inss.dodlive.mil SF No. 288 1 

Despite its reputation for peace and stability in a troubled region, the 

East African country of Tanzania is experiencing a rising number of 

militant Islamist attacks that have targeted local Christian leaders 

and foreign tourists, as well as popular bars and restaurants. These attacks, which 

began in 2012, rarely make the headlines of international media. However, they 

should serve as a wake-up call for U.S. policymakers to increase short-term engagement with Tanzanian officials and support for Tanzanian security agencies 

to preempt the emergence of a more significant threat to U.S. and international 

interests in East Africa. 

Thus far, the attacks in Tanzania have been relatively unsophisticated. 

They have involved crude homemade explosives, handguns, and buckets of 

acid; they have been focused on poorly protected targets of opportunity; 

and they have not resulted in mass casualties. However, as events over the 

past few years in neighboring Kenya have demonstrated, today’s seemingly 

minor and manageable threats can evolve quickly into something far more 

lethal and intractable. In Kenya, similarly unsophisticated attacks only a 

few years ago have grown quickly, resulting in the Westgate Mall attack 

in September 2013, when 4 shooters killed 67 people and wounded 175 

more; the discovery in March 2014 of a massive car bomb in Mombasa that 

could have killed scores more; and the massacre of more than 60 villagers 

in Lamu County in June 2014. Events such as these have thrown Kenya 

into a cycle of violence pitting national security forces against clandestine 

militant cells. 

This paper provides an overview of the current threat posed by Islamist 

militants in Tanzania by tracing their evolution in the Tanzanian political 

The Rising Terrorist Threat in 

Tanzania: Domestic Islamist 

Militancy and Regional Threats

by Andre LeSage

Strategic Forum

National Defense University

About the Author

Dr. Andre LeSage is a Senior Research 

Fellow in the Center for Strategic 

Research, Institute for National 

Strategic Studies, at the National 

Defense University.

Key Points

◆ The growing number of militant 

Islamist attacks in Tanzania 

demonstrates a nascent terrorist 

threat that can undermine peace 

and stability in yet another East 

African country.

◆ Local and regional dynamics—

including foreign fighters 

returning from Somalia, disputes 

over the Zanzibar islands, and 

national elections in 2015—could 

create a “perfect storm” that 

would exacerbate the threat.

◆ If its issues remain unaddressed, 

Tanzania is likely to experience 

the same security trends as Kenya, 

where, with the help of external support, local capabilities 

have been developed to conduct 

increasingly deadly attacks that 

affect U.S. and other foreign 

interests.

◆ In response, the United States 

needs to focus policy-level attention on the situation in Tanzania 

and invest additional intelligence, 

law enforcement, and strategic 

communications efforts to combat 

the spread of violent extremism.

September 2014

Center

f

o

r Strate

gic R

eSEARCH
2 SF No. 288 inss.dodlive.mil

context, identifying the major Islamist movements 

active in the country today, and assessing the spillover of al Shabab– and al Qaeda–associated threats 

from Somalia and Kenya. The paper concludes with 

recommendations that the United States pay closer 

attention to the situation in Tanzania, build Tanzanian capabilities to address current threat streams, and 

work closely with the governments in both mainland 

Tanzania and the Zanzibar islands to counter further 

radicalization. 

Njombe Tukuyu

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The boundaries and names shown and the designations used

on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance 

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inss.dodlive.mil SF No. 288 3 

The Tanzanian Context

Globally, Tanzania is known for its rich cultural history, political stability, and increasingly vibrant economy. 

Politically, the country earned respect from international 

observers as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement and 

a key regional force in the struggle against South African 

apartheid. Julius Nyerere, Tanzania’s first president who 

served from 1964 to 1985, promoted national unity of the 

country’s 120 ethnic groups and emerged as one of Africa’s 

leading statesmen. The economy is primarily based on agriculture, infrastructure remains poor, and corruption is a 

significant problem. However, foreign direct investment is 

booming in the mining and oil exploration sectors. In addition, tourism opportunities abound—including safaris 

in the Serengeti, climbing on Mount Kilimanjaro, and the 

luxury beach resorts of Zanzibar.

Officially known as the United Republic of Tanzania, the country was formed through the union of mainland Tanganyika and the Zanzibar islands (Unguja and 

Pemba), which lie approximately 20 miles off the coast. 

Tanzania has a population of approximately 48 million, 

divided roughly evenly between Christians and Muslims 

at 35 to 45 percent each, with a large segment of traditional animists making up the difference. Tanzania is not 

dominated by a single ethnic group. The largest tribe—the 

Sukuma, located around Lake Victoria—constitutes less 

than 20 percent of the population. Other tribes, including 

the Nyamwezi, Haya, Gogo, Ha, and Masaai, individually 

comprise less than 10 percent of the population.

Muslims—primarily from the Shafi’i school of 

Sunni Islam—are scattered across the country and interspersed with non-Muslims in all major Tanzanian 

cities. That said, the largest concentrations of Muslims 

can be found in Zanzibar—where Muslims make up 95 

percent of the population of 750,000 people—and the 

mainland Tanzanian coastline. Islam arrived in Tanzania from Arabia, resulting in dynastic settlements along 

the coast by the 13th century, and then spread inland 

along pre-colonial trade routes. Zanzibar—including 

the more populous island of Unguja and the smaller, 

poorer island of Pemba—was critical to this process as 

it became the seat for an Omani sultanate by the mid1800s and a main base for the slave trade deep into the 

mainland. European colonization—the British on Zanzibar and the Germans on the mainland—did little to 

disrupt the spread of Islam. In fact, “the diffusion of 

Islam in East Africa generally followed the establishment of railroads, and was facilitated by the fact that 

the Germans initially employed Muslims as officials, 

police, soldiers and teachers.”1

Control of mainland Tanganyika shifted from Germany to Britain during World War II. The territory 

then gained independence in December 1961 under the 

leadership of Julius Nyerere and his Tanganyika African 

National Union (TANU). Zanzibar did not achieve independence until December 1963. Its first government, 

a constitutional monarchy led by the Sultan of Zanzibar, 

was overthrown in an extremely violent coup by the AfroShirazi Party (ASP), which quickly merged Zanzibar with 

Tanganyika in 1964 to form the modern Tanzanian state. 

