A PUBLICATION OF THE AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

ACSS SPECIAL REPORT

Advancing Stability 

and Reconciliation in 

Guinea-Bissau: Lessons from 

Africa’s First Narco-State

June 2013

Davin O’Regan and Peter Thompson
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies supports United States foreign and 

security policies by strengthening the strategic capacity of African states to 

identify and resolve security challenges in ways that promote civil-military 

cooperation, respect for democratic values, and safeguard human rights.
Advancing Stability and 

Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau: 

Lessons from Africa’s First 

Narco-State

ACSS Special Report No. 2

June 2013

Africa Center for Strategic Studies

Washington, D.C.
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Defense Department or any other agency 

of the Federal Government. Cleared for public release; distribution unlimited.

Portions of this work may be quoted or reprinted without permission, provided that a standard source 

credit line is included. The Africa Center would appreciate a courtesy copy of reprints or reviews. 

First printing, June 2013.

For additional publications of the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, visit the Center’s Web site at 

http://africacenter.org.
iii

Table of Contents

Executive Summary........................................................................................1

A Worsening Cycle of Crises and Regional Spillover..............................3

Politicization of the Military ....................................................................6

Winner Take All .......................................................................................... 10

Guns, Drugs, and Illicit Resources.......................................................... 16

Competition Drawn Along Ethnic Lines ................................................ 22

Distrusted International Partners.......................................................... 24

Analysis: From Fragile States to Narco-States........................................ 29

Recommendations ....................................................................................... 33

Political and Governance Reforms.......................................................................................33

Dealing with the Past ..........................................................................................................34

Depoliticization of the Military...........................................................................................36

Reversing the Narco-State ...................................................................................................39

Pressuring Spoilers ..............................................................................................................41

Empowering Civil Society and Independent Media ............................................................42

Harmonizing International Approaches ..............................................................................43

Conclusion .................................................................................................. 45

Notes............................................................................................................ 46

About the Authors..................................................................................... 50

1

Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau

Executive Summary

A string of crises stretching back more than a decade has rendered Guinea-Bissau one of the most 

fragile states in Africa. This recurring cycle of political violence, instability, and incapacitated 

governance, moreover, has accelerated in recent years, most notably following a military coup in April 

2012. Exploiting this volatility, trafficking networks have coopted key political and military leaders 

and transformed Guinea-Bissau into a hub for illicit commerce, particularly the multibillion dollar 

international trade in cocaine. This has directly contributed to instability in Senegal, Guinea, Liberia, 

Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, and elsewhere in Africa. European and African organized criminal groups 

have likewise established ties to the Guinea-Bissau trade. Drawn by the lucrative revenues, al Qaeda in 

the Islamic Maghreb and other militant groups in West Africa have also been linked to Guinea-Bissau 

trafficking. Now commonly referred to as Africa’s first narco-state, Guinea-Bissau has become a regional 

crossroads of instability.

Responses to Guinea-Bissau’s bouts of crises, however, have tended to be short lived and neglect the 

country’s deep institutional weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Clashes within the military, coups d’état, 

and strings of politically motivated killings have been met with condemnation from regional and 

international partners followed by calls for investigations or a transitional election—but with few 

genuine reforms. Oftentimes many of the perpetrators of Guinea-Bissau’s crises retain or even expand 

their influence and stature. Meanwhile, economic growth has been episodic, human development 

indicators have been stagnant, and a humanitarian emergency imperiling 300,000 people looms. Given 

the sensational nature of these crises, root drivers of instability are consistently overlooked, including a 

political system marked by the concentration of authority in the executive branch and a security sector 

that has gradually expanded its involvement in politics. As a result, crises inevitably reemerge. While 

narcotics traffickers initially targeted Guinea-Bissau because of its weak oversight and governance 

capacity, the drug trade has dramatically compounded these drivers of instability while spawning others. 

Despite Guinea-Bissau’s serious challenges, some groundwork for reform has been laid by the 

country’s emerging civil society actors and democratic institutions. An independent media sector, 

several prominent and well-organized human rights groups, an improved police force, and a national 

legislature that has on occasion demonstrated its influence, represent a potentially vital reform 

network. These civil society actors and independent reformers are under growing pressure from the 

increasingly emboldened military and political leadership that has captured escalating trafficking 

revenues, however.

At the heart of Guinea-Bissau’s instability is its winner-take-all political system. To break its cycle of 

violence and instability, Guinea-Bissau will need to institute stronger checks and balances in order to 

diminish the concentration of authority in the Office of the President. This includes codifying the role 

of other branches of government in authorizing public expenditures and government appointments, 

among other responsibilities. The armed forces will also need to undergo an objective and balanced 
2

ACSS Special Report

review of its management and mission. To become a constructive actor, this top-heavy institution 

will need to upgrade its policies of promotion, retirement, and recruitment to create a more dynamic, 

ethnically balanced, and threat-based force structure. Stabilization will similarly require protecting civil 

society actors as they represent the drivers for change internally. Institutional reforms in the political 

and military spheres will be contingent on reconciliation efforts to bridge entrenched inter-elite and 

state-society rifts following years of unresolved abuses, coups, killings, and political machinations.

Given the level of polarization within Guinea-Bissau, stabilization cannot be achieved through domestic 

efforts alone. Instead, it will require the sustained engagement of international partners. Moreover, 

while Guinea-Bissau is frequently perceived as solely a domestic challenge, its instability is part of a 

transnational criminal threat affecting regional and international security. As such, neighboring states, 

as well as Europe and the United States have vested interests in a stable Guinea-Bissau. To advance this 

objective, international partners should expand their efforts to detect and interdict the sea and air traffic 

conveying bulk drug shipments to Africa via Guinea-Bissau. Additionally, international actors should 

investigate and prosecute trafficking networks, many of which clearly hold assets and operational 

bases in jurisdictions well beyond Guinea-Bissau. Countering trafficking within Guinea-Bissau will 

require capable multinational engagement to reconstitute the judicial sector, law enforcement, and 

associated legal and regulatory frameworks. Such an effort could be modeled on a unique joint United 

Nations-Guatemalan initiative to combat organized criminal activity and strengthen government 

counter-crime capacities. 

Efforts to stabilize Guinea-Bissau hold numerous insights on preventing and reversing the rise of other 

narco-states in Africa. This is an increasingly real prospect given the growing levels of cocaine, heroin, 

and amphetamine trafficking on the continent. Guinea-Bissau may be Africa’s first narco-state, but 

worrying signs in Mali, The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Mozambique, Kenya, and elsewhere indicate 

that it is not the only country struggling against the hollowing effects of drug trafficking on security, 

development, and governance.
3

Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau

A Worsening Cycle of Crises and 

Regional Spillover

No elected president has ever completed a term in office. All but one have been deposed by the military, 

including a coup d’état in the midst of national elections in April 2012. One was assassinated by soldiers 

in 2009. Among the previous five chiefs of staff of the armed forces, three were murdered and one was 

forcibly exiled by a rival officer. A former head of the navy was arrested in international waters and the 

chief of staff of the armed forces indicted by U.S. authorities following a drug sting operation in April 

2013. In short, Guinea-Bissau has lurched from crisis to crisis since the 1990s.

Such civil-military intrigue has steadily worsened in recent years. Activists, business leaders, political 

candidates, journalists, some military officers, and other prominent individuals have been detained, 

brutally beaten, exiled, or killed under mysterious circumstances. Draconian restrictions were imposed 

by the transitional authorities following the April 2012 military coup, including a ban on public 

demonstrations and discussion of the coup or previous unsolved assassinations.1 Indicative of the 

deterioration in the rule of law, when disputes or fighting erupts, many civilian leaders immediately 

flee to foreign embassies to avoid arrest. The military, meanwhile, is increasingly fragmented. In 

October 2012, several soldiers were killed during what the military alleged was an attempted 

countercoup. Days later, a senior officer presumed to have been exiled in Portugal was arrested near 

Bissau and, along with other military figures, eventually sentenced by military tribunal to several years 

in prison for masterminding the attack. Rival troop factions fought street battles in late December 

2011. Such deepening fragmentation in the armed forces has become a major driver of Guinea-Bissau’s 

persistent political crises. 

Accelerating this disarray is competition for control of the lucrative flow of cocaine through GuineaBissau. First emerging in the mid-2000s, narcotics trafficking has steadily worsened, with indications 

that large shipments arrived on a weekly or biweekly basis in 20122 and that at least 25 tons of cocaine 

entered the country from April to July of that year.3 In other words, more than half the total annual 

cocaine flow previously estimated to be trafficked through the entire West African region transited 

Guinea-Bissau in less than 4 months. These rising drug flows, which may rival the value of GuineaBissau’s entire economy,4

 have severely impacted the country’s governance and security. Today, the 

country is widely described as Africa’s first narco-state.

Instability, meanwhile, has sidetracked meaningful development progress in Guinea-Bissau. Between 

1980 and 2012, the country averaged an anemic 0.4 percent rate of annual economic growth. In 30 

years, real per capita income rose just 5 percent, from $158 to $166 a year. Infant mortality remains 40 

percent higher than the Sub-Saharan African average. Indicative of the breakdown in state institutions 

and basic services, numerous other data on school enrollment, government expenditures, and other key 

measures of development performance have not been regularly collected since the early 2000s. 
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ACSS Special Report

Since the coup d’état of 2012, the situation has grown more precarious for Bissau-Guineans. The 

economy shrank 2.5 percent in 2012. The vital cashew nut industry, which employs 80 percent of the 

workforce, saw a 50 percent fall in exports. The shock to the economy largely reflected the contraction of 

government activity following the coup—a situation that never fully returned to normal. The closure of 

banks and money transfer agencies frustrated many buyers and traders. Some prominent buyers became 

fearful of even travelling to Guinea-Bissau.5 Displacement following the coup, moreover, disrupted the 

April-June harvest season. The instability caused by the coup simultaneously led to a near doubling in 

the price of rice, the country’s staple grain, two-thirds of which must be imported. Forced to spend 

more of their already limited funds on food, farmers were less able to purchase inputs for the new 

season, perpetuating the cycle.6 In short, the coup sent an already fragile economy into a tailspin. In 

March 2013, the World Food Program (WFP) issued its first appeal in years for emergency food aid to 

Guinea-Bissau—for nearly 300,000 people.7

The lack of opportunity in the country also alters the stakes of the country’s political disputes. With so 

few avenues through which to earn income, competition for office—and the resources that come with 

it—becomes more critical. Likewise, alternatives to a position in the military and the influence this 

affords are limited, fueling tensions and competition within the armed forces. For even those in power, 

managing supporters and patronage networks can be difficult amid such minimal growth. As a result, 

other “self-financing mechanisms,” such as arms and drug trafficking, become increasingly compelling.

Guinea-Bissau is often overlooked in a region with many other security challenges. Yet while it is a small 

country of just 1.6 million people, its recurring instability, especially its pivotal role in the drug trade, 

has had significant and worsening consequences across West and North Africa. For example, a Boeing 

727 jet believed to have been transporting several tons of cocaine found crashed in the desert near the 

northern Malian city of Gao in November 2009 had been registered in Guinea-Bissau to a Senegalese 

business.8 Given a 727’s flight range and the distance from its presumed departure point in Venezuela, 

the aircraft would have been unable to make the trip to Mali without landing first in Guinea-Bissau 

or another West African coastal state. Likewise, the length of trafficking routes into and through West 

Africa inevitably mean that the increasingly numerous shipments arriving in Guinea-Bissau must move 

through neighboring West African countries before reaching their final destinations in Europe. With 

the increase in trafficking, attendant criminality also spreads. Money tied to the drug trade must find 

channels for laundering, which often means buying property in Senegal or The Gambia, bartering for 

gold, diamonds, and other commodities in Liberia, or investing in dodgy and unproductive businesses 

elsewhere, which crowds legitimate entrepreneurs out of the market. 

A 30-year-old insurgency in Casamance, the southern-most region of Senegal, also has strong links 

in neighboring Guinea-Bissau. Senegal’s rebels and elements of Guinea-Bissau’s military and political 

elite have fought side by side and against one another during previous conflicts. Islamic militant groups 

such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other African organized criminal groups have 

also exploited Guinea-Bissau’s instability to facilitate their activities. Two members of AQIM were 
5

Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau

seized at an upscale hotel in Bissau in early 2008 where they were hiding following the killings of 

four French tourists in Mauritania in December 2007. Scattered reports have also suggested AQIM 

members may have visited Bissau to coordinate trans-Sahel drug trafficking with Latin American 

criminal networks.9 Nigerian criminal syndicates, similarly, have benefited extensively from GuineaBissau’s weak government oversight. The large Lebanese community in Bissau has spurred concerns of 

the presence of Hezbollah,10 which has been active in the cocaine trade in Benin, Nigeria, and elsewhere 

in West Africa. Organized criminal groups in Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom, among others, 

have also had a hand in Guinea-Bissau’s trafficking networks. 

SENEGAL

NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN

THE GAMBIA

GUINEA

BISSAU

Cacheu

Farim

Mansôa

Bafatá

Gabú

Buba

Catió

Boloma

A

R

O

UIPÉLAGO DOS BIJAGÓS

Figure 1. Map of Guinea-Bissau

Source: CIA World Factbook. Modified by author.
6

ACSS Special Report

As evidence of heroin, cocaine, and amphetamine trafficking expands in Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, 

Mali, Ghana, South Africa, and other African states, lessons from Guinea-Bissau hold important insights 

for what appears to be a worsening problem across the continent.

Guinea-Bissau’s instability has long been minimized or deemed an isolated phenomenon. In the 

process, its problems have metastasized. The country’s endless string of disputes, coups d’état, and 

political crises now pose a persistent threat to regional stability. However, the drivers of instability 

in Guinea-Bissau run deeper than the latest crisis of the moment. There are complex, long-running 

issues that need to be confronted to break Guinea-Bissau’s cycle of instability and the regional threat 

it poses. Three interwoven trends within the country stand out: the politicization of the armed forces, 

winner-take-all battles for the presidency, and the influence of illicit trafficking. Meanwhile, new 

challenges are emerging that further fuel and complicate reform efforts, including ethnic cleavages 

within the military as well as competing interests among international actors engaged in the country. 

Together, these overarching issues are compounding Guinea-Bissau’s stabilization challenge. 

Politicization of the Military

Civil-military relations in Guinea-Bissau have deteriorated significantly over the last decade, 

resulting in the steady expansion of political meddling by military officers, fragmentation within 

the armed forces, and a shattered military professional ethos. 

The military and its troops were once widely respected in Guinea-Bissau. The People’s Revolutionary 

Armed Forces (FARP), as it is still known today, fought from 1963 until 1974 in a frequently brutal 

war of independence against Portuguese rule. In the 1998-1999 civil war, military mobilization 

swelled three-fold as it rose up and ultimately exiled the unpopular authoritarian President João 

Bernardo “Nino” Vieira. In a nation that had endured years of post-independence stagnation, 

authoritarianism, and instability, the military was repeatedly celebrated as liberators. 

