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INNOVATION ACT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

ON

H.R. 9 

APRIL 14, 2015 

Serial No. 114–20 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia, Chairman 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

RAU ́ L LABRADOR, Idaho 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

DOUG COLLINS, Georgia 

RON DeSANTIS, Florida 

MIMI WALTERS, California 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DAVE TROTT, Michigan 

MIKE BISHOP, Michigan 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

JUDY CHU, California 

TED DEUTCH, Florida 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

KAREN BASS, California 

CEDRIC RICHMOND, Louisiana 

SUZAN DelBENE, Washington 

HAKEEM JEFFRIES, New York 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

SCOTT PETERS, California 

SHELLEY HUSBAND, Chief of Staff & General Counsel 

PERRY APELBAUM, Minority Staff Director & Chief Counsel 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

APRIL 14, 2015 

Page 

THE BILL TEXT 

H.R. 9, the ‘‘Innovation Act’’ ................................................................................... 3 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Virginia, and Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary ................................. 1 

The Honorable Jerrold Nadler, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of New York, and Member, Committee on the Judiciary ................................. 19 

The Honorable Darrell E. Issa, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California, and Member, Committee on the Judiciary ................................. 20 

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Michelle Lee, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual 

Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 22 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 25 

Kevin T. Kramer, Vice President, Deputy General Counsel for Intellectual 

Property, Yahoo! 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 67 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 69 

Robert A. Armitage, former Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Eli 

Lilly & Co. 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 81 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 83 

David M. Simon, Senior Vice President, Intellectual Property, Salesforce.com 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 120 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 122 

Hans Sauer, Deputy General Counsel for Intellectual Property, Biotechnology 

Industry Organization 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 135 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 137 

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Material submitted by the Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of Virginia, and Chairman, Committee on the 

Judiciary ............................................................................................................... 33 

Material submitted by the Honorable Steve King, a Representative in Congress from the State of Iowa, and Member, Committee on the Judiciary ....... 45 

Material submitted by the Honorable Darrell E. Issa, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of California, and Member, Committee on the 

Judiciary ............................................................................................................... 58 

Material submitted by the Honorable Scott Peters, a Representative in Congress from the State of California, and Member, Committee on the Judiciary ......................................................................................................................... 170 
Page

IV 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Michigan, and Member, Committee on the 

Judiciary ............................................................................................................... 179 

Prepared Statement of the National Retail Federation (NRF) ............................ 181 

Response to Questions for the Record from the Honorable Michelle Lee, 

Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of 

the United States Patent and Trademark Office .............................................. 190 

Response to Questions for the Record from Kevin T. Kramer, Vice President, 

Deputy General Counsel for Intellectual Property, Yahoo! .............................. 195 

Response to Questions for the Record from Robert A. Armitage, former Senior 

Vice President and General Counsel, Eli Lilly & Co. ....................................... 201 

Response to Questions for the Record from David M. Simon, Senior Vice 

President, Intellectual Property, Salesforce.com ............................................... 203 

Response to Questions for the Record from Hans Sauer, Deputy General 

Counsel for Intellectual Property, Biotechnology Industry Organization ....... 205 
(1) 

INNOVATION ACT 

TUESDAY, APRIL 14, 2015 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:18 p.m., in room 2141, 

Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Bob Goodlatte 

(Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Goodlatte, Smith, Chabot, Issa, Forbes, 

King, Franks, Gohmert, Jordan, Marino, Labrador, Farenthold, 

Collins, DeSantis, Walters, Buck, Ratcliffe, Trott, Bishop, Conyers, 

Nadler, Lofgren, Jackson Lee, Johnson, Chu, Deutch, Bass, 

DelBene, Jeffries, Cicilline and Peters. 

Staff Present: (Majority) Shelley Husband, Chief of Staff & General Counsel; Branden Ritchie, Deputy Chief of Staff & Chief Counsel; Allison Halataei, Parliamentarian & General Counsel; Vishal 

Amin, Senior Counsel, Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet; Kelsey Williams, Clerk; (Minority) Perry 

Apelbaum, Staff Director & Chief Counsel; Danielle Brown, Parliamentarian; and Norberto Salinas, Counsel. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Good afternoon. The Judiciary Committee will 

come to order, and without objection the Chair is authorized to declare recesses of the Committee at any time. 

We welcome everyone to this afternoon’s hearing on H.R. 9, the 

‘‘Innovation Act.’’ And I will begin by recognizing myself for an 

opening statement. Today we are here to discuss H.R. 9, the ‘‘Innovation Act.’’ The enactment of this bill is something I consider central to U.S. competitiveness, job creation, and our Nation’s future 

economic security. This bill builds on our efforts over the past decade. It can be said that this bill is the product of years of work. 

We have worked with Members of both parties in both the Senate 

and the House, with stakeholders from all areas of our economy, 

and with the Administration, and the courts. 

In February, I along with a large bipartisan group of Members, 

reintroduced the Innovation Act. This bill was the product of multiple discussion drafts and hearings, passing the House last Congress with more votes than the landmark America Invents Act of 

2011. 

Last week we recognized the 225th anniversary of the U.S. Patent Act. When President Washington signed the bill that laid the 

foundation for our patent system, even he could not have foreseen 

the revolution in technology that was yet to come. During these 
2 

past two centuries, America has been at the forefront of innovation, 

from the industrial revolution to the telegraph and telephone, to 

advances in medicine, modern computers and the Internet. To a 

whole new era of mobile computing and personal devices. American 

inventors have led the world for centuries in new innovations, from 

Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Edison to the Wright brothers and 

Henry Ford. But if we want to continue as leaders in the global 

economy, we must continue to encourage the innovators of today to 

develop the technologies of tomorrow. 

The fuel that powers the innovation engine that is America is its 

people. But the rules of the road require regular adjustment, and 

during the last 200 years we have seen our patent laws updated 

and modernized. The most significant reforms took place in 1836, 

1952, and most recently in 2011 with the America Invents Act. Of 

interesting note is that Section 5 of the original 1790 Patent Act, 

included an early version of fee shifting that was updated by Section 285 of the 1952 act, and today the Innovation Act further modernizes and clarifies that provision of the law. 

Many view the AIA as the most comprehensive overhaul to our 

patent system since the 1836 Patent Act. However, the AIA was in 

many respects a prospective bill. The problems that the Innovation 

Act will solve are more immediate and go to the heart of current 

abusive patent litigation practices. To that end, the Innovation Act 

includes heightened pleading standards, and transparency provisions requiring parties to do a bit of due diligence up front before 

filing an infringement suit is just plain common sense. It not only 

reduces litigation expenses, but saves the courts time and resources. Greater transparency and information makes our patent 

system stronger. 

The Innovation Act’s fee shifting provisions are fair, predictable, 

and will be reliably enforced. If a party’s position and conduct is 

reasonably justified in law and fact, then there will be no fees shifted, but if you bring an unreasonable case that is not justified in 

law and fact, then you take on the risk that the Court awards reasonable fees against you. The Innovation Act also provides for more 

clarity surrounding initial discovery, case management, joinder 

provisions to deal with insolvent shell companies, the common-law 

doctrine of customer stays, and protecting IP licenses in bankruptcy. 

We will continue to work to perfect the customer stay provision 

and others, and we will work with interested parties to find reasonable solutions to the issue of demand letter abuse. Further, the 

bill’s provisions are designed to work hand in hand with the procedures and practices of the Judicial Conference, including the Rules 

Enabling Act and the courts providing them with clear policy guidance while ensuring that we are not predetermining outcomes and 

that the final rules and the legislation’s implementation in the 

courts will be both deliberative and effective. 

The bill contains needed reforms to address the issues that businesses of all sizes and industries face from patent troll type behavior while keeping in mind several key principles, including targeting abusive behavior rather than specific entities, preserving 

valid patent enforcement tools, preserving patent property rights, 
3 

promoting invention by independence and small businesses, and 

strengthening the overall patent system. 

First, we are targeting abusive patent litigation behavior and not 

specific entities or attempting to eliminate valid patent litigation. 

When we use the term patent troll, it is more of an adjective describing behavior than a noun. Our goal is to prevent individuals 

from taking advantage of gaps in the system to engage in litigation 

extortion. 

Second, our bill does not diminish or devalue patent rights. The 

patent system is integral to U.S. competitiveness, and we must ensure that any legislative measure does not weaken the overall patent system or violate our international treaty obligations, and that 

it comports with the Constitution. 

Third, this bill strikes the right balance, pushing for robust legal 

reform measures while protecting property rights and innovation. 

Furthermore, supporters of this bill understand that if America’s 

inventors are forced to waste time with frivolous litigation, they 

won’t have time for innovation, and that’s what innovation is really 

all about, isn’t it? If you’re able to create something, invent something new and unique, then you should be allowed to sell your 

product, grow your business, hire more workers, and live the American dream. We can no longer allow our economy and job creators 

to be held hostage to legal maneuvers and the judicial lottery. Congress, the Federal courts, and the USPTO, must take the necessary 

steps to ensure that the patent system lives up to its constitutional 

underpinnings. This bill holds true to the Constitution, our founders, and our promise to future generations that America will continue to lead the world as a fountain for discovery, innovation, and 

economic growth. 

We will continue to work with any and all stakeholders that are 

interested in helping us improve our patent system and this bill. 

As we take these steps toward eliminating the abuses of our patent 

system, discouraging frivolous patent litigation, and keeping U.S. 

patent laws up to date, we will help fuel the engine of American 

innovation and creativity, creating new jobs and growing our economy. 

[The text of the bill, H.R. 9, follows:] 

I 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 9 

To amend title 35, United States Code, and the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 

to make improvements and technical corrections, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 5, 2015 

Mr. GOODLATTE (for himself, Mr. DEFAZIO, Mr. ISSA, Mr. NADLER, Mr. SMITH of 

Texas, Ms. LOFGREN, Mr. CHABOT, Ms. ESHOO, Mr. FORBES, Mr. PIERLUISI, Mr. 

CHAFFETZ, Mr. JEFFRIES, Mr. MARINO, Mr. FARENTHOLD, Mr. HOLDING, Mr. JOHNSON of Ohio, Mr. HUFFMAN, Mr. HONDA, Mr. LARSEN of Washington, and Mr. 
4 

THOMPSON of California) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend title 35, United States Code, and the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 

to make improvements and technical corrections, and for other purposes. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States 

of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Innovation Act’’. 

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows: 

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 

Sec. 2. Definitions. 

Sec. 3. Patent infringement actions. 

Sec. 4. Transparency of patent ownership. 

Sec. 5. Customer-suit exception. 

Sec. 6. Procedures and practices to implement recommendations of the Judicial 

Conference. 

Sec. 7. Small business education, outreach, and information access. 

Sec. 8. Studies on patent transactions, quality, and examination. 

Sec. 9. Improvements and technical corrections to the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act. 

Sec. 10. Effective date. 

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 

In this Act: 

(1) DIRECTOR.—The term ‘‘Director’’ means the Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and 

Trademark Office. 

(2) OFFICE.—The term ‘‘Office’’ means the United States Patent and Trademark Office. 

SEC. 3. PATENT INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS. 

(a) PLEADING REQUIREMENTS.— 

(1) AMENDMENT.—Chapter 29 of title 35, United States Code, is amended 

by inserting after section 281 the following: 

‘‘§ 281A. Pleading requirements for patent infringement actions 

‘‘(a) PLEADING REQUIREMENTS.—Except as provided in subsection (b), in a civil 

action in which a party asserts a claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress 

relating to patents, a party alleging infringement shall include in the initial complaint, counterclaim, or cross-claim for patent infringement, unless the information 

is not reasonably accessible to such party, the following: 

‘‘(1) An identification of each patent allegedly infringed. 

‘‘(2) An identification of each claim of each patent identified under paragraph (1) that is allegedly infringed. 

‘‘(3) For each claim identified under paragraph (2), an identification of each 

accused process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter (referred to in 

this section as an ‘accused instrumentality’) alleged to infringe the claim. 

‘‘(4) For each accused instrumentality identified under paragraph (3), an 

identification with particularity, if known, of— 

‘‘(A) the name or model number of each accused instrumentality; or 

‘‘(B) if there is no name or model number, a description of each accused 

instrumentality. 

‘‘(5) For each accused instrumentality identified under paragraph (3), a 

clear and concise statement of— 

‘‘(A) where each element of each claim identified under paragraph (2) 

is found within the accused instrumentality; and 

‘‘(B) with detailed specificity, how each limitation of each claim identified under paragraph (2) is met by the accused instrumentality. 

‘‘(6) For each claim of indirect infringement, a description of the acts of the 

alleged indirect infringer that contribute to or are inducing the direct infringement. 
5 

‘‘(7) A description of the authority of the party alleging infringement to assert each patent identified under paragraph (1) and of the grounds for the 

court’s jurisdiction. 

‘‘(8) A clear and concise description of the principal business, if any, of the 

party alleging infringement. 

‘‘(9) A list of each complaint filed, of which the party alleging infringement 

has knowledge, that asserts or asserted any of the patents identified under 

paragraph (1). 

‘‘(10) For each patent identified under paragraph (1), whether a standardsetting body has specifically declared such patent to be essential, potentially essential, or having potential to become essential to that standard-setting body, 

and whether the United States Government or a foreign government has imposed specific licensing requirements with respect to such patent. 

‘‘(b) INFORMATION NOT READILY ACCESSIBLE.—If information required to be disclosed under subsection (a) is not readily accessible to a party, that information may 

instead be generally described, along with an explanation of why such undisclosed 

information was not readily accessible, and of any efforts made by such party to access such information. 

‘‘(c) CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION.—A party required to disclose information described under subsection (a) may file, under seal, information believed to be confidential, with a motion setting forth good cause for such sealing. If such motion is 

denied by the court, the party may seek to file an amended complaint. 

‘‘(d) EXEMPTION.—A civil action that includes a claim for relief arising under 

section 271(e)(2) shall not be subject to the requirements of subsection (a).’’. 

(2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The table of sections for chapter 29 of title 

35, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 281 the following new item: 

‘‘281A. Pleading requirements for patent 

infringement actions.’’. 

(b) FEES AND OTHER EXPENSES.— (1) AMENDMENT.—Section 285 of title 35, United States Code, is amended 

to read as follows: 

‘‘§ 285. Fees and other expenses 

‘‘(a) AWARD.—The court shall award, to a prevailing party, reasonable fees and 

other expenses incurred by that party in connection with a civil action in which any 

party asserts a claim for relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, unless the court finds that the position and conduct of the nonprevailing party 

or parties were reasonably justified in law and fact or that special circumstances 

(such as severe economic hardship to a named inventor) make an award unjust. 

‘‘(b) CERTIFICATION AND RECOVERY.—Upon motion of any party to the action, 

the court shall require another party to the action to certify whether or not the 

other party will be able to pay an award of fees and other expenses if such an award 

is made under subsection (a). If a nonprevailing party is unable to pay an award 

that is made against it under subsection (a), the court may make a party that has 

been joined under section 299(d) with respect to such party liable for the unsatisfied 

portion of the award. 

‘‘(c) COVENANT NOT TO SUE.—A party to a civil action that asserts a claim for 

relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents against another party, 

and that subsequently unilaterally extends to such other party a covenant not to 

sue for infringement with respect to the patent or patents at issue, shall be deemed 

to be a nonprevailing party (and the other party the prevailing party) for purposes 

of this section, unless the party asserting such claim would have been entitled, at 

the time that such covenant was extended, to voluntarily dismiss the action or claim 

without a court order under Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.’’. 

(2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT AND AMENDMENT.— (A) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The item relating to section 285 of the 

table of sections for chapter 29 of title 35, United States Code, is amended 

to read as follows: 

‘‘285. Fees and other expenses.’’. 

(B) AMENDMENT.—Section 273 of title 35, United States Code, is 

amended by striking subsections (f) and (g). 

(3) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this subsection shall take 

effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to any action 
6 

for which a complaint is filed on or after the first day of the 6-month period 

ending on that effective date. 

(c) JOINDER OF INTERESTED PARTIES.—Section 299 of title 35, United States 

Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: 

‘‘(d) JOINDER OF INTERESTED PARTIES.— 

‘‘(1) JOINDER.—In a civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating 

to patents in which fees and other expenses have been awarded under section 

285 to a prevailing party defending against an allegation of infringement of a 

patent claim, and in which the nonprevailing party alleging infringement is unable to pay the award of fees and other expenses, the court shall grant a motion 

by the prevailing party to join an interested party if such prevailing party 

shows that the nonprevailing party has no substantial interest in the subject 

matter at issue other than asserting such patent claim in litigation. 

‘‘(2) LIMITATION ON JOINDER.— 

‘‘(A) DISCRETIONARY DENIAL OF MOTION.—The court may deny a motion 

to join an interested party under paragraph (1) if— 

‘‘(i) the interested party is not subject to service of process; or 

‘‘(ii) joinder under paragraph (1) would deprive the court of subject 

matter jurisdiction or make venue improper. 

‘‘(B) REQUIRED DENIAL OF MOTION.—The court shall deny a motion to 

join an interested party under paragraph (1) if— 

‘‘(i) the interested party did not timely receive the notice required 

by paragraph (3); or 

‘‘(ii) within 30 days after receiving the notice required by paragraph (3), the interested party renounces, in writing and with notice to 

the court and the parties to the action, any ownership, right, or direct 

financial interest (as described in paragraph (4)) that the interested 

party has in the patent or patents at issue. 

‘‘(3) NOTICE REQUIREMENT.—An interested party may not be joined under 

paragraph (1) unless it has been provided actual notice, within 30 days after 

the date on which it has been identified in the initial disclosure provided under 

section 290(b), that it has been so identified and that such party may therefore 

be an interested party subject to joinder under this subsection. Such notice shall 

be provided by the party who subsequently moves to join the interested party 

under paragraph (1), and shall include language that— 

‘‘(A) identifies the action, the parties thereto, the patent or patents at 

issue, and the pleading or other paper that identified the party under section 290(b); and 

‘‘(B) informs the party that it may be joined in the action and made 

subject to paying an award of fees and other expenses under section 285(b) 

if— 

‘‘(i) fees and other expenses are awarded in the action against the 

party alleging infringement of the patent or patents at issue under section 285(a); 

‘‘(ii) the party alleging infringement is unable to pay the award of 

fees and other expenses; 

‘‘(iii) the party receiving notice under this paragraph is determined 

by the court to be an interested party; and 

‘‘(iv) the party receiving notice under this paragraph has not, within 30 days after receiving such notice, renounced in writing, and with 

notice to the court and the parties to the action, any ownership, right, 

or direct financial interest (as described in paragraph (4)) that the interested party has in the patent or patents at issue. 

‘‘(4) INTERESTED PARTY DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term ‘interested 

party’ means a person, other than the party alleging infringement, that— 

‘‘(A) is an assignee of the patent or patents at issue; 

‘‘(B) has a right, including a contingent right, to enforce or sublicense 

the patent or patents at issue; or 

‘‘(C) has a direct financial interest in the patent or patents at issue, including the right to any part of an award of damages or any part of licensing revenue, except that a person with a direct financial interest does not 

include— 

‘‘(i) an attorney or law firm providing legal representation in the 

civil action described in paragraph (1) if the sole basis for the financial 

interest of the attorney or law firm in the patent or patents at issue 

arises from the attorney or law firm’s receipt of compensation reasonably related to the provision of the legal representation; or 
7 

‘‘(ii) a person whose sole financial interest in the patent or patents 

at issue is ownership of an equity interest in the party alleging infringement, unless such person also has the right or ability to influence, direct, or control the civil action.’’. 

(d) DISCOVERY LIMITS.— 

(1) AMENDMENT.—Chapter 29 of title 35, United States Code, is amended 

by adding at the end the following new section: 

‘‘§ 299A. Discovery in patent infringement action 

‘‘(a) DISCOVERY IN PATENT INFRINGEMENT ACTION.—Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c), in a civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to 

patents, if the court determines that a ruling relating to the construction of terms 

used in a patent claim asserted in the complaint is required, discovery shall be limited, until such ruling is issued, to information necessary for the court to determine 

the meaning of the terms used in the patent claim, including any interpretation of 

those terms used to support the claim of infringement. 

‘‘(b) DISCRETION TO EXPAND SCOPE OF DISCOVERY.— 

‘‘(1) TIMELY RESOLUTION OF ACTIONS.—In the case of an action under any 

provision of Federal law (including an action that includes a claim for relief 

arising under section 271(e)), for which resolution within a specified period of 

time of a civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents will 

necessarily affect the rights of a party with respect to the patent, the court shall 

permit discovery, in addition to the discovery authorized under subsection (a), 

before the ruling described in subsection (a) is issued as necessary to ensure 

timely resolution of the action. 

‘‘(2) RESOLUTION OF MOTIONS.—When necessary to resolve a motion properly raised by a party before a ruling relating to the construction of terms described in subsection (a) is issued, the court may allow limited discovery in addition to the discovery authorized under subsection (a) as necessary to resolve 

the motion. 

‘‘(3) SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES.—In special circumstances that would make 

denial of discovery a manifest injustice, the court may permit discovery, in addition to the discovery authorized under subsection (a), as necessary to prevent 

the manifest injustice. 

‘‘(4) ACTIONS SEEKING RELIEF BASED ON COMPETITIVE HARM.—The limitation 

on discovery provided under subsection (a) shall not apply to an action seeking 

a preliminary injunction to redress harm arising from the use, sale, or offer for 

sale of any allegedly infringing instrumentality that competes with a product 

sold or offered for sale, or a process used in manufacture, by a party alleging 

infringement. 

‘‘(c) EXCLUSION FROM DISCOVERY LIMITATION.—The parties may voluntarily consent to be excluded, in whole or in part, from the limitation on discovery provided 

under subsection (a) if at least one plaintiff and one defendant enter into a signed 

stipulation, to be filed with and signed by the court. With regard to any discovery 

excluded from the requirements of subsection (a) under the signed stipulation, with 

respect to such parties, such discovery shall proceed according to the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure.’’. 

(2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The table of sections for chapter 29 of title 

35, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 

item: 

‘‘299A. Discovery in patent infringement action.’’. 

(e) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that it is an abuse of the 

patent system and against public policy for a party to send out purposely evasive 

demand letters to end users alleging patent infringement. Demand letters sent 

should, at the least, include basic information about the patent in question, what 

is being infringed, and how it is being infringed. Any actions or litigation that stem 

from these types of purposely evasive demand letters to end users should be considered a fraudulent or deceptive practice and an exceptional circumstance when considering whether the litigation is abusive. 

(f) DEMAND LETTERS.—Section 284 of title 35, United States Code, is amended— 

(1) in the first undesignated paragraph, by striking ‘‘Upon finding’’ and inserting ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—Upon finding’’; 

(2) in the second undesignated paragraph, by striking ‘‘When the damages’’ 

and inserting ‘‘(b) ASSESSMENT BY COURT; TREBLE DAMAGES.—When the damages’’; 
8 

(3) by inserting after subsection (b), as designated by paragraph (2) of this 

subsection, the following: 

‘‘(c) WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT.—A claimant seeking to establish willful infringement may not rely on evidence of pre-suit notification of infringement unless that 

notification identifies with particularity the asserted patent, identifies the product 

or process accused, identifies the ultimate parent entity of the claimant, and explains with particularity, to the extent possible following a reasonable investigation 

or inquiry, how the product or process infringes one or more claims of the patent.’’; 

and 

(4) in the last undesignated paragraph, by striking ‘‘The court’’ and inserting ‘‘(d) EXPERT TESTIMONY.—The court’’. 

(g) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Except as otherwise provided in this section, the amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this 

Act and shall apply to any action for which a complaint is filed on or after that date. 

SEC. 4. TRANSPARENCY OF PATENT OWNERSHIP. 

(a) AMENDMENTS.—Section 290 of title 35, United States Code, is amended— 

(1) in the heading, by striking ‘‘suits’’ and inserting ‘‘suits; disclosure of 

interests’’; 

(2) by striking ‘‘The clerks’’ and inserting ‘‘(a) NOTICE OF PATENT SUITS.— 

The clerks’’; and 

(3) by adding at the end the following new subsections: 

‘‘(b) INITIAL DISCLOSURE.— 

‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), upon the filing of 

an initial complaint for patent infringement, the plaintiff shall disclose to the 

Patent and Trademark Office, the court, and each adverse party the identity of 

each of the following: 

‘‘(A) The assignee of the patent or patents at issue. 

‘‘(B) Any entity with a right to sublicense or enforce the patent or patents at issue. 

‘‘(C) Any entity, other than the plaintiff, that the plaintiff knows to 

have a financial interest in the patent or patents at issue or the plaintiff. 

‘‘(D) The ultimate parent entity of any assignee identified under subparagraph (A) and any entity identified under subparagraph (B) or (C). 

‘‘(2) EXEMPTION.—The requirements of paragraph (1) shall not apply with 

respect to a civil action filed under subsection (a) that includes a cause of action 

described under section 271(e)(2). 

‘‘(c) DISCLOSURE COMPLIANCE.— 

‘‘(1) PUBLICLY TRADED.—For purposes of subsection (b)(1)(C), if the financial 

interest is held by a corporation traded on a public stock exchange, an identification of the name of the corporation and the public exchange listing shall satisfy the disclosure requirement. 

‘‘(2) NOT PUBLICLY TRADED.—For purposes of subsection (b)(1)(C), if the financial interest is not held by a publicly traded corporation, the disclosure shall 

satisfy the disclosure requirement if the information identifies— 

‘‘(A) in the case of a partnership, the name of the partnership and the 

name and correspondence address of each partner or other entity that holds 

more than a 5-percent share of that partnership; 

‘‘(B) in the case of a corporation, the name of the corporation, the location of incorporation, the address of the principal place of business, and the 

name of each officer of the corporation; and 

‘‘(C) for each individual, the name and correspondence address of that 

individual. 

‘‘(d) ONGOING DUTY OF DISCLOSURE TO THE PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE.— 

‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—A plaintiff required to submit information under subsection (b) or a subsequent owner of the patent or patents at issue shall, not 

later than 90 days after any change in the assignee of the patent or patents 

at issue or an entity described under subparagraph (B) or (D) of subsection 

(b)(1), submit to the Patent and Trademark Office the updated identification of 

such assignee or entity. 