This was followed by the merger of the TANU and ASP 

parties to create Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM, or the 

Party of the Revolution). 

Tanzania was established by Nyerere along the lines 

of state corporatism, which was originally considered a 

mid-point between capitalism and Marxism. In the corporatist state, all interest groups—trade unions, women’s 

organizations, ethnic organizations, youth organizations, and even religious groups—are directly controlled 

by the government. The ideas behind state corporatism 

were that interest groups would still be represented, but a 

strong government able to guide economic and political 

development would be firmly in control.2

Tanzania remained a single-party state under the 

CCM until multiparty elections were allowed in 1992, 

but the CCM’s rule continued unbroken until today. 

Since the CCM remains deeply intertwined with state 

institutions and retains its organized system of party representation from the village level up to the national level, 

it has been difficult for Tanzanian opposition parties to 
4 SF No. 288 inss.dodlive.mil

challenge the party’s dominance. However, in the run-up 

to national elections in 2015, cracks in CCM’s control 

are beginning to show, and political competition is becoming fiercer and occasionally violent.

Although several political parties exist,3

 the primary 

challenges to CCM rule come from two parties: Chama 

Cha Wananchi (CUF, or the Civic United Front) and 

Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA, or the Party for Democracy and Progress). While 

the CCM is able to draw support from all parts of the 

country, the CUF emerged in Zanzibar—particularly 

the poorer and more religiously conservative island of 

Pemba—and Muslims remain its primary supporters. 

Although the CUF is working to build stronger support 

on the mainland, Zanzibar remains its base. After losing 

closely contested elections in Zanzibar to the CCM in 

1995, 2000, and 2005, violent demonstrations occurred 

after CUF supporters decried vote-rigging by CCM 

politicians. In an attempt to avoid future conflict, a Government of National Unity was created for Zanzibar 

following a referendum in July 2010, effectively to share 

power between CCM and CUF leaders on the islands. 

As a result, following the 2010 elections, the CCM retained power in Zanzibar under President Ali Mohamed 

Shein, with long-time CUF leader Seif Sharif Hamad as 

his first vice president.4

The other main opposition party, CHADEMA, 

is building its constituencies on the mainland among 

young people and other disenchanted voters, and it won 

26 percent of the national vote in 2010. CHADEMA, 

as well as the CUF, is hoping for a much stronger 

showing in the 2015 elections. Several CCM leaders are positioning themselves to succeed the current 

president, Jakaya Kikwete, who has served his maximum two terms in office. In addition, public frustration with CCM leaders is elevated following a series 

of high-profile (and high-value) corruption scandals 

and the sacking of four ministers in 2013 for human 

rights abuses committed by Tanzanian security forces 

involved in anti-poaching operations.5

 Efforts by the 

CCM to undermine its challengers have led to accusations of state-sponsored repression of opposition 

politicians, civic leaders, and journalists, the banning 

of opposition demonstrations, and a dangerous rise in 

political violence. The abduction and torture of party 

leaders have been reported, and a handgrenade thrown 

into a CHADEMA rally in Arusha in 2013 killed four 

people.6

Despite the formation of the Government of National Unity before the 2010 elections, the question 

of Zanzibar also remains a critical issue. Following 2 

years of work, a Constitutional Review Commission, 

chaired by Joseph Warioba, has recommended changing the structure of the republic to a federation or 

“three government system.” According to this proposal, Tanzania’s new structure would include one overall 

national government and two state governments—one 

for the mainland and one for Zanzibar. The proposal, 

however, remains highly controversial. Failure to find 

a significant degree of national consensus on the issue 

could further divide Tanzanians on political, regional, 

and religious lines. 

Security Dynamics in Tanzania

Despite Tanzania’s long history of political stability, the country has been plagued by criminal threats 

that have overwhelmed local security services’ abilities 

to respond. These threats include trafficking in drugs, 

ivory, and humans; the poaching of endangered anithreats include trafficking in drugs, 

ivory, and humans; the poaching of 

endangered animal species; illegal 

fishing, vigilantism in response 

to low-level criminality; and 

cross-border crime and violence 

associated with refugee flows and 

civil wars in neighboring states 
inss.dodlive.mil SF No. 288 5 

mal species; illegal fishing; vigilantism in response to 

low-level criminality; and cross-border crime and violence associated with refugee flows and civil wars in 

neighboring states. Since 2013, protests over the distribution of benefits from mining efforts, particularly 

in the southern Tanzanian region of Mtwara, have also 

turned violent.7

Meanwhile, Tanzanian security forces—including the Tanzania Police Force, Tanzania People’s Defence Force, and Tanzania Intelligence and Security 

Service—are considered generally too weak, under-resourced, and poorly coordinated to ensure the security 

of the country’s borders.8 According to an assessment 

by the Jamestown Foundation, “Not only is the region 

characterized by highly porous land and sea borders, it 

is also beset by largely dysfunctional structures of law 

and enforcement, endemic organized criminal activity 

(involving everything from drugs and people smuggling 

to weapons trafficking) and relative proximity to known 

Islamist logistical hubs such as Yemen and the United 

Arab Emirates.”9

The political crises, corruption, and security issues 

discussed above have eroded the security forces’ ability to secure Tanzania’s borders and protect its populace. However, on their own, these issues have never 

presented an existential threat to the Tanzanian state 

or to regional and international interests. Today, this 

situation may be changing as Tanzania is also facing 

rising violence led by domestic and foreign militant 

Islamists, some of whom are directly associated with 

al Qaeda and its regional affiliate based in Somalia, al 

Shabab. Violence by Islamist militants risks prompting 

the failure of Tanzania’s longstanding tradition of religious tolerance, the rise of sectarian conflicts across the 

country, the escalation of an independence struggle for 

Zanzibar, and an economic crisis that would damage 

Tanzania’s prospects for development. At the extreme, 

Tanzania could emerge as part of a wider, regional safe 

haven for militants linked to al Shabab.

