U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 

Anthony A. Braga, Ph.D. 

Program in Criminal Justice 

Policy and Management 

John F. Kennedy School of 

Government, Harvard University 

Police Enforcement Strategies to 

Prevent Crime in Hot Spot Areas 

Crime Prevention 

Research Review No. 2 

The Campbell Collaboration 

The Campbell Collaboration Crime and Justice Group 
Suggested citation: 

Braga, Anthony A. Crime Prevention Research Review No. 

2: Police Enforcement Strategies to Prevent Crime in Hot Spot 

Areas. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice Office 

of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2008. 

The opinions contained herein are those of the author and 


do not necessarily represent the official position or policies 


of the U.S. Department of Justice. References to specific 


companies, products, or services should not be considered 


an endorsement by the author or the U.S. Department of 


Justice. Rather, the references are illustrations to supplement 


discussion of the issues. 


Cover crime-mapping illustration by Thomas Beretich.
 

Copyright 2008, DWI Resource Center, Inc.
 

ISBN: 978-1-935676-37-9 


The Campbell Collaboration Crime and Justice Group 


(http://campbellcollaboration.org/ccjg) is an international 


network of researchers that prepares, updates, and rapidly 


disseminates systematic reviews of high-quality research 


conducted worldwide on effective methods to reduce 


crime and delinquency and improve the quality of justice.
 

The Campbell Collaboration The Campbell Collaboration 

Crime and Justice Group 
Contents 

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
 

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
 

Identifying Evaluations of Hot Spots Policing Programs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
 

Characteristics of Hot Spots Policing Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
 

Effects of Hot Spots Policing Programs on Crime and Disorder . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
 

Displacement and Diffusion Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
 

Conclusion and Policy Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
 

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
 iii 

 

 

 

Acknowledgments
 

This research was supported by funds from the Smith Richardson Foundation. The author 

thanks Phyllis Schultze of Rutgers University’s Criminal Justice Library and Deborah 

Braga of the University of Massachusetts – Amherst for their assistance in completing the 

review. David Weisburd, David B. Wilson, Anthony Petrosino, Larry Sherman, Brandon 

Welsh, David Farrington, Matthew Lysakowski, and the anonymous reviewers also deserve 

thanks for making helpful comments on earlier iterations of this review. This paper briefly 

reviews the research on the crime-control effectiveness of hot spots policing programs. 

Readers interested in a more detailed assessment of the crime-prevention value of hot spots 

policing programs should refer to earlier published works (Braga, 2001, 2005) or consult 

the Campbell Crime and Justice Group web page for updated reviews (www.aic.gov. 

au/campbellcj/). 

A note regarding the Crime Prevention Research Review Series 

The research included in this Crime Prevention Research Review is limited to studies that 

use experimental or quasi-experimental designs and meet the criteria for rigor as laid out 

in The Campbell Collaboration Crime and Justice Group review criteria (see http://www. 

campbellcollaboration.org/guidelines.asp). It is important to note that other pieces of 

evidence regarding the effectiveness of various strategies were excluded from this research. 

The popular series of Problem-Oriented Guides for Police (POP Guides) published by the 

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (the COPS Office) differs significantly 

from this review because the standards for inclusion of evidence are less tied to the use of 

experimental designs and thus include a wider range of evidence. 

“Police Enforcement Strategies to Prevent Crime in Hot Spot Areas” is the second in the 

Crime Prevention Research Review Series. The first publication in the series is “Disrupting 

Street-Level Drug Markets.” Both are available from the COPS Office, www.cops.usdoj.gov. 

v 

 

 

 

 

 

Given the growing popularity of this approach to 

crime prevention, a review of existing evaluations 

of hot spots policing programs can help police 

executives and policymakers understand what 

works in preventing crime in hot spot areas. 

Introduction 
6 

Introduction 

Hot spots policing has become a very popular way for police departments to prevent 

crime. A Police Foundation report found that 7 in 10 departments with more than 100 

sworn officers reported using crime mapping to identify crime hot spots (Weisburd et al., 

2001). Recent research studies suggest that focused police interventions, such as directed 

patrols, proactive arrests, and problem-oriented policing, can produce significant gains in 

crime prevention at high-crime hot spots (Eck, 1997, 2002; Braga, 2002; Weisburd and 

Eck, 2004). Given the growing popularity of this approach to crime prevention, a review 

of existing evaluations of hot spots policing programs can help police executives and 

policymakers understand what works in preventing crime in hot spot areas. 

