About the Report

This report briefly examines the historical aspects of 

Afghanistan’s neutrality as an initial step toward a more 

comprehensive study of desirability and feasibility of neutralitybased diplomatic solutions for conflict in Afghanistan. 

The research and discussions conducted for the study were 

supported by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). 

The author also thanks the management of Afghanistan Centre 

at Kabul University for their kind and invaluable assistance. 

About the Author

Nasir A. Andisha is a visiting fellow at the School of 

International, Political & Strategic Studies at the Australian 

National University (ANU) in Canberra and a candidate for a 

doctoral degree in diplomatic studies at the ANU Asia-Pacific 

College of Diplomacy. A senior career Afghan diplomat, Andisha 

was a Fulbright fellow at the Bush School of Government 

in Texas A&M University and taught International Relations 

and Economics at the Al-Berony University in Kapisa and the 

Foreign Ministry ’s Institute of Diplomacy in Kabul. 

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 360 March 2015

© 2015 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Contents

Definitions, Scope, and Practice 2

Types of Neutrality 2

Efforts and Proposals, 1980–2013 4

Foreign Policy 6

Neutralism and Nonalignment 10

Conclusion 12

Nasir A. Andisha

Neutrality in Afghanistan’s 

Foreign Policy

Summary

• The planned withdrawal of U.S. combat troops by the end of 2016 and a declining international engagement leave Afghanistan once again vulnerable to increasing competition from 

neighboring and regional states for strategic influence in the country.

• Given Afghanistan’s geographic location and historical neutral status, experts have argued 

that an internationally guaranteed neutrality offers a least-worst but workable long-term 

solution to the problem of proxy conflict in the country.

• Historically, one form of neutrality, known as bitarafi in Farsi/Dari, has often been considered 

a pillar of Afghanistan’s foreign and security policy. Although a formal foreign and security 

policy, bitarafi was a continuation of a colonially imposed buffer policy aimed at maintaining 

a balance between competing external powers.

• Except during the two world wars, Afghanistan’s traditional neutrality has not fully

conformed to the definitions and types of neutrality practiced by other neutral states. Conceptually, Afghanistan’s traditional neutrality evolved into positive neutrality, neutralism, 

and nonalignment.

• Given the history of invasions and regional interferences in Afghanistan and the fragility of 

its state institutions today, Afghan government leaders are apprehensive about making the 

country a neutral state.

• Continuation of international support is vital to sustaining Afghan state institutions. Policymakers in the new unity government, however, recognize that lasting peace and stability and 

regional cooperation require regional solutions.

Introduction

President Obama’s decision to withdraw all U.S. combat troops from Afghanistan by the end of 

2016, as well as an expected decline in civilian aid, leaves the field wide open once again for 

neighboring and regional states to intensify their race for strategic influence in the country. 

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT
2 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 360

In the past, these zero-sum rivalries have fed proxy wars and impeded the consensus necessary among Afghans to maintain internal stability. The recent transfer of authority, however 

contested the process, from long-serving President Hamid Karzai to today’s national unity 

team headed by Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah seems to have avoided a relapse into 

conflict. Such a fragile political consensus, however, means that Afghanistan is still vulnerable 

to internal insurgent threats and outside interference in its affairs.

It has been argued, by international diplomats in particular, that an internationally guaranteed neutrality offers a least-worst but workable long-term resolution to Afghanistan’s proneness to proxy conflict.1 Afghanistan’s geographic location positions it, at least potentially, as 

a facilitator for wider regional economic cooperation, an initiative most recently backed by 

the ongoing Heart of Asia or Istanbul Process. Proponents of permanent neutrality argue that 

it would ensure state stability and integrity, alleviate security and strategic concerns of major 

regional stakeholders, and neutralize the contest among regional competitors. They assert that 

that past periods of stability have generally coincided with some form of neutrality policy and 

that a return to neutrality could thus be a return to normalcy and stability.

However, a deeper evaluation and an examination of initiatives and proposals since the 

1979 Soviet occupation challenge these assumptions. A cursory look at successful neutral 

states reveals that, beyond a geostrategic location, other factors are necessary to maintain 

neutrality, including internal cohesion, acceptance by regional powers, and the perceived 

military capability of the neutral state to defend itself. To date, geopolitical tensions and 

deep-rooted mistrust among regional stakeholders have rendered regional cooperation 

initiatives and solutions ineffective and have left Afghanistan vulnerable to intervention.

Ultimately, permanent neutrality as a compromise solution for the future of Afghanistan 

requires more than a declaration of intent. Neutrality cannot be a long-term solution until 

strength and political cohesion are established in the near term.

Definitions, Scope, and Practice

Neutrality at its most basic is “the state of not supporting or helping either side in a conflict.” 2

In the context of international law and interstate relations, it is defined as a wartime political 

position involving legal duties and responsibilities. An early definition included 

observance of a strict and honest impartiality, so as not to afford advantage in the 

war to either party; and particularly in so far restraining its trade to the accustomed 

course which is held in time of peace, as not to render assistance to one of the 

belligerents in escaping the effects of the other’s hostilities. Even a loan of money to 

one of the belligerent parties is considered a violation of neutrality.3

The rights and duties of neutral states and persons during war were further codified by 

the Hague Convention of 1907 as “the first embodiment of neutral rights and duties under 

positivist international law.” 4 Although traditional legal definitions focus mainly on negative rights of neutrals during war—in other words, what neutrals should not do—recent 

definitions allow for a more positive and constructive role of the neutral state as an honest 

broker capable of offering good offices and mediating between belligerents.5 Neutrality is 

thus not only a wartime legal status but also a peacetime political and diplomatic posture.

Types of Neutrality

The scope and nature of neutrality have evolved over time, and various subtypes—such as 

neutralization, neutralism, armed neutrality, positive neutrality, nonaligned, military nonThe views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital 

worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others 

with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

Stephen J. Hadley, (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, LLC, 

Washington, DC • George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct 

Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, DC • Judy Ansley, Former Assistant to the President and 

Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. Bush, Washington, DC • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner 

in Residence, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International 

Studies, Washington, DC • Joseph Eldridge, University Chaplain 

and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, School of International 

Service, American University, Washington, DC • Kerry Kennedy, 

President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human 

Rights, Washington, DC • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care 

Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, NV • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham 

H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford 

University, Palo Alto, CA • John A. Lancaster, Former Executive 

Director, International Council on Independent Living, Potsdam, 

NY • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason 

University, Fairfax, VA • J. Robinson West, Chairman, PFC 

Energy, Washington, DC • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice 

President, Leadership Conference on Civil and 

Human Rights, Washington, DC 

Members Ex Officio

John Kerry, Secretary of State • Ashton Carter, Secretary of 

Defense • Gregg F. Martin, Major General, U.S. Army; President, 

National Defense University • Nancy Lindborg, President, 

United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 360 3

aligned, non-allied—have emerged.6 The meaning has also been stretched to accommodate 

states’ interests and changes in global politics.7

Based on their legal and political dimensions, policies have been divided into three 

broad categories: neutralization or permanent neutrality, neutralism or nonalignment, and 

neutrality or militarily un-aligned. Each type can, depending on the depth of analysis, be 

further divided into subcategories.