‘‘(2) FAILURE TO COMPLY.—With respect to a patent for which the requirement of paragraph (1) has not been met— 

‘‘(A) the plaintiff or subsequent owner shall not be entitled to recover 

reasonable fees and other expenses under section 285 or increased damages 

under section 284 with respect to infringing activities taking place during 

any period of noncompliance with paragraph (1), unless the denial of such 

damages or fees would be manifestly unjust; and 
9 

‘‘(B) the court shall award to a prevailing party accused of infringement 

reasonable fees and other expenses under section 285 that are incurred to 

discover the updated assignee or entity described under paragraph (1), unless such sanctions would be unjust. 

‘‘(e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

‘‘(1) FINANCIAL INTEREST.—The term ‘financial interest’— 

‘‘(A) means— 

‘‘(i) with regard to a patent or patents, the right of a person to receive proceeds related to the assertion of the patent or patents, including a fixed or variable portion of such proceeds; and 

‘‘(ii) with regard to the plaintiff, direct or indirect ownership or control by a person of more than 5 percent of such plaintiff; and 

‘‘(B) does not mean— 

‘‘(i) ownership of shares or other interests in a mutual or common 

investment fund, unless the owner of such interest participates in the 

management of such fund; or 

‘‘(ii) the proprietary interest of a policyholder in a mutual insurance company or of a depositor in a mutual savings association, or a 

similar proprietary interest, unless the outcome of the proceeding could 

substantially affect the value of such interest. 

‘‘(2) PROCEEDING.—The term ‘proceeding’ means all stages of a civil action, 

including pretrial and trial proceedings and appellate review. 

‘‘(3) ULTIMATE PARENT ENTITY.— 

‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the term 

‘ultimate parent entity’ has the meaning given such term in section 

801.1(a)(3) of title 16, Code of Federal Regulations, or any successor regulation. 

‘‘(B) MODIFICATION OF DEFINITION.—The Director may modify the definition of ‘ultimate parent entity’ by regulation.’’. 

(b) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The item relating to section 290 

in the table of sections for chapter 29 of title 35, United States Code, is amended 

to read as follows: 

‘‘290. Notice of patent suits; disclosure of 

interests.’’. 

(c) REGULATIONS.—The Director may promulgate such regulations as are necessary to establish a registration fee in an amount sufficient to recover the estimated costs of administering subsections (b) through (e) of section 290 of title 35, 

United States Code, as added by subsection (a), to facilitate the collection and maintenance of the information required by such subsections, and to ensure the timely 

disclosure of such information to the public. 

(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this section shall take effect 

upon the expiration of the 6-month period beginning on the date of the enactment 

of this Act and shall apply to any action for which a complaint is filed on or after 

such effective date. 

SEC. 5. CUSTOMER-SUIT EXCEPTION. 

(a) AMENDMENT.—Section 296 of title 35, United States Code, is amended to 

read as follows: 

‘‘§ 296. Stay of action against customer 

‘‘(a) STAY OF ACTION AGAINST CUSTOMER.—Except as provided in subsection (d), 

in any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, the court 

shall grant a motion to stay at least the portion of the action against a covered customer related to infringement of a patent involving a covered product or process if 

the following requirements are met: 

‘‘(1) The covered manufacturer and the covered customer consent in writing 

to the stay. 

‘‘(2) The covered manufacturer is a party to the action or to a separate action involving the same patent or patents related to the same covered product 

or process. 

‘‘(3) The covered customer agrees to be bound by any issues that the covered customer has in common with the covered manufacturer and are finally 

decided as to the covered manufacturer in an action described in paragraph (2). 

‘‘(4) The motion is filed after the first pleading in the action but not later 

than the later of— 
10 

‘‘(A) the 120th day after the date on which the first pleading in the action is served that specifically identifies the covered product or process as 

a basis for the covered customer’s alleged infringement of the patent and 

that specifically identifies how the covered product or process is alleged to 

infringe the patent; or 

‘‘(B) the date on which the first scheduling order in the case is entered. 

‘‘(b) APPLICABILITY OF STAY.—A stay issued under subsection (a) shall apply 

only to the patents, products, systems, or components accused of infringement in the 

action. 

‘‘(c) LIFT OF STAY.— 

‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—A stay entered under this section may be lifted upon 

grant of a motion based on a showing that— 

‘‘(A) the action involving the covered manufacturer will not resolve a 

major issue in suit against the covered customer; or 

‘‘(B) the stay unreasonably prejudices and would be manifestly unjust 

to the party seeking to lift the stay. 

‘‘(2) SEPARATE MANUFACTURER ACTION INVOLVED.—In the case of a stay entered based on the participation of the covered manufacturer in a separate action involving the same patent or patents related to the same covered product 

or process, a motion under this subsection may only be made if the court in 

such separate action determines the showing required under paragraph (1) has 

been met. 

‘‘(d) EXEMPTION.—This section shall not apply to an action that includes a cause 

of action described under section 271(e)(2). 

‘‘(e) CONSENT JUDGMENT.—If, following the grant of a motion to stay under this 

section, the covered manufacturer seeks or consents to entry of a consent judgment 

relating to one or more of the common issues that gave rise to the stay, or declines 

to prosecute through appeal a final decision as to one or more of the common issues 

that gave rise to the stay, the court may, upon grant of a motion, determine that 

such consent judgment or unappealed final decision shall not be binding on the covered customer with respect to one or more of such common issues based on a showing that such an outcome would unreasonably prejudice and be manifestly unjust 

to the covered customer in light of the circumstances of the case. 

‘‘(f) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit 

the ability of a court to grant any stay, expand any stay granted under this section, 

or grant any motion to intervene, if otherwise permitted by law. 

‘‘(g) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

‘‘(1) COVERED CUSTOMER.—The term ‘covered customer’ means a party accused of infringing a patent or patents in dispute based on a covered product 

or process. 

‘‘(2) COVERED MANUFACTURER.—The term ‘covered manufacturer’ means a 

person that manufactures or supplies, or causes the manufacture or supply of, 

a covered product or process or a relevant part thereof. 

‘‘(3) COVERED PRODUCT OR PROCESS.—The term ‘covered product or process’ 

means a product, process, system, service, component, material, or apparatus, 

or relevant part thereof, that— 

‘‘(A) is alleged to infringe the patent or patents in dispute; or 

‘‘(B) implements a process alleged to infringe the patent or patents in 

dispute.’’. 

(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The table of sections for chapter 29 of title 35, 

United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to section 296 and inserting the following: 

‘‘296. Stay of action against customer.’’. 

(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this section shall take effect 

on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to any action for which 

a complaint is filed on or after the first day of the 30-day period that ends on that 

date. 

SEC. 6. PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES TO IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE. 

(a) JUDICIAL CONFERENCE RULES AND PROCEDURES ON DISCOVERY BURDENS

AND COSTS.— 

(1) RULES AND PROCEDURES.—The Judicial Conference of the United States, 

using existing resources, shall develop rules and procedures to implement the 

issues and proposals described in paragraph (2) to address the asymmetries in 

discovery burdens and costs in any civil action arising under any Act of Con-
11 

gress relating to patents. Such rules and procedures shall include how and 

when payment for document discovery in addition to the discovery of core documentary evidence is to occur, and what information must be presented to demonstrate financial capacity before permitting document discovery in addition to 

the discovery of core documentary evidence. 

(2) RULES AND PROCEDURES TO BE CONSIDERED.—The rules and procedures 

required under paragraph (1) should address each of the following issues and 

proposals: 

(A) DISCOVERY OF CORE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE.—Whether and to 

what extent each party to the action is entitled to receive core documentary 

evidence and shall be responsible for the costs of producing core documentary evidence within the possession or control of each such party, and 

whether and to what extent each party to the action may seek nondocumentary discovery as otherwise provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

(B) ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION.—If the parties determine that the 

discovery of electronic communication is appropriate, whether such discovery shall occur after the parties have exchanged initial disclosures and 

core documentary evidence and whether such discovery shall be in accordance with the following: 

(i) Any request for the production of electronic communication shall 

be specific and may not be a general request for the production of information relating to a product or business. 

(ii) Each request shall identify the custodian of the information requested, the search terms, and a time frame. The parties shall cooperate to identify the proper custodians, the proper search terms, and the 

proper time frame. 

(iii) A party may not submit production requests to more than 5 

custodians, unless the parties jointly agree to modify the number of 

production requests without leave of the court. 

(iv) The court may consider contested requests for up to 5 additional custodians per producing party, upon a showing of a distinct 

need based on the size, complexity, and issues of the case. 

(v) If a party requests the discovery of electronic communication for 

additional custodians beyond the limits agreed to by the parties or 

granted by the court, the requesting party shall bear all reasonable 

costs caused by such additional discovery. 

(C) ADDITIONAL DOCUMENT DISCOVERY.—Whether the following should 

apply: 

(i) IN GENERAL.—Each party to the action may seek any additional 

document discovery otherwise permitted under the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, if such party bears the reasonable costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees, of the additional document discovery. 

(ii) REQUIREMENTS FOR ADDITIONAL DOCUMENT DISCOVERY.—Unless 

the parties mutually agree otherwise, no party may be permitted additional document discovery unless such a party posts a bond, or provides 

other security, in an amount sufficient to cover the expected costs of 

such additional document discovery, or makes a showing to the court 

that such party has the financial capacity to pay the costs of such additional document discovery. 

(iii) LIMITS ON ADDITIONAL DOCUMENT DISCOVERY.—A court, upon 

motion, may determine that a request for additional document discovery is excessive, irrelevant, or otherwise abusive and may set limits 

on such additional document discovery. 

(iv) GOOD CAUSE MODIFICATION.—A court, upon motion and for 

good cause shown, may modify the requirements of subparagraphs (A) 

and (B) and any definition under paragraph (3). Not later than 30 days 

after the pretrial conference under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, the parties shall jointly submit any proposed modifications 

of the requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) and any definition 

under paragraph (3), unless the parties do not agree, in which case 

each party shall submit any proposed modification of such party and 

a summary of the disagreement over the modification. 

(v) COMPUTER CODE.—A court, upon motion and for good cause 

shown, may determine that computer code should be included in the 

discovery of core documentary evidence. The discovery of computer code 

shall occur after the parties have exchanged initial disclosures and 

other core documentary evidence. 
12 

(D) DISCOVERY SEQUENCE AND SCOPE.—Whether the parties shall discuss and address in the written report filed pursuant to Rule 26(f) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the views and proposals of each party on 

the following: 

(i) When the discovery of core documentary evidence should be 

completed. 

(ii) Whether additional document discovery will be sought under 

subparagraph (C). 

(iii) Any issues about infringement, invalidity, or damages that, if 

resolved before the additional discovery described in subparagraph (C) 

commences, might simplify or streamline the case, including the identification of any terms or phrases relating to any patent claim at issue 

to be construed by the court and whether the early construction of any 

of those terms or phrases would be helpful. 

(3) DEFINITIONS.—In this subsection: 

(A) CORE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE.—The term ‘‘core documentary evidence’’— 

(i) includes— 

(I) documents relating to the conception of, reduction to practice of, and application for, the patent or patents at issue; 

(II) documents sufficient to show the technical operation of the 

product or process identified in the complaint as infringing the patent or patents at issue; 

(III) documents relating to potentially invalidating prior art; 

(IV) documents relating to any licensing of, or other transfer 

of rights to, the patent or patents at issue before the date on which 

the complaint is filed; 

(V) documents sufficient to show profit attributable to the 

claimed invention of the patent or patents at issue; 

(VI) documents relating to any knowledge by the accused infringer of the patent or patents at issue before the date on which 

the complaint is filed; 

(VII) documents relating to any knowledge by the patentee of 

infringement of the patent or patents at issue before the date on 

which the complaint is filed; 

(VIII) documents relating to any licensing term or pricing commitment to which the patent or patents may be subject through 

any agency or standard-setting body; and 

(IX) documents sufficient to show any marking or other notice 

provided of the patent or patents at issue; and 

(ii) does not include computer code, except as specified in paragraph (2)(C)(v). 

(B) ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATION.—The term ‘‘electronic communication’’ means any form of electronic communication, including email, text 

message, or instant message. 

(4) IMPLEMENTATION BY THE DISTRICT COURTS.—Not later than 6 months 

after the date on which the Judicial Conference has developed the rules and 

procedures required by this subsection, each United States district court and 

the United States Court of Federal Claims shall revise the applicable local rules 

for such court to implement such rules and procedures. 

(5) AUTHORITY FOR JUDICIAL CONFERENCE TO REVIEW AND MODIFY.— 

(A) STUDY OF EFFICACY OF RULES AND PROCEDURES.—The Judicial Conference shall study the efficacy of the rules and procedures required by this 

subsection during the 4-year period beginning on the date on which such 

rules and procedures by the district courts and the United States Court of 

Federal Claims are first implemented. The Judicial Conference may modify 

such rules and procedures following such 4-year period. 

(B) INITIAL MODIFICATIONS.—Before the expiration of the 4-year period 

described in subparagraph (A), the Judicial Conference may modify the requirements under this subsection— 

(i) by designating categories of ‘‘core documentary evidence’’, in addition to those designated under paragraph (3)(A), as the Judicial Conference determines to be appropriate and necessary; and 

(ii) as otherwise necessary to prevent a manifest injustice, the imposition of a requirement the costs of which clearly outweigh its benefits, or a result that could not reasonably have been intended by the 

Congress. 
13 

(b) JUDICIAL CONFERENCE PATENT CASE MANAGEMENT.—The Judicial Conference of the United States, using existing resources, shall develop case management procedures to be implemented by the United States district courts and the 

United States Court of Federal Claims for any civil action arising under any Act 

of Congress relating to patents, including initial disclosure and early case management conference practices that— 

(1) will identify any potential dispositive issues of the case; and 

(2) focus on early summary judgment motions when resolution of issues 

may lead to expedited disposition of the case. 

(c) REVISION OF FORM FOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT.— (1) ELIMINATION OF FORM.—The Supreme Court, using existing resources, 

shall eliminate Form 18 in the Appendix to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

(relating to Complaint for Patent Infringement), effective on the date of the enactment of this Act. 

(2) REVISED FORM.—The Supreme Court may prescribe a new form or forms 

setting out model allegations of patent infringement that, at a minimum, notify 

accused infringers of the asserted claim or claims, the products or services accused of infringement, and the plaintiff’s theory for how each accused product 

or service meets each limitation of each asserted claim. The Judicial Conference 

should exercise the authority under section 2073 of title 28, United States Code, 

to make recommendations with respect to such new form or forms. 

(d) PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL-PROPERTY LICENSES IN BANKRUPTCY.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Section 1522 of title 11, United States Code, is amended 

by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(e) Section 365(n) shall apply to cases under this chapter. If the foreign representative rejects or repudiates a contract under which the debtor is a licensor of 

intellectual property, the licensee under such contract shall be entitled to make the 

election and exercise the rights described in section 365(n).’’. 

(2) TRADEMARKS.— 

(A) IN GENERAL.—Section 101(35A) of title 11, United States Code, is 

amended— 

(i) in subparagraph (E), by striking ‘‘or’’; 

(ii) in subparagraph (F), by striking ‘‘title 17;’’ and inserting ‘‘title 

17; or’’; and 

(iii) by adding after subparagraph (F) the following new subparagraph: 

‘‘(G) a trademark, service mark, or trade name, as those terms are defined in section 45 of the Act of July 5, 1946 (commonly referred to as the 

‘Trademark Act of 1946’) (15 U.S.C. 1127);’’. 

(B) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 365(n)(2) of title 11, United 

States Code, is amended— 

(i) in subparagraph (B)— 

(I) by striking ‘‘royalty payments’’ and inserting ‘‘royalty or 

other payments’’; and 

(II) by striking ‘‘and’’ after the semicolon; 

(ii) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period at the end of clause 

(ii) and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 

(iii) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: 

‘‘(D) in the case of a trademark, service mark, or trade name, the trustee 

shall not be relieved of a contractual obligation to monitor and control the quality of a licensed product or service.’’. 

(3) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this subsection shall take 

effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to any case that 

is pending on, or for which a petition or complaint is filed on or after, such date 

of enactment. 

SEC. 7. SMALL BUSINESS EDUCATION, OUTREACH, AND INFORMATION ACCESS. 

(a) SMALL BUSINESS EDUCATION AND OUTREACH.— 

(1) RESOURCES FOR SMALL BUSINESS.—Using existing resources, the Director 

shall develop educational resources for small businesses to address concerns 

arising from patent infringement. 

(2) SMALL BUSINESS PATENT OUTREACH.—The existing small business patent 

outreach programs of the Office, and the relevant offices at the Small Business 

Administration and the Minority Business Development Agency, shall provide 

education and awareness on abusive patent litigation practices. The Director 

may give special consideration to the unique needs of small firms owned by disabled veterans, service-disabled veterans, women, and minority entrepreneurs 

in planning and executing the outreach efforts by the Office. 
14 

(b) IMPROVING INFORMATION TRANSPARENCY FOR SMALL BUSINESS AND THE

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE USERS.— 

(1) WEB SITE.—Using existing resources, the Director shall create a userfriendly section on the official Web site of the Office to notify the public when 

a patent case is brought in Federal court and, with respect to each patent at 

issue in such case, the Director shall include— 

(A) information disclosed under subsections (b) and (d) of section 290 

of title 35, United States Code, as added by section 4(a) of this Act; and 

(B) any other information the Director determines to be relevant. 

(2) FORMAT.—In order to promote accessibility for the public, the information described in paragraph (1) shall be searchable by patent number, patent 

art area, and entity. 

SEC. 8. STUDIES ON PATENT TRANSACTIONS, QUALITY, AND EXAMINATION. 

(a) STUDY ON SECONDARY MARKET OVERSIGHT FOR PATENT TRANSACTIONS TO

PROMOTE TRANSPARENCY AND ETHICAL BUSINESS PRACTICES.— 

(1) STUDY REQUIRED.—The Director, in consultation with the Secretary of 

Commerce, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Securities and 

Exchange Commission, the heads of other relevant agencies, and interested parties, shall, using existing resources of the Office, conduct a study— 

(A) to develop legislative recommendations to ensure greater transparency and accountability in patent transactions occurring on the secondary market; 

(B) to examine the economic impact that the patent secondary market 

has on the United States; 

(C) to examine licensing and other oversight requirements that may be 

placed on the patent secondary market, including on the participants in 

such markets, to ensure that the market is a level playing field and that 

brokers in the market have the requisite expertise and adhere to ethical 

business practices; and 

(D) to examine the requirements placed on other markets. 

(2) REPORT ON STUDY.—Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit a report to the Committee on the 

Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee on the Judiciary 

of the Senate on the findings and recommendations of the Director from the 

study required under paragraph (1). 

(b) STUDY ON PATENTS OWNED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.— 

(1) STUDY REQUIRED.—The Director, in consultation with the heads of relevant agencies and interested parties, shall, using existing resources of the Office, conduct a study on patents owned by the United States Government that— 

(A) examines how such patents are licensed and sold, and any litigation 

relating to the licensing or sale of such patents; 

(B) provides legislative and administrative recommendations on whether there should be restrictions placed on patents acquired from the United 

States Government; 

(C) examines whether or not each relevant agency maintains adequate 

records on the patents owned by such agency, specifically whether such 

agency addresses licensing, assignment, and Government grants for technology related to such patents; and 

(D) provides recommendations to ensure that each relevant agency has 

an adequate point of contact that is responsible for managing the patent 

portfolio of the agency. 

(2) REPORT ON STUDY.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary 

of the House of Representatives and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on the findings and recommendations of the Director from the 

study required under paragraph (1). 

(c) STUDY ON PATENT QUALITY AND ACCESS TO THE BEST INFORMATION DURING

EXAMINATION.— 

(1) GAO STUDY.—The Comptroller General of the United States shall, using 

existing resources, conduct a study on patent examination at the Office and the 

technologies available to improve examination and improve patent quality. 

(2) CONTENTS OF THE STUDY.—The study required under paragraph (1) 

shall include the following: 

(A) An examination of patent quality at the Office. 

(B) An examination of ways to improve patent quality, specifically 

through technology, that shall include examining best practices at foreign 
15 

patent offices and the use of existing off-the-shelf technologies to improve 

patent examination. 

(C) A description of how patents are classified. 

(D) An examination of procedures in place to prevent double patenting 

through filing by applicants in multiple art areas. 

(E) An examination of the types of off-the-shelf prior art databases and 

search software used by foreign patent offices and governments, particularly in Europe and Asia, and whether those databases and search tools 

could be used by the Office to improve patent examination. 

(F) An examination of any other areas the Comptroller General determines to be relevant. 

(3) REPORT ON STUDY.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit to the Committee on the 

Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee on the Judiciary 

of the Senate a report on the findings and recommendations from the study required by this subsection, including recommendations for any changes to laws 

and regulations that will improve the examination of patent applications and 

patent quality. 

(d) STUDY ON PATENT SMALL CLAIMS COURT.— (1) STUDY REQUIRED.— (A) IN GENERAL.—The Director of the Administrative Office of the 

United States Courts, in consultation with the Director of the Federal Judicial Center and the United States Patent and Trademark Office, shall, 

using existing resources, conduct a study to examine the idea of developing 

a pilot program for patent small claims procedures in certain judicial districts within the existing patent pilot program mandated by Public Law 

111–349. 

(B) CONTENTS OF STUDY.—The study under subparagraph (A) shall examine— 

(i) the necessary criteria for using small claims procedures; 

(ii) the costs that would be incurred for establishing, maintaining, 

and operating such a pilot program; and 

(iii) the steps that would be taken to ensure that the procedures 

used in the pilot program are not misused for abusive patent litigation. 

(2) REPORT ON STUDY.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States 

Courts shall submit a report to the Committee on the Judiciary of the House 

of Representatives and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate on the 

findings and recommendations of the Director of the Administrative Office from 

the study required under paragraph (1). 

(e) STUDY ON DEMAND LETTERS.— 

(1) STUDY.—The Director, in consultation with the heads of other appropriate agencies, shall, using existing resources, conduct a study of the prevalence of the practice of sending patent demand letters in bad faith and the extent to which that practice may, through fraudulent or deceptive practices, impose a negative impact on the marketplace. 

(2) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit a report to the Committee on the 

Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee on the Judiciary 

of the Senate on the findings and recommendations of the Director from the 

study required under paragraph (1). 

(3) PATENT DEMAND LETTER DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘patent 

demand letter’’ means a written communication relating to a patent that states 

or indicates, directly or indirectly, that the recipient or anyone affiliated with 

the recipient is or may be infringing the patent. 

(f) STUDY ON BUSINESS METHOD PATENT QUALITY.— 

(1) GAO STUDY.—The Comptroller General of the United States shall, using 

existing resources, conduct a study on the volume and nature of litigation involving business method patents. 

(2) CONTENTS OF STUDY.—The study required under paragraph (1) shall 

focus on examining the quality of business method patents asserted in suits alleging patent infringement, and may include an examination of any other areas 

that the Comptroller General determines to be relevant. 

(3) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General shall submit to the Committee on the 

Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Committee on the Judiciary 

of the Senate a report on the findings and recommendations from the study required by this subsection, including recommendations for any changes to laws 
16 

or regulations that the Comptroller General considers appropriate on the basis 

of the study. 

(g) STUDY ON IMPACT OF LEGISLATION ON ABILITY OF INDIVIDUALS AND SMALL

BUSINESSES TO PROTECT EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS TO INVENTIONS AND DISCOVERIES.— 

(1) STUDY REQUIRED.—The Director, in consultation with the Secretary of 

Commerce, the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States 

Courts, the Director of the Federal Judicial Center, the heads of other relevant 

agencies, and interested parties, shall, using existing resources of the Office, 

conduct a study to examine the economic impact of sections 3, 4, and 5 of this 

Act, and any amendments made by such sections, on the ability of individuals 

and small businesses owned by women, veterans, and minorities to assert, secure, and vindicate the constitutionally guaranteed exclusive right to inventions 

and discoveries by such individuals and small business. 

(2) REPORT ON STUDY.—Not later than 2 years after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary 

of the House of Representatives and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on the findings and recommendations of the Director from the 

study required under paragraph (1). 

SEC. 9. IMPROVEMENTS AND TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS TO THE LEAHY-SMITH AMERICA INVENTS ACT. 

(a) POST-GRANT REVIEW AMENDMENT.—Section 325(e)(2) of title 35, United 

States Code is amended by striking ‘‘or reasonably could have raised’’. 

(b) USE OF DISTRICT-COURT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION IN POST-GRANT AND INTER

PARTES REVIEWS.— 

(1) INTER PARTES REVIEW.—Section 316(a) of title 35, United States Code, 

is amended— 

(A) in paragraph (12), by striking ‘‘; and’’ and inserting a semicolon; 

(B) in paragraph (13), by striking the period at the end and inserting 

‘‘; and’’; and 

(C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: 

‘‘(14) providing that for all purposes under this chapter— 

‘‘(A) each claim of a patent shall be construed as such claim would be 

in a civil action to invalidate a patent under section 282(b), including construing each claim of the patent in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the 

art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent; and 

‘‘(B) if a court has previously construed the claim or a claim term in 

a civil action in which the patent owner was a party, the Office shall consider such claim construction.’’. 

(2) POST-GRANT REVIEW.—Section 326(a) of title 35, United States Code, is 

amended— 

(A) in paragraph (11), by striking ‘‘; and’’ and inserting a semicolon; 

(B) in paragraph (12), by striking the period at the end and inserting 

‘‘; and’’; and 

(C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph: 

‘‘(13) providing that for all purposes under this chapter— 

‘‘(A) each claim of a patent shall be construed as such claim would be 

in a civil action to invalidate a patent under section 282(b), including construing each claim of the patent in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the 

art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent; and 

‘‘(B) if a court has previously construed the claim or a claim term in 

a civil action in which the patent owner was a party, the Office shall consider such claim construction.’’. 

(3) TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 18(a)(1)(A) of the 

Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (Public Law 112–29; 126 Stat. 329; 35 U.S.C. 

321 note) is amended by striking ‘‘Section 321(c)’’ and inserting ‘‘Sections 321(c) 

and 326(a)(13)’’. 

(4) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this subsection shall take 

effect upon the expiration of the 90-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall apply to any proceeding under chapter 31 or 32 

of title 35, United States Code, as the case may be, for which the petition for 

review is filed on or after such effective date. 