This mentality became deeply engrained within Bissau-Guinean society, particularly among 

leading military officers. It contributed to a growing sense of military entitlement to shape the 

country and its politics. Written in 1984 and last revised in 1996, the constitution’s treatment of 

the military is emblematic of this perception. The document not only addresses the military as an 

institution within the state’s architecture, but also it singles out certain members of the military 

who deserve special perquisites and accolades above and beyond those allotted to the military 

as a whole. Under the constitution’s “Fundamental Principles,” Article 5 “proclaims [GuineaBissau’s] eternal gratitude to those fighters who, through their voluntary sacrifice, guaranteed 

the liberation of the Homeland from foreign domination, by re-winning national dignity and our 

people’s right to freedom, progress, and peace.” It further states that these “freedom fighters,” 

who are constitutionally entitled to certain benefits for their contributions, are those militants 

who were registered when the liberation movement was formed on September 19, 1956, 10 
7

Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau

years before the FARP, through September 24, 1973, just months before the country secured its 

independence from Portugal.

In fact, most of its leading officers still meet the constitution’s qualifications of a “freedom fighter,” 

40 years after the liberation war ended. As a whole, then, Guinea-Bissau’s military is old, top heavy, 

over-sized, and suffers from institutional sclerosis. Even after a demobilization campaign following the 

1998-1999 civil war reduced the armed forces by roughly half, the military’s troop-to-population ratio 

remains double the West African average. According to a 2008 study (see Table 1), more than half the 

army is over the age of 40, and 45 percent of all active duty members have more than 20 years of service. 

Personnel are heavily concentrated in the capital, with 70 percent based in Bissau. There are twice as 

many senior officers in the armed forces as there are rank and file troops. In other words, the armed 

forces is less a dynamic and mission-focused institution serving the state than an exclusive club of aging 

individuals that frequently operates for their personal interests. Merit, performance, and leadership have 

far less impact than loyalty, seniority, and patronage on promotional advancement. 

These institutional shortcomings have contributed to a worsening tendency of the military to interfere 

in the country’s politics. A milestone of these altered civil-military relations was Guinea-Bissau’s 1998-

1999 civil war. Then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces General Asumane Mané launched the conflict 

in 1998 after he had been sacked by then President Vieira for allegedly trafficking arms to support 

Le Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance (MFDC), a rebel group in Senegal. (It later 

emerged that Vieira was also involved in arms trafficking). Vieira had miscalculated, though, and only 

curried minimal support from the armed forces and population. He was forced to rely on 2,000 troops 

quickly deployed by neighboring Senegal and Guinea after Mané launched the conflict. With most 

of the country behind him, Mané eventually emerged victorious in 1999, and Vieira fled to Portugal. 

Civil-military relations in Guinea-Bissau have been in decline ever since.

After the civil war, elections for parliament and the presidency were held in 1999 and 2000, respectively, 

and General Mané did not stand as a candidate. However, it became apparent Mané was reluctant 

to relinquish his newfound role as kingmaker, which might insulate the military from any future 

domineering civilian leaders. Not long after the presidential elections in 2000, a sign was erected 

above Mané’s offices declaring him “co-president.” He ignored or refused measures by the new civilian 

government to promote or shift troops and officers. Meanwhile, loyalty to Mané within the military 

began to fray as Mané became more deeply involved in politics. Some members of the armed forces sided 

with newly elected President Kumba Ialá, who had tried to consolidate his authority among the rank 

and file by favoring his fellow ethnic Balanta. Ialá ordered Mané arrested for subverting his authority, 

and Mané was killed in November 2000 by soldiers loyal to Mané’s successor, military Chief of Staff 

General Veríssimo Correia Seabra. 

Since Mané, other officers have delved ever more deeply into politics. In 2003, General Seabra overthrew 

the increasingly unpopular and erratic President Kumba Ialá, who was blamed for a widely dysfunctional 
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ACSS Special Report

government and economic crisis. Like Mané, Seabra oversaw a return to civilian rule and elections, 

but fragmentation within the armed forces worsened as groups began to align behind different senior 

officers and military factions. Seabra was a victim of this deterioration when he was killed in a revolt 

in 2004. General Batista Tagme Na Wai rose to the top military post after Seabra’s death. Na Wai’s 

selection, which was largely determined by military elites as opposed to the civilian government, was 

a sign of how contentious things had become in the upper ranks of the military. He was a member of 

former President Ialá’s ethnic group, the Balanta, but many of his deputies and newly promoted officers 

were closely aligned with former President Vieira in a delicate effort to balance competing groups in 

the armed forces and civilian political class.12 

Civil-military relations continued to worsen. General Na Wai had an extremely antagonistic 

relationship with President Vieira, who had returned from exile and narrowly won a second-round 

presidential vote in 2005 as an independent candidate. For instance, one soldier was killed when socalled mutinous troops attacked the presidential palace in November 2008,13 and General Na Wai 

survived “accidental” gunfire directed at his motorcade by members of Vieira’s security detail.14 It was 

assumed that such incidents were orchestrated by each side. On March 1, 2009, Na Wai was killed 

in a bombing. Hours later, troops loyal to Na Wai stormed the presidential residence, tortured, and 

fatally shot Vieira. Later it was reported that the device used to kill Na Wai was more sophisticated 

than anything previously seen in Guinea-Bissau. The explosive may have originated in Thailand, 

leading to suggestions that Latin American drug cartels had sponsored a connection between Na 

Wai’s rivals in Bissau and high-profile weapons traffickers.15 

Table 1. Demographic Composition of the Armed Forces of Guinea-Bissau

Source: Results of a 2008 study commissioned by the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau.11

Proportion of Total (%)

Rank

Officers 42%

Noncom Officers & Corporals 38%

Rank and File 20%

Services

Army 86%

Air Force 4%

Navy 10%

Age

20 or younger 0.1%

20-40 44%

40-60 51%

Over 60 5%

Length of Service

Less than 5 Years 33%

5-20 Years 23%

20-30 Years 20%

More than 30 Years 25%
9

Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau

Na Wai’s successor was Vice Admiral José Zamora Induta, a deputy under General Mané during the 

civil war. Induta was in office for just a year when without explanation on April 1, 2010, his deputy, 

General António Indjai, arrested him, other military officers, and then prime minister and presidential 

aspirant, Carlos Gomes Jr. The latter, in particular, had been a strong supporter of Indjai’s rivals within 

the military and was advancing robust changes within the security sector. Indjai declared himself 

military chief of staff. Ultimately, Gomes Jr. was released under intense pressure from large public 

demonstrations, influential civil society leaders, and international partners. Vice Admiral Induta and 

another officer were detained for 8 months without charge. 

Tensions and mistrust between Indjai and Gomes Jr., however, only deepened. In April 2012, Indjai 

arrested Gomes Jr. again as the latter seemed poised for a second-round runoff victory in presidential 

elections. This time, however, Indjai did not back down. Indjai asserted that Gomes Jr. was collaborating 

with Angola, which had deployed several hundred troops as part of a military technical assistance 

mission in Guinea-Bissau. Indjai was skeptical of the Angolan mission, which he saw as aimed at 

undermining the Bissau-Guinean armed forces and consolidating its influence in the country. More 

importantly, if elected president, Gomes Jr., given his considerable political influence, would have been 

much more able to sideline Indjai. Guinea-Bissau’s neighbors and the Economic Community of West 

African States (ECOWAS) pressured General Indjai to relent, and Gomes Jr. and others were eventually 

allowed to leave the country and have since lived in exile in Portugal. Notably, some senior officers 

were killed just before the April 2012 coup d’état and others were arrested. Vice Admiral Induta, the 

former military chief of staff who had been detained by General Indjai’s forces for most of 2010, fled 

through Casamance to The Gambia where he departed for Portugal. In other words, factions within 

the military were purged and forced aside during the coup. Though a transitional civilian government 

ostensibly soon took over, Indjai remained the most powerful individual in the country and in a position 

to shape the civilian political arena. 

The trend that began with General Mané and persists today reflects the steady politicization of the armed 

forces. Mané’s initial intentions appeared comparatively moderate. Having been personally targeted 

by the previous political leadership and having endured a yearlong civil war, he sought to isolate the 

military from the political process and reserve the authority to selectively stifle certain policies or civilian 

leaders. His successors and many other military leaders have sought to broaden these powers. General 

Na Wai publicly contravened official policy and had parliamentarians and politicians detained on 

several occasions. General Indjai once threatened to kill Prime Minister Gomes Jr. at a news conference. 

As chief of staff of the armed forces, Indjai claimed substantial new powers for himself, including 

responsibility for recruitment, promotions, defense budgeting and spending, and the national defense 

strategy—changes that were codified in new laws passed in 2011.16 Given that the defense sector has 

accounted for at least 30 percent of the government budget in recent years, such authorities provide 

military leaders enormous influence. 

The expanding politicization of the armed forces has upended Guinea-Bissau’s weak system of institutional 
10

ACSS Special Report

checks and balances as well as the more formidable but unofficial balance of power among different 

groupings of influential elites. Bouts of instability in the form of high-profile assassinations, coup attempts, 

and military takeovers have grown more recurrent (see timeline on pages 26–27). Given the exclusivity 

of its officer corps and the institutional sclerosis in the armed forces, this steady politicization of the 

military has prompted infighting and factionalism within the security sector itself. In order to advance 

one’s career, soldiers must ally themselves with a strongman. Inevitably, power plays, competition, and 

internal strife within the military have grown more common, fueling a worsening cycle of instability.

Winner Take All

Competition for the Office of the President has characterized much of Guinea-Bissau’s history. 

This tension is a structural feature of Guinea-Bissau’s political system, whereby a disproportionate 

concentration of power resides in the presidency. Individuals aligned with the president gain access to 

financial opportunities and career advances unavailable to the general population. Outsiders are also 

subject to intimidation and the arbitrary application of the law.

This practice is partly a legacy of President João Bernardo “Nino” Vieira, Guinea-Bissau’s long-serving 

authoritarian leader who was president following a coup d’état in 1980 until the end of a civil war in 

1999, and again after returning from exile in 2005 until his assassination in 2009. His statutory authority 

as well as his style of leadership centralized power in the presidency, and he exercised it to the fullest 

extent to empower allies, reward supporters, and sideline or punish enemies, whether real, emerging, 

or merely perceived. Shuffles were a common strategy to extend and retain power and influence.

Guinea-Bissau features a hybrid or “semi-presidential” political system, with both a president and a 

prime minister. According to the constitution, the Office of the President has wide powers, including 

the ability to appoint and dismiss the prime minister, the head of the armed forces, the attorney general, 

and other ministers. The president can also create new government ministries and offices, swear in 

judges, and issue certain decrees and laws. In practice, the Office of the President has exercised many 

other powers. Following presidential elections, victors have thoroughly restaffed ministries, regional 

and local governments, the judiciary, and sections of the armed forces. Even following the coup d’état 

in April 2012, the transitional civilian administration, contravening promises to ECOWAS and United 

Nations (UN) representatives, shuffled political appointments throughout the government and placed 

members of the theretofore leading opposition Party of Social Renewal (PRS) in power.17 

All together, the constitutional powers of the office, Guinea-Bissau’s limited experience with democratic 

governance, and Vieira’s lengthy time in power have imbued the presidency with outsized influence. As 

a result, elections have become points of fierce competition. Even following closely contested elections, 

which would ordinarily lead to some sort of power-sharing accommodation, victors have asserted the 

same sweeping authority. This has marginalized losing candidates and their parties while further fueling 

a dangerous and conflict-prone winner-take-all perception of the Office of the President. 
11

Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau

That said, incremental improvements to Guinea-Bissau’s political system have been periodically realized 

(see text box on page 14). In response to economic pressure, calls for political reform from international 

partners in the post-Cold War democratization wave, and internal opposition to Vieira’s authoritarian 

rule, multipartyism was introduced in Guinea-Bissau in 1990, leading to a more dynamic political 

environment. Nonetheless, Vieira was able to leverage his extensive networks throughout the government 

and economy to win the country’s first multiparty presidential elections in 1994, though only by a 

narrow margin in a second-round runoff vote. His dominance, and that of the presidency, persisted 

during this early democratic transition. 

Lacking other established democratic checks and balances, by the mid-1990s, a crisis began to simmer 

and eventually exploded into the country’s destructive 1998-1999 civil war. The MFDC rebel movement 

in the south of Senegal had grown increasingly active in the mid-1990s attacking Senegalese forces. 

Senegal attributed this to the flow of illicit arms through Guinea-Bissau and pressured Vieira to do 

something. Seeking to satisfy an ally and simultaneously sideline his rival, Vieira attempted to dismiss 

Mané as chief of staff of the armed forces, citing evidence of Mané’s ties to arms trafficking and the 

MFDC. In fact, a parliamentary investigation scheduled to be released just days after Mané’s dismissal 

indicated that both Vieira and Mané were profiting from illicit arms trafficking. General Mané refused 

to obey the order and with the help of most of the armed forces seized several military facilities in the 

first maneuvers of what would be an 11-month civil war leading to Vieira’s flight to Portugal and Mané 

taking control of Bissau in May 1999. 

Surprisingly, a transition to civilian rule was relatively rapid and multiparty elections were held in late 

1999. Many members of the ruling African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde 

(PAIGC) were ousted as new opposition parties were elected to parliament. Bissau-Guineans elected 

Kumba Ialá, the head of the opposition PRS, as president with 39 percent of the vote in the first-round 

and 72 percent in the second-round runoff. It was the first alternation of power in Guinea-Bissau, 

something many other stable African states have yet to realize. Reflective of the degree of political 

competition, the PRS was not able to command a majority in the legislature and was forced to form a 

coalition with another opposition party to form a government. In fact, this arrangement largely reflects 

Guinea-Bissau’s voting record since multipartyism was introduced two decades ago. Every presidential 

race since 1994 has gone to a runoff, most of which have been decided by narrow margins and few 

legislative elections have delivered an absolute majority to one party (see Tables 2 and 3).

Unfortunately, like Vieira before him, Ialá attempted to exceed the authority of his office. His supporters 

were quickly appointed to positions throughout the government, from national to local levels. Ialá 

regularly dismissed those who disagreed with him, including key members of his government and 

several judges of the Supreme Court. Ialá also clashed with the military brass when he attempted to 

sideline some officers and grant promotions to others (primarily on the basis of ethnicity). It was Ialá 

loyalists in the military who ultimately killed General Asumane Mané as they attempted to arrest him 

in November 2000. In late 2002, Ialá dissolved the National Assembly. By 2003, Ialá was a president 
12

ACSS Special Report

without a prime minister or legislature, was continuously delaying elections, and facing protests over 

back salaries for civil servants and poor services.18 Such erratic and destructive leadership caught up 

with him. Mané’s successor as military chief of staff, General Veríssimo Correia Seabra, deposed Ialá 

amid an acute political and economic crisis in September 2003. 