Neutralization is the formal and strict type of neutrality practiced during both war and 

peace. It is also referred to as permanent neutrality or perpetual neutrality. A neutralized 

state is defined as

A state whose political independence and territorial integrity is guaranteed 

permanently by a collective agreement of great powers, subject to conditions 

that the neutralized state will not take up arms against another state, except to 

defend itself, and will not assume treaty obligations which may compromise its 

neutralized status.8

Official and internationally recognized agreements distinguish formal legal neutrality 

from other types. It can be either self-declared and externally recognized and guaranteed or 

externally proscribed and guaranteed with some tacit understanding and acceptance by the 

country. Switzerland’s neutrality is a classic example of the first type. Belgium, Luxembourg, 

Austria, and Laos—at various times—have been instances of the second. Turkmenistan’s 

proclamation of permanent neutrality appears notionally similar to that of Switzerland in 

that it is self-declared and externally recognized. Legally and practically, however, the two 

are quite different. Swiss permanent neutrality was recognized and guaranteed by major 

European powers in 1815. Turkmenistan’s permanent neutrality was endorsed merely in a 

nonbinding UN general assembly resolution in 1996.

Neutralism was a Cold War phenomenon, expressed through the Non-Aligned Movement 

(NAM), and refers to a policy of distancing oneself from the East-West conflict while trying 

to maintain an independent outlook toward global issues. Neutralism, in the eyes of its proponents, such as India, Indonesia, the former Yugoslavia, Egypt, and others, was an attempt 

to “remove or, at least, mitigate some of the harshness of the Cold War struggle.” 9 In its 

essence, neutralism is a political and diplomatic posture and has no legal implications. Since 

the nonaligned countries defined this version of neutrality in relation to the Cold War power 

struggle and colonialism, their relevance as a group in the post-Cold war era has declined 

significantly and their actions in foreign policy, especially at a regional level, have often 

lost any character of neutrality.

Neutral or militarily un-aligned refers to the classical form declared and observed during 

major wars, legal obligations being enshrined in the provisions of The Hague convention 

and enforced only for the period of war. This category includes states that prefer to remain 

neutral after cessation of war and that declare their peacetime neutrality in internal legislation without seeking international recognition or guarantee. In the past, Sweden, Ireland, 

and Finland have described themselves as neutral states this way.

An Evaluation

Some form of neutrality has often been considered one of the pillars of Afghanistan’s 

foreign and security policy. Throughout the nineteenth century, Afghanistan was a buffer 

state separating the territories of the rival British and Russian empires in the region. Since 

regaining full independence in 1919—in particular independence in making its own foreign 

policy—almost all rulers of Afghanistan have advocated some form of neutrality in their 

official policy statements.10

Since regaining full independence 

in 1919, almost all rulers of 

Afghanistan have advocated 

some form of neutrality in their 

official policy statements.
4 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 360

However, except during the two world wars, Afghanistan’s traditional neutrality does not 

fully conform to the identified formal definitions. Instead, in the parlance of Afghanistan’s 

foreign policy, the term neutrality was transliterated from the Persian word bitarafi (without 

sides). Louis Dupree, a prominent scholar of Afghanistan’s history, believed that bitarafi was 

not synonymous with neutrality but rather meant “without sides in great powers’ conflicts.” 

11 In practice, after World War II the term bitarafi was used to denote both a policy of nonalignment and a policy of balancing between neighboring powers.

Afghanistan’s tradition of bitarafi is usually associated with what is called the Era of Tranquility, which lasted from 1929 to 1978.12 However, it is difficult to ascertain whether this 

period was a direct consequence of neutrality or the product of an environment of domestic 

and international stability.

Afghanistan declared and observed a strict wartime neutrality during both world wars 

and remained impartial during the postwar ideological confrontations, striving to maintain 

balanced relations between the East and the West. It shifted toward neutralism and joined 

the NAM. The 1978 communist coup d’état and the subsequent Soviet military invasion disrupted that equilibrium and placed Afghanistan at the center of East-West active hostility, 

triggering a cycle of violence and conflicts that continues to plague the region today.13

In the past three decades, a number of policymakers and scholars have argued that a 

return to neutrality will restore stability and tranquility in Afghanistan and attempts have 

been made to turn it into a permanently neutral state. 

Efforts and Proposals, 1980–2013

In Afghanistan, neutrality has repeatedly been proposed for security and balance of power 

in the region. Most of the efforts have been initiated by outside powers, often during situations of crisis or toward the end of foreign interventions.

One of the first attempts was a U.S.-supported and British-led neutralization initiative 

in the immediate aftermath of the 1979 Soviet invasion.14 The initiative was put forward 

by the British foreign secretary, Lord Carrington, in the midst of international fury over 

the invasion. It envisaged that an agreement on neutralization, modeled after the 1955 

agreement on Austria,15 could end the Soviet military occupation and pave the way for a 

face-saving withdrawal of the Soviet forces.16 The initiative, which included an immediate 

military withdrawal, was swiftly rejected by both the Soviet leadership and the communist 

regime in Kabul on the grounds that it was a plot by the West to undo the “revolution” 

and reestablish Western influence.17

The next attempt came in the wake of the Soviet military withdrawal in 1988. This time 

the initiative was conceived in Moscow but officially proposed by the regime in Kabul. President Mohammad Najibullah called on the Secretary General of the UN to hold an international conference to discuss the reinstatement and confirmation of Afghanistan’s permanent 

neutrality and to work out an international assistance program in support of a peace and 

reconciliation program.18 At the domestic level, Najibullah instructed Afghanistan’s Academy of Science in May 1989 to study the feasibility of adopting a policy of demilitarized 

permanent neutrality. A year later, in May 1990, the constitution was amended to reflect 

the regime’s desire for neutralization and demilitarization. An entire new chapter in the 

amended constitution was dedicated to foreign policy and, for the first time in the country’s 

history, the term permanent neutrality featured in its constitution.19

Although Najibullah managed to secure consensus among his elites on the declaration, 

the initiative did not attract serious regional and international support. Western capitals 

and Afghan resistance forces in fact predicted an imminent collapse of the Kabul regime 

In the past three decades, a 

number of policymakers and 

scholars have argued that a 

return to neutrality will restore 

stability and tranquility in 

Afghanistan and attempts have 

been made to turn it into a 

permanently neutral state. 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 360 5

soon after the withdrawal of Soviet forces.20 At that juncture, with the Soviet Union on the 

verge of collapse, neither Kabul nor Moscow had enough political capital to garner wider 

support for such an ambitious proposal.

The failure of both initiatives indicate that as long as any of the conflicting parties believe 

that a victory is achievable on the battlefield, accepting neutrality as the basis for a solution 

to a conflict or political crisis is out of the question. Consensus on a neutrality declaration 

therefore requires a military stalemate accompanied by diplomatic leverage and perseverance.

These two cases were conceived by diplomatic actors. Additional neutralization proposals 

have been raised in Track 2 diplomacy and scholarly discussions. After the failure of Lord 

Carrington’s initiative in the early 1980s, Selig Harrison, an American scholar and South 

Asia expert, declared that a “Finland-style arrangement”—a softer and more Soviet-friendly 

version of neutralization, which could include a phased withdrawal of Soviet forces, with a 

medium-term return to Afghanistan’s policy of bitarafi—could win Moscow’s acceptance.21

Harrison believed that such an arrangement would be possible only if the Soviet Union pursued limited objectives in Afghanistan and if the leadership in Moscow was serious about 

finding a consensus solution to conflict in Afghanistan rather than relying on the total victory of its client government there. These assumptions turned out to be false.

