FREE TRADE 

AGREEMENTS

U.S. Partners Are 

Addressing Labor 

Commitments, but 

More Monitoring and 

Enforcement Are 

Needed

Report to Congressional Requesters

November 2014

GAO-15-160

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-15-160, a report to 

congressional requesters

November 2014

FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS

U.S. Partners Are Addressing Labor Commitments, 

but More Monitoring and Enforcement Are Needed

Why GAO Did This Study

The United States has signed 14 FTAs,

liberalizing U.S. trade with 20 countries.

These FTAs include provisions regarding

fundamental labor rights in the partner 

countries. USTR and DOL, supported by

State, are responsible for monitoring and 

assisting FTA partners’ implementation of 

these provisions. 

GAO was asked to assess the status of 

implementation of FTA labor provisions in 

partner countries. GAO examined (1) 

steps that selected partner countries 

have taken, and U.S. assistance they 

have received, to implement these 

provisions and other labor initiatives and 

the reported results of such steps; (2) 

submissions regarding possible violations 

of FTA labor provisions that DOL has 

accepted and any problems related to 

the submission process; and (3) the 

extent to which U.S. agencies monitor 

and enforce implementation of FTA labor 

provisions and report results to 

Congress. GAO selected CAFTA-DR and 

the FTAs with Colombia, Oman, and 

Peru as representative of the range of 

FTAs with labor provisions, among other 

reasons. GAO reviewed documentation 

related to each FTA and interviewed 

U.S., partner government, and other 

officials in five of the partner countries.

What GAO Recommends

DOL should reevaluate its submission

review time frame and better inform 

stakeholders about the submission

process. USTR and DOL should 

establish a coordinated strategic 

approach to monitoring and enforcement 

labor provisions. USTR’s annual report to 

Congress should include more 

information of USTR’s and DOL’s 

monitoring and enforcement efforts. The 

agencies generally agreed with the 

recommendations but disagreed with 

some findings, including the finding that 

they lack a systematic approach to 

monitor and enforce labor provisions in 

all FTAs. GAO stands by its findings.

What GAO Found

Partner countries of free trade agreements (FTA) that GAO selected—the Dominican 

Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) and the

FTAs with Colombia, Oman, and Peru—have taken steps to implement labor provisions 

and other initiatives to strengthen labor rights. For example, U.S. and foreign officials said 

that El Salvador and Guatemala—both partners to CAFTA-DR—as well as Colombia, 

Oman, and Peru have acted to change labor laws, and Colombia and Guatemala have

acted to address violence against union members. Since 2001, U.S. agencies have

provided $275 million in labor-related technical assistance and capacity-building activities

for FTA partners, including $222 million for the four FTAs GAO reviewed. However, U.S. 

agencies reported, and GAO found, persistent challenges to labor rights, such as limited 

enforcement capacity, the use of subcontracting to avoid direct employment, and, in 

Colombia and Guatemala, violence against union leaders.

Since 2008, the Department of Labor (DOL) has accepted five formal complaints—known 

as submissions—about possible violations of FTA labor provisions and has resolved one, 

regarding Peru (see fig.). However, for each submission, DOL has exceeded by an 

average of almost 9 months its 6-month time frame for investigating FTA-related labor 

submissions and issuing public reports, showing the time frame to be unrealistic. Also, 

union representatives and other stakeholders GAO interviewed in partner countries often 

did not understand the submission process, possibly limiting the number of submissions 

filed. Further, stakeholders expressed concerns that delays in resolving the submissions, 

resulting in part from DOL’s exceeding its review time frames, may have contributed to the 

persistence of conditions that affect workers and are allegedly inconsistent with the FTAs.

Five Labor Submissions Accepted by DOL Regarding Free Trade Agreements

In 2009, GAO found weaknesses in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR) 

and DOL’s monitoring and enforcement of FTA labor provisions. In the same year, the 

agencies pledged to adopt a more proactive, interagency approach. GAO’s current review 

found that although the agencies have taken several steps since 2009 to strengthen their 

monitoring and enforcement of FTA labor provisions, they lack a strategic approach to 

systematically assess whether partner countries’ conditions and practices are inconsistent 

with labor provisions in the FTAs. Despite some proactive steps, they generally rely on 

labor submissions to begin identifying, investigating, and initiating steps to address 

possible inconsistencies with FTA labor provisions. According to agency officials, resource

limitations have prevented more proactive monitoring of all FTA labor provisions. As a 

result, USTR and DOL systematically monitor and enforce compliance with FTA labor 

provisions for only a few priority countries. USTR’s annual report to Congress about trade 

agreement programs provides limited details of the results of the agencies’ monitoring and 

enforcement of compliance with FTA labor provisions. View GAO-15-160. For more information, 

contact Kimberly Gianopoulos at (202) 512-

8612 or gianopoulosk@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

Letter 1

Background 5

Selected Countries Have Taken Steps, with U.S. Assistance, to 

Address FTA Labor Commitments and Other Labor Initiatives 

but Have Limited Enforcement Capacity 10

One of Five Labor Submissions Has Been Resolved, but 

Reporting Deadlines and Limited Public Awareness of the 

Process Present Problems 23

U.S. Agencies Provide Limited Monitoring, Enforcement, and 

Reporting on FTA Labor Provisions 32

Conclusions 46

Recommendations for Executive Action 47

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 47

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 50

Appendix II Reported Violence against Trade Unionists in Colombia and 

Guatemala 55

Appendix III U.S. Monitoring of Implementation of Other Labor Initiatives 65

Appendix IV Status of Labor Submissions 69

Appendix V Comments from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 77

Appendix VI Comments from the Department of Labor 92

Appendix VII GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 96

Contents
Page ii GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

Figures

Figure 1: Labor-Related Technical Assistance Administered by 

U.S. Agencies under Selected Free Trade Agreements 

(FTA) and All Other FTAs 16

Figure 2: U.S. DOL Labor Submission Process 24

Figure 3: Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Labor Submissions 

Accepted by DOL as of July 2014 26

Figure 4: Murders of Unionists in Colombia, 2003-2013 56

Figure 5: Timeline and Status of Labor Submission Regarding 

Bahrain 70

Figure 6: Timeline and Status of Labor Submission Regarding the 

Dominican Republic 72

Figure 7: Timeline and Status of Labor Submission Regarding 

Guatemala 74

Figure 8: Timeline and Status of Labor Submission Regarding 

Honduras 75

Figure 9: Timeline and Status of Labor Submission Regarding 

Peru 76
Page iii GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

Abbreviations 

AFL-CIO American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 

Organizations

CAFTA-DR Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free 

Trade Agreement 

CICIG International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala

DOL Department of Labor

DPPS División de Protección de Personas y Seguridad

DRL Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 

ENS Escuela Nacional Sindical

FTA free trade agreement

ILO International Labour Organization

INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement

NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement

NGO nongovernmental organization 

SENA Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje

SINAUT National Union of Tax Administration Workers

SUNAUT National Superintendency of Tax Administration

TPSC Trade Policy Staff Committee

UNP Unidad Nacional de Protección

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development

USTR Office of the U.S. Trade Representative

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Page 1 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

November 6, 2014

The Honorable George Miller

Ranking Member

Committee on Education and the Workforce

House of Representatives

The Honorable Sander M. Levin

Ranking Member

Committee on Ways and Means

House of Representatives

As global economic competition has intensified, concerns in the United 

States that competitors’ labor practices may disadvantage U.S. workers 

and producers have become acute. Recent U.S. free trade agreements 

(FTA) contain a provision requiring partner countries to commit to respect 

internationally accepted core labor rights, such as freedom of association 

and the right to bargain collectively.1 FTAs phase out barriers to trade 

with particular countries or groups of countries and contain rules and 

other commitments to improve access for services and investment. FTAs 

represent a major component of U.S. trade policy, as the United States 

has signed 14 FTAs with 20 countries covering, according to the 

Department of Commerce, more than 35 percent of all U.S. imports—$2.3 

trillion in 2013.2

 1

For example, FTAs that have entered into force since February 2009 contain a provision 

stating that “[e]ach Party shall adopt and maintain in its statutes and regulations, and 

practices thereunder, the following rights, as stated in the ILO [International Labour 

Organization] Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and Its Followup (1998).” For example, see United States-Colombia FTA (entered into Force May 2012), 

art. 17.2. According to the Department of Labor (DOL), freedom of association is the right 

of workers and employers to organize to defend their interests, including for the purpose 

of negotiating salaries, benefits, and other conditions of work, and is a fundamental right 

that underpins democratic representation and governance; collective bargaining is an 

essential element of freedom of association that helps to ensure that workers and 

employers have an equal voice in negotiations and provides workers the opportunity to 

seek to improve their living and working conditions. 

The status of the implementation of FTA labor provisions 

2

As of July 2014, the United States had entered into FTAs with Australia, Bahrain, 

Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, 

Honduras, Israel, Jordan, South Korea, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Oman, Panama, 

Peru, and Singapore. The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade 

Agreement (CAFTA-DR) covers six of these countries (Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 

El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua).
Page 2 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

is of particular relevance, as the United States is negotiating the TransPacific Partnership—a trade agreement with 11 Pacific Rim countries, in 

which the administration is seeking to negotiate high-standard labor 

provisions. The effective implementation of labor provisions is also 

relevant as Congress considers renewal of the President’s lapsed Trade 

Promotion Authority, most recently in effect from 2002 through 2007.3

In 2009, we reported significant challenges connected with the 

enforcement of labor provisions in four FTAs.4 We also reported that the 

U.S. agencies responsible for the monitoring and implementation of labor 

provisions in the FTAs in many cases engaged in only minimal oversight 

and assistance with FTA partner countries to address these challenges. 

We recommended that the Department of Labor (DOL), in consultation 

with other agencies, initiate regular contact with all FTA partners’ 

ministries of labor to review implementation of FTA labor provisions and 

to develop ongoing priorities and plans for technical cooperation on labor 

matters. We also recommended that the Office of the U.S. Trade 

Representative (USTR), in cooperation with other agencies, prepare 

updated plans to implement, enforce, monitor, and report on compliance 

with and progress under the FTAs’ labor provisions and that these plans 

should reflect ongoing trade developments, be provided to Congress, and 

be summarized in USTR’s annual trade agreements report. In 2012, both 

agencies were taking actions to address the recommendations.5

As the main U.S. point of contact for all FTAs, USTR has general 

oversight responsibility for commitments in FTAs. DOL is responsible for 

monitoring partner countries’ labor conditions and compliance with FTA 

labor provisions, addressing complaints regarding violations of these 

provisions, and providing technical assistance. The Department of State 

 3

Trade Promotion Authority, previously known as “fast track” negotiating authority, 

established conditions and procedures under which the President could submit legislation 

to approve and implement trade agreements, such as FTAs, that Congress could approve 

or disapprove but could not amend or filibuster. See Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority 

Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, Div. B, § 2103, 116 Stat. 933, 1004–08.

4

GAO, International Trade: Four Free Trade Agreements GAO Reviewed Have Resulted 

in Commercial Benefits, but Challenges on Labor and Environment Remain, GAO-09-439

(Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2009). Our 2009 report reviewed implementation of the U.S. 

FTAs with, respectively, Chile, Jordan, Morocco, and Singapore. 

5

Additional information about U.S. agencies’ monitoring and reporting on compliance with, 

and progress under, FTA labor provisions is presented later in this report.
Page 3 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

(State) supports USTR and DOL in discharging their responsibilities and 

also monitors labor conditions in each partner country. In some instances, 

the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) supports partner 

countries in implementing FTA labor obligations and initiatives by 

administering technical assistance projects, carried out by USAID’s 

implementing partners. In 2009, USTR announced that it would take 

steps jointly with DOL and State to improve interagency cooperation; 

proactively monitor the implementation of labor provisions; and address 

identified problem areas, including foreign practices that would constitute 

violations of FTA requirements. Furthermore, the President’s 2014 Trade 

Policy Agenda indicates that the administration will focus on 

implementation of the numerous agreements into which the United States 

has entered and that the United States will work with key trading partners 

around the world to address specific labor issues.

You asked us to assess the current status of the implementation of FTA 

labor provisions as well as the United States’ and trade partner countries’ 

responses to related challenges, such as reported violence against 

unionists in some partner countries. This report examines the following 

(see app. I for a detailed description of our scope and methodology):

1) steps that selected partner countries have taken, and U.S. assistance 

they have received, to implement FTA labor provisions and other 

labor initiatives and the reported results of such steps;

2) complaints—known as submissions—about possible violations of FTA 

labor provisions that DOL has accepted and any problems related to 

the submission process; and

3) the extent to which USTR, DOL, and State monitor and enforce 

partner countries’ implementation of FTA labor provisions and report 

results to Congress.

In addition, appendix II describes reported violence against labor 

unionists in selected FTA partner countries as well as steps that the 

countries have taken to address such occurrences. Appendix III describes 

U.S. agencies’ efforts to monitor implementation of other labor initiatives.

For our review, we selected four FTAs—the Dominican Republic-Central 

America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), the United 

States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (Colombia FTA), the 

United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement (Oman FTA), and the United 

States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (Peru FTA). We also visited five 

partner countries—El Salvador and Guatemala, both of which are 
Page 4 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

CAFTA-DR partners; Colombia; Oman; and Peru. We selected these 

FTAs and countries in part because of the extent of known labor issues in 

each country; because of the timing of the FTAs’ entry into force; and to 

reflect regional dispersion across Central America, South America, and 

the Middle East.6 In addition, we selected the Colombia and Peru FTAs in 

part because the labor chapters in those agreements contain provisions 

reflecting labor language as delineated in the May 10, 2007, Bipartisan 

Trade Agreement on Trade Policy, popularly known as the May 10th 

Agreement.7

To address our objectives, we reviewed relevant documents, including 

the labor chapters of the four selected FTAs; labor submissions received 

by DOL; labor rights reports and trade agreement reports compiled by 

U.S. agencies, international organizations, and FTA stakeholders; and 

documents pertaining to U.S. monitoring and enforcement plans. In 

addition, we reviewed documentation related to labor conditions in partner 

countries that we obtained from partner country governments as well as 

from business associations, labor unions, the International Labour 

Organization (ILO), and nonprofit organizations. We interviewed 

representatives of these organizations; relevant foreign government 

officials; and U.S. agency officials in Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, 

Oman, and Peru during fieldwork in those countries. We also interviewed 

U.S. agency representatives in Washington, D.C., and Geneva, 

Switzerland.

However, the results of our review of these selected FTAs 

and partner countries cannot be generalized to all FTAs and partner 

countries.

8

 6

According to USTR, FTA provisions provide for the FTA’s entry into force through an 

exchange of formal diplomatic notes among the parties. USTR also notes that, in the 

United States, the President must first determine that the trading partner has come into 

compliance with obligations that will take effect when the agreement enters into force. 

When an FTA enters into force, it generally means that the agreement becomes legally 

binding on the parties to the agreement.

We collected data on U.S. funding for labor assistance 

7

Congressional leaders and the Bush administration jointly agreed to the May 10th 

Agreement, resulting in a new trade policy template that calls for, among other things, (1) 

enforceable reciprocal obligation for the countries to adopt and maintain in their laws and 

practice the five basic internationally recognized labor principles, as stated in the 

International Labour Organization (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 

at Work and (2) labor obligations subject to the same dispute settlement procedures and 

remedies as commercial obligations. 

8

The views expressed by these officials and organizations cannot be generalized to all 

officials or organizations knowledgeable about labor provisions in the selected FTAs.
Page 5 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

programs in FTA partner countries from 2001 to 2013 and on reported 

violence against unionists in Colombia—the only selected FTA partner 

country with such data—and we assessed these data’s reliability by 

interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data sources and 

by tracing the data to source documents. We determined that the data 

were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of describing U.S. assistance 

for implementation of labor provisions in FTA partner countries and 

describing general trends in reported violence against unionists in 

Colombia. (See app. I for further details of our scope and methodology.)

We conducted this performance audit from May 2013 to November 2014 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The current and prior administrations have expressed concerns that poor 

labor standards in FTA partner countries may affect workers in the United 

States and other parts of the world, incentivizing a global “race to the 

bottom” that unfairly distorts global markets and prevents U.S. businesses 

and workers from competing on a level playing field. According to DOL, to 

address such concerns, each FTA signed in the past decade, including 

those we selected, contains a “labor chapter” that differs in detail across 

the FTAs but generally includes labor provisions, establishes points of 

contact for labor matters, and provides a recourse mechanism for matters 

arising from the labor provisions.9

 9

All of the selected FTAs contain mechanisms to address matters arising under the 

respective labor chapters. CAFTA-DR and the Colombia, Oman, and Peru FTAs each 

include labor provisions that state that each party shall designate an office within its labor 

ministry that shall serve as a contact point with the other party and with the public. 

Furthermore, the FTAs state that each party’s contact point shall provide for the 

submission, receipt, and consideration of communications on matters related to the 

respective labor chapter and shall make such communications available to the other party 

and, as appropriate, to the public. While either party can request consultations regarding 

any matter addressed in the labor chapter, FTA dispute settlement procedures may be 

invoked only under specified circumstances, which vary by FTA.

The provisions in the labor chapters of 

Background

FTA Labor Provisions

and Other Initiatives to 

Address Labor Concerns
Page 6 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

the four FTAs that took effect most recently generally reflect the trade 

policy template created by the May 10th Agreement.10

• In FTAs that entered into force from January 2004 through January 

2009, including CAFTA-DR and the Oman FTA, the labor chapter 

contains a provision that a party shall not fail to effectively enforce its 

labor laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or 

inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the parties.11 Under 

CAFTA-DR and the Oman FTA, matters related to this obligation are 

the only matters under the respective labor chapters for which parties 

can seek recourse through dispute settlement that may result in 

possible fines and sanctions.12 These FTAs also contain a provision 

whereby parties commit to “strive to ensure” that the labor rights 

enumerated in the respective labor chapter are protected by their 

laws; however, matters arising under this provision do not have 

recourse through the dispute settlement chapter of the respective 

FTA.13

• In FTAs that entered into force after January 2009, including the 

Colombia and Peru FTAs,14

 10FTAs with Colombia, Panama, Peru, and South Korea contain language reflecting the 

labor provisions of the May 10th Agreement.

the labor chapter includes language 

echoing the May 10th Agreement that obligates each partner to adopt 

and maintain in its statutes, regulations, and practices certain 

11United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (entered into force in January 2004), 

art. 17.2; United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement (entered into force in January 2004), 

art. 18.2; United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement (entered into in force January 

2005), art. 18.2; United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement (entered into force in 

January 2006), art. 16.2; CAFTA-DR (entered into force between 2006 and 2009 for the 

various countries), art. 16.2; United States-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement (Bahrain FTA) 

(entered into force in January 2006), art. 15.2; and Oman FTA (entered into force in 

January 2009), art. 16.2.

12CAFTA-DR, art. 16.6.7; Oman FTA art. 16.6.5. 

13CAFTA-DR, art. 16.1.1 and 16.6.7; Oman FTA, art. 16.1.1 and 16.6.5. 

14United States-Peru FTA (entered into force in February 2009), art. 17.2, 17.3; United 

States-Colombia FTA (entered into force in May 2012), art. 17.2, 17.3; United StatesKorea Free Trade Agreement (entered into force in March 2012), art. 19.2, 19.3; and 

United States-Panama Free Trade Agreement (entered into force in October 2012), art. 