Remarkably, Vieira returned from exile and won presidential elections as an independent candidate in 

2005. His victory was not resounding, however. He defeated the PAIGC candidate, who had won the 

first-round vote, by a narrow margin in a second-round runoff. Vital to his victory, Vieira had negotiated 

a rapprochement with Kumba Ialá, whose PRS party retained substantial support of the ethnic Balanta 

community, which comprises roughly a quarter of the population. Once back in power, Vieira quickly 

reverted to the manipulative use of his authority and strained relations with military leaders, particularly 

Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces General Batista Tagme Na Wai, who had replaced General Seabra 

after he had been killed in a 2004 revolt. Meanwhile, Carlos Gomes Jr. of the PAIGC had risen to 

become prime minister and soon clashed with Vieira. Vieira’s subsequent dismissal of Carlos Gomes Jr. 

Round 1 Candidates & Results Round 2 Candidates & Results

March 2012

Carlos Gomes Jr. (PAIGC) – 49%

April 2012 Never held following military coup d’état. 

Kumba Ialá (PRS) – 23.4%

Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo (Indep.) – 

15.7%

Henrique Pereira Rosa (Indep.) – 5.4%

June 2009

Malam Bacai Sanhá (PAIGC) – 37.5% 

July 2009

Malam Bacai Sanhá (PAIGC) – 63.3%

Henrique Pereira Rosa (Alliance) – 22.9%

Kumba Ialá (PRS) – 27.9% Kumba Ialá (PRS) – 36.7%

June 2005

Malam Bacai Sanhá (PAIGC) – 35.5%

July 2005

João Bernardo "Nino" Vieira (Indep.) – 52.3% João Bernardo "Nino" Vieira (Indep.) – 

28.9%

Malam Bacai Sanhá (PAIGC) – 47.7% Kumba Ialá (PRS) – 25% 

November 1999

Kumba Ialá (PRS) – 38.8%

January 2000

Kumba Ialá (PRS) – 72% Malam Bacai Sanha (PAIGC) – 23.4% 

Faustino Imbali – 8.2%

Malam Bacai Sanhá (PAIGC) – 28% Fernando Gomes – 7%

July 1994

João Bernardo "Nino" Vieira (PAIGC) – 

46.2%

August 1994

João Bernardo "Nino" Vieira (PAIGC) – 52%

Kumba Ialá (PRS) – 21.8% 

Domingos Fernandes (RGB-MB) – 17.4% Kumba Ialá (PRS) – 48% Carlos Gomes (Indep.) – 5.1%

Table 2. Results of Guinea-Bissau’s Presidential Elections

Sources: IFES Election Guide, Africa Elections Database, and various news reports. 
13

Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau

in 2005 and appointment of an ally as prime minister, however, were roundly criticized and eventually 

overturned when a multiparty coalition in parliament forced Vieira to select Martinho Ndafa Cabi, a 

leading PAIGC parliamentarian, as prime minister in 2007. 

Vieira was killed by soldiers immediately following the still unexplained assassination of Chief of Staff of 

the Armed Forces Na Wai, in March 2009. In the lead up to elections to replace Vieira, several prominent 

politicians, including one candidate for president, were assassinated under mysterious circumstances, 

indicating how high the stakes for the presidency remained. Eventually, Malam Bacai Sanhá, a hero 

of the liberation era and long-time leader in the PAIGC, was elected in a second-round runoff in July 

2009. Relative to the turbulence of the previous decade, President Sanhá oversaw an era of stability. The 

Table 3. Results of Guinea-Bissau’s Legislative Elections

Sources: IFES Election Guide, Africa Elections Database, and various news reports.

* Percentage of total votes estimated based on previous results. 

Date of Elections Number of Seats Won Percentage of Total Votes

November 2008

PAIGC – 67 49.5

PRS – 28 25.2

PRID – 3 7.5

PND – 1 2.3

AD – 1 1.4

March 2004

PAIGC – 45 33.9

PRS – 35 26.5

PUSD – 17 17.6

UE – 2 4.3

APU – 1 1.4

November 1999*

PRS – 38 28.5

RGB-MB – 29 21.7

PAIGC – 24 18.0

AD – 3 2.3

UM – 3 2.3

PSD – 3 2.3

FDS – 1 1.8

UNDP – 1 1.8

July 1994

PAIGC – 62 46.4

RGB-MB – 19 19.8

PRS – 12 10.3

UM – 6 12.7

PCD – 1 5.3

FLING – 1 2.6
14

ACSS Special Report

government under Sanhá, which included Carlos Gomes Jr. as prime minister and General António 

Indjai as military chief of staff, lasted from 2010 through early 2012. This was the most stable regime 

in Guinea-Bissau since multipartyism was instituted in the early 1990s. Economic growth was strong, 

salaries were consistently paid to the civil service, and fiscal and balance of payment challenges were 

alleviated as cashew production and exports expanded. The International Monetary Fund and World 

Bank deepened their engagement and lauded the government’s progress. 

This brief window of stability and growth is not necessarily attributable to the particular actions or 

policies of President Sanhá, Prime Minister Gomes Jr., or General Indjai.19 Tensions and mistrust 

between all three were rife. General Indjai, of course, had unlawfully detained military personnel and 

civilians, including Gomes Jr., and was presumed to be deeply involved in trafficking cocaine. For his 

part, Gomes Jr. had become very powerful within the PAIGC, the oldest and largest political party 

in Guinea-Bissau. Some party members resented his domineering tactics, and he sought to isolate 

them. His family members served in key positions throughout the government, and he held many 

business interests in petroleum and banking, among other sectors. Gomes Jr. also worked closely with 

the Angolan government, which extended tens of millions of dollars in credit, initiated large mining 

Guinea-Bissau’s Emerging Institutions and Civil Society

Despite a history of centralized rule and pervasive political and economic patronage, Guinea-Bissau’s institutional and 

civil society landscape has grown increasingly dynamic. The military and political elites remain the country’s preponderant forces, but some institutions of government and individuals have attempted to operate more independently, and at 

times managed to influence some positive outcomes amid the country’s persistent instability.

The country’s elections, for instance, have been relatively well managed. No contest for the presidency has ever been 

won in the first round and most parliamentary elections have resulted in coalition governments. This suggests that the 

Commission on National Elections has been able to maintain a degree of independence, and incumbents have been unable to significantly rig the contests. Support for parties has shifted significantly between election cycles and between 

first- and second-round presidential votes, indicating that many voters exercise their rights pragmatically rather than 

along rigid regional, ethnic, or party lines.

Controlling the legislature has also proven increasingly difficult for Guinea-Bissau’s presidents. In 1998, a parliamentary commission was set to report on an investigation into arms trafficking that would have implicated President Vieira, 

but was preempted by the outbreak of civil war. A multiparty coalition of parliamentarians came together in 2007 to 

oust an acolyte of President Vieira from the post of prime minister. Parliament has launched investigations into the 

killings of politicians and military officers, including the assassinations of the president and military chief of staff in 

2009. These investigations have made little headway, but continued parliamentary debate over the matter, particularly 

its slow progress, has kept the issue at the forefront of headlines. The lack of a majority in parliament to support the 

transitional arrangements following the April 2012 coup has been a major obstacle for military leaders, demonstrating 

the growing clout of this legislative body.

Guinea-Bissau’s media is also relatively lively and independent. Prior to the 2012 coup, it ranked just a few notches 

lower than Kenya and Senegal but surpassed Liberia, Malawi, and Zambia in press freedom rankings from Freedom 

House.20 Several print media outlets have reported on drug trafficking and official corruption, some weathering 

lawsuits and intimidation. There are dozens of community radio stations across the country that the populace has 

come to rely on for news and information. Some have reported on controversial subjects, including one that uncovered 

unlicensed timber harvesting by Chinese firms, which prompted citizen protests against the activity. One prominent 
15

Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau

investments in Guinea-Bissau, and deployed a bilateral military technical assistance and training mission 

in Bissau across the street from Gomes Jr.’s offices. Meanwhile, Sanhá promised to advance the fight 

against the growing cocaine trade in the country and conduct investigations into the series of political 

assassinations that had occurred in 2009. In fact, little progress was made on these issues during his 

tenure as president. 

However, for the first time in Guinea-Bissau a balance of power between three nodes of influence— 

Sanhá, Indjai, and Gomes Jr.—laid the foundations for a period of stability. None was a close ally of 

the other. President Sanhá worked to prevent Indjai or Gomes Jr. from maneuvering to sideline each 

other, and both grew to appreciate the buffer that he maintained. President Sanhá did not entirely trust 

Prime Minister Gomes Jr., but tolerated his leadership rather than replaced him, as Gomes Jr. oversaw 

an improvement in the functioning of government. For that matter, Sanhá would have faced some 

blogger, António Aly Silva, has reported on drug trafficking, published court documents into investigations of past 

military abuses, been sued by Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Jr., and was beaten by soldiers while reporting on the April 

2012 coup d’état. In 2013, he published alleged evidence that Chinese firms were paying Bissau-Guinean embassy and 

consular staff in Macau and Beijing for Guinea-Bissau passports to circumvent Chinese business regulations and that 

these payments may have benefited ministers in the Gomes Jr. and post-2012-coup governments. While increasingly 

under pressure and intimidation, the press has been courageous in trying to inform the public, and Bissau-Guineans 

increasingly expect media sources that are relatively independent.

There are also several prominent watchdog and civil society groups in Guinea-Bissau. The Bissau-Guinean League for 

Human Rights has been operating since the mid-1990s and its leadership has explicitly criticized government leaders 

and institutions for subverting the rule of law and human rights. They have issued detailed reports analyzing human 

rights abuses and trends in the country. The Law Society of Guinea-Bissau has likewise publicly criticized actions by 

the armed forces as well as official corruption and manipulation of legal proceedings. Other civil society groups have 

worked to improve access to and participation in local government as well as provide technology and media training. 

One group, “Mom ku Mom” (“hand in hand”), has run a civil-military dialogue project since August 2009 in which it 

facilitates exchanges between current and former military officers, representatives of civil society groups, and victims 

of military abuses.

Even in the face of the country’s burgeoning drug trade, there have been bright spots in law enforcement. The Judicial 

Police have made several laudable drug busts, including the arrest of some military figures, though prosecutions have 

typically foundered in court. Even in the days after the April 2012 coup d’état, the Judicial Police made narcotics-related 

arrests in Bissau.21 Despite having little money for fuel or adequate means of transportation, they have developed 

sources in communities around the country to spot suspicious planes and movement of goods. This progress has continued under several heads of the Judicial Police, suggesting deepening institutional resilience.

Contrary to what often seems a bleak outlook in Guinea-Bissau, therefore, aspects of government accountability 

have gained some traction. With the emergence of drug trafficking, worsening political crises, and expanding military 

interference in politics, however, many of these gains are under increasing pressure. Prominent civil society and human 

rights activists have been targets of lawsuits and pressure from political leaders. Some have been severely beaten by 

military personnel. Since the military coup in 2012, the authorities have purchased new equipment to identify and block 

radio networks, potentially curbing a vital source of information for the populace.22 Dozens of officials, civil servants, 

and other notable individuals hid for months in foreign embassies after the coup, including the head of the Commission 

on National Elections (CNE) who after emerging from 2 months in the EU embassy was physically removed from the 

CNE offices by members of the military when he tried to resume his work. In many respects, these additional pressures 

are an affirmation of the growing influence that these groups and individuals have developed and the perceived threat 

they pose to the status quo. They also reveal the ongoing fragility of reform efforts. 
16

ACSS Special Report

difficulty in removing the increasingly influential Gomes Jr., who had earned the trust of numerous 

international partners. 

In short, the arrangement between these three leaders served as a weak form of checks and balances in 

Guinea-Bissau in a way that the country’s formal government institutions had yet to realize. The Office 

of the President was held at bay by the growing support for Gomes Jr., while the military was held in 

check by Sanhá’s presidential authority and Gomes Jr.’s influence. Gomes Jr. still faced an enemy in 

Indjai, but one kept at a distance by Sanhá.

The tenuous period of progress and stability from 2010 to 2012 began to unravel in late 2011. In 

November 2011, the elderly President Sanhá was hospitalized in France. With the withdrawal of his 

buffering presence, tensions rose. In December, troops of rival military officers fought battles on the 

streets of Bissau. On January 9, 2012, Sanhá died. Seizing an opportunity, Carlos Gomes Jr. stepped 

down as prime minister and declared an intention to run for president.

The move was controversial. As leader of the PAIGC, with family members and close allies throughout 

government (including a handpicked successor as prime minister), strong business interests, and close 

relations with allies such as Angola and China, Carlos Gomes Jr. would have dominated government 

in Guinea-Bissau as no previous leader had if elected president. Gomes Jr. had to maneuver within the 

PAIGC against efforts to prevent him from running as the party’s presidential candidate. Gomes Jr. 

decided that a “show of hands” at party headquarters be used to choose their candidate, rather than the 

traditional secret ballot—meaning opponents to his leadership would be revealed and sidelined. Still, 

a third of all voting members of the PAIGC abstained, and some left the party to run as independent 

candidates when Gomes Jr. was selected as the PAIGC candidate for president. This included Manuel 

Serifo Nhamadjo, who ran as an independent candidate, came in third, and was subsequently appointed 

transitional president in the post-coup agreement negotiated by ECOWAS.

Gomes Jr. did not win the first-round presidential elections outright in March 2012, but his victory in 

the second round against Kumba Ialá was almost a certainty. In the early morning of April 12, 2012, 

less than 3 weeks before the second-round vote, General Indjai’s troops blew a hole through the outer 

wall of Carlos Gomes Jr.’s home and detained him. Interim President Raimundo Pereira was also seized, 

the constitution suspended, and a “Military Command” announced on state media that it had assumed 

control of government.

Guns, Drugs, and Illicit Resources

While most well-known for the flows of cocaine that emerged over the previous decade, Guinea-Bissau 

suffered from illicit trafficking and its deleterious effects on stability before the arrival of drug shipments. 

During the 1990s, the country was a conduit for arms, primarily destined for the MFDC anti-government 

insurgent group in southern Senegal. 
17

Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau

The trafficking in arms was an important source of funds that catalyzed other destabilizing patterns. 

Profits from arms trafficking became critical for elites to build and maintain alliances and loyalty—a 

mechanism of “self-financing” separate from the diversion of official budgets and abuse of authorities 

to feed patronage networks.23 In the armed forces, in which poverty and delays in salary payments for 

low-level officers and troops had been common despite the privileged status enjoyed by military leaders, 

the loyalty of many troops was determined by which officers could support them financially. General 

Mané’s reported engagement in arms trafficking in Casamance in the mid-1990s and his access to funds 

made him a popular and powerful general, hence the widespread support he garnered in the lead up 

to the 1998-1999 conflict. 