Another noted but unofficial appeal came at the height of the Taliban and al-Qaeda’s 

power in Afghanistan. In a June 2000 hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign 

Relations,22 Peter Tomsen, former U.S. envoy for the Afghan resistance, urged Washington 

to encourage and support international negotiations aimed at removing Afghanistan from 

regional rivalries. Like Carrington in the 1980s, Tomsen proposed that the “1955 State Treaty 

on Austrian Neutrality” might be a useful model.23 However, neither the Clinton administration nor the George W. Bush administration had any visible foreign policy interest in 

Afghanistan from 1992 to September 2001. Tomsen’s proposal went unheeded.24

During the decade plus of U.S. intervention in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks, 

the only country to occasionally speak about Afghanistan’s neutrality was Russia. While 

supporting the international security and reconstruction efforts, it also emphasized that 

Afghanistan should become a neutral state after the International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF) mission ended. Moscow also actively campaigned for the removal of NATO/ISAF hubs 

from the former Soviet republics in Central Asia. Russian officials in private meetings with 

the Afghan authorities continuously raised their concern about the size, purpose, and duration of the U.S. military bases inside Afghanistan.25 Thus, the Russian policy of favoring 

a neutral Afghanistan followed the old pattern in the context of the great power rivalry, 

in which the weaker power prefers neutralizing the contested area to prevent rivals from 

accessing and dominating it. 

Discussions on neutrality-based solutions resumed in the wake of President Obama’s 

plan to withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan. In a 2009 New York Times op-ed, former 

U.S. assistant secretary of state Karl Inderfurth and Ambassador James Dobbins, who later 

became Obama’s special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, asserted that the “ultimate 

exit strategy” for Afghanistan could include a multilateral accord to declare Afghanistan a 

permanently neutral country.26 Dobbins insisted on Afghanistan’s permanent neutrality—

though he used the term permanently nonaligned to not upset Karzai—as a requisite of a 

durable solution for the conflict there.

In a private testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 23, 2011, 

former secretary of state Hillary Clinton confirmed the need for a broad regional diplomatic 

gathering akin to that of the Congress of Vienna in 1815, which had declared “the Benelux 

countries as a free zone.” 27 She argued, “If we could get to that point with the regional 

powers in South Asia that would not recommence with the great game in Afghanistan that 
6 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 360

would be a very worthy outcome.” 28 Officially, however, neutrality remained an unmarketable policy, in part because of Karzai’s resistance to the idea. Instead, the concept of a grand 

regional gathering was transformed into a regional confidence-building and cooperation 

forum, known as the Istanbul Process, launched in November 2011.29

The most recent call for neutralization came even after Afghanistan signed strategic partnership agreements (SPAs) with the United States and other major regional and European 

countries and subsequently became a “major non-NATO ally” of the United States.30 Audrey 

Kurth Cronin, professor of public policy at George Mason University, argued in 2013 that “a 

tradition of repelling invaders...as well as formidable geography that is difficult to occupy 

make Afghanistan a natural candidate for neutralization.” 31 Given the regional and international security implications of destabilization, Cronin insisted that building consensus would 

be more viable in a post-withdrawal environment than at any time during the Cold War.

Afghanistan’s neutrality was also discussed in a regional Track 2 forum recently established to develop policy recommendations for confidence-building and closer cooperation 

among the countries in the region. This resulted, in November 2013, in a Joint Declaration 

on Regional Peace and Stability recommending a gradual “Afghan led and Afghan specific 

neutrality.” 32 The document described neutrality as “a vision and goal” to be arrived at 

gradually and in tandem with other regional initiatives. It does not seem to point to neutralization in terms of a formal, internationally guaranteed, long-term status.

Foreign Policy

In the early nineteenth century, intense rivalry between two major European powers—Great 

Britain and Tsarist Russia—extended into the Far East and the Indian subcontinent. Afghanistan became proxy battleground in the Anglo-Russian struggle for dominance in the region.33

After two rounds of failed British military campaigns, and futile Russian attempts to 

win over fugitive and incumbent Afghan kings and princes, both imperial powers agreed 

to accept Afghanistan as a buffer state in which neither would seek to increase its influence to the detriment of the other. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 formalized this 

understanding, which largely continued beyond the British withdrawal from the Indian 

subcontinent and its partition into India and Pakistan.34

The term buffer state, now a common term in international relations, was first used 

in 1883 by British India officials in reference to Afghanistan.35 Both Russia and Britain, 

through a series of agreements—Granville-Gorchakov agreement of 1873, Abdul Rahman–Sir 

Mortimer Durand agreement of 1893, and the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907—delineated the boundaries of Afghanistan as a geographic buffer between the two empires.

Afghanistan’s positioning was arguably effective in maintaining the balance of power 

in the region for almost a hundred years.36 The buffer status also served the domestic 

interests of the Afghan leaders, in that they received substantial cash and arms from the 

British and occasional support from Russia but still avoided direct British and Russian 

influence in their internal affairs. Afghanistan’s religious, tribal, and ethnic leaders also 

favored the policy, if only as isolation from foreign meddling.37

The first instance of Afghanistan upholding a policy of neutrality with some degree 

of independence occurred during World War I. Despite still being a British protectorate 

and proscribed from formulating its own foreign policy, Afghanistan faced the real choice 

of entering the war or remaining neutral. Domestically, the decision to remain neutral 

became particularly challenging when, in late October 1914, the Ottoman Empire—the 

de facto leader of the Islamic world—joined the war in support of the Central Powers 

against Britain.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 360 7

Britain and Russia urged the Afghan ruler, Amir Habibullah I (1901–19), to remain neutral. In September 1914, King George V wrote a letter reminding Habibullah that neutrality 

was in Afghanistan’s interest, urging him to remain neutral and assuring him of an eventual 

British and Allied victory.38 Habibullah initially did declare Afghanistan neutral, but subsequent developments seriously tested his ability to uphold the policy.39 On September 1915, 

a Turco-German delegation known as the Niedermayer-Hentig Expedition arrived in Kabul 

to attempt to persuade Habibullah to back the Central Powers. At the same time, certain 

members of the ruling family led by Nasrullah Khan (Habibullah’s brother) and a pan-Islamist 

Afghan intelligentsia led by Mahmud Tarzi (editor in-chief of Siraj-al Akhbar, the only Afghan 

newspaper) also lobbied for an alliance with the Turks and Germans.40

British authorities in India demanded that, as a neutral country, Afghanistan should 

arrest and disarm the members of the Niedermayer-Hentig delegation, who represented belligerent states. Habibullah did not consider the delegation’s visit to Afghanistan a breach 

of neutrality, however, and instead entertained it for nearly two years without giving a 

definite response. Similarly, he waited sixteen months before replying to King George’s letter 

in January 1916.

Habibullah took his time and tried to strengthen domestic support for his policy of neutrality by holding a consultative gathering, a jirga, on October 1915.41 A week after replying 

to King George’s letter and reiterating his commitment to neutrality, Habibullah signed a 

treaty of friendship with Germany. The treaty was more of a tactical step to appease the 

pro-German domestic lobby and provide a face-saving exit for the Niedermayer-Hentig 

delegation rather than a serious commitment to joining the war against British interests in 

India. It specified, for example, that any possible support from the Afghan government was 

contingent on the arrival of more than twenty thousand German or Turkish troops inside 

Afghanistan and supply of a hundred thousand rifles, three hundred canon, and at least 

ten million pounds to the government of Afghanistan. Immediately after signing the document, Habibullah privately reassured the British envoy of his neutrality resolve. However, 

by signing the treaty with Germany, he also wanted to send a signal to the British that he 

was determined to act as an independent sovereign. With hindsight, one can argue that 

neutrality was the most rational policy for Afghanistan at the time, and one that enabled 

Habibullah to secure promises of concessions from the British and a treaty of friendship with 

Germany at the same time.