(c) CODIFICATION OF THE DOUBLE-PATENTING DOCTRINE FOR FIRST-INVENTORTO-FILE PATENTS.— 

(1) AMENDMENT.—Chapter 10 of title 35, United States Code, is amended 

by adding at the end the following new section: 
17 

‘‘§ 106. Prior art in cases of double patenting 

‘‘A claimed invention of a patent issued under section 151 (referred to as the 

‘first patent’) that is not prior art to a claimed invention of another patent (referred 

to as the ‘second patent’) shall be considered prior art to the claimed invention of 

the second patent for the purpose of determining the nonobviousness of the claimed 

invention of the second patent under section 103 if— 

‘‘(1) the claimed invention of the first patent was effectively filed under section 102(d) on or before the effective filing date of the claimed invention of the 

second patent; 

‘‘(2) either— 

‘‘(A) the first patent and second patent name the same individual or individuals as the inventor; or 

‘‘(B) the claimed invention of the first patent would constitute prior art 

to the claimed invention of the second patent under section 102(a)(2) if an 

exception under section 102(b)(2) were deemed to be inapplicable and the 

claimed invention of the first patent was, or were deemed to be, effectively 

filed under section 102(d) before the effective filing date of the claimed invention of the second patent; and 

‘‘(3) the patentee of the second patent has not disclaimed the rights to enforce the second patent independently from, and beyond the statutory term of, 

the first patent.’’. 

(2) REGULATIONS.—The Director shall promulgate regulations setting forth 

the form and content of any disclaimer required for a patent to be issued in 

compliance with section 106 of title 35, United States Code, as added by paragraph (1). Such regulations shall apply to any disclaimer filed after a patent has 

issued. A disclaimer, when filed, shall be considered for the purpose of determining the validity of the patent under section 106 of title 35, United States 

Code. 

(3) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—The table of sections for chapter 10 of title 

35, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new 

item: 

‘‘106. Prior art in cases of double patenting.’’. 

(4) EXCLUSIVE RULE.—A patent subject to section 106 of title 35, United 

States Code, as added by paragraph (1), shall not be held invalid on any nonstatutory, double-patenting ground based on a patent described in section 

3(n)(1) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (35 U.S.C. 100 note). 

(5) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this subsection shall take 

effect upon the expiration of the 1-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to a patent or patent application only if both 

the first and second patents described in section 106 of title 35, United States 

Code, as added by paragraph (1), are patents or patent applications that are described in section 3(n)(1) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (35 U.S.C. 

100 note). 

(d) PTO PATENT REVIEWS.— (1) CLARIFICATION.— (A) SCOPE OF PRIOR ART.—Section 18(a)(1)(C)(i) of the Leahy-Smith 

America Invents Act (35 U.S.C. 321 note) is amended by striking ‘‘section 

102(a)’’ and inserting ‘‘subsection (a) or (e) of section 102’’. 

(B) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by subparagraph (A) shall 

take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to any 

proceeding pending on, or filed on or after, such date of enactment. 

(2) AUTHORITY TO WAIVE FEE.—Subject to available resources, the Director 

may waive payment of a filing fee for a transitional proceeding described under 

section 18(a) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (35 U.S.C. 321 note). 

(e) CLARIFICATION OF LIMITS ON PATENT TERM ADJUSTMENT.— (1) AMENDMENTS.—Section 154(b)(1)(B) of title 35, United States Code, is 

amended— 

(A) in the matter preceding clause (i), by striking ‘‘not including—’’ and 

inserting ‘‘the term of the patent shall be extended 1 day for each day after 

the end of that 3-year period until the patent is issued, not including—’’; 

(B) in clause (i), by striking ‘‘consumed by continued examination of the 

application requested by the applicant’’ and inserting ‘‘consumed after continued examination of the application is requested by the applicant’’; 

(C) in clause (iii), by striking the comma at the end and inserting a period; and 

(D) by striking the matter following clause (iii). 
18 

(2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this subsection shall take 

effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and apply to any patent application that is pending on, or filed on or after, such date of enactment. 

(f) CLARIFICATION OF JURISDICTION.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Federal interest in preventing inconsistent final judicial determinations as to the legal force or effect of the claims in a patent presents a substantial Federal issue that is important to the Federal system as a 

whole. 

(2) APPLICABILITY.—Paragraph (1)— 

(A) shall apply to all cases filed on or after, or pending on, the date 

of the enactment of this Act; and 

(B) shall not apply to a case in which a Federal court has issued a ruling on whether the case or a claim arises under any Act of Congress relating to patents or plant variety protection before the date of the enactment 

of this Act. 

(g) PATENT PILOT PROGRAM IN CERTAIN DISTRICT COURTS DURATION.— 

(1) DURATION.—Section 1(c) of Public Law 111–349 (124 Stat. 3674; 28 

U.S.C. 137 note) is amended to read as follows: 

‘‘(c) DURATION.—The program established under subsection (a) shall be maintained using existing resources, and shall terminate 20 years after the end of the 

6-month period described in subsection (b).’’. 

(2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act. 

(h) TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS.— 

(1) NOVELTY.— 

(A) AMENDMENT.—Section 102(b)(1)(A) of title 35, United States Code, 

is amended by striking ‘‘the inventor or joint inventor or by another’’ and 

inserting ‘‘the inventor or a joint inventor or another’’. 

(B) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by subparagraph (A) shall 

be effective as if included in the amendment made by section 3(b)(1) of the 

Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (Public Law 112–29). 

(2) INVENTOR’S OATH OR DECLARATION.— 

(A) AMENDMENT.—The second sentence of section 115(a) of title 35, 

United States Code, is amended by striking ‘‘shall execute’’ and inserting 

‘‘may be required to execute’’. 

(B) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by subparagraph (A) shall 

be effective as if included in the amendment made by section 4(a)(1) of the 

Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (Public Law 112–29). 

(3) ASSIGNEE FILERS.— 

(A) BENEFIT OF EARLIER FILING DATE; RIGHT OF PRIORITY.—Section 

119(e)(1) of title 35, United States Code, is amended, in the first sentence, 

by striking ‘‘by an inventor or inventors named’’ and inserting ‘‘that names 

the inventor or a joint inventor’’. 

(B) BENEFIT OF EARLIER FILING DATE IN THE UNITED STATES.—Section 

120 of title 35, United States Code, is amended, in the first sentence, by 

striking ‘‘names an inventor or joint inventor’’ and inserting ‘‘names the inventor or a joint inventor’’. 

(C) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this paragraph shall 

take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to any 

patent application, and any patent issuing from such application, that is 

filed on or after September 16, 2012. 

(4) DERIVED PATENTS.— 

(A) AMENDMENT.—Section 291(b) of title 35, United States Code, is 

amended by striking ‘‘or joint inventor’’ and inserting ‘‘or a joint inventor’’. 

(B) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by subparagraph (A) shall 

be effective as if included in the amendment made by section 3(h)(1) of the 

Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (Public Law 112–29). 

(5) SPECIFICATION.—Notwithstanding section 4(e) of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (Public Law 112–29; 125 Stat. 297), the amendments made by 

subsections (c) and (d) of section 4 of such Act shall apply to any proceeding 

or matter that is pending on, or filed on or after, the date of the enactment of 

this Act. 

(6) TIME LIMIT FOR COMMENCING MISCONDUCT PROCEEDINGS.— 

(A) AMENDMENT.—The fourth sentence of section 32 of title 35, United 

States Code, is amended by striking ‘‘1 year’’ and inserting ‘‘18 months’’. 

(B) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by this paragraph shall 

take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply to any 
19 

action in which the Office files a complaint on or after such date of enactment. 

(7) PATENT OWNER RESPONSE.— (A) CONDUCT OF INTER PARTES REVIEW.—Paragraph (8) of section 316(a) 

of title 35, United States Code, is amended by striking ‘‘the petition under 

section 313’’ and inserting ‘‘the petition under section 311’’. 

(B) CONDUCT OF POST-GRANT REVIEW.—Paragraph (8) of section 326(a) 

of title 35, United States Code, is amended by striking ‘‘the petition under 

section 323’’ and inserting ‘‘the petition under section 321’’. 

(C) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by this paragraph shall 

take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act. 

(8) INTERNATIONAL APPLICATIONS.— 

(A) AMENDMENTS.—Section 202(b) of the Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act of 2012 (Public Law 112–211; 126 Stat. 1536) is amended— 

(i) by striking paragraph (7); and 

(ii) by redesignating paragraphs (8) and (9) as paragraphs (7) and 

(8), respectively. 

(B) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by subparagraph (A) 

shall be effective as if included in title II of the Patent Law Treaties Implementation Act of 2012 (Public Law 112–21). 

SEC. 10. EFFECTIVE DATE. 

Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of this Act shall take 

effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall apply to any patent issued, 

or any action filed, on or after that date. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses on the Innovation Act and the issue of abusive patent litigation. And now it’s my pleasure to recognize the Ranking Member 

of the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Internet, the gentleman from New York, Mr. Nadler, for his opening 

statement. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing which will 

help us to examine the Innovation Act and the problem of abusive 

patent litigation. I am proud to join you as a cosponsor of this legislation so that we can deter patent trolls and protect individuals 

and businesses from abusive patent litigation. But as I have said 

before, and as many have said before, no legislation is perfect, and 

this hearing will help us to determine how H.R. 9 can be further 

improved. 

Our economy depends on innovation to grow and to thrive, and 

this has been true since the dawn of our Nation. The founders 

knew the importance of patent protection in fostering innovation 

and even wrote it into the Constitution. Last week the U.S. Patent 

and Trademark Office celebrated a 225th anniversary of the first 

U.S. patent act just days after issuing its 9 millionth patent. 

Strong patent protection has helped unleash unmatched creativity 

in this country, and it’s vital that we maintain a strong and vibrant patent system. 

Unfortunately the system currently faces a wave of abusive litigation by patent trolls, which stifles innovation and threatens our 

economy. Patent trolls use litigation or the threat of litigation as 

a weapon to extort settlements from innocent defendants. They 

generally own weak patents and make vague claims that will require extensive and time-consuming discovery on the part of the 

defendant. Many patent trolls prey on end users who have no 

knowledge or control over the alleged infringing project. Their goal 

is to drive up the cost of litigation and force the defendant to deter-
20 

mine that it simply makes financial sense to settle even a totally 

bogus claim early, rather than seeing litigation through to the end 

and paying the exorbitant legal fees that can go along with such 

a course of action. Such abusive litigation threatens small and 

large businesses alike. Those companies that refuse to give in to 

the patent trolls’ demands may be forced to spend millions of dollars defending a frivolous lawsuit. And it is not just businesses that 

should be concerned about these lawsuits. Patent trolls harm all 

consumers searching for the next great invention to improve their 

lives. That is because every dollar spent fending off frivolous lawsuits is a dollar that cannot be spent on research and development 

or on improving customer service. When patent trolls win, the rest 

of us lose. 

I support the Innovation Act because a strong patent system requires that we protect businesses and consumers from the harm 

caused by abusive litigation. But I am mindful of the fact that in 

addressing the patent troll problem, we must not impose too great 

a burden on legitimate plaintiffs. A strong patent system also depends on inventors having the ability to protect their creations in 

court. We must be careful to ensure that the reforms included in 

this legislation do not have unintended consequences. For example, 

it is no secret that I have traditionally been an opponent of loser 

pays provisions. People or businesses with legally legitimate disputes should not be punished for trying to protect their interests 

in court. 

H.R. 9 attempts to strike a balance, that will deter patent trolls 

from filing frivolous suits while protecting those with reasonable 

but ultimately unsuccessful claims. I have made it clear, however, 

that my support for this legislation depends in part on a commitment that the fee shifting provision will not get any more stringent 

than in the current version of the legislation. I hope it can be improved further. In fact, I will be interested to hear from our witnesses their thoughts on whether this bill strikes an appropriate 

balance in this regard. 

I particularly want to welcome Michelle Lee and congratulate her 

on her recent confirmation as Director of the Patent and Trademark Office. I look forward to her testimony and to the testimony 

of all our witnesses as we explore the Innovation Act in depth. 

There are many provisions in this bill that require close consideration, and I appreciate the opportunity to examine them today. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of my 

time. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair is now pleased to recognize the gentleman from California, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Courts Intellectual 

Property, and the Internet, Mr. Issa, for his opening statement. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it’s altogether fitting 

that this be a full Committee hearing because, Ms. Lee, clearly you 

are at the heart of why we are, in fact, producing H.R. 9. Often 

Members of this body will talk about patent trolls. They’ll talk 

about weak patents being used by these trolls. They’ll talk about 

our friends in Marshall and Tyler, Texas who seemed to never find 

a patent they didn’t want to consider valid and enforceable and infringed. However, since we passed the landmark legislation in 
21 

2011, it has become clear that to this day we still have a problem 

at the USPTO. This is not a problem of the making of the Patent 

and Trademark Office. As a matter of fact, as the Chairman just 

said, celebrating the 9 millionth patent is quite a celebration. 

However, my little sister, born in 1961 could have celebrated the 

3 millionth patent. We have in my lifetime produced more than 

three out of every four patents produced since our founding. This 

epidemic of innovation would be a good thing if, in fact, patents 

were rigorously defended throughout the process, the Patent Office 

had ever better information, and to be honest, if the bias had been 

toward obviousness not becoming the hallmark of innovation. 

During my lifetime it has become extremely common for inventors to simply take the inevitable direction of a new technology and 

re-patent what was previously patented under the previous technology. This occurs in the automotive industry, in all the sciences, 

including even in health care. 

So as we meet with our Under Secretary, it is very clear that our 

greatest goal in our reform is not just in Article III courts, where 

heightened pleading and fee shifting clearly will make a difference 

for trolls, but, in fact, every inventor should have to work harder, 

narrow further, their claims so that the real patent they receive 

from the Patent Office, they have patent certainty on. 

Often many of the companies in BIO come before this Committee 

and into my office, and they talk about certainty. And I tell them, 

if your patent is often reduced or even made invalid when scrutinized either by the Patent and Trademark Office or in an Article 

III court or even in the ITC, then in fact we have done you a disservice, but you have done yourself a disservice. An inventor is best 

off having a narrow patent, fully understood, so that he or she can 

assert that patent when appropriate and understand that innovation comes, quite candidly, from patents that you work around. 

So as we go into H.R. 9, as was said earlier, a bill that in the 

last Congress enjoyed a 33 to 5 in this Committee’s support and 

325 positive votes on the House floor, I want everyone to understand that like the Chairman of the full Committee and the other 

Members, I’ll work tirelessly to try to find ways to make this bill 

better in the basic ways of both streamlining the activities that go 

on once a patent is granted but also work with the Patent and 

Trademark Office to ensure that in the future we will have patents 

which are either not granted, or granted more clearly so that once 

granted, an inventor understands what the limitations of their patent is. 

I think today, Mr. Chairman, we will undoubtedly hear from Ms. 

Lee in detail about the success of the CBM program and re-examinations and where we can work with the Patent and Trademark 

Office to ensure that post-grant and other ways to improve patent 

quality are addressed in this bill. And I want to thank the Chairman again for giving us an opportunity for both of these important 

panels, and I yield back. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. The Chair thanks the gentleman. 

Without objection all other Members’ opening statements will be 

made a part of the record. 

We welcome our distinguished witness for today’s first panel, and 

Ms. Lee, if you would rise, I will begin by swearing you in. 
22 

Do you swear that the testimony that you are about to give shall 

be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help you 

God? 

Thank you very much. Let the record reflect that the witness responded in the affirmative. 

Our first witness today is the Honorable Michelle Lee, Under 

Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the 

United States Patent and Trademark Office. In her role as Director, she oversees one of the largest intellectual property offices in 

the world and serves as the principal adviser to the President on 

both domestic and international intellectual property matters. Prior 

to her role as director, Ms. Lee was Deputy Director and also 

served as the first director of the Silicon Valley USPTO. 

Her experience also includes being the first head of patents and 

strategy at Google while serving as the company’s deputy general 

counsel. She received her J.D. from Stanford Law School and her 

M.S. and B.S. in electrical engineering and computer science from 

the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 

Ms. Lee, welcome. Your testimony will be entered into the record 

in its entirety, and we ask that you summarize your statement in 

5 minutes or less. And to help you with that, there’s a timing light 

on the table. We again welcome you. 

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE MICHELLE LEE, UNDER SECRETARY OF COMMERCE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 

AND DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND 

TRADEMARK OFFICE 

Ms. LEE. Thank you. Chairman Goodlatte, Ranking Member 

Conyers, Chairman Issa, and Ranking Member Nadler, thank you 

for the opportunity to discuss with you our views on H.R. 9, the 

‘‘Innovation Act.’’ Mr. Chairman, we are pleased that you have reintroduced the Innovation Act to begin the legislative patent reform 

efforts in the 114th Congress, to curtail abusive patent litigation, 

to increase patent transparency, and to level the playing field for 

all innovators. 

As a general matter, we believe that the final bill should target 

truly abusive practices while maintaining a patent owner’s legitimate right to enforce his or her patent. Further, we believe that 

the final legislation should take a fair and balanced approach that 

neither favors nor disfavors any particular area of technology, industry, or business model. Finally, any current legislative effort 

should, of course, take into account recent changes in the patent 

system that have come from the courts through rulings and local 

rules, by the Judicial Conference via its rule changes and from the 

USPTO through its implementation and refinement of the America 

Invents Act post-grant trials, as well as its enhanced patent quality 

initiative. 

With these principles in mind, allow me to focus my limited time 

on a few key provisions in the Innovation Act. My written statement contains more detailed thoughts, factors to be weighed, and 

views regarding provisions in the bill. 

First, we generally support the bill’s proposal to require an 

award of attorney’s fees and expenses in patent cases where it is 

proven that the losing party’s position or conduct was unreason-
23 

able. Fault-based fee shifting will raise the cost for those engaging 

in abusive tactics, whether plaintiffs or defendants. It gives the financial incentive to prepare and to present their cases responsibly, 

and it should discourage parties from bringing unjustified cases. 

This type of attorneys’ fee provision will also help ensure consistency in fee awards across the judicial districts. 

Second, we believe it is good policy to have patent owners provide 

more information to defendants in a complaint about why they allegedly infringe a patent than is mandated by current law. Accordingly, we generally support the Innovation Act’s requirement that 

a complaint explain how each element of a patent claim is met by 

an accused product or process or why such information is not readily accessible. 

We believe that requiring the identification of the allegedly infringing products and an explanation of how they infringe at least 

one claim of each asserted patent is important. But any requirement to plead additional claims in a patent at this early stage of 

litigation should be weighed in light of the burdens it would place 

on the patent owner, the potential that it creates for procedural 

motions that may not materially advance the case, and incentives 

that it creates to overplead marginally relevant patent claims. 

Legislation should account for the fact that a party often lacks 

a complete understanding of the case at the outset. We recognize 

that there are ongoing negotiations on how to craft the details of 

this proposal to address these various concerns, and we are supportive of those efforts. 

I would also like to address the Innovation Act’s proposal to stay 

discovery until a court issues a claim construction ruling. Now let 

me begin by saying that I am well aware of the high cost of discovery in patent litigation cases. Discovery is a significant cost 

driver in litigation, and we are committed to working with the 

Committee and stakeholders to find proposals that will reduce 

these costs. But claim construction is complex, and it can be difficult to perform in a vacuum. Often it takes some amount of additional discovery to understand which claims and which technical 

terms in those claims are critical and must be construed, and claim 

construction alone may not dispose of a case, especially when there 

has been no discovery on infringement and invalidity. In those 

cases, discovery costs wouldn’t be avoided, only delayed. We believe 

that there may be alternatives to reducing excessive discovery in 

patent litigation worth considering, and we welcome the opportunity to work with the Committee and stakeholders to develop 

such proposals. 

Finally, we generally support the bill’s proposals to protect customers using off-the-shelf products such as a coffee shop that uses 

an Internet router. A customer stay provision would allow the 

party who understands the technology, the manufacturer, to handle 

the case. Of course, appropriate safeguards should be included. For 

example, the manufacturer and customer both agreeing to the stay, 

and in exchange for the stay, the customer agreeing to be bound 

by the ruling. With safeguards such as these, we believe strides 

can be made to help curtail some of the most coercive patent litigation abuses while simultaneously appropriately preserving limited 

judicial resources. 
24 

We understand that there are extensive, or were extensive negotiations on this topic last year, and we are also supportive of these 

efforts. I will defer to my written statement for more details on the 

rest of the many important provisions in this bill, but briefly I will 

say that the USPTO generally supports the bill’s provisions on; 

transparency, patent licenses in foreign bankruptcy proceedings, 

demand letters, and the many technical corrections. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to share our views 

on these important issues. My staff and I are available to help in 

any way we can toward crafting meaningful, fair, and balanced legislative reforms that are so important to strengthening our patent 

system for American innovators. Thank you. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you, Director Lee. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lee follows:] 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 

Mr. GOODLATTE. And I’ll begin the questioning. I appreciate your 

testimony, and seeing that the Administration continues to be committed to seeing patent reform enacted into law and that they view 

this as a high legislative priority, in that vein I’d like to ask for 

unanimous consent to submit the White House’s Statement of Administration Policy on H.R. 3309, the ‘‘Innovation Act’’ from last 

Congress, which expresses strong support for our bill. 

[The information referred to follows:] 
34 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Director, I’d also like to ask you to talk more 

about three things. First, the importance of the Innovation Act’s 

fee-shifting provisions; second, the ways to make the joinder provisions clearer that they apply to insolvent shell companies that file 

frivolous suits and not legitimate startups and universities; and, 

third, on customer stay. As we look to improve that provision, do 

you support the customer stay language negotiated last May in the 

Senate? 

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much for your question, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me start with the first of the issues that you raised, fee shifting. As I mentioned, we are generally supportive of the provision 

introduced in H.R. 9 on fee shifting. We believe it raises the cost 

for those who are engaging in abusive tactics, and it provides the 

right financial incentives for both plaintiffs and defendants. 

With regard to ways to improve the joinder provision to make 

sure that we are targeting the right individuals but yet excluding 

others, I think as a general matter it is critical that we ensure that 

passive investors, those who do not have the ability to control or 

direct the litigation, are not subject to any kind of joinder or fee 

liability. We need to protect that because otherwise we can chill investment in some very important new enterprises which is so critical to our Nation’s continued economic success. 

And as to universities, my thought there is the university’s business model happens to be education, but we shouldn’t distinguish 

between what people’s business model is. If they’re engaged in abusive behavior, as much as I appreciate universities and their ability 

to contribute to innovation, it’s important that if they’re engaged 

in abusive behavior and they direct and control abusive litigation, 

that they too should be responsible. So, whatever your business 

model, if you control or engage in abusive litigation, you should be 

able to bejoined or held liable. And the final issue was—— 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Customer stay language. 

Ms. LEE. Customer stay, we’re generally supportive of the concepts in it. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. And last May the Senate negotiated some language. If you’re familiar with that, do you have an opinion on that? 

Ms. LEE. I think we are generally supportive with the concepts 

there. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you. We have all heard about plaintifffriendly venues and patent cases being brought in jurisdictions 

where neither party is conducting any business whatsoever. What 

are your thoughts on addressing the issue of venue. 

Ms. LEE. So venue is a very important issue, and many courts 

are working hard to actively manage their cases and control discovery in their district courts. A few courts permit broader discovery, and it appears to be limited to a small number of courts 

and Federal districts. So one option might be to focus on reducing 

the opportunities for forum shopping and the advantages of forum 

shopping by increasing or tightening the venue requirements. Making sure that the parties who end up in a district, have real ties, 

meaningful business ties, to that district, I think would benefit patent litigation throughout the entire process, not just early on in 

terms of discovery pre-claim construction, but at time of ruling for 

summary judgment, at trial, and so forth. So there are clear advan-
35 

tages to be had in considering proposals related to tightening venue 

restrictions. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you. One last question. Just last week 

we saw that the Electronic Frontier Foundation succeeded in an 

inter partes review of Personal Audio’s notorious podcasting patent. 

If someone is bringing a legitimate post-grant or IPR to the USPTO 

showing that there are problems with the patent, then that clearly 

goes to patent quality. But if someone is bringing a frivolous case 

or demanding cash settlements not to file, then that would appear 

to be a clear abuse of the system. I believe that the USPTO has 

full authority under the America Invents Act to address the latter. 

Understanding that any legislative fixes could potentially impede 

the USPTO’s ability to address such issues, what is the USPTO 

doing to prevent the IPR process from being abused. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much for the question, Mr. Chairman. 

You are right. The USPTO is working hard to make sure that the 

proceedings, the AIA post-grant review proceedings are as efficient 

and fair as possible. 

And one of the first initiatives that I undertook when I became 

the head of the office, first as Deputy Director, was to reach out 

to the public who had been using the post-grant review proceedings 

and get input on what we were doing right, what was working, and 

what was not working, and what we could improve upon. And we 

engaged in an eight-city listening tour which I have to say each of 

the cities the attendance was very well attended, and we also solicited written comments on how to improve those proceedings. We 

have gotten that input. We have already issued some quick fixes, 

and by summertime you will see some proposed rules on how we 

can again strengthen the post-grant review proceedings, trials, and 

make them fairer and more efficient, and we hope to complete that 

process by the end of the year. 

So Congress has given us the authority to implement those proceedings. We have implemented it. We also have the authority to 

refine it, and where we can within the congressional mandate we 

are doing everything that we can to make sure those proceedings 

are fair and efficient. 

Mr. GOODLATTE. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the gentleman 

from New York, Mr. Nadler, for his questions. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Lee, in your testimony you say that a plaintiff should only be required to notify the 

defendant of a single representative claim. If the plaintiff conducts, 

as we would expect, the necessary investigation to determine how 

his or her patent was infringed, why would they not be able to 

bring all the claims alleged at the outset? 

Ms. LEE. Thank you, very much, Congressman Nadler, for the 

question. As a general matter, certainly earlier and greater notice 

with respect to claims pled, helps expedite the resolution of the 

case and streamline discovery. And we support, of course, the removal of Form 18 which provided a very low threshold for pleadings in patent cases and a complaint requiring as a baseline for at 

least one claim, a description of how each element is met by an accused product or process or the reasons why that information is not 

readily accessible. 
36 

The issues of pleading and how much should be included in the 

complaint are complex and have many competing considerations 

that should be weighed. And a concern we have is that requiring 

the pleading of additional claims with greater specificity at the beginning of a litigation might unduly burden a patent owner, might 

encourage needless and early procedural motions in the form of motions to dismiss and not materially advance the case when all that 

is required is an appropriately pled, single claim in order for the 

case to move forward. Patent owners oftentimes lack full information about the case at the beginning when they’re filing the complaint, but we recognize the need to have to balance on the one 

hand notice to defendants against the burden and fairness of the 

plaintiffs, and we recognize that there are negotiations going on to 

address these very important concerns and issues, and we look forward to supporting those and providing help where we can. 