Trafficking was a key source of funds for Vieira, too. Deeply mistrusted by many elites, Vieira relied on 

funds from arms trafficking as a critical supplement to official corruption and patronage to maintain 

support. Since both Mané and Vieira relied on illicit trafficking to govern their respective networks 

of supporters, they were less bound to the normal constraints, laws, and other checks and balances of 

their offices and institutions, weak though they were. 

The corruptive influences of illicit trafficking have intensified with the surge in high-value narcotics 

flowing through Guinea-Bissau. Illustratively, the value of the cocaine trade in West Africa is estimated 

to be at least eight times (and probably much higher than) the size of arms trafficking, and larger than 

all other illicit commodities trafficked in the region.24 

Among the first prominent actors behind the surge in the cocaine trade in Guinea-Bissau was President 

Vieira during his return to office from 2005 to 2009. Many senior military officers also became deeply 

involved. During General Na Wai’s years as chief of staff of the armed forces, cocaine was found 

at military installations;25 soldiers were arrested from vehicles transporting cocaine; military officers 

intervened in police drug investigations to release prisoners and confiscate cocaine;26 and in one wellknown incident in July 2008 troops cordoned off and unloaded 500-600 kilograms of drugs from a 

private plane that landed at the country’s main airport from Venezuela.27 

Over time, the flow of cocaine has expanded and grown more sophisticated.28 Even though actual 

seizures and interdictions have been intermittent (see Table 4), the UN Secretary General reported 

to the UN Security Council in December 2012 that hundreds of kilograms of cocaine were entering 

Guinea-Bissau each week (with an approximate European wholesale value of at least $10-20 million).29 

Many key figures have been involved. Rear Admiral José Américo Bubo Na Tchuto, twice the head 

of the navy, and General Ibraima Papa Camará, chief of staff of the air force, served as top military 

leaders even though they were sanctioned as drug traffickers by the U.S. government in April 2010. Na 

Tchuto was arrested along with several other Bissau-Guineans in April 2013 in international waters by 

U.S. authorities following a 7-month-long drug sting operation. He was recorded on multiple occasions 

agreeing to facilitate the transshipment of 4 tons of cocaine into Guinea-Bissau and, eventually, into 

the United States and Europe. Na Tchuto’s commission was $1 million per ton. Four other military 
18

ACSS Special Report

officers including General Indjai were involved in a separate investigation. This plan involved smuggling 

cocaine in a shipment of military uniforms into Guinea-Bissau from Colombia by plane, after which 

the plane would return to Colombia bearing sophisticated weaponry purchased by the Guinea-Bissau 

military. According to the indictment of Indjai, he was recorded telling U.S. law enforcement informants 

that he would arrange for the purchase of surface-to-air-missiles and to ship cocaine. In 2012, near his 

home village of Mansôa, General Indjai struck ground on a sizable new estate with apparent plans for a 

private landing strip, presumably to better manage, protect, and conceal drug shipments. Since the coup, 

there have been few interdictions, reflecting the more conducive operating environment for traffickers.

Like arms trafficking, the drug trade has amplified the level of instability in the country and refutes 

the common assumption that transshipment of drugs—the movement of drugs produced and consumed 

Table 4. Reports of Bulk Drug Shipments Linked to Guinea-Bissau

Date Quantity 

(kgs)

Wholesale 

Value in Europe 

(millions of US$)

Wholesale 

Value in Bissau 

(millions of US$)

Circumstances

2005 535 27.8 8.6 Cocaine is found in a shipping container 

in Bissau bound for Portugal.

April 2005 18 0.9 0.3

Police raid a fish processing facility 

serving as a front for cocaine traffickers 

in the Bijagós islands. Several Latin 

Americans are arrested along with 

arms and drugs.

2005 Unknown Unknown Unknown

20-kilogram bails of cocaine wash up on 

shore in Biombo, Guinea-Bissau, the lost 

cargo of a presumed shipwrecked 

or intercepted boat.

January 2006 106 5.5 1.7

A plane loaded with cocaine that 

departed from a runway near the 

Senegalese border is apprehended as it 

lands at a small airport in Segovia, Spain.

2006 1,000 52 16.2

Reported to have been delivered 

in Bijagós islands, though never 

intercepted.

September 2006 674 35 10.9

Drugs are seized following a chase 

and shootout between police and two 

Venezuelans in Bissau. Arms, GPS, cash, 

and other equipment are also seized.

December 2006 2,000 104 32.4

Guinea-Bissau Navy sources tell Agence 

France-Presse that a patrol boat found a 

vessel that had grounded close to shore. 

No seizures are ever reported.

April 2007 635 33 10.3

Cocaine seized by police from a vehicle 

in Bissau. Five individuals also arrested. 

Reportedly, the remainder of the 2.5-ton 

shipment was lost during pursuit.
19

Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau

Date Quantity 

(kgs)

Wholesale 

Value in Europe 

(millions of US$)

Wholesale 

Value in Bissau 

(millions of US$)

Circumstances

May 2007 48 2.5 0.8

Cocaine is discovered among the freight 

on a commercial aircraft that landed in 

Lisbon, Portugal from Guinea-Bissau.

May 2007 28 1.5 0.5 Cocaine is seized from a vehicle in 

Morocco from Guinea-Bissau.

July 2008 550 28.6 8.9

Plane from Venezuela makes illegal 

landing and parks at military hangar 

of Bissau airport. Customs officers 

prevented from searching plane. Plane 

was unloaded and drugs were never 

found, though drug sniffing dogs and 

later examination of plane suggest 

500-600 kgs were on board. Pilots 

claim they were transporting medicine 

for armed forces.

February 2009 200 10.4 3.2

Army officer reports that cocaine 

found in army hangar belonged to 

military general staff.

March 2010 Unknown Unknown Unknown

General Indjai acknowledges his 

involvement in the landing of a plane 

full of drugs in Cufar, Guinea-Bissau.

December 2011 750 39 12

Reports of two planes delivering 

separate 750-ton shipments of cocaine 

to makeshift runways manned by 

soldiers. Subsequent reports suggest that 

disputes over these shipments may have 

triggered violence between troops in 

Bissau on December 26.

October 2012 Unknown Unknown Unknown

A small propeller plane lands at airport 

in Bissau. Evidence emerges that the 

plane may be registered to the same 

Senegalese businessman wanted in 

connection with the landing of a 727 

transporting cocaine in Mali in 2009.

February 2013 300 15.6 4.8

Informants notify Guinea-Bissau Judicial 

Police of a plane that lands illegally on 

a makeshift air strip on the island of Ilha 

de Melo near southern border of GuineaBissau. Judicial Police lack means of 

transportation to reach plane before 

it unloads and departs.

Sources: The UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s Bi-Annual Individual Seizure Report (2006-2011) supplemented by various 

research and media reports from the International Crisis Group, BBC, IRIN, Lusa, and others.30 
20

ACSS Special Report

Jet Setting in Guinea-Bissau

Drug busts in Guinea-Bissau frequently exemplify how intertwined the country has become with expansive transnational trafficking networks. Among the most common means of transporting drugs into and out of Guinea-Bissau are 

the use of propeller planes and jets. 

Though landing planes into weakly monitored areas may sound simple, the method is often logistically complex. Behind 

each shipment typically lays an intricate fabric of aircraft purchases, aircraft registries, companies, financiers, fake business deals to conceal the reasons for travel and cargo, complicit licensed pilots and crew, and cooptation of officials. 

In other words, a number of entities and individuals from multiple criminal networks operating in several countries and 

jurisdictions are involved in each flight that lands or departs from Guinea-Bissau.31 

Several previous interdictions illustrate this pattern. For instance, on July 12, 2008, a Gulfstream II jet landed at 

Osvaldo Vieira International Airport in Bissau from Venezuela. The jet parked at a military hangar and was unloaded. 

Customs was prevented from searching the plane, and eventually it departed. Engine trouble forced the jet to return, 

after which members of the Guinea-Bissau Judicial Police seized the aircraft, which still contained small amounts of 

cocaine. With the assistance of international investigators, it was concluded that it had transported 500-600 kilograms 

of drugs. The pilot and crew were arrested along with several collaborating police officers and air traffic controllers. 

As it turned out, the pilot was Carmelo Vásquez Guerra, a Venezuelan allegedly linked to Mexico’s Sinaloa drug cartel 

and wanted in connection with the landing of a DC-9 airplane in Mexico in 2006 that had transported 5 tons of cocaine 

from Venezuela.32 His brother and several other individuals were arrested in the 2006 incident. Not long after his arrest 

in Bissau, however, a judge ordered Guerra to be released, ruling that his provisional detention had expired. He soon 

disappeared but was again arrested for drug trafficking in Venezuela in 2011. Meanwhile, evidence seized from the 

Gulfstream jet that Guerra had flown to Bissau mysteriously disappeared just several days after the aircraft was seized. 

No case was ever advanced, and the plane remains abandoned on the airport tarmac in Bissau.

Like its pilot, the Gulfstream jet also held an interesting history. The aircraft was registered as N351SE in January 

2008 by a corporation named LB Aviation Inc. with an address in Yorklyn, Delaware in the United States.33 The address of incorporation is a house in a remote wooded area off a small country road and shared by a law firm named 

Whittington and Aulgur.34 The plane was likely never in Delaware but located at the Fort Lauderdale airport in 

Florida, where it was photographed in February, March, and May of 2008 before reappearing in Bissau in July. As it 

happened, LB Aviation Inc. was registered to a Luis Bustamante in Fort Lauderdale for just 12 months, from September 2007 (a few months prior to when N351SE was certified in January 2008) to September 2008 (roughly 2 months 

after N351SE was seized in Bissau). 

While stranded in Bissau due to engine problems, another plane arrived from Dakar to repair the Gulfstream and take 

it to Senegal.35 This repair crew and rescue plane were under the employ of Africa Air Assistance, a business based 

in Senegal that had also been named as an owner of the infamous 727 jet that would later be found abandoned in 

northern Mali after delivering several tons of cocaine to traffickers in the Sahelian desert.36 Planes owned by Africa 

Air Assistance or its proprietors have been photographed in West Africa, Portugal, Spain, and France. According to 

Bissau-Guinean blog reports, one plane was sighted making a mysterious landing at a military airport in Bissau in 

October 2012. 

Similar circumstances suggest this is a recurring business model in the region. In January 2011, a plane carrying 944 

kilograms of cocaine was seized in Barcelona, Spain along with its crew of three Argentines, all of whom were sons of 

former brigadier generals in the Argentine armed forces. The Challenger 604 aircraft had departed from a small airport 

outside Buenos Aires but landed in Amílcar Cabral International Airport in Cape Verde before reaching Spain. Cape 

Verde is a close neighbor of Guinea-Bissau, and the two actually comprised one state until 1981. The Challenger would 

be unable to make a transatlantic flight without refueling, hence the stop in Cape Verde, but there was also some 

media speculation, denied by Cape Verdean officials, that drugs may have been loaded or unloaded in Cape Verde.37 

The Challenger 604 had a U.S. registration number, N600AM. It was owned by 604 Jet LLC since November 2006,38

and prior to that by Secure Aviation LLC, both incorporated in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.39 It had made previous trips to 

Malaga (Spain), Tel Aviv, and London. Secure Aviation LLC shares the same address and management as 604 Jet LLC, 

according to corporate registry documents. Meanwhile, court documents from the proceedings against the three Ar-
21

Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau

in other states—has a benign effect on the transited country. The assassinations of Vieira and Na Wai 

in March 2009 were assumed to be linked in part to disputes over narcotics trafficking. In April 2010, 

General Indjai, then deputy chief of staff of the armed forces, detained his superior and other senior 

officers, effectively promoting himself to head of the military. Soon after, he reinstated Rear Admiral 

Bubo Na Tchuto to his position as head of the navy, despite the fact that Na Tchuto was an internationally 

sanctioned drug trafficker and had fled the country in 2008 pending charges of coup plotting. 

These erstwhile partners, however, had their own falling out almost 2 years later. Troops loyal to Indjai 

and Na Tchuto fought gun battles on the streets of the capital on December 26, 2011. Na Tchuto was 

eventually arrested and charged (again) with attempting a coup d’état. However, the entire incident 

may have been a dispute over shipments of cocaine, suggesting the rising potency of narco disputes 

within the worsening fragmentation of the armed forces.41 In another volte-face, Na Tchuto once 

again was released from detention in May 2012. There were subsequent reports that he may have been 

promoted to a Vice Admiral and was on track to be reinstated as head of the navy until his arrest by 

U.S. authorities in April 2013.42

Military infighting and coups d’état are secondary and symptomatic of a larger, systemic challenge—

the ongoing disintegration of state structures. Through the drug trade, certain senior officials, both in 

the military and civilian sectors, have been able to amass unprecedented wealth and influence, making 

them less beholden to the constraints of their offices, other institutions, or the political system. Their 

decisions are opportunistic, based on personal interests, and arbitrary. Meanwhile, power shifts have 

become more frequent and violent given the huge amounts of money involved in the drug trade relative 

to the economy. This transcends previous patterns of corruption and patronage in Guinea-Bissau, which 

required a certain degree of inter-elite or cross-institutional support. Drug trafficking has provided both 

the means and motive to sidestep the state, and it has sparked its own fierce competition. It has weakened 

the state as a whole, from the inside and out, as institutions are coopted. As a result, the government of 

Guinea-Bissau is less able to manage even certain basic functions of the state and the country’s cycle of 

crises has amplified. The effects of the drug trade, thus, have rippled outward. With the sharp contraction 

of the cashew nut industry and the economy more generally, the majority of ordinary Bissau-Guineans, 

who were already living at the margins, have been negatively impacted. Though initially perceived as 

a matter of inter-elite competition, the destabilizing effects of the drug trade, compounded over time, 

have spread throughout the country and across borders.

gentines reportedly indicated that they may have had connections to Colombian drug traffickers and had made multiple 

visits to Bolivia and Spain prior to their arrest.40 Two of the three were ultimately convicted in January 2013. 

While it is often lamented that little can be done about drug trafficking in Guinea-Bissau given how weak and compromised the country’s leadership is, the trade through the country is actually only one part of a more complex trail of individuals and activities, whether in neighboring African states, Latin American countries, Europe, or the United States. 
22

ACSS Special Report

Competition Drawn Along Ethnic Lines 

Further complicating Guinea-Bissau’s cycle of crises is an emerging ethnic dimension, particularly within 

the military. The issue is a relatively nascent aspect of the country’s instability. During the liberation 

war against Portugal from 1963-1974 and the immediate post-independence period, Guinea-Bissau’s 

ethnic diversity was not politicized. In the 1980s, President Vieira’s attempts to stack loyalists in state 

institutions led to an over-representation of his ethnic kin, the Papel, but ethnicity was rarely cited in 

disputes or political debates. Even during the 1998-1999 civil war, factions did not divide along ethnic 

lines, nor did competing rhetoric or visions invoke ethnicity.43 The leader of the anti-Vieira faction, 

General Mané, was a Mandinga with roots in The Gambia, but the Balanta comprised a plurality of 

the military. In the presidential elections after the conflict, Kumba Ialá’s second-round electoral victory 

of 72 percent indicated significant support across ethnic, religious, and regional lines.