After the conclusion of the war, it became apparent that the size of British concessions 

neither matched Kabul’s aspiration for independence nor corresponded with the difficulties 

Habibullah had endured to confine domestic dissatisfaction with his policy and prevent the 

uprising of the frontier tribes against British India.42 The nationalists were emboldened. 

Habibullah lost the remaining support he had enjoyed during the war and was assassinated 

in February 1919.

From a conceptual and international legal viewpoint, this first episode of Afghanistan’s 

neutrality fits the general definition as described in the 1907 Hague Convention.43 However, 

given the noted setbacks, wartime neutrality did not carry over into peacetime neutrality. 

Afghanistan’s post-World War I and postindependence foreign policies were guided by an 

anticolonial fervor influenced by the prevailing idealism of the period.

The Search for Allies

After ascending the throne in Kabul, the reformist Afghan King Amanullah (1919–29), son 

of Habibullah, in his first formal correspondence with the British pressed for negotiations 

that would grant Afghanistan full independence. Britain’s rejection of the demand prompted 

Amanullah to unilaterally declare Afghanistan an independent country on April 19, 1919.44
8 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 360

Contrary to his father’s defensive policies, Amanullah initiated a political and diplomatic 

offensive to compel Britain to recognize Afghanistan’s independence. He ended Afghanistan’s 

policy of isolation, appointed Mahmud Tarzi as the first foreign minister, and dispatched 

Mohammad Wali Khan Darwazi as his first ambassador-at-large to negotiate the establishment of diplomatic relations with other countries around the world.45 Between 1919 and 

1922, Afghanistan signed treaties of bilateral cooperation with Russia, Turkey, France, Italy, 

and Iran.46 In search of new alliances, Darwazi traveled in July 1921 to Washington, DC, 

where he met with President Warren Harding, solicited diplomatic recognition, and asked for 

the establishment of economic ties between Afghanistan and the United States. Washington, 

which considered Afghanistan to be part of the British sphere of influence, declined to confer 

diplomatic recognition or to invest in the country.

Amanullah’s ambitious attempt to attract new allies and his closer ties with Soviet Russia, 

which provided generous financial and technical support, did not end Afghanistan’s economic 

and military dependence on British India. Amanullah failed to realize that even as a fully independent country recognized by a dozen regional and European nations, striking a “correct balance” in relations with the British and Soviet empires would have to remain the fundamental 

principle of Afghanistan’s foreign policy. Abdul Samad Ghaus, author and former deputy foreign 

minister (1973–78), even suggests that Amanullah’s unorthodox foreign policy—hostile toward 

Britain while welcoming Russians and other Europeans—may have contributed to the collapse 

of his rule in 1929, when he was deposed following tribal uprisings.47

Keeping the Balance

After the brief stint of Amir Habibullah Kalakani, the leader of the uprising that deposed 

Amanullah, Mohammed Nadir, a former military chief, seized power in Kabul. Nadir (1929–33) 

favored closer ties with Britain, which had supported him in his campaign for power. According to Ghaus, “Nadir Shah saw to it that the Afghan foreign policy, having wandered from its 

natural course, was brought back into line....The pendulum, which had gone too far to the 

left, swung back to the middle.” 48

Nadir, in his opening remarks to the opening session of the Afghan National Assembly, 

stated, “The best and most fruitful policy that one can imagine for Afghanistan is a policy 

of neutrality. Afghanistan must give its neighbours assurances of its friendly attitudes while 

safeguarding the right of reciprocity.” 49 At the official level, Nadir Shah elevated neutrality 

as the core principle of Afghanistan’s foreign policy. His most significant challenge, however, 

according to the historian Vartan Gregorian, was “to make Afghan neutrality a reality and to 

convince all elements, including the Soviets and the Muslim nationalist-modernists inside 

and outside the country, that he was not a tool of British imperialism.” 50

Nadir took a series of steps to build confidence in his policy. He reaffirmed previous AngloAfghan treaties and signed a new treaty of neutrality and nonaggression with the Soviet 

Union.51 To further convince his powerful neighbors that Afghanistan would be truly neutral, 

Nadir did not take sides in subsequent conflicts and Pashtun uprisings against British India 

in tribal areas, refrained from intervening in the affairs of Soviet Central Asia, and expelled 

Central Asian independence fighters from northern Afghanistan. He struck the necessary balance in his ties with Britain and the Soviet Union, avoiding them as much as possible, and 

increasingly engaged with the so-called third powers—that is, other European nations such 

as Germany, France, and Italy—in developing Afghanistan’s economic and education sectors.

Nadir’s reign came to an abrupt end with his assassination in November 1933. The delicate tasks of maintaining balance in foreign policy and nurturing his peacetime policy of 

neutrality were left to his teenage successor, Mohammed Zahir, and the former king’s conservative younger brother Mohammed Hashim, who served as regent. Although the young 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 360 9

king remained the de jure sovereign, Hashim actually steered Afghanistan’s foreign relations 

over the next thirteen years.

Zahir did not make direct reference to Afghanistan’s neutrality in his first major policy 

speech to the parliament in 1934. Instead, he alluded to a unilateral policy of nonaggression toward neighbors and expected reciprocal treatment. Gregorian argues that “in practice 

the Hashim government was guided by the same principles as Nadir in foreign policy.”52

However, some moves—such as Afghanistan’s participation in the Saadabad Pact of 1937, 

a regional security alliance allegedly aimed at containing the Soviet influence, and Kabul’s 

growing political and economic ties with Nazi Germany—indicate an increasing desire for 

forging alliances as and when available.53

Wartime Neutrality

Once again anxious about provoking either of its powerful neighbors, Afghanistan refused 

to take part in World War II. On September 6, 1939, Zahir Shah, on the advice of his prime 

minister (and uncle) Mohammad Hashim, declared that Afghanistan would remain neutral 

and not join any of the warring alliances.54 Much like its counterpart had during World 

War I, the Hashim government faced serious pressure from the government and the public. 

First, an active and strong ultranationalist and somewhat pro-German constituency existed 

in the highest ranks of government, including two of his favorite nephews (Zahir Shah’s 

cousins) Prince Daoud and Naim, who later became prime minister and foreign minister, 

respectively. Second, nearly two hundred German and Italian technical experts worked and 

lived in Afghanistan, some of whom were accused of subversive activities against British 

interests in the tribal areas.55 Third, Germany’s investment in the nascent economic and 

financial sectors had been generous and the public was generally sympathetic to Germany, 

in contrast to being suspicious of and disgusted with British and Soviet activities in the 

country.56 However, Zahir Shah’s declaration of neutrality had the support of his powerful 

prime minister, who “had the final say on all policy matters.” 57 To strengthen his position, 

Zahir called a grand assembly of elders (loya jirga) in November 1941 to deliberate on the 

policy of neutrality and provide advice on the Allies’ demands for the eviction of all suspicious Axis nationals from Afghan territory.58

The jirga overwhelmingly supported neutrality and announced both that Afghanistan 

would not allow belligerents to use its territory against one another and that the country 

stood ready to defend itself against foreign aggression. The jirga also recommended that 

German and Italian nationals be given a dignified and safe exit to their home countries.59

Except for a few diplomats who remained in Kabul, most Axis nationals were deported from 

Afghanistan to Turkey with such a guarantee of safe passage.