16.2, 16.3. 
Page 7 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

fundamental labor rights as stated by the ILO.15 Although the text of 

the respective FTAs’ labor chapters varies, this language generally 

relates to, for example, the rights to freedom of association and 

collective bargaining and the elimination of compulsory or forced 

labor. The labor chapters of these FTAs also obligate the parties not 

to fail to effectively enforce these labor laws in a manner affecting 

trade between the parties. Pursuant to the labor chapters of these 

FTAs, if consultations fail, the parties can seek to resolve matters 

arising under the labor chapters by pursuing recourse through the 

respective FTAs’ dispute settlement chapters, which may result in 

possible fines and sanctions.16

In addition, other labor initiatives—one known as the White Paper17 and 

the other titled Colombian Action Plan Related to Labor Rights (Labor 

Action Plan)18—were developed in the context of CAFTA-DR and the 

Colombia FTA, respectively.19

• White Paper. Before Congress enacted implementing legislation for 

CAFTA-DR,20

 15International Labour Organization, Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 

Work and Its Follow-Up (1998), 

a group of vice ministers responsible for trade and labor 

in the partner countries developed the White Paper to address labor 

concerns in Central America and the Dominican Republic. The White 

http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration 

/textdeclaration/lang--en/index.htm, accessed August 18, 2014. The principles and rights 

stated by the ILO are (1) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right 

to collective bargaining, (2) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor, (3) 

the effective abolition of child labor, and (4) the elimination of discrimination in respect of

employment and occupation.

16United States-Peru FTA, art. 17.7; Colombia FTA, art. 17.7; United States-Korea Free 

Trade Agreement, art. 19.7; and United States-Panama Free Trade Agreement, art. 16.7.

17Working Group of the Vice Ministers Responsible for Trade and Labor in the Countries 

of Central America and the Dominican Republic, The Labor Dimension in Central America 

and the Dominican Republic: Building on Progress: Strengthening Compliance and 

Enhancing Capacity (April 2005), accessed June 7, 2013, http://www.ilo.org/sanjose 

/lang—es/index.htm.

18Colombian Action Plan Related to Labor Rights (April 7, 2011), accessed May 29, 2013, 

http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2787.

19These labor initiatives were created outside an FTA framework. 

20Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement 

Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 109-53, 119 Stat. 262 (Aug. 2, 2005).
Page 8 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

Paper detailed six areas of focus and included recommendations to 

enhance the implementation and enforcement of labor standards and 

to strengthen the region’s labor institutions.21

• Labor Action Plan. Colombia and the United States agreed in 2011 

to the Labor Action Plan, in furtherance of Colombia’s commitment to 

protect internationally recognized labor rights, prevent violence 

against labor leaders, and prosecute the perpetrators of such 

violence. The plan listed nine issue areas to strengthen labor rights 

that Colombia was required to address before the FTA could receive 

congressional approval.

According to DOL, the 

U.S. government did not participate in preparing or negotiating the 

White Paper’s recommendations. The ILO Verification Project, funded 

by DOL, was created to monitor implementation of the White Paper 

commitments and released verification reports every 6 months 

between 2007 and 2010.

22 USTR and DOL are jointly responsible for 

monitoring Colombia’s ongoing progress in fulfilling these 

requirements.

USTR, DOL, and State have key responsibilities related to monitoring 

partner countries’ implementation of FTA labor provisions. These roles 

involve both discrete and shared responsibilities that require both formal 

and informal coordination. USAID has provided funding for cooperative 

projects to improve labor capacity.

• USTR. The U.S. Trade Representative is the President’s principal 

adviser and spokesperson on trade and has lead responsibility for 

negotiating trade agreements, including FTAs, as well as for 

 21Under the White Paper, the labor ministers of the six CAFTA-DR countries agreed to 

address the following priority areas: (1) labor law and implementation, (2) budget and 

personnel needs of the labor ministries, (3) strengthening the judicial system for labor law, 

(4) protections against discrimination in the workplace, (5) worst forms of child labor, and 

(6) promoting a culture of compliance.

22The nine areas that Colombia agreed to address under the Labor Action Plan were (1) 

creation of a specialized Ministry of Labor; (2) criminal code reform; (3) prohibiting the 

misuse of cooperatives; (4) preventing the use of temporary service agencies to 

circumvent labor rights; (5) criminalizing the use of collective pacts to undermine the right 

to organize and bargain collectively; (6) collecting and disseminating information on the 

definition of essential services; (7) seeking the ILO’s assistance in implementing the Labor 

Action Plan and working with the ILO to strengthen its presence, capacity, and role in 

Colombia; (8) reforming protection programs; and (9) criminal justice reforms. 

U.S. Agencies’ 

Responsibilities Related to 

Monitoring Implementation 

of FTA Labor Provisions
Page 9 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

developing and coordinating U.S. trade policy and issuing policy 

guidance related to international trade functions. USTR is responsible 

to the President and Congress for administering the trade agreements 

program, including periodic reporting to Congress as required.23

• DOL. DOL’s Bureau of International Labor Affairs is responsible for 

monitoring implementation of FTA labor provisions for all FTAs. The 

bureau’s Office of Trade and Labor Affairs is designated as the point 

of contact for implementation of the labor provisions of the FTAs as 

well as for the labor cooperation mechanisms. Before congressional 

approval and implementation of an FTA, DOL’s responsibilities 

include preparing reports for Congress, in consultation with USTR and 

State, about the partner country’s labor rights protections and child 

labor laws and the FTA’s potential effect on employment in the United 

States. After an FTA enters into force, DOL’s responsibilities include 

receiving, reviewing, and acting on any public complaint submitted 

about the partner’s compliance with FTA labor obligations 

(submissions).

USTR is also responsible for coordinating the administration’s 

activities to create a fair, open, and predictable trading environment 

by identifying, monitoring, enforcing, and resolving the full range of 

international trade issues. According to USTR, this includes asserting 

U.S. rights; vigorously monitoring and enforcing bilateral and other 

agreements; and promoting U.S. interests, including labor interests, 

under FTAs.

24

 2319 U.S.C. § 2171. Generally, the trade agreements program includes all activities 

consisting of, or related to, the negotiation or administration of international agreements 

that primarily concern trade and that are concluded pursuant to the authority vested in the 

President by the Constitution, 19 U.S.C. § 1351, the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, and 

the Trade Act of 1974 as amended.

Both before and after an FTA is implemented, DOL is 

responsible for assisting the partner country as needed—for example, 

planning, developing, and pursuing cooperative projects related to 

labor matters—to strengthen the partner country’s capacity to promote 

respect for core labor standards.

24In addition, DOL is responsible for convening the FTA labor affairs councils among 

partner government’s labor ministries, which oversee the FTA labor chapters, and for 

administering the U.S. Labor Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations and Trade 

Policy. The committee consists of representatives of labor organizations and is tasked 

with providing information and advice with respect to negotiation and implementation of 

U.S. trade agreements. DOL also administers the National Advisory Committee for Labor 

Provisions of U.S. Free Trade Agreements, which consists of 12 representatives (4 from 

the business community, 4 from the labor community, and 4 from the public sector). 
Page 10 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

• State. State is responsible for supporting USTR and DOL in 

implementing and monitoring FTAs. State’s Bureau of Democracy, 

Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) coordinates State’s in-country labor 

officers, who are tasked with carrying out regular monitoring and 

reporting and day-to-day interaction with foreign governments 

regarding labor matters. State annually produces Country Reports on 

Human Rights Practices, which includes information about countries’ 

labor practices. In addition, State participates with USTR and DOL in 

the USTR-led interagency team that negotiates FTA labor provisions, 

contributes critical input to the research and analysis of reports 

produced by DOL, and provides technical assistance funding to 

strengthen some countries’ labor capacity. Because USTR and DOL 

do not maintain a presence in other countries, they often rely on State 

for outreach, monitoring, and reporting activities related to FTA labor 

provisions.

• USAID. USAID administers technical assistance programs to address 

labor-related matters. USAID administers trade-capacity-building 

programs globally in both FTA and non-FTA partner countries. In 

addition, during the FTA negotiations, USAID provides USTR input on 

draft FTA text as well as input on possible trade-capacity-building 

programs to address labor-related issues.

Each of the FTA partner countries that we selected for our review has 

taken steps to strengthen labor rights pursuant to its FTA with the United 

States, and some of these countries have also implemented other labor 

initiatives outside the FTA framework. The U.S. government has provided 

some technical assistance to help FTA partner countries meet their labor 

commitments. However, stakeholders reported that limitations in partner 

countries’ capacity to enforce labor laws cause gaps in labor protections 

to persist.

Selected Countries 

Have Taken Steps, 

with U.S. Assistance, 

to Address FTA Labor 

Commitments and 

Other Labor Initiatives 

but Have Limited 

Enforcement 

Capacity
Page 11 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

El Salvador and Guatemala, the CAFTA-DR countries we selected for our 

review, have both taken steps to implement labor initiatives responding to 

their FTA commitments and areas of focus identified in the White Paper. 

According to the ILO, and as reported by DOL, these countries have 

addressed these areas of focus by implementing changes to improve 

labor protections, such as increasing the number of labor inspectors and 

increasing the number of judges and courts that hear labor cases.

El Salvador. According to DOL and ILO verification reports, El Salvador 

increased its Ministry of Labor’s enforcement budget by about 120 

percent from 2005 to 2010, leading to an increase in the number of labor 

inspectors during the same period as well as increases in both the 

number of inspections conducted and the number of fines imposed on 

employers.25 Ministry of Labor officials reported that with the increase in 

size and budget, which resulted from the White Paper recommendations,

the ministry is now able to accommodate workers’ requests for workplace 

inspections and labor inspectors can issue fines for violations not 

addressed by employers.26

 25Department of Labor, Progress in Implementing Chapter 16 (Labor) and CapacityBuilding under the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade 

Agreement (Washington D.C.: May 11, 2012). According to DOL, this report relies on 

information collected by the ILO as part of its project to verify the results of actions taken 

to address the White Paper recommendations. 

In addition, according to officials from the 

Supreme Court in El Salvador, the labor courts have created a 

comprehensive statistical system to track labor issues identified in the 

White Paper, and unions have successfully advocated for legislation that, 

if passed, would speed labor case reviews and allow plaintiffs to 

participate more actively.

26Stakeholders reported challenges related to the issuance of fines, as discussed later in 

this report

Selected Countries Have 

Taken Steps to Implement 

FTA Labor Commitments 

and Other Labor 

Initiatives, Including 

Strengthening Labor 

Institutions

CAFTA-DR: El Salvador and 

Guatemala
Page 12 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

Guatemala. Guatemala has taken some steps to address labor 

conditions in accordance with commitments outlined in an Enforcement 

Plan that the United States and Guatemala agreed to in 2013 as a result 

of negotiations to resolve a labor case initiated through a labor 

submission to DOL.27 The actions that the plan calls for include, among 

others, increasing the budget for labor law enforcement at the Ministry of 

Labor and verifying employer compliance with court orders.28

According to USTR, Colombia has taken steps to implement labor 

protection commitments outlined in the Labor Action Plan, such as 

reforming the criminal code to establish criminal penalties for employers 

that undermine the right to organize and bargain collectively, enacting 

legal provisions and regulations prohibiting the use of temporary service 

agencies to circumvent labor rights, and reforming the criminal justice 

system. USTR and DOL have reported that the Colombian government 

took concrete steps and made meaningful progress under the Labor 

Action Plan, which fulfilled the condition for advancing the FTA to 

Congress and resulted in the FTA’s entering into force in May 2012. The 

government’s steps included securing legislation to establish a separate 

labor ministry and expanding its labor inspectorate by hiring additional 

Officials 

from the Ministry of Labor reported improvements in labor rights 

implementation in response to the Enforcement Plan. For example, the 

number of labor inspections rose from about 5,000 nationwide in 2011 to 

about 36,800 nationwide in 2013. Also, according to ministry officials, the 

ministry now conducts labor inspections regularly, rather than in response 

to complaints, and has increased its legal education requirements for 

labor inspectors, to further fulfill its Enforcement Plan commitments.

 27Mutually Agreed Enforcement Action Plan between the Government of the United States 

and the Government of Guatemala (2013), accessed August 1, 2013, 

http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/otla/guatemalasub.htm. 

28The commitments outlined in the Enforcement Plan are (1) reaching an interagency 

information exchange agreement, (2) providing police assistance for Ministry of Labor 

inspectors, (3) allocating resources for Ministry of Labor enforcement of labor laws, (4) 

allowing for the ministry to issue fine recommendations and expedited judicial review, (5) 

standardizing time frames for Ministry of Labor inspections, (6) ensuring labor law 

compliance for certain enterprises, (7) ensuring labor law compliance for enterprises 

receiving export benefits, (8) ensuring labor law compliance upon enterprise closure, (9) 

employer substitution, (10) developing a system for tracking compliance with court orders, 

(11) verifying employer compliance with court orders, (12) monitoring judicial enforcement 

of court orders, (13) applying certain labor code articles, (14) ensuring transparency and 

tripartite coordination on Enforcement Plan implementation, (15) publishing labor law 

enforcement statistics and data. 

Colombia
Page 13 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

inspectors. Additionally, USTR and the Colombian Ministry of Labor 

reported that the government enacted a series of laws and ministerial 

decrees that expanded labor protections as a result of the Labor Action 

Plan. According to USTR and the Colombian Ministry of Labor, these 

laws and decrees include, for example, legislation to establish criminal 

penalties, including imprisonment, for employers that undermined the 

right to organize and bargain collectively as well as new provisions and 

regulations to prohibit and sanction with significant fines the misuse of 

cooperatives29 and other employment relationships that undermine 

workers’ rights.30

Oman has taken steps to implement labor protections that have allowed 

for unionization and collective bargaining. Officials from Oman’s Ministry 

of Manpower—the ministry responsible for labor affairs—reported that 

Oman’s interest in entering into a free trade agreement with the United 

States helped lead to the introduction of labor reforms, including the 

establishment of unions. According to USTR, in order to meet its 

commitments made in connection with the FTA, Oman has enacted a 

number of labor law reforms including, among others, a royal decree in 

2006 that established the right to organize labor unions, allowed for 

collective bargaining, prohibited the dismissal of workers for union 

activity, guaranteed the right to strike, and guaranteed unions the right to 

practice their activities freely and without interference from outside 

parties. According to union and Ministry of Manpower officials we met 

with in Oman, the General Federation of Trade Unions held its first 

election in 2010 and served as the starting point for the union movement 

in Oman. The federation serves as an umbrella organization representing 

workers from various sectors and, according to union officials, represents 

about 200 company-level unions and one sector-level union, established 

in 2013 in the oil and gas sector.

 29According to DOL, associated work cooperatives are self-governed, autonomous 

enterprises, under which associated workers are considered cooperative owners, rather 

than workers, and are excluded from many Labor Code protections. 

30According to DOL’s 2011 Labor Rights Report on Colombia, until late 2010, penalties for 

the misuse of cooperatives to avoid direct employment relationships were not enforced 

against third-party employers. According to DOL, as a result, cooperatives became a 

vehicle widely used by employers to end direct employment relationships with their 

workforces while retaining the same workers through cooperatives and continuing to act 

as their de facto employers. 

Oman
Page 14 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

According to USTR, Peru committed to steps to implement labor 

protection commitments in the context of FTA negotiations with the United 

States. During our fieldwork, officials at Peru’s Ministry of Labor told us 

that Peru recently established a new labor inspection regime and that the 

ministry has focused on improving inspections in the workplace. For 

example, in 2013, according to Ministry of Labor officials, the ministry 

took action to centralize authority for labor inspections and help ensure 

that inspectors are applying the same criteria across the country. Ministry 

of Labor officials also reported that the ministry took steps to improve 

labor inspections by modernizing its information systems to allow for 

digital record keeping, with technical assistance provided by USAID. 

According to USAID, as a result of these programs, the time required to 

adjudicate labor cases has decreased from 2 years to 6 months. 

Additionally, according to a 2007 U.S. House of Representatives, 

Committee on Ways and Means report, in order to bring Peruvian labor 

laws into alignment with the obligations under the FTA, the government of 

Peru took steps to change Peru’s legal framework governing temporary 

employment contracts, subcontracting and outsourcing contracts, the 

right of workers to strike, recourses against unit-union discrimination, and 

workers’ right to organize. Ministry of Labor officials reported that the 

ministry has progressively increased the number of labor inspectors, in 

connection with the commitments Peru made during the FTA negotiation, 

to double its labor inspectorate. As of September 2013, the ministry 

reported having about 400 labor inspectors on staff nationally.

Peru
Page 15 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

From fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2013, the U.S. government 

provided a combined total of about $275 million in labor-related 

assistance for all FTA partner countries.31 All CAFTA-DR countries, 

Colombia, and Peru received a combined total of about $222 million in 

labor-related technical assistance and capacity-building activities since 

the passage of implementing legislation for these FTAs. In contrast, the 

U.S. government provided about $53 million in labor-related assistance 

for all other FTA partner countries during the periods since those FTAs 

were implemented.32

Figure 1 shows the labor-related technical assistance that U.S. agencies 

provided under CAFTA-DR and the Colombia, Oman, and Peru FTAs 

during the periods beginning, respectively, with the year that Congress 

passed the FTA’s implementing legislation and ending in 2013. Figure 1 

also shows labor-related technical assistance that U.S. agencies provided 

from 2001 through 2013 under all other FTAs that entered into force in or 

after 2001.

 31This amount includes both FTA and non-FTA labor-related assistance provided to FTA 

partner countries. This amount does not include labor-related technical assistance to 

Oman that DOL provided for a joint project in Oman and Bahrain. DOL’s records show 

that it obligated $758,000 for the project in 2006 but do not show how the funds were 

divided between the two countries, because, according to DOL, standard financial reports 

for federal grants to more than one country do not allow the grantor to report amounts 

received by each country. In addition, this amount excludes any assistance provided 

under the United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement (Israel FTA), which does not contain 

a specific article on labor provisions, and the North American Free Trade Agreement 

(NAFTA), which addresses labor-related issues under a related agreement, the North 

American Agreement on Labor Cooperation. 

32This amount excludes the Israel FTA and NAFTA. 

U.S. Agencies Have 

Provided Technical 

Assistance to Help FTA 

Partner Countries Meet 

Labor Commitments, with 

Largest Amounts for 

CAFTA-DR
Page 16 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

Figure 1: Labor-Related Technical Assistance Administered by U.S. Agencies under 

Selected Free Trade Agreements (FTA) and All Other FTAs

Notes: Time periods for the data shown for CAFTA-DR and the Colombia, Oman, and Peru FTAs 

each begin with the year that the respective FTA’s implementing legislation was passed by Congress, 

before the FTA entered into force. Data for “All other FTAs” exclude the only FTAs that entered into 

force before 2001—the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement (1985) and the North American Free Trade 

Agreement (1994).

Totals for projects that DOL administered under CAFTA-DR include projects that Congress funded 

through appropriations to DOL for technical assistance to reduce child labor as well as projects that 

State’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs funded through transfers to DOL from State’s 

Economic Support Fund and Development Assistance account.

Data shown exclude funding that DOL provided for a regional labor-related technical assistance 

project in Oman and Bahrain in 2006. According to DOL officials, data showing country-specific 

funding for regional projects are not available.

Data shown for Colombia include $500,000 that State provided for promotion of labor rights.

CAFTA-DR’s six partner countries have received the largest amounts of 

U.S. assistance for labor-related projects undertaken pursuant to the FTA 

or independent of the FTA. From 2005, when the CAFTA-DR 

CAFTA-DR
Page 17 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

implementing legislation was passed by Congress, through 2013, the 

U.S. government provided about $170 million for such projects. According 

to DOL, this amount included funding appropriated by Congress to fund 

labor-capacity-building activities as well as funds appropriated to DOL for 

child labor technical assistance projects to assist these partner countries 

in addressing labor-related priorities outlined in the White Paper.33

U.S. technical assistance for labor-related projects in Colombia totaled 

about $24 million from 2011, when the Colombia FTA implementing 

legislation was enacted, through 2013. U.S. agencies provided $9 million 

of that amount for projects to combat child labor and about $13 million to 

address workers’ rights. DOL has also provided in-kind resources, 

sending a staff person with labor expertise to support the Colombian 

government in taking initial steps to implement the Labor Action Plan. The 

United States is currently funding multiple labor-related projects in 

Colombia, including State’s award of about $500,000 to the ILO for the 

promotion of core labor rights and DOL’s award of about $7.8 million for 

the ILO office in Colombia.