Legend

International Boundary

Regional Boundary

Balanta – 27%

Fula – 23%

Mandinga – 13%

Manjaco – 11%

Papel – 7%

Mancanha – 3%

Beafada – 3%

Bijagó – 2.5%

Banhuns – <1%

Nalus – <1%

Diolas – 1.5%

CACHEU

OIO

BIOMBO

QUINARA

BOLOMA

TOMBALI

BISSAU

BAFATA

GABU

Farim

Bafata

Gabu

Buba

Catio

Boloma

Quinhamel

Cacheu

Figure 2. Geographical Distribution of Guinea-Bissau’s Ethnic Groups

Source: United Nations, modified by author.
23

Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau

The politicization of ethnicity first emerged in the 1999 postconflict transition in the disputes and 

posturing between newly elected President Kumba Ialá and General Mané. Trying to consolidate his 

authority, Ialá had dismissed dozens of senior officers within the military and advanced the promotion 

almost exclusively of Balantas, his ethnic kin, which, comprising a quarter of the population, are 

marginally the largest ethnic group in the country (see Figure 2). Meanwhile, the military had more than 

trebled in size during the 11-month conflict, and the economy was in a parlous state. Senior posts in the 

military were desirable and something few wanted to relinquish. General Mané openly opposed Ialá’s 

moves to shuffle his officers. In the subsequent standoff, Ialá elevated the issue of ethnicity, claiming that 

as the largest group in the country the Balanta deserved more representation in government, especially 

among senior military officers, and implicitly challenged Mané’s authority on the basis of his ethnicity. 

This made for a powerful rallying cry amid a difficult transition, particularly for those facing the 

prospect of losing their privileged positions in the military, which was due to undergo a large postwar 

demobilization. Cracks opened in Mané’s support within the armed forces. Ialá ordered his arrest and, 

in November 2000, Mané was killed by troops loyal to Ialá. 

Discord within the military festered, and senior officials within the armed forces have contested 

the ethnic makeup of the forces ever since. The dispute over Ialá’s promotions and dismissals was 

not resolved until December 2004, long after Mané was killed and Ialá was deposed in a coup. In 

a delicate balancing act meant to achieve consensus, 65 officers were readmitted to the military and 

senior positions were given to former Mané and Vieira supporters while the military command was 

held by a Balanta.44 Ethnicity continues to be a contentious issue within the military, with Balanta 

comprising 80 percent of Guinea-Bissau’s armed forces. As a result, promotions and recruitment often 

provoke tensions and disputes. 

Ialá, who remains a prominent political figure and recurring candidate in presidential elections, has 

continued to advance a decidedly pro-Balanta agenda. Even senior members of his PRS party accuse 

him of leading the party by “ethnic principles.”45 Given Ialá’s weak record in office, this remains his 

most effective strategy of mobilization. However, it does not reflect deeper antipathies within the society. 

Aside from the interethnic tensions within the military and among civilian elites, there is little indication 

that these rifts have spread to the population as a whole. Interethnic or intercommunal violence is rare. 

This is to be expected given the broad diversity of ethnic groups within Guinea-Bissau where no single 

group approaches a majority.46 That said, reforming and streamlining the military remains a critical 

element of stabilizing the country, and ethnic reconciliation within the armed forces will be vital to 

achieving sustainable progress. Moreover, the rise in ethnic divisions demonstrates how new drivers of 

instability in Guinea-Bissau rear up as other sources of instability go unresolved.

Distrusted International Partners

As Guinea-Bissau has lurched from crisis to crisis, neighboring states and international organizations 
24

ACSS Special Report

have, at times, become involved. Instead of fostering a stabilizing effect, these external actors have often 

been accused of choosing sides or competing with one another. As a result, most of Guinea-Bissau’s 

closest neighbors and international partners are not broadly perceived as trustworthy mediators. 

For example, within days of the first hostilities in the 1998-1999 conflict, neighboring Senegal and 

Guinea jointly deployed roughly 2,000 troops to support President Vieira. Bissau-Guineans widely 

opposed the foreign intervention and sided with General Mané’s forces. Bouts of heavy fighting between 

Senegalese and Bissau-Guinean troops ensued. Eventually, ECOWAS intervened, but in a manner 

that many interpreted as favoring Vieira. The Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), 

meanwhile, tried to negotiate peace, yet Senegal and ECOWAS resisted the organization’s involvement, 

which they regarded as favoring Mané’s forces.47 In other words, few outside parties seemed credibly 

neutral in the conflict. 

These dynamics persist today with some new players. Angola has become increasingly more involved 

in the affairs of Guinea-Bissau, both bilaterally on political, economic, and military issues as well as 

through the CPLP, which was chaired by Angola in 2010-2012. The mining firm Bauxite Angola 

announced in 2007 a $321 million investment in Guinea-Bissau and paid a $13 million upfront fee 

to the government to mine bauxite deposits (the main ingredient in aluminum) in the southeastern 

region of the country and to develop a port in Buba to facilitate exports. This region shares much of the 

same geology as neighboring Guinea, Africa’s largest bauxite producer. Bauxite Angola is 70 percent 

owned by Angolan parastal companies Sonangol and the Banco Angolano de Investimentos (Angolan 

Investment Bank), 20 percent owned by the Angolan government directly, and 10 percent owned by 

the government of Guinea-Bissau. In September 2010, a bilateral Technical and Military Assistance 

Protocol was signed in Luanda by Guinea-Bissau Minister of Defense Aristides Ocante da Silva and 

his Angolan counterpart Cândido Pereira Van-Dúnem. Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Jr. and Angolan 

President José Eduardo dos Santos both affirmed their support for the effort during joint public remarks, 

laying the foundation for the March 2011 launch of the Angolan Security Mission to Guinea-Bissau 

(MISSANG) that eventually numbered 600 troops to implement a $30 million security sector reform 

effort. Though he was involved in initial consultations about the Angolan mission, General Indjai 

suspected that MISSANG was primarily intended to support and protect Prime Minister Carlos Gomes 

Jr. and Angola’s interests in the country. He claimed the troops were armed with heavy weaponry and 

tanks, which were inappropriate for a security sector reform mission.

Bissau-Guinean government officials, including Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Jr., have also made 

frequent trips to Luanda. During crises such as the fighting in Bissau in December 2011, Gomes Jr. 

sought refuge in the Angolan embassy. The government of Angola also forgave Guinea-Bissau’s entire 

bilateral debt of $38 million and extended a credit line of $25 million to Guinea-Bissau in 2010. 

Following the April 2012 coup d’état, MISSANG withdrew from the country. The ECOWAS Mission 

for Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) deployed 677 troops in May 2012, first to oversee the MISSANG 
25

Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau

withdrawal and, under an expanded mandate, to support the transition and ongoing security sector 

reform efforts. Unfortunately, ECOMIB includes a substantial contingent of Senegalese troops, reviving 

antipathies from the 1998-1999 conflict and questions about the force’s neutrality. It has also been 

heavily criticized in Guinea-Bissau as ineffective since it is based far from Bissau, engages in few patrols, 

and human rights abuses by the military have continued. The ECOWAS mission must also guard against 

West African troops being drawn into narcotics trafficking themselves.

Though there has been some degree of cooperation, ECOWAS has viewed the Angolan intervention 

and the CPLP’s involvement in Guinea-Bissau more generally as a breach of ECOWAS’s designated 

role as the preeminent body for managing peace, security, and development in West Africa. Conversely, 

the CPLP has sometimes been accused of wanting to play a role beyond that of a body set up mainly 

to share cultural and trade links. From ECOWAS’s perspective, CPLP lacks the budget, institutional 

capacity, and experience dealing with these sorts of challenges, whereas ECOWAS has a larger team 

and has allocated more resources for interventions in Guinea-Bissau. 

More generally, CPLP and ECOWAS have pursued markedly different responses to the 2012 coup in 

what has been described as a turf war.48 Immediately following the coup d’état, ECOWAS suspended 

Guinea-Bissau’s membership and imposed travel and visa bans on top Guinea-Bissau military officials, 

including General Indjai. Yet ECOWAS quickly negotiated a transitional framework in May 2012 

with Indjai’s “Military Command” and several opposition parties. It was initially intended to last 12 

months but has since been extended until the end of 2013. The framework was vehemently criticized 

by the PAIGC, which for months opted out of the framework, seeing it as legitimizing the coup. 

Notably, Manuel Serifo Nhamadjo, an independent candidate for president in the first round of the 

March 2012 elections and a former PAIGC parliamentarian, was introduced by ECOWAS negotiators 

as the consensus transitional president following talks with major national stakeholders days prior 

to the signing of the transition pact. Having served as a member of the ECOWAS Parliament for 

11 years, including 1 year as vice president of the assembly, Nhamadjo enjoys considerable support 

from ECOWAS leaders.

CPLP’s approach has stood in marked contrast to that of ECOWAS. At CPLP summits since the 

coup, the deposed leaders of Guinea-Bissau have represented the country. The organization has 

withheld recognition of the transitional authorities and advocates for the immediate resumption of 

constitutional rule. Meanwhile, Gomes Jr. and other exiled political and military elites have lived in 

Portugal, the seat of the CPLP. In short, both the CPLP and ECOWAS appear to support separate 

networks of allies in Guinea-Bissau, deepening political polarization and reinforcing obstinacy among 

elites within the country. 

Portugal has also remained influential in Guinea-Bissau. It has supported some capacity building 

initiatives in the country, particularly vetting, training, and supporting the expansion of the Judicial 

Police, which has demonstrated significant improvements. The Portuguese Parliament has also continued 
26 27

ACSS Special Report Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau

Mandate of UN mission

in Guinea-Bissau

expires in May 2014.

ECOWAS

intervenes,

negotiates

transitional

government,

and deploys

stabilization

force.

President

Sanhá dies

in oce

January 9.

Indjai detains senior

ocers and Prime

Minister Gomes Jr.,

declares himself

military chief of 

sta in April.

Naval Chief of Sta Na 

Tchuto ees to The 

Gambia in August to 

evade arrest for 

alleged coup plot. The three largest parties in

parliament sign pact in March, 

voting to oust President Vieira’s 

handpicked prime minister.

Military Chief of 

Sta Seabra killed 

during troop revolt 

in October.

Vieira returns, wins

presidential elections in 

July, quickly dismisses 

Prime Minister Gomes Jr.

Military coup

overthrows Ialá

in September.

Vieira

announces

dismissal of

Mané, whose

supporters

seize

barracks

touching o

11-month

civil war.

Mané’s forces seize

Bissau, Vieira ees

to exile in Portugal.

Ialá dissolves 

parliament in 

November, 

which does not 

sit again for 18 

months.

General 

Mané killed 

by troops 

loyal to Ialá in 

November.

Nearly 600 kgs of

cocaine delivered

by plane to military

base in July. Senior

military ocers

allegedly involved.

Two Venezuelans

arrested in Bissau

following shoot out 

and seizure of 674 

kgs of cocaine. 

Prime Minister 

orders transfer of 

custody of drugs, 

which then

disappear. Judge

releases suspects 

for lack of evidence.

President Vieira

and General

Tagme Na

Wai killed in

successive

assassinations

in early March.

Indjai launches

military coup

in April just

weeks prior to

second-round

presidential

elections.

Rear Admiral Bubo Na 

Tchuto and others arrested 

in April in U.S. drug sting 

operation. Indjai

indicted but not arrested.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 

informs UN Security Council in 

December that cocaine ows have 

surged in Guinea-Bissau following 

2012 coup d’état, with hundreds of 

kilograms arriving weekly.

President

Military 

Chief of Sta

Prime

Minister

Color Key

Rui Duarte

Barros

Carlos

Correia

Carlos

Correia

Carlos 

Gomes Jr.

Mário

Pires

Faustino

Imbali

Caetano

N'Tchama

Alamara

Nhassé

Francisco

Fadul

Artur

Sanhá

Martinho

Ndafa Cabi

Adiato

Djaló

Nandigna

Malam

Bacai

Sanhá

João

Bernardo 

“Nino” Vieira

Year 2014 2013 2012 2011

Carlos Gomes Jr.

Malam Bacai Sanhá João Bernardo "Nino" Vieira Henrique Pereira Rosa Kumba Ialá

António Indjai José Zamora Induta Batista Tagme Na Wai Veríssimo Correia Seabra Asumane Mané

Aristides Gomes

2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998

–

–

–

Manuel Serifo

Nhamadjo

Raimundo

Pereira

Raimundo

Pereira

N

/

A

Unconstitutional Appointment Assassinated While In Oce Exiled/Barred From Travel Following

Unconstitutional Removal Unconstitutional Removal From Oce

Figure 4. Timeline of Key Events and Figures in Guinea-Bissau’s Worsening Instability
28

ACSS Special Report

to provide some technical support to the National Assembly in Bissau, including language and literacy 

training. Portugal has worked primarily through the European Union’s engagement in the country, 

which ended its security sector reform mission in September 2010 following the rise of General Indjai 

and the reinstatement of Rear Admiral Na Tchuto. Likewise, Portugal has strongly supported the position 

of the CPLP with regard to the April 2012 coup d’état. This has left Portugal at odds with ECOWAS, 

which has sought to expand recognition of the transitional government. Holding a seat on the UN 

Security Council from 2011 through 2012, Portugal may have stymied efforts by ECOWAS to advance 

a new UN engagement strategy with the transitional government. According to critics of the CPLP, 

Portugal is perceived to have lost out in the coup d’état. Prominent Portuguese companies, including 

state-owned franchises, have links to businesses associated with Carlos Gomes Jr., including petroleum 

retailer Petromar, majority owned by Galp Energia, and the country’s largest retail bank, Banco da Africa 

Ocidental (BAO), formerly owned by major Portuguese investment bank Montepio Geral. 

A controlling stake in BAO was purchased in 2007 by Geocapital, a business owned by Macau 

gambling magnate Stanely Ho, at the same time that Carlos Gomes Jr. sold his shares in the 

bank.49Notably, Angola’s lines of credit to Guinea-Bissau are managed by Banco Privado Atlântico, 

which is an international bank jointly owned by Sonangol and Global Pactum, a company also owned 

by Stanley Ho’s Geocapital.50 Stanley Ho has previously been investigated by U.S. regulators and 

law enforcement for his links to money laundering and Chinese organized crime.51 The combination 

of Guinea-Bissau’s limited connections to the international financial system and BAO’s size and 

connections to banks in Portugal, Cape Verde, Macau, and Angola, make it an ideal conduit for 

laundering drug trafficking proceeds.