Police officers have long recognized the importance of place in crime problems. Police 

officers know the locations in their beats that tend to be trouble spots and are often very 

sensitive to signs of potential crimes across the places that comprise their beats. As Bittner 

(1970) suggests in his classic study of police work, some officers know “the shops, stores, 

warehouses, restaurants, hotels, schools, playgrounds, and other public places in such a way 

that they can recognize at a glance whether what is going on within them is within the range 

of normalcy.” At the organizational level, the traditional police response to such trouble 

spots typically included heightened levels of patrol and increased opportunistic arrests and 

investigations. Until recently, police crime-prevention strategies did not focus systematically 

on crime hot spots and did not seek to address the underlying conditions that give rise to 

high-activity crime places. 

Unlike most innovations in policing, the emergence of hot spots policing can be traced 

to the development of computerized mapping and database technologies and the growing 

academic interest in the importance of specific places in understanding crime problems 

(Weisburd and Braga, 2006). During the late 1980s and early 1990s, a number of research 

studies documented that crime is not spread evenly across city landscapes; rather, that 

crime clusters in very small places, or hot spots, that generate a disproportionate amount 

of criminal events (Pierce et al., 1988; Sherman, Gartin, and Buerger, 1989; Weisburd et 

al., 1992). In Minneapolis, for instance, only 3 percent of the city’s addresses accounted 

for 50 percent of calls for service to the police (Sherman, Gartin, and Buerger, 1989). 
In Jersey City, about 4 percent of streets and intersection areas generated nearly half of 

the city’s narcotics arrests and almost 42 percent of the disorder arrests (Weisburd and 

Green Mazerolle, 2000). Even in the most crime-ridden neighborhoods, crime clusters in 

a few discrete locations, while other areas are relatively crime free (Sherman, Gartin, and 

Buerger, 1989). A number of police policymakers and researchers have suggested that many 

crime problems can be reduced more efficiently if police officers focused their attention 

to these deviant places (Sherman and Weisburd, 1995; Weisburd and Green, 1995). The 

appeal of focusing limited resources on a small number of high-activity crime places is 

straightforward. If we can prevent crime at hot spot locations, then we might be able to 

reduce total crime. 

Hand-developed pin maps have been used widely in police departments for more than half 

a century (Weisburd and McEwen, 1997) and there are isolated examples of what today 

would be defined as hot spots policing in earlier periods (Weiss, 2001). A recent study by 

Weisburd and Lum (2005), however, suggests that the adoption of the hot spots policing 

strategy among larger police agencies during the late 1990s and early 2000s was linked to 

the extensive diffusion of innovation in computerized crime mapping and the dissemination 

of research studies documenting the potential effectiveness of preventing crime in hot spot 

areas. CompStat, a police management and accountability model that seeks to focus police 

organizations on specific problems and empower them to identify and solve those problems, 

was developed in 1994 by then Commissioner William Bratton and the New York City 

Police Department. The widespread adoption of CompStat in other police agencies can also 

be credited with growing practical interest in hot spots policing (Weisburd et al., 2001). 

Dealing with crime hot spots is now a common crime-prevention strategy engaged by many 

American police departments. 

7 

 

 

 

 

The appeal of focusing limited resources on a 

small number of high-activity crime places is 

straightforward. If we can prevent crime at hot 

spot locations, then we might be able to reduce 

total crime. 

Identifying Evaluations of Hot 

Spots Policing Programs 
10 

1

These evaluation designs permit the clearest assessments 

of “cause and effect” in determining whether hot spots 

policing programs prevent crime. These designs examine 

preprogram and postprogram measurements of crime 

outcomes in targeted locations relative to “control” 

locations. The control groups in the identified hot spots 

evaluations received routine levels of traditional police 

enforcement tactics. 