According to DOL officials, DOL, State, and USAID established an 

interagency group to develop FTA labor-related projects in consultation 

with USTR and CAFTA-DR partner governments and to allocate funding 

among these projects, with funds transferred from State. DOL reported 

that from 2005 to 2013, these three U.S. agencies administered more 

than 20 technical assistance projects in support of the White Paper’s 

priority issue areas.

Oman has not received U.S. technical assistance specifically for laborrelated projects since the FTA was enacted. According to State, the 

United States is not involved in any labor-capacity-building or laborrelated assistance programs in Oman because of the Omani 

government’s reluctance to accept foreign assistance. However, officials 

at Oman’s Ministry of Manpower told us that the United States has 

provided information and advice on supporting unions and the role of 

unions in the economy and has expressed support of ongoing labor 

reforms, including the establishment of unions.

 33Beginning in 2005, Congress appropriated funds for labor-capacity-building activities 

relating to the free trade agreements with the countries of Central America and the 

Dominican Republic. For example, see Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. 

No.108-447, §570, 118 Stat. 2809, 3026 (2004).

Colombia

Oman
Page 18 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

U.S technical assistance for labor-related projects in Peru totaled about 

$27.5 million from 2007, when the Peru FTA implementing legislation was 

enacted, through 2013. Of that amount, $13 million was dedicated to 

combat child labor, with the remainder dedicated to labor-capacitybuilding and education projects. USAID officials stated that, for example, 

the agency expended $3.3 million over a 3-year period to target labor 

issues. Of this amount, $2.7 million was granted to the Solidarity Center, 

a labor nongovernmental organization (NGO) affiliated with the American 

Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), 

to strengthen union negotiation capacity, and $600,000 was granted to an 

implementing partner—Nathan Associates—for improving information 

systems, providing training for labor inspectors, and training judges on the 

implementation of labor laws.

El Salvador. Stakeholders we met with during our fieldwork in El 

Salvador identified concerns related to the enforcement of labor rights. 

Further, State and DOL reports show that workers are often unable to 

benefit from the legal rights afforded in the labor laws. For example, 

according to NGO officials, although labor courts have improved their 

ability to process cases, court decisions are often not enforced. U.S. 

officials stated that the Ministry of Labor’s increases in its budget and 

number of labor inspectors have not improved the labor inspectorate’s 

effectiveness. According to Ministry of Labor officials, although the 

ministry’s labor inspectors can fine employers for labor law violations, the 

ministry does not collect the fines and workers must petition the labor 

courts to enforce the penalties. Moreover, according to an ILO official, 

although the government of El Salvador has greatly reduced the amount 

of time that the courts take to accept a case, resolution of most labor 

disputes still takes 2 to 4 years. Officials from the Supreme Court in El 

Salvador told us that about 51 percent of labor court sentences are not 

enforced, primarily because the plaintiffs do not have the funds required 

to continue the claims. Union and NGO officials we met with in El 

Salvador emphasized their concerns over enforcement, stating that 

because of the length of time the courts take to adjudicate labor cases, 

Peru

Stakeholders Reported 

Limited Enforcement 

Capacity and Gaps in 

Labor Rights in Selected 

Partner Countries

CAFTA-DR: El Salvador

and Guatemala
Page 19 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

workers often take buyouts from the company and drop the cases. State’s 

2013 Human Rights Report echoes these concerns. For example, the 

report states that in 2013, the government of El Salvador did not always 

effectively enforce the laws on freedom of association and the right to 

collective bargaining, and that legal remedies and penalties are 

ineffective.

Guatemala. According to stakeholders we met with during our fieldwork 

in Guatemala, as well as State reports, concerns related to the 

enforcement and application of labor rights persist. According to USTR, 

Guatemala has taken steps to address labor reforms outlined in the 

Enforcement Plan, but additional steps are needed, including passing 

legislation providing for an expedited process to sanction employers that 

violate labor laws and implementing a mechanism to ensure payments to 

workers in cases where enterprises have closed.34 Additionally, according 

to USTR, Guatemala will need to demonstrate that the legal reforms it 

has undertaken and still needs to undertake are being implemented 

effectively and are leading to positive changes.35

 34According to USTR, as of September 2014, this bill had not been passed by the 

Guatemalan congress.

Union representatives 

reported concerns related to freedom of association—specifically, that 

union leaders have been offered monetary compensation to resign from 

their jobs and to influence other workers against joining the union. Union 

officials we met with also noted that workers have been terminated for 

their union affiliation or for not disbanding unions. State’s 2013 Human 

Rights Report echoed these concerns, stating that the government of 

Guatemala did not effectively enforce legislation on freedom of 

association, collective bargaining, or antiunion discrimination. Further, 

according to this report, as a result of inadequate allocation of budget 

resources and inefficient legal and administrative processes, the relevant 

government institutions did not effectively investigate, prosecute, and 

punish employers who violated freedom of association and collective 

35For more information about the status of implementation of the Guatemala Enforcement 

Plan, see app. III.
Page 20 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

bargaining laws, and the institutions did not reinstate workers illegally 

dismissed for engaging in union activities.36

Stakeholders we met with in Colombia identified concerns related to the 

enforcement of labor rights and not benefiting from rights afforded in the 

labor laws. According to USTR, the government of Colombia has made 

meaningful progress under the Labor Action Plan, but work remains to 

build on this progress and address remaining and new challenges.

• According to USTR, the collection of fines for labor violations remains 

problematic. USTR and DOL have reported that although Colombia’s 

national training and apprenticeship system, Servicio Nacional de 

Aprendizaje (SENA), is responsible for collecting fines for labor 

violations, until recently SENA has been barred from collecting fines 

from companies that filed a judicial appeal.37

• USTR has reported that new forms of abusive contracting remain 

problematic to the protection of labor rights in Colombia. For example, 

according to USTR, although the number of illegal cooperatives has 

dropped, many employers have shifted to various forms of 

subcontracting, including entities known as simplified stock 

companies, to avoid direct employment relationships.

According to a joint 

USTR-DOL statement, as of April 2014, SENA was authorized to hold 

monetary payment as collateral payment from businesses, pending 

the outcome of the judicial appeal of their fines, but had not yet begun 

to exercise this authority. Additionally, although the Ministry of Labor 

increased the number of inspectors, labor unions and NGOs reported 

that this action has not resulted in more effective inspections or 

improved working conditions.

38

 36According to U.S and Guatemalan officials, as well as union representatives and the 

ILO, violence against unionists has occurred in Guatemala. The government of Guatemala 

reported that it had taken steps to address the violence. However, stakeholders were 

unsure of the extent of the problem because of a lack of statistics collected by the 

government. For more information about violence against unionists in Guatemala, see 

app. II.

ILO, NGO, 

37According to DOL, Colombia’s Minister of Labor heads SENA's board of directors.

38According to DOL, a simplified stock company is a corporate model that holds 

shareholders liable only up to the amount of their investment. DOL further stated that 

these companies are easy to create and dissolve and are a legitimate business model in 

Colombia. In cases where a simplified stock company is used for contracting—either legal 

or illegal—an employer hires the company to carry out a task and the company provides 

the labor through its own employees.

Colombia
Page 21 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

and labor union officials we met with described this form of 

subcontracting as a legal loophole that is used to undermine workers’ 

rights. According to union officials, a law passed by the Colombian 

government in 2013 prohibiting the misuse of cooperatives was also 

intended to increase formalized employment and encourage 

companies to hire workers directly instead of as temporary labor.

State’s 2013 Human Rights Report noted that the Colombian government 

generally enforced applicable labor laws and took steps to increase the 

enforcement of freedom-of-association laws. However, the report 

identified weaknesses in labor protections in Colombia, echoing concerns 

expressed to us by labor union and NGO representatives, related to labor 

inspections, collecting fines for labor violations, and employers’ use of 

outsourcing contracts.39

Ministry of Manpower and union officials we met with in Oman reported 

that collective bargaining and freedom of association are allowed by law 

and largely respected. However, State has raised concerns about the 

enforcement of labor law among Oman’s foreign worker population. 

State’s 2013 Human Rights Report notes that Oman’s Ministry of 

Manpower effectively enforces the labor law as it applies to Omani 

citizens but has not effectively enforced regulations related to working 

conditions and hours for foreign workers.

Despite steps that the government of Peru has taken to address labor 

conditions, union and NGO officials we met with reported that 

enforcement of labor laws remains weak and labor conditions have not 

improved in certain respects. According to State, Peru’s labor laws place 

a 5-year limit on the continuous renewal of short-term labor contracts not 

leading to permanent employment in most sectors of the economy. 

However, State’s 2013 Human Rights Report notes that a sector-specific 

law covering nontraditional export sectors such as apparel exempts 

employers from this 5-year limit and allows them to hire workers through 

indefinite series of short-term contracts. Union officials we met during our 

fieldwork also reported poor labor conditions in Peru’s nontraditional 

 39In addition, although murders of unionists have generally been decreasing over the past 

10 years, and despite actions by the Colombian government to reduce homicides of union 

members and labor activists, stakeholders we interviewed reported that violence against 

unionists continues. For a more detailed description of reported violence against union 

members and activists in Colombia, see app. II.

Oman

Peru
Page 22 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

export sectors, which these officials described as not affording the same 

labor rights as other sectors in the economy.40

State’s 2013 Human Rights Report also identifies continuing labor 

concerns in Peru’s nontraditional export sectors, such as the effect of the 

use of temporary service contracts and subcontracting on workers’ 

freedom of association. State’s report also notes that in 2013, penalties 

for violations of freedom of association and collective bargaining were 

rarely enforced, the judicial process was prolonged, and employers were 

seldom penalized for dismissing workers involved in trade union activities.

In addition, union officials whom we met with stated that Peru’s 

agricultural law allows for workers to be paid less than the legal minimum 

wage and to be continuously hired on temporary contracts for 2- to 3-

month periods. These officials stated that this limits workers’ ability to 

collectively bargain and exercise freedom of association, because of fear 

that if they join a union, their contracts will not be renewed.

More generally, according 

to NGO officials, Peru’s large informal sector makes it difficult for the 

government to enforce labor rights, because informal companies, which 

are not registered with the government and therefore are not subject to 

labor inspections, typically do not follow labor laws.

 40According to State, Peru’s nontraditional export sectors include fishing, wood and paper, 

nonmetallic minerals, jewelry, textiles and apparel, and the agriculture industry. 
Page 23 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

DOL has accepted five of six labor submissions—that is, formal 

complaints alleging that FTA labor provisions had been violated—that it 

has received since 200841 and has closed one submission as resolved. 

However, DOL did not meet its original deadlines for reviewing and 

reporting on any of the submissions, exceeding the established 6-month 

submission review time frame by an average of about nine months and 

possibly delaying resolution of the submissions. Stakeholders whom we 

interviewed in the selected five partner countries generally expressed a 

lack of awareness or understanding of DOL’s submission process, which 

may have limited the number of submissions filed. Moreover, 

stakeholders we interviewed expressed concerns about delays in 

resolving labor concerns detailed in the submissions for Guatemala and 

Honduras.

According to DOL, FTA labor provisions establish official processes for 

receiving submissions from interested organizations that believe a trading 

partner is not fulfilling its labor commitments. In the United States, DOL 

generally receives and reviews submissions made under the labor 

chapters of each trade agreement. DOL issued procedural guidelines 

pertaining to this function via publication of a Federal Register notice in 

2006.42

 41According to DOL officials, DOL also received a sixth submission, filed under the Costa 

Rica FTA in July 2010, which the filing party withdrew before DOL decided whether to 

accept it. DOL has also accepted other labor submissions under the North American 

Agreement on Labor Cooperation (one of three accords supplementary to NAFTA), which 

we did not examine.

The guidelines contain deadlines and substantive criteria for 

acceptance and investigation of submissions. For example, DOL shall 

determine whether to accept a submission within 60 days and is to 

consider, among other things, whether it contains statements that, if 

substantiated, would constitute a failure by the other party to comply with 

its commitments under an FTA. If DOL determines that the circumstances 

require, the 60-day timeframe can be extended. According to DOL, its 

decision to review a public submission does not indicate any 

determination as to the validity or accuracy of the allegations contained in 

the submission; the submission’s merit is addressed in the public report 

that follows DOL’s review and analysis. DOL officials noted that although 

DOL has responsibility for investigating submissions, USTR, DOL, and 

State work together to engage diplomatically to address concerns.

4271 Fed. Reg. 76691 (Dec. 21, 2006).

One of Five Labor 

Submissions Has 

Been Resolved, but 

Reporting Deadlines 

and Limited Public 

Awareness of the 

Process Present 

Problems

DOL Announced Its 

Process for Receiving

and Evaluating 

Submissions in 2006
Page 24 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

Figure 2 illustrates DOL’s submission process, including the established 

time frames for accepting and reviewing submissions.

Figure 2: U.S. DOL Labor Submission Process

Legend: FTA = free trade agreement, USTR = Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.

a

DOL may extend the timeframe if it determines that circumstances require such an extension.

b

The free trade commission established for each FTA is the primary forum for bilateral dialogue about 

the FTA’s implementation.
Page 25 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

Since 2008, DOL has accepted labor submissions filed under the 

Bahrain, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, and Peru FTAs and 

has closed the Peru FTA submission.43

 43 DOL has also accepted other labor submissions under the North American Agreement 

on Labor Cooperation (one of three accords supplementary to NAFTA), which we did not 

examine.

The submissions for Bahrain, the 

Dominican Republic, and Guatemala—accepted in 2011, 2012, and 2008, 

respectively—remain open while the U.S. government engages with the 

governments to address the concerns that the submissions raised. The 

submission for Honduras, accepted in 2012, remains open while DOL 

reviews its allegations. Figure 3 presents information about the five 

submissions (see app. III for further details).

DOL Has Closed One of 

Five Labor Submissions 

Accepted since 2008
Page 26 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

Figure 3: Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Labor Submissions Accepted by DOL as of 

July 2014

Notes: DOL has also accepted other labor submissions under the North American Agreement on 

Labor Cooperation, which we did not examine.

Alleged violations shown for the Bahrain, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Honduras 

submissions are examples of those detailed in the submissions. 
Page 27 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

Although DOL accepted most of the submissions it received within the 60-

day time frame established by its guidelines, it did not complete its 

reviews of the submission within the established 180-day time frame.44

For each of the submissions, DOL determined at the end of the original 

180-day review time frame to extend the review period and reported its 

findings and recommendations an average of 262 days after the original 

time frame had ended. According to USTR and DOL, before DOL 

publishes its review of a submission, both agencies engage informally 

with the relevant partner country to explore ways to address the concerns 

raised in the submission. However, USTR and DOL do not request formal 

consultations with a partner country to address DOL’s recommendations 

until DOL has issued its report. As a result, extensions of DOL’s review 

time frame may delay resolution of the submission.

A 

DOL official we met with indicated that DOL cannot complete within the 

180-day time frame the types of comprehensive investigations and 

reports it has been providing.

• Bahrain. DOL received the Bahrain submission on April 21, 2011, 

and accepted it on June 10, 2011, or 50 days later. In December 

2011, DOL extended the submission review period to consider and 

review additional information received from the government of Bahrain 

and Bahraini workers, amendments made to the Bahraini Trade Union 

Law, and labor-related developments in international forums. DOL 

issued its report on December 20, 2012, 559 days after accepting the 

submission.

• Dominican Republic. DOL received the Dominican Republic 

submission on December 22, 2011, and accepted it on February 22, 

2012, or 62 days later. In August 2012, DOL extended the review time 

frame to consider public comments about the submission as well as 

information gathered by a Bureau of International Labor Affairs 

delegation during a visit to the Dominican Republic. DOL issued its 

report on September 27, 2013, 583 days after accepting the 

submission.

• Guatemala. DOL received the Guatemala submission on April 23, 

2008, and accepted it on June 12, 2008, or 50 days later. DOL issued 

 44DOL may extend the timeframe if it determines that the circumstances require such an 

extension. 71 Fed. Reg. 76691. 

DOL Did Not Meet 6-

Month Time Frame for

Any Submission, Showing 

the Time Frame to Be 

Unrealistic
Page 28 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

its report on January 16, 2009, 218 days after accepting the 

Guatemala submission.

• Honduras. DOL received the submission on March 26, 2012, and 

accepted it on May 14, 2012, or 49 days later. On November 2, 2012, 

5 days before DOL’s 180-day reporting deadline, DOL extended its 

review because of the scope of the submission, the scope of the 

alleged labor law violations, and the large amounts of information 

received from the Honduran government and stakeholders. As of 

September 2014, DOL officials were continuing to review 

documentation of the allegations and prepare their report. DOL 

officials were unable to estimate when they would issue a public 

report.

• Peru. DOL received the submission for Peru on December 29, 2010, 

and accepted it on July 19, 2011, or 202 days later. On January 20, 

2012, 185 days after accepting the submission, DOL concluded that 

circumstances required an extension of time for a thorough and 

detailed review of the Peru submission. DOL issued its report for the 

Peru submission on August 30, 2012, 408 days after accepting it.

Although DOL has periodically reviewed and updated the submission 

process since establishing it in 1994, DOL officials told us that they have 

not reviewed or adjusted the submission review time frame to reflect the 

time it takes DOL to issue its reports after accepting the submissions. 

DOL’s extensions of each submission review period since 2008 have 

shown this time frame to be unrealistic. Federal standards for internal 

control call on agency management to monitor and assess the 

effectiveness and efficiency of their operations over time and to promptly 

resolve any deficiencies.45

 45GAO, Auditing and Financial Management: Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 

Government, AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 1999).
Page 29 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

Our interviews with union and other nongovernmental stakeholders in the 

selected partner countries suggested that little or no awareness and 

understanding of the FTA labor submission process may have affected 

the number of submissions filed. Union representatives we interviewed in 

our five case study countries—Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Oman, 

and Peru—were generally either unaware of DOL’s labor submission 

process or considered it difficult to understand and use. For example, a 

union representative in Colombia stated that the union would have filed a 

submission if the representative had known about the process. In another 

example, representatives of one of the larger El Salvador unions—

GMIES, an NGO that monitors the actions of the Salvadorian 

government—stated that it was difficult for a “typical worker” to file a 

submission with DOL and that the information required for the submission 

is generally difficult, if not impossible, to obtain and document. A small 

number of union representatives who were aware of the process 

attributed their knowledge to information received from AFL-CIO or their 

country’s Solidarity Center.46

Moreover, although the government officials we interviewed in the five 

countries knew of the labor submission process, only in El Salvador did 

these officials express an understanding of how DOL evaluates a 

submission and conducts its fact-finding investigations. For example, the 

Guatemalan Ministry of Labor officials we interviewed could not provide 

information about how the process works or describe the criteria DOL 

uses to evaluate a submission’s merits. The Ministry of Manpower

officials whom we interviewed in Oman did not understand the purpose of 

the submission process or how submissions could be filed.

For instance, in Guatemala, a representative 

of a union that had signed the current Guatemala submission stated that 

without the help of the Solidarity Center, the union would have been 

unable to locate submission instructions and file the submission.

In addition, U.S. agencies have made minimal efforts to publicize the 

process for nongovernment stakeholders, who are most likely to file 

submissions. Federal standards for internal control pertaining to 

information and communication call for agencies to have relevant, 

 46The American Center for International Labor Solidarity, better known as the Solidarity 

Center, is a nonprofit organization affiliated with the AFL-CIO labor federation whose 

mission is to help build a global labor movement by strengthening the economic and 

political power of workers around the world through effective, independent, and 

democratic unions.

Interviewed Stakeholders 

Generally Did Not 

Understand the Labor 

Submission Process,

and U.S. Agencies Have 

Made Minimal Efforts to 

Explain It
Page 30 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

reliable, and timely communications relating to internal as well as external 

events, to ensure control of their operations.47 According to DOL officials, 

DOL relies exclusively on its website and its 2006 Federal Register notice 

to inform the public about the process.48 Moreover, U.S. officials whom 

we interviewed in the countries we visited indicated that they do not 

advertise the existence of the submission process. Without additional 

efforts to inform nongovernment stakeholders in FTA partner countries 

about the DOL labor submission process, U.S. agencies are limited in 

their ability to use the submission process as a means of holding FTA 

partners accountable for fulfilling their labor commitments.