Mr. NADLER. But pursuing the same vein, complaints, of course, 

can be amended as the discovery progresses; but if a plaintiff 

knows what other claims they believe are infringed when they initially file their complaint, why should they not be required to put 

all their complaints—of their claims in that complaint? Couldn’t it 

be considered being deceptive if they only put some of them in? 

Ms. LEE. So if there is a heightened pleading requirement in the 

complaint, clearly there is an incentive to get every claim in that 

you think is allegedly infringed, including perhaps some of them 

that you have not fully developed. So, there maybe an incentive to 

over plead, and we have seen cases where you have patent litigation where there are multiple patents, and within each patent 

there are multiple claims asserted. Sometimes you can have upwards of tens if not close to a hundred claims. And that’s a very 

voluminous complaint you have there if you’re going element by 

element. All of that said, certainly greater specificity is beneficial, 

and you’ve got to weigh that against the burdens on the plaintiff 

pre-discovery for providing that sort of information. 

Mr. NADLER. Okay. Now patent trolls, as we know, seek to leverage the cost of discovery to extort settlements from defendants. 

That’s the whole point of—one of the major points of patent trolls. 

Everything we can do to focus discovery on genuine issues and 

eliminate the extraneous demands would both limit the trolls’ leverage and enhance the efficient progress of the litigation. Do you 

agree that a district court is competent to manage such a process 

that would limit the parties’ exchange to the core documents actually essential to the claimed infringement, and do you agree that 

parties could be required to pay for materials outside that core? 

And if not, why not? 

Ms. LEE. So, the question is, do we think a district court is competent to manage the production of core documents requiring the 

parties to pay for the production of core documents and the parties 

the other costs. I think there’s a lot of sense to that proposal, and 

I think certainly many district courts across the country are very 

capable of doing that. And then the question is do we want a uniform standard across all district courts in the country, and do we 

want to legislate that to make sure that that happens? 

Mr. NADLER. And do you think—— 
37 

Ms. LEE. I think there’s an advantage to uniformity in our system. 

Mr. NADLER. And therefore we should legislate that? 

Ms. LEE. It should be something that we consider amongst many 

others, but yes. 

Mr. NADLER. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. ISSA [presiding]. Thank you. I recognize myself now. I’m 

going to follow up with the Ranking Member went through that. 

Is this something that we should allow the Fed circuit input into, 

so that in fact, we work in harmony with those rules? Essentially 

I think his point is a good one which is if you know that your elements on appeal are one court and you know that there is one 

USPTO, shouldn’t we find a way, whether working with the courts 

or on our own and with you, to mandate a sufficient similarity of 

the courts that, in fact, forum shopping is less valuable? 

Ms. LEE. I’m in favor of anything we can do to decrease the opportunities and advantages of forum shopping. I think that it imposes a discipline across all district courts to provide consistency. 

Mr. ISSA. And to that extent, I’d like to shift to the CBM program. Obviously that’s a program designed to dramatically reduce 

the caseload on Article III courts. Could you give us an update on 

what it’s done to reduce low-quality patents? 

Ms. LEE. Yes. Thank you very much, Chairman Issa, for that 

question. The USPTO has successfully implemented the CBM program pursuant to the America Invents Act, meeting its congressional intent. And it was meant to provide a faster, more efficient 

low-cost alternative to district court litigation with regard to a certain category of patents, those pertaining to financial services. And 

we have implemented those, and I want to share some statistics 

with you about them. 

We have received 321 filings to date with 206 institutions and 43 

written decisions, and for the most part based upon the input that 

we’ve received from the roundtable discussions, the eight-city listening tour, I think stakeholders have found the proceedings to be 

helpful; and we have also heard from the stakeholders areas we 

can improve on it, and we are certainly working on that. 

Mr. ISSA. And staying on the subject of patent improvement, the 

IPR process, you know, when I was producing products and applying for patents, it was an interesting world because there was a 

one-way exchange where I gave all the information to the patent 

examiner, and he or she may or may not have had the other side 

of the story in catalogues. And then if somebody presented a patent 

and I wanted to narrow that patent that somebody else had, I went 

through a reexamination process where I essentially threw material at the Patent Office and hoped that they would take it up and 

reconstruct the claims, but I had no input. So, can you give us the 

important difference in the IPR process? 

Ms. LEE. So I think, Chairman Issa, you hit exactly the point 

which is that in the IPR proceedings, you have two sides to a proceeding or—— 

Mr. ISSA. Three if we include you. 

Ms. LEE. I’m usually not a party to it, although I could be. But 

you have two sides, so by virtue of advocacy, each side is putting 

forth their best arguments as to either why the patent is valid or 
38 

why it is invalid, and there is a benefit to that. So, the IPR proceedings, as Members of Congress intended, was meant to be a 

quality check on the patents that were already in the system. The 

USPTO is working on the quality of the patent it issues during an 

examination before it issues, but the IPR, the post-grant review 

proceedings, and the covered business method, those three categories of proceedings were meant to be a check on the quality of 

the patents in the patent system after issuance. 

Mr. ISSA. Straightforward question; do you think the CBM program should be extended, or continued would be another way of 

putting it? 

Ms. LEE. So it is scheduled to expire, and the question is should 

it be extended? And I believe the intent of the CBM proceedings 

was to address some patents that had issued out of the United 

States Patent and Trademark Office in the area of business methods related to financial services. And that this program would be 

in effect for a period of time and that patents that should not have 

issued would be removed. And that’s why it was meant to be a temporary program. As to whether it should be extended or not, I 

think that’s up for—— 

Mr. ISSA. Let me ask you a leading question if I may. 

Ms. LEE. Okay. 

Mr. ISSA. Isn’t it true that in reviewing those financial patents, 

what you often discover is that there was a trade practice that was 

widely known but was not presented when the patent application 

was applied for; and, in fact, today aren’t there many business 

practices that are widely used but not at your researchers’ disposal? 

Ms. LEE. So the question is? 

Mr. ISSA. Do you still not know what you find out later on in the 

CBM process at the time that you’re granting new patents? 

Ms. LEE. I think we know many more things now than we did 

when some of the patents that are at subject or issue in the CBM 

proceedings were issued, because the USPTO’s resources and databases are much richer and deeper. So, I think the USPTO has done 

a much better job at issuing the patents that should issue. 

Mr. ISSA. Well I have so many more questions and no more time. 

With that is the Ranking Member ready? It’s my pleasure to recognize the gentleman from Michigan, the Ranking Member, Mr. Conyers, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Excuse my tardiness. 

And of course Ms. Lee, I really wanted to be with you at your testimony. I thank you as the Director and Under Secretary. In your 

opening statement I believe it’s been indicated whether the USPTO 

supports Section 3(d) of H.R. 9. And I wanted to give you an opportunity to enlighten us on that. The provision stays discovery in patent cases pending a ruling by the Court on claim construction. That 

provision might lead to duplication in discovery. Does USPTO or 

you support this as written, or are there other preferred alternatives? 

Ms. LEE. Well, thank you very much for the question. And I 

think I mentioned an alternative which is considering tightening 

the venue requirements. Another alternative might be to consider 

staying discovery pending a ruling by the district court on motions 
39 

to transfer. Those are two alternatives that might be a possibility. 

But we recognize that discovery is a big, important driver in many 

patent litigations in terms of incentives and cost and so forth. And 

we certainly support H.R. 9’s provision to have the Judicial Conference look at imbalances between plaintiffs and defendants in 

discovery, and we believe that H.R. 9’s stay provision on discovery 

pending claim construction, needs to be weighed carefully, both the 

benefits of delaying discovery in an attempt to save some costs up 

front against the cost of preventing the parties and the Court from 

developing a more complete understanding of the case through earlier and fuller discovery. 

And based upon my experience and also serving on the Northern 

District of California Local Patent Rules Committee, which is a 

committee that promulgates case management and discovery rules 

on patent cases, claim construction of technical terms is complicated. And one concern might be that it’s hard to construe claims 

in a vacuum, in the abstract. And even a minimal amount of information early in a case including on validity or infringement, can 

facilitate an early resolution or settlement of a case. So further 

claim construction is oftentimes not always dispositive. So in that 

instance, discovery wouldn’t be avoided. It would just be delayed. 

And there are differences, too, in patent infringement cases. In 

some cases claim construction and infringement is critically important, and the stay mentioned might actually just work out just fine. 

In other cases, you’ve got other issues that might be case dispositive such as inequitable conduct or laches. So, I think there are differences in patent cases, but we should definitely be considering all 

proposals to ensure that discovery facilitates early resolution, 

avoids excesses, and is fair to both plaintiffs and defendants. 

Mr. CONYERS. Well, I’m glad to hear that you have some recommendations to make this a better bill. I had even more than you. 

I’m interested in working on it. I think H.R. 9 could be seriously 

improved, and this would be a start. Let me just ask about the 

written testimony in which you assert that the USPTO generally 

supports the concepts of Section 5 of H.R. 9, which provides for 

stays of customer suits in patent cases. Do you have offhand any 

recommendations for how we might improve that language? 

Ms. LEE. It’s generally a good provision in concept. We’re supportive of encouraging a stay of a case against retailers and customers while the case is being litigated by the manufacturer. We 

believe that the end user and the retailer, they oftentimes lack the 

technical understanding of how the product works. The manufacturer has that information, and the manufacturer also has the incentive to fight vigorously and defend vigorously, so they have the 

information, and they have the incentives and therefore they’re 

probably the appropriate party. 

And so some thoughts into what might be necessary or included 

in such a provision are that you want to make sure that the manufacturer and the end user retailer are in agreement that that stay 

should be in effect. And secondly, you want to give the end user 

and retailer the option to opt out. 

Mr. CONYERS. Let me get—— 

Mr. ISSA. I’d ask unanimous consent the gentleman have an additional minute. Without objection. 
40 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, sir. Let me just ask you in conclusion 

about the expansiveness of the joinder provision in 3(c) in the bill, 

especially if it might be used to chill investments. Does that leave 

you as concerned as I am about that portion of the bill? 

Ms. LEE. I think that’s an issue that is of great importance. I 

mean, you don’t want to chill investments in new enterprises because those who are passive investors in a company are subject to 

a possible fee-shifting award or possibly being joined in a lawsuit. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you very much. Thank the Chairman. 

Mr. ISSA. And I thank the Ranking Member. We now go to the 

gentleman from Virginia for 5 minutes. Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Chairman, thank you. Ms. Lee, thank you for being 

here today. You stated in your testimony that the USPTO believes 

that identification of the allegedly infringing products, an explanation of how they infringe in at least one claim of each asserted 

patent, would provide needed notice to accused infringers. This is 

a lot less information than is currently required by H.R. 9, but it 

was my understanding that you had stated previously that H.R. 9 

struck the right balance between placing burdens on the patent 

owner and the need to provide adequate information for defendants. Why the shift in policy and in your opinion? 

Ms. LEE. So, we definitely favor heightened notice to patent defendants in patent pleadings, and a proposal to heighten the pleading requirements for at least one claim, and certainly the removal 

of Form 18, would go a long ways and certainly accomplish that. 

Now, what beyond one claim, we need to require heightened pleading and specificity for a patent infringement claim. I think we need 

to take into account all the factors that I discussed. Right. We have 

to weigh and take into account the burden on the plaintiff, their 

access to information, and really trying to avoid over pleading of 

marginally relevant claims to make sure that our litigation process 

is streamlined. 

Mr. FORBES. But did you previously state that you felt that H.R. 

9 struck the right balance between placing burdens on the patent 

owner and the need to provide adequate information for defendants. 

Ms. LEE. What we said is we generally agree with the heightened 

pleading requirements in H.R. 9, including an element-by-element 

explanation of how the product infringes a claim. But on the issue 

of the claims and which claims are required to be pled with specificity, at least one, and beyond one we should definitely weigh factors. 

Mr. FORBES. So it’s your position today that you haven’t changed 

your policy. That’s always been your policy? 

Ms. LEE. Correct. 

Mr. FORBES. So you don’t think that more information for defendants to adequately address the claims asserted would help improve 

the patent litigation system? 

Ms. LEE. More information would help, and certainly requiring 

heightened pleadings for at least one claim is an improvement. And 

the question is is that enough, and you need to take into account 

the other factors of determining. It’s a balance. I mean, there are 

many competing factors, and we want to be fair to both the plaintiffs and defendants. 
41 

Mr. FORBES. Now, as someone with extensive background in the 

technology industry, do you think that the technology industry is 

unique compared with other industries such that tech companies 

are more vulnerable to patent trolls than other IT-intensive industries due to its unique ecosystem? Do you think the current patent 

system hurts innovation and the ability of U.S. technology companies to compete globally? 

Ms. LEE. I think we have got one of the best intellectual property 

systems in the world. And now that I have had the privilege of having the job that I have and serving in it for 1 year and having the 

opportunity to meet with individuals in foreign countries who lead 

other intellectual property offices, they all want to know what 

we’re doing in the United States to incentivize the innovation that 

we incentivize. All of that said, I think I feel an obligation, and I 

think all of us want to make sure that we continue ensuring that 

the patent system in the United States is as strong as it can possibly be, and I think that’s why we’re all here today. 

Mr. FORBES. So you don’t think that tech companies are more 

vulnerable to patent trolls than any other industry? 

Ms. LEE. I think patent litigation abuse can occur in a variety 

of industries. It’s not limited to any one. So as we craft proposals, 

we want to craft proposals that are not industry-specific and that 

are just good policy. 

Mr. FORBES. Do you think in your analysis that the problems 

surrounding abusive patent litigation are the result of certain 

plaintiff-friendly judicial districts? 

Ms. LEE. The question one more time? 

Mr. FORBES. Yeah, do you think that the problems surrounding 

abusive patent litigation is the result of certain plaintiff-friendly judicial districts? 

Ms. LEE. I think the system would benefit by consistency across 

all Federal districts. 

Mr. FORBES. What can Congress do to send a better message to 

those districts to get that consistency? 

Ms. LEE. All the issues that you’re considering in H.R. 9. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. ISSA. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. FORBES. I would be happy to. 

Mr. ISSA. I want to follow up on what Mr. Conyers said about, 

and your response on heightened pleading briefly. If I understood 

correctly, you’re saying well—and without discovery sometimes it’s 

hard to know what the, the product in the patent in suit is really 

about. In other words, you don’t know enough about the defending 

product. Is that what you said, that would affect your heightened 

pleading in the beginning of the case? 

Ms. LEE. I think before you’ve conducted discovery, it’s very hard 

to know all the claims that will be infringed or will be the cause 

of an infringement. 

Mr. ISSA. Sure. But let me just be the devil’s advocate for a moment. Let’s assume for a moment you have the leave to amend 

when you discover more about the product than you knew in the 

beginning, and let’s assume that you have the leave to add additional claims. But, as a basic concept, shouldn’t you know everything about what your patent means on the day you file? In other 
42 

words, in the heightened pleading one element is, you say this is 

what my patent means, which is what you live and die by whether 

you’re overly broad and thus invalid based on prior art, shouldn’t 

that be part of the heightened pleading early on so that you’re held 

by the breadth or the narrowness of your claim? And don’t you 

know all there is to know about your patent at the time that you 

file? 

Ms. LEE. So, yes, Mr. Chairman, as the patent owner I know everything about my patent claim hopefully, or I should. But what I 

don’t know is how the alleged infringer’s device may work. Many 

of these devices—— 

Mr. ISSA. Sure. And I know we’ll get back to that. I was taking 

a limited amount of time. I just wanted to say that from a standpoint of—often what happens is the breadth of a claim by the 

plaintiff, widens and narrows through discovery and even morphs 

leading up to the last days of the Markman. So from a heightened 

pleading, I believe the bill intended—and Ms. Lofgren may followup on this—intended to both have you disclose what your patent 

means and then, of course, what you believe the product does. I 

was only asking about the former part of it, which is, as you said, 

you do know all about your product on the day that you filed. 

Ms. LEE. You should know about your patent. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. Your patent. Thank you. Ms. Lofgren. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Well, thank you very much. And, Ms. Lee, it’s 

great to see you here. And just a quick report, the Silicon Valley 

office that you left to come here to Washington is proceeding apace, 

and we hope to have it open toward the end of this year or early 

next; so thank you for the leadership that you showed. You really 

got it off to a great start, and the people that you have selected to 

follow through on it are following your lead. So I didn’t want to go 

further without thanking you and the City of San Jose for what 

they are doing to make this all possible. 

I had a couple of questions that have really been asked, in one 

case a proposal made to me by somebody in the Valley on demand 

letters. Now, in the bill we’re doing a study of demand letters. It 

was suggested to me by an engineer that if we simply required all 

the demand letters to be posted and searchable, that that would 

have a very positive impact in terms of abusive demand letters, 

and it would allow people who are being victimized to actually find 

each other and solve problems together. What do you think of that 

idea? 

Ms. LEE. That’s an interesting question. And, in my prior life I 

did a lot of patent licensing. And, I think you have to be careful. 

I mean, on the one hand, transparency and identifying who the 

senders of large volume, vague patent claim demand letters is helpful, because if you see somebody else who has been on the receiving 

end of that, you can perhaps work together, et cetera. On the other 

hand, if I’m a legitimate business. I’ve invented something, and my 

business is licensing, you know, I oftentimes put some confidential 

information, some business information in there; and I’m not so 

sure I would want everybody to see all the financial terms that I’m 

offering one particular recipient of a letter. So I guess it depends 

what is being put in the database; would there be portions redacted 

and what the problem is that we’re trying to solve for. 
43 

I do believe that transparency and patent ownership information 

is helpful. At the time you’re doing a design of a product, you 

should know who owns government-granted monopoly rights and 

make intelligent and informed decisions at that time. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Would you just think some more about it and ask 

around the office? I know that there is a small business education 

outreach information provision that requires posting of the filings. 

You know, I just promised this engineer I would raise it, and it sort 

of intrigued me as a sort of non-legalistic approach, although the 

issue that you have raised, I certainly do understand that it maybe 

would preclude it. 

I want to ask another question. In 2010 the University of Michigan School of Law had a law review article trying to assess the 

number of patents per product by industry. And what they found 

or reported was that the average number of patents for a pharmaceutical drug is about 2.97 with a median of two per product and 

that the number of patents covering a drug varied from therapeutic 

classes from 1.79 to a high of 4.23 per drug. 

So in 2012, there was a study by another group that concluded 

that there are around 250,000 active U.S. patents relevant to smart 

phones, and I think other hardware-software products are similarly 

situated. Now, I think as we think about patent reform and litigation reform and how it hits, we need to think about startups. We 

need to think about the pharma-biotechnical industry, the technology industry, and we value all of those elements of our economy. 

The discrepancy, though, between the number of tech patents and 

BIO patents makes the business completely different and makes IT 

products particularly vulnerable to abusive efforts. 

Now, the TRIPS agreement requires that patent rights be enjoyed without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field 

of technology, and whether products are imported or locally produced, but it doesn’t say anything about the number of patents per 

product. I’ve been thinking, what would you think about an approach that made distinctions in remedies between products that 

have less than 10 patents versus more, as a way to kind of preserve the value for different industries without violating TRIPS? 

Ms. LEE. Well, that’s a very interesting proposal, and I think it’s 

the first I heard of it, but it’s probably worthy of some consideration; and let me get back with you on that item as well. I think 

that’s a very interesting idea because if nothing else, it’s clear and 

it’s simple; and it goes to the issue that there are fundamental differences amongst technology sectors, but it also goes to the value 

of the patent for a product in one industry versus another, which 

seems to be a lot of the tension in some of the proposals we’re considering. So I think that’s worthy of consideration. Absolutely. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you. I look forward to hearing your further 

comments. 

Mr. ISSA. I thank the gentlelady. We now go to the gentleman 

from the State that candidates in both parties seem to be flocking 

to, Mr. King. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Director Lee. Thanks 

for your testimony. I think your responses have been very well 

done and on point here today. I’m very respectful of anyone who 

can emerge in the patent business, especially as a patent attorney 
44 

and then given that there’s so much knowledge base that has to be 

encompassed to be able to do a real job with this, with all of the 

other disciplines plus the legal discipline added together, and I just 

don’t want that to be lost on this Committee or the people that are 

watching this hearing today. 

So these questions get complex and intricate, and there are a few 

patent holders in this Congress that focus their attention on this 

a great deal. And I would just ask you to give me a broader description if you could. If you have a sense of what it costs to establish a patent and get it commercialized? 

Ms. LEE. Yes. In my prior life I was head of patents for a company, and we filed for a lot of patents, and it does vary somewhat 

by industry. And certainly I would imagine in the biotech and 

pharmaceutical industries that there might be some additional 

costs because you do additional searching to determine more fully 

what has been done before. 

The most expensive costs for filing for a patent are not necessarily the USPTO filing fees. Those fees are relatively modest. 

It’s really the attorney’s fees, so the attorney’s fees for writing the 

application, for conducting, interacting with the USPTO, and then 

another big variable is the cost in how much you spend on doing 

a prior art search. So when you add those pieces together, that’s 

the actual cost of getting a patent; and after that you have to pay 

certain fees to maintain it. 

To commercialize it, I mean, you have your business people writing letters, reaching out to various licensees and whatever cost that 

is, and if you have to enforce it in patent infringement in order to 

get the licensing revenue, average cost of litigation in patent litigation it ranges from on the order of millions on up. Right. So it’s an 

expensive endeavor to litigate. But to get the patent, it’s relatively 

modest, more modest, and hopefully that answers your question. 

Mr. KING. Typically, if we were talking about to get the patent 

and to commercialize, would we be looking at a figure typically 

under or over $100 million? 

Ms. LEE. Under or over how much? 

Mr. KING. Under or over $100 million. 

Ms. LEE. Oh, less than that. I mean, it varies. To get a patent, 

maybe it is $20,000 including the attorney’s fees. I am just ballparking right now. And then after that, to commercialize it, depending on whether or not there is litigation, on the order of millions, right. $100 million is a lot of money. 

Mr. KING. Yes. 

Ms. LEE. So, I think in some instances, absolutely, probably that 

number could be hit. But I wouldn’t think in most instances. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Chairman, I have a letter here in my file that has 

about 15 cosigners on it that stipulate some of these costs. I would 

ask unanimous consent to enter it into the record. 

Mr. ISSA [presiding]. All 15 will be entered without objection. 

[The information referred to follows:] 
45 
46 
47 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Returning to our witness, 

I appreciate that testimony. And I also would state that in some 

of the discussions I have had with patent holders, I have seen 

those numbers go up to 7-,$800 million, or even $1 billion in the 

extreme cases that are extensively litigated. So I am concerned 

that it is getting more and more difficult to establish a patent, and 

that this great creative country that we are is losing its international edge. Do you think that this bill helps our international 

edge that we have traditionally held since the time of the founding 

of the republic? Or does it, perhaps, diminish our edge? 

Ms. LEE. So I do believe that the issues in this bill are critically 

important, that Congress needs to act. And some of these issues 

that we are considering in H.R. 9 are what is needed to make sure 

that our IP system continues to incentivize innovation. 

Mr. KING. Thank you. And then I see also that the bill allows 

defendants to join other parties, or other parties to join the defendant and the distribution of the loser pays component of this. Would 

there be any reason for plaintiffs not to be able to also have that 

same opportunity? 

Ms. LEE. The attorney’s fees shifting provision should apply 

equally to plaintiff and defendant. So if you are a plaintiff and you 

have pursued a case too aggressively, and you lost and the other 

side won and won fees, you should pay. If you defended too vigorously, then you should also be required to pay. 

Mr. KING. I appreciate your testimony. And that concludes my 

questioning. And I would yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. ISSA. I thank the gentlemen. And we now go to the 

gentlelady from Texas. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ISSA. Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee. I am sorry. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. You had a moment? 

Mr. ISSA. I had a moment and I got the Texas—you had just 

come back and I—— 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I was in the anteroom here. 

Mr. ISSA. Well, you were missed. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you so very much. 

Mr. ISSA. The gentlelady is recognized for a full 5 minutes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. As you know, Mr. Chairman, we do double 

duty with our constituents, and we must be in a number of places. 

So thank you for your courtesy. Let me thank our witness for serving our Nation, and particularly let me thank you for the many in 

the patent bar who have indicated that they have found the Patent 

Office to be responsive and sensitive under your leadership. So, 

again, we appreciate very much your service. Thank you so very 

much. Can I just start with your assessment of this bill. Are you 

and the Administration supporting it in its present form? 

Ms. LEE. In my written testimony, I think we have gone through 

sort of issue by issue the areas that we support, where we think 

other considerations might be taken. We are generally supportive 

of the goal. And many of the issues here, in one form or another, 

we believe are necessary to ensure meaningful and balanced reforms necessary to continue to incentivize innovation in the United 

States. 
48 

*Note: The submitted material was not received by the Committee at the time of the printing 

of this hearing record on June 25, 2015. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I think that is a very important point. I am 

going to have a series of questions. I know the Chairman is listening intently, that it will be important as we proceed with a markup. 

Mr. ISSA. And the sooner the better. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. That we are open to the concerns expressed 

in your testimony and some of the concerns that we will be expressing as we go through this. Let me ask the Chairman to allow 

me to submit into the record a letter from the Texas Bankers Association, I am submitting it as a Texan, and on April 13, 2015, to 

let the Texas Bankers Association know that we are concerned of 

their issues and we will discuss the merits of the issues, but we 

are concerned of their issues. Ask unanimous consent to put this 

letter into the record.* 

Mr. ISSA. The letter will be placed in the record without objection. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much. Let me just ask, Ms. 

Lee, on the issue of an increase in abusive patent litigation, whether or not you believe it has been and how the abusive patent litigation has harmed inventors and innovation? And specifically, do you 

see this legislation mitigating that? 

Ms. LEE. This legislation with the various proposals I think will 

go a good part of the way to helping to curtail abusive patent. 