Until recently, many scholars and policy analysts 

viewed Tanzania as relatively immune to the emergence of 

domestic militant Islam. In a 2006 study, Jeffrey Haynes 

reached this conclusion for several reasons:

◆ the diversity of Islamic practice in Tanzania, 

wherein Sunni Sufist tradition is likely to trump the appeal of fundamentalists

◆ the willingness of mainstream Muslim groups in 

Tanzania, including state-sponsored Islamic organizations, to pursue their objectives through dialogue

◆ apparently limited local Muslim interest to support or join the ranks of al Qaeda and its affiliates

◆ fears that fundamentalists seek to impose a strict, 

authoritarian political system that would essentially create new grievances.10

In addition, “there appeared to be little tension between Tanzania’s Muslim communities and the government, no doubt in part because Muslims enjoyed 

senior political positions, or between Muslims and 

Christians, a reflection of the high degree of social 

consensus achieved under the rule of President Julius 

Nyerere (1964–85).”11

Haynes, however, was writing nearly a decade ago 

and, as the following sections will demonstrate, events 

on the ground in Tanzania may be telling a different 

story today. In fact, Islamic mobilization—around both 

domestic political and economic issues, as well as fundamentalist desires to reform local Islamic practices in 

Tanzania—has been a slowly growing force in the country for many years. The remainder of this paper addresses 

the evolution of domestic Islamist militancy, as well as its 

connections to regional terrorist groups.

Domestic Islamist Militancy

The challenge posed by militant Islamists in Tanzania is not new. Most well known are the al Qaeda 

attacks on the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and 

Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on August 7, 1998. Those 

attacks, which killed 213 people in Nairobi and 11 in 

Dar es Salaam as well as injuring scores more, were 

primarily led by foreign al Qaeda operatives. However, 
6 SF No. 288 inss.dodlive.mil

November 2011 Tanzanian government issues a warning of potential al Shabab attacks after 10 

Tanzanian nationals were arrested on the Kenya-Somalia border attempting to 

join al Shabab.

June 2012 Arrest of Emrah Erdogan, a German national who had joined al Shabab, at Dar 

es Salaam airport.

October 2012 Tanzanian policeman is hacked to death with machetes in Zanzibar.

November 2012 Acid attack on moderate, anti-UAMSHO Muslim imam in Zanzibar.

December 2012 Shooting of a Catholic priest in Zanzibar.

February 2013 Interfaith rioting in Mwanza area related to Muslim protests against Christian 

butchery practices leads to beheading of a local priest. 

February 2013 Murder of a Catholic priest and torching of a church in Zanzibar.

March 2013 Rioting by Sheikh Ponda Issa Ponda supporters in Dar es Salaam.

May 2013 Handgrenade attack at St. Joseph’s Church in Arusha, killing 3 and wounding 

63, during a celebration by the Vatican nuncio.

May 2013 Burning of a Christian church in Tanga region.

May 2013 Arrest of five men in Dar es Salaam in possession of explosives and improvised explosive device–related materials.

July 2013 Arrest of British terrorism suspect, Hassan Ali Iqbal, in Kyele, Mbeya region, as 

he tried to cross into Malawi.

August 2013 Acid attack on two young British women in Zanzibar’s Stone Town.

August 2013 Homemade petrol bomb attack on a Christian church in Dar es Salaam.

September 2013 Acid attack on a Catholic priest in Zanzibar’s Stone Town.

September 2013 Attempted handgrenade attack at shopping area in Zanzibar’s Stone Town. 

September 2013 Killing of a elderly priest in Zanzibar’s Stone Town.

October 2013 Arrest of 13 suspected al Shabab–linked militants at a military-style training 

camp at Makolionga Mountain in Mtwara region.

October 2013 Arrest by Kenyan military forces of three Tanzanians traveling to Somalia to 

join al Shabab.

October 2013 Arrest of Tanzanian businessman Juma Abdallah Kheri for financing terrorism 

in Kenya and Tanzania.

November 2013 Arrest of 69 people running an “al Shabab child indoctrination camp” for over 

50 4–13 year olds in Tanga.

January 2014 Explosives attack at New Year’s Eve celebration at Christian church in Arusha.

February 2014 Three IED attacks in Zanzibar targeting two Christian churches and a restaurant popular with tourists. 

February 2014 Acid attack on moderate Muslim preacher and his son in Arusha.

April 2014 Bombing of a crowded bar popular with tourists in Arusha, injuring 15 people.

June 2014 Explosives attack on a mosque in Zanzibar’s Stone Town, killing one and 

wounding four people, potentially linked to Islamists’ intent to attack an anti–al 

Shabab cleric.

July 2014 Explosives attack on the private house in Arusha where moderate clerics were 

gathered.

July 2014 Explosives attack on an Indian restaurant in Arusha popular with tourists and 

local residents. 

Recent Islamist-Associated Attacks in Tanzania

Sourced from local and international media sources, including BBC News and Sabahi.com.
inss.dodlive.mil SF No. 288 7 

they did include one Tanzanian national from Zanzibar, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, and the attackers 

received support from Islamist charity groups operating in Tanzania. Another Zanzibari, Qaed Sanyan alHarithi, was involved in the October 2000 USS Cole

bombing and was later killed by a U.S. drone strike in 

Yemen in 2002. 

Less well known is Tanzania’s history of struggle 

with domestic Islamist militancy. Tanzanian Islamists 

are not simply inspired by foreign calls to support a 

global jihad. Rather, they “have emerged out of locallyspecific contexts and histories, and the government 

ought to ease [communal] tensions through reconciliation and by addressing underlying grievances.”12

These local circumstances include a historical marginalization of more conservative Islamist political voices 

in Tanzanian politics, continued frustrations over the 

status of Zanzibar, high rates of unemployment, and 

perceptions that Muslims do not benefit proportionally from Tanzanian development efforts and privatesector investment. 

One attack that did make international headlines in 

Western media was directed against two young British 

women who were volunteering at a local nursery school 

in Zanzibar’s capital, Stone Town. Men on a motorbike 

threw acid at their faces while the women were walking through the city.13 It was the first ever such attack 

on foreign tourists in the country. Unfortunately, it was 

only one in a string of acid attacks that have now taken 

place. Others have targeted moderate Islamic preachers 

who have spoken out against Tanzanian fundamentalist 

groups and the al Shabab group in Somalia, as well as 

Christian priests. The four acid attacks that have taken 

place since November 2012 coincide with an increased 

number of arson attacks and the use of grenades or 

homemade explosives against similar targets. Fearing a 

response from Christian vigilante groups, Tanzanian cities with religiously mixed populations, including Dar es 

Salaam, Mwanza, Mbeya, Arusha and Zanzibar’s Stone 

Town, have been identified by some analysts as most 

prone to inter-communal conflict.14

Beyond the rise of opposition political parties, Tanzania’s government has also faced religious organizations 

challenging state policies and, in some cases, state control. As in other East African nations, these bodies were 

initially outlawed in Tanzania, and the state attempted 

to use state-controlled proxies to influence the attitudes 

of local populations. However, this system of control has 

eroded over time.