China’s growing involvement in Guinea-Bissau is also notable. China financed the construction of the 

National Assembly in 2006, the Palace of Justice in 2008, a military hospital and barracks in 2010, and a 

multi-story government office building in 2011. Restoration work on the presidential palace commenced 

that same year. China has also provided budgetary assistance packages to the government, such as $4 

million provided in 2005 to pay salary arrears for civil servants and to finance a CPLP meeting in Bissau.52

Meanwhile, in May 2012, it emerged that tens of thousands of Chinese had obtained Guinea-Bissau 

passports from the Guinea-Bissau consular office in Macau. This was apparently an attempt by mainland 

Chinese to skirt foreign investment restrictions as well as a potential means of money laundering.53 The 

news emerged just 18 months after Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Jr. had overseen the opening of the 

consular office in Macau, where his son eventually obtained a job.54

By lining up so closely with Gomes Jr.’s interests, China’s investments, financing, budgetary support, 

and other activities in Guinea-Bissau may be inadvertently fueling the competition and tensions that 

are playing out between civilian and military leaders. In the process, Chinese engagements in GuineaBissau may reinforce the patronage, behind-the-scenes competition, and institutional sclerosis that have 

proven so destabilizing.
29

Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau

In short, disagreements among ECOWAS, the CPLP, and other prominent international actors in 

Guinea-Bissau have compounded the stabilization challenges in the country. Those states with the 

most leverage and familiarity over the dynamics driving Guinea-Bissau’s crises are increasingly seen 

as contributing to the polarization themselves. Their actions are therefore viewed with deep suspicion 

and their proposals for reform or compromise are effectively used as a justification to resist any change. 

Analysis: From Fragile States to NarcoStates

Guinea-Bissau’s post-independence story may seem to be solely one of elite competition and intrigue—a 

small recurring cast of characters seeking to outmaneuver one another in ever more desperate ways, and 

in the process dragging the country from crisis to crisis. However, the country’s troubles cannot be boiled 

down to the machinations of single individuals. The death in 2009 of President Vieira, arguably the 

most powerful and destabilizing figure since independence, gave Guinea-Bissau no respite from coups 

d’état or drug trafficking. Rather, the country’s persistent instability is rooted in multiple, interwoven, 

and often institutional problems: a weak political framework, a politicized security sector, and illicit 

trafficking, all of which are compounded by the emerging instrumentalization of ethnic differences 

and the sometimes partisan roles played by international partners. 

Yet Guinea-Bissau’s challenges were not always so complex. Ethnic differences were minimal during the 

independence struggle and the 1998-1999 civil war. And the comparatively small European market for 

cocaine in the late 1990s and early 2000s left Guinea-Bissau with a negligible role in the international drug 

trade. Instead, at the root of much of Guinea-Bissau’s instability has been the historically domineering 

role played by the Office of the President. Guinea-Bissau’s presidents have cultivated a winner-take-all 

political system that allows them great discretion to tap public monies to support personal political 

interests, make appointments across multiple branches and levels of government, dismiss prosecutors to 

scuttle investigations, and dissolve governments. This existed prior to the politicization of the military, 

illicit trafficking, and other contemporary challenges. In many respects, it was the authority of the 

presidency to operate beyond appeal that prompted the military’s strong reaction to President Vieira’s 

move to replace the chief of staff of the armed forces in 1998, leading to the civil war and the military’s 

creeping politicization thereafter. The concentration of power in the Office of the President sustained 

the unchecked and disastrous rule of Kumba Ialá in the early 2000s that led to another collapse of 

the state in 2003. It has also encouraged increasingly violent measures to compete for control of this 

important office, including facilitating cocaine trafficking and stirring ethnic tensions. Even the country’s 

international partners have been drawn into this competition by aligning themselves behind opposing 

factions—and sacrificing their neutrality and credibility in the process. Therefore, while Guinea-Bissau’s 

crises are interconnected, it is the over-concentration of power in the presidency—and, inversely, the 

political system’s weak framework of checks and balances—that have directly and indirectly bred the 

country’s contemporary complex of instability. 
30

ACSS Special Report

The destabilizing cycle of all-or-nothing political competition in Guinea-Bissau, deepened by a 

decade of drug trafficking, has also surpassed the ability of domestic institutions or leaders to 

realistically manage or reverse this growing fragmentation internally. Rather, sustained international 

involvement is needed to stabilize the country. External actors have ever increasing incentives to 

become engaged, given how Guinea-Bissau’s worsening predicament is feeding instability elsewhere 

in the region. A lesson from previous external engagements, however, is that piecemeal efforts to 

contain the country’s problems or appease the reigning politico-military elites in power have only 

allowed new and more intractable problems to emerge. Instead, a sustained, integrated strategy 

to mitigate Guinea-Bissau’s key drivers of instability is necessary to break the country’s cycle 

of crises. Fortunately, there is a viable contingent of domestic actors laying the groundwork for 

recovery. An emerging civil society, a resilient media sector, the national legislature, and other 

independent voices could provide the balance and momentum needed to persistently advance 

a reform agenda. They are unlikely to gain traction without political, financial, and technical 

support from international partners, however. 

The stabilization challenge in Guinea-Bissau should also be viewed as a warning for Africa—

and an imperative to prevent more narco-states from developing. For, even though it is the first, 

Guinea-Bissau is not a special case. The centralization of authority, weak institutions, poor 

security sector governance, minimal development, history of conflict, and social cleavages are 

recurring features of fragile states.55 Indeed, these are the conditions that narcotics trafficking 

networks seek out (see text box on page 31). Various permutations of these circumstances prevail 

in the 25 African states, including Guinea-Bissau, listed as “critical” or “in danger” of failing in 

the 2012 Failed States Index.56

Moreover, trafficking in high-value narcotics has grown in many of Guinea-Bissau’s neighbors. 

Cocaine has been seized in large quantities in Senegal, and regional traffickers have used the 

country as a base. A bank in The Gambia was sanctioned by the U.S. government in 2011 for its 

linkages to a West African drug-trafficking and money-laundering network operated by Hezbollah.57 

Several large seizures of cocaine have occurred in Sierra Leone, including an incident in 2008 that 

implicated the Minister of Transportation and led to his dismissal. Never indicted, he was rehired 

as a special advisor to the President not long after and became Minister of Political and Public 

Affairs in 2013.58 The nature of narcotics trafficking in Africa also continues to evolve. There have 

been multiple incidents not only of cocaine but also heroin trafficking in Ghana. Large quantities 

of chemicals used to manufacture amphetamines have been seized in Côte d’Ivoire and Niger.59

One trafficking network detained in 2010 in Liberia was surreptitiously recorded by U.S. law 

enforcement informants trying to convince Liberia’s senior intelligence officials to establish a drug 

laboratory to manufacture amphetamines for sale in the United States and Japan. Since July 2011, five 

sophisticated amphetamine laboratories have been discovered in Nigeria.60 Amphetamines often sell 

at a much higher wholesale price than cocaine or heroin, netting higher profits for criminal groups. 

This, in turn, could usher in a whole new era of narcotics-driven destabilizing effects in Africa.
31

Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau

These changes signify how the international drug trade in Africa continues to deepen, evolve, and grow. 

It was only in 2006-2007 that alarms were first raised over Latin American cartels exploiting West 

Africa’s weak states to transship cocaine to Europe.61 By 2012, substantial shipments of cocaine from 

South America were flowing into West Africa, heroin from South Asia was being trafficked through East 

Africa, and amphetamines were being manufactured on the continent for sale in East and Southeast 

Asia.62 Increasingly, much of this activity has been taken over by African criminal networks. Left 

unaddressed, what was initially a transshipment problem has metastasized into something larger, more 

complex, homegrown, and destabilizing. 

The Making of a Narco-State 

From the perspective of a drug trafficker assessing the “ease of doing business,” fragile states potentially offer a number of attractive features to the international narcotics supply chain: 

◆ Geographically advantageous relative to producer and high-value user countries or to critical interim destinations to reach those markets. “Geography” here is conceived not just in terms of physical distance between 

producers and consumers, but also in terms of how they are connected through high-traffic air and sea ports, 

land routes, or the international finance and banking system.

◆ Sufficient concentration of authority in relatively few individuals, particularly over air, sea, and land connections, who are amenable to facilitating complex movement of bulk drug shipments. 

◆ Amenability of individuals to cooption is shaped by some combination of:

 Poor salary, weak career prospects, limited institutional pride, low professionalism, weak national identity, 

lack of allegiance to the community, etc.

 High need for revenues among key individuals, whether because of weak or uncertain alternative sources 

of funds or because of competition within prevailing political economy.

 Prevalence of other forms of corruption, particularly other forms of illicit trafficking which leads to a 

smooth segue or “graduation” to high-value narcotics trafficking.

 Weak understanding of over-the-horizon risks associated with transshipment, prompting communities and 

interest groups to ignore illicit activity.

◆ Low risk of discovery due to weak oversight, independent media, or civil society.

◆ Low risk of prosecution due to unclear legal code, such as a lack of criminalization of drug smuggling, or a 

manipulable judicial system, which allows for skipping bail or corrupting key figures. 

◆ Low cost of operations, primarily in terms of payments to local facilitators for services.

◆ Weak, incomplete, or opaque regulatory environment allowing for simple acquisition of land and front companies.

Guinea-Bissau is attractive to traffickers because it is close to the growing market in Europe and has reasonably good 

connections to Portugal, a key landing point for drugs in Europe, as well as other African hubs such as Senegal, Mauritania, The Gambia, or Morocco. President Vieira was certainly amenable to trafficking and retained sufficient authority 

to facilitate its movement. He may even have been one of the first individuals to introduce bulk cocaine trafficking 

through Africa to Europe based on connections he developed while exiled in Portugal, Senegal, and Guinea from 1999 

to 2005. As the trafficking developed, military leaders also became involved, given their authority over land, air, and 

sea routes as well as their ability to protect bulk shipments. In fact, the military’s previous involvement in arms trafficking may have facilitated a segue into drug trafficking. The military and Vieira as well as other key elites were already 

in competition for power and had few comparable alternative revenue streams. They would, therefore, welcome the 

huge funds associated with drug trafficking to strengthen their positions. There were few other institutions that could 

intervene: the National Assembly, the Judicial Police, and the judiciary remained too weak. Risk of discovery was 

low, though civil society groups and independent media have consistently highlighted the issue in recent years, some 

bravely fingering key leaders and officials. Risk of prosecution is minimal. What few arrests have occurred have generally been dismissed in court or delayed. The regulatory environment is extremely lax. Acquiring land or establishing 

companies is fairly simple with minimal paperwork or oversight, particularly for well-connected individuals. All these 

conditions gave Guinea-Bissau a “comparative advantage” in becoming Africa’s first narco-state.
32

ACSS Special Report

Given this constant evolution and expansion of drug trafficking in Africa, Guinea-Bissau may not be 

the continent’s only narco-state, just its most recognizable. With a small economy, high levels of preexisting competition among politico-military elites, a history of conflict, and weak state institutions, 

the deterioration that accompanied high-value narcotics trafficking progressed rapidly in Guinea-Bissau 

leading to a quickening pace of coups, killings, and crises. Lacking this same combination and intensity 

of negative influences, few countries in Africa resemble Guinea-Bissau. This does not mean that other 

African narco-states are not emerging, however. Mali, for example, first exhibited overt signs of drugfueled instability in 2007-2008.63 Rising levels of cocaine trafficking into and through Mali during the 

last decade contributed to a weakening of the Malian state, including cooptation of the military, and 

to competition among emerging militia, criminal, and terrorist networks in the northern half of the 

country.64 This led to the rapid spiral of events in early 2012. What had once been a model of emerging 

democracy and stability in West Africa was subjected to a military coup and divided in half between 

a military-run state in the south and an ungoverned north controlled by violent Islamist militias. 

Comparable processes may be unfolding in other African countries, but as these changes tend to occur 

from the inside out, they are not initially readily evident. It is only when crises begin to take hold that 

the degree to which the state has been compromised comes to the surface. 

This is a common feature of narcotics trafficking. While the drug trade conjures images of the violence 

that has for years plagued Mexico or Colombia, this is more often the reflection of a late stage in the 

evolutionary process of narco-states. Trafficking usually commences unnoticed, as traffickers coopt 

critically placed individuals or institutions to facilitate their clandestine activities.65 This leads to a gradual 

weakening of state institutions from within. Over time, the police, the judiciary, the military, and the 

political process as a whole can be subverted by high levels of drug-fueled corruption.66 Likewise, the drug 

trade feeds pre-existing drivers of instability within a transshipment country. As the trade grows, the state 

becomes weaker. Meanwhile, inter-elite competition accelerates, as does political violence, corruption, and 

gang or militia activity. In some countries, trafficking grows to the point where corruption and cooptation 

no longer suffice in a high stakes trade for what are ultimately limited resources involving numerous 

actors and groups. Instead, intimidation and violence are used to protect or grow the drug trade in such 

mature drug trafficking environments. Combating established trafficking groups and reversing what 

has been years of a metastasizing problem requires an intense and often lengthy period of rehabilitation 

and reform. As in Guinea-Bissau, such reform is often all but impossible without substantial amounts 

of external engagement, far more than would have been necessary to slow or prevent such deterioration 

had it been confronted sooner when the challenge was more unidimensional.67
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Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau

Recommendations

The persistent state of crisis in Guinea-Bissau has grown more acute and more violent. Moreover, it is 

increasingly driving instability among its neighbors, particularly in Senegal, The Gambia, Mauritania, 

Mali, Guinea, and elsewhere. Rather than a symptoms-based response, however, a stabilization 

framework is needed to resolve the deep-rooted political fissures in the country. Breaking the country’s 

cycle of crises will require fundamental reforms. These fissures are also multilayered, so multiple tracks 

of reform must be pursued concomitantly and collaboratively by actors at the national and international 

level. Given the entrenched interests of influential figures in the status quo, pushback to any reform 

initiative is inevitable. 