With few exceptions, then, between 1930 and 1945 Afghanistan pursued an internationally sanctioned wartime neutrality and a peacetime neutrality similar to those followed by other neutral states at the time.60 However, rapid and dramatic shifts in postwar 

international and regional contexts—such as the demise of the British Empire, the emergence of the Soviet Union and the United States as the two dominant global powers with 

competing ideologies, and, most significantly, the creation of Pakistan as an independent 

state incorporating the frontier Pashtun tribes—forced the Afghan government to review 

its foreign and domestic policies. Although the older and more conservative policymakers, 

such as Hashim, thought that Afghanistan could continue its buffer-neutral state policy by 

replacing the British with the Americans in the traditional balancing formula, the younger 

and more hardline group—the troika of Daoud, Naim, and Majid Zabuli, an industrialist 

and later minister of national economy—began to demand radical reforms in foreign and 

domestic policies.
10 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 360

Badly bruised by post-partition developments, including the lack of international sympathy for Afghanistan’s position on the issue of the Durand Line, which demarcated the frontier 

between Afghanistan and Pakistan,61 and the ultimate incorporation of the Pashtun tribal 

areas east of the Durand Line into the new state of Pakistan, Zahir was forced to adopt a 

harder line. Although the period under the prime ministership of Shah Mahmoud (1946–53) 

saw some improvement in relations with the outside world (particularly with the United 

States),62 Zahir’s appointment of his cousin Mohammed Daoud effectively marked the end of 

Afghanistan’s tradition of neutrality.

The policies followed by successive Afghan governments, first Daoud and later the Soviet 

occupation, could be described as neutralism, positive neutrality, and nonalignment, differing in meaning and scope from how Afghanistan had previously interpreted its policy. Any 

discussion of Afghanistan’s neutrality, particularly from the 1955 Bandung Conference that 

created the NAM, needs to consider this shift in concept and practice.63

Neutralism and Nonalignment

Prime Minister Daoud (1953–63) quickly embarked on a reform and modernization drive 

which, according to Amin Saikal, pivoted on “three interrelated policy goals: to centralize 

power as comprehensively as possible under his leadership, to institute a command-based 

process of speedy social and economic change, and to promote Pashtunism as the foundation 

for Afghan nationalism...” 64

To achieve these goals, Daoud introduced revolutionary changes in the structure of his 

cabinet. First, he appointed a group of like-minded, young, and highly educated ministers. 

He was acutely aware that his goals could not be realized without economic, military, and 

political support from external sources. Strict adherence to traditional (passive) neutrality 

limited his ability to enlist much-needed foreign assistance in pursuit of his domestic and 

regional ambitions.

Daoud calculated that a shift in foreign policy was possible because the strategic imperatives that had forced Afghanistan to be a buffer state in the past had disappeared. With 

the British departure from India, Afghanistan was no longer constrained by keeping a strict 

balance between its northern and southern neighbors. During this period, it was actively 

engaged in a territorial and political dispute with Pakistan and was eagerly looking for partners to strengthen its position.

He therefore redefined neutrality to attract military and political support from, in particular, the Soviet Union. Explaining this shift, Sayed Qasim Reshtia, author and press minister 

in the 1960s, affirms that the new policy “was based on the national interest and independent judgement of the people of Afghanistan.” 65 According to Abdul Rahman Pazhwak, 

Afghanistan’s permanent representative at the United Nations in the 1960s, the new policy 

was intended to preserve close and friendly relations with the United States and the Soviet 

Union and thus to receive unconditional assistance but not be aligned with either side.66

Reshtia argues that in the early years this policy enabled Afghanistan to receive considerable 

development aid from various sources, including the U.S. government.67

Over time, frustrated by the American lack of interest in meaningful assistance and Washington’s pro-Pakistani approach,68 Daoud found the Soviet bloc a more responsive partner. 

Politically, he joined the NAM to maintain a veneer of Afghanistan’s neutral posture and preserve his ability to engage all sides. From this point, in the words of Reshtia, “Afghanistan’s 

neutrality had evolved into active nonalignment.” 69

On July 17, 1973, Daoud (now the Afghan president after a bloodless coup against Zahir 

Shah) described this new form of neutrality in a national address: “The foreign policy of 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 360 11

Afghanistan is based on neutrality, non-participation in military pacts, and independent 

judgment of the issues by the people themselves. Emanating from our national aspirations, 

this policy is designed to fulfil the material and spiritual needs of the people.” 70

By this time, however, and according to William Piez, an economic and political officer 

at the U.S. embassy (1963–66), Afghanistan was

considered to be a neutral country but with a pretty strong Communist influence. 

Their [Afghanistan’s] representative at the UN almost always voted on the Soviet 

side of any issue and was recognized by American political analysts as essentially 

a kind of stalking horse for Russians whenever an important issue came up.71

Perhaps neither Daoud nor other Afghan policymakers and intellectuals of the time 

foresaw the historical outcome: that Daoud’s emotional and obsessive Pakistan-centric 

foreign and security policy drove Afghanistan deeply into the Soviet orbit. The so-called 

unconditional assistance and training offered by the Eastern bloc brought with it a zealous 

ideology that soon pervaded all levels of Afghan government and society and sowed the 

seeds of instability for decades to come.

The Soviet invasion ended what was left of Afghan autonomy and neutrality, though the 

Soviet-backed regimes would continue to espouse neutrality in their rhetoric. Even within 

the NAM, the invasion caused a serious division between members when Yugoslavia and 

several Arab states decided to condemn it on the basis of NAM’s principle of noninterference. 

The effort was promptly suppressed by a joint Soviet and Cuban diplomatic offensive.72

Ironically, even the Afghan communist regimes, despite their obvious military dependence on and ideological association with the Soviet Union, formally remained committed 

to the rhetoric of neutrality. Prime Minister Noor Mohammed Taraki, in a radio address in May 

1978, avowed that “the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan adheres to a policy of non-alignment and positive and active neutrality...based on principles of peaceful coexistence.” 73

Afghanistan officially remained a member of the NAM after the 1989 Soviet withdrawal 

and the fall of the last communist regime in 1992, as well as during the five troubled years 

of the Mujahideen government in Kabul from 1992 to 1996. Given that this was a period of 

civil war, and that the government was badly divided, there was no real possibility of making 

an independent foreign policy. The Taliban regime that followed (1996–2001) was more of 

an ideological movement than a government with articulated domestic and foreign policy 

goals. As Olivier Roy once emphasized, “The Taliban have no foreign policy.” 74 Moreover, the 

Taliban regime was not recognized by the wider international community, and no records 

indicate their official position on Afghanistan’s neutrality and membership in the NAM.75

Attitude Under Karzai

The post-2001 government of Afghanistan has remained an active member of the NAM and 

regularly participates in the movement’s meetings. However, it has refrained from using the term 

neutrality in its official statements over the past thirteen years. Whereas most previous Afghan 

leaders considered neutrality a principle of Afghan foreign policy—at least rhetorically—Karzai 

was particularly sensitive about even references to it.76 In fact, occasionally he went so far as 

to openly discuss the desire to strengthen ties between Afghanistan and NATO member states.