In the post-independence one-party states of Tanzania and Kenya, the state forbade political parties based 

on religion, instead establishing state-run Muslim associations. These were tasked to deal with educational, 

religious, and social matters while acting as a conduit 

between their constituencies and the government and as 

a mouthpiece for their respective government policies.15

In Tanzania, the state-sponsored Muslim organization is known as BAKWATA (Baraza Kuu Waislamu Watanzania, or the Supreme Council of Muslims 

in Tanzania). Although its official linkages to the Tanzanian government always undermined the group’s legitimacy with many Muslims, it remained sufficiently 

respected and resourced to exercise significant influence. 

Over time, fundamentalist challengers to BAKWATA 

have emerged. Ironically, the opening of political space 

following the end of single-party rule has enabled these 

movements to flourish.

These groups publicly challenge the authority of 

BAKWATA, traditional tribal leaders, and moderate 

sheikhs and regularly engage in the armed takeover of 

mosques and religious centers.16 They have been formed 

the four acid attacks that have 

taken place since November 2012 

coincide with an increased number 

of arson attacks and the use of 

grenades or homemade explosives 

against similar targets 
8 SF No. 288 inss.dodlive.mil

and supported by youths and professionals who have 

returned from years of study or work in Yemen, Saudi 

Arabia, Sudan, Malaysia, or other countries with fundamentalist beliefs. Back inside Tanzania, their efforts 

to reform the traditional practice of Islam and mobilize Muslims’ political awareness have been supported 

by the continued investments of Islamic charities from 

Arab Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia, the United 

Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Kuwait.17

During the system of one-party rule, the dominance 

of the CCM left no space for Muslim community leaders and Muslim youths to voice their dissent within the 

Tanzanian political system. In the 1980s, this led to the 

emergence of movements such as BALUKTA (Baraza 

la Uendelezaji wa Koran Tanzania, or the Council for 

the Promotion of the Koran in Tanzania), which was led 

by Sheikh Yahya Hussein in Dar es Salaam. BALUKTA 

organized protests against government plans to utilize 

Christian church networks as part of national health 

and education service delivery programs, but it also led 

attacks on markets selling pork and alcohol and even 

occupied the offices of state-sponsored BAKWATA. 

While BALUKTA was banned by the Tanzanian 

government in 1993, other groups filled the Islamist political vacuum. These included Simba wa Mungu (God’s 

Lion) led by Sheikh Ponda Issa Ponda, who became a key 

leader of Jumuiya ya Taasisi za Kiislam, the Community 

of Muslim Organizations. Sheikh Ponda’s inflammatory 

public speeches and the involvement of his supporters 

in the physical takeover of moderate mosques have led 

the Tanzanian government to accuse him of incitement 

and arrest him. This in turn has resulted in Islamist street 

protests that often result in violence against Christian 

targets and deaths when government security forces intervene. In short, a vicious cycle has emerged wherein Islamist perceptions of disenfranchisement and repression 

beget outbreaks of Islamist violence that in turn reinforce 

the Islamists’ original motivations to act out against the 

government and non-Islamists. 

Zanzibar, particularly the more conservative island 

of Pemba, has been a locus of Islamist mobilization for 

many years. It remains the home base of the CUF opposition party as well as the point of origin of many fundamentalist Islamists movements, including Imam Mejlis (Imam Society) and Daawa Islamiya (Islamic Call), 

which “openly challenge the authority of traditional elders.”18 Their appeal in Zanzibar comes from the local 

Muslim community’s perceptions of disenfranchisement 

in national politics: “Locals complain that there is an 

unequal distribution of wealth. They are still not enjoying the benefits of new, lucrative hotels and they suffer 

through insufficient sewage systems, water and work. . . . 

For locals, civil society remains weak and unemployment 

is 85% amongst the youth.”19 Other grievances include 

the dress and behavior of Western tourists that can be 

insensitive to Muslim social practices, the conspicuous 

consumption of alcohol, rising rates of local drug abuse, 

prostitution, and corruption associated with both local 

business and political elections.20

The new Government of National Unity created for 

Zanzibar in October 2010 resulted in a coalition government including the dominant CCM and CUF parties on the islands. On the one hand, this agreement has 

been hailed as a success in bridging the divide between 

rival political elites and the communities that they represent. On the other hand, the Government of National 

Unity created a new type of political vacuum in Zanzibar. While the CUF traditionally represented Muslim 

demands for more change, including for more autonomy 

and development investment for Zanzibar vis-à-vis the 

mainland, that party is now viewed as a supporter of the 

status quo by local nationalist leaders. As a result, interest 

in alternative, nongovernmental, and more radical leaders has grown. 

Zanzibar, particularly the more 

conservative island of Pemba, 

has been a locus of Islamist 

mobilization for many years
inss.dodlive.mil SF No. 288 9 

One particular local movement called UAMSHO 

(also known as the Association for Islamic Mobilisation 

and Propagation, The Awakening, or, in Swahili, as Jumuiya ya Uamsho na Mihadhara ya Kiislam) has capitalized on this situation. Led by Sheikh Farid Hadi, the 

group was established as an Islamic nongovernmental 

organization in 2001 but has progressively become more 

involved in radical politics over time. The group openly 

calls for full independence from Tanzania for Zanzibar 

and has been involved in multiple protests since 2012 

that have virtually shut down Zanzibar City and ended 

in violence. As with Sheikh Ponda’s movement in Dar 

es Salaam, the arrest of UAMSHO’s leader in 2012 

was both a cause and result of these public outbursts.21

UAMSHO is most often blamed for attacks that take 

place in Zanzibar, including the acid, arson, and explosive attacks detailed above. 