Political and Governance Reforms

At the heart of Guinea-Bissau’s many crises is the centralization of power and lack of checks and 

balances on the Office of the President. The thin margins of victory in past presidential elections in 

Guinea-Bissau and the regular reshuffling of parties elected to parliament are indications that the 

electorate favors a more balanced government that includes broad representation. Bissau-Guineans 

want a decisionmaking process that is more deliberative and rules-based, breaking the winner-take-all 

ethos that has long dominated Bissau-Guinean politics, particularly the often-violent contests over 

the Office of the President. Establishing multiple poles of power can lower these stakes and enhance 

stability and prosperity. Indeed, during President Sanhá’s term in office, an almost accidental balance 

of power among key factions across the government contributed to a period of peace and economic 

growth with broad-based benefits. Such a system of checks and balances needs to be institutionalized, 

however, potentially including legislation that:

◆ Endows a prime minister with more executive authorities

◆ Specifies the limited authority of the president to make appointments at the national, regional, 

and local levels

◆ Reinforces parliament’s role in approving budgets and monitoring spending 

◆ Grants more authority and autonomy for:

 Office of the attorney general

 Courts system

 Anti-corruption commission

 Human rights commission 

◆ Revitalizes a merit-based civil service.68

These and other changes will require Guinea-Bissau to revise its constitution, which still largely reflects 

the one-party state that emerged in the immediate post-independence era. Explicit references to political 

parties by name, the liberation movement, or other specific events feature prominently in a document 
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ACSS Special Report

that should be timeless and serve as the foundation of a political system that is larger than any one party, 

institution, or era. A committee featuring political and legal experts with strong representation from 

Bissau-Guinean civil society groups should be convened to develop a modern governance framework 

more conducive to a stable, balanced, and enduring democratic order. Such an initiative would draw 

from the precedents set by the various constitutional assemblies held throughout West Africa during 

past transitions, including the committee on constitutional reform that was established following a 

political crisis in Niger over the powers of the presidency that resulted in a military coup d’état in 2010. 

The committee featured 18 Nigerien political and legal experts, including a scholar from the diaspora 

who served as chairman, and formulated a draft constitution following extensive deliberations as well as 

input from civil society and interest groups. The draft was eventually adopted by national referendum, 

paving the way for a resumption of constitutional order under a new governance framework with greater 

limitations on the presidency and the office of the prime minister, a stronger constitutional court, and 

clearer individual rights, among many other revisions.69

While generally considered to be well organized, balanced, and representative in spite of its 

paltry budget, Guinea-Bissau’s parliament, the National People’s Assembly, is underutilized 

as a mechanism for reform and change in the country. Members do not feel empowered and 

lack experience working with counterparts to collectively advance a policy agenda or exercise 

the oversight roles of a legislature. Moreover, village-level meetings and initiatives to connect 

communities with their deputies are rare, creating a gap between national-level politics and 

community-level interests that weakens both parliamentarians and citizens. Although the 

legislatures of Portugal and the United Kingdom have made efforts to promote the values of 

parliamentarianism in the context of the country’s development, the international community 

as a whole needs to elevate the National Assembly in a strategy for the normalization of GuineaBissau’s politics and to empower its deputies, who should legally be at the forefront in representing 

citizen interests and efforts to build cohesion in Bissau-Guinean society.

A more empowered National Assembly in Guinea-Bissau will require a stronger role for the parliamentary 

opposition. Successive opposition groups in the National Assembly have found themselves without 

meaningful participation in debates pertaining to the state budget, the composition of bills, government 

programs, and other, critical components of political life. This disconnect also explains the propensity of 

some opposition politicians to subvert the democratic process, collude with the military, and destabilize 

the country. In many legislatures and parliaments, leading opposition parties are given control of select 

committees, typically called Public Accounts Committees, with powers to hold hearings, call government 

officials to testify, commission audits of government programs, and assess spending. Creating a similar 

committee in Guinea-Bissau’s National Assembly may strengthen checks and balances, incentivize 

opposition politicians to work within rather than around the political system, and minimize the winnertake-all metrics that have so dominated Guinea-Bissau’s politics.
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Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau

Dealing with the Past

Regardless of how reasonable or balanced any reform agenda may be, the intensity of polarization and 

divisions fostered through years of political machinations, abuses of power, conflict, and coups d’état 

will complicate implementation and consensus-building.70 Trust and dialogue are in dire need of repair. 

The Commission for National Reconciliation, established by the National Assembly in 2009, should be 

a lead actor for efforts to foster trust and dialogue. Thus far, the Commission has received financial and 

technical assistance from the UN, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, and the governments of Portugal and 

Japan, while the British Parliament has provided external mediation. It engages in outreach on multiple 

tracks, both among key political and military factions as well as with community leaders, citizen groups, 

and civil society around the country. Its purpose is to gradually revive a norm of communication vital 

to peaceful dispute resolution in Guinea-Bissau. 

Without established channels of communication to mitigate tensions or resolve misunderstandings, 

small incidents in Guinea-Bissau quickly gain their own momentum and result in full-blown but often 

avoidable emergencies. However, from 2010 through early 2012, the UN Integrated Peacebuilding 

Office in Guinea-Bissau and the Commission on National Reconciliation made much progress in 

routinizing semi-private and even public exchanges between key aides to General Indjai, Prime Minister 

Gomes Jr., and President Sanhá. Though many of these meetings achieved little in terms of concrete 

reforms, simply institutionalizing such regular exchanges can slowly rebuild trust and often reveal 

areas of mutual agreement that can form the foundation for progress. Unfortunately, with the death 

of President Sanhá in early 2012, this emerging dynamic was broken and not sufficiently entrenched 

to prevent the subsequent tensions that emerged and resulted in the April 2012 coup d’état. However, 

the prior effort demonstrated that constructive dialogue was possible. The Commission on National 

Reconciliation and the UN mission should work toward revitalizing exchanges between key political 

and military factions toward more firmly establishing a routine of dialogue to prevent crises from 

spinning out of control. 

The Commission on National Reconciliation is also mandated to prepare for and host a National 

Conference for Pathways to Peacebuilding and Development. This broad-based event is meant to serve 

as a venue where a cross section of Bissau-Guineans can introduce their priorities, grievances, and 

aspirations for the country and discuss the causes of conflict and potential reforms and strategies needed 

to reconcile the prevailing national polarization. Toward this end, extensive preparatory consultations by 

the Commission on National Reconciliation have already been conducted around the country to foster 

broad-based buy-in for the effort. In addition to holding multiple meetings in Bissau with representatives 

from key political and security sector institutions, the Commission on National Reconciliation held 22 

meetings with 1,400 attending delegates over the course of 80 days of travel through all administrative 

regions of the country in 2010 and 2011. Views and discussions captured from these meetings will 

go directly toward informing the agenda of the National Conference. Additionally, international 
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ACSS Special Report

peace experts from postconflict countries such as Rwanda, South Africa, and Northern Ireland will be 

included in the National Conference to serve as objective facilitators as well as repositories of lessons 

on reconciliation from other polarized contexts. 

The National Conference was originally scheduled to take place in late January 2012, but President 

Sanhá’s death in early January forced its postponement. The process then fell by the wayside following 

the subsequent coup d’état. However, much valuable work has already been achieved toward revitalizing 

a sense of trust and dialogue in the country. Accordingly, the National Conference should be put back 

on track. It will prove to Bissau-Guineans that they can constructively share their views, that they will 

be heard, and that dialogue is a valuable means to air grievances and build a shared understanding. 

Complementary to the National Conference process, other sustained reconciliation initiatives are 

needed, particularly between civilians and the military. Existing efforts to routinize exchanges between 

veterans, officers, and civil society representatives, such as “Mom ku Mom,” should be further supported 

and expanded. Revisiting the history of Guinea-Bissau’s united struggle for independence may also 

help bridge divides between the security sector and broader society. In fact, this proposal first emerged 

during regional meetings in preparation for the 2012 National Conference. This project could feature 

civilian historians and civil society representatives working with an ethnically mixed group of “freedom 

fighters” from the anti-colonial struggle. The project should focus on the bonds formed during the 

struggle, the sacrifices of all groups, the shared sense of pride that was developed, and how these bonds 

could be rekindled. A frank appraisal of this history could heal divisions within the armed forces, revive 

respect for this institution among the rank and file as well as the population, and prevent a further 

deterioration of state-society relations. 

Depoliticization of the Military

Another fundamental driver of instability in Guinea-Bissau is the politicization of the military. Legislative 

reforms must be undertaken to set clear parameters on the roles and responsibilities of the military, 

founded on a clear-eyed national security assessment and strategy. Among other things, such reforms 

will require reestablishing the authority for setting national security policy with legitimate civilian 

leaders and active legislative oversight. Doing so vests such authority in leaders who are accountable to 

the general population.71 Given the legacy of distrust between the presidency and military in GuineaBissau, reinstituting such norms would likely require creating a widely respected, independent oversight 

body knowledgeable in security issues so that military leaders are protected from politically motivated 

punitive acts by civilian authorities.

Rebalancing the Ranks. While the military’s input into officer promotions and recruitment should 

continue, these decisions should be made by the national legislature based on clear, merit-based guidelines 

that aim to raise the level of professionalism within the military. Such decisions should also be guided 

by the objective of national reconciliation following nearly two decades of worsening patronage, ethnic 
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Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau

favoritism, and other abuses in the armed forces. Existing units must also be gradually restructured to 

integrate multiple ethnic groups and regularly engage in exercises and training to build cross-ethnic 

camaraderie. With the Balanta comprising nearly 80 percent of troop strength but accounting for just 

a quarter of a diverse population, they are currently highly over-represented in the armed forces. 

Term Limits. Limits on the terms in which senior officers can serve in appointments—a common 

standard in other countries—should be adopted to prevent policy or strategic inertia in critical offices, 

reduce patronage and corruption, and open opportunities for rising officers. In many countries, senior 

officers are nominated for military commissions by the executive branch, approved by parliament or a 

parliamentary committee, and then serve 2 to 3 year terms with an option for an additional term. Such 

personnel management adjustments will be critical to accommodating concerns that military affairs 

will be dominated by a single faction of politico-military elites or use promotions and recruitment as 

a means of patronage, all of which have been the bases for past crises. Instituting such limits is also 

consistent with a trend in Africa toward presidential term limits.

Pensions. Any initiative that institutionalizes term limits for senior military officers should also uphold 

attractive military pensions and benefits for those who retire in good standing. In Guinea-Bissau, the 

biggest concern among many senior officers is a system of pensions that has malfunctioned for years, 

resulting in extreme reluctance to retire but dwindling interest to serve.

International partners of Guinea-Bissau could lend valuable support for meaningful reform efforts in 

this area. Many advances have been made in improving the system of military pensions in Guinea-Bissau 

over the last decade with help from ECOWAS, the CPLP, and European countries. Funds have been 

set aside and an administrative system put in place, but the scheduled launch of the Special Pension 

Fund system in January 2012 never took place. Following the coup d’état in April 2012, cooperation 

between international actors all but disappeared. Launching and sustaining a system of pensions might 

stimulate badly needed demobilization and rebalance the military’s composition, which contains far 

too many old and senior officers.

Professionalizing Administrative Oversight. Methods of delivering salaries could be made more 

transparent to discourage corruption and improve morale. A system to deliver payments electronically by 

mobile phone should be explored. In Afghanistan, salary payments, person-to-person money transfers, 

and other banking services have been made available to police via mobile phones using M-Pesa, a 

mobile technology pioneered in Kenya. Users in Afghanistan were pleased with the program and 

even reported that they were receiving “raises,” though in actuality the process was just preventing 

unscrupulous superiors from routinely skimming their staff’s wages. Meanwhile, large numbers of 

“ghost” police officers, nonexistent employees created to divert salaries, were discovered and removed 

from the payrolls.72 Mobile phone-based payments of civil servants are also increasingly common in 

Kenya and South Africa73 and have been launched in the Democratic Republic of the Congo where they 

will be dramatically expanded as a result of the success and popularity of the system.74
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ACSS Special Report

Professional Military Education. Offers of military exchanges and training from international 

partners might further incentivize and professionalize Guinea-Bissau’s military brass, gradually 

reversing the politicization of the military. Exchanges with staff colleges and training academies in 

countries with strong traditions of civilian control of the military and that have a sufficiently neutral 

reputation in Guinea-Bissau would be essential. Such professional military education opportunities 

have been shown to have a measurable impact on stabilizing countries undergoing political transitions.75 

Brazil, which remains respected in Guinea-Bissau and has led some peacebuilding efforts in the 

country, may be an ideal option for such exchanges. India may be another, given Indian businesses’ 

dominant presence in Guinea-Bissau’s cashew industry, their relatively neutral reputation in the 

country, and the professionalism of their armed forces. Several African countries have laudable 

staff colleges and could provide useful opportunities for Bissau-Guinean officers, such as Ghana, 

Botswana, or South Africa. Other African partners—such as Senegal, Angola, and Nigeria—may 

initially be poorly received given their perceived alliances in Guinea-Bissau. International partners not 

hosting such exchanges could support them financially. Curricula should emphasize strategic analysis 

and planning, threat assessments, and the practicalities of democratic security sector governance. 

However, tactical or operational training should not be entirely neglected since it may boost morale, 

confidence, and unit solidarity.

Incentives to Reform. Why would the armed forces of Guinea-Bissau willingly support such a reform 

agenda and submit to civilian authority? First, members of the armed forces, from the rank and file to the 

very senior levels of the officer corps, have all been victims of the country’s political volatility and crises. 

Heads of the armed forces rarely step down of their own accord, and many have been assassinated. Nor 

is serving in the inner circle of the military leadership a guarantee of safety and continued prosperity. 

For example, General António Indjai’s chief of security was arrested in February 2013 for unknown 

reasons. The once Chief of Staff of the Navy, Rear Admiral Bubo Na Tchuto, repeatedly moved in and 

out of the inner circles of the military—from detention cells to leadership meetings and back—before 

his arrest by U.S. authorities in April 2013.76 It has been nearly 30 years since a military chief of staff 

was replaced in a peaceful fashion. 

Along with this instability, there are few opportunities for making a genuine career in the armed forces. 

Training is minimal, benefits such as housing or medical care are very poor, and pay is infrequent. For 

young troops and rising officers, promotions and upward mobility are determined by the politics of the 

moment rather than merit or performance. And, not to be disregarded, the armed forces’ reputation 

among the population is abysmal. They are distrusted, disliked, and unwelcome. In other words, while 

fears and resistance to reforming the security sector are inevitable, there is hardly a unified internal 

commitment to the existing system. In contrast with the violence and uncertainty of the politicized 

military in Guinea-Bissau, civilian and democratic oversight of the armed forces tends to deliver more 

predictable resources for force modernization, greater popular legitimacy for the security services, and 

more protections from arbitrary demotion or detention for officers.77
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Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau

Beyond tangible reform initiatives, consistent and transparent communication will be vital to any security 

sector reform effort. Given the years of violent factionalism within the armed forces that have seen senior 

leaders killed and multiple revolts, suspicions are likely to be high. Spoilers will inevitably spread 

misinformation to undermine reform efforts. Thus, any plan for change in the security sector must be 

clear and widely disseminated, and reformers must engage national and local media, particularly radio 

and by mass SMS, to continually explain the rationale for transformation, the benefits, and to provide 

relevant updates. Given prevailing civil-military divides and suspicions, identifying skilled communicators 

within the armed forces to serve as vital liaisons would help counter rumors within the barracks. 