Several stakeholders we spoke with expressed concerns about delays in 

U.S. agencies’ efforts to resolve the matters raised in the Guatemala and 

Honduras submissions. Because of the complexity of these matters, 

resolving them has proven difficult and time-consuming, according to 

USTR. Moreover, according to USTR, no process or time frames for U.S. 

agencies’ efforts to engage diplomatically with FTA partners to resolve 

labor matters related to DOL submission reports are outlined in any active 

FTA that had entered into force or in U.S. implementing guidance.

According to USTR and DOL, they engage with FTA partners through 

informal and formal communication to resolve any FTA concerns. For 

example, according to a USTR official, USTR has informally engaged with 

FTA partners—through labor affairs council discussions, telephone 

conversations, and e-mail exchanges—for an average of 6 months 

regarding concerns raised in a submission before requesting formal 

consultations with the partner government.49

 47

If an FTA partner does not 

address USTR’s and DOL’s labor concerns or is unwilling to informally 

engage, USTR and DOL may request formal consultations under the 

FTA’s labor chapter. USTR officials stated that an FTA partner’s 

willingness to engage determines in part how quickly potential labor 

AIMD-00-21.3.1.

48U.S. Department of Labor, Submissions under the Labor Provisions of Free Trade 

Agreements, accessed Aug. 5, 2014, http://www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/agreements/ftasubs.htm. See also, 71 Fed. Reg. 76691.

49The labor chapters of some FTAs call for the establishment of a bilateral labor affairs 

council to oversee, and review progress in, implementation of the labor chapter’s 

provisions.

Some Stakeholders 

Expressed Concern

about Delays in Resolving 

Labor Submissions
Page 31 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

violations are addressed. According to USTR officials, some FTA partners 

are willing to engage informally to resolve labor violations, while other 

partners engage only after USTR and DOL have jointly requested formal

consultations under the FTA’s labor chapter.

Examples of stakeholders’ concerns include the following.

• AFL-CIO representatives in Washington, D.C., who were involved with 

the Honduras and Guatemala submissions expressed appreciation of 

DOL’s care in investigating cases and were eager to provide requisite 

evidence. However, they expressed disappointment that both cases 

have taken longer than they anticipated, stating that justice delayed 

can mean justice denied when workers’ livelihoods are at stake.

• A union representative in Guatemala expressed disappointment that 6 

years after the submission was filed, it had not been resolved. He also 

said that the steps outlined in the enforcement plan were mainly 

administrative and did not address all complaints detailed in the 

submission. As a result, according to the union representative, the 

conditions of workers identified in the submission have not improved.

• Four government officials from CAFTA-DR partner countries whom 

we interviewed in Washington, D.C., described DOL’s submission 

process as lacking fairness and transparency. According to these 

representatives, DOL does not give partner governments clear 

information about next steps or access to evidence supporting the 

submissions and deprives the countries of the opportunity to respond 

to allegations presented by any member of the public.50

 50In commenting on a draft of this report, DOL noted that during its submission review, the 

partner government has the opportunity to provide input and DOL visits the partner 

country and reviews any information that the partner government provides. DOL also 

noted that the submission review process is a fact-finding exercise intended to evaluate 

the merits of allegations raised in a submission and that acceptance of a submission for 

review does not imply that the allegations are correct. In addition, DOL stated that its 

decision to review a public submission does not indicate any determination as to the 

validity or accuracy of the allegations contained in the submission; instead, the 

submission’s merit is addressed in the public report that follows DOL’s review and 

analysis. According to DOL, after its submission review report is issued, USTR and DOL 

engage with the partner country to address any recommendations in DOL’s report and to 

attempt to find a mutually agreeable solution to any potential violation of FTA labor 

provisions. 

The CAFTADR representatives added that in their opinion, DOL conducts the 

submission process in an adversarial manner and that the process 

therefore does not function as a mechanism for addressing concerns 
Page 32 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

on a cooperative basis. The representatives noted that this, in turn, 

can delay or complicate resolution of problems.

Since 2009, USTR and DOL, with State’s assistance, have taken steps 

intended to strengthen monitoring and enforcement of FTA partners’ 

compliance with FTA labor provisions, but their monitoring and 

enforcement remain limited.51 After USTR announced in July 2009 that 

the agencies would take a more proactive, interagency approach to 

monitoring and enforcing FTA labor provisions, USTR and DOL 

developed mechanisms to track labor conditions and practices in priority 

trade partner countries. They also took some proactive monitoring steps 

with several FTA partners. However, although they jointly address labor 

submissions and work together to engage with partner countries 

regarding labor concerns, USTR and DOL have not established a 

coordinated strategic approach to systematically assess and address 

other possible inconsistencies with the FTA labor provisions, such as

concerns that DOL identifies in internal management reports. The lack of 

such an approach may be inconsistent with USTR’s 2009 announcement 

as well as with best practices for interagency collaboration. Agency 

officials cited limited funding and staffing as constraints on their ability to 

monitor and enforce FTA labor provisions. USTR’s, DOL’s, and State’s 

annual reports to Congress provide information about labor conditions in 

partner countries. However, reflecting in part USTR’s and DOL’s limited 

monitoring and enforcement of FTA labor provisions, the reports generally 

do not detail concerns about the implementation of FTA labor provisions 

by partner countries that have not been the subject of labor submissions.

.

 51For information about USTR’s and DOL’s efforts to monitor Guatemala’s and Colombia’s 

implementation of other labor initiatives, see app. III.

U.S. Agencies 

Provide Limited 

Monitoring, 

Enforcement, and 

Reporting on FTA 

Labor Provisions
Page 33 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

In 2009, USTR made a public statement pledging to address weaknesses 

in monitoring and enforcement of FTA labor provisions such as those we 

identified in our July 2009 report.52 In its statement, USTR—which has 

principal responsibility for monitoring and enforcing statutory trade 

agreements—publicly announced its intention to adopt a proactive, 

interagency approach to monitoring and enforcing FTA labor provisions in 

cooperation with DOL and State.53

A broad range of activities underpins federal monitoring and enforcement 

efforts. For the purposes of this report, “monitoring” refers to federal 

activities that are undertaken to identify instances where foreign laws, 

regulations, and practices may be inconsistent with trade agreement 

provisions; “enforcement” refers to actions taken by USTR to secure 

foreign compliance with trade agreements, which can include initiating 

dispute settlement procedures that certain trade agreements provide.

According to USTR’s announcement, 

for example, the agencies would no longer enforce labor obligations only 

in response to complaints, would hold trading partners to their obligations 

on labor standards, and would work in close partnership to immediately 

identify and investigate labor violations. In addition, USTR’s July 2009 

announcement stated that the agencies would deploy resources more 

effectively to identify and solve problems at the source and would jointly 

engage with governments of countries that violate the rules, to quickly 

restore workers’ rights, assist partner countries to find a way to fix 

identified labor problems, and pursue legal remedies when other options 

are closed. 

54

 52

When agencies identify possible inconsistencies with FTA provisions, 

agencies take a variety of actions to encourage and obtain foreign 

compliance with trade agreements. As we previously reported, according 

to records and staff at USTR and other agencies, monitoring and 

enforcement of trade agreements typically involves several key steps:

identifying compliance problems, setting priorities, gathering and 

analyzing information, developing and implementing responses, taking 

GAO-09-439.

53Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “Ambassador Kirk Announces New Initiatives 

for Trade Enforcement” (press release), July 16, 2009, accessed July 18, 2013, 

http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/speeches/transcripts/2009/july/ambassador-kirkannounces-new-initiatives-trade.

54See GAO, International Trade: Strategy Needed to Better Monitor and Enforce Trade 

Agreements, GAO/NSIAD-00-76 (Washington, D.C.: March 2000).

USTR and DOL Pledged 

in 2009 to Strengthen 

Monitoring and 

Enforcement of FTA

Labor Provisions
Page 34 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

actions to enforce agreements, and coordinating with other agencies.

55

In our July 2009 report, we found that U.S. agencies had not proactively 

monitored FTA partners’ compliance with labor commitments and did not 

consider that they were required to do so.

Systematic implementation of these key steps is necessary to ensure that 

the agencies effectively and efficiently accomplish their objective and help 

ensure that management's directives are carried out. 

56 Moreover, U.S. interaction 

with partners regarding labor issues after FTAs entered into force had 

been limited, usually in part because of the low priority attached to this 

function. Further, we found that U.S. agencies generally gave attention to 

problematic labor situations in certain FTA partners’ export sectors only 

after media exposure of the situations.

Since July 2009, USTR and DOL have taken steps intended to strengthen 

monitoring and enforcement of FTA partners’ compliance with FTA labor 

provisions.57 USTR staff indicated that an important component of 

USTR’s and DOL’s work occurs between an FTA’s finalization and its 

entry into force. For example, for the Colombia FTA, the agencies worked 

with the Colombian government to establish the Labor Action Plan, 

outlining steps that the government was required to take before the FTA 

could receive congressional approval. (See app. III for information about 

the agencies’ efforts to monitor Colombia’s implementation of the Labor 

Action Plan).58 In addition, DOL and other U.S. agencies have supported

cooperative activities to assist the countries to be better positioned to 

meet their labor commitments after FTAs have entered into force.59

 55

In 

general, after FTAs have entered into force, USTR and DOL have 

GAO/NSIAD-00-76. To identify these five steps, we reviewed agency records and 

interviewed agency officials and staff at several U.S. agencies. 

56GAO-09-439.

57For information about other steps that DOL took in response to our 2009 report’s 

recommendations, see http://gao.gov/products/GAO-09-439.

58App. III also discusses the agencies’ efforts to monitor implementation of the CAFTA-DR 

White Paper and the Guatemala Enforcement Plan.

59See fig. 1 for information about U.S. agencies’ cooperative project funding by FTA 

partner. In comments on a draft of this report, USTR indicated that 12 of the 20 FTA 

partners have received, or are expected to receive, some technical assistance from State

or Labor. 

USTR and DOL Track 

Partner Countries’ Labor 

Conditions but Do Not 

Systematically Monitor 

and Enforce Compliance 

with FTA Labor Provisions
Page 35 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

engaged in discussions with partner countries, gathering information 

about labor conditions in the countries and responding to FTA labor 

concerns. In doing so, the agencies have addressed some of the typical 

key elements of monitoring and enforcement that we previously identified, 

such as gathering and analyzing information and setting priorities. 

However, the agencies’ approach for countries other than Jordan, 

Panama, and, to some extent, Colombia and Peru generally does not

incorporate other key elements, such as identifying compliance problems, 

developing and implementing responses, and taking enforcement actions.

In October 2012, USTR established the Trade Policy Staff Committee 

(TPSC) Subcommittee on Labor Monitoring and Enforcement to focus on 

monitoring and enforcing labor provisions in partner countries, with 

members from various agencies, including DOL and State.60 USTR 

charged the subcommittee with monitoring and enforcing labor issues in 

20 FTA partner countries as well as 146 countries that participate in U.S. 

trade preference programs. According to a USTR document, the 

subcommittee participates in efforts to enforce labor obligations, such as 

through submission reviews, consultation, and dispute settlement under 

FTAs.61 However, according to DOL and State staff who have participated 

in the Subcommittee on Labor Monitoring and Enforcement, the 

subcommittee’s meetings generally serve as an information-sharing 

mechanism rather than a monitoring and enforcement mechanism.62

 60USTR divided the existing TPSC Subcommittee on Labor to form the Subcommittee on 

Labor Monitoring and Enforcement and the Subcommittee on Labor Policy and 

Negotiations.

State participants described the subcommittee as an interagency process 

for reviewing and discussing labor conditions and assessing risks in trade 

partner countries, including FTA and trade preference program partners. 

State added that although this process does not entail a regular, detailed 

review of each FTA partner country’s compliance with labor obligations, it 

61In addition, according to USTR, the subcommittee is responsible for satisfying public 

reporting requirements and making eligibility determinations tied specifically to labor 

standards, such as those in specific preference programs. According to USTR, other 

TPSC subcommittees may also address enforcement of labor provisions.

62USTR staff noted that they also receive information about labor conditions in partner 

countries from the subcommittee as well as by other means, such as direct coordination 

with DOL and State staff, discussions with stakeholders such as unions and advocacy 

groups, communication with FTA partner government officials, and reviews of State cables 

and reports and news articles.

USTR
Page 36 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

facilitates discussion of concerns and development of next steps to 

address these concerns based on input from each agency. A USTR 

official stated that when the subcommittee met in October 2012 and 

February 2013, it decided that an emphasis on overseeing labor 

conditions in parts of Africa and Haiti was needed and that monitoring of 

FTA labor provisions’ implementation would be based mainly on 

addressing DOL labor submissions. USTR officials noted that information 

sharing is a key part of its process to assess labor conditions in FTA 

partner countries relative to their commitments and to identify matters that 

are appropriate for further action. 

According to a USTR official, work by the subcommittee and ad hoc 

interagency country teams has led to increased actions and engagement 

in countries such as Jordan, Panama, Peru, and Morocco, where, 

according to USTR, it has conducted, or expects to conduct, high-level 

labor meetings and monitoring trips in 2014. Further, according to USTR 

officials, USTR has used input from the subcommittee to develop a matrix 

to more comprehensively track monitoring activities and technical 

capacity-building assistance across FTA partner countries. USTR officials 

indicated that this tool has served as a point of departure for soliciting the 

subcommittee’s input on priorities and coordination of future activities. In 

addition, according to USTR officials, USTR regularly coordinates and 

communicates with other agencies, industry, labor unions, the ILO and 

other external stakeholders to identify possible inconsistencies with the 

labor provisions of trade agreements. 

USTR officials said that the agencies routinely address labor issues 

identified in the subcommittee or by other stakeholders through bilateral 

consultations and formally established FTA mechanisms, such as the 

labor affairs councils established by most FTAs and the FTA free trade 

commissions, which are the main forums for bilateral dialogue about FTA 

implementation for each FTA. USTR has publicly reported on such 

meetings, as we recommended in 2009. However, the labor affairs 

councils for most FTAs have in most cases met only once and in two 
Page 37 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

cases have not met at all since the FTAs entered into force.

63

USTR officials stated that monitoring and enforcement covers a large 

spectrum of activities and that in some cases USTR has taken steps to 

resolve issues in countries where submissions have not been filed. For 

example, according to USTR officials, USTR and DOL negotiated an 

implementation plan in 2012 to address concerns regarding foreign 

workers in Jordan’s garment sector and have continued to monitor 

Jordan’s implementation of its FTA labor commitments. USTR officials 

also cited as examples of proactive monitoring and enforcement USTR’s 

engagement with Colombia regarding the Action Plan, cooperation with 

Panama in passing administrative and legal changes to address labor 

concerns as part of the FTA ratification process in 2011, and discussions 

with Peru regarding commitments that the government made in 2007 to 

improve respect of labor rights for temporary and subcontracted workers.

Moreover, 

the FTA free trade commissions’ discussions reportedly do not address 

labor issues in depth. For example, officials from the Ministry of Labor in 

Peru indicated that in the last free trade commission meeting they 

attended, labor issues were not substantively addressed; instead

members of the commission agreed that a meeting on the topic could be 

held later in the year.

Our analysis shows that in Jordan and Panama, USTR’s and DOL’s 

activities have addressed the typical key elements of monitoring and 

enforcement. Regarding Jordan, USTR documents indicate that USTR 

and DOL have addressed all key elements of monitoring and 

enforcement, such as by putting in place a concrete plan to fix an 

identified problem and taking steps to assure that the plan is 

implemented. Regarding Panama, USTR documents show that the 

agencies took steps to assure that Panama met its commitments both 

before and after the FTA entered into effect in 2012 and have been 

pursuing steps, such as holding several recent meetings, that may help in 

 63According to DOL, the labor affairs councils for the Singapore and Australia FTAs have 

not met since the FTAs went into effect (in 2004 and 2005, respectively). The labor 

subcommittee (which serves the same purpose as a labor affairs council) for the Jordan 

FTA has met twice since the FTA took effect, and the labor affairs councils under the 

remaining FTAs have each met once. The last labor affairs council meeting under CAFTA 

was in 2008. According to DOL staff, meetings of the labor affairs councils under the 

Morocco and Peru FTAs have been planned. The labor chapters of the Israel FTA and 

NAFTA did not provide for labor affairs councils.
Page 38 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

resolving outstanding concerns about implementation of FTA labor 

provisions. 

However, while USTR’s and DOL’s reported monitoring activities in 

Colombia and Peru can assist the countries to be better positioned to 

meet their FTA labor commitments and help to better inform USTR of 

labor concerns in these countries, the evidence that we examined does 

not demonstrate systematic implementation of the typical key elements 

for monitoring and enforcement of labor provisions.

• Colombia. Documentation that USTR and DOL provided, as well as 

evidence that we gathered in Colombia and in interviews with agency 

officials, indicates that the agencies took several of the key steps of 

monitoring and enforcement. For example, a report that USTR and 

DOL jointly prepared in 2014 showed that the agencies have been 

gathering and analyzing information, setting priorities, assessing 

implementation, and identifying compliance problems. However, we 

did not see evidence that a current plan is in place to address the 

outstanding concerns that USTR and DOL have identified. 

• Peru. Documentation that USTR and DOL provided demonstrates a 

systematic approach to some, but not all, of the monitoring and 

enforcement steps that we identified. Specifically, both agencies have 

engaged to some extent with Peru regarding labor matters in the 5 

years since the Peru FTA went into effect. The agencies’ 

documentation shows that at least some of their efforts to gather and 

analyze information regarding Peru relate to verifying the 

government’s implementation and enforcement of previous reforms, 

such as reforms of its labor inspection regime and of its legal 

framework for temporary employment and subcontracting. USTR and 

DOL documents also show that the agencies have identified several 

possible compliance concerns and have engaged with the 

government by scheduling meetings and asking questions. However, 

we did not see evidence of a plan to resolve outstanding U.S. 

concerns. Further, in July 2014, Peru announced that it had enacted

legal changes that rolled back previously implemented improvements 

in its labor laws in areas such as health and safety protection for 

workers, to improve the business climate and attract investment. 
Page 39 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

To strengthen its monitoring and enforcement of FTA labor provisions, in 

2012, DOL established the Monitoring and Enforcement of Trade 

Agreements Division within the Bureau of International Labor Affairs’ 

Office of Trade and Labor Affairs.64 The division’s objectives are to 

ensure that partner governments (1) effectively enforce their labor laws 

and implement policies that protect worker rights; (2) understand their 

commitments under the FTA labor chapters; and (3) revise or adopt laws, 

regulations, and policies consistent with international labor standards. 

The division mainly monitors implementation of FTA labor provisions 

through its review of FTA labor submissions and through the use of 

internal documents called management reports, according to DOL 

officials.65

• FTA labor submissions. DOL’s review of the five FTA labor 

submissions—for Bahrain, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, 

Honduras, and Peru—that it has accepted since 2008 have led to 

recommendations in three of its submission reports that the partners 

address alleged violations of FTA labor provisions.

However, DOL uses management reports to identify labor 

concerns rather than to fully assess consistency with FTA labor 

provisions.

66

 64According to DOL staff, DOL has been monitoring compliance with FTA labor provisions 

since NAFTA entered into force in 1994. Before DOL established the Monitoring and 

Enforcement of Trade Agreements Division, the Trade Agreement Administration and 

Technical Cooperation Division, in the Bureau of International Labor Affairs’ Office of 

Trade and Labor Affairs, oversaw administration of FTA labor provisions. 

According to 

USTR officials, labor submissions are a central component of the 

FTAs’ framework for monitoring and enforcement of labor obligations

and USTR and DOL invest extensive time and resources in 

addressing submissions. For the Bahrain and Guatemala 

submissions, DOL, with USTR, formally requested labor consultations 

under the FTAs’ labor chapters to address the concerns raised in the 

submissions. In Guatemala’s case, after consultations failed to 

address the concerns, the U.S. government invoked dispute 

settlement proceedings; during these proceedings, the two 

governments negotiated the Enforcement Plan, outlining steps that 

65According to DOL, the Monitoring and Enforcement of Trade Agreements Division also 

monitors implementation of FTA labor provisions and other labor conditions through phone 

calls, e-mails, and interactions with numerous stakeholders, as well as through periodic 

visits to partner countries, as resources allow. 