Some senior cabinet members went further in interviews, challenging the entire logic 

of Afghanistan’s traditional neutrality and disagreeing with the proposition that it was the 

most suitable foreign policy for the country. Instead, recalling the Russian invasion of 1979, 

these ministers argued that, especially in the absence of a credible domestic or international 

enforcement mechanism, it made Afghanistan vulnerable to foreign aggression. One of the 

ministers added emphatically that had Afghanistan joined the Western-led alliances of the 
12 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 360

time, such as the Central Treaty Organization, and had Afghanistan maintained a more strategic than Pakistan-centric attitude toward the United States, the Soviet leadership would 

have thought twice before invading the country in 1979.77

Conclusion

Historically, bitarafi has been a prominent feature of Afghanistan’s foreign policy but has 

also been advanced by different actors at different times with varying definitions and has 

often involved active balancing among rival regional military powers under a broad banner 

of neutrality. This study offers three broad conclusions on a basis of its historical review.

First, Afghanistan’s postindependence policy of neutrality was not a strategic choice 

crafted through usual policymaking processes but instead a meek continuation of a 

colonially imposed buffer policy. The main function of this policy was for Afghanistan to 

maintain a certain balance between its neighboring and hegemonic powers, initially the 

Soviet Union and the British Empire and later the Soviet Union and the United States.

Second, despite some consistency in official statements of the various Afghan governments regarding neutrality, in practice the country was never truly neutral except during 

the two world wars. Afghan rulers from time to time used a broad definition of the concept 

of bitarafi, often to their own convenience. Neutrality often served as a fallback position to 

which they could return whenever other alternatives failed or proved highly risky. Although 

subsequent governments insisted on their neutrality, over time, conceptually, the country’s 

traditional neutrality evolved into positive neutrality, neutralism, and nonalignment.

Third, most permanent neutrality initiatives and proposals put forward since the Soviet 

invasion have emerged as a tactical response to a situation of crisis. The initiatives were 

usually pushed by the trailing external player in the conflict, the United States and the UK 

in the 1980s and the Soviet Union in 1989–90, which at the time also lacked the political 

leverage to create consensus among major stakeholders on the merits of declaring Afghanistan a formal neutral state.

This historical analysis therefore does not support the argument of neutrality proponents—mainly foreign academic and diplomatic circles—that Afghanistan was a neutral 

state in the past and therefore is amenable to a permanent neutrality in future. On the 

contrary, domestically, given the history of invasions and interference in Afghan affairs and 

the fragility of state institutions, top-level policymakers have been generally apprehensive 

about schemes to make Afghanistan a neutral state.

This negative outlook, however, appears to be slowly shifting. This move was evident 

from the proceedings of the Track 2 regional peace and stability forum involving high-profile 

Afghan politicians, former diplomats, and civil society leaders, which endorsed a vision of 

“Afghan-led and Afghanistan-specific enduring neutrality.” The participants who endorsed 

a long-term vision of neutral Afghanistan are senior members of the national unity government team, but it is hard to predict whether the debate could gain momentum in the near 

future. Nonetheless, the consensus among Afghan policymakers is that though continuation 

of international support is vital to sustainability of Afghan state institutions, at least for 

another decade, to achieve lasting peace and stability and to realize the benefits of regional 

cooperation in and around Afghanistan, it is equally important to keep exploring internationally backed regional arrangements. A treaty of regional nonaggression and neutrality will 

remain an option in the menu of long-term diplomatic solutions.

The consensus among Afghan 

policymakers is that though 

continuation of international 

support is vital to sustainability 

of Afghan state institutions, 

to achieve lasting peace and 

stability and to realize the 

benefits of regional cooperation 

in and around Afghanistan, it 

is equally important to keep 

exploring internationally backed 

regional arrangements. 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 360 13

Notes

1. Numerous international and regional experts and former diplomats in recent years—including Ambassadors 

James Dobbins, Karl Inderfurth, and Peter Tomsen in the United States, Hamid Ansari and Chinmaya Gharekhan 

in India, and Aziz Ahmad Khan in Pakistan—have argued in favor of a neutrality-based solution for the Afghan 

crisis. For more information, see Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Thinking Long on Afghanistan: Could It Be Neutralized?” 

Washington Quarterly 36, no. 1 (2013); Karl F. Inderfurth and James Dobbins, “Ultimate Exit Strategy,” New York 

Times, March 26, 2009.

2. Oxford Dictionaries Online, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/neutrality.

3. John Bouvier, A Law Dictionary: Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States of America (Philadelphia: 

T. & J. W. Johnson, 1843), 772.

4. Christine Agius, The Social Construction of Swedish Neutrality: Challenges to Swedish Identity and Sovereignty 

(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), 15. 

5. Oppenheim, one of the founders of the modern discipline of international law, defines neutrality as “the attribute 

of impartiality adopted by third states toward the belligerents and recognized by the belligerents, such attribute 

creating responsibilities and duties between the impartial states and belligerents.” T. J. Lawrence emphasizes that 

“neutrality may be defined as the condition of those states which in time of war take no part in the contest, but 

part in the contest but continue pacific intercourse with the belligerents.” See L. F. Oppenheim, International Law: 

A Treatise, vol. 1, Peace, ed. Hersch Lauterpacht, 8th ed. (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1955); T. J. Lawrence, 

The Principles of International Law, 4th ed. (Boston: D.C Heath, 1910), 587.

6. According to Agius and Devine, confusion over the terminology and labels used to denote neutrality is 

considerable. See Christine Agius and Karen Devine, “Neutrality: A Really Dead Concept? A Reprise,” Cooperation 

and Conflict 46, no. 3 (2011).

7. Neutrality is a historically developed concept and, like all such concepts, it denotes different things at different 

times. L. Modjoryan, “Neutrality,” New Times, Moscow, February 15, 1956, 17. Quoted in Peter Lyon, “Neutrality 

and Emergence of the Concept of Neutralism,” Review of Politics 22, no. 2 (1960): 266. 

8. Cyril E. Black, Neutralization and World Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), xi. 

9. Lyon, “Neutrality and Emergence,” 267. 

10. After World War II, Afghanistan’s foreign relations outlook was based largely on two themes: unification of all 

Pashtun territory in both Pakistan and Afghanistan under Afghan rule and Cold War nonalignment through a 

policy of strict neutrality. See Amin Saikal, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival (London: I. 

B. Tauris, 2006), 123. See also Zubeida Hasan, “The Foreign Policy of Afghanistan,” Pakistan Horizon 17, no. 1 

(1964): 48.

11. See Louis Dupree, “Myth and Reality in Afghan ‘Neutralism’,” Central Asian Survey 7, no. 2-3 (1988): 1.

12. Cronin, “Thinking Long on Afghanistan,” 55.

13. Abdul Samad Ghaus, The Fall of Afghanistan: An Insider’s Account (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey’s International 

Defense Publishers, 1988), 209. See also Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton, 

NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 238; Robert O. Freedman, Moscow and the Middle East: Soviet Policy Since 

the Invasion of Afghanistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

14. President Carter personally supported the idea and in a letter to Marshal Tito, then Yugoslavian president, 

supported restoration of Afghan neutrality, offering “to help guarantee Afghanistan’s true neutrality.” See “Carter 

Backs Afghan Neutrality,” Sarasota Herald-Tribune, February 27, 1980, 1.