Litigation. But I think change will occur throughout our system; 

you are already seeing the courts through the court rulings, including on issues on attorney’s fees, including on issues on what is patent-eligible subject matter, making improvements to the patent 

law. You are seeing the USPTO implementing the post-grant review proceedings which allow parties to remove patents from the 

system that should not have issued. You are seeing the USPTO 

focus on patent quality. 

So, all the pieces and all the stakeholders in the patent ecosystem really need to work together. And legislation is a necessary 

piece of that. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me quickly move to my next question. 

Thank you very much. I have always raised the question of the impact of legislation dealing with innovation and patents on small 

businesses. So I specifically ask whether H.R. 9 would assist new 

and small businesses that often lack the resources to defend themselves in these very complex and expensive lawsuits. 

Ms. LEE. Right. So in H.R. 9, I think a provision that would be 

helpful to small businesses in particular is the customer stay provision. This is meant to protect the end user and retailer. So, for example, in the case of the Internet router and the coffee shop, often 

times the retailer or the end user is a small business. So I think 

there are protections to be had there for the smaller businesses and 

so forth. But a lot of the changes that we are talking about in the 

patent system, making sure that discovery is streamlined; making 

sure that there is heightened pleadings so everybody knows roughly what the case is about, and ensuring that there is fee shifting 

where there is behavior that exceeds that’s what should happen or 
49 

overly aggressive behavior, pursuing claims overly aggressively, 

whether you are on the plaintiff side or the defense side. All of 

those have benefits, I think, to players big and small. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me follow up with this question and specifically go to the USPTO’s enhanced patent quality initiative. As 

I often hear, there needs to be improvements made to the quality 

of the patents at the Patent Office. And so I want to ask whether 

this initiative has improved patent quality? Are there additional 

steps that Congress should take? 

And then specifically, I want to ask if you would comment on 

whether H.R. 9 properly assesses the kind of research that is done 

in universities, particularly those that have institutes, who have a 

number of endowed chairs, where there are professors who are designated, or teams that are designated specifically for very sophisticated research to be produced. It comes to mind the universities in 

my community, but particularly M.D. Anderson, not an institute, 

a university, but it is very much engaged in research among other 

hospitals that we represent in the area. So would you respond to 

that please. 

Ms. LEE. We certainly need to do all that we can to continue to 

ensure that our universities are an engine of innovation. And I 

think the changes that we are contemplating in H.R. 9 give everybody confidence in our patent system. If we can make these improvements and we can achieve them and we can achieve the necessary changes in legislation and beyond, to the extent that everyone has greater confidence in the patent system, that will benefit 

universities, that will benefit businesses and so forth. 

And with regard to what the USPTO is doing in terms of enhancing quality, I could probably go on and on on that topic. But just 

let me just say that we have launched an enhanced patent quality 

initiative. We had a 2-day summit where we are looking at everything, internally, externally. We have engaged stakeholders. We 

had over a thousand participants. I have appointed a deputy commissioner for patent examination quality to focus on patent quality 

now and in the future. And I have to say the funds that we have 

received, because Congress has given us the right to set our fees 

and we are now able to, for the most part, collect the full amount 

of our appropriated fees and keep it and have an operating reserve, 

make a huge difference in terms of USPTO’s ability to be able to 

focus on initiatives really long-term, deep initiatives that cost 

money, like the patent quality initiative. 

Mr. ISSA. I thank the gentlelady. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you. And I will just put this on the 

record for your contemplation. I hope as we proceed, one of the 

issues that I mentioned to the patent director, I am very interested 

in small and new businesses. I really want to see an emphasis 

through this legislation. And specifically as well, universities I 

think need to be addressed. Those are the innovators, the next 

level of innovation in America. So I thank the gentleman for yielding to me and I yield back. 

Mr. ISSA. I thank the gentlelady. We now go to the next person 

from Texas, the gentleman from Corpus Christi, Mr. Farenthold. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Lee, 

we have heard a lot of discussion about discovery. And one of the 
50 

solutions that has been batting around is a stay of discovery pending a motion to transfer venue. In your opinion, is that a good idea? 

Ms. LEE. I think that is an idea that is worthy of consideration. 

And there is a lot of merit to it for a couple of reasons. One is that 

a motion to transfer occurs early on in a patent litigation case. Oftentimes, it doesn’t take long for a judge to rule on it. And it 

doesn’t involve extensive discovery on the substance of the patent 

case. So the claim construction, the infringement, any of that, you 

don’t have to touch that. It is oftentimes where is the principal 

place of business? Where do they have an R&D center? Do they 

have ties to the area? So staying discovery pending transfer, ruling 

on a motion to transfer perhaps in combination with the venue restrictions and tightening that might be a good combination in 

terms of really helping and improving the system overall, whether 

it be discovery or other abuses that may be occurring. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Right. Now, I have, heard a lot about how IPR 

supposedly knocked out nearly 80 percent of claims. But looking at 

the USPTO website, I noticed this chart from earlier this year, that 

out of 9,000 claims challenged, 2,200 had been found unpatentable, 

which is far less than 80 percent. What am I missing here? Is the 

kill rate of IPR being dramatically overstated? 

Ms. LEE. Well, thank you for the question. And, you know, I 

think at the USPTO, we keep track of the statistics. And you can 

characterize statistics however you would like. Some may say it is 

a lot; Some may say it is not a lot. But the bottom line is our 

judges work very, very hard to work on each and every single case. 

And they look at the facts and they look at the record and they 

apply the law in as accurate a manner as possible, given the case 

and the record. And I would like to say that the good work so far, 

knock on wood, all of the cases that have come out of the Patent 

Trial Appeal Board when they have gone up on appeal have been 

affirmed. So we hope to keep up that good record. And we will let 

the statistics fall where they may. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. All right. Great. As someone who supports the 

BRI standard to weed out weak patent claims, I would also be interested in finding out ways to alleviate some of the concerns so 

that we can preserve it. Is there a reason that amendments have 

largely not been allowed to claims, according to some of the interested parties, at least that is what they are saying? And is there 

a fix in place to help deal with this concern? Also, to use district 

court construction. And can you tell me why it is important to repeal the right to amend? 

Ms. LEE. Yes. Thank you very much for the question, Congressman. And the issue of amendment is an issue that came up when 

we went on that eight-city listening tour as we evaluated the Patent Trial and Appeal Board proceedings. And we got a lot of input 

on that. And that is one of the issues that we are looking at, which 

is we are reviewing the procedures and the requirements and even 

the page limits that are permitted in filing a motion to amend. So 

we are looking at everything. And we want to make sure that it 

is as flexible and as effective as possible. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Great. You got all my questions in record time. 

Mr. ISSA. If the gentleman would yield. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. I would be happy to yield. 
51 

Mr. ISSA. Because I think Mr. Farenthold asked a great question 

and I would like to follow up on it. If I apply for a patent and I 

fail to disclose all the inventors, I could have an invalidity problem. 

If I fail to disclose known prior art, I can have an invalidity problem. If I fail to honestly state any number of items, the patent is 

invalid. If I claim a broader claim than I can have, and I then take 

that forward and sue somebody, why wouldn’t that be another 

wrongful act that would essentially invalidate the claim? In other 

words, following up on the gentleman’s statement about amendments, when is it too late to amend? 

Is it too late to amend while you are going through the process 

of applying for your patent? Of course not. Is it too late to amend 

once you have asserted a very broad claim that really doesn’t exist 

and you are now trying to save your patent, either before an Article 

III court or before the USPTO? If you touch on that, it is important 

to us because we are looking at legislation and we want to know 

do you have the tools and do you think it is an appropriate balance 

today? 

Ms. LEE. Obviously, during the application process, you can always pull back on your claims. After the patent issues, as a patent 

owner, through supplemental examination, you can always put 

your patent back into that process, put it back before the USPTO, 

introduce prior art and—— 

Mr. ISSA. You can reexamine your own patent? 

Ms. LEE. Exactly. 

Mr. ISSA. But if, in fact, you go before an Article III court and 

you expand the meaning of your patent dramatically, and then 

once they accept that, if that is true, then, in fact, there is lots of 

prior art, should you be able to amend your assertion at that point? 

Ms. LEE. One more time? 

Mr. ISSA. Everybody goes through a patent process and they narrow and narrow and narrow what their patent means. As soon as 

they receive a patent, they almost always think that it is a pioneering patent with broad everything when they look at their competition. Historically, the Article III courts have been inconsistent 

on whether or not you have hoisted yourself by asserting a broader 

claim than you should. Because of the heightened pleading that we 

are asserting, what level of accountability should entities have 

when they receive a patent by saying I am fairly narrow, just give 

us a simple patent, and then they assert it against others and 

broadly claim that you violate their patent even though you are 

much beyond what they actually claim? 

Ms. LEE. Thank you for clarifying that question. There are rules 

in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which require you to make 

your assertions in good faith after due diligence and so forth. So 

if you don’t have a basis for bringing the lawsuit, it is not grounded 

upon actual diligence and investigation, and then later on the discovery that you get about the allegedly infringing product, then you 

are asserting the case in bad faith. 

And I want to go back and correct one thing. I believe with regard to go to supplemental examination, you cannot invoke it at 

any time. I believe that if there is an IPR proceeding going on, you 

can’t actually take the patent out of that proceeding to supplemental examination. So I just wanted to clarify that as well. 
52 

Generally speaking, when there is not anything going on and you 

think the patent issued more broadly or maybe you are getting 

ready to assert it, supplemental examination is a tool created to 

allow you to make sure that your claims are solid. 

Mr. ISSA. And I think, without trying to do your job better than 

your job, because you do it well, if you are in reexamination by a 

third party, you can supplement information. You can actually further say you are absolutely right and I have discovered something 

else. But you are right, you can’t take it out of that for good reason. 

We now have the pleasure of going to the gentleman from Georgia 

next, Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You make a good 

point, Ms. Lee, about needing to be specific, complaints, particularly. And if a complaint is not complete or is not legally sufficient, 

one can always file under Rule 12(e) for a motion for a more definitive statement, isn’t that correct? 

Ms. LEE. You can amend to clarify. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, you can amend and you can force, a defendant can force someone to amend their complaint by filing a motion 

for a more definitive statement. And if that doesn’t work, a motion 

for judgment on the pleadings. But you, in your testimony, you 

state that the USPTO supports the Innovation Act’s limits on discovery, fee shifting provisions, and heightened pleading requirements. Although I might point out that as far as heightened pleading requirements are concerned, that only applies to a complaint 

filed by a plaintiff alleging patent infringement. It does not apply 

to a defendant who can generally deny, just generally deny the allegations set forth in a petition or in a complaint. Isn’t that correct? 

Ms. LEE. That is correct. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And this legislation that we are here about today 

does not impose any heightened pleading requirements on a defendant, just the plaintiff. This heightened pleading requirement, 

it would make it harder and more costly for small businesses to assert their patent claims and, indeed, large businesses too, isn’t that 

correct? And individuals, be they rich or poor, it would be more 

costly? 

Ms. LEE. There would be additional obligations earlier on with 

the goal of streamlining discovery. 

Mr. JOHNSON. It would make it tougher for the plaintiff. But the 

defendant would be left to just generally deny and to continue to 

infringe if, in fact, the allegations of the—— 

Ms. LEE. Well, I think there are benefits here to the defendant 

as well. The fee shifting provision is party neutral. And even—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. But the defendant already has the ability to hold 

the plaintiff accountable under Rule 11 for fees for abusive litigation, isn’t that correct? 

Ms. LEE. I am sorry, the question was? 

Mr. JOHNSON. The defendant already has the ability to hold the 

plaintiff accountable for attorneys fees and costs under Rule 11 

should the complaint be found to be vexatious, or not in good faith 

or for a number of other reasons. 

Ms. LEE. If it rises to that level, if it rises to the level of not 

meeting Rule 11 requirements? 
53 

Mr. JOHNSON. I think it is pretty well known that under Rule 11, 

courts can award attorneys fees and costs to defendants to punish 

plaintiffs from bringing frivolous lawsuits. 

Mr. ISSA. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, I will. 

Mr. ISSA. Briefly, I believe Rule 11 is against the counsel, the attorneys for their actions. And this is slightly different than what 

we do in the bill. But I know the point you are making. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Attorneys and parties can be held accountable 

under Rule 11. Let me ask this question, ma’am: The Supreme 

Court decided six patent cases in 2014, including the Alice case and 

the Octane Fitness case which make it easier for district courts to 

award attorneys fees and costs to prevailing parties in meritless 

cases. And the judicial conference has adopted rules to raise pleading standards in patent cases to match those in all Federal cases. 

And, in addition, the America Invents Act, which was the largest 

overhaul of the patent system in half a century, has only been fully 

implemented for 2 years. And the AIA’s new post-grant inter partes 

review procedures are proving very popular as a litigation alternative. So shouldn’t we wait to assess the impact to the patent system of these new measures over the past couple of years before we 

put our thumb on the scale and tip the scales in balance of patent 

infringers? 

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much for the question, Congressman. 

You are right, there are a lot of changes that are going on in the 

patent system now. But we still need the legislative reform on a 

handful of issues because these are issues that only Congress can 

address. And any change that Congress addresses needs to take 

into account the changes in the courts, the changes at the USPTO, 

the procedures we are implementing and so forth so that we collectively and comprehensively have meaningful and balanced reform. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ISSA. I thank you. We now go to the gentleman from Idaho, 

who has been patiently waiting, Mr. Labrador. 

Mr. LABRADOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Lee, thanks for 

being here. The Federal Circuit recently decided in the case of In 

Re: Cuozzo Speed Technologies, which you are very familiar with, 

and in that decision, the majority determined that because Congress enacted the AIA with full awareness of the 100-year-old tradition at USPTO of applying the broadest reasonable interpretation, or the BRI standard, and gave no indication that a different 

standard should obtain, they decided that the BRI should continue 

to apply in IPR decisions, correct? That are coming before the 

board? Do you agree that legislative ratification compels application of BRI in board reviews of patents in different review proceedings? 

Ms. LEE. So the application, when the USPTO implemented 

these post-grant review proceedings, we implemented it with the 

BRI standard and not the district court claim construction. The 

idea is that in the proceedings before the Patent Trial and Appeal 

Board, we have the ability to amend claims. And oftentimes when 

you have the ability to amend, it is in the public interest, in terms 

of improving quality, to come to the applicant or the patent owner 

with as much prior art as possible and say you tell me how your 
54 

invention is different from the prior art. So that was the thought 

behind it. 

And we are grateful that the Federal Circuit said that we were 

within the congressional intent. And all I would say is that if there 

is a change to district court claim construction from the broadest 

reasonable interpretation, that we revisit the issue of whether or 

not amendments should be permitted. If we are applying district 

court claim construction, then there shouldn’t be an ability to 

amend. 

Mr. LABRADOR. That was going to be my follow-up question. 

What else should we be looking at? 

Ms. LEE. Besides? 

Mr. LABRADOR. Besides what you just said with respect to allowing amendments in? 

Ms. LEE. Well, we are looking at many other aspects of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board proceedings. We are looking at the ease 

and the ability for litigants to amend. We are looking at how we 

staff the trials with the judges, whether you get the same threepanel of judges at the time of institution as well as determining of 

the merits. So we are really revisiting and trying to improve everywhere we can to make sure that those proceedings are more efficient and more fair, at least within the congressional mandate to 

the extent that we can. 

Mr. LABRADOR. And are you advocating for eliminating the BRI 

standard? 

Ms. LEE. Not advocating. All I am simply noting is that it is a 

quality issue. I mean, the broader the pull of prior art that you 

bring before the applicant or the patent owner, you put upon them 

the opportunity to hem in and tighten their claims. But whichever 

way Congress deems is best appropriate as far as standards go, we 

would apply it. But just keep in mind that the standard oftentimes 

is related to the ability to amend. 

Mr. LABRADOR. Okay. You have no position. You are not advocating for a change. And you wouldn’t be recommending that we 

don’t change it? 

Ms. LEE. For consistency purposes, I mean a lot of our proceedings at the USPTO are conducted using the broadest reasonable interpretation, during examination, during a lot of our other 

proceedings. So it would be a little odd, too, if we had a patent or 

a claim being construed in a different proceeding, that is being construed under broadest reasonable interpretation. But under the 

PTAB proceeding, it is being construed under district court. So 

there is a possibility of an inconsistency there. 

I also flagged the quality issue. But these are multifaceted 

issues. And you have to take into account competing interests. 

Mr. LABRADOR. Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ISSA. I thank the gentleman. We now go to the gentlelady 

from California, Ms. Chu. 

Ms. CHU. Director Lee, first I would like to congratulate you on 

your confirmation as USPTO’s new director. As one of your first 

acts, you launched an initiative to enhance the quality of patents 

that are granted. I am so glad to hear this, because we often hear 

about the problem of vague or overly broad patents. Could you talk 
55 

about the core elements of the enhanced patent quality initiative 

and what you are trying to achieve? Also, I know that this is one 

of several actions taken administratively to address potentially 

frivolous patent litigation, and you have stated that legislation is 

still necessary to fully tackle abusive patent litigation. Could you 

address that as well? 

Ms. LEE. Yes. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Chu, for 

the question. I launched the enhanced patent quality initiative last 

fall. And now is the time to really, for the USPTO, to focus on patent quality. We have always had it as a priority. But when your 

backlog and pendency are going up and up, it is your first duty to 

make sure you get that under control. And I have to say recently, 

our backlog and pendency numbers have gone down. And they continue to go down. And we will continue to drive them down. 

And in light of all the discussion we are having here today about 

the importance of patents and the abuses in the system, it is even 

more incumbent on the USPTO to issue the very best quality patents possible. So we are looking at a bunch of things. We have 

three pillars. One is making sure that we have excellence in the 

quality of our prosecution. Second is we make sure that we have 

excellence in customer service, of course. And the third pillar is 

that we have excellence in terms of measurement of patent quality. 

And that is not such an easy thing to address. But we are engaged 

with stakeholders. We are getting lots of ideas from our own internal examiners. We are going to gather all the ideas and everything 

is on the table. And that which we can implement, we will do. That 

which will take longer, we will also take a look and make sure we 

take steps to do it to the extent we can. 

So, that is the patent quality initiative. I am very excited about 

it. I can go on much further. But I also want to get to your second 

question. The second question was with regard to frivolous litigation and sort of is it still necessary in light of all the changes. And 

as I have said, I think it is. I mean, there are only certain things 

that Congress can do. You have the ability to establish uniformity 

across this country where there are variances in district court application of law. 

So we have law from the Supreme Court on the issue of attorneys fees. And it is being applied, in some cases, varyingly over the 

various different district courts. So I think it would help to have 

legislation, for example, in that area for uniformity. That is just 

one issue. Discovery, heightened pleading also as well. So there is 

still a need. 

Ms. CHU. In fact, that brings me to my second question. Many 

of us here are concerned about the downstream users of products. 

Oftentimes they receive demand letters alleging patent infringement, even though they had no part in manufacturing the product. 

You state that there is a growing need for a national approach to 

demand letter regulation, and that at least 18 States have enacted 

laws on this matter. 

Could you discuss what effect this patchwork approach may have 

on stakeholders who use and rely on patents? How is compliance 

more difficult? And how different are the State laws from one compared to the other? 
56 

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Chu, for that 

question. I was on the business side, in fact, I did a lot of patent 

licensing in my prior life. And if, for example, a business has invented something, files for a patent, and their business model is to 

license patent technology rather than to manufacture it, think 

about it, if you have to go into 50 States and reach out to potential 

licensees in 50 States, but before you do that, you need to consult 

the regulations in each of the 50 States to determine to make sure 

that your letter, reaching out to that business, complies with that 

State’s laws, that is rather inefficient. I am not saying they are different in all 50 States. But I did have my office conduct a study 

of the legislation that had passed and some of the pending legislation. And while there is a fair amount of commonality, there are 

quite a few differences. So that is why, I think, an even greater 

need for a Federal standard that is clear, if nothing else, as a business matter. 

Ms. CHU. And, finally, you stress in your testimony that with regard to customers’ stay, customers should be bound or should be 

required to be bound by the outcome of the manufacturer’s case. 

Why do you believe that this should be the case? 

Ms. LEE. I think that is only fair because if you think about it, 

you are a patent owner, you have now stayed your case against end 

users and retailers while you are litigating a case against the manufacturer. Let’s say you get the ruling you want. You shouldn’t 

have to re-litigate that case, the same issues, against every end 

user and every retailer. That is just simply unfair. So we are trying 

to both be fair to the patent owner, but also conserve judicial resources. That is not an efficient use of our very limited, very precious judicial resources. 

Ms. CHU. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. ISSA. Could the gentlelady yield to me for a follow-up question? 

Ms. CHU. Certainly. 

Mr. ISSA. In your case, though, if the manufacturer loses, you are 

envisioning that the fees wouldn’t come from the downstream anyway, because you only collect once. So your assumption is the indemnification inherently goes with the damages provision, that if 

you collect from the manufacturer, you have no further collection 

from the retailer possible. 

Ms. LEE. Yes. Under patent law, you can only collect once. You 

cannot collect multiple times downstream. 

Mr. ISSA. So there is an inherent indemnification in this process, 

would you say? 

Ms. LEE. I am not sure what you mean by indemnification. 

Mr. ISSA. Well, if you take on the case, the manufacturer, and 

you win, then there is no fee. And if you lose, then, by definition, 

you are going to pay the damages on behalf of that product that 

was originally sued, is that right? 

Ms. LEE. I think that is right. 

Mr. ISSA. I think that sort of brings an answer to your question. 

I now would ask unanimous consent that letters from Mr. Conyers: 

a coalition letter from PhRMA, BIO, and others; a letter from the 

agricultural companies and organization; a letter from the Big 10 

universities; a letter from several conservative groups; a letter from 
57 

**Note: The submitted material is not printed in this hearing record but is available at the 

Committee and can be accessed at: http://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ 

ByEvent.aspx?EventID=103304. 

the Eagle Forum; a letter from the Federal Circuit Bar Association; 

a letter from the American Universities; a letter from USIJ, the Alliance for U.S. Start-Ups; a letter from the Medical Device Manufacturers, MDMA; and a letter from the Innovative Alliance be 

placed in the record.** 

Without objection, so ordered. As long as I am doing Mr. Conyers, I would ask unanimous consent that the excerpt page from 

Popular Mechanics, March 1951, Page 158, be placed in the record, 

in that it congratulates America on the 2,500,000th patent which 

was granted in March 1951. And it includes some key information 

on milestones and the speed and acceleration of innovation 

throughout the 18th and 19th and early 20th centuries. Without 

objection, so ordered. We now go to Mr. Deutch. 

[The information referred to follows:] 
58 
59 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to you and the 

Ranking Member for continuing the Committee’s efforts to address 

abusive practices in patent litigation. And I think Director Lee for 

being here and offering her testimony and your expertise. From the 

start of this Congress, we continue to explore patent reforms that 

may be necessary to stop the well documented and abusive tactics 

of so-called patent trolls. And I have long agreed that we have to 

curb these abuses, many of which result from a lack of transparency. However, I also believe that Congress must take care not 

to push our system of patent litigation too far beyond the direction 

the courts are already taking it. Why? Because in every sector of 

our economy, the strength and the reliability of our patent system 

has helped drive investment and innovation. 

Our goal must be to address the abuses of bad actors without undermining the work of all the good ones, the independent inventors, 

the medical researchers at our universities, scientists and engineers leading corporate research and development. And simply to 

highlight the work that is being done in 2013; 719 new commercial 

products were made available. And the net product sales arising 

from research through these products from U.S. universities, hospitals, research institutions, and Federal labs exceeded $22 billion 

annually. 

That is what is at stake. And the goal in addressing the problems is a goal that is reflected by my own legislation, the End 

Anonymous Patents Act. My bill would help curb the abuses of patent trolls who often hide behind a web of shell companies and subsidiaries in order to avoid accountability. The End Anonymous Patents Act would require transparency of ownership and real party 

interest for new patents, patent transactions, and updated information as part of regular patent maintenance. These requirements 

would go beyond the transparency provisions in section 4 of H.R. 

9, which are limited to disclosure requirements of plaintiffs who 

have filed infringement claims in court. 

Now, Director Lee, in your testimony, you offer support for disclosure by those filing patent claims in court required by section 4 

of the bill. Would you expand on some of the benefits from expanding transparency more broadly throughout the patent system. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much, Congressman, for the question. 

And transparency of patent ownership information is something 

that the USPTO has looked deeply into and thought deeply about. 

And we believe it is a benefit to our overall ecosystem, the patent 

ecosystem. We had a number of round tables in 2013 and 2014 exploring the benefits of patent transparency, increasing patent 

transparency ownership information. And, basically, to the extent 

that businesses know who else have and hold government granted 

monopoly rights, at the time that they are making important design decisions, engineering design decisions, they can make a more 

informed decision. 

If you know that your arch rival competitor has the way of doing 

a certain thing and you are never going to get a license, you are 

going to do a design-around. Or if you know it is somebody else and 

you can get a license, then that will inform your decision. You can 

make a better informed cost-benefit decision,rather than building 

the product, building the factory, selling the product, having the 
60 

product in channel, and then after the product is in channel, you 

find out it is infringing and then having to stop it. 

Mr. DEUTCH. That is very helpful. I would like to shift gears for 

a second. You support the joinder and fee shifting provisions, you 

have spoken to that. You have also said that you want our universities to continue to be innovative. You recognize the contributions 

that they make. There are concerns that the universities have 

raised about losing funding and incurring fees when they don’t control litigation. Can you address those, are you, is the suggestion 

that you are making or that the Administration is making that the 

concerns of the universities are unfounded? I would just like to understand it better. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much for the opportunity to clarify it 

because that is certainly not what I meant. All I meant is that 

whether you are a university or you are a business, if you are investing in a company and that company engages in patent assertion behavior that is abusive, and later on fees are, they must pay 

fees, you have to be careful about protecting the passive investor. 

And whether that passive investor is a private company or a university, if they don’t control or direct the litigation, we need to be 

very careful not to put them, or expose them to liability for some 

of the fee shifting. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I only have a second left. I appreciate your saying 

that. The concern as it has been addressed by the universities is 

that this legislation would do exactly that. Are they wrong? 

Ms. LEE. Which, provision would do exactly what? 

Mr. DEUTCH. When you talk about the concerns for investors and 

what would happen if they are not, if they don’t control litigation 

and ultimately the liability would accrue to them. 