Progress in reforming the armed forces is likely to be gradual and setbacks are probable. This was a 

common feature in previous successful security sector transformations in fragile or transitioning states, 

including Portugal, Brazil, El Salvador, Sierra Leone, and Ghana, among other countries.78 GuineaBissau has never had strong military doctrine, a clear institutional framework for governing the security 

sector, or a workable national security strategy. Thus, sudden changes to the armed forces will provoke a 

strong backlash, and many reforms will initially be infeasible given the weak institutional capacities in 

the military and defense sector. Rather, change must be made with a view to the long term and persist 

through any relapses or setbacks. 

Reversing the Narco-State

In tandem with political and security sector reforms, narcotics and other forms of illicit trafficking must 

be more directly confronted. Trafficking networks have coopted many military and civilian officials 

in Guinea-Bissau, dramatically reducing the availability of local partners and points of entry to make 

progress. Still, much can be achieved in this fight by focusing on the links between Guinea-Bissau 

and other intermediaries in this trade. For instance, cocaine that arrives in Guinea-Bissau must travel 

through neighboring states to reach markets in Europe and elsewhere. Therefore, there is an important 

role for international actors to play in curbing this trade. More strenuous efforts to disrupt these networks 

of traffickers at the regional level would make trafficking more expensive and discourage the use of 

Guinea-Bissau as a narcotics corridor. Likewise, European states and the United States could expand 

surveillance and reconnaissance of trafficking as well as interdiction of bulk shipments. The Maritime 

Operations and Analysis Center-Narcotics (MAOC-N), a combined effort of several European nations 

working closely with the United States, Cape Verde, Brazil, and other countries to collaborate in 

intelligence and interdiction, could concentrate more efforts and assets on Guinea-Bissau. Additionally, 

while some sea-based trafficking has been intermittently interdicted, efforts to identify and restrict air 

traffic are needed. Small planes that can carry hundreds of kilograms of cocaine are one of the preferred 

methods of moving drugs into and out of Guinea-Bissau. Many are registered outside of the country. 

Efforts to better monitor, record, and inspect activity at airports in Senegal, The Gambia, the Canary 

Islands, Guinea, and Cape Verde may complicate efforts to use this mode of trafficking. Simple steps 

might have a big impact, such as supporting watchdog groups that monitor planes that land and depart 

from airports and share registration information online. Likewise, establishing better relationships with 
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ACSS Special Report

fishing communities and their professional associations might foster a valuable source of information 

on sea-based trafficking, as artisanal fisherman are frequently courted for their assistance in moving 

drugs from ship-to-shore or along coastal trafficking routes.79

While drug interdiction is an insufficient solution to drug trafficking and its impacts, in Guinea-Bissau 

it could weaken spoilers by reducing their use of trafficking proceeds to manipulate patronage networks. 

This would provide vital breathing room to advance other technical assistance and structural reforms 

to prevent the cooptation and infiltration of state institutions by trafficking networks. Additionally, 

targeted investigations like the one that led to the arrest of Rear Admiral Bubo Na Tchuto and four other 

Bissau-Guinean traffickers in April 2013 can also have a significant impact, both by breaking up existing 

networks, challenging the culture of impunity, and changing the risk calculation of other traffickers. 

Though difficult, pressure on trafficking activities must be increased within Guinea-Bissau as well. This 

will mean improving the capacity of investigators, prosecutors, and judges to pursue cases. Surprisingly, 

the progress of many of these institutions has been a bright spot in recent years, including real achievements 

in the Judicial Police.80 Past parliamentary inquiries, including into arms trafficking in the late 1990s, 

also shed light on such illicit activities. However, reformers in Guinea-Bissau require more assistance. 

Previous investigations have not resulted in prosecutions because of the strong connections between 

criminal networks and government officials. To strengthen reformers, an internationally mandated 

mission of foreign experts in investigation, prosecution, and judicial issues should be based in Bissau 

to provide direct and sustained technical assistance to local counterparts. International experts would 

provide not only capacity to uphold the law, but might also provide a boost of morale to local reformers 

who face political pressure and intimidation to delay their work or simply self-censor. Such a concept 

has been advanced previously in Guinea-Bissau. Coordination meetings between the CPLP, ECOWAS, 

the African Union, and the United Nations in September 2011 openly discussed detailing Brazilian 

and Portuguese legal experts and administrators to Bissau to train and support local counterparts.81

An initiative in Guatemala run by the United Nations but sanctioned by the national legislature called 

the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) offers a potentially useful 

precedent. CICIG has contributed to a marked improvement in investigations and prosecutions of major 

crimes in government as well as many administrative and legal reforms. Following Guatemala’s long 

civil war that ended in 1996, the country endured staggeringly high-levels of official corruption and 

criminal and political violence, much of it perpetrated by former rebels who had infiltrated or coopted 

government agencies. This was further aggravated by Guatemala’s role in the inter-American cocaine 

trade, in which large quantities of drugs and drug revenues were flowing through the country. The 

country’s homicide rate was among the highest in the world. CICIG was established explicitly to target 

the interference of government offices and agencies by organized criminal groups, which was a root 

cause of the prevailing violence and corruption. Launched in 2007, CICIG’s success has led to multiple 

extensions. Since its inception, it has conducted numerous investigations, arrests, prosecutions, trainings, 

and legal reforms. Former ministers, a police chief, a top counternarcotics official, an attorney general, 
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Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau

and many other politically and economically powerful individuals have been removed from office for 

impropriety or arrested and charged with various crimes.82 CICIG has also developed a reputation for 

credibility and neutrality—some investigations have exonerated high-profile individuals believed to have 

been behind killings, trafficking, or other crimes. Additionally, dozens of prosecutors and investigators 

have been trained and numerous police officers have been vetted, resulting in the dismissal of more than 

2,000 deemed unfit for service due to links to corruption. New laws regarding organized crime, arms 

and ammunition, criminal prosecution, and plea bargaining have all been strengthened or passed.83 A 

similarly-styled mission for Guinea-Bissau could be mandated by the UN with strong support from the 

African Union, the CPLP, and ECOWAS. Detailees could be drawn from African states, Lusophone 

countries, and Europe so as to forestall any accusations of bias. Indeed, the 186 member CICIG team 

comprises a mix of nearly two dozen nationalities. 

Such missions are highly relevant to the challenges posed by narco-states and transnational organized 

crime across Africa. While peacekeeping operations have become the default instrument for dealing with 

state failure or conflict, a battalion of peacekeepers is not the way to deal with shadowy criminal networks 

or the pervasive cooptation of state officials and institutions by trafficking networks. Narco-states and 

those suffering from deep penetration by criminal networks require multilateral missions with technical 

expertise relevant to reforming legal frameworks and penal codes, tax administration, corporate registries 

and financial regulations, and modern investigative techniques to build and prosecute challenging criminal 

cases. To be sure, these missions will require protection from violence and intimidation. They also require 

a strong mandate and consistent political support from a respected international body and are often most 

effective when sanctioned by the national legislature, convention, or similarly representative entity. 

Members of these missions can achieve short-term gains while fostering self-sustaining reforms. For 

instance, the CICIG in Guatemala has worked closely with vetted law enforcement units and prosecutors 

to make immediate advances in major cases, including against once “untouchable” individuals 

with powerful political connections. Other elements of CICIG have focused on advanced training 

and reforming tax administration and legal codes. Most importantly, the presence of international 

counterparts working side-by-side with local law enforcement, prosecutors, judges, and civil servants can 

dispel the disillusionment and fear bred by deeply entrenched cultures of impunity that are among the 

most pernicious challenges in narco-states and similar contexts.84 The work of CICIG has also changed 

citizens’ perceptions of the government by prosecuting cases of official corruption as well as exonerating 

some leaders from suspected foul play. In other words, such initiatives have widespread impacts not only 

on transnational crime but on reestablishing good governance and government legitimacy. 

Pressuring Spoilers 

Additional means of pressure will be needed to encourage cooperation and deter attempts to spoil 

peacebuilding efforts. In the wake of the April 2012 military coup d’état, targeted financial sanctions 

and travel bans were instituted against key military leaders by the United Nations, the European Union, 
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ACSS Special Report

the African Union, and ECOWAS. Unfortunately, the application of such measures has been spotty, 

particularly within ECOWAS countries. Reports that General Indjai, the head of Guinea-Bissau’s 

armed forces, traveled to Mali and Côte d’Ivoire in July 2012 and again to Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal in 

March 2013 undermine the effects of such measures and the credibility of ECOWAS more generally.85 

ECOWAS must apply these measures more rigorously. Moreover, given Guinea-Bissau’s membership 

in the West African Central Bank, ECOWAS should be able to investigate the financial assets of key 

leaders in Guinea-Bissau, who likely hold assets and accounts in The Gambia, Senegal, and elsewhere 

in the region. Nor should such measures focus solely on military officers, since certain civilian leaders 

and organizations have also played prominent roles in destabilizing Guinea-Bissau. 

An international commission of inquiry or group of experts should also be launched to investigate the 

string of assassinations that took place in 2009, including of the president, the chief of staff of the armed 

forces, and several leading politicians. This initiative is long overdue, given the steady string of mysterious 

killings that have triggered crises in Guinea-Bissau. The commission or group of experts would require 

a strong mandate supported by ECOWAS, the African Union, and the United Nations to conduct 

work in Guinea-Bissau and around the region. It should also publicly issue independent evidence-based 

reports of their findings, including identifying military and civilian leaders and organizations that have 

intentionally contributed to violence, corruption, or instability. Announcement of such an initiative—

and the potential accountability it could bring—may force spoilers in Guinea-Bissau to recalculate their 

strategies of intransigence and potentially induce more cooperation with reform efforts. 

Indeed, the April 2013 arrest of Na Tchuto and subsequent indictment of Indjai was followed by a surge 

in negotiations and compromises by military leaders to advance the political transition and improve 

cooperation with international actors to combat drug trafficking.86 By May 2013, parliament, including 

the PAIGC, adopted a new transitional pact creating a more inclusive transitional government and 

scheduled national elections for November 2013. 

Empowering Civil Society and Independent Media 

Guinea-Bissau’s emerging democratic institutions, civil society, and independent media are another 

area in need of support. Remarkably, they have proven to be a resilient and influential force in the 

country. Yet, they are facing growing intimidation and violence from military and political leaders who 

resent the attention these independent outlets generate. International actors, particularly ECOWAS 

through its current political and ECOMIB military mission in the country, must do more to protect 

these groups, which are under increasing threat. Attacks, intimidation, or baseless legal action 

targeting human rights and civil society activists as well as journalists must be publicly condemned 

by leaders of all segments of Bissau-Guinean society. Laws should be passed to criminalize the 

targeting of journalists and in the event of violations, obligate investigations that include independent 

and international actors. The government must also cease the use of recently purchased equipment 

to identify and limit community radio transmissions. 
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Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau

There are several sophisticated and well-established nonprofit organizations that track human and civil 

rights, monitor government accountability and integrity, support entrepreneurship, and improve civic 

participation and access to government. Further investments in building the capacity of these groups are 

needed. Meanwhile, technical training and equipment to radio and print journalists can expand their 

reach and engagement with the population. Equally important will be networking all these actors to 

scale up their effectiveness and collectively resist spoilers and any intimidation. Supporting conferences 

of civil society groups, media, and government reformers will exponentially expand their efforts and 

improve their resilience. 

Harmonizing International Approaches 

Unfortunately, instituting reforms in Guinea-Bissau has been severely complicated by the fact that many 

of Guinea-Bissau’s oldest and closest neighbors and partners enjoy low credibility in the country. In 

the case of the CPLP and ECOWAS, long-running disagreements have sidetracked the efforts of major 

organizations and bilateral partners working to stabilize the country. Meanwhile, Angola’s unilateral 

military assistance mission combined with its massive investments in the extractive industry inevitably 

made it a lightning rod for claims of foreign meddling and favoritism for specific factions.

In reality, bilateral and multilateral partners can each provide different leverage to advance stability 

and reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau. The CPLP has been closest to the largest political party, the 

PAIGC, and is widely respected among Bissau-Guineans, providing it the credibility to bring GuineaBissau’s most influential political organization into a consensus-based dialogue without sacrificing face 

among PAIGC’s supporters and the population. However, the CPLP has no real budget, expertise, 

or mandate to lead a stabilization mission. For its part, ECOWAS has a larger presence in Bissau, a 

more robust framework for managing peace and security in West Africa, broader legitimacy across 

the region, and more resources to bear. Additionally, it enjoys good connections with Guinea-Bissau’s 

military leadership, though many Bissau-Guineans distrust the organization because of Senegal’s 

support of President Vieira during the 1998-1999 civil war and ECOMIB’s weak reputation for 

preventing human rights abuses. 

What is needed is a process operating at three levels to foster a shared international approach to GuineaBissau’s stabilization challenge. First, an International Contact Group for Guinea-Bissau should be 

revitalized. Such a Contact Group has existed in the past and was proposed in the month following 

the April 2012 coup d’état but has remained underutilized. It should be revived and restructured to 

include a strong role for countries with fewer existing interests in Guinea-Bissau, such as non-CPLP 

or non-ECOWAS states, to create a more trusted venue for constructively reconciling differences and 

formulating a shared international vision for stabilizing Guinea-Bissau.

A multilateral effort will also be needed within Guinea-Bissau to coordinate a multitrack stabilization 

vision through implementation. As the organization with the largest staff, budget, consistent presence, 
44

ACSS Special Report

and credibility among both domestic actors and international partners, the UN mission in GuineaBissau is best placed to enhance on-the-ground cooperation and coordination among international 

actors. In continuous operation since 1999—first as the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in GuineaBissau and then as the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau since 2009—the UN 

mission is in fact mandated to fulfill that coordinating role among the CPLP, ECOWAS, and the 

AU. Some progress was achieved on this front in late 2012 and early 2013, as exemplified by the joint 

assessment missions in Guinea-Bissau conducted by the five major multilateral organizations: the AU, 

the CPLP, ECOWAS, the EU, and the UN.87 Supported by an expanded Contact Group that provides 

a clearer and mutually agreed upon vision of stability in Guinea-Bissau, the UN mission should be 

able to more adequately fulfill this role. Additionally, it will directly support peacebuilding through 

the training, technical assistance, small-project funding, and other activities it has regularly launched. 

The CPLP and ECOWAS will each have vital roles given their points of contact, leverage, and unique 

interests in the country. ECOWAS is the natural multilateral organization through which to channel 

most engagements with the government of Guinea-Bissau and stabilization activities. As a member 

state, Guinea-Bissau is a signatory to ECOWAS protocols on democratic governance, its framework 

for the free movement of peoples and goods within the region, and code of conduct for the armed 

forces. Guinea-