66The five FTA labor submissions exclude any submissions that DOL has received under 

the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation.

DOL
Page 40 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

Guatemala agreed to take. (See app. III for a discussion of DOL’s 

monitoring of Guatemala’s implementation of the Enforcement Plan.)

• Internal management reports. In 2012, according to DOL staff, DOL 

began consistently monitoring FTA-related labor issues in 13 FTA 

partner countries. The management reports provide, among other 

information, a synopsis of labor conditions in partner countries based 

on sources such as State, ILO, the International Trade Union 

Confederation, local stakeholders, and the press. The reports include 

updated contact information for each partner and identify labor 

conditions or practices—for example, related to freedom of 

association and collective bargaining—that may be inconsistent with 

the FTA labor provisions. They also outline steps that DOL staff 

propose to take to address any identified concerns, subject to 

approval and resource availability. According to DOL officials, DOL 

uses the management reports to identify labor concerns, rather than 

potential FTA violations for enforcement purposes, and to facilitate 

engagement on technical assistance projects with FTA partner 

countries. DOL officials noted that claiming and proving a violation of 

FTA labor provisions would be very costly and legally complicated. 

The officials explained that when a management report identifies labor 

concerns, DOL may request formal or informal consultations with the 

partner country’s ministry of labor to discuss these concerns and will 

attempt to cooperatively address them. The officials also noted that a 

persistent condition may result in a submission from a stakeholder.

USTR and DOL work together on an ad hoc basis to address labor 

concerns identified in submissions and to engage with partner countries 

regarding labor matters. However, the agencies have not developed a

coordinated strategic approach to systematically assess and address 

other possible inconsistencies with FTA labor provisions, such as the 

issues that DOL’s management reports identify, in other partner 

countries. This lack of a joint approach may be inconsistent with USTR’s 

2009 statement that the agencies would work in close partnership to 

immediately identify and investigate labor violations.

Further, while the agencies take steps such as gathering facts from 

credible and reliable sources and prioritizing their monitoring of the 

partner countries, they have not jointly operationalized other key steps 

that we previously identified as typical for monitoring and enforcement of 

trade agreements. For example, although DOL’s management reports are 

its primary means, other than submissions, of monitoring and identifying 

issues that may be inconsistent with FTA labor provisions, the agencies 

USTR and DOL Lack a 

Coordinated Strategic 

Approach to Address 

Identified Labor Issues
Page 41 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

have not established a coordinated strategic approach to identify and 

carry out steps necessary to address issues identified in the reports. 

According to DOL, the management reports are available to USTR and 

State and the three agencies routinely discuss the reports’ contents.

USTR confirmed that DOL shares information from the reports with the 

Subcommittee on Labor Monitoring and Enforcement for discussion and 

consideration. However, USTR officials noted that USTR regards the 

management reports as one of multiple information sources that it 

considers before deciding to engage with a country about a labor 

concern, rather than as an indicator of a need to engage with the country. 

USTR officials also noted that USTR views the management reports as a 

new internal DOL tool and is assessing how best to use these reports in 

the interagency process.

Moreover, USTR, DOL, and State have differing perspectives on how to 

monitor and enforce FTA labor provisions, according to agency officials. 

According to a USTR official, each agency approaches monitoring and 

enforcement in relation to its mission, and as a result, some of the 13 

countries that DOL has identified internally as priorities differ from 

countries that USTR has identified as priorities in the context of the FTAs. 

The USTR official stated that USTR must assess whether a labor issue 

constitutes a breach of obligations set forth in the relevant FTA before it 

pursues dispute settlement, whereas DOL and State—as observers of 

labor conditions and human rights, respectively—approach labor issues 

more strictly as labor rights concerns. According to a State official, USTR

prefers to address identified partner countries’ labor issues without the 

intent to invoke the FTA.

Our prior work identifying best practices for interagency collaboration has 

shown that agencies can enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts 

by engaging in eight practices.67

 67These eight practices are as follows: (1) define and articulate a common outcome; (2) 

establish mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; (3) identify and address needs by 

leveraging resources; (4) agree on roles and responsibilities; (5) establish compatible 

policies, procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries; (6) develop 

mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results; (7) reinforce agency 

accountability for collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports; and (8) reinforce 

individual accountability for collaborative efforts through performance management 

systems. GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and 

Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, 

For example, to achieve a common 

GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: October 

2005). An updated version of this guidance is available at 

http://www.gao.gov/key_issues/leading_practices_collaboration/issue_summary.
Page 42 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

outcome, collaborating agencies need to, among other things, not only 

define and articulate the outcome but also establish strategies that work 

in concert with their partners’ or are joint in nature. Such strategies help in 

aligning the partner agencies’ activities, core processes, and resources to 

accomplish the common outcome.

Agency officials cited limited staffing and resources as constraints on their 

ability to proactively monitor and enforce implementation of FTA labor 

provisions as the number of FTAs increases, leading the agencies to 

focus most of their efforts in a few priority countries. The agencies 

described enforcement activities as particularly resource intensive. DOL 

officials told us that because they had to focus much of their available 

resources on enforcing the Colombia Labor Action Plan and the 

Guatemala Enforcement Plan, their ability to monitor and enforce FTA 

partners’ compliance with their FTAs’ labor provisions in the last year was 

limited. Given the staffing and resource constraints that USTR, DOL, and 

State officials cited, effective interagency collaboration—including joint 

strategies that assist in aligning partner agencies’ activities, core 

processes, and resources to more effectively accomplish the common 

outcome—is essential to maximize the agencies’ ability to monitor and 

enforce compliance with these provisions.68

USTR. Staffing and funding constraints have, at times, limited the office’s 

engagement with FTA partner countries regarding labor matters, 

according to USTR officials. Notably, according to the officials, recent 

sequestration-related cuts at USTR sharply limited travel. The officials 

told us that USTR’s Office of Labor Affairs has four staff members—an 

Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Labor, two Deputy Assistant U.S. 

Trade Representatives for Labor, and the Director for Labor Affairs—

whose responsibilities include, among others, negotiating labor provisions 

in new agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, overseeing 

labor matters for 20 FTA partner countries and 120 trade preference 

countries, and engaging with countries to address labor complaints. 

According to USTR officials, although the Office of Labor Affairs staff has 

doubled from two to four since 2008, the number of trade partner 

countries for which they are responsible has increased from 14 to 20. 

USTR staff stated that because so few staff are available, they cannot 

 68GAO-AIMD-00-21.3.1.

U.S. Agencies Focus 

Limited Monitoring

and Enforcement 

Resources on a Few 

Priority Countries
Page 43 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

engage with partner countries regarding every labor issue identified and 

must address such issues in cooperation with other agencies. USTR staff 

also noted that they depend on DOL and State for day-to-day monitoring 

of labor conditions in partner countries.

DOL. Resource constraints limit DOL’s ability to monitor implementation 

of FTA labor provisions except in partner countries that DOL has 

identified as priorities, such as countries cited in labor submissions, 

according to DOL officials. DOL reported that in fiscal years 2013 and 

2014, the Monitoring and Enforcement of Trade Agreements Division had

five to eight full-time staff, with primary responsibilities that include 

monitoring labor conditions in 20 FTA partners and addressing and 

following up on labor submissions—for example, assessing 

implementation of submission report recommendations and engaging in 

consultations with the FTA partner. DOL officials stated that over the past 

year, the division’s staff spent 80 percent of their work hours monitoring 

implementation of the Guatemala Enforcement Plan; following up on 

activities initiated under the Colombia Labor Action Plan; and addressing 

labor submissions for Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Bahrain, and 

Mexico.69

State. State has limited resources available to support USTR’s and 

DOL’s monitoring of FTA labor provisions, according to State officials. 

State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) 

coordinates State’s in-country labor officers or labor reporting officers, 

who carry out regular monitoring and reporting and day-to-day interaction 

with foreign governments on labor matters. However, these staff are not 

responsible for monitoring implementation of labor provisions in the FTAs. 

State informs USTR and DOL about labor concerns identified in FTA 

partner countries, through reporting cables and other means, and 

supports them in investigating labor submissions and addressing related 

The employees’ remaining work hours were available to 

monitor and engage with the other 14 FTA partner countries. DOL 

officials expressed concern that challenges related to resource limitations 

will grow as the number of FTAs increases. For example, according to 

DOL and State officials, Vietnam is among the countries participating in 

the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations with a poor record of protecting 

labor rights.

 69In January 2012, DOL accepted a labor submission for Mexico under the North 

American Agreement on Labor Cooperation.
Page 44 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

recommendations. DRL has seven staff at State’s headquarters in 

Washington, D.C., one of whom focuses on trade-related issues, who are 

supported by labor affairs officers and labor reporting officers at the 

embassies in each of the 20 FTA partner countries.70 State officials 

explained that each of these labor affairs officers and labor reporting 

officers has other responsibilities. Overall, the amount of time that these 

officers dedicated to labor issues varied from 5 percent (in Australia) to 75 

percent (in Mexico).

USTR, DOL, and State provide required annual reports to Congress that 

contain some information about labor conditions in FTA partner countries. 

However, the annual reports generally do not detail concerns about the 

implementation of FTA labor provisions by partner countries that have not 

been the subject of labor submissions, in part reflecting the agencies’

limited monitoring and enforcement of the provisions.

71

USTR. Each year, USTR provides Congress with the current Trade Policy 

Agenda for the current year, as well as the Annual Report of the 

President of the United States on the Trade Agreement Programs. The 

agenda and the annual report include information about trade policy 

USTR has 

statutory responsibility to report to Congress about trade agreement 

programs on an annual basis. According to DOL and State, they do not 

have such a responsibility, although some of their required reports include 

related information.

 70DRL also includes a position of Special Representative for International Labor Affairs, 

which State reported to be vacant during the time of our review. 

71Section 163 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. § 2213), requires the 

President to annually submit to Congress the Trade Policy Agenda and the Annual Report 

of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program. The President 

delegated this function to USTR in 2004. 69 Fed. Reg. 10133 (Mar. 1, 2004). The 

President is required to submit a biennial report about labor issues for CAFTA-DR. 19 

U.S.C. § 4111(a). This function was delegated to DOL in 2008. 73 Fed. Reg. 38297 (June 

30, 2008). State is required to report to Congress annually about human rights in every 

country worldwide. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151n and 2304. The Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 

§ 2464) requires the President to submit an annual report to Congress on the status of 

internationally recognized worker rights within each beneficiary developing country (i.e., 

countries that benefit from U.S. trade preferences), including the findings of the Secretary 

of Labor with respect to the beneficiary country’s implementation of its international 

commitments to eliminate the worst forms of child labor. According to DOL, this 

commitment historically has been fulfilled by State's Human Rights Reports and DOL's 

Trade and Development Act of 2000 reports on child labor.

U.S. Agencies’ Annual 

Reports Address FTA 

Partners’ Labor Conditions

to an Extent
Page 45 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

priorities and actions taken to implement FTAs. For example, the 2014 

agenda indicates, among other things, that USTR will seek to ensure that 

trade partners meet their obligations related to labor rights, will focus on 

implementation of FTAs, and will work with key partner countries to 

address specific labor issues. The 2013 annual report describes, among 

other things, the status of the labor submissions regarding Bahrain, 

Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and Honduras and USTR’s efforts to 

address the concerns that the submissions identify; in some cases, 

possible inconsistencies with the FTA may be discussed. However, the 

annual report generally does not detail concerns about the 

implementation of FTA labor provisions by partner countries that have not 

been the subject of labor submissions, reflecting in part USTR’s and 

DOL’s limited monitoring and enforcement of these provisions. Including 

appropriate information resulting from more extensive monitoring and 

enforcement could help inform Congress and other U.S. stakeholders 

about the extent to which trade partners are fulfilling their FTA labor 

commitments.

DOL. DOL is required to report to Congress every 2 years regarding labor 

issues related to CAFTA-DR but is not required to report on the 

implementation of labor provisions in other FTAs. For CAFTA-DR, DOL is 

required to submit a biennial report to Congress on the progress made by 

the CAFTA-DR partner countries in implementing the labor chapter 

provisions and labor cooperation and capacity-building activities.72

State. Every year, State provides Congress with the annual Country 

Reports on Human Rights Practices, which covers all countries receiving 

assistance and all United Nations member states, including all U.S. FTA 

partners. Each of the country reports includes a section on labor issues, 

covering topics such as internationally recognized individual, civil, 

political, and worker rights, as set forth in the 

DOL’s 

2011 report on CAFTA-DR summarizes the progress made by each 

CAFTA-DR partner country in implementing these provisions and 

activities, although the report generally does not detail concerns about the 

implementation of CAFTA-DR labor provisions.

Universal Declaration of 

Human Rights and other international agreements. In addition, most of 

the country reports for FTA partner countries that we reviewed include 

information about unfavorable conditions faced by workers and any 

 7219 U.S.C. § 4111(a). 
Page 46 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

challenges to the partner countries’ implementation of their labor laws. 

The reports generally do not—and, according to State, are not intended 

to—detail concerns about the implementation of FTA labor provisions.

The United States’ recent FTAs have served as means of securing 

commitments from trade partners to uphold and protect internationally 

recognized labor rights. Although the FTA partners we selected for our 

review have made some progress, with U.S. assistance, in implementing 

their FTA labor commitments, enforcement weaknesses and problematic 

labor conditions persist. In addition, nongovernment stakeholders we 

interviewed in partner countries had little or no awareness of the labor 

submission process that DOL established to allow such stakeholders to 

register concerns about FTA partners’ labor practices. Further, DOL’s 

extensions of its 6-month submission review time frame by an average of 

nine months per submission has shown the time frame to be unrealistic. 

Moreover, U.S. agencies’ work with the partners to resolve these 

concerns has in some cases been very time consuming. For example, 6 

years after DOL received the Guatemala labor submission, the 

submission remains open, and according to U.S. agencies, Guatemala 

has not fully addressed the weaknesses in its labor law enforcement or 

the resulting hardships on workers.

Further, although USTR and DOL jointly pledged in 2009 to adopt a more 

assertive, interagency approach to monitoring and enforcing FTA labor 

provisions, in practice the agencies systematically investigate possible

inconsistencies with these provisions primarily in response to labor 

submissions. In addition, despite ongoing interaction between USTR and 

DOL—for example, in addressing submissions—they have not developed 

a strategic approach to jointly set priorities and coordinate efforts to 

respond to labor concerns such as those identified in the DOL 

management reports. Without such strategic coordination, and given 

constraints on resources, both agencies have focused their monitoring 

and enforcement activities, apart from addressing labor submissions, on a 

few priority countries. As a result, consistency with FTA labor provisions 

in most partner countries is generally not monitored and enforced 

systematically. Moreover, USTR may be limited in its ability to report to 

Congress regarding concerns about FTA partners’ implementation of their 

respective FTA labor commitments.

Conclusions
Page 47 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

To improve the capacity of the U.S. government to monitor and enforce 

FTA partners’ compliance with mutually agreed FTA labor provisions, we 

are making four recommendations to the U.S. Trade Representative and 

the Secretary of Labor.

• We recommend that DOL reevaluate and adjust, if necessary, its FTA 

labor submission review time frame to ensure that it more accurately 

reflects the time required to thoroughly investigate and to report on 

most labor submissions.

• We recommend that DOL take steps to better inform stakeholders in 

FTA partner countries about its FTA labor submission process.

• We recommend that USTR and DOL, in cooperation with State, 

establish a coordinated strategic approach to monitoring and 

enforcing FTA labor provisions, to ensure that they systematically

assess the consistency of priority FTA partner countries’ laws, 

regulations, and practices with trade agreement labor provisions and 

address any identified concerns.

• We recommend that USTR ensure that the Annual Report of the 

President of the United States on the Trade Agreement Programs, 

which USTR provides each year to Congress, includes results of 

USTR’s and DOL’s efforts to proactively monitor partner countries’ 

compliance with FTA labor provisions.

We provided a draft of our report to USTR, DOL, State, and USAID. 

USTR and DOL provided written comments, which are reproduced in 

appendixes V and VI, respectively. USTR, DOL, and State also provided 

extensive technical comments, which we incorporated or addressed as 

appropriate. USAID did not provide comments.

In their written comments, USTR and DOL expressed general agreement

with our recommendations. USTR wrote that it embraced the 

recommendation to improve coordination with the Departments of Labor 

and State, to identify and address areas of concern, and to ensure that its 

reporting to Congress effectively reflects the results of these efforts. DOL 

committed to reevaluate its internal submission review process, in 

consultation with USTR and State, to determine whether internal 

adjustments may be necessary. DOL also said that it will evaluate 

additional available actions to expand its ability to inform stakeholders in 

FTA partner countries about the FTA labor submission process. Finally, 

DOL said that it will evaluate additional options to increase its proactive 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 48 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

monitoring and enforcement of labor provisions in FTAs and its 

coordination with USTR and State on such issues.

Nevertheless, USTR and DOL took issue with our findings that the 

agencies do not systematically monitor and enforce labor provisions for 

all FTA partners and lack a coordinated strategic approach to monitoring 

and enforcement. Although we made some adjustments in response to 

new information that USTR and DOL provided with their comments, we 

maintain that, in general, the two agencies have not systematically 

implemented all key elements of monitoring and enforcement with regard 

to FTA labor provisions. (See app. V for our full response to USTR’s 

written comments and descriptions of our adjustments to the report in 

response.) We acknowledge that USTR, DOL, and State generally 

collaborate in engaging with partner countries on labor issues and in 

addressing submissions. However, the evidence that we reviewed, such 

as agendas for interagency meetings and our interviews with USTR and 

DOL staff, did not show that the agencies have developed a coordinated, 

strategic approach to systematically address possible inconsistencies 

with FTA labor provisions in most partner countries that have not been 

the subject of labor submissions. For example, we did not see evidence 

of a coordinated approach to address issues such as those identified by 

USTR in the partner countries it designates as high risk or that DOL 

identifies in its management reports.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the content of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies to the U.S. Trade 

Representative, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of State, and other 

interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the 

GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.
Page 49 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-8612 or gianopoulosk@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix VII.

Kimberly Gianopoulos

Acting Director, International Affairs & Trade
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 50 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

This report examines (1) steps that selected partner countries have taken, 

and U.S. assistance they have received, to implement free trade 

agreement (FTA) labor provisions and other labor initiatives and the 

reported results of such steps; (2) complaints—known as submissions—

about possible violations of FTA labor provisions that DOL has accepted 

and any problems related to the submission process; and (3) the extent to 

which the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), Department of 

Labor (DOL), and Department of State (State) monitor and enforce 

partner countries’ implementation of FTA labor provisions and report 

results to Congress. In addition, appendix II describes reported violence 

against labor unionists in selected FTA partner countries as well as steps 

that the countries have taken to address such occurrences. Appendix III 

describes U.S. agencies’ efforts to monitor implementation of other labor 

initiatives. Appendix IV describes the status of labor submissions received 

by the Department of Labor.

We chose to concentrate our review on four FTAs and five partners to 

these FTAs, so that we could examine the unique set of circumstances 

for FTA partner countries with some specificity. The FTAs and partner 

countries on which we chose to focus—the Dominican Republic-Central 

America-United States (CAFTA-DR), among whose six partner countries 

we selected El Salvador and Guatemala; the Colombia FTA; the Oman 

FTA; and the Peru FTA—are FTAs that contain labor provisions and 

countries with regional dispersion across Central America, South 

America, and the Middle East. We also selected CAFTA-DR because of 

the CAFTA-DR White Paper labor initiatives, and we selected El Salvador 

and Guatemala among CAFTA-DR countries because of the extent of 

U.S. assistance for labor programs and, in Guatemala’s case, the FTArelated Enforcement Plan. In addition, we selected the Colombia FTA 

because of the Labor Action Plan, and we chose the Colombia and Peru 

FTAs because they contain language echoing the Bipartisan Trade 

Agreement of May 10, 2007, popularly known as the May 10th 

Agreement. However, the results of our review of these selected FTAs 

and partner countries cannot be generalized to all FTAs and partner 

countries.