Ms. LEE. If universities are not controlling, directing the litigation, they, too, should be protected just as private, a passive investor should be protected, because we want to incentivize the universities to license their technology out. We want to incentivize investors to invest in companies and development of technology. So we 

do need to make sure we protect both passive investors or the situation where you have got a university and they are not actively 

controlling or directing the litigation, you need protections for those 

entities. Thanks for the opportunity to clarify. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you. 

Mr. ISSA. I thank the gentleman. Now we go to the gentlelady 

from Washington, Ms. DelBene. 

Ms. DELBENE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you, Director 

Lee, for being with us for so long today. We appreciate it. I just 

wanted to follow up on the past comments on transparency. The Innovation Act requires the plaintiff in a patent suit to provide detailed information about all interests in a patent. But I understand 

that the USPTO is currently proposing rules and holding some of 

the discussions you just talked about on procedures that might 

achieve a similar result through a different approach. So I wanted 

to get your feedback on any insights you have gleaned so far and 

your views on addressing transparency through rulemaking versus 

section 4(a) of the Innovation Act. 
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Ms. LEE. Thank you very much for that question. And we did do 

extensive stakeholder outreach on some of the transparency proposed rules that the USPTO has put forth, and basically concluded 

that, after reading a lot of input and talking to a lot of stakeholders, that it is really Congress is in the best position to enact 

rules on transparency, because you have better authority to ask for 

that kind of information at time of litigation. I mean, keep in mind 

the patent has already left the Patent and Trademark Office, oftentimes for many years. And we are not, we don’t have a touch point 

with a patent after it leaves, except for certain very discrete points 

after it issues and maintenance fees are paid. But if you want 

transparency at time of litigation where there is potential for abusive assertion and even if you want transparency of patent ownership information before the assertion of the lawsuit, our view is 

that really Congress is in the best position to implement those laws 

and rules. 

Ms. DELBENE. Thank you. I know you are preparing to open a 

satellite office in Dallas, I believe, later this year. I wondered if you 

could elaborate on the impact of having satellite offices on your 

ability to serve innovators, and do you consider opening any other 

offices or do you think this is a good way to help innovators in a 

local area. 

Ms. LEE. I was the first head of the Silicon Valley satellite offices, Congresswoman Lofgren knows. And I am a huge fan of the 

satellite offices. And I think having the USPTO outside of the 

Washington, D.C. Area, in the innovation communities, reaching 

out to the small inventors, the small businesses who don’t have the 

funds to fly out to Washington to participate in our round tables, 

to provide input on how what we do affects them benefits all of us. 

So I could go on and on. But these satellite offices, as far as us 

being able to serve the American innovation community, better 

serving their needs and really enabling us to do the job as best we 

can are invaluable. And all I would like to say is with regard to 

additional offices, I get that question asked frequently, is that we 

are focused on getting those four up and running. And after we are 

done with that, then we need to make sure they are integrated into 

the work of the USPTO. And we went through a pretty rigorous 

process in selecting, we tried to choose across the country to get 

broad representation. And I think we have done a pretty good job. 

Ms. DELBENE. So kind of following up on that, like myself, I 

know you spent time with start-ups earlier in your career. And 

there was a question asked earlier about small businesses. But, in 

particular, you look at it from the view of a start-up, how do you 

think the Innovation Act either benefits or gets in the way, maybe, 

of some of the work happening at start-ups and facilitating future 

innovation? 

Ms. LEE. I think addressing the issue of abusive litigation is 

critically important to big businesses and small businesses. But I 

think it is really important for small businesses because coming 

from the start-up world, an average round of capital venture funding is on the order of several million. And patent litigations, one 

patent litigation in that same range, you can easily see how, if you 

are pulled into an abusive patent litigation, that could easily con-
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sume basically all your resources for a round of funding or possibly 

two. 

So I think it is critically important that we curtail abusive litigation where we can, as best we can. And that is for the benefit of 

both the small and the big, but especially for the small companies. 

Ms. DELBENE. Thank you very much for all your time and feedback. And I will yield back. 

Mr. GOHMERT [presiding]. Thank you. And we do appreciate your 

being here. I haven’t been able to be here for much of the hearing. 

But, Director Lee, we appreciate your service. And as we have gone 

through bills in past Congresses, one of the common things we 

have heard over and over is we have got to do something about 

patent trolls. And as a former judge and chief justice, I would review the law and go this really doesn’t address what we are being 

told it addresses. The patent troll issue still is alive and well. And 

so here we come back again. I am curious, what do you think would 

be the single biggest help to businesses, small businesses that are 

named as defendants who really unknowingly were using, for example, banks, processing checks, what would be the best way to, 

or the best item in any bill that you have seen to address that particular issue? I think the stay seems to be a big help. What is your 

opinion? 

Ms. LEE. I think the customer stay is incredibly helpful. As I described, it tends to benefit the smaller players, the less patent 

savvy players. I also think that the Patent Trial and Appeal Board 

proceedings provide an attractive, cost-efficient alternative to district court litigation. And it can happen much more quickly than 

district court litigation. And if a patent is being asserted against 

you that should not have issued, with a little bit less discovery and 

a little bit less money and a panel of three technically-trained 

judges looking at the issue, you may have a solution to your problem. 

Now, that is not a guarantee because, of course, it may not come 

out of a Patent Trial and Appeal Board, the allegedly infringed 

claim may not be invalidated. But I would also say that all the 

other factors working together are all needed. You need the heightened discipline in terms of the actions of the attorneys in prosecuting and defending these cases. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Okay. But when we don’t have that, then where 

do we go? The heightened discipline among the attorneys? That is 

why we are in the trouble we are in. 

Ms. LEE. Heightened discipline, I mean prompted by things like 

attorneys fees and the shifting of attorneys fees. 

Mr. GOHMERT. So a loser pays system? 

Ms. LEE. What is set forth in H.R. 9. And then heightened pleadings also provides both parties greater information about the issues 

in the litigation and, therefore, streamline the discovery and the 

motions practice and so forth. So I think you really need a combination of many of those other pieces. But if I were to point to a 

handful that are particularly useful to small players, it would certainly be the end user customer stay. It would certainly be, for example, having available to them the Patent Trial and Appeal Board 

proceedings. And we have a patent litigation tool kit that USPTO 

has stood up where we pool together resources that all the patent 
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attorneys probably in this room have access to in their law firms 

and know how to get to that information, but if you are not a sophisticated and frequent user of the patent system, this is a single 

place where you can go to get some very, very basic information. 

We think that will help too. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Do you see a shift from first to invent to first to 

file? Did you see that being any assistance in dealing with the patent troll issue? 

Ms. LEE. I don’t think that affects the patent troll issue so much. 

I think it goes to clarity of patent rights. And it also goes to harmonizing the system in the United States with the rest of the world. 

And there are important reasons for that. But it doesn’t really go 

to the issue of abusive patent litigation. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, we share that opinion. And that is why I 

was telling people making that change doesn’t help the patent troll 

issue. But, anyway, we obviously have a lot of work to do. There 

are lots of businesses that suffer unnecessarily. And the last thing 

that I would want to do is eliminate the ability for entrepreneurs 

to be encouraged and be properly remunerated in coming up with 

their innovation. And so it is a delicate balance. And I appreciate 

your servicein trying to pursue that. I get the impression that is 

what you are doing. So we appreciate that very much. I understand 

Mr. Jeffries will be next for 5 minutes, recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you, Director 

Lee, for your service and for your presence here today. I think we 

could all agree that the litigation system is an important part of 

our democracy in the context of making sure that we resolve disputes in a manner consistent with the rule of law. But in order for 

the litigation system to work, I think we have got to make sure 

that disputes that are brought into the litigation context are resolved or the parties to those disputes are incentivized to resolve 

them based on the merits of the underlying claim, as opposed to, 

for instance, in the context of abusive patent litigation, the high, 

burdensome cost of litigation, particularly centered around discovery. 

So I think what many of us have attempted to do in the context 

of dealing with this problem is to address that discovery issue in 

a way that is fair to both sides. But I want to focus on another area 

that I think raises some concernand that relates to venue. I think 

there are 94 district courts that are in this country. Would it be 

fair to say that a disproportionately high number of abusive litigation matters are brought in just a handful of those district courts? 

Ms. LEE. I appreciate the question, Congressman. I haven’t done 

a study, but I know there is a lot of good work going on in a lot 

of district courts in terms of establishment of local patents rules 

and active management of patent cases and controlling of discovery. So I couldn’t give you a number. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. I think there was a recent study that suggested 

that for a period of time, I believe between 2007 and 2011, approximately a third of patent troll type litigation matters were brought 

in just three of the 94 district courts. So if you will posit that there 

is a venue problem as it relates to forum shopping, would you 

agree that part of making sure that there is fundamental fairness 
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in the litigation system is making sure that the matter is being litigated in the correct forum, is that fair to say? 

Ms. LEE. I couldn’t agree with you more. As I said earlier, to the 

extent that we can decrease the opportunities and advantages for 

gamesmanship and venue shopping, I think the system will be better off. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Now, when a someone in a party finds itself in 

what they believe to be an inappropriate venue, I think it is section 

1404, permits that party to move, to transfer venue. But if you look 

at 1404, there is no requirement in statute that sets forth a time 

frame within which a district court judge needs to make a venue 

transfer decision, is that correct? 

Ms. LEE. That is my understanding. And that is why, perhaps, 

as we contemplate tightening the new restrictions, perhaps that in 

combination with staying discovery pending a court’s ruling on a 

motion to transfer would incentivize an early and prompt ruling on 

that. And if it belongs in that district, great. It should stay there. 

But if it doesn’t belong there, it should be moved. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Well, you anticipated my question. I am pleased 

to hear that you agree with that is something we should at least 

consider in terms of this Committee. Because if you have got someone who is inappropriately brought into a jurisdiction as a result 

of gamesmanship, resulting from forum shopping because of a belief that within that jurisdiction, perhaps in Delaware, Central District of California, wherever the case may be, because of a belief 

that justice may not be served in that particular venue, it seems 

like before the litigation proceeds, particularly deeply into discovery, which is what allows for some to abuse the system and use 

as a hammer the high cost of discovery, that you have a decision 

up or down in terms of whether you are in the appropriate venue. 

I think my time is running out. But let me focus on something 

you also touched on with Representative Deutch, and that is this 

notion of the passive investor. I think in your written testimony, 

you mention that section 3(c) should include some kind of clear exemption for passive investors, those who lack the ability to direct 

or control the company’s litigation. Could you give us some color in 

terms of who you would view as a passive investor? How we might 

define that? 

Ms. LEE. That is a hard issue and we will probably have to spend 

quite a bit of time discussing the precise language of that. But 

drawing the lines that we have roughly—appropriately would be 

critically important. What is the definition of control? What does 

directing mean? What is directing? What is indirect? Those are all 

issues that I think certainly my team would look forward to working with stakeholders and Members of Congress to iron out. But 

that is critical to protecting the passive investor. 

Mr. JEFFRIES. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. ISSA [presiding]. Thank you. We now go to the gentleman 

from Rhode Island, Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Director 

Lee. Congratulations on your confirmation and congratulations also 

on your initiative for the enhanced patent quality. I think that will 

bear fruit many generations into the future. And I also want to 

thank you for your approach to satellite offices and hope that you 
65 

think about smaller and midsize cities and the impact that a patent office will have in those communities as well, like Providence, 

for example. 

I want to first turn to the issue of attorneys fees. It sounded like 

from reviewing your written testimony that H.R. 9 requires the 

award of attorneys fees upon motion of a party. And then the burden shifts to the losing party to prove that the litigation position 

was reasonably justified. It sounds like in your written testimony, 

you are suggesting that it makes sense for the party seeking the 

award to bear the burden of demonstrating that they are entitled 

to it. It seems as if you are suggesting a modification or an amendment to H.R. 9 that would incorporate, designate who really bears 

the burden of proof. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you for reading my written testimony so carefully. And you are absolutely right. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Do you have a recommendation as to what that 

burden of proof should be, what the standard should be? 

Ms. LEE. How much? We haven’t, no. 

Mr. CICILLINE. I would love to know your thoughts on that, what 

the standard of proof should be. And also would you just sort of tell 

us why you think that that is the appropriate place for the burden 

of proof to rest? 

Ms. LEE. In many areas of American jurisprudence, if you are 

the party that is requesting some thing, you both bear the burden 

of moving or the burden of production, and the burden of proof, 

why do you think you are entitled to? Why do you think the other 

side’s behavior was unreasonable? What specific elements? Right, 

at least articulate that. It seems only fair. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. With respect to the discovery provisions, you also, again, in your written testimony, said that the U.S. 

Patent and Trademark Office believes that there may be better alternatives for achieving the goal of reducing excessive discovery in 

patent litigation cases. Would you share with us what some of 

those might be? 

Ms. LEE. Absolutely. So clearly, discovery is a big cost driver in 

patent litigation. And we support H.R. 9’s provision to have the 

Federal Judicial Conference look at it and consider further. But our 

thought is that many district courts and Federal districts are taking active steps to manage their cases and to control discovery. But 

certain courts are not per Congressman Jeffries’ point. 

So to the extent that we can focus on tightening venue requirements, to make sure that parties are in a jurisdiction where they 

have real meaningful ties, where they have an R&D center, where 

they have a principal place of business, and they are not just there 

because they find that venue attractive for a variety of reasons that 

have nothing to do with their contacts to the location, their business contacts, I think it makes good sense. 

I think it provides an incentive for district courts to apply the 

law as is handed down and that you don’t get any more clients because you favor one side or another. So tightening venue requirements, perhaps in combination with a stay of discovery, pending a 

ruling on a motion to transfer would encourage district court 

judges to rule quickly and promptly to get the litigation in the 

proper district. 
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Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. And, finally, you made reference in 

testimony just a moment ago about what was happening with the 

patchwork of demand letters, 18 legislatures have enacted provisions. And this bill, H.R. 9, has a set of requirements for demand 

letters in the context of willful infringement. Does it make sense 

to think about those same requirements in the context of demand 

letters generally in terms of establishing a national standard? 

Should we look at that? And are there other things we should be 

looking at that particularly protect the small innovator, the small 

entrepreneur who is really challenged in the current environment 

and maybe not have the resources or support staff to defend 

against or to prosecute those claims? 

Ms. LEE. So does it make sense? H.R. 9 has a provision which 

requires, you are not entitled to enhanced damages unless you 

identify the patent, identify the allegedly infringing product, identify the patent owner and who the ultimate current entity is, and 

how the infringement is occurring. And I think those sorts of things 

would be helpful to have in demand letters as well. 

Mr. CICILLINE. As a national standard? 

Ms. LEE. Certainly to consider, right, the precise details and so 

forth all to be worked out. But there should be some level of notice, 

so you avoid the problem of these vague patent demand letters 

where you receive it and you really have no idea what the issue 

is or what is allegedly the infringing product even. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. Ms. Lee, I understand that you have a 

plane to catch. 

Ms. LEE. Who told you? 

Mr. ISSA. You have a very good staff. We have a second panel. 

Is there anyone that truly needs any further questions? Or can we 

let the first panel be dismissed? 

In that case—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, anytime I hear anybody ask that 

question, I am always prompted to respond in the affirmative. But 

since our witness has a plane to catch, I will defer. 

Mr. ISSA. I thank the gentleman from Georgia. Ms. Lee, obviously after today’s testimony, the discussion will continue. I think 

that a lot of people recognize your willingness to engage in specific 

dialogue. And we welcome that. So when you return from this got 

to catch the plane now, we look forward to working with you further on each of these issues. 

Ms. LEE. Thank you. Thank you for your work on this important 

bill. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. We will now take a very short recess to set 

up for the second panel. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. ISSA. The Committee will come to order. We now welcome 

our second panel: Mr. Kevin Kramer, Vice President, Deputy General Counsel for Intellectual Property at Yahoo!; Mr. Robert 

Armitage, former Senior Vice President and General counsel at Eli 

Lilly & Company; Mr. David M. Simon, Senior Vice President Intellectual Property at Salesforce.com; and Mr. Hans Sauer, Deputy 
67 

General Counsel For Intellectual Property Biotechnology Industry 

Organization. 

Pursuant to the Committee Rules, I must ask you to please rise, 

raise your right hand, and take the oath. 

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony that you are 

about to give will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but 

the truth? 

Thank you, please be seated. Let the record reflect that all witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

I want to thank all of you. I noticed you were here for the first 

panel, and it was informative for all of us. As you can see, the second panel might go slightly shorter, but we do have votes coming 

within the next hour, so our hope is to conclude by that time. And 

with that I’ll go right down the row, starting with Mr. Kramer for 

5 minutes. 

TESTIMONY OF KEVIN T. KRAMER, VICE PRESIDENT, DEPUTY 

GENERAL COUNSEL FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, YAHOO! 

Mr. KRAMER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of 

the Committee. Thank you for inviting me to testify today. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Committee for the second time on reducing abusive patent litigation. This issue is extremely important to Yahoo. 

Patent trolls are bad for our business, bad for our industry, and 

bad for innovation in America. Trolls are typically shell corporations that use the law as a sword to extract money from operating 

businesses. Businesses that conduct research, create products, employ people, and take all the risk of driving the economic engine 

of our country. 

I believe in the patent system, and I want to make sure that it 

thrives so that it can be used by operating businesses for its intended purpose. 

Yahoo holds over 2,000 U.S. patents, and we have enforced those 

patents against our competitors when we felt the need to do so. We 

also have an active licensing program. In short, we are active participants in the system. Because Yahoo has been both a defendant 

and a plaintiff in the system, we appreciate how very important it 

is for Congress to get this issue right. We need a solution to the 

patent troll problem that curtails abuse and understands that patents matter. 

H.R. 9, the ‘‘Innovation Act,’’ is that solution. The Innovation Act 

would help reduce—excuse me, would help restore the balance between encouraging innovation and discouraging abuse. It would do 

that by focusing the litigation from the start, prioritizing important 

decisions like claim construction, limiting unnecessary discovery, 

joining real parties in interest to the litigation, and establishing a 

presumption toward fee shifting for unreasonable cases. These common sense changes would benefit both plaintiffs and defendants 

while giving the courts the autonomy to manage their dockets. 

Yahoo’s experience highlights why we need Congress to act. Between 1995 and 2006, at any given time during that time period, 

we faced only two to four cases on our docket. Since 2007, that 

number has increased almost tenfold, and we have spent more 

than $100 million defending ourselves in outside counsel fees alone 
68 

in these types of cases. That number does not include confidential 

settlements, and it also doesn’t include the untold lost hours of our 

engineers and others who get pulled away from projects to do document production, give depositions and go to trial. All this time and 

money could be spent more productively researching new technologies, developing new products, and employing people. Instead, 

we continue to devote time and attention to fighting patent trolls, 

and the rest of the industry does too. In fact, patent litigation 

brought by trolls remains at historically high levels. 

Unified Patents, which is a company that tracks patent troll assertions, reported that the first quarter of this year saw 13 percent 

more new district court cases than the prior year. Unified also reported that troll assertions made up 84 percent of new cases 

against high-tech companies in Q-1 2015, compared to only 70 percent in 2014. 

Clearly patent troll litigation is not going away. Neither Supreme 

Court case law, nor USPTO post-grant procedures have deterred 

new cases. In our experience, the cases being filed are still overreaching. For example, Yahoo was recently accused of infringing 

patent claims requiring a digital camera apparatus. We don’t sell 

those devices. Another case was filed against us simply to provoke 

a settlement from a third-party patent aggregator to which we 

have no relationship. 

Cases are also still inefficient. When a complaint is filed against 

Yahoo, 90 percent of the time we’re left guessing as to the true 

scope of the case. We have to spend typically 3 to 6 months of litigation to find out, during which time we spent several hundred 

thousand dollars. It takes another 6 months to a year before the 

court provides a claim construction decision, during which time we 

have typically spent another million dollars on the case. If we go 

to trial, that’s another several million dollars on the case. All this 

points to the need for Congress to pass H.R. 9. The bill is a bipartisan bill and makes common sense reforms that would make a real 

difference. It includes requiring genuine notice pleading in patent 

cases, prioritizing important decisions like claim construction, providing presumptive limits on discovery, and ensuring that only reasonable cases are brought. 

These provisions would give companies the ability to better defend themselves against patent trolls. We encourage Congress to 

pass H.R. 9 quickly. 

Again, thank you for attention to this important issue. Yahoo 

looks forward to working with you as the bill moves through Congress, the legislative process, and I welcome your questions. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kramer follows:] 
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Mr. ISSA. Mr. Armitage. 

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT A. ARMITAGE, FORMER SENIOR VICE 

PRESIDENT AND GENERAL COUNSEL, ELI LILLY & CO. 

Mr. ARMITAGE. Thank you, Chairman Issa and Members of the 

Committee. Thanks for the opportunity to appear here today to testify. Let me begin right way with the loser pays provision. I believe 

the loser pays default rule could be a significant check on abusive 

patent litigation practices, whether they’re undertaken by the patent owner or by the accused infringer. It should in reality make 

strong patents even stronger and questionable patents more problematic to assert. I would urge the Committee to maintain this provision as-is as a centerpiece of its patent reform litigation efforts. 

Second, H.R. 9 would make deferral of most types of discovery 

in patent lawsuits until a so-called Markman ruling on claim construction has been decided, a mandatory provision. This provision, 

however, has been criticized even today as potentially overreaching. However, I think the provision could be readily recrafted 

so it poses fewer fairness issues for patent owners. In this respect 

the Committee might wish to consider whether this section of the 

bill should instead mandate discovery stays pending resolution of 

venue disputes and drop all together the Markman-related provision. 

Third, H.R. 9 heightens pleading requirements on plaintiffs filing 

patent infringement complaints. This is another provision where 

concerns expressed by critics could readily be addressed while preserving the early disclosure intent of this provision. Mandatory initial disclosure requirements now exist under local patent rules in 

several district courts and apply in equal measure to both patent 

owners and accused infringers. The mandated initial disclosures 

under these rules track, at least in part, the heightened pleading 

standards currently in H.R. 9. These local patent rules therefore 

create an opportunity for rewriting H.R. 9’s provisions. 

First, the bill could set out a set of heightened pleading standards that simply mirror the best practices among the existing local 

rules and, second, impose new pleading standards only on plaintiffs 

where the district court’s initial disclosure rules don’t meet the best 

practices standard. This formulation could have a number of benefits, including spurring more district courts to adopt optimal patent 

case management procedures. 

Next, the customer stay, patent transparency, and judicial conference mandate provisions in H.R. 9 appear to have broad support 

across a wide spectrum of interests. Any concerns that have been 

expressed go more to the details of the operation of these provisions 

rather than their substance. Further, H.R. 9 contains laudable provisions addressing what the bill characterizes as abusive demand 

letter practices that limit the patent owner’s ability to secure treble 

damages while leaving unaffected the patent owner’s right to be 

made whole in the case the patents are found to be infringed. 

The bill, of course, has other provisions of significant importance. 

H.R. 9 would make needed corrections to the America Invents Act, 

the most important of which is correcting a legislative error that 

resulted in a too broad judicial estoppel provision in post-grant review. Tied to this change is a related provision on claim construc-
82 

tion that would apply both to post-grant review and to inter partes 

review procedures. These changes are essential to the PGR and 

IPR laws. They are needed to assure that USPTO adjudications on 

the validity of patent claims are not premised on the assumption 

that the patent covers more than it actually does. 

This brings me to the topic of IPR, the inter partes review procedure. Let me here jump right to the conclusion. Congress needs to 

make statutory changes to the IPR process to assure that this procedure treats the patent owner fairly and to assure that this procedure has the appearance of fairness. In my view this can best be 

accomplished if Congress makes changes now to the IPR law to 

provide a presumption that patents in IPR proceedings are not only 

valid, but assure that evidence of invalidity is clear and convincing. 

I would urge the Committee to place the issue of IPR remediation 

at the top of the list of things to be accomplished as H.R. 9 proceeds through the legislative process. 

My hope is that the hearing today will provide the impetus for 

making the adjustments in H.R. 9 that will not only assure that 

it will again overwhelmingly pass the House, but also assure that 

House action spurs the Senate into moving forward with its patent 

reform agenda to the common end of producing another set of much 

needed improvements to our Nation’s patent laws. Thank you. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Armitage follows:] 
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Mr. ISSA. Mr. Simon. 

TESTIMONY OF DAVID M. SIMON, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, 

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, SALESFORCE.COM 

Mr. SIMON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to talk to you about H.R. 9, 

which addresses the abuses in the patent litigation system. It is a 

problem that I have been talking to this Committee about since 

2002. 

My name is David Simon. I’m the Senior Vice President for Intellectual Property, for IP, at Salesforce, which Forbes has named for 

an unprecedented 4 years the most innovative company in the 

world. So I understand the importance of having good intellectual 

property laws to protect that innovation. At the same time, I also 

understand there is a need for balance to protect that. 

The result of not having the appropriate balance in my view has 

resulted in too much money being made available for people who 

speculate on the patent system and their financiers who finance 

their use of litigation inefficiencies that results in an unfair tax on 

American industry. 

We really appreciated the AIA, which helped address many patent quality issues, though many more unfortunately remain. But in 

the 4 years since the passage of the AIA, the problem has not gotten better with patent abuse. It has gotten worse. It has gone from 

Silicon Valley to Main Street. We think H.R. 9 takes a balanced approach in trying to address some of these problems. 

First, I would like to highlight the provision that stays discovery 

until the scope of the government monopoly is spelled out. Taking 

FCC monopolies as a comparison, with an FCC grant, the exact 

amounts in spectrum is clearly defined. Patents depend on words 

which inherently are ambiguous, as we all know. We think before 

permitting parties to launch into a multi-million dollar discovery 

effort that tends to place almost all the burdens on the defendant, 

we should know what rights has the government actually granted. 

Get that district court to tell us what that is. We think that’s fair 

and balanced. We also think it exempts companies who have government-imposed deadlines on the uses of their patents, and it also 

has carve outs for competitive litigation. So, we think it’s a great 

provision. 

Second, pleading. Just one of many egregious examples of 

boilerplate pleadings in my written statement where you don’t 

know whose product is at issue, whether it’s even your product that 

is at issue, and what product it is, what claims you’re being sued 

on, which could be one of hundreds of claims in a patent, et cetera. 

This needs to stop. Some opponents of this legislation have said the 

dropping of Form 18 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is sufficient. We disagree vehemently. First of all, until we go through 

at least a decade of litigation, no one will know what exactly is required for pleading. Section 3 of the Act spells it out in clear detail. 