Identifying Evaluations of Hot Spots Policing Programs 

The effectiveness of focused police efforts to prevent crime in hot spot areas was examined 

by reviewing all available academic studies evaluating hot spots policing programs. To be 

eligible for this review, programs used to control crime hot spots were limited to police 

enforcement efforts. Suitable police enforcement efforts included traditional tactics such as 

directed patrol and heightened levels of traffic enforcement, as well as alternative strategies 

such as aggressive disorder enforcement and problem-oriented policing with limited 

situational responses and limited engagement of the public. To be included in this review 

of research, eligible problem-oriented policing initiatives must engage primarily traditional 

policing tactics such as law enforcement actions, informal counseling and cautioning, and 

referrals to other agencies. Problem-oriented policing programs that involved nontraditional 

interventions implemented by other stakeholders such as community members, business 

owners, or resident managers, were not considered because of the complexities of separating 

the crime-prevention effects associated with enforcement-based responses from communitybased responses. 

Eligible program evaluations were also limited to police programs that targeted small areas 

such as street corners, homes, apartment buildings, and subway stations. Police programs 

that focused on large areas, such as an entire neighborhood, were not considered. Identified 

studies were further screened to ensure that rigorous evaluation designs, such as randomized 

experiments and quasi-experiments, were used.1

 Particular attention was paid to studies that 

measured crime displacement effects and diffusion of crime-control benefit effects. Policing 

strategies focused on specific locations have been criticized as resulting in displacement 

(Repetto, 1976); that is, criminals at targeted locations would simply move around 

the corner to areas that were not protected by focused police attention. More recently, 

academics have observed that crime-prevention programs may result in the complete 

opposite of displacement—that crime-control benefits were greater than expected and spill 

over into places beyond the target areas (Clarke and Weisburd, 1994). 

The review was not restricted to a specific period and relevant studies written in languages 

other than English were obtained and translated wherever possible. Eligible studies include 

published as well as unpublished works (journal articles, theses/dissertations, reports, books, 
book chapters, and conference papers). See Braga (2001 and 2005) for further details of 

the systematic search methodology. A total of 697 article summaries were reviewed for any 

suggestion of an evaluation of a hot-spots policing program. Of the 697 summaries, 57 

were selected for closer review and the full-text reports, journal articles, and books for these 

evaluations were acquired and carefully assessed to determine whether the interventions 

involved focused police enforcement efforts at crime hot spots and whether the studies used 

rigorous evaluation designs. Using these methods, nine hot spots policing evaluations were 

identified and included in this review: 

1. Minneapolis Repeat Call Address Policing (RECAP) Program 


(Sherman, Buerger, and Gartin, 1989)
 

2. Minneapolis Hot-Spots Patrol Program (Sherman and Weisburd, 1995) 

3. Jersey City Drug Markets Analysis Program (DMAP) (Weisburd and Green, 1995) 

4. Jersey City Problem-Oriented Policing at Violent Places Project 


(Braga, Weisburd, Waring, Green Mazerolle, Spelman, and Gajewski, 1999)
 

5. St. Louis Problem-Oriented Policing (POP) in Three Drug Market Locations Study 

(Hope, 1994) 

6. Kansas City Gun Project (Sherman and Rogan, 1995a) 

7. Kansas City Crack House Police Raids Program (Sherman and Rogan, 1995b) 

8. Houston Targeted Beat Program (Caeti, 1999) 

9. Beenleigh (Australia) Calls for Service Project (Criminal Justice Commission, 1998) 

11 

 

 

 

 

The enforcement problem-oriented policing strategy 

resulted in significant reductions in total calls for 

service and total crime incidents, as well as varying 

reductions in all subcategories of crime types. 

