J-S09030-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

SAMUEL SANTOS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1766 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 21, 2019,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County,

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0004067-2019.

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED MAY 27, 2022

Samuel Santos appeals the trial court’s denial of his post-sentence 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea to a charge of causing an accident resulting 

in injury or death while driving without a license.1 Santos argues that his plea 

was not knowing or voluntary because he was unaware that his driving 

privileges would be suspended for one year upon his conviction. After review, 

we affirm.

The parties do not dispute the underlying facts of the case. On July 18, 

2018, law enforcement officers responded to a multi-vehicle crash. Upon 

arriving at the scene, the officers spoke to Santos, who had been operating a 

vehicle involved in the crash. Santos admitted that he had been distracted 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3742.1(a).
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and failed to avoid a collision with a stopped vehicle in front of him. The 

officers checked Santos’ record and discovered that his license had been 

suspended. Santos was charged and on October 21, 2019, pled guilty to 

causing an accident involving injury or death while driving without a license. 

Santos was sentenced to four months of probation. Due to this conviction, 

the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation suspended Santos’ license for 

one year.2 Because Santos’ colloquy did not reference this suspension, he 

filed a post-sentence motion to withdraw the guilty plea on October 31, 2019. 

The motion was denied by operation of law on August 26, 2021.

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Santos filed this timely notice of appeal on August 27, 2021. Both 

Santos and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 1925.

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2 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 1532(a) states that that PennDOT “shall suspend the 

operating privilege of any driver for one year upon receiving a certified record 

of the driver’s conviction of . . . (3) [a]ny violation of the following provisions: 

. . . Section 3742.1 (relating to accidents involving death or personal injury 

while not properly licensed).”

3 Pa. R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(a) states that post-sentence motions are denied by 

operation of law if the trial court does not make a specific ruling upon them 

within 120 days. In such cases, the clerk of courts then enters an order 

denying the motions on behalf of the court and serve it upon the parties. Pa. 

R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(c). However, if the clerk does not timely enter an order, 

the failure of a party to file a notice of appeal within 30 days after the 120-

day period has ended can be excused due to a “breakdown in the court 

system.” Commonwealth v. Braykovich, 664 A.2d 133, 137–138 (Pa. 

Super. 1995).

In this case, Santos’ post-trial motions were denied by operation of law on 

February 28, 2020, but a final order was not entered until August 26, 2021. 

We agree with the trial court that a “breakdown of the court” occurred and 

Santos’ notice of appeal was timely. Trial Court Opinion, 9/23/21, at 3–4.
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On appeal, Santos raises the following single issue: “Did the lower court 

err in failing to permit the withdrawal of [Santos’] guilty plea where [his] plea 

was not knowingly entered since he was not informed of the collateral 

consequences of his plea, namely the suspension of his driver’s license?”

Santos’ Brief at 3.

The decision to grant a defendant’s motion to withdraw a guilty plea lies 

within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an 

abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Hart, 174 A.3d 660, 664 (Pa. Super. 

2017). “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but is 

rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment 

that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or 

partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.” Commonwealth v. Santos, 

176 A.3d 877, 882 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

Santos contends that his one-year driver’s license suspension is “deeply 

enmeshed with a criminal conviction” and so a defendant must be informed of 

this consequence to knowingly enter a guilty plea, citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 

559 U.S. 356 (2010) in support. Santos’ Brief at 8–9. Consequently, Santos 

states, because the trial court failed to inform him that his license would be 

suspended, he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at 

10.

A defendant may withdraw his guilty plea after sentencing only upon a 

showing of “manifest injustice.” Commonwealth v. Pantalion, 957 A.2d 

1267, 1271 (Pa. Super. 2008). “A plea rises to the level of manifest injustice 
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when it was entered into involuntarily, unknowingly, or unintelligently.” 

Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378, 383 (Pa. Super. 2002)

(citation omitted). A guilty plea will be considered voluntarily, knowingly, and 

intelligently made when a defendant is made aware of the criminal penalties, 

or the direct consequences, of the offense being pled to. Pa. R.Crim.P. 590

(comment) (“At a minimum the judge [conducting a plea colloquy] should ask 

questions to elicit the following information: . . . (5) is the defendant aware 

of the permissible range of sentences and/or fines for the offense charged?”)

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has distinguished between collateral 

and direct consequences of a criminal conviction, explaining that direct 

consequences are characterized as criminal punishments and collateral 

consequences are those of a civil, non-retributive nature over which a 

sentencing judge has no control. Commonwealth v. Leidig, 956 A.2d 399, 

404 (Pa. 2008). A guilty plea is not invalid merely because a defendant was 

not advised of the collateral consequences of his criminal conviction. Id. at 

402. 

This Commonwealth has long held that an operating privilege 

suspension is a collateral civil consequence. Commonwealth v. Duffey, 639 

A.2d 1174, 1176 (Pa. 1994) (“Courts of this Commonwealth have consistently 

recognized that a license suspension is a collateral civil consequence of a 

criminal conviction”); Commonwealth v. Englert, 457 A.2d 121, 123 (Pa. 

Super. 1983) (“The suspension of operating privileges is a collateral 
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consequence of a conviction for failing to stop at the scene of an accident in 

violation of 75 Pa. C.S. § 3743).

The trial court found that Santos knowingly pled guilty to causing an 

accident involving death or injury while not licensed, despite being unaware 

of the license suspension, because the suspension was a collateral civil 

consequence to a criminal conviction. Trial Court Opinion, 9/23/21, at 5. 

Santos argues, however, that the reasoning of Padilla compels the opposite 

result. We disagree. 

In Padilla, the Supreme Court of the United States considered whether 

a permanent resident defendant was deprived of his right to effective counsel 

when his attorney failed to inform him that a guilty plea to certain drug 

charges would lead to deportation. 559 U.S. at 359–360. It held that U.S.

law has “enmeshed criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation for 

nearly a century” and so deportation was “uniquely difficult to classify as either 

a direct or a collateral consequence.” Id. at 365–366. 

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has examined, in light of Padilla,

the direct/collateral consequence distinction in the context of statutory 

pension forfeiture triggered by a criminal conviction. Commonwealth v. 

Abraham, 62 A.3d 343 (Pa. 2012). It concluded that “Padilla did not 

abrogate application of such analysis in cases that do not involve deportation.” 

Id. at 350. More recently, the Court has specifically described operating 

license suspensions as “collateral civil consequences” that do not “constitute 

a portion of [a defendant’s] punishment” about which a criminal defendant 
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must be informed. Bell v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Transp., Bur. of 

Driver Licensing, 96 A.3d 1005, 1019 (Pa. 2014).

Santos does not even explain how Padilla should control other than to 

simply declare that a license suspension is “deeply enmeshed with a criminal 

conviction for accidents involving death or injury while not properly licensed.” 

Santos’ Brief at 9. More importantly, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania still 

considers license suspensions to be collateral civil consequences even after 

Padilla. Bell, supra. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion when it found Santos knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty 

and denied his motion to withdraw the plea.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/27/2022