We think that is far better to have that specifics because otherwise 

what will happen, as several Members have alluded to earlier, is 

you will get forum shopping. People will go to those jurisdictions 

that will have the lowest standard, plaintiffs will. And that will 
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lead to even more forum shopping given that, at least last year, 70 

percent of all NPE litigation was brought in two districts. 

Finally, the third provision I think is what the attorney’s fees 

provision does, which goes far beyond what the Supreme Court has 

done. First of all, it forces shell companies to reveal who their investors are so we now know who is financing the litigation. Secondly, it says if you have been responsible for financing unjustified 

litigation, being involved in that litigation, you are personally accountable for it. We think all of that helps make patent litigation 

fairer. It makes things clearer. It will get people to behave better 

because we will know who they are. So we think that is another 

huge step forward. 

In sum, we are at, from my personal view, approaching the end 

of what I hope to be a 13-year process, because I’m sure you’re very 

tired of seeing me back. 

Mr. ISSA. No. We’re just beginning to get warmed up. We can do 

this for decades, but would like to do incremental legislation. 

Mr. SIMON. I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. This bill has already been amended many times to address the concerns of multiple stakeholders. We hope you see fit to pass the bill, and I am 

happy to answer any questions. Thank you. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Simon follows:] 
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Mr. ISSA. Mr. Sauer. 

TESTIMONY OF HANS SAUER, DEPUTY GENERAL COUNSEL 

FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION 

Mr. SAUER. Chairman Issa, Members of the Committee, thank 

you for the opportunity to testify here today. The biotechnology industry supports this Committee’s efforts to protect the patent system from opportunists who seek only their own financial gain without promoting innovation. And in scrutinizing dubious practices by 

some patentholders, Congress should not overlook abuses by others 

who are undermining the patent system for similarly illegitimate 

reasons, whether these occur in the courts or at the USPTO, 

whether by patent owners or against patent owners. 

Unfortunately misuse of the patent system against patent owners is also a real and growing problem. In particular the USPTO’s 

inter partes review system of administrative patent challenges is 

undermining the value and predictability of longstanding investment-backed patent rights. Questionable entities have begun to approach biotech companies with threats of dragging their key patents into IPR proceedings unless payments are made. And recently 

the Wall Street Journal reported on a speculation scheme that involves taking a short position in the stock of a biotech company 

and then challenging its key patents in IPR proceedings to drive 

down the company’s stock. 

Hedge funds have already targeted multiple biotech companies 

using this strategy in just the past 2 months and have promised 

many more. The first victim was a small biotech company whose 

main product is a new drug that helps patients with multiple sclerosis walk better. This company lost more than $150 million, over 

10 percent of its market capitalization, on the day the IPR challenge was filed. I want to emphasize there has been no finding that 

these patents are invalid. The Patent Office has not yet even 

agreed to accept the petition, but to the company, the damage was 

done. 

Markets react in this way because the IPR system unfairly 

stacks the deck against patent owners in many ways, leading to 

patent invalidation rates clearly exceeding those seen in district 

court patent litigation. Investors have become acutely aware of 

these high invalidation rates and are now routinely raising questions about possible IPR proceedings when evaluating a proposed 

deal. This is a disturbing development for a process that very few 

people had heard of just 1 year ago, and it shows just how necessary it is for Congress to restore balance to this system quickly. 

H.R. 9 contains one necessary change requiring the Patent Office 

to use the same claim interpretation approach as would be used in 

district court, but any final bill must go further to ensure that the 

IPR process can no longer be gamed to the unfair detriment of patent owners. 

With respect to broader patent reform, we believe consensus can 

be achieved on a range of issues, including enhancing transparency 

of patent ownership and enforcement, curtailing unfair deceptive 

demand letters, addressing how patents can be enforced against 
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blameless end users or consumers of infringing products, and making the IPR system more balanced and fair. 

Biotech companies both assert and defend against patents. 

Eighty percent are small pre-commercial companies that well understand the need for balanced opportunities to resolve patent disputes. 

We remain concerned, however, and therefore that certain proposals contained in H.R. 9 lack this requisite balance as currently 

drafted. Exhaustive pleading requirements, mandatory stays of 

merits discovery, customer stays that would allow infringing manufacturers to deflect lawsuits to others higher up in the supply 

chain, enjoinder of unwilling third parties under the threat of attorney fee awards unduly raise the cost and risk of patent enforcement for all patent owners, not just so-called patent trolls. 

Without predictable and enforceable patents, many investors 

would decrease or stop investing in biotech innovation, degrading 

our ability to provide solutions to the most pressing challenges 

faced by this Nation today. 

This Committee should also not ignore a series of developments 

in patent law over the past 2 years that have clearly trended toward more protections for accused patent infringers. Today patents 

are litigated at lower rates and are invalidated at higher rates 

than when the Innovation Act was first conceived. Just yesterday 

the Federal Circuit Bar Association reported that attorney fee 

awards have tripled since Octane Fitness was decided. And this, 

however, does not mean that Congress should not act to curb abusive practices. Rather these changes do reenforce the need to ensure that any patent legislative package does not swing the pendulum too far in any direction. 

In closing, BIO believes that the Congress can play an important 

role in bringing together diverse stakeholders to reach reasonable 

compromises, as it did in the 2011 Leahy-Smith America Invents 

Act, and as it is doing in the current companion Senate process. A 

process that has been inclusive and that has made substantial 

progress in narrowing differences. For example, BIO has worked 

with Senator Hatch and a group of high tech and university stakeholders to develop an alternative construct that addresses attorney 

fee awards from patent shell companies. 

We are optimistic that targeted solutions that address other 

practices of entities who unfairly enforce or attack patents can 

similarly be achieved, and I look forward to your questions. Thank 

you. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sauer follows:] 
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Mr. ISSA. I’m going to hold to a strict 5 minutes in hopes that 

we get everyone in before the vote occurs. I also will waive asking 

my questions first. I would caution the four witnesses also, that 

there are many questions, so if you’re asked a question, answer it 

as briefly as you can; and others weigh in only if the person asking 

the question would like additional answers. And that will allow a 

maximum number of questions. We’ll get as much in as we can. 

And with that I’ll go to Mr. Franks of Arizona. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sauer, I’m 

going to ask you the questions first here. Could you please just 

speak to your thoughts in general on the value of intellectual property, specifically patents in driving innovation and economic growth 

in the United States. I know that’s the blooming obvious question 

of the century, but I’d love to have it restated. 

Mr. SAUER. Well to an industry that’s as dependent on outside 

investments as the biotech industry, and we feel we are extremely 

dependent on investors. Bringing a biotech medicine to market 

takes an average fully capitalized investment of $1.2 billion. That 

kind of investment over a decade before a product reaches the market cannot be sustained just from the resources of a single company 

alone. So biotech companies very much depend on their intellectual 

property working under a slow innovation cycle to attract the investment and partnering to bring these products to market. If patents become more risky and less easy to enforce, less meaningful, 

if you will, why would anyone license this kind of technology? Why 

would anyone invest in a company that depends on this kind of 

IPR to bring these products to market? That is the driving concern 

that we hear from all our members every time a bill is proposed 

that systematically raises the risk and cost of patent enforcement 

and makes them harder to enforce. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I think that’s a good answer. The Supreme 

Court has been active on patent issues, as you know, in recent 

years. One area is fee shifting where Supreme Court decisions have 

already led to fees being awarded in more cases than in prior to 

those decisions, and it seems like this is an area where the courts 

may already be addressing some of the issues. Another area is the 

pleading requirements. The Judicial Conference has recommended 

eliminating the standard form for patent infringement complaints, 

and this would mean that patents would be subjected to the same 

higher pleading standards as in other cases. Do you think Congress 

needs to legislate on fee shifting and pleading requirements for 

patent cases? 

Mr. SAUER. On fee shifting, our members have different views. 

We have large member companies who are not just comfortable, 

but support the notion of fee shifting; and we have a lot of small 

member companies who have expressed the access to justice concerns that you might perhaps expect. As an organization as a 

whole, I believe we’re on the fence. Our concerns about fee shifting 

relate mainly to the enforcement provisions that attach to them. 

Impleader for the purpose of collecting fees, those have created a 

lot of concern among our members, but it’s an ancillary issue. 

The question of pleadings, nobody disagrees that pleadings in 

patent cases should conform to the same standards that apply in 

other civil litigation. Our concern with the pleadings is that in the 
160 

exhaustive way in which the bill proposes to do this, H.R. 9, it will 

allow a lot of gaming, unproductive litigation, and churn in litigation before the litigation can even get underway, even in cases 

where a judge may agree that there is enough for a lawsuit. 

I was heartened to hear Michelle Lee’s comments earlier about 

perhaps finding a compromise where we talk about pleading at 

least one claim of one patent to the required degree of specificity, 

and that would mean there’s enough for a lawsuit. And then the 

disclosure requirements that kick in in patent litigation would take 

care of the rest of fleshing out the case. I think there’s an opening 

there, and I do believe compromise can be found. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, I’m going to yield 

back the balance of my time. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank you so much. Moving right along, we will now 

go to the gentlelady from San Jose. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you very much. Mr. Sauer, you were describing basically a shakedown using IPR, not lawsuits, in terms 

of extorting settlements. Have you seen that now drift over to actually litigation, as the IT sector has? I’m asking because there was 

a Law Review article done about a year and a half ago that predicted that PhRMA and BIO would be the next victims of abusive 

patent litigation. 

Mr. SAUER. The answer is not really. So we haven’t heard a lot 

of complaints from many of our members of being subjected to abusive litigation. In principle, as Director Lee said, it could happen 

in any industry. Personally I do believe in the biotech industry 

where the value for patent is so much higher, that those who would 

abuse the system for their own financial gain might gravitate toward using the IPR system which lends itself very well to attacking 

specific IT assets—— 

Ms. LOFGREN. Because it’s cheap. 

Mr. SAUER—rather than bringing litigation. That’s right. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Let me ask a question in terms of money. Mr. 

Simon, you talked about—I believe it was you. No, no. It was you, 

Mr. Kramer, about the costs that Yahoo is experiencing, you say 

a hundred million dollars, and that’s not all of it. Recently the 

president of the Consumer Electronics Association, Gary Shapiro, 

said that, and this is a quote: ‘‘This legalized extortion racket costs 

our economy an estimated $1.5 billion a week.’’ I don’t know where 

he got that figure. Can you tell me, Mr. Kramer, what does abusive 

patent litigation cost Yahoo just in terms of dollars and as a percentage of revenue or profit? Can you answer that? 

Mr. KRAMER. Sure. Thank you for that question. I can certainly 

answer the question of how much does it cost us. Since 2007, I 

think we have had about 79 cases. We have spent on outside counsel fees a hundred million dollars. That’s just on outside counsel 

fees alone. That doesn’t include licenses, settlements, the time and 

expense, effort of actually getting people prepared, collecting documents, going to trial, and that’s just Yahoo. Our competitors have 

many more cases than we do, some of them. Some of them have 

less, but it’s been an uphill battle since about 2007. That’s going 

on 8 years. 

Ms. LOFGREN. So have you done an assessment of what the 

cost—obviously when you’re sued it is not just the outside legal 
161 

fees. You have got staff time to respond and search for documents 

for discovery and a lot of other things. Have you ever like added 

it all up? 

Mr. KRAMER. You are exactly correct. I have not spent the time 

to add that all up, but certainly I can say in terms of man hours 

over the last 8 years it has been hundreds of man hours lost to 

these cases when they could have been spending time more productively on developing new products. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Do you have any idea what percentage that is of 

your revenue or profit? 

Mr. KRAMER. I do not. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Simon, let me ask you the same question. Do 

you have information along those lines? 

Mr. SIMON. No, I do not have specific numbers that I can give 

you, but I can tell you you’re right in pointing out there are many 

hidden costs that result from this, from the time taken talking to 

the engineers to the impact of the engineers after they’re being deposed or having gone to a trial where they’re now gun shy to design 

things they should be designing. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Let me ask you very quickly. I asked Ms. Lee 

about the idea of having, for example, post-grant review procedures 

and the like, tiered rule, so that if you had under 5 or under 10 

patents, it wouldn’t apply to you. If you had 100 or 1,000, it would. 

Do you think that’s a workable idea? Does it solve any problems 

for the different ways industries use patents? Maybe I should ask 

Mr. Sauer also. 

Mr. SIMON. If I understand what you’re proposing, is basically 

based off the number of proceeds that would apply—— 

Ms. LOFGREN. Patents for product, yeah. 

Mr. SIMON. Then you would get somewhat different treatment as 

a result. I’ve only heard of that one time before—I actually think 

it’s a good idea—and it was in a discussion with a member of the 

pharmaceutical industry where we both agreed it was a good idea 

when we were trying to work something out. However, we both 

went back to other stakeholders that early morning—— 

Ms. LOFGREN. My time is up. I know the Chairman wants to— 

I’ll just say that certainly PHARMA has a different business model 

than IT, and that’s important. 

Mr. SIMON. Yep. 

Ms. LOFGREN. On the other hand, we’re rolling the dice on who’s 

going to win, who’s going to lose; and it might be time to talk some 

compromise. 

Mr. ISSA. Would the gentlelady like to place Mr. Shapiro’s, that 

article in the record. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Yeah, I just you a the article in the paper. 

Mr. ISSA. Yeah, we’ll put the article in the record. We now go to 

the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Farenthold. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Mr. Simon, you might as well leave your mic 

on. I’m going to start with you. We have heard a lot about abuses 

of the discovery system. Understanding that we want to stop these 

abuses, what alternatives are available to Markman? Specifically 

I’d like you to comment on the proposal to tie discovery to venue, 

and how can we make that work or do you have other alternatives 

you’d like to propose? 
162 

Mr. SIMON. Thank you. Although we’re very happy with the provisions in the bill on Markman, there are potentially other ways to 

try to deal with this issue. Certainly we have seen instances where 

various courts try to do a pocket veto on a motion to transfer, particularly since motions to transfer are discretionary. And then they 

eventually say, well, the Court is now so familiar with the case the 

public interests factors outweigh the private interest factors. So 

certainly there are ways to tie discovery on venue and motions to 

dismiss to encourage speedy rulings and that we think those things 

might be things to consider. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Great. Now Mr. Kramer, we also hear a lot 

about the need for further compromise in this. To me, and I think 

Chairman Goodlatte when he started this hearing way back when, 

said that H.R. 9 was the result of some compromises. I think it 

would be helpful to review the fact. Can you tell us a little bit 

about what’s not in the bill that the tech community has given up 

to get to this compromise? 

Mr. KRAMER. Sure. Let me first say I fully support the bill as is. 

I think that it is a great bill. I think it does the things we need 

to do to help solve the problem. Certainly some things that are not 

in the bill that the tech community would support are the venue 

issue, which you mentioned. Clarity on damages provisions would 

be extremely helpful. One of the things that we see in every case, 

it’s routinely pled—I would call it a plague on the system—is willfulness. You know, just because I got a complaint, all of a sudden 

I’m a willful infringer. I think I would like to see that addressed 

too. Having said that, I think this bill goes a long way to solving 

the abusive litigation practices, and I would like to see Congress 

act on it. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. Great. And I guess, Mr. Armitage, you’re with 

the pharmaceutical industry. You all gave up some stuff that you 

all would want, too, didn’t you? 

Mr. ARMITAGE. First of all, I’m here for myself. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. You’re familiar with it. I guess we’ve got to ask 

Mr. Sauer, if you’d rather punt that question. 

Mr. ARMITAGE. Let me just say a couple things. For issues like 

willfulness, for example, I wish there were a way to go forward on 

that because I think frankly willful infringement, treble damages, 

don’t quite fit as well in the patent system as they should. Venue 

is a great issue to deal with. It turns out every time we have tried 

we have come close; we have not made it. Is it worth trying again? 

I think everybody should be open to that. You can be skeptical, but 

please be open to it. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. All right. Mr. Simon, I think the BRI standard 

makes some sense for the Patent and Trademark Office. But 

there’s an issue with amendability of claims as I hear from some 

of the biopharmacy industry, so we’re struck with district court 

construction. Would repealing the right to amend make that standard more workable from your perspective? 

Mr. SIMON. Which one of us? 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. I’ll ask that of Mr. Simon. We’ll let Mr. Sauer, 

we’ll follow-up with you. 

Mr. SIMON. First of all, the current rules do permit amendment 

on a one-on-one replacement. They are very specific because Con-
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gress placed a tight timeline on the Patent Office to handle these 

AIA proceedings, and I think there have been a number of cases 

recently where an amendment has been granted. I think part of the 

problem is that the amendment rules were adopted from interference practice, which is a truly specialized practice, and many 

people didn’t understand how they worked well. I think they actually do work just fine. In terms of the other part of your question 

about, you know, going through the standard in district court, I’m 

really worried that the standard in district court doesn’t work for 

the reasons that are set forth in detail in my written statement. 

I don’t want to take all that time to go through that. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. I’ve got about 30 seconds. I’ll let Mr. Sauer 

weigh in on that. 

Mr. SAUER. There is no realistic right to amend claims. The AIA 

says there is. The Patent Office has granted as far as we know 3 

motions to amend claims out of 3,000 proceedings that were requested. I think that will probably require some work. More importantly, the right to amend claims or the amendment of claims and 

its connection to the broadest reason of a claim interpretation 

standard historically applies when the Patent Office examines 

claims, that is when it affirmatively grants rights. IPR proceedings 

are different in kind. They’re adjudications where the Patent Office 

decides whether the claim is invalid or not. It doesn’t grant rights. 

Mr. FARENTHOLD. All right. I appreciate your answer. Mr. Chairman, I see my time is expired. 

Mr. ISSA. We now go to the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Kramer, you cited 

79 cases on which you hired outside counsel since 2007. Is that correct? 

Mr. KRAMER. Yes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. At a cost of about $100 million. Is that correct? 

Mr. KRAMER. That is correct. 

Mr. JOHNSON. What percentage of those 79 cases were adjudicated in favor of Yahoo? 

Mr. KRAMER. So we have been to trial in the Eastern District of 

Texas four times. We have won three of those trials. The other one 

we lost, but we won on appeal. In the last 8 years, I have won 

probably 8 summary judgment motions. The rest of the cases I 

have settled. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Settled them because they were meritorious? 

Mr. KRAMER. Typically settlement arises because the plaintiff 

comes to a position where economically it makes sense to settle. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Some meritorious claims in there I would assume? 

Mr. KRAMER. I would not be here today saying that all cases are 

meritless. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And so all patent cases are not cases that are 

brought by patent trolls. Correct? 

Mr. KRAMER. I would agree that not every plaintiff is a troll. For 

example, Yahoo, we assert our patents. I would not consider us a 

troll. We are an operating company. 

Mr. JOHNSON. What percentage of cases or demand letters and 

cases filed are what we would call patent trolls? 
164 

Mr. KRAMER. That’s a really good question. If a troll is a shell 

corporation above anything else, then that’s a troll. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, now, we can get at some of these shell companies, judgment-proof shell companies. That’s not unique to patent law, and there are some existing statutory and case law that 

provide clear and proven opportunities to get at that kind of situation, but, you know, I recognize that there is a problem with patent 

trolls, but I think that because patents are so important, they drive 

innovation in America, and they contribute to economic growth in 

this country; and I’m concerned about slamming the courthouse 

door shut, particularly on smaller patent holders who have not acquired the ends or the finances that a Yahoo would have to be able 

to pay, say, a thousand dollars an hour to a law firm that, you 

know, sometimes the principals in a company that their sister-inlaw might practice law with one of the big firms that charges a 

thousand dollars an hour, so you end up getting a whole lot of litigation costs like that. But I’m concerned about closing the litigation 

door, the courthouse door, on small people who have invented 

something. They’ve secured a patent, and someone, a big corporate 

goon, takes it and starts using it and dares you to sue them because they know that if there’s a loser pay provision in there, Mr. 

Armitage, that they’re going to be able to pay those lawyers a thousand dollars an hour for a thousand hours to win the case, as 

you’ve done on your four cases you prevailed that went into litigation, you prevailed. And if the loser had to pay fees, that would 

cause a lot of small people to just not be able to have the burden 

or to take up the burden of asserting their own patent claim. Do 

you agree with that, Mr. Sauer? 

Mr. SAUER. We have heard from our own small member companies concerns as the ones you’ve described, yes. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Do you care about that, Mr. Simon and you Mr. 

Armitage? 

Mr. SIMON. Anybody who has a good patent that a large company 

is infringing, they get a contingency fee lawyer to represent them. 

They need to get a contingency fee lawyer to represent them. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Go up against that $1,000 dollar an hour lawyer 

who is usually going to win the case. 

Mr. SIMON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. JOHNSON. And then there’s a loser pay provision that prevents the plaintiff, that coerces the plaintiff not to file that suit. Do 

you care about that? I guess not. But thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ISSA. While the gentleman is sitting down, we’ll give Ms. 

DelBene—oh, I’m sorry. I missed Mr. Ratcliffe. It is your moment. 

The gentleman from Texas. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the 

witnesses for being here today to discuss this important issue. You 

know, the phrase American ingenuity is often used to describe our 

country. Americans are known around the world for our can-do attitude and the fact that no challenge is too great and no invention 

is out of reach, and this is certainly stimulated by the assurance 

that our ideas, including our intellectual property, are protected. 

The patent system is so central to this idea in the American spirit 

that it’s actually enshrined in our Constitution. I know that all the 

witnesses here and probably most of the folks in this room know 
165 

that our patent system empowers any individual from any walk of 

life to turn an idea into a product and in turn transform our society. Our patent system is one of the things that has allowed us to 

be at the cutting edge of innovation and make us the envy of the 

rest of the world. So it is certainly vital that we protect the patent 

system and address its abuses, and hopefully that is something we 

all can agree upon here today. My familiarity with this issue started before I came to Congress where I was the U.S. attorney for the 

Eastern District of Texas, a district mentioned by Mr. Kramer in 

answering some of the questions, and the district sometimes referred to as the rocket docket. As the U.S. attorney, I often felt that 

some of the judicial resources that I needed to go after hardened 

criminals and drug traffickers and child predators were instead 

sometimes diverted to handle patent litigation because patent 

plaintiffs, and I think this is not in dispute, flock to our area because they saw it as a quote-unquote plaintiff friendly environment. So Mr. Kramer, you discussed this in your testimony and in 

answering one of the questions as it relates to the fee shifting provision that exists in the current law. So I’d like to follow-up and 

ask you whether in your opinion, are the problems surrounding, 

from your perspective, abusive patent litigation the result of plaintiff-friendly judicial districts like the Eastern District of Texas? 

And if so, what do you think we can do here in Congress to send 

a message to judicial districts that are tipping the scales in favor 

of abusive patent behavior? 

Mr. KRAMER. Sure. Thank you for the question. Excellent question. Thank you for all your hard work in the Eastern District. Certainly I think that forum shopping is part of the problem. One of 

the things that Congress can do is put everybody on the same playing field, and H.R. 9 does that, and it is very friendly to both plaintiffs and defendants because it does the things that you would do 

if you were going to design a system from the beginning. For example, let’s focus the case from the start. Let’s prioritize important decisions like claim construction, like venue. Let’s make sure that we 

avoid needless discovery disputes. Let’s make sure that we get all 

the parties who really have an interest in the litigation present in 

the litigation, and let’s make sure that the cases that are being 

brought are reasonable cases. If they’re not reasonable, then they 

should not have been brought in the first place, but so long as a 

case is reasonable, fees will not be shifted and that’s a good thing. 

So H.R. 9 does those things. That’s why we support it. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank you, Mr. Kramer. I’d like to follow-up on 

a point because I’ve had conversations with stakeholders across the 

spectrum on this issue. I have heard from folks who both support 

this bill and oppose this bill, and a common concern from some of 

them, and specifically universities and others seem to be on the 

fee-shifting provision which has been described to me as a strict 

loser pays system. As I read the bill, losers are required to pay only 

if the claims are not reasonably justified. But I understand that 

some are concerned that this provision would chill the ability of inventors to challenge infringing parties. So, Mr. Kramer, provide 

some clarity for me here. Specifically, does this bill give judges 

enough room to address this issue. And can you speak, or will you 

speak to some of the folks’ concerns that the fee shifting provision 
166 

here would deter venture capitalists, for example, from investing in 

patents. 

Mr. KRAMER. Thank you for the question. Let me address the feeshifting issue. Certainly the provisions in the bill allow for the 

judge to take into consideration special circumstances and whether 

it’s an individual inventor, for example. So there’s plenty of room 

in the bill for the judge to make exceptions, and it is not a strictly 

loser pays provision because, again, if you have a reasonable case, 

even if you lose, you don’t have to pay. So I think it’s a good provision for that reason. 

With respect to venture capital companies, certainly when venture capital companies invest in innovation, they invest in real 

products, they invest in jobs, that is all good behavior that will not 

be at all affected by the provisions of H.R. 9. If a venture capital 

company is supporting litigation for the sake of litigation, then 

they may be drawn in for purposes of the joinder provision for fee 

shifting if, indeed, they have sponsored litigation that is unreasonable. And that is the least I would expect of any corporate entity, 

any individual. If you bring an unreasonable case, as a society we 

should not really tolerate that. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank you, Mr. Kramer. And, again, I have questions I wish I could ask from each of you. Thank you for being here. 

I’m out of time. I yield back. 

Mr. ISSA. I thank the gentleman. We now go to the gentlelady 

from Washington, Ms. DelBene. 

Ms. DELBENE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thanks to all of you 

for being here so late on this panel. I guess I’ll start with Mr. Kramer. In Yahoo’s experience, how has discovery worked in patent 

cases that you’ve defended yourself against, and what improvements do you think, if any, are necessary in this process right now? 

Mr. KRAMER. Sure. Thank you, Congresswoman, for that question. I can give you a great example from the three trials that I 

attended on behalf of Yahoo in Texas. In each of those cases there 

was a discovery period where we produced hundreds of thousands 

of pages of documents electronically. In those cases we used less 

than 1 percent of the documents that we produced. So very minimal discovery is actually used at the end of the day in trial to 

prove a case. It is an expense that we could have avoided. In a typical case, I think what you want to do is prioritize claim construction because in our experience that is pivotal. It crystalizes the parties’ decisions, and we’re able to reach settlement more quickly and 

easily once we have that decision from the Court. I think if you 

push off some of that unnecessary discovery until you get the claim 

construction decision, that’s going to help a lot. And H.R. 9 does 

that, and that’s why we support it. 