Overall, the response of moderate Muslims and 

Christians to these attacks has remained balanced. In 

May 2014, the Foundation of Sheikhs and Islamic 

Scholars of Tanzania called for an end to interfaith conflict, and Tanzania’s Muslims and Christians Brotherhood Society (known locally as UNDUGU) calls for a 

ban on UAMSHO, linking it to al Shabab, Boko Haram, 

and al Qaeda. Nonetheless, in 2013, leaflets distributed 

anonymously in Zanzibar called for the mobilization of 

Christians to retaliate against Muslims for the recent 

attacks.22 This raises the specter of religious vigilantism 

and the potential for isolated Islamist militant attacks to 

evolve into wider sectarian crisis. 

Somalian Connections, Kenyan 

Parallels

While domestic Islamist militancy in Tanzania 

is concerning in and of itself, it is the threat that Islamist militants there may link up with their regional 

and global counterparts that poses the greatest threat. 

Evidence is growing—including the discoveries in 

Tanzania mentioned above of terrorist training camps, 

weapons caches, and indoctrination centers associated 

with regional militants—that Tanzania’s Islamists are 

increasingly interconnected with similar movements in 

Somalia and Kenya, particularly al Shabab and its Kenyan offshoot al Hijra.

In June 2012, a German national of Turkish origin, 

Emrah Erdogan (also known as Abdulrahman Othman), was arrested at Julius Nyerere International Airport in Dar es Salaam upon his arrival from Kenya. The 

purpose for his travel to Tanzania remains unknown, 

but it closely followed his departure from Somalia, 

where Erdogan had joined the al Shabab movement. 

Moreover, Erdogan was wanted in connection with recent bomb attacks in Kenya.23 More recently, in July 

2013, a British national, Hassan Ali Iqbal, was also 

arrested in Tanzania as he attempted to transit overland to Malawi. Iqbal was carrying multiple passports 

with different names and was wanted in the United 

Kingdom for involvement in terrorist activities there.24

Finally, in October and November 2013, several training camps, weapons caches, and “child indoctrination 

centers” associated with Somalia’s al Shabab movement 

were identified and dismantled by Tanzanian authorities, leading to dozens of arrests.25 As a result, Tanzania 

is now under increased scrutiny as a potential transit 

zone and safe haven for foreign terrorist operatives. 

Al Shabab was established in Somalia in approximately 2004 by a small group of militants linked to al 

Itihad al-Islamia, Somalia’s original (and now defunct) 

Islamist militant group. The al Shabab network included 

operatives who provided protection for the al Qaeda

cell that conducted the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings 

evidence is growing that Tanzania’s 

Islamists are increasingly 

interconnected with similar 

movements in Somalia and Kenya, 

particularly al Shabab and its 

Kenyan offshoot al Hijra
10 SF No. 288 inss.dodlive.mil

and organized other regional attacks. Al Shabab’s existence became public in 2006 when the group served as 

a self-appointed vanguard force within the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), a broad-based and popular Islamist 

movement that defeated the clan-based warlords who 

dominated southern Somalia since the fall of the Siad 

Barre regime in 1991. Ethiopian military intervention 

in Somalia from 2007 to 2009 defeated the UIC. However, al Shabab successfully launched an insurgency campaign that gradually retook control of southern Somalia. 

In 2012, under the command and control of its leader, 

Ahmed Abdi Godane, al Shabab swore bayat—a loyalty 

oath—to al Qaeda. The group now combines the traits 

of a local insurgency looking to seize control of Somalia 

to impose an Islamist state with those of a transnational 

terrorist group that seeks to conduct operations outside 

of Somalia’s borders. To this end, al Shabab has recruited 

a large number of foreign operatives, including significant numbers from Kenya, Tanzania, and other East African countries.26

In 2011, the tide began to turn dramatically 

against al Shabab. Peacekeeping forces from the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), now including Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia, 

and Sierra Leone, partnered with a former clan-based 

militia in Mogadishu that had been integrated into a 

nominal Somalia National Army. They succeeded in 

pressuring al Shabab to vacate Mogadishu and have 

subsequently liberated other key towns across the 

country, and they provide protection to the Federal 

Government of Somalia (created in 2012). Today, as a 

result of the regional military offensive and clan-based 

uprisings against the movement, al Shabab governs 

little territory and has returned to guerrilla resistance. 

The group is working to survive while trying to undermine the authority and control of AMISOM and the 

Federal Government of Somalia.

As part of its guerrilla strategy, al Shabab has increased its rate of external attacks across East Africa. The 

group’s external plots have focused on those East African 

countries contributing to AMISOM. In 2010, al Shabab attacked viewers of the FIFA World Cup finals in 

Kampala, Uganda, killing 74 people and wounding 70 

more. In 2013, al Shabab gunmen attacked the Westgate 

shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya, killing 67 people and 

wounding over 175. As of 2014, al Shabab has claimed 

further attacks in Djibouti and Kenya as well as attempting to strike Ethiopia. 

Thus far, Tanzania has not deployed its own forces to 

the multinational AMISOM force in Somalia. However, 

in July 2014, the Tanzanian government announced that 

it would begin training 1,000 Somali National Army 

soldiers. Plans to mobilize the Tanzania People’s Defence Force to deploy in Somalia exist but remain hotly 

debated by members of Parliament.27 Tanzania’s slowly 

emerging support for the government in Somalia thus 

makes the country more vulnerable to al Shabab’s attention. Even without more direct support for AMISOM 

and the Somali government, it is possible that al Shabab

will focus on attacking soft targets in Tanzania—including tourist locations or diplomatic personnel—in order 

to demonstrate the militant group’s potency and simply 

to employ East African foreign fighters who seek to expand the reach of jihad to their home countries. 

When considering scenarios for the future of Islamist militancy in Tanzania, analysts do not have far to 

look for a troubling example. Kenya, Tanzania’s northern 

neighbor, has experienced a remarkably similar trajectory of Islamist violence that has escalated into a nascent 

insurgency. Similar to Tanzania in the 1990s, which 

saw rivalries between the officially sponsored BAKWATA and the radical BALUKTA groups, Kenya saw 

rivalries between its official Supreme Council of Kenya 

Muslims and the radical, upstart Islamic Party of Kenya. Today, similar to the challenge posed in Zanzibar 

as part of its guerrilla strategy, al 

Shabab has increased its rate of 

external attacks across East Africa
inss.dodlive.mil SF No. 288 11 

by UAMSHO, the Mombasa Republican Council is 

working to mobilize Muslims on Kenya’s coast to take 

up arms against political and economic domination by 

up-country Christian tribes. Both countries also suffered 

from the al Qaeda bombings of the U.S. Embassies in 

1998, which had been facilitated by a growingly influential movement of foreign-backed Islamist charities 

working across East Africa. 