In gathering information for each of our objectives, we engaged in three 

types of activities:

• We obtained information and perspectives from U.S. government, 

foreign government, nongovernmental organization (NGO), labor 

union, and private sector officials; stakeholders such as umbrella 

business associations; and experts.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 51 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

• We obtained information and analysis from legal and secondary 

literature sources.

• We obtained information through visits to partner countries.

During our visits to Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Oman, and Peru, 

we met with U.S. officials; foreign government officials responsible for the 

implementation of labor provisions of the FTAs and other labor initiatives; 

umbrella business groups, such as chambers of commerce; officials of 

international organizations such as the International Labour Organization 

(ILO), trade unions, NGOs, and other subject matter experts. Additionally, 

we visited Costa Rica to meet with ILO officials in their Central America 

regional office, in San Jose. The views expressed by these officials and 

organizations cannot be generalized to all officials or organizations 

knowledgeable about labor provisions in the selected FTAs.

To examine the steps that the selected FTA partner countries have taken 

to implement labor protection commitments under the respective 

agreements and other labor initiatives in the context of the respective 

FTAs, as well as the reported results of these steps, we obtained, 

reviewed, and analyzed documents from a variety of sources, including 

the four selected FTAs and their associated labor annexes as well as the 

CAFTA-DR White Paper and the Colombia Labor Action Plan. For this 

analysis, we included steps taken by partner countries, beginning with 

FTA negotiations for each FTA through May 2014. We also reviewed 

congressionally mandated reports, such as State’s Country Reports on 

Human Rights Practices (Human Rights Reports), of which the 2013 

reports were the latest available; USTR’s annual trade agenda and trade 

report; and DOL’s biennial Progress in Implementing Chapter 16 (Labor) 

and Capacity Building under the Dominican Republic-Central AmericaUnited States Free Trade Agreement. In addition, we reviewed reports 

submitted to Congress in conjunction with FTA implementing legislation, 

such as DOL’s Labor Rights Reports for each of our selected FTAs.

Additionally, we interviewed officials from DOL’s International Labor 

Affairs Bureau and the Office of Trade and Labor Affairs; USTR’s Labor 

Affairs office; and State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 

Labor. We also interviewed State desk officers responsible for selected 

partner countries and labor, political, and economic officers at U.S. 

embassies. In each of the selected countries, except Colombia, we 

interviewed officials from the relevant ministries, including the ministry of 

labor. (Colombia’s Ministry of Labor chose to provide written responses to 

Objective 1: Examine 

Steps That Selected 

Partner Countries Have 

Taken, and U.S. 

Assistance They Have 

Received, to Implement 

FTA Labor Provisions and 

Other Labor Initiatives and 

the Reported Results of 

Such Steps
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 52 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

our questions.) We did not independently identify or evaluate FTA partner 

countries’ enforcement or compliance with laws and procedures but 

rather relied on evidence obtained from U.S. and partner government as 

well as stakeholder sources. Because of the ILO’s role in interpreting, 

assessing, and improving signatories’ compliance with ILO Conventions 

and Fundamental Principles, we conducted a series of meetings at the 

ILO in Geneva as well as with umbrella organizations participating in the 

ILO’s tripartite (government-business-labor) governance structure.

To examine U.S. funding for labor-related assistance projects, we

collected data on such funding obligations—from the date when Congress 

passed the respective FTA implementing legislation through 2013—from 

relevant officials at State, DOL, and USAID and publicly available data on 

trade-related labor assistance from USAID’s Trade Capacity Building 

Database. We assessed the reliability of the data by (1) interviewing 

agency officials knowledgeable about the data sources and (2) tracing the 

data to source documents. We determined that the data were sufficiently 

reliable for the purposes of describing U.S. assistance for labor provisions 

in FTA countries.

In addition, to identify any changes in levels of reported violence against 

workers exercising labor rights in the selected countries and the partner 

governments’ responses (see app. II), we obtained, reviewed, and 

analyzed documents from USTR, DOL, and State, such as State’s 

Human Rights Reports and DOL’s Labor Rights Reports. During our 

fieldwork in each selected country, we interviewed U.S. and foreign 

government officials, labor unions, and NGOs to learn of any violence 

against unionists. Of the countries we selected for review, violence 

against unionists was reported only in Colombia and Guatemala. During 

our fieldwork in Colombia, we interviewed and obtained information from 

entities responsible for collecting and reporting data on violence against 

unionists, including the Colombian Prosecutor General’s office; ENS 

(Escuela Nacional Sindical)—a labor rights NGO—and State’s Human 

Rights and Labor officers at the U.S. embassy in Bogota. We assessed 

the reliability of ENS’s and the Colombian Prosecutor General’s data by 

(1) interviewing officials from each entity about their criteria and data 

collection methodology for determining whether a victim’s union activity 

was a motive in the killing and (2) interviewing State’s Human Rights and 

Labor officers, who report ENS and Colombia’s Prosecutor General’s 

data in the annual Human Rights Report for Colombia. We determined 

the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of describing reported 

violence against unionists in Colombia. In Guatemala, we interviewed, 

and obtained information from, the Guatemalan Prosecutor General’s 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 53 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

Office, which is responsible for prosecuting crimes against unionists, and 

the Guatemalan Ministry of the Interior, which investigates crimes against 

unionists at the direction of the Prosecutor General’s Office. Because 

Guatemala did not collect data on violence against unionists, we did not 

review such data on homicide rates over time. We also interviewed 

State’s political officer responsible for labor affairs at its embassy in 

Guatemala City, labor unions, and NGO officials. We reviewed ILO 

reports and discussed steps by Colombia and Guatemala to address 

violence with ILO officials. Our analysis was based on reputable 

secondary sources. We did not make any independent determination 

regarding the merit of any evidence of violence against unionists.

To examine labor submissions that have been filed under FTA 

agreements and any problems related to the submission process, we 

obtained, reviewed, and analyzed documents, including each labor 

submission filed with DOL. We interviewed officials from DOL’s Office of 

Trade and Labor Affairs—the office responsible for investigating and 

reporting on submissions—as well as USTR and State officials who 

review DOL’s reports and are involved in following up with FTA partner 

countries, if needed. During our fieldwork, we interviewed union and NGO 

representatives involved in filing submissions, as well as relevant 

government ministries, including the Ministries of Labor in Peru and 

Guatemala.

To examine the extent to which USTR, DOL, and State monitor and 

enforce implementation of FTA labor provisions and associated 

commitments (see app. III) and report results to Congress, we requested, 

reviewed, and analyzed documents from each agency. These documents 

included strategic plans and documents reflecting monitoring activities, 

such as DOL’s management reports for 13 selected FTA partner 

countries, State cables, and USTR monitoring documents. In addition, we 

interviewed selected members of the USTR-chaired Trade Policy Staff 

Committee and its subcommittee on FTA labor monitoring and 

enforcement. To examine the resources that USTR, DOL, and State 

dedicate to monitoring labor provisions in FTAs, we obtained and 

analyzed data on staffing and other resources such as travel. We 

interviewed officials from DOL’s International Labor Affairs Bureau and its 

Office of Trade and Labor Affairs; USTR; and State’s Bureau of 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, as well as State’s in-country 

labor, labor reporting, political, and economic officers at U.S. embassies 

during our fieldwork. In addition, during our fieldwork, we interviewed 

Objective 2: Examine 

Submissions about 

Possible Violations of FTA 

Labor Provisions That 

DOL Has Accepted and 

Any Problems Related to 

the Submission Process

Objective 3: Examine the 

Extent to Which USTR, 

DOL, and State Monitor 

and Enforce Partner 

Countries’ Implementation 

of FTA Labor Provisions 

and Report Results to 

Congress
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 54 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

officials from the partner countries’ various ministries, including the 

ministries of labor, as well as representatives from labor unions and NGO 

officials implementing programs funded by U.S. agencies. To determine 

whether USTR, DOL, and State report the results of their monitoring 

activities to Congress, we reviewed and analyzed the agencies’ reports, 

such as USTR’s Trade Policy Agenda and Annual Report (2009 to 2013), 

DOL Annual Performance Reports (2010 to 2013), and State’s Human 

Rights Reports (2009 to 2013).

We conducted this performance audit work from May 2013 to November

2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Reported Violence against Trade 

Unionists in Colombia and Guatemala

Page 55 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

U.S. and Colombian officials and representatives of unions, 

nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and private sector groups we met 

with reported that violence against unionists continues to exist in 

Colombia, which union leaders and NGOs reported undermines workers’ 

ability to freely associate because of the fear that their union activities 

may lead them to become victims of violence.1

Data collected by the NGO Escuela Nacional Sindical (ENS) and the 

Colombia Prosecutor General’s Office, as reported in the U.S. 

Department of State’s Human Rights Reports, show that murders of trade 

unionists have generally decreased over the past decade, although 

homicides continue to occur (see fig. 4).

NGO officials in Colombia 

reported that although murders of unionists are a serious concern, threats 

of violence against union members also create a significant deterrent to 

workers organizing, with one NGO official noting a greater impact in rural 

areas than in major cities. According to this NGO official, authorities are 

less likely to have the capacity to investigate and respond to threats made 

in rural areas, with the result that victims flee the area or disengage from 

labor activities.

2

 1

Of the countries we selected for our review, violence against unionists was reported only 

in Colombia and Guatemala.

For example, according to DOL, 

as of July 2014 ENS had recorded 35 murders in 2013, compared with 

102 murders of union members and labor activists in 2003. This trend 

continued in the period since the Labor Action Plan—which contains 

specific commitments to address labor violence—was announced in 

2011. Labor union officials acknowledged the number of homicides has 

decreased, but they noted that violence continues to exist.

2

ENS and Colombia’s Prosecutor General’s Office have used different methodologies to 

determine whether a victim was murdered because of union affiliation. In some cases, 

ENS has considered a murder union related, while the Prosecutor General’s Office has 

classified the murder as unrelated to union activities. For more information on the 

differences in data collection methodologies, see Congressional Research Service, U.S.-

Colombia Free Trade Agreement: Labor Issues, RL34759 (Washington, D.C.: January 

2012). 

Appendix II: Reported Violence against 

Trade Unionists in Colombia and Guatemala

Colombia

Violence and Threats of 

Violence against Unionists, 

Undermining Freedom of 

Association, Have Been 

Reported in Colombia
Appendix II: Reported Violence against Trade 

Unionists in Colombia and Guatemala

Page 56 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

Figure 4: Murders of Unionists in Colombia, 2003-2013

Further, according to ENS, as a result of the Labor Action Plan, ENS and 

the Prosecutor General’s Office have developed a collaborative 

relationship, with the Prosecutor General’s Office consulting with ENS on 

cases involving murders or threats that may be linked to the victims’ union 

activities.

Government officials and labor groups we met with in Colombia all 

reported that threats of violence against unionists have been increasing. 

However, ENS is the only source of such threat data, and its reports do 

not show a clear pattern over the past decade.3

 3

We did not determine the cause of the variation, because it was beyond the scope of our 

work. 

ENS’s data represent 

only reported threats; threats of violence against unionists may go 

unreported.
Appendix II: Reported Violence against Trade 

Unionists in Colombia and Guatemala

Page 57 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

The government of Colombia committed to a number of reforms related to 

labor violence in April 2011 in the Labor Action Plan. Such commitments 

included broadening the scope of the government of Colombia’s 

protection program, Unidad Nacional de Protección (UNP), to include 

labor activists, union members, and people engaging in efforts to form a 

union, increasing the budget for the additional resources necessary to 

support the expansion of the protection program, eliminating the backlog 

of protection applications awaiting risk assessments, completing future 

risk assessments within a 30-day period (as described below), and 

reforming the Colombian interagency committee that reviews risk 

assessments. In addition, Colombia committed to criminal justice reforms 

in the Labor Action Plan, which included

• assigning 95 additional full-time judicial police investigators to support 

the investigations of criminal cases involving union members and 

activists;

• analyzing closed cases of union member homicides to determine 

patterns relating to targets, criminal methods, and any evidence of 

motives;

• identifying budgetary needs for training investigators and prosecutors 

on issues related to labor cases; and

• instructing investigators to determine whether a homicide victim was 

an active or retired union member, or was actively engaged in union 

formation and organization, during the initial phase of the 

investigation.

According to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and the 

Department of Labor (DOL), in accordance with Colombia’s Labor Action 

Plan commitments, the Colombian government has implemented 

changes to a number of institutions and programs. For example, union 

members, in addition to union leaders, are now included in the UNP’s 

jurisdiction. As of April 2014, the UNP protects more than 670 unionists, 

with about 24 percent of its budget dedicated to the protection of unionists 

and labor activists.

Additionally, USTR has reported that the Colombian government 

reformed the risk assessment process at the UNP and eliminated the 

backlog of hundreds of applicants to the protection program. During our 

fieldwork in Colombia, UNP officials described changes to the risk 

assessment process. For example, when an application is received, 

instead of a single individual investigating the case, as occurred before 

the process’s reform, a committee now conducts interviews and fieldwork 

Colombia Has Taken Agreed 

Steps to Prevent and 

Investigate Violence against 

Trade Unionists, but Unions 

Report That Violence Persists
Appendix II: Reported Violence against Trade 

Unionists in Colombia and Guatemala

Page 58 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

to investigate the nature of the threat and determine a risk score. The 

case is then forwarded to another committee, comprising representatives 

from organized labor, other vulnerable populations, and government 

agencies, that determines the risk level in each case as ordinary, 

extraordinary, or extreme. UNP officials reported that, based on the 

outcome of the risk assessment, protection measures ranging from 

providing a cell phone to providing an armored car and armed 

bodyguards are taken. State’s 2013 Human Rights Report notes that 

between January 1 and October 31, 2013, the UNP conducted 565 risk 

assessments of union leaders or members. Of those, the UNP classified 

203, about 36 percent, as having an extraordinary threat or extreme 

threat and provided the leaders or members with protection measures. 

According to UNP officials, prior to the Labor Action Plan–related reforms, 

about 10 to 15 percent of risk applicants were determined to be under 

extraordinary or extreme risk. Additionally, according to State, 

approximately one-half of the unionists enrolled in the program were 

provided with “hard” protection measures that included a bodyguard.

According to USTR, Colombia increased the budget of its Prosecutor 

General’s Office, in part to investigate and prosecute cases involving 

union members or labor activists as victims. Further, USTR has reported 

that the Prosecutor General’s Office has issued a mandate that assigned 

over 20 prosecutors exclusively to crimes against union members and 

labor activists. In addition, the National Police have assigned an 

additional 100 full-time judicial police investigators to support the 

prosecutors in investigating cases involving union members and labor 

activists. To implement the Labor Action Plan commitments to identify 

and effectively prosecute intellectual authors of labor homicides, the 

Prosecutor General’s Office created a context and analysis directorate 

tasked with investigating the patterns and context of similar cases, 

including labor homicides. Officials from this unit we met with during our 

fieldwork in Colombia described the unit as taking an integrated approach 

to analyzing cases across the spectrum of human rights crimes to 

determine common themes and perpetrators.

Despite the actions Colombia has taken to reduce violence against union 

members and labor activists, Colombian union and NGO officials, as well 

as USTR officials, report that violence and impunity remain problems. 

Union members we met with during our fieldwork in Colombia reported 

the existence of a high impunity rate for violent crimes against unionists. 

According to DOL, of the 100 unionist murders that have occurred since 

2011, Colombia’s Prosecutor General’s Office has obtained only one 

conviction. Union officials we met with acknowledged that the government 
Appendix II: Reported Violence against Trade 

Unionists in Colombia and Guatemala

Page 59 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

of Colombia has taken positive steps to address violence, that the 

number of labor-related homicides has decreased, and that reforms have 

been implemented at the UNP. However, they also reported they are 

concerned for their safety because of their union activities. Additionally, 

union officials voiced the concern that risk was not being assessed at the 

UNP in a way that accurately captured the dangers union leaders and 

members face. UNP officials we met acknowledged that two union 

leaders who were receiving “light” protection were murdered and another 

union leader was murdered while he awaited the UNP’s risk assessment.

In support of reducing violence in Colombia, including violence against 

unionists, U.S. agencies have funded multiple assistance projects. 

According to U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) officials, 

from 2001 to 2010, the agency provided about $11.6 million in funding 

through its Human Rights fund to establish and support Colombia’s UNP. 

The UNP, which is under the Colombian Ministry of Interior, received 

between 10 and 18 percent of its total annual budget from USAID funding 

from 2001 to 2005 (ranging from about $916,000 in 2001 to about $2.5 

million in 2005). According to USAID, its assistance for the UNP has 

steadily decreased as budget support from the government of Colombia 

and the effectiveness of the UNP have increased. For example, from 

2011 to 2014, USAID provided approximately $150,000 per year in 

assistance to the UNP.

In support of Colombia’s Labor Action Plan commitment to seek 

cooperation, advice, and technical assistance of the International Labour 

Organization (ILO), DOL is currently funding a 5-year (2011 to 2016), 

$7.82 million technical cooperation project implemented by the ILO. The 

objectives of this project include strengthening the institutional capacity of 

the Colombian government to enhance protection measures for trade 

union leaders, members, activists, and organizers and combating 

impunity for perpetrators of violence against them. Under this project, the 

ILO is training Colombian prosecutors, investigators, and judges on labor 

rights and investigating crimes against union leaders and labor activists. 

In addition, Colombia’s Prosecutor General’s Office officials reported that 

the office has received assistance from the U.S. Department of Justice on 

broad criminal justice reforms, including transitioning from an inquisitorial 

to an accusatory legal system. USTR reports that State has funded, and 

the Department of Justice has implemented, assistance to train 

investigators and prosecutors throughout Colombia in best practices for 

crime scene investigation, including forensic evidence handling, 

investigating threats, and prosecutorial management of cases for trial. 

The Department of Justice’s and State’s programs are aimed at broader 

U.S. Government Has 

Provided Assistance to 

Colombia to Address

Violence, Including

Violence against Unionists
Appendix II: Reported Violence against Trade 

Unionists in Colombia and Guatemala

Page 60 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

criminal justice reform; however, Colombia’s Prosecutor General’s Office 

reported to us that the reforms apply to investigating and prosecuting 

violence against unionists.

U.S. and Guatemalan government officials and ILO and union 

representatives reported that violence against unionists exists in 

Guatemala; however, the extent of the problem is unclear because 

disaggregated statistics on violence against unionists are not collected. 

Nevertheless, a union collected information on 63 cases in which union 

leaders or members were killed from 2007 through 2013. The unions 

alleged that the motive for these murders was related to the victims’ union 

activities and that the government of Guatemala has not done enough to 

investigate and resolve the cases. In addition, ILO officials stated that 

they have detailed extremely serious and systematic violations of the right 

to freedom of association in Guatemala, including murder.

A 2012 ILO complaint against the Guatemalan government cited 63 

murders of trade unionists and called for the establishment of an ILO 

commission of inquiry.

4

 4

A commission of inquiry, the ILO’s highest-level investigative procedure, is generally 

established when a member state is accused of committing persistent and serious 

violations and has repeatedly refused to address them. According to DOL, as of August 

2014, 12 commissions of inquiry had been established.

Guatemalan officials confirmed that violence 

against trade unionists exists but reported that many of the cases cited in 

the ILO complaint were the result of general, extensive violence and 

crime in the country rather than violence directed against trade unionists. 

According to Ministry of the Interior officials, the ministry’s initial 

investigation of the 63 murder cases was unable to identify any link 

between the perpetrators’ motives and the victims’ union activity. 