15. Carrington emphasized that “we have the idea of neutralization in a broad form, but there are certain paths we 

could follow.” Ibid. 

16. Edith Hassman, “U.S. Foreign Policy: The View from Vienna,” Executive Intelligence Review 7, no. 10 (March 11, 

1980), 56.

17. “Britain Gets Private Word on Afghanistan,” Sarasota Herald-Tribune, March 12, 1980, 3.

18. “Permanent Neutrality and Disarmament of Afghanistan,” collection of articles from a seminar held by the 

Academy of Science of Afghanistan, government publication, 1989, 3. 

19. The preamble read, “Creating favourable conditions for determining the legal status of permanent neutrality of 

Afghanistan and its demilitarization.” See the constitution of Afghanistan 1990, www.afghan-web.com/history/

const/const1990.html.

20. For example, the prevailing attitude in the U.S. government strongly argued that “we judge that the Najibullah 

regime will not long survive the completion of Soviet withdrawal even with continued Soviet assistance. The 

regime may fall even before the withdrawal is complete.” See “USSR: Withdrawal from Afghanistan,” Director 

of Central Intelligence, SNIE 11/37-88, Special National Intelligence Estimate, March 1988, 219, www.cia.

gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/at-cold-wars-end-usintelligence-on-the-soviet-union-and-eastern-europe-1989-1991/16526pdffiles/SNIE11-37-88.pdf. 

21. After losing parts of its territory to the Soviet Union during the Winter War (1939–40) and suffering another 

Soviet onslaught during World War II, Finland signed the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual 

Assistance with the Soviet Union in April 1948. The pact imposed serious restriction and costs but enabled 

Finland to remain outside great power conflicts by adopting a policy of neutrality, which it maintained during 

the Cold War. As a result, Finland did not participate in the Marshall Plan, took neutral positions on Soviet 

actions abroad, stayed generally away from NATO, and successfully resisted Soviet pressure to cooperate with 

the Warsaw Pact. For more information, see Brian S. Faloon, “Aspects of Finnish Neutrality,” Irish Studies in 

International Affairs 1, no. 3 (1982): 3–12. Selig S. Harrison, “Dateline Afghanistan: Exit Through Finland?” 

Foreign Policy no. 41 (Winter 1980–81):183.

22. “The Taliban: Engagement or Confrontation?” Hearing Before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 

June 20, 2000, www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-106shrg68769/html/CHRG-106shrg68769.htm.

23. Peter Tomsen, “Chance for Peace in Afghanistan: The Taliban’s Days Are Numbered,” Foreign Affairs 79, no. 1 

(2000): 179–82.

24. Another reason for Tomsen’s proposal being overlooked could be its timing during an election year. 

25. Interview with former senior Afghan security officials, August–September 2013. 
14 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 360

26. Inderfurth and Dobbins, “Ultimate Exit Strategy.” 

27. Daniel Dombey and Matthew Green, “US Aims To Turn Afghanistan into Neutral Zone,” Financial Times, June 27, 

2011, www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/de0bcfc8-a0ff-11e0-adae-00144feabdc0.html#axzz346cw8RI.

28. Ibid. 

29. For more information on the Istanbul process, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Istanbul Process on Regional 

Security and Cooperation for a Secure and Stable Afghanistan,” November 2, 2011, http://mfa.gov.af/en/

news/4598.

30. The “Major Non-NATO Ally” is a title given by the U.S. government under Section 2350a(f)(2) of Title 10, United 

States Code to strategically important allies who are not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 

MNNA status does not involve any mutual defense guarantees however it makes the country eligible for certain 

kinds of U.S. military assistance, including purchasing excess defense articles and participating in cooperative 

defense research and development projects. See “Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA),” www.globalsecurity.org/military/

agency/dod/mnna.htm. 

31. Cronin, “Thinking Long on Afghanistan,” 56.

32. “Afghanistan’s Region: 2014 & Beyond, Joint Declaration on Regional Peace and Stability,” Friedrich Ebert 

Stiftung, November 17, 2013, http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/10307.pdf.

33. John Keay, India: A History, rev. ed. (New York: Grove Press, 2010). See also Sayed Qasim Reshtia, Afghanistan in 

19th Century (Kabul: Maiwand Publishing, 2010), p. 101.

34. From edited extracts of a paper prepared by Research Department of British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 

www.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/our-history/historic-views-kabul/learning-from-history/.

35. “The notion of buffer regions has existed for centuries in many forms and at varying scales. The term ‘buffer 

state’ seems to date from the British use of the term in 1883 in connection with Afghanistan. A buffer generally 

is situated between two or more powerful, conflicting spheres of influence; it separates the contending parties 

to reduce the likelihood of physical contact and conflict between them.” David B. Knight, “Buffer States in 

World Politics by John Chay; Thomas E. Ross,” Geographical Review 78, no. 1 (1988): 93–95, www.jstor.org/

discover/10.2307/214314. Successful buffers gain neutrality, strength, and independence but do not have 

meaningful autonomy; they must play the assigned role as peacekeeper. The existence of a buffer implies that 

the contending parties agree to territorial separation; if they are determined to fight, the buffer means nothing. 

Because power relations and thus relative location change, buffer status need not be permanent. 

36. On August 31, 1907, a convention was signed between Great Britain and Russia formalizing the arrangements 

on Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. For the full text, see “Convention Signed on August 31, 1907, between Great 

Britain and Russia, Containing Arrangements on the Subject of Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet,” American Journal 

of International Law 1, no. 4 (October 1907): 398–406. 

37. Afghan amirs under the influence of religious and tribal leaders resisted the presence of foreign officers inside 

Afghanistan. For example, one of the major concessions Shir Ali Khan received from Lord Mayo in 1869 was the 

promise that “no European officers would be placed as Resident in his cities.” See Sir Owen Tudor Burne, “British 

Agents in Afghanistan, (1879),” Books in English, Paper 12 (London: W. H. Allen, 1879). Digitized Afghanistan 

materials in English from the Arthur Paul Afghanistan Collection are available online at the University of Omaha, 

http://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/afghanuno/12.

38. A copy of the letter from King George V is printed as an appendix in Ludwig W. Adamec, Afghanistan 1900–1923: 

A Diplomatic History (Santa Barbara: University of California Press, 1967), 205.

39. An editorial on page one of Siraj al-Akhbar reported the proclamation of neutrality on October 21, 1914. The 

name of the author is not specified but is assumed to be Mahmoud Baig Tarzi, the newspaper’s editor in chief. 

40. Ludwig W. Adamec, Afghanistan’s Foreign Affairs to the Mid-Twentieth Century: Relations with the USSR, Germany, 

and Britain (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1974), 27.

41. It has been argued that though the history of jirgas in Afghanistan goes back centuries, the traditional Afghan 

elder’s consultative gathering has officially been called a Loya Jirga only since 1923. See “Loya jirga-i ‘umumi dar 

Jalalabad (1923, March 16),” Aman-i Afghan, 11–12; Benjamin Bucholz, “Thoughts on Afghanistan’s Loya Jirga: 

A Myth?” Asien no. 104 (July 2007): 27; Jamil Hanifi, “Colonial Production of Hegemony Through the ‘Loya Jerga’ 

in Afghanistan,” Iranian Studies 37 (2004): 295–322.