In early 2012, al Shabab recognized Ahmed Iman 

Ali as the group’s emir for Kenya, implicitly recognizing 

his al Hijra group (previously known as the Pumwani 

Muslim Youth and the Muslim Youth Centre [MYC]) as 

a component of al Shabab: “Like Al-Shabaab, Al-Hijra’s 

jihadist origins intersect with the AQEA [al Qaeda East 

Africa] network responsible for the 1998 U.S. embassy 

bombings and the 2002 Mombasa attacks.”28 Ahmed 

Iman has relocated to Somalia, serves as the group’s 

ideological leader, and connects al Shabab to his operational counterparts inside Kenya. Al Hijra leaders there, 

including Sheikh Aboud Rogo and Sheikh Abubakar 

Sharif Makaburi, have been targeted for arrest and apparent extrajudicial killings following the failure of Kenya’s judicial system to prosecute them.

Al Hijra has been blamed for a long series of smallscale attacks since 2011 in Kenya’s main cities of Nairobi 

and Mombasa, including grenade attacks, rudimentary 

improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, targeted killings of moderate preachers and security personnel, and 

attacks on churches and sporting events. The group is 

also accused of financing al Shabab, supporting its foreign fighter recruitment efforts, and facilitating al Shabab

external operations in Kenya. As in Tanzania, al Shabab 

and al Hijra attacks were limited in both sophistication 

and impact in 2011. However, by 2013, they culminated 

in the 2013 Westgate mall shooting spree. 

Direct al Shabab efforts to build a parallel operational network in Tanzania have already begun. To support recruitment across East Africa, including Tanzania, 

al Shabab uses a well-organized media campaign to 

radicalize East African youths, including audio recordings, Web sites, social media, and a sophisticated online 

magazine called Gaidi Mtaani that is published in both 

English and Swahili. 

At the operational level, a group known as the Ansar 

Muslim Youth Centre (AMYC)—led from the northern mainland city of Tanga by Sheikh Salim Abdulrahim 

Barahiyan—has been linked directly to al Hijra in Kenya 

and al Shabab in Somalia, as well as to old AQEA networks that conducted the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings. 

According to a study drafted for the Canadian Security 

Intelligence Service:

Formed in the 1970s as the Tanzanian Muslim 

Youth Union (UVIKITA), the organisation 

was renamed AMYC in 1988 for the purpose 

of propagating Salafi Islam. In the late 1990s, 

the AMYC began to drift toward radicalism, 

apparently through its association with the Saudibased charitable foundation Al-Haramayn, which 

provided funding to the AMYC. The head of AlHaramayn’s Tanzanian office between 1997 and 

2003 was reportedly an Algerian known as Laid 

Saidi (a.k.a. “Abu Huzhaifa” a.k.a. Ramzi ben 

Mizauni ben Fraj). . . . According to the United 

Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, 

following Abu Huzhaifa’s deportation and the 

cessation of Al-Haramayn’s Tanzanian operations 

[due to terrorist affiliations], at least seven former 

employees of Al-Haramayn joined the AMYC. Two 

of these individuals, Nur Abubakar Maulana (a.k.a. 

“Abu Maulana”) and Omar Suleiman, reportedly 

became acquainted with Aboud Rogo during their 

service with Al-Haramayn. Through this connection, 

Kenya, Tanzania’s northern neighbor, 

has experienced a remarkably 

similar trajectory of Islamist 

violence that has escalated into a 

nascent insurgency
12 SF No. 288 inss.dodlive.mil

AMYC recruits were routinely sent to study in 

Kenya at institutions associated with Rogo and the 

MYC/Al-Hijra, notably Masjid Musa, Kanamai 

and Masjid Sakina.29

AMYC is the only publicly known affiliate of al 

Shabab and al Hijra in Tanzania; however, it is not necessarily a singular or coherent movement with structured 

command and control of all militant Islamists in the 

country. Similar to the organization of al Hijra in Kenya, and to the organization of Somali militants before 

the establishment of al Shabab in 2006, AMYC is better 

described as one visible part of a loose network that includes hardline Islamist preachers, their radical mosques, 

Islamic social centers, and schools, likeminded businessmen who finance militant activities, and multiple, small 

cells of armed youth that cooperate with each other despite being scattered around the country. Only a small 

number of key leaders and operatives who spent time in 

Somalia (individuals who may not be the same as the official chairman of AMYC or other official organizations) 

are likely to have direct contacts with al Shabab and al 

Hijra leaders outside Tanzania.

This networked style of organization makes understanding the structure and leadership extremely challenging, stresses the importance of sophisticated intelligence 

collection and analysis efforts, and is likely to strain law 

enforcement–based approaches to produce evidence in 

Tanzanian courts that conclusively indicts individuals associated with the country’s emerging terrorist network 

(or networks). At the same time, however, the dispersed 

structure does not make Tanzania’s emerging terrorists 

any less dangerous. 

In addition to launching low-level attacks against 

Christian and foreign targets today, Tanzanian militants may develop more sophisticated capabilities and a 

higher, sustained operational tempo of attacks over time. 

This has certainly been the case with al Hijra in Kenya. 