Ms. DELBENE. Now, you were just speaking with Mr. Johnson 

about the trial you said in your testimony and just now that you 

prevailed at three trials and won eight summary judgments. Is 

that correct? 

Mr. KRAMER. If memory serves, yes. 

Ms. DELBENE. In the last few years, but in none of those cases 

were you awarded attorney’s fees? 

Mr. KRAMER. That is correct. 
167 

Ms. DELBENE. And so with the Supreme Court’s decision in Octane Fitness and Highmark, do you think it would make it more 

likely that you would receive attorney’s fees if you prevail in similar cases in the future, or if so, or if not, why not? 

Mr. KRAMER. I would hope that it would. It is unclear at this 

time whether we would prevail certainly in some forums. I think 

if you look at the statistics that have been gathered so far on those 

fee shifting cases, it is on a forum-by-forum basis, and that again 

feeds into plaintiff’s choice of forum. A lot of times I cannot get a 

case transferred, so it’s an issue. So even if a plaintiff brings a bad 

case, even with the Octane Fitness case, I’m not sure that I would 

get my fees recovered in that case. The reason is because even 

though the Supreme Court granted, they loosened the standard a 

little in the Octane Fitness case, in the companion case, the 

Highmark case, they said appropriately it was for the discretion of 

the district court. But as we know, on a district-by-district basis it’s 

going to vary, and what H.R. 9 does, is it puts all the jurisdictions, 

all the forums on the same playing field, and so I think that would 

be a vast improvement. 

Ms. DELBENE. Do others have feedback on what they think the 

impact of Octane Fitness or Highmark would have on future cases? 

Mr. SIMON. I guess I was asked this. I think it will have a mild 

impact; but, again, the Supreme Court also said two things. One 

Mr. Kramer said about it’s about discretion of the court, which 

means venue becomes all the more important. I think the second 

that matters is that it said it’s still exceptional; so it’s going to happen very, very rarely. 

Mr. ARMITAGE. There’s actually some data on the IPO website 

where they track each decision on a motion for attorneys’ fees. I 

think in the month of March, for example, there were 6 cases in 

which they were awarded and 19 cases in which they weren’t, more 

or less. 

Mr. SAUER. The Federal Circuit Bar Association yesterday sent 

a letter to the Chairman of this Committee giving more recent updates, and so according to their account, it’s more than tripled the 

rate. But with that said, what I’m hearing is I think this discussion 

would benefit, and especially our members would benefit from an 

understanding of how often exactly, you know, would Congress intend for fees to be shifted? There seems to be an assumption that 

under the standards that are proposed in the bill, fee shifting 

would be rare; it would be a very unusual occasion. And what I 

hear from the testimony is it’s not often enough. It would have to 

happen more often. So I would like to get a better understanding 

at the end of the day how often is then, you know, is the sweet 

spot, because either it’s very rare, or we want it to be a lot more 

common; but how a lot more common is kind of unclear to me. 

Mr. ARMITAGE. I think one of the virtues of this bill is it changes 

behavior. It sets a default rule that you will get your fees unless 

your defenses are reasonable in law or fact. And, therefore, if 

you’re a patent owner with strong patent, you’re likely to be up 

against someone who will not defend as they might otherwise have 

defended if they don’t have a good case of noninfringement against 

your patent. It makes strong patents stronger, and basically makes 
168 

weak patents pretty much unenforceable because you’ve doubled 

down on your attorney costs. 

Ms. DELBENE. My time is expired. Thank you very much. And 

I yield back, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. ISSA. We now go to the gentleman from San Diego who recently named the John Rhoades Federal Judiciary Center in his 

district, an expansive complex that normally would have more patent cases being heard, but they do seem to end up in Texas. Mr. 

Peters is recognized. 

Mr. PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your excellent work on that as well. I want to thank all the witnesses for 

being here. I want to thank Mr. Kramer in particular for spending 

some time with me on the phone, and I hope you will continue to 

take my calls as we sort through this. Just on those three cases 

you won, were the plaintiff’s claims reasonable under the standards 

set forth by H.R. 9? 

Mr. KRAMER. In my opinion, I think the first case, the Bright Response case which I believe is in my testimony was clearly unreasonable, and I should have gotten my attorney’s fees. But I think 

it’s an exceptional case because the plaintiff essentially came to 

court knowing that their patent was invalid, yet they made me 

take it all the way through trial. 

Mr. PETERS. Under the new jurisprudence under the Supreme 

Court, would that be a case where a court could consider fees 

under a loosened standard? 

Mr. KRAMER. It would be, yeah. 

Mr. PETERS. I just think that the point is, sort of implication 

from the question from Ms. DelBene was you had three cases and 

you didn’t get your fees. What’s the right rate? I had the same 

question pop in my head that maybe Mr. Sauer did. I want to give 

Mr. Sauer just a chance maybe if you would. Your testimony did 

say and I think your written testimony and your oral testimony 

that you believe in targeted patent reforms, and I wanted to give 

you a chance to say what those are, in particular to distinguish 

them from, to explain why they would be different from what’s in 

H.R. 9, either in degree, or also if H.R. 9 is missing any reforms 

that you would include. 

Mr. SAUER. I will take the last one first. You know, what is not 

an H.R. 9 but should be there is we need to talk more about how 

to make the IPR proceeding of administrative patent challenges a 

more fair and balanced proceeding that has more due process protections for patentees. 

With respect to the Innovation Act, what I heard and that is 

shared by BIO’s members, is there are a lot of shared objectives, 

things we want to do. When we say more targeted reforms, we 

don’t just mean the ones where we see clearly there is going to be 

a good chance for consensus, that is transparency, that is dealing 

with demand letters, small business protections. But we also think 

that those provisions should deal with enhanced pleadings. You 

know, we agree that pleadings should be elevated to the standards 

that apply to other civil litigation. And we can work to make these 

pleadings, pleading requirements more targeted. 

You know, Michelle Lee testified about this concept of at least 

one claim apply to at least one product in a way that states a plau-
169 

sible claim. I think all these ways will make the provisions more 

targeted. Likewise, I was encouraged to hear the number of alternative ideas to come to grips with discovery stays. I think that is 

what we mean with targeting the bill. Like we urge moderation 

without abandoning the same objectives. 

Mr. PETERS. Right. I might also mention that, the question I 

heard from Mr. Ratcliffe before he left about venture capital, that 

has been addressed by the venture capital industry themselves, 

who have indicated that particularly the personal liability for sponsoring litigation does have a tremendously chilling effect probably 

both on the litigation itself but also on the investment side. And 

I think that is something that we should probably resolve as part 

of going forward with the patent reform. 

And, finally, Mr. Chairman, if we could, Biocom wrote a letter 

dated today, April 14, about their concerns with this bill. I would 

ask that it be included in the record. 

Mr. ISSA. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information referred to follows:] 
170 
171 
172 

Mr. PETERS. And thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. ISSA. Thank the gentleman. We now go to the Ranking Member of the full Committee, Mr. Conyers. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, sir. I apologize for my absences during 

the hearing. But I did want to ask Deputy General Counsel Sauer 

a question or two. I apologize to Mr. Kramer, Armitage, and Simon. 

In your testimony, you suggest that that the new impleader authority in the measure under consideration, H.R. 9, is one-sided because it benefits only winning defendants. Why do you think this 

does harm to small companies and individual inventors if you do 

in fact? 

Mr. SAUER. There are two aspects about the impleader provision 

in particular that we believe really interfere with the ability of 

biotech companies to operate in their licensing and partnership and 

financing ecosystems. 

The first is the provision that talks about the notices of potential 

liability under the impleader provision of the bill. At the defendant’s option, the accused infringer would get to send out notices to 

all the patentee’s business partners, the licensors and their VC 

companies, to invite those to either renounce their interest in the 

patent or otherwise dissolve, if you will, their business relationship 

with the patentee or else be subjected to potential attorneys fee 

awards. So early in the case, there is a letter that will come to 

business partners that exposes them to liability and has a certain 

menace attached to it. That is one. We think that will interfere 

with business relationships. 

Secondly, the definition of those who could be impleaded, you 

know, is quite broad and could capture, for example, VC investors 

if they have certain voting rights. It is all those who stand to benefit from the litigation and have the right to direct or have the 

right and direct to control the litigation. So that captures universities, VCs who have a seat on the board. And these are the kind 

of entities that small biotech companies very much need to do business with in order to advance their innovations. And so those were 

the two main concerns. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. In what I think was your testimony, 

you have described H.R. 9 as an overbroad attempt to deter abusive patent litigation. But, at the same time, I read into your remarks that it is woefully inadequate. What should H.R. 9 include 

other than inter partes review? Is that a fair question? 

Mr. SAUER. That is a fair question because the patent system has 

to work for all industries. And as the biotech industry, right we 

don’t operate in a vacuum. I think it behooves us to take account 

of the needs of other industries for whom the patent system may 

not work in the same way. So if you are asking me what else 

should the bill include, I would say the bill should include that, 

which other industries need to the extent it doesn’t hurt biotech 

and to the extent it makes for a better patent system that works 

for everybody who has to participate in it, not just biotech. So you 

know, we want to be quite reasonable in that sense. 

Mr. CONYERS. I see. Would H.R. 9 affect your member companies 

and other small businesses and individual inventors to obtain 

much needed funding? Would it help? Or would the bill have negative consequences for the innovation economy itself? 
173 

Mr. SAUER. It would, there is no doubt in our mind that it would 

have negative consequences, at least on innovation in biotechnology 

because we depend so much on external funding. To say it again, 

it takes us more than a decade to bring a product to market. And 

once we are on the market, these products are very long-lived. So 

we depend on investors’ confidence. And those investors expect that 

their investments will be secured, among other things, by patents 

that are meaningful and enforceable. 

Mr. CONYERS. Finally, let me ask you about the suggestion that 

limiting discovery is too rigid and would delay litigation costing 

plaintiffs market share and potentially increasing damages for a 

defendant. In what ways, in your opinion, does this proposed measure make matters worse? 

Mr. SAUER. The proposed measure proposes to stay basically 

merits discovery until the court has ruled on the interpretation of 

the patent claim. The problem beyond that is that going into the 

litigation, at the very beginning, the parties don’t really know what 

kind of information they need to discover to even interpret the patent claim. In district courts that do this often, there are local patent rules that have set up a streamlined process to get to a claim 

construction process and claim construction ruling quickly. And 

these processes, you know, lay out certain categories of information 

that need to be exchanged by both parties, to both parties with documents to back them up. I think it would be a good idea for Congress to look to local patent rules in the more sophisticated districts for inspiration of how such a streamlined process could be 

crafted. Our objective too would be, if we can, to get to a claim construction hearing in cases where that is necessary within a year or 

less. I think that would be a good outcome. 

Mr. CONYERS. I thank you. And I thank Chairman Issa. 

Mr. ISSA. I thank all of you. And hopefully I am last but not 

least. Did you go? No, you didn’t. Well then I won’t be last. Thank 

you for returning, Mr. Deutch. The gentleman is recognized. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is too kind. I appreciate it. 

First, I would like to thank the witnesses for your testimony 

today. We are well aware of the serious abuses that have plagued 

the patent system in recent years. The question is what scope of 

congressional action will stop these abuses without also endangering America’s innovation economy? That is what we are grappling with here. 

The legislation that we are considering is the same as legislation 

that passed out of this Committee in 2013. But as all of our witnesses have noticed, the context surrounding this bill has changed 

dramatically. The Supreme Court has issued six landmark patent 

decisions related to subject matter eligibility and fee shifting standards. The standard pleading form for patent complaints will be 

eliminated later that year. The Patent and Trademark Office is in 

the process of implementing the America Invents Act to improve 

patent quality. District courts with high volumes of patent filing 

have updated their local rules. And the FTC is exercising its powers to protect end users from abusive demand letters. 

Undoubtedly, all of those charged with building a strong and efficient patent system have more to do to put an end to abusive be-
174 

havior. My primary concern with H.R. 9, as currently drafted, centers on the broader litigation reforms. These reforms push the patent litigation system in a direction that it is already heading and 

may result in unintended consequences that harm legitimate patent owners, including entrepreneurs and small businesses, independent inventors, and major research universities. Now, Mr. 

Armitage, a question for you, section 3(a) of H.R. 9 would add 

pleading requirements just as the judicial conference eliminates 

form 18. And the question is won’t eliminating form 18 impose the 

specificity requirements in Twombly and Iqbal on patent cases and 

won’t the pleading rules in H.R. 9 go further than the pleading 

standard for other Federal courts? 

Mr. ARMITAGE. One way to compare the standards currently in 

H.R. 9 is actually to go read local patent rules that have been put 

in place in recent years, look at what the initial mandatory disclosures are in those rules. I looked at two for the purposes of this 

hearing, Northern District of Illinois and California, and what I 

discovered is they’re great similarities. What I was proposing in my 

testimony was very simple, use those rules as a template for pleading standards in H.R. 9, have them only apply to those district 

courts where they don’t actually have best practices in local rules. 

That way you would encourage uniformity across district court 

with best practices, not have a statutory provision that would be 

out of step with Twombly requirements, and probably have much 

less concern among critics of that provision. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Okay. Thank you. Mr. Sauer, you note in your testimony that limiting discovery before claims construction could 

delay discovery on merits by at least 12 months. Can you explain 

just a bit more from your perspective why this may have negative, 

unintended consequences for legitimate patent owners among your 

members. And could you give examples of instances where a delay 

in discovery would be wasteful or harm a patent holder’s right to 

defend their property rights? 

Mr. SAUER. The delay in discovery could certainly be wasteful because in the exchange of contentions that Mr. Armitage described 

is also embedded a production of documents to back up these contentions. So, in other words, in districts where it works pretty well, 

the parties have to not just work toward claim construction but 

also lay bare their theory of the case and the evidence that backs 

it up. This is not relevant just for claim construction. If this kind 

of evidence can be developed in a patent case, it is relevant for 

claim construction and also often gets the case in a position for 

early summary judgment because we discover relevant information 

alongside that which is relevant for claim construction. 

This is not to say that, you know, there are certain kinds of evidence that, especially under the modified rules of civil procedure, 

you know, which are going to be required to be proportionate to the 

needs of the case, the judges shouldn’t take a hard look at the 

kinds of evidence that should be produced in every case. Damages 

discovery may not be relevant in every case. Willfulness discovery 

may not be relevant in every case. Discovery about inequitable conduct may not be relevant in a lot of cases before liability has even 

been established. So that is the response to the second half of your 

question. I forgot the first half. 
175 

Mr. DEUTCH. That is a perfectly appropriate response as we are 

headed down to vote. And I am out of time. Thanks again to the 

witnesses. And, Mr. Chairman, thank you. For giving me the time. 

Mr. ISSA. Of course. Thanks for your participation on both panels. We now get to just me and I am up against the clock too. Mr. 

Kramer, Mr. Armitage, Mr. Simon, I am going to ask you because 

you sort of have firsthand knowledge of your companies. Earlier we 

had a figure that came from Gary Shapiro at the Consumer Electronics Association and everyone said well, how did he get that figure. I just want to ask it in a different way. I did the arithmetic, 

it is 3/10ths of 1 percent of GDP. So the question is, is 3/10ths of 

1 percent something that, in fact, you think excess patent litigation 

could, in fact, be hurting innovation and, thus, our GDP by that 

amount? Sometimes the only way to break something down is to 

say, you know, 3/10ths of a cent per dollar, do these trolls and excess litigation of this sort, does it cost us that, not in actual legal 

fees, but in the hit to all parts of it including innovation? 

Mr. KRAMER. My answer is that it is a problem. It continues to 

be a problem. I have not quantified it in terms of GDP. But certainly for the high tech industry, we see new cases all the time. 

Even if we settle them, we tend to get more. I just won a case 

under 101, only for the troll to go and sue me again in another 

country on a similar patent, the foreign equivalent. So this problem 

is not going away. Because it is not going away, I think it deserves 

our attention. Because it is a significant problem, we should address it. H.R. 9 does that. Thank you. 

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Armitage, would you say that your time at Eli Lilly 

that 3/10ths of 1 percent might have been spent directly and indirectly related to litigation? 

Mr. ARMITAGE. So when I am enforcing a patent that is worth 

$20 or $30 billion, no one asks me what the cost of defense is, that 

is true. But the problem is that same order of magnitude of cost 

for defense applies to patents that, for example, may only be worth 

$5 or $10 million. It makes them effectively worthless. So unless 

you address abusive litigation practices across the board, what you 

are saying to a whole spectrum of inventors is, go get your patents 

but they are effectively unenforceable. Or when you are faced with 

a patent infringement allegation that costs millions to defend, you 

effectively have no defense. I think that is why we are here today, 

the integrity of the patent system is at stake. 

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Simon, just a guess, you have spent a few dollars 

related to troll activity, what do you think it costs you? 

Mr. SIMON. Well, I have seen studies that at least I personally 

find credible in the tens of billions of dollars. So the numbers don’t 

surprise me. But however it is measured, for our company, millions 

of dollars means lots of engineers, means lots of R&D, means lots 

of things we cannot do for our customers. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. For all of you, I am going to ask a final set of 

questions and they really have to do with, Ms. Lee. With the director, we talked earlier about fee shifting. And throughout the day, 

there has been a lot of discussion about shell corporations and so 

on. She had some concerns. You all, Mr. Sauer, has some concerns. 

Let’s talk about what a shell corporation isand so on. 
176 

So, Mr. Kramer, I will start with you. When you sue on behalf 

of Yahoo, you put the whole company behind it, right? You don’t 

form a separate shell and stick the patent in there? 

Mr. KRAMER. That is exactly correct. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. And you do control—all three of you in your 

roles, you controlled the conduct of the patent? 

Mr. KRAMER. Correct. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. Now, a passive investor, let’s see if we can go 

through a definition, because it is important to me that we get the 

bill right. If a passive investor is somebody who gives money to a 

venture and that venture includes the activities that might lead to 

suits but also includes, let’s say, a university looking for people to 

produce the product, to license, perhaps even that venture is going 

to produce a product using that technology, would you say that is 

a shell corporation or would that, by definition, shield the limited 

partners because it had purposes other than just litigation? In the 

current bill and in your history. Mr. Kramer, you have got the biggest smile, I will start with you. 

Mr. KRAMER. Yeah, it is a complex fact pattern, number one. 

Mr. ISSA. The bill does say that if your primary purpose of the 

enterprise is more than just the litigation, then there is no piercing 

of that corporate veil. And that is where I want to ask. Because I 

think we have real questions about what a passive investor is. Is 

it an investor in a lawsuit or is it an investor in a technology? 

Mr. KRAMER. A passive investor would be the investor in the 

technology, right. We should support investment in technology because that is how we get jobs, that is how we grow the industry. 

We don’t grow the GDP by investing in suing each other. And that 

is the problem. So I think if you have an interest, a direct interest 

in the litigation, you have an active stream of revenue from that 

litigation, then I think the joinder provision should kick in. And if 

the shell corporation cannot pay the fees, then whoever is backing 

it financially should be on the hook. 

Mr. ISSA. So are the rest of you comfortable with that, that if the 

corporation has some purpose other than just suing and we make 

that clear, if it is not already clear in the legislation, you are comfortable with that, that an enterprise that, let’s say, has licensed 

half a dozen people, is actively supporting that, and may be developing more technology would be exempt, even if they have no 

money, even if their claim was frivolous. In your experience, are 

you comfortable with us not dealing with that part of the so-called 

troll, you know troll industry? Because that is the way I think the 

bill is structured today. And I think that is what even, Mr. Sauer, 

I think that is what you would want to see is that somebody who 

is actively trying to do something more than just sue would find 

themselves exempt from their investors being at risk. 

I just want to make sure that we have got that consensus. Because I think it is important because that is the intent of what I 

think the bill does. And I want to make sure I understand today, 

and with Ms. Lee, I want to make sure that we get the bill to say 

that in a term everybody understands. So any final comments? Mr. 

Armitage? 

Mr. ARMITAGE. I think I am with you. Remember, this is a context where someone takes a patent, asserts it, it has no reasonable 
177 

basis on which to assert the patent, it loses, it has no money, and, 

therefore, this provision means nothing unless someone pays. So, 

I think in that context what you said is fair. But you can’t have 

too much sympathy for a passive investor if the only purpose of the 

investment was to bring relatively meritless claims on patents of 

this type. 

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Simon, you are dealing with a lot more start-ups, 

a lot more people who have these sort of one-off patents. How do 

you feel about that, you know, that limited protection that we are 

giving you to pierce the corporate veil in this case? 

Mr. SIMON. Well, given the press of time, I will say I think Mr. 

Armitage pretty much stated it very well, as he normally does, 

even when I disagree with him. But this time, I agree with them. 

Mr. ISSA. Okay. And, finally, you get the last word on this subject. 

Mr. SAUER. And I will keep it short. I think there is a lot of unanimity trying to achieve the same goals. I do note the provision in 

H.R. 9 is different from the one that was in the Cornyn bill in the 

last Congress. Right so there are a number of different ways one 

can get at this. There is yet a different provision that is circulating 

that Senator Hatch is working on. I think we can make a lot of 

progress and I would urge maybe getting a bunch of stakeholders 

together which I believe has worked well during the AIA. 

Mr. ISSA. Well, we are going to continue to do that. And I want 

to thank all of you for your testimony. Pursuant to the rules, I will 

say this concludes today’s hearing. I want to thank all of my witnesses. Without objection, all Members will have 5 legislative days 

to submit additional written questions for you all and additional 

materials for the record. 

And with that, we stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:40 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(179) 

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Prepared Statement of the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Michigan, and Member, Committee on the 

Judiciary 

We all agree that the exploitation of the patent process and abusive patent litigation practices must be stopped. 

In responding to these serious problems, however, Congress must not harm our 

patent system, discourage innovation, weaken patent rights, or increase patent litigation. 

Unfortunately, H.R. 9 goes too far in its approach. And, for that reason, I continue 

to have serious concerns with this legislation. 

To begin with, the bill does not take into consideration current ongoing developments. 

For instance, the United States Patent and Trademark Office is in the midst of 

implementing the America Invents Act and has undertaken various efforts to prevent problems of abusive patent litigation. And, the Office just held a Patent Quality Summit to address the issues surrounding weak quality patents. 

The legislation should also reflect how the federal courts are changing the patent 

litigation landscape. 

For example, the Supreme Court will soon eliminate the use of Form 18 in patent 

proceedings, which will lead to the higher pleading requirements of Twombly and 

Iqbal. 

Recent Supreme Court decisions such as Octane Fitness, which lowered the standard by which a court may award attorneys’ fees, and Highmark, which gives deference to district court decisions on appeal, should effectively make it much easier 

for prevailing parties to obtain attorneys fees. 

And other decisions, such as Alice, which declared that abstract ideas could not 

be patented, and Nautilus, which set a higher standard for certainty and specificity 

for patent claims, will make it easier to invalidate many vaguely-worded software 

patents and business method patents and prevent the Office from granting them in 

the first place. 

Further, many lower courts are adopting model discovery orders and guidelines 

that limit discovery in patent lawsuits, while others are promoting early and active 

judicial case management. 

Legislation also should not ignore the actions the Federal Trade Commission and 

state Attorneys General are taking to stop deceptive practices in sending vague patent demand letters. 

Cumulatively, these various efforts address many of the concerns about abusive 

patent litigation. 

Unfortunately, H.R. 9 ignores the changing landscape and goes well beyond 

tackling abusive patent litigation. It actually weakens every single patent in America. 

• H.R. 9’s heightened pleading requirements simply create needless hurdles for 

legitimate inventors to access the courts. 

These requirements will work an unfairness against patent holders across the 

board because they are drafted in a one-sided manner; they will prolong litigation; 

and are unnecessary because the courts are already addressing pleading standards. 

• The bill’s fee shifting requirement favors wealthy parties and chills meritorious claims. They are drafted in an over-broad manner to apply beyond 
180 

patent infringement actions. They deprive courts of discretion and will confuse courts and litigants about who is the prevailing party in an action. And, 

again, they are unnecessary in light of recent Supreme Court decisions. 

• The bill’s discovery limitations are counter-productive. They will delay litigation; lead to greater expenses for the parties; and are more properly dealt 

with by the courts. 

• Further, H.R. 9 mandates that the federal judiciary adopt a series of new 

rules and judicial changes. The federal judiciary, with its very deliberative 

rule-making process, would do far better than Congress legislating changes. 

By unbalancing the patent system, we send a signal to inventors that their inventions are not worthy of full legal protection. And, overly broad legislation, such as 

H.R. 9, could engender more rather than less litigation, while weakening patent enforcement protections. 

Finally, legislation to stop abusive patent litigation should target the underlying 

issues fostering abusive patent litigation. 

One of the most effective steps we can take in responding to abusive patent litigation is to ensure that poor quality patents are not issued to begin with. 

We need to provide our examiners the resources they need to review and analyze 

the hundreds of thousands of complex and interrelated patent applications they receive every year. 

Therefore, we must stop the diversion of patent fees, which has already led to an estimated $1 billion in fees diverted over the last two decades. And to protect these 

funds from a sequester or appropriators’ decisions to siphon money from the U.S. 

Patent and Trade Office. 

Legislation should also address the problem of the extortionist use of demand letters. At every hearing on abusive patent litigation, witnesses have requested a legislative fix to curtail the use of vague and deceptive patent demand letters. 

Yet, H.R. 9 does not do enough to resolve this issue. Legislation should be drafted 

to apply to all parties because certain defendants can employ abusive litigation tactics too. 

In responding to the problem of abusive patent litigation, Congress should do so 

in a more balanced and effective approach than H.R. 9. 

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Response to Questions for the Record from the Honorable Michelle Lee, 

Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of 

the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
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Response to Questions for the Record from Kevin T. Kramer, Vice 

President, Deputy General Counsel for Intellectual Property, Yahoo! 
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Response to Questions for the Record from Robert A. Armitage, 

former Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Eli Lilly & Co. 
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Response to Questions for the Record from David M. Simon, 

Senior Vice President, Intellectual Property, Salesforce.com 
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Response to Questions for the Record from Hans Sauer, Deputy General 

Counsel for Intellectual Property, Biotechnology Industry Organization 
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