Characteristics of the 

Hot-Spots Policing Programs 
14 

Characteristics of the Hot-Spots Policing Programs 

The nine evaluations were conducted in five large cities in the United States and one suburb 

in Australia. Police programs to prevent crime at hot spots fell into three broad categories: 

enforcement problem-oriented policing programs, directed and aggressive patrol programs, 

and police crackdowns and raids (Table 1). The effects of problem-oriented policing 

initiatives comprising mostly traditional tactics with limited situational responses were 

evaluated in the Minneapolis RECAP Program, Jersey City POP at Violent Places Study, 

St. Louis POP at Drug Market Locations Study, and the Beenleigh (Australia) Calls for 

Service Project. The evaluation of the Houston Targeted Beat Program examined the effects 

of three types of police strategies applied in different target areas; these strategies included 

high-visibility patrol, “zero tolerance” disorder policing, and enforcement problem-oriented 

policing. The Kansas City Gun Project examined the gun violence-prevention effects of 

proactive patrol and intensive enforcement of firearms laws through safety frisks during 

traffic stops, plain-view searches and seizures, and searches incident to arrests on other 

charges. The Minneapolis Hot-Spots Patrol program evaluated the effects of increased levels 

of preventive patrol on crime. The Jersey City DMAP and Kansas City Crack House Raids 

programs evaluated the effects of well-planned crackdowns on street-level drug markets and 

court-authorized raids on crack houses, respectively. 

The nine evaluations used crime-incident report data and citizen emergency calls for service 

data as official indicators of crime. Although official data are widely used for assessing trends 

and patterns of crime, these data do have shortcomings. For instance, crime-incident data 

are biased by police decisions not to record all crimes reported by citizens (Black, 1970). 

Call data are subject to both underreporting (e.g., a lack of telephones in poverty-stricken 

places) and overreporting (e.g., two separate calls reporting the same incident risk being 

counted as two distinct events; see Sherman, Gartin, and Buerger, 1989; Klinger and 

Bridges, 1997). Call data, however, are suggested to be more reliable measures of crime and 

crime-related activity than incident data or arrest data (Pierce, Spaar, and Briggs, 1988). 

Most notably, citizen calls for service are affected less heavily by police discretion than other 

official data sources (Warner and Pierce, 1993); therefore, call data are often regarded as “the 

widest ongoing data collection net for criminal events in the city” (Sherman, Gartin, and 

Buerger, 1989: 35). 
Table 1: Hot Spots Policing Programs. Source:Adapted from Braga (2001). 

Study Program Elements 

Minneapolis (MN) RECAP 

Sherman, Buerger, and 

Gartin (1989) 

Problem-oriented policing to control crime at high-activity 

addresses; interventions comprised mostly traditional enforcement 

tactics with some situational responses. 

Minneapolis (MN) 

Hot Spots 

Sherman and Weisburd (1995 

Increased uniformed police patrol in crime hot spot areas; 

treatment group, on average, experienced twice as much patrol 

presence as the control group. 

Jersey City (NJ) DMAP 

Weisburd and Green (1995) 

Well-planned crackdowns on street-level drug markets followed by 

preventive patrol to maintain crime control gains 

Jersey City (NJ) 

POP at Violent Places 

Braga et al. (1999) 

Problem-oriented policing to prevent crime at violent hot 

spot areas; interventions comprised mostly aggressive disorder 

enforcement tactics with some situational responses. 

St. Louis (MO) 

POP in Three Drug Areas 

Hope (1994) 

Problem-oriented policing to prevent crime at three high-drug 

activity addresses; interventions comprised mostly traditional 

enforcement tactics with some situational responses. 

Kansas City (MO) 

Crack House Raids 

Sherman and Rogan (1995a) 

Court-authorized raids on crack houses conducted by uniformed 

police officers. 

Kansas City (MO) 

Gun Project 

Sherman and Rogan (1995b) 

Intensive enforcement of laws against illegally carrying concealed 

firearms in targeted beat through safety frisks during traffic stops, 

plain view, and searches incident to arrest on other charges. 

Houston (TX) 

Targeted Beat Program 

Caeti (1999) 

Patrol initiative designed to reduce Index crimes in seven beats: 

Three beats used “high visibility patrol” at hot spots 

Three beats used “zero tolerance” policing at hot spots 

One beat used a problem-oriented policing approach that 

comprised mostly traditional tactics to control hot spots. 

Beenleigh (AUS) 

Calls for Service Project 

Criminal Justice Commission (1998) 

Problem-oriented policing to control crime at high-activity crime 

addresses; interventions comprised mostly traditional enforcement 

tactics with some situational responses. 