Moreover, Tanzania could emerge as—or may already 

be—a significant source of foreign fighter recruits for al 

Shabab in Somalia. These individuals would gain muchneeded operational experience and technical know-how 

in Somalia and would likely gravitate toward al Shabab’s 

external operations wing with a focus on conducting attacks in Kenya and Tanzania. At a regional level, Tanzania may already be serving as a rear base for al Shabab and al Hijra operations in Kenya, particularly the 

Mombasa coastal area, allowing operatives to move more 

freely, raise funds, communicate, and organize. This also 

raises the concern that Tanzania could be a base from 

which militants from Somalia to South Africa could 

connect and collaborate.30

Conclusion

Tanzania is facing multiple distinct but mutually 

reinforcing security threats. These include the ongoing 

dispute over the status of Zanzibar and its relative benefits from union with the mainland, the mobilization 

and radicalization of aggrieved Muslim youth by both 

UAMSHO in Zanzibar and Sheikh Ponda Issa Ponda’s 

movements based in Dar es Salaam, the gradual encroachment of al Shabab and al Hijra terrorist networks 

from Somalia and Kenya, and the creation of local Islamist militant networks of which AMYC is the only 

publicly named group at this time. Despite the relatively 

unsophisticated and loosely coordinated nature of the 

current Islamist militant threats in Tanzania, there is a 

danger that the threat is primed to grow significantly:

The nature of Islamist militancy in Tanzania 

is likely to change drastically over the next 

AMYC is the only publicly known 

affiliate of al Shabab and al Hijra 

in Tanzania; however, it is not 

necessarily a singular or coherent 

movement with structured 

command and control of all militant 

Islamists in the country
inss.dodlive.mil SF No. 288 13 

few years. . . . Although the IED explosions 

in Zanzibar in February 2014 caused few 

casualties and little damage to property, the 

attacks marked a significant change in militant 

groups’ intention and methodology. First, this 

was the first time that a tourist attraction had 

been targeted. . . . Second this was the first time 

that three IEDs had struck within just two days 

and targeted a variety of assets. . . . Although the 

capacity of Zanzibar-based militant groups is 

still rudimentary, their skill set is fast improving 

and their target set is expanding.31

While apparently distinct, domestic Islamist militants could serve the interests of regionally connected 

militants such as AMYC in several ways. First, the domestic militants are “stirring the pot” in Tanzania and 

may incite more Muslims—particularly unemployed and 

angry youth—to radicalize and seek to follow movements such as al Shabab. As militants tied to UAMSHO 

and Sheikh Ponda bait Tanzanian security services with 

protests and additional attacks, they are likely to draw 

heavy-handed police responses that affect large swaths 

of the civilian population, thus turning more Muslims 

against the government. Second, domestic Islamist 

movements may serve as a stepping stone for would-be 

terrorists. Their networks may offer an easy place to join 

in Muslim resistance activities before graduating to more 

robust, regionally connected militant networks. 

Third, UAMSHO and the institutions linked to 

Sheikh Ponda may be used as a facilitation network for 

AMYC, al Hijra, and al Shabab. This could take the form 

of financial donations or a willingness by local militants 

to facilitate the movement of and safe haven for members of regional militant networks. The greatest danger, 

of course, is that al Shabab affiliates, particularly East 

African foreign fighters who have gained battlefield experience in Somalia, return to Tanzania and begin cooperating with domestic militant groups in earnest to the 

point that regional and domestic threats merge—as appears to be the case today in Kenya. Monitoring for such 

connections between the two groups should be key to 

ongoing assessments of the potential for a robust insurgency to emerge. 

Policy Recommendations

In response to the Islamist challenge now facing 

Tanzania, the United States needs to focus policy-level 

attention on the situation and invest additional intelligence, law enforcement, and strategic communications 

efforts to combat the spread of violent extremism there. 

This response needs to include urgent but targeted efforts to build Tanzanian security services’ capabilities to 

address current threat streams, as well as efforts to support both the mainland Tanzanian and Zanzibar governments to prevent further radicalization. 

It is likely that al Shabab already has a dedicated 

presence inside Tanzania, in addition to local support 

networks and an unknown number of Tanzanian operatives still inside Somalia. However, the current situation does not require the deployment of U.S. military 

forces to directly confront these threats. Tanzania is not 

yet facing a “war on terrorism,” and escalation in that 

direction is exactly what U.S. and other international 

engagement should seek to prevent. That certainly does 

not mean that U.S. defense and military capabilities 

are not required. Rather, they must be deployed in a 

discreet manner that supports Tanzanian authorities as 

they secure their own country.

There are several key areas where the United States 

and other Western partners can provide assistance. These 

the United States needs to focus 

policy-level attention on the 

situation and invest additional 

intelligence, law enforcement, and 

strategic communications efforts 

to combat the spread of violent 

extremism in Tanzania
14 SF No. 288 inss.dodlive.mil

include much-needed efforts to collect, analyze, and share 

better information and intelligence on Islamist militants 

in Tanzania. This must include more detailed mapping 

of domestic Islamist groups inside Tanzania, assessments 

of their interrelations in the country, as well as their 

connections to al Shabab and al Hijra in Somalia and 

Kenya. The precise ties between leaders and senior-level 

supporters of UAMSHO and Sheikh Ponda’s Simba wa 

Mungu and Jumuiya ya Taasisi za Kiislam movements 

are also key. If these entities are in any way connected 

to al Shabab or other local attack networks, then the responsible individuals should be brought to justice and 

the movements banned. If, however, the attacks are not 

the doings of these movements, they should be engaged 

more robustly to bring their grievances and demands 

into a formal, peaceful political process. Other analytical priorities include gaining a clearer understanding of 

Islamic charity groups and their funding streams and of 

potential militant linkages from Tanzania to both Arab 

Gulf states and southward toward South Africa. 

Capacity-building is also a priority, particularly 

for local intelligence-driven law enforcement. Support 

should be surged to the Tanzanian Intelligence and Security Service as well as the Tanzanian Police Force. If 

the overall police system is incapable of enhancing its 

performance in the near term, then efforts should focus 

on building the capacity of a small, highly professional 

antiterrorism unit that can address imminent threats. 

Given the potential for al Shabab or even domestic militants to launch low-tech but extremely deadly attacks 

similar to the Westgate shopping mall attack in Nairobi, 

rapid response security capabilities and emergency services need to be developed. 

The Tanzanian justice system and national financial regulatory bodies need to be further strengthened 

in order to effectively handle counterterrorism-related 

prosecutions. Regional intelligence-sharing with Tanzania’s East African Community partners and with the 

African Union is also possible. However, the fastest way 

for Tanzania to gain a stronger understanding of threats 

emanating from or connected to Somalia may be the 

short-term integration of a small number of Tanzanian 

military and intelligence officials into the AMISOM 

force headquarters in Mogadishu. Finally, to counter the 

violent extremist message being broadcast by al Shabab 

and local militant groups, Tanzania—in conjunction 

with international partners—needs to launch more concerted strategic communications and public diplomacy 

efforts as well as detailed negotiations and investment in 

services to redress public grievances. The focus should be 

on prevention so as to avoid the need for a cure. 