42. British India authorities had apparently promised Habibullah that if he maintained Afghanistan’s neutrality and 

cooperated with them, the British government would grant Afghanistan full independence once the war ended, 

but he was offered instead only some weapons and cash. See Ghaus, Fall of Afghanistan, 25. 

43. The full text of the convention is available at the University of Minnesota Human Rights Library at www1.umn.

edu/humanrts/instree/1907d.htm.

44. Muhammad Siddiq Farhang, Afghanistan dar panj qarn-i akhir [A history of Afghanistan in the last five centuries] 

(Alexandria, VA: Markaz Farhang Sanayi, 1988), 776.

45. See Afghan Modern Diplomacy: The Role of Allama Mahmoud Tarzi and Mohammad Vali Khan Darvazi (Kabul: Centre 

for Strategic Studies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, 2009).

46. The English translations of these treaties are available in Adamec, Afghanistan, 188–98.

47. Ghaus, Fall of Afghanistan, 47.

48. Ibid.

49. Islah newspaper, July 8, 1931, cited in Vartan Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan (Stanford, CA: 

Stanford University Press, 1969), 321.

50. Ibid.

51. For text of the treaty, see the League of Nations Treaty Series, no. 3611, vol. 157 (1935), 370–81.

52. Gregorian, Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, 375.

53. In 1941, Iraqi Prime Minister Rashid Ali al-Gaylani invoked the Saadabad treaty and requested Afghanistan to 

support his country in fighting against British invasion. The Afghan government declined his request on the basis 

of its declaration of neutrality in 1939. See Farhang, Afghanistan, 646.

54. In August 1939, Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia had signed a nonaggression pact even as Great Britain prepared 

to confront Germany. Effectively, Afghanistan’s northern and southern neighbors were on different sides of the 

grand conflict then emerging.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 360 15

55. See Adamec, Afghanistan’s Foreign Affairs, 250–51.

56. Ella Maillart, “Afghanistan’s Rebirth,” Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 27, no. 2 (1940); see also 

Gregorian, Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, 380.

57. As a conservative, pragmatic, and elderly statesman, Prime Minister Hashim was rarely, if ever, challenged on state 

policy matters. See Farhang, Afghanistan, 645.

58. The Soviet embassy in Kabul for example had invoked the 1931 treaty of neutrality and nonaggression to demand 

the eviction of nationals of belligerent states.

59. Ibid.

60. Peacetime neutrals avoid treaties of alliance with other states that could put them at risk of being a party to a 

future war or support of war preparations. Such were the policies of Switzerland, Belgium, Sweden, and to some 

extent the United States before her entrance into World War II. See Wilhelm Wengler, “The Meaning of Neutrality 

in Peacetime,” McGill Law Journal 10, no. 4 (1964): 369–80. 

61. After partition of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan, the Afghan government supported the right of selfdetermination for Pashtuns and Baluchs residing on the other side of the Durand Line. 

62. In 1946, the United States provided its first major financial and technical assistance to Afghanistan in the 

Helmand Valley irrigation project. Then, in 1948, the U.S. diplomatic mission in Kabul was upgraded to a resident 

embassy level. Afghanistan joined the UN in 1946. Trade and bilateral cooperation with the Soviet Union, France, 

Germany, Japan, and Czechoslovakia also expanded. Despite these developments, however, Afghanistan remained 

politically isolated and diplomatically ineffective.

63. After 1955, the suffixes mosbat and fa’al were added to the Persian word bitarafi, reading bitarafi mosbat and 

bitarafi fa’al, which respectively mean positive neutrality and active neutrality. 

64. Saikal, Modern Afghanistan, 123.

65. Sayed Qaseem Reshtia, The Political Memoirs of Sayed Qaseem Reshtia, 1932–1992 (Virginia: American Speedy 

Press, 1997), 101. 

66. A. R. Pazhwak, “Afghanistan’s Policy of Non-Alignment,” Kabul Times, May 21, 1962, 2. 

67. Reshtia, Political Memoirs, 101.

68. During his visit to Kabul in 1953, U.S. vice president Richard Nixon disapproved of Daoud’s position on 

Pashtunista. Nixon referred to Afghanistan’s neutrality as equivalent to “political leprosy.” A year later, U.S. 

secretary of state John Foster Dulles refused to offer any military assistance to Foreign Minister Mohammad Naim, 

Daoud’s brother, though a huge military assistance program was approved for Pakistan. See Jeffery J. Roberts, 

The Origins of Conflict in Afghanistan (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 147. See also ABC-CLIO, “The Soviet-Afghan 

War: A Cold War Chess Piece,” History and the Headlines, www.historyandtheheadlines.abc-clio.com/ContentPages/

ContentPage.aspx?entryId=1193923. 

69. Reshtia, Political Memoirs, 101.

70. Ghaus, Fall of Afghanistan, 109.

71. Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, “Afghanistan: Country Reader,” www.adst.org/Readers/

Afghanistan.pdf. 

72. A top secret instruction was sent by the Soviet Foreign Ministry to its ambassadors in the nonaligned countries to 

counterbalance Yugoslavia’s effort to convene a meeting concerning the invasion of Afghanistan. For an excerpt 

of the cable, see the Wilson Center Digital Archive, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112499.

73. V. P. Vaidik, “Afghan Non-Alignment: Changing Faces,” International Studies 20, no. 1-2 (1981): 239. 

74. Olivier Roy, “Has Islamism a Future in Afghanistan?” in Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghanistan and the Taliban, ed. 

William Maley (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 210.

75. The three countries that recognized the Taliban government were Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United 

Arab Emirates. Afghanistan’s seat at the United Nations was held by a representative appointed by the former 

mujahideen government that had been headed by Burhannudin Rabbani.

76. In a September 2013 meeting, Kai Eide, former Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Afghanistan 

(2008–10), recalled that when he used the term neutrality in reference to Afghanistan’s future international 

status, President Karzai rejected the idea as “totally unacceptable.” This incident is referred to in his memoir, 

Kai Eide, Power Struggle Over Afghanistan: An Inside Look at What Went Wrong—And What We Can Do to Repair 

the Damage (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2013), 138–40. Karzai also went on record with his displeasure, 

expressing “reservations about a regional approach based on Afghanistan’s future as a permanently neutral state.” 

Chinmaya Gharekhan, Karl Inderfurth, and Ashley Tellis, “Reviewing the Regional Approach to Afghanistan,” 

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2010, http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/10/13/

reviewing-regional-approach-to-afghanistan/1uyl?reloadFlag=1.

77. Private conversations with current and former senior Afghan ministers, Canberra and Kabul, April–August 2013. 

In reality, any attempt by Afghanistan to join the containment alliance system would likely have been blocked 

by Pakistan.
ISBN: 978-1-60127-283-6

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our website 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.

United States 

Institute of Peace

2301 Constitution Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20037

www.usip.org

@usip

Of Related Interest

• Afghanistan’s Emerging Mining Oligarchy by Javed Noorani (Special Report, January 2015)

• Forging Afghanistan’s National Unity Government by Ali Jalali (Peace Brief, January 2015)

• Donor Aid Challenges in Shaping Incentive Programs and Spurring Afghan Reform by Trent Ruder 

(Peace Brief, November 2014)

• Last Chance: The International Community and the 2014 Afghan Elections by Scott Smith (Peace 

Brief, March 2014)