15 

 

 

 

 

 

The Jersey City DMAP Program found that 

well-planned crackdowns in street-level drug 

markets followed by patrol maintenance 

resulted in significant reductions in disorder 

calls for service. 

Effects of Hot Spots Policing 

Programs on Crime 

and Disorder 
18 

 

2

Meta-analysis is a technique used to investigate overall 

program effects associated with a selected set of studies 

(see Lipsey and Wilson, 2001). 

Effects of Hot Spots Policing Programs on Crime and Disorder 

Noteworthy crime reductions were reported in seven of the nine selected studies (see Table 

2). A meta-analysis of hot spots policing experiments revealed significant overall prevention 

effects of hot spots policing programs in reducing citizen calls for service (Braga, 2005).2 

The strongest gains in crime control were reported in the Jersey City POP at Violent Places 

Study and the Kansas City Gun Project. In the Jersey City POP Study, the enforcement 

problem-oriented policing strategy resulted in significant reductions in total calls for service 

and total crime incidents, as well as varying reductions in all subcategories of crime types 

(Braga et al., 1999). Additional analyses of observation data collected over the course of the 

evaluation revealed that social disorder, such as loiterers and public drinkers, and physical 

disorder, such as trash, graffiti, and vacant lots, was also reduced significantly. Proactive 

patrols focused on firearm recoveries in the Kansas City Gun Project resulted in a 65 

percent increase in gun seizures and a 49 percent decrease in gun crimes in the target beat 

area; gun seizures and gun crimes in the comparison beat area did not change significantly 

(Sherman and Rogan 1995a). A separate study examined community reaction to the Kansas 

City intervention and found that the community strongly supported the intensive patrols 

and perceived an improvement in the quality of life in the treatment neighborhood (Shaw, 

1995). 

The Minneapolis Hot Spots Patrol Program revealed that roughly doubling the level of 

patrol in crime hot spots resulted in modest, but significant, reductions in total calls for 

service, ranging from 6 percent to 13 percent (Sherman and Weisburd, 1995). Moreover, 

systematic observations of the hot spots documented that disorderly behavior in the targeted 

areas was also reduced (Sherman and Weisburd, 1995). The Jersey City DMAP Program 

found that well-planned crackdowns in street-level drug markets followed by patrol 

maintenance resulted in significant reductions in disorder calls for service (Weisburd and 

Green, 1995). Similarly, the St. Louis POP quasi-experiment found that the enforcement 

problem-oriented policing strategy was associated with varying degrees of reductions in total 

calls for service at all three high-activity drug locations; these reductions were greater than 

any reductions observed in other blocks and intersections in the surrounding areas (Hope, 

1994). The Kansas City Crack House Raid experiment reported modest decreases in citizen 

calls for service and crime offenses at the targeted blocks that decayed within 2 weeks of the 

raids (Sherman and Rogan, 1995b). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Houston Targeted Beat Program suggests that the aggregated target beats experienced 

significant reductions in auto theft, total Part I index crimes, and total Part I “patrol 

suppressible” crimes (robbery, burglary, and auto theft) (Caeti, 1999). The targeted beats 

where “zero tolerance” aggressive disorder policing was used to control hot spots experienced 

mixed reductions in Part I crimes; the three targeted beats where “high-visibility” directed 

patrol was used to control hot spots experienced reductions in a wide variety of Part I 

crimes; the one targeted beat where an enforcement problem-oriented policing strategy was 

implemented to control hot spots did not experience noteworthy decreases. The limits of 

the analytic framework used in this evaluation preclude conclusions that certain types of 

policing strategies may be more effective in preventing crime in hot spots (see Braga, 2001). 

Nevertheless, the results of this study can be broadly taken to support the position that 

focused police enforcement efforts can be effective in reducing crime at hot spots. 

The evaluation of the Beenleigh Calls for Service Project found no noteworthy differences 

in the total number of calls in the town of Beenleigh relative to the matched town of 

Brown Plains (Criminal Justice Commission, 1998); however, simple comparisons found 

noteworthy reductions in total citizen calls for service in 16 of 19 case studies included in 

the report. The research team concluded that the problem-oriented policing strategy enjoyed 

some success in reducing calls for service at the targeted locations, but because of the small 

scale of the project and limitations of the research design, these crime-prevention gains were 

not large enough to be detected at the aggregate town level (Criminal Justice Commission, 

1998). 