Overall, the case of evolving militant Islamist threats 

in Tanzania—a location that is important to U.S. interests in East Africa but not critical to U.S. national security—represents an interesting test for makers of foreign 

policy. At what point in the emergence of a potential 

Islamist threat should the United States increase its engagement? And how can evolving threats that have yet to 

result in the deaths of American citizens receive priority 

attention from senior policymakers? While the United 

States must balance its security commitments across the 

globe, doing too little too late risks the need for a major 

response once a successful attack is conducted. 

Notes 1 Jodi Vittori, Kristin Bremer, and Pasquale Vittori, “Islam in 

Tanzania and Kenya: Ally or Threat in the War on Terror?” Studies in 

Conflict and Terrorism 32, no. 12 (December 2009), 1077. 

2 Ibid., 1080.

3 These include the Civic United Front, Party for Democracy 

and Progress, Tanzania Labour Party, United Democratic Party, and 

National Convention for Construction and Reform.

4 For details on the Government of National Unity, see 

Mohammed Bakari and Alexander Makulilo, “Beyond Polarity in 

Zanzibar? The ‘Silent’ Referendum and the Government of National 

Unity,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 30, no. 2 (April 2012), 

195–218; and Archie Matheson, “Maridhiano: Zanzibar’s Remarkable 

Reconciliation and Government of National Unity,” Journal of Eastern 

African Studies 6, no. 4 (November 2012), 591–612.

5 Hanno Brankamp, “CCM’s Identity Crisis: Comebacks, Constitution and Corruption in Tanzania,” Think Africa Press, February 

21, 2014.

6 See Nicholas Kulish, “Violent Episodes Grow in Tanzania, an 

African Haven,” The New York Times, June 30, 2013; and The Citizen, 

“Chaos Threat Looms Ahead of 2015 General Election,” May 7, 2014. 

7 Robert Ahearne, “The Untold Story of Tanzania’s Resource 

Curse,” Think Africa Press, May 31, 2013. 

8 For instance, see the country report on Tanzania from U.S. 

Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2013, Washington, DC, April 30, 2014.
inss.dodlive.mil SF No. 288 15 

9 “Tanzania: Al Qaeda’s East African Beachhead?” Terrorism 

Monitor 1, no. 5 (May 5, 2005), 1.

10 Jeffrey Haynes, “Islam and Democracy in East Africa,” Democratization 13, no. 3 ( June 2006), 490–507.

11 Ibid., 495. Vittori, Bremer, and Vittori go so far as to say that:

The presidency seems to unofficially rotate between Muslims 

and Christians: Julius Nyerere was the first president, to be 

succeeded by Muslim Ali Hassan Mwinyi, who served until 

1996, followed by another Christian, Benjamin Mkapa. 

Today’s president is also a Muslim—Jakaya Kikwete. 

Moreover, the president of Zanzibar is constitutionally 

a deputy president of Tanzania. Cabinets have also been 

relatively well balanced between Christians and Muslims. 

Moreover . . . quota systems for all tribal and ethnic groups, 

including Muslims, were introduced so that Muslims were 

better represented in secondary schools.

See Vittori, Bremer, and Vittori, 1082.

12 Hanno Brankamp, “Tanzania’s Islamist Militants: A Domestic 

Threat from a Domestic Context,” Think Africa Press, June 20, 2013. 

13 “British Women Attacked with Acid in Zanzibar,” BBC 

News, August 8, 2013. 

14 Robert Besseling, “The Emergence of Domestic Islamist 

Militancy in Tanzania,” Think Africa Press, May 17, 2013. 

15 Vittori, Bremer, and Vittori, 1081.

16 “Tanzania,” 1.

17 Unfortunately, no studies have been dedicated to mapping 

Islamic and Arab Gulf state charitable activities in Tanzania or to 

quantifying their financial importance. This remains a critical gap in 

understanding the importance of their activities, and their level of 

societal influence. 

18 Haynes, 496.

19 Thembi Mutch, “Zanzibar and the Mainland: The Shaky State 

of the Union,” Think Africa Press, November 20, 2012. 

20 Ibid.

21 United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, 

“Tanzania: Islamist Riots Threaten Zanzibar’s Stability,” October 24, 

2012. 

22 “Anonymous Leaflets Threaten Christian Retaliation in Zanzibar,” Sabahi News, March 3, 2013. 

23 “How Nairobi Bomb Suspect Was Seized in Tanzania,” 

AfricaReview.com, June 14, 2012. 

24 “Tanzanian Police Arrest British Terror Suspect,” Sabahi 

News, July 7, 2013.

25 “Two More Arrested in Connection to al-Shabaab Military 

Training in Mtwara,” Sabahi News, October 18, 2013; and “Tanzania 

Dismantles al-Shabaab Child Indoctrination Camp in Tanga Region,” 

Sabahi News, November 15, 2013. 

26 On Somalia and al Shabab, see Matt Bryden, The Reinvention 

of Al-Shabaab: A Strategy of Choice or Necessity? (Washington, DC: 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2014); and 

Andre LeSage, “Security and Governance in Somalia: Consolidating 

Gains, Confronting Challenges,” testimony to the U.S. Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee, October 8, 2013.

27 “Tanzania Set to Train Contingents from Somali National 

Army,” SomaliCurrent.com, June 13, 2014. 

28 Canadian Security Intelligence Service, The Future of AlQaeda: Results of a Foresight Project, World Watch Expert Notes 

publication no. 2013-05-01 (May 2013), 61. 

29 Ibid., 65.

30 Ryan Cummings, “Al-Shabaab: How Much of a Threat to 

South Africa?” The Daily Maverick (South Africa), June 12, 2014. 

31 Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst, “Rising Tide: Islamist Terrorism 

in Tanzania,” 2–3. 

The Center for Strategic Research within the Institute for 

National Strategic Studies provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

unified combatant commands through studies, reports, 

briefings, and memoranda. The center conducts directed 

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The Strategic Forum series presents original research by 

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