;/
./%+)(

11.1
7..-!A/;/
./+B)B+

4427.4123!"!

C%!
.3'"2+(C+

27#.13-	D(D%*

@.1;)C+%'D(%C

7!2#2@;)C+%'D((C

Case 15-33894-KLP Doc 39 Filed 05/10/16 Entered 05/10/16 10:41:07 Desc Main

 Document Page 1 of 4
D/ 2@2E3#!1..92!3421321!@@6#1215!5261.#

21.2.1/

(/ 7@  ##  5!    !  92@@  #  21  !.1  92  7@21!  2.  .  42@215

$1F"7:7!!.12$@41392@@!7".2521@!251"!.122.1!13

!73"@!2..42@215!233.7"#1!211:
1F"7:."21!12!27

.425212/

+/ .11:-"!"1.
1F"7:"@!+CCB13DCCD;4-@F2!3273.

!137.:.42!3.@@2!.1!627@2!73./

13               

	
	
0

!F4.2!

  G!G11.1
7..     11.1
7..-!A/;
H+B)B+

4427.4123!"!

C%/
.3-"2+(C+

27#.13-	D(D%*

@.1;)C+%'D(%C

7!2#2@;)C+%'D((C

11353

G!G7@##;#2@33&G(GDC%B

7@##-!A/


"5592#

+%C(21
235.3-"2%C(

24?-	DDC(C

May 9 2016 /s/ Keith L. Phillips

Entered on Docket: May 10 2016

Case 15-33894-KLP Doc 39 Filed 05/10/16 Entered 05/10/16 10:41:07 Desc Main

 Document Page 2 of 4


$:724:-"!"1..7@"@*CDD'%-4.5.215..!33

	.6215@#1,2
"592#-!$1!63.1.13.!3$:@@

17!!:2!/

  G!G11.1
7..    11.1
7..-!A/

4427.4123!"!

C%/
.3-"2+(C+

27#.13-	D(D%*

@.1;)C+%'D(%C

7!2#2@;)C+%'D((C

Case 15-33894-KLP Doc 39 Filed 05/10/16 Entered 05/10/16 10:41:07 Desc Main

 Document Page 3 of 4



11.1
7..

4427.4//"!

C%!
.3-"2+(C+

27#.13-	D(D%*

7@##


"5592#

+%C(21
235.3-"2%C(

24?-	DDC(C

.221##.13

,2@@2#27@##.13

DDB%#112259:

.7"!.6-	DD&C)

Case 15-33894-KLP Doc 39 Filed 05/10/16 Entered 05/10/16 10:41:07 Desc Main

 Document Page 4 of 4