The Minneapolis RECAP evaluation revealed no significant differences in the prevalence of 

citizen calls for service at addresses that received the problem-oriented policing treatment 

(Sherman, Buerger, and Gartin, 1989). These results were probably caused by methodological 

problems in the research design, such as the assignment of too many cases to the RECAP unit, 

thereby outstripping the amount of resources and attention the police officers provided to 

each address (Buerger, 1993). Although the overall findings suggest that the RECAP program 

was not effective in preventing crime, a case study analysis revealed that several addresses 

experienced dramatic reductions in total calls for service (Buerger, 1992). 

19 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 2: Results of Hot Spots Policing Evaluations. Source:Adapted from Braga (2001). 

20 

Study Crime Other Displacement / 

Outcomes Outcomes Diffusion 

Minneapolis (MN) RECAP No effect. None. Not measured. 

Sherman, Buerger, and 

Gartin (1989) 

Minneapolis (MN) Reductions in total citizen Observational data Not measured. 

Hot Spots calls for service. revealed reductions 

Sherman and Weisburd (1995 in crime and disorder. 

Jersey City (NJ) DMAP 

Weisburd and Green (1995) 

Reductions in citizen calls 

for disorder offenses. 

None. Little evidence of 

displacement; analyses 

suggest modest diffusion 

of crime-control benefits. 

Jersey City (NJ) Reductions in total calls Observational data Little evidence of 

POP at Violent Places for service and total crime revealed reductions immediate spatial 

Braga et al. (1999) incidents.All subcategories 

of crime experienced 

in social and physical 

disorder. 

displacement. Possible 

diffusion of crime-control 

varying reductions. benefits. 

St. Louis (MO) All three drug locations None. One location experienced 

POP in Three Drug Areas experienced varying significant displacement. 

Hope (1994) reductions in total calls. 

Kansas City (MO) 

Crack House Raids 

Sherman and Rogan (1995a) 

Modest decreases in citizen 

calls and offense reports that 

decayed in 2 weeks 

None. Not measured. 

Kansas City (MO) 

Gun Project 

Sherman and Rogan (1995b) 

Increase in number of 

guns seized by the police 

followed by decrease in gun 

crimes. 

Community survey 

revealed favorable 

opinion of police 

efforts. 

No significant crime 

displacement. 

Diffusion effects reported. 

Houston (TX) Aggregated targeted beats None. No evidence of 

Targeted Beat Program experienced significant crime displacement. 

Caeti (1999) reductions. Specific beats 

reported mixed results. Diffusion effects reported 

Beenleigh (AUS) 

Calls for Service Project 

Criminal Justice Commission 

(1998) 

No noteworthy differences 

in total number of calls 

between Beenleigh and 

Brown Plains areas. 

Noteworthy reductions in 

calls reported in majority of 

case studies. 

None. Not measured. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Displacement and Diffusion Effects 

Five studies examined whether focused police efforts were associated with crime displacement 

or diffusion of crime-control benefits (see Table 2). Prior to a discussion of the research 

findings, it must be noted that it is very difficult to detect displacement effects because the 

potential manifestations of displacement are quite diverse. As Barr and Pease (1990) suggest, 

“if, in truth, displacement is complete, some displaced crime will fall outside the areas and 

types of crime being studied or be so dispersed as to be masked by background variation... 

no research study, however massive, is likely to resolve the issue.” Diffusion effects are likely 

to be as difficult to assess. All five studies were limited to examining immediate spatial 

displacement and diffusion effects; that is, whether focused police efforts in targeted areas 

resulted in crime “moving around the corner” or whether these surrounding areas experienced 

unintended crime-control benefits. 