Furthermore, as part of a cooperative agreement with the Guatemalan 

Attorney General’s Office, the International Commission against Impunity 

in Guatemala (CICIG) began a review of the 58 cases cited in the ILO 

Guatemala

Instances of Violence and 

Threats of Violence against 

Trade Unionists Have Been 

Reported in Guatemala
Appendix II: Reported Violence against Trade 

Unionists in Colombia and Guatemala

Page 61 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

complaint to ensure the adequacy of the investigations.5

In addition, unions reported other violent acts, such as threats, bribes, 

and intimidation against union members. According to union 

representatives we interviewed, threats of violence begin with harassing 

phone calls to a union leader or member. The union representative stated 

that if the phone calls do not get the desired results, the harassment is 

escalated to include physical intimidation and threats of kidnapping. If the 

physical intimidation fails, then kidnapping or murder occurs.

According to 

DOL, as of June 2014, CICIG had completed its review of 56 cases and 

concluded that 6 of the cases indicated a possible link to union activity. 

To address the complaint filed by the unions, the ILO initiated the process 

to establish commissions of inquiry. To avoid the establishment of the 

commission, the government of Guatemala signed a memorandum of 

understanding in March of 2013, committing to take specific steps to 

address the issues in the complaint and establishing a plan called the 

Road Map that outlined the actions needed. In response, the ILO decided 

to postpone the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry and has been 

working with Guatemala to implement the Road Map.

According to information that the government of Guatemala provided to 

the ILO, as of March of 2014, steps that the government had taken to 

address violence against unionists included

• a cooperative agreement signed with the International CICIG to 

support the Public Prosecutor’s Office in analyzing cases of violence 

against trade unionists;

• the transfer of 20 trained investigators to the Attorney General’s Office 

and the creation of the new post of assistant prosecutor in the special 

unit investigating crimes against trade unionists;

• improvement in the time periods for trial and convictions, including 

those for some of the 58 murders reported to the ILO; and

 5

As a result of a 2006 agreement between the United Nations and the government of 

Guatemala, CICIG was established as an independent international body designed to 

support the Guatemalan Public Prosecutor's Office, National Civil Police, and other 

government institutions in the investigation of crimes committed by members of illegal 

security forces and clandestine security structures and, in a more general sense, to help 

disband such groups.

Guatemala Has Taken Steps 

to Prevent and Investigate 

Violence against Unionists in 

Response to ILO Review
Appendix II: Reported Violence against Trade 

Unionists in Colombia and Guatemala

Page 62 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

• submission by the Ministry of the Interior, in the context of analyzing 

assaults on trade unionists, of a draft protocol for implementing 

immediate and preventive security measures for trade union leaders, 

unionized workers, and workers from trade unions in the process of 

being established.

Following are descriptions of some of the Guatemalan government’s 

ongoing efforts to address violence against trade unionists.

Cooperative agreement with CICIG. According to a March 2014 ILO 

report, the Guatemalan Attorney General’s Office signed a cooperative 

agreement with CICIG on September 24, 2013.

6

Additional trained investigators. The Ministry of the Interior and the 

Attorney General’s Office established interinstitutional links for 

cooperation to strengthen the investigations and criminal prosecution. 

Through this mechanism, the Ministry of the Interior transferred 20 trained 

investigators to the Attorney General’s Office, with the effort to provide 

additional support to investigate cases of violence against unionists.

As part of the 

agreement, the Attorney General’s Office established a coordination 

mechanism with CICIG for the analysis of specific cases of violence 

against trade union members. CICIG agreed to support the Attorney 

General’s Office in the analysis of specific cases of violence against union 

members, providing recommendations to strengthen the investigation of 

those cases. Under the new coordination mechanism, the 58 murder 

cases cited in the ILO complaint were transferred to CICIG to continue 

the investigation process. In addition, the Attorney General agreed to 

cooperate with CICIG in the analysis of crime trends based on landmark 

cases of attacks and violence against union members known to the 

different units and offices of the Public Prosecutor’s Office.

Timely trials and convictions. The government of Guatemala has 

worked to improve the length of time it takes to bring perpetrators of 

crimes to trial and issue convictions. In regard to the 58 murder cases 

cited in the ILO complaint, the Attorney General’s Office provided an 

 6

International Labour Organization Governing Body, Complaint Concerning NonObservance by Guatemala of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 

Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), Made by Delegates to the 101st Session (2012) of 

the International Labour Conference under Article 26 of the ILO Constitution, 

GB.320/INS/9 (Mar. 19, 2014).
Appendix II: Reported Violence against Trade 

Unionists in Colombia and Guatemala

Page 63 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

update of the status of the 28 cases that have been brought to court and 

reported that extinction of criminal liability has been applied in 4 cases, 

arrest warrants have been issued in 13 cases, rulings have been handed 

down in 6 cases, and 5 cases are pending trial.7

Strengthening analysis of attacks against human rights defenders. 

The Attorney General’s Office restructured and strengthened the unit that 

analyzes attacks against human rights defenders, a category that 

includes unionists. As part of this process, representatives of unionized 

workers will meet regularly to study trends in attacks against human rights 

defenders and draw up recommendations for investigations by the 

Attorney General Office to assist both criminal investigations and the 

conviction of the perpetrators. An adequately staffed office will be created 

to carry out the relevant investigations.

The government of Guatemala reported several other steps it intends to 

initiate or has initiated to address the issues in the ILO complaint. For 

example, according to the ILO’s March 2014 report, the Ministry of Labor 

and Social Welfare proposed amendments to the Labor Code and other 

relevant laws, incorporating the amendments proposed by the ILO 

supervisory bodies.8

 7

The Guatemalan Attorney General’s Office stated that extinction of criminal liability is 

defined as an instance in which the government is unable to prosecute as a result of the 

death of the offender. 

The ILO’s report stated that legislative reforms have 

also been proposed by the Ministry of Labor to enable the general labor 

inspectorate to fulfill its mandate to ensure the effective application of 

labor legislation. On the basis of the progress demonstrated in addressing 

points in the Road Map reported by the government of Guatemala, the 

ILO decided in March 2014 to again postpone the implementation of the 

Commission of Inquiry and reevaluate progress in November of 2014.

8

International Labour Organization Governing Body, Complaint Concerning NonObservance by Guatemala of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 

Organise Convention.
Appendix II: Reported Violence against Trade 

Unionists in Colombia and Guatemala

Page 64 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

The United States has provided some funding through State’s Bureau of 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) to assist Guatemalan 

authorities to provide better protection to unionists. INL provided 

Guatemala $2 million dollars in assistance for fiscal years 2012 through 

2016 to implement reform and capacity-building projects. The goal of the 

INL funding is to increase the investigative capabilities of law enforcement 

officers within the Ministry of the Interior. Part of the funding focuses on

defenders of human rights, including addressing violence against trade 

unions. Assistance provided by INL has ranged from the provision of 

equipment to technical training and exchanges. For example, INL 

provided the Ministry of the Interior’s recently established security 

division, División de Protección de Personas y Seguridad (DPPS), with 

filing cabinets to organize files on union leaders for which it was providing 

protection. INL officials stated that DPPS lacked a tracking system and 

had rooms stacked with disorganized files and, as a result, could not 

accurately track the number of people receiving protection. According to 

INL officials, as of December 2013, DPPS was providing protection for 

about 1,000 union leaders and members. INL officials also stated that 

they had discussed the possibility of creating a risk analysis unit in DPPS, 

similar to Colombia’s UNP.

U.S. Government Has 

Provided Assistance to 

Guatemala for Law 

Enforcement Reform and to 

Address Violence, Including 

Violence against Unionists
Appendix III: U.S. Monitoring of 

Implementation of Other Labor Initiatives

Page 65 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

In addition to being responsible for monitoring partner countries’ 

implementation of free trade agreement (FTA) labor provisions, U.S. 

agencies are responsible for monitoring the implementation of labor 

initiatives such as the White Paper1 and the Labor Action Plan,2 which 

were developed in the context of, respectively, the Dominican RepublicCentral America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) and 

the United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement (Colombia 

FTA).3 U.S. agencies are also responsible for monitoring Guatemala’s 

Labor Enforcement Plan, developed in response to a CAFTA-DR labor 

submission to the Department of Labor (DOL).4

To discharge its responsibility for monitoring implementation of the 

CAFTA-DR White Paper projects, in 2007 DOL provided a $10 million 

grant to the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) Verification 

Project.5

The ILO Verification Project tracked spending and implementation of 

every White Paper project, requiring grant recipients to submit periodic 

reports to ILO for the biannual report. ILO staff provided the reports to 

DOL, which used the reports to ensure transparency and progress of the 

The Verification Project prepared reports every 6 months from 

2005 through 2010 regarding the implementation of the White Paper 

projects. The Verification Project and most White Paper projects 

concluded in 2012.

 1

Working Group of the Vice Ministers Responsible for Trade and Labor in the Countries of 

Central America and the Dominican Republic, The Labor Dimension in Central America 

and the Dominican Republic: Building on Progress: Strengthening Compliance and 

Enhancing Capacity (April 2005), accessed June 7, 2013, http://www.ilo.org/sanjose 

/lang—es/index.htm.

2

Colombian Action Plan Related to Labor Rights (April 7, 2011), accessed May 29, 2013, 

http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2787.

3

These labor initiatives were created outside an FTA framework. Consequently, matters 

arising from these initiatives would not be addressed through the dispute settlement 

provisions of an FTA.

4

Mutually Agreed Enforcement Action Plan between the Government of the United States 

and the Government of Guatemala (2013), accessed August 1, 2013, 

http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/otla/guatemalasub.htm. 

5

According to DOL, its funding for the ILO Verification Project in 2007 and subsequent 

years totaled $11.6 million. According to ILO staff, the Verification Project represents one 

of the ILO’s most comprehensive evaluation efforts in the region. 

Appendix III: U.S. Monitoring of 

Implementation of Other Labor Initiatives

CAFTA-DR White Paper
Appendix III: U.S. Monitoring of 

Implementation of Other Labor Initiatives

Page 66 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

U.S.-funded projects. Entities implementing White Paper projects 

included, among others, the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID), partner countries’ ministries of labor and labor courts, and 

nongovernmental organizations. According to ILO staff, although the 

Verification Project did not measure the impact of the projects on labor 

conditions, the reports reflected improvements of government institutions 

and other entities and demonstrated the benefit of addressing some 

issues faced by workers. ILO officials noted that, besides providing 

accountability for the expenditure of funds and tracking the progress of 

projects, the Verification Project led to improvements in data gathering 

and reporting capabilities of the ministries of labor.

The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), in cooperation with 

DOL and the Department of State (State), is responsible for monitoring 

the implementation of the Colombia Labor Action Plan, most of which 

Colombia was required to implement by 2012. The plan listed steps to 

improve labor conditions, mutually agreed on by the U.S. and Colombian 

governments, that the Colombian government agreed to take before the 

President of the United States would put the FTA forward for 

congressional consideration. The conditions that the Labor Action Plan 

addressed included violence against Colombian labor union members, 

inadequate efforts to bring to justice perpetrators of crimes against labor 

union members, and insufficient protection of workers’ rights in Colombia. 

According to USTR staff, the plan continues to serve as a framework for 

cooperation with Colombia. The plan includes regular meetings between 

officials from both countries to monitor and implement the plan through 

2013, and both governments announced an extension of these meetings 

through at least 2014.

On April 2012, USTR announced that the Colombian government had 

taken important steps to fulfill the Labor Action Plan and that the FTA 

would go into effect. USTR officials did not provide records or 

documentation of these steps, stating that they did not request such 

records because the website for the Presidency of Colombia supplied 

documentation of all actions taken. On reviewing some of the 

documentation on the website, we found that the documents were not 

structured so as to readily provide information about steps that the 

Colombian government had taken to meet its Labor Action Plan 

commitments. In written responses to our questions, Colombia’s Ministry 

of Labor indicated that the government had met all Labor Action Plan 

commitments, and the ministry provided examples of the government’s 

actions to meet these commitments. 

Colombia Labor 

Action Plan
Appendix III: U.S. Monitoring of 

Implementation of Other Labor Initiatives

Page 67 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

USTR officials reported that USTR, DOL, and State had engaged 

extensively with the Colombian Ministry of Labor and other government 

institutions in Colombia to discuss and confirm Colombia’s progress in 

implementing each element of the Labor Action Plan. According to USTR, 

as of August 2014, USTR and DOL staff had made seven visits to 

Colombia since the FTA entered into force to address these issues. 

USTR fact sheets and a USTR and DOL report from April 2014 provided 

information about Colombia’s accomplishments under the Labor Action 

Plan—for example, the report detailed the number of labor inspectors 

hired, the number of special prosecutors and investigators hired, and the 

number of convictions in cases of violence against labor leaders—as well 

as remaining challenges. In addition, according to DOL, a DOL staff 

member, detailed to the U.S. embassy in Bogota from 2011 to 2012 to 

oversee implementation of the Action Plan, met during that period with 

Colombian government officials, nongovernmental organizations, union 

representatives, and other stakeholders to discuss the Labor Action 

Plan’s implementation, among other topics.

USTR, in cooperation with DOL and State, is responsible for monitoring 

implementation of the Guatemala Enforcement Plan, agreed to by the 

U.S. and Guatemalan governments in April 2013, to address concerns 

identified in a labor submission filed under CAFTA-DR. USTR provided us 

with internal documents that it had used to track Guatemala’s progress in

taking the steps required by the plan. For example, USTR provided a 

matrix tracking the status of legal instruments required under the 

Enforcement Plan; USTR also provided quarterly progress reports 

submitted by the Guatemalan Ministry of Labor, identifying steps that the 

ministry had taken to address commitments in the Enforcement Plan. 

USTR officials said that since 2009, USTR and DOL had directly engaged 

with Guatemala on the labor case through 17 trips, including 7 trips that 

involved staff at the Assistant Secretary level or higher. In addition, 

officials at the Guatemalan Ministry of Labor told us that they had 

interacted extensively with DOL and USTR, including through multiple 

video-teleconferences, meetings in person, and correspondence, to 

update them on progress in implementing the Enforcement Plan. 

Guatemala Enforcement 

Plan
Appendix III: U.S. Monitoring of 

Implementation of Other Labor Initiatives

Page 68 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

In April 2014, USTR told us that although it recognized steps that 

Guatemala had taken under the Enforcement Plan, it had not seen 

sufficient progress to close the case. USTR officials stated that if the 

Guatemalan government did not take the steps delineated in the plan by 

the specified dates, USTR might decide to pursue arbitration. In 

September 2014, USTR announced that the U.S. government was 

pursuing dispute settlement proceedings against Guatemala because it 

had not met the terms of the Enforcement Plan.
Appendix IV: Status of Labor Submissions

Page 69 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

The following provides details about the status of the five labor 

submissions that the Department of Labor (DOL) has accepted since 

2008.1

In June 2011, DOL accepted a labor submission regarding Bahrain, 50 

days after receipt. The submission remains open, with consultations 

ongoing. The submission, received from the American Federation of 

Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) with a 

statement from the General Federation of Bahrain Trade Unions, alleged 

that Bahrain had violated free trade agreement (FTA) labor provisions 

regarding the right of association, particularly nondiscrimination against 

trade unionists. In December 2012, DOL issued a public report that found 

that the government of Bahrain’s actions appeared inconsistent with its 

commitments under the labor chapter. Specifically, the report found that 

trade unionists and leaders were targeted for dismissal, and in some 

cases prosecuted, in part for their role in organizing and participating in a 

general strike and that the dismissals reflected discrimination based in 

part on political opinion and activities. The report also found sectarian 

discrimination against Shia workers. The Department of Labor’s (DOL) 

report outlined nine recommendations focused on legal and 

administrative changes to Bahraini labor law for the U.S. government to 

pursue during consultations with Bahrain and also recommended that the 

parties develop a plan of action.

On May 6, 2013, more than 4 months after DOL issued its report, the U.S. 

government formally requested cooperative labor consultations with the 

government of Bahrain in a joint letter from the Acting Secretary of Labor 

and the Acting U.S. Trade Representative. Consultations began when an 

interagency delegation met with the government of Bahrain in Manama, 

Bahrain, on July 15 and 16, 2013. However, according to DOL, the first 

round of consultations did not resolve all issues DOL had identified, and 

consultations were ongoing as of September 2014. The Office of the U.S. 

Trade Representative (USTR) attempted to schedule second-round

consultations but agreed to a request from Bahrain to delay them. The 

United States and Bahrain held a second round of consultations on June 

22 and 23, 2014, according to DOL. During the consultations, the two 

 1

DOL has also accepted other labor submissions under the North American Agreement on 

Labor Cooperation, which we did not examine. 

Appendix IV: Status of Labor Submissions

Bahrain
Appendix IV: Status of Labor Submissions

Page 70 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

parties used the recommendations in the DOL report as a basis for jointly

developing an action plan, which includes concrete steps for the 

government of Bahrain to address the concerns that the report raises. 

USTR officials noted that the allegations raised in the submission are 

subject to resolution through the consultation procedures but are not 

subject to dispute settlement.2

Figure 5 shows the timeline and status of the Bahrain labor submission.

Figure 5: Timeline and Status of Labor Submission Regarding Bahrain

Legend: DOL = U.S. Department of Labor.

In February 2012, DOL accepted a labor submission regarding the 

Dominican Republic, 62 days after receipt. The submission remains open

and unresolved while DOL monitors the Dominican Republic’s progress in 

 2

Pursuant to the Bahrain FTA Labor Chapter, parties may only have recourse to dispute 

settlement under the FTA for matters arising under the commitment to not fail to effectively 

enforce its labor laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a 

manner affecting trade between the parties. Seeking recourse through the dispute 

settlement chapter of the FTA could lead to the imposition of a monetary assessment or 

other trade measures. Matters arising under the other commitments in the labor chapter 

cannot have recourse to dispute settlement under the FTA, but parties are entitled to 

request consultations on any matter arising under the chapter in an effort to find a 

mutually agreeable solution. Bahrain FTA, art. 15.6 and ch.19.

Dominican Republic
Appendix IV: Status of Labor Submissions

Page 71 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

addressing concerns that the submission raises. The submission, 

submitted by a private individual, alleged the failure of the Dominican 

Republic’s government to enforce its labor laws in the sugar sector as 

required under the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States 

Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). The submission alleged nine 

violations, ranging from human trafficking and forced labor to retaliatory 

firing of workers for affiliation with, or attempts to organize, labor groups 

or unions. In September 2013, DOL issued a public report that found 

evidence of apparent and potential violations of the Dominican Republic’s 

labor laws pertaining to the sugar sector. DOL’s report also identified 

significant concerns about procedural and methodological shortcomings 

in the inspection process that undermine the government’s capacity to 

effectively identify labor violations. In addition, the report cited concerns 

regarding freedom of association, the right to organize, and collective 

bargaining. DOL’s report offered 11 recommendations to the government 

of the Dominican Republic to address the report’s findings and improve 

enforcement of Dominican labor laws in the sugar sector and stated that 

DOL would reassess the situation in 6 and 12 months after the report’s 

publication. The recommendations range from administrative changes to 

help the government of the Dominican Republic improve its enforcement 

of Dominican labor laws to outreach suggestions for better informing 

sugar sector workers about their labor rights.

In April 2014, DOL issued its 6-month assessment, noting that the 

Dominican Republic’s Ministry of Labor had committed to measures that, 

if instituted, would begin to address some of the recommendations in 

DOL’s public report. DOL’s assessment also noted that the government of 

the Dominican Republic had not yet indicated plans or taken actions to 

address most of the public report’s recommendations.

Figure 6 shows the timeline and status of the Dominican Republic labor 

submission.
Appendix IV: Status of Labor Submissions

Page 72 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

Figure 6: Timeline and Status of Labor Submission Regarding the Dominican 

Republic

Legend: DOL = U.S. Department of Labor.

In June 2008, DOL accepted a submission regarding Guatemala, 50 days 

after receipt. The submission remains open and unresolved and is 

currently in arbitration. The submission, from the AFL-CIO and six 

Guatemalan worker organizations, alleged that Guatemala had violated 

its obligation under CAFTA-DR to effectively enforce its labor laws 

regarding freedom of association, the rights to organize and bargain 

collectively, and acceptable conditions of work. In January 2009, DOL 

issued a public report that found significant weaknesses in Guatemala’s 

labor law enforcement. The report outlined 10 recommendations for the 

government of Guatemala, including administrative and technical 

changes, to address the issues raised in the submission. The report also 

recommended that DOL reassess Guatemala’s progress in implementing 

the recommendations within 6 months after the publication of DOL’s 

report to determine whether further action is warranted.

USTR and DOL engaged with the Guatemalan government in an effort to 

address DOL’s recommendations for systemic improvements in the 

enforcement of labor laws in Guatemala. In July 2010, after Guatemala’s 

actions proved insufficient to address the concerns raised in the report, 

USTR and DOL jointly requested cooperative labor consultations with 

Guatemala under the CAFTA-DR Labor Chapter. The consultations failed 

to resolve the matter, and on May 16, 2011, USTR requested a meeting 

of the CAFTA-DR’s free trade commission pursuant to the agreement’s 

Dispute Settlement Chapter. The commission met in June 2011 but did 

not resolve the dispute, and in August 2011, the United States requested 

Guatemala
Appendix IV: Status of Labor Submissions

Page 73 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

the establishment of an arbitral panel. After the panel was constituted in 

November 2012, the parties agreed to suspend it to allow for additional 

negotiation. In April 2013, the parties reached agreement on a 

comprehensive 18-point Enforcement Plan with concrete benchmarks 

and timelines for implementation. The plan extended the arbitration 

panel’s suspension for 6 months, with the possibility of an additional 6-

month extension based on Guatemala’s progress in implementing the 

plan. In October 2013, 6 months after the signing of the Enforcement 

Plan, USTR, in consultation with DOL, determined that Guatemala had

taken sufficient steps to enact the legal instruments called for under the 

plan. USTR and DOL granted the 6-month extension, noting that 

significant work remained to ensure the full implementation of the 

Enforcement Plan.

In April 2014, USTR, in consultation with DOL, granted Guatemala a 4-

month extension to continue its implementation of the Enforcement Plan 

but retains the right to reactivate the arbitration panel at any point during 

this period. In September 2014, the United States reactivated the panel 

after determining that Guatemala had not met the terms of the 

Enforcement Plan and that concerns over the enforcement of 

Guatemala’s labor laws had not been resolved. 

Figure 7 shows the timeline and status of the Guatemala labor 

submission.
Appendix IV: Status of Labor Submissions

Page 74 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

Figure 7: Timeline and Status of Labor Submission Regarding Guatemala

Legend: DOL = U.S. Department of Labor; CAFTA-DR = United States-Dominican Republic-Central 

America Free Trade Agreement.

In May 2012, DOL accepted a submission regarding Honduras, 49 days 

after receipt. The submission remains open and unresolved, pending

publication of DOL’s report. The submission, from the AFL-CIO and 26

Honduran organizations, alleged that the government of Honduras had 

violated its obligation under CAFTA-DR to enforce its labor laws relating 

to freedom of association; the right to organize; child labor; the right to 

bargain collectively; and the right to acceptable conditions of work in the 

Honduran apparel and auto manufacturing, agriculture, and port sectors. 

According to DOL officials, DOL has received over 1,200 documents in 

Spanish and visited Honduras four times to meet with stakeholders, 

reflecting the breadth of the allegations and detailed information reviewed 

and analyzed. As of May 2014, DOL was continuing to review 

documentation of the allegations and, according to DOL officials, is 

preparing its report.

Figure 8 shows the timeline and status of the Honduras labor submission.

Honduras
Appendix IV: Status of Labor Submissions

Page 75 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

Figure 8: Timeline and Status of Labor Submission Regarding Honduras

Legend: DOL = U.S. Department of Labor.

In July 2011, DOL accepted a submission regarding Peru, 202 days after 

receipt, which DOL closed as resolved in August 2012. The submission, 

from the Peruvian National Union of Tax Administration 

Workers (SINAUT), alleged that Peru’s National Superintendency of Tax 

Administration (SUNAT), an executive branch agency of the Peruvian 

government that oversees both customs and tax administration, had 

failed to comply with Peru’s labor laws as they relate to collective 

bargaining, in violation of the United States-Peru Trade Promotion 

Agreement. In August 2012, DOL issued a public report finding that 

although the Ministry of Labor and Promotion of Employment appeared to 

have fulfilled its duties during the collective bargaining processes at issue, 

SUNAT had failed to comply with certain elements of the Peruvian 

Collective Bargaining Law, including deadlines for launching 

negotiations. Further, with regard to all other issues raised in the 

submission, DOL determined that important legal ambiguity during the 

period at issue prevented a finding that SUNAT had failed to comply with 

the law or that the government of Peru had failed to comply with, or 

enforce, its own labor laws during that time. DOL’s report did not 

recommend formal consultations between the U.S. government and the 

Peruvian government. According to DOL, because the government of 

Peru had taken important steps to address some of the issues raised in 

the submission, including issuing legal instruments to help clarify legal 

ambiguity and facilitate collective bargaining, DOL did not believe that 

formal consultations were needed to continue positive engagement and 

progress on these matters. As a result, DOL closed the submission as 

resolved in August 2012.

Peru
Appendix IV: Status of Labor Submissions

Page 76 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

In September 2011, according to DOL, while it was reviewing the 

submission, the government of Peru issued two executive orders that 

clarified the parties’ collective bargaining duties in this and similar cases. 

DOL’s report on the submission explained that on March 29, 2012, after 

applying the recent executive orders, an arbitral panel reached a decision 

favorable to SINAUT that contained both economic and noneconomic 

awards for the union. Moreover, DOL reported that the government of 

Peru appealed the ruling, contending that the ruling reflects a 

misapplication and misinterpretation of the Public Sector Budget Law. 

According to the DOL report, on appeal, the Peruvian labor courts 

overturned the economic elements of the arbitral award, based on a ruling 

that those elements conflicted with Peru’s Public Sector Budget Law, but 

sustained the noneconomic elements of the award.

Figure 9 shoes the timeline and status of the Peru labor submission.

Figure 9: Timeline and Status of Labor Submission Regarding Peru

Legend: DOL = U.S. Department of Labor; USTR = Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.
Appendix V: Comments from the

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative

Page 77 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

Appendix V: Comments from the

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative

Note: GAO comments 

supplementing those 

in the report text 

appear at the end of 

this appendix.
Appendix V: Comments from the

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative

Page 78 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

See Comment 1

See Comment 2

See Comment 3

See Comment 4
Appendix V: Comments from the

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative

Page 79 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

See Comment 5

See Comment 6
Appendix V: Comments from the

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative

Page 80 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

See Comment 7

See Comment 8
Appendix V: Comments from the

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative

Page 81 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements
Appendix V: Comments from the

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative

Page 82 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements
Appendix V: Comments from the

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative

Page 83 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

See Comment 9

See Comment 10
Appendix V: Comments from the

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative

Page 84 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

See Comment 11

See Comment 12
Appendix V: Comments from the

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative

Page 85 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements
Appendix V: Comments from the

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative

Page 86 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

The following are GAO’s comments regarding the Office of the U.S. Trade 

Representative’s (USTR) letter dated September 16, 2014.

In its letter, USTR questions our evaluation of its monitoring and 

enforcement of free trade agreement (FTA) partners’ compliance with their 

labor commitments and expresses concern that we do not give sufficient 

credit to U.S. agencies for their multifaceted work to help FTA partners 

comply with their labor commitments. We acknowledge in our report that 

the agencies have given, overall, greater political and organizational 

priority to monitoring and enforcement of FTA labor commitments since we 

last reported on this topic in 2009.1 The evidence that USTR and the 

Department of Labor (DOL) provided demonstrate that their monitoring 

and enforcement activities have sometimes led to a strengthening of FTA 

partners labor laws and practices that might not have occurred absent 

these activities. Nevertheless, we stand by our current assessment that 

USTR and DOL have not demonstrated a proactive and systematic 

approach to monitoring and enforcing FTA partners’ compliance with their 

FTA labor commitments, with the exception of a few partner countries.2

Our review focuses on steps that USTR and DOL have taken, with support 

from the Department of State (State), to monitor and enforce the labor 

provisions in the FTAs. In reviewing USTR’s and DOL’s monitoring and 

enforcement of the provisions in the FTA labor chapters, we looked for

On 

the contrary, the evidence that the agencies provided shows that USTR’s

and DOL’s approaches and actions are generally ad hoc and leave 

important gaps.

• evidence that USTR and DOL took steps to ensure that each FTA 

partner had the requisite laws in place by the time the President 

determined that the FTA could enter into force, as well as

• evidence that USTR and DOL have taken steps to ensure that the 

partners are enforcing their laws and maintaining labor rights in law and 

practice since the FTAs entered into force.

 1

GAO, International Trade: Four Free Trade Agreements GAO Reviewed Have Resulted in Commercial 

Benefits, but Challenges on Labor and Environment Remain, GAO-09-439 (Washington, D.C.: July 10, 

2009).

2

At the same time, we stand by our prior decision to close recommendations from our 2009 report 

because USTR and DOL had taken steps to increase engagement with all FTA partners on labor 

matters and to identify and address labor compliance concerns in several partners.

GAO Comments
Appendix V: Comments from the

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative

Page 87 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

Further, because USTR announced in 2009 that it would not wait for 

complaints (e.g., labor submissions) to investigate and address possible 

inconsistencies with FTA provisions, we looked for evidence that the 

agencies had established means or mechanisms to anticipate, analyze, 

and resolve problems in the absence of a submission.

We consider the approach to monitoring and enforcement that USTR 

outlines in its letter to be broadly compatible with the definitions of 

monitoring and enforcement and with the key elements of monitoring and 

enforcement that we have identified in our report. That is, enforcement 

involves taking action to secure compliance by the partner, and monitoring 

and enforcement typically involve six key steps: (1) gathering and 

analyzing information, (2) setting priorities, (3) identifying compliance 

problems, (4) developing and implementing responses, (5) taking 

enforcement actions, and (6) coordinating with agencies.

Following are specific comments in response to USTR’s letter.

Comment 1: Throughout our year-long review process, we requested 

documentation of USTR’s monitoring and enforcement of labor provisions. 

However, USTR provided a large number of documents very late in the 

process and provided most documents only after receiving our draft report. 

We thoroughly reviewed and considered all documents that USTR 

provided and made changes in our report as appropriate to ensure its 

accuracy and completeness. Several of these changes are described in 

the comments that follow.

Comment 2: The evidence that we obtained from USTR and DOL does 

not support USTR’s assertion that the two agencies actively and 

systematically monitored and enforced labor provisions in all 20 FTA 

countries, implementing all of the key elements that we identified, 

regardless of whether the country had been the subject of a submission. 

USTR and DOL submitted evidence that they had taken some of these key 

steps in several FTA partner countries, three of which—Colombia, Jordan, 

and Panama—were not the subject of labor submissions. In addition, to 

support its technical comments about a draft of our report, USTR 

submitted further evidence of certain proactive steps, which we have 

incorporated in our report as appropriate. However, in the absence of 

evidence that USTR and DOL have taken steps to analyze and address 

possible inconsistencies with FTA labor provisions in most partner 

countries that have not been the subject of a labor submission, we could 

not conclude that the agencies had implemented a systematic approach to 

monitoring the implementation of all labor provisions in all FTAs. Moreover, 
Appendix V: Comments from the

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative

Page 88 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

according to DOL—on which USTR relies for day-to-day monitoring of the 

FTA partners—the division’s staff spent 80 percent of their work hours in 

the past year monitoring implementation of the Guatemala Enforcement 

Plan, addressing submissions for five other countries, and following up on 

activities initiated under the Colombia Labor Action Plan. This left the 

employees’ remaining work hours available to monitor and engage the 

other 14 FTA partner countries. With the exception of Colombia, 

stakeholders in countries we visited indicated that their recent interactions 

with USTR and DOL had been very limited. Stakeholders in these 

countries also told us that the FTA labor affairs councils in their countries 

had been largely inactive and that the councils’ meetings were considered 

a formality. 

Comment 3: Having reviewed all of the cables that State provided, we 

consider them a useful tool for DOL and State to obtain information about 

labor conditions in partner countries. Our report acknowledges that USTR 

is an addressee on such cables and is generally well informed about labor 

conditions in partner countries as a result of this and other input. Obtaining 

and analyzing information from credible sources such as State is integral 

to completing the first step of the monitoring and enforcement process.

Comment 4: USTR states that it deploys a range of tools to try to resolve 

concerns, whether they were identified formally or informally. However, we 

found that USTR’s and DOL’s approach to addressing concerns that were 

identified formally, such as by a submission, is more systematic than their 

approach to addressing concerns that they have identified informally. For 

example, in responding to a labor submission, DOL conducts a formal 

review and issues an official report, which generally identifies any possible 

inconsistencies with labor provisions in the FTA and contains specific 

recommendations to resolve the issue. DOL and USTR typically use the 

report’s findings to further engage with the FTA partner country and 

develop an action plan, such as in the case of Guatemala. When they 

have identified a concern informally, USTR and DOL may engage with the 

partner country to discuss the concern, usually in the context of an

established FTA mechanism such as the FTA labor affairs council or free 

trade commission. However, we found that USTR and DOL use these 

mechanisms infrequently, and USTR and DOL officials told us that except 

for a few high-priority countries such as Colombia, the agencies do not 

typically perform in-depth analysis of a partner country’s compliance with 

its FTA labor commitments unless the country has been the subject of a 

submission.
Appendix V: Comments from the

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative

Page 89 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

Comment 5: We acknowledge that USTR’s work with Colombia did not 

end with the ratification of the FTA. We added text to our report to indicate 

our concurrence with this point and to illustrate USTR’s postratification 

monitoring and enforcement activities.

Comment 6: We acknowledge that USTR and DOL have engaged 

extensively with the government of Colombia to monitor the 

implementation of the Labor Action Plan, in the process addressing 

several of the key elements of monitoring and enforcement FTAs. 

However, we cannot conclude that a systematic approach to monitoring 

and enforcement labor provisions is in place, because we did not see 

evidence of certain key elements—for example, an approach to respond to 

outstanding issues identified since the implementation of the Labor Action 

Plan. 

USTR also indicates that its level of engagement to monitor and enforce 

labor provisions in Colombia is not unique and that USTR and DOL have 

engaged with other FTA countries to a similar extent as with Colombia. 

However, we did not see evidence of such a level of engagement with 

other countries that have not been the subject of a submission. In fact, 

DOL reported that in the last year, its monitoring division staff spent 80 

percent of their time following up on the Colombia Labor Action Plan 

activities and addressing submissions. 

Comment 7: We do not assume or indicate that a tailored, country-specific 

approach to labor monitoring and enforcement is inappropriate, and we do 

not exclude such approaches from our evaluation. We reviewed the 

documentation that USTR and DOL provided, looking for evidence that key 

elements of monitoring and enforcement have been implemented. We 

recognize that USTR and DOL have successfully implemented certain 

steps, such as gathering information and identifying compliance problems, 

using different methods in different countries. However, we did not see 

evidence of an overarching strategy that assures that priorities and 

problems are systematically addressed.

Comment 8: We evaluated all evidence that USTR and DOL provided, 

including documentation that USTR provided with its technical comments, 

and we made changes to our report. Specifically, we incorporated 

language acknowledging that in some partner countries, the agencies took 

steps before and after FTA ratification that were consistent with key 

elements of monitoring and enforcement and that likely contributed to 

assuring that the partners met certain labor commitments. 
Appendix V: Comments from the

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative

Page 90 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

Comment 9: We acknowledge that the labor submission process is a 

central component of USTR’s and DOL’s approach to addressing possible 

inconsistencies with FTA labor provisions in partner countries and that the 

agencies have done extensive work to investigate allegations in the 

submissions that DOL has accepted. However, in our view, reliance on 

labor submissions to assess compliance and take enforcement actions is 

inconsistent with USTR’s 2009 commitment to no longer enforce FTA 

partners’ labor commitments “only on a complaint-driven basis” but instead 

to “immediately identify and investigate labor violations.”3

Comment 10: As stated, the report acknowledges that labor submissions 

are a key component of USTR’s and DOL’s monitoring and enforcement of 

FTA labor provisions and that the agencies undertake considerable 

research and analysis in the process of addressing submissions We 

modified the text of the report to clarify that after DOL receives a 

submission, it works with USTR and State to engage diplomatically to 

address concerns, as well as independently to investigate and analyze the 

issues.

Comment 11: We acknowledge that USTR and DOL work together to 

address labor concerns identified in submissions and to engage with 

partner countries regarding labor matters. Our review of evidence obtained 

from the agencies and in FTA partner countries generally confirmed that 

USTR and DOL also coordinate on an ad hoc basis. However, the 

evidence that we reviewed did not show that the agencies have developed 

a coordinated, strategic approach to systematically address the key steps 

of monitoring and enforcing labor provisions in all FTAs and to address 

labor conditions that may be inconsistent with FTA provisions, such as the 

conditions identified in DOL’s management reports. For example, agendas 

that USTR provided for two meetings of the interagency Subcommittee on 

Labor Monitoring and Enforcement list meeting topics but do not detail 

expected actions or outcomes; USTR provided no record, beyond a 

general description, of what transpired at the meetings or of any intraagency correspondence following the meetings. Further, during our 

interviews with USTR officials, the officials discussed items that the 

interagency process had not produced, such as up-to-date assessments of 

risk; agreed-on priorities; and formal action plans for partners other than 

 3

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “Ambassador Kirk Announces New Initiatives for Trade 

Enforcement” (press release), July 16, 2009, accessed July 18, 2013, http://www.ustr.gov/aboutus/press-office/speeches/transcripts/2009/july/ambassador-kirk-announces-new-initiatives-trade.
Appendix V: Comments from the

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative

Page 91 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

Colombia, Guatemala, and Jordan. For example, USTR officials indicated 

that a previous interagency effort to develop a comprehensive risk-based 

approach had been overtaken by events and not revised. DOL officials 

indicated that in general, there had been no discussion of cross-agency 

resource use However, our work on best practices in collaboration has 

shown that agencies can enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts by 

engaging in the following eight practices: (1) define and articulate a 

common outcome; (2) establish mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; (3) 

identify and address needs by leveraging resources, (4) agree on roles

and responsibilities; (5) establish compatible policies, procedures, and 

other means to operate across agency boundaries; (6) develop 

mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results; (7) reinforce 

agency accountability for collaborative efforts through agency plans and 

reports; and (8) reinforce individual accountability for collaborative efforts 

through performance management systems.

Comment 12: Our report does not state that USTR should explicitly 

accuse partner countries of trade violations in its annual report to 

Congress. Our report states that, reflecting in part USTR’s and DOL’s 

limited monitoring and enforcement of these provisions, USTR’s annual 

report generally does not detail concerns about the implementation of FTA 

labor provisions by partner countries that have not been the subject of 

labor submissions. Our report also states that appropriate information 

resulting from more extensive monitoring and enforcement could help 

inform Congress and other U.S. stakeholders about the extent to which 

trade partners are fulfilling their FTA labor commitments.
Appendix VI: Comments from the

Department of Labor

Page 92 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

Appendix VI: Comments from the

Department of Labor
Appendix VI: Comments from the

Department of Labor

Page 93 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements
Appendix VI: Comments from the

Department of Labor

Page 94 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements
Appendix VI: Comments from the

Department of Labor

Page 95 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements
Page 96 GAO-15-160 Labor Provisions in Free Trade Agreements

Kimberly Gianopoulos, (202) 512-8612 or gianopoulosk@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Kim Frankena (Assistant 

Director), Francisco Enriquez (Analyst-in-Charge), Juan P. Avila, Nicholas 

Jepson, Jill Lacey, Reid Lowe, Grace Lui, and Oziel Trevino made major 

contributions to this report.

Appendix VII: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(320980)
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