NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PAUL M. SANDERS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

LEGACY EMANUEL MEDICAL 

CENTER, an Oregon corporation; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-35977

D.C. No. 3:14-cv-00690-PK

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Michael W. Mosman, Chief Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 18, 2017**

Before: TROTT, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges. 

Paul M. Sanders appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing 

his action alleging violations of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active 

Labor Act (“EMTALA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. We have jurisdiction under 28 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

JAN 26 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
 2 14-35977 

U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Arrington v. Wong, 237 F.3d 1066, 1069 

(9th Cir. 2001). We reverse and remand. 

The district court erred by concluding that Sanders had not stated an 

EMTALA claim against defendant Legacy Emanuel Medical Center. Liberally 

construed, Sanders alleged facts showing that he had received a different 

examination than would have been offered to other patients presenting similar 

symptoms. Sanders also alleged that as a result of the disparate screening, the 

hospital failed to identify an emergency medical condition and he therefore 

suffered harm. Assuming these allegations are true, the allegations in the First 

Amended Complaint were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. See Jackson v. 

East Bay Hosp., 246 F.3d 1248, 1255-56 (9th Cir. 2001) (under EMTALA “the 

touchstone is whether . . . the procedure is designed to identify an emergency 

medical condition, that is manifested by acute and severe symptoms[,]” which is 

determined by whether an examination is comparable to that “offered to other 

patients presenting similar symptoms . . . .” (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (providing that “if any individual . . .

comes to the emergency department and a request is made on the individual’s 
 3 14-35977 

behalf for examination or treatment for a medical condition, the hospital must 

provide for an appropriate medical screening examination . . . to determine whether 

or not an emergency medical condition . . . exists.”); id. § 1395dd(d)(2)(A) (“Any 

individual who suffers personal harm as a direct result of a participating hospital’s 

violation of a requirement of this section may. . . obtain those damages available 

for personal injury . . . .”); id. § 1395dd(e)(1) (defining “emergency medical 

condition”); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting obligation 

to construe pro se pleadings liberally). 

Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with 

this disposition. 

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued 

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on 

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

REVERSED and REMANDED.