None of the five studies reported substantial immediate spatial displacement of crime 

into areas surrounding the targeted locations. Four studies suggested possible diffusion 

effects associated with the focused police interventions. The Jersey City POP at Violent 

Places experiment found little evidence of displacement in surrounding areas and reported 

significant decreases in total calls for service and disorder calls for service in surrounding 

areas. The Jersey City DMAP evaluation found significant decreases in public morals3 calls for 

service and narcotics calls for service in areas immediately surrounding the targeted drug hot 

spots. The Kansas City Gun Project evaluation examined whether gun crimes were displaced 

into seven beats contiguous to the target beat. None of the contiguous beats showed 

significant increases in gun crime and two of the contiguous beats reported significant 

decreases in gun crimes. 

The Houston Targeted Beat quasi-experiment also examined displacement and diffusion 

effects by analyzing reported Part I index crimes in beats contiguous to the targeted beats. 

The analyses revealed no overall evidence of displacement and contiguous beats surrounding 

three targeted beats (one problem-oriented policing beat and two zero-tolerance beats) 

experienced possible diffusion effects as several types of reported Index crimes decreased 

notably. The St. Louis POP at Drug Locations quasi-experiment assessed displacement effects 

by comparing trends in calls for service at targeted addresses to nontargeted addresses on 

21 

3

“Public morals” calls for service represented a 

subcategory of disorder calls for service in the 

Jersey City DMAP evaluation. According to 

Weisburd and Green (1995), public morals calls 

for service included citizen reports of gambling, 

lewdness, possession of liquor, and prostitution. 
 

 

 

 

22 

the same block. Significant increases in calls for service at nontargeted addresses on the same 

block were reported in only one of the three analyses. The primary cause of the observed 

displacement was a shift in drug sales from a targeted apartment building to a similar 

nontargeted apartment building on the same block. 
 

 

 

 

The results of this systematic review support 

the assertion that focusing police efforts on 

high-activity crime places can be used to 

good effect in preventing crime. 

Conclusion and Policy 

Implications 
24 

Conclusion and Policy Implications 

The results of this systematic review support the assertion that focusing police efforts on 

high-activity crime places can be used to good effect in preventing crime. Seven of the nine 

evaluations reported noteworthy reductions in crime and disorder. Problems in the research 

and evaluation design probably accounted for the lack of crime-prevention gains in the 

Minneapolis RECAP experiment. This review also supports the growing body of research 

evidence that suggests that focused crime-prevention efforts do not inevitably lead to the 

displacement of crime problems (Clarke and Weisburd 1994; Hesseling 1994; Eck 1993); 

rather, when displacement was measured, it was quite limited and often unintended crimeprevention benefits were associated with the hot spots policing programs. While only five 

studies examined potential displacement and diffusion effects, none of these evaluations 

reported substantial immediate spatial displacement of crime into areas surrounding the 

targeted locations. The National Research Council’s Committee to Review Research on 

Police Policy and Practices examined the results of an earlier and more detailed version of 

this review (Braga, 2001) and concluded that there was “strong empirical support for the 

hot spots policing approach” to crime prevention (Skogan and Frydl, 2004: 240). 

While the available evidence supports the assertion that hot spots policing is effective, 

there are important gaps in our knowledge about it. Clearly, the enforcement-oriented 

strategies reviewed here work in preventing crime. We do not know, however, which 

enforcement strategies are more effective in preventing crime and under what circumstances 

certain strategies are more appropriate. For instance, we do not know whether many of 

the observed crime-control gains were generated by increased arrests, increased contacts 

with potential offenders, or simply increased police presence in very small areas. This 

small body of evaluation research also does not unravel the important question of whether 

enforcement-oriented programs result in long-term crime reductions in hot spot areas. 

Comparison periods to detect potential crime-prevention effects ranged from only 1 month 

(Sherman and Rogan, 1995b) to 1 year (Sherman and Weisburd, 1995). 

This review also offers little insight into the effectiveness of enforcement tactics relative to 

other broader-based community problem-solving policing programs (Skogan and Hartnett, 

1997). Research suggests that a variety of situational factors causes crime to cluster at 
particular places (Eck and Weisburd, 1995). Proactive patrols, raids, and crackdowns 

specifically do not address the site features (such as easy access, lack of capable guardians, 

inept or improper place management, and the presence of value items) and facilities (such 

as the presence of abandoned buildings and bars) that cause specific locations to generate 

high volumes of crime. With the exception of the problem-oriented policing programs with 

limited situational interventions, the place-oriented interventions in this review consisted 

of uniform tactics applied across varied places. Perhaps a greater focus on changing the 

conditions that cause crime to cluster might result in longer lasting crime reductions in hot 

spot areas. 

The recent National Research Council review of police policy and practices also suggests that 

the most generalized strategies—for example, preventive patrol and drug raids—are likely to 

have less impact than approaches that include more focused problem-solving elements, such 

as working with landlords, local business owners, and residents (Skogan and Frydl, 2004). 

Our understanding of the effects of hot spots policing, however, remains very general. If we 

are to maximize the crime-prevention effects of hot spots approaches we need to examine 

carefully the interaction of different strategies with different hot spots settings. This effort 

would demand a large group of studies, but given the promise of hot spots policing, such 

an investment in research in this area seems appropriate. Future studies should examine the 

monetary costs associated with implementing these programs. In the studies reviewed here, 

very little attention was paid to issues such as staffing, overtime costs, and other related 

expenditures.4 

Also, too little attention has been paid to the potential harmful effects of hot spots 

approaches. Police effectiveness studies traditionally have overlooked the effects of policing 

practices on citizen perceptions of police legitimacy (Tyler, 2000; Tyler, 2001). Does the 

concentration of police enforcement in specific hot spots lead citizens to question the 

fairness of police practices? There is some evidence that residents of areas that are subject 

to hot spots policing welcome the concentration of police efforts in problem places (Shaw, 

1995); however, focused aggressive police enforcement strategies have been criticized as 

resulting in increased citizen complaints about police misconduct and abuse of force in New 

York City (Greene, 1999). Citizen appraisals of police legitimacy are greatly influenced by 

whether community members perceive that they were treated fairly and with respect and 

25 

4

For instance, in the Kansas City Gun Study, the 

evaluators note that the intervention was funded 

by a U.S. Bureau of Justice Assistance Weed and 

Seed grant to the Kansas City (Missouri) Police 

Department (Sherman and Rogan, 1995a). While 

the evaluation notes that the program budget paid for 

police overtime and extra patrol cars in the targeted 

areas, there is no discussion of specific dollar amounts 

or the cost-effectiveness of the approach. 
26 

dignity by police officers (Tyler, 2000; Tyler, 2001). As in the case of understanding the 

effectiveness of police strategies, the potential effects of hot spots policing on legitimacy 

may depend in good part on the types of strategies used and the context of the hot 

spots affected. But whatever the effects, we need to know more about the effects of hot 

spots policing approaches on the communities that the police serve. Police executives 

considering enforcement-oriented hot spots policing initiatives should engage the 

community in the development of the program and train officers in fair and respectful 

policing techniques. 

Finally, the research overall strongly supports the position that hot spots policing can 

have a meaningful effect on crime without simply displacing crime-control benefits to 

areas nearby. However, a recent study, which reinforces the findings that there is little 

immediate spatial displacement of crime as a result of hot spots policing approaches, 

identifies other displacement outcomes that may occur in focused policing efforts 

(Weisburd et al., 2006). Offenders interviewed in the study described factors that 

inhibited spatial displacement, including the importance of familiar territory to 

offenders and the social organization of illicit activities at hot spots that often precluded 

easy movement to other areas that offer opportunities for crime. Prostitutes, for example, 

were found to work near their homes, and described being uncomfortable in moving 

to other areas where different kinds of people worked and different kinds of clients 

were found. Prostitutes and drug dealers in the study described the importance of 

the familiarity of a place to their clients, and some offenders talked of the dangers of 

encroaching on the territories of offenders in other hot spots. 

Overall, a number of factors seemed to discourage spatial displacement in the study. 

Nonetheless, Weisburd et al. (2006) find that offenders will often try other modes 

of adaptation to police interventions, the most common being a change in methods 

of committing illegal acts. Prostitutes and drug dealers, for example, may begin to 

make “appointments” with their customers, or move their activities indoors to avoid 

heightened police activities on the street. While the net gain in crime prevention may 

still be large for hot spots efforts, these findings suggest the importance of continued 

investigation of possible nonspatial displacement (e.g., method displacement) outcomes 

in hot spots policing. 
References
 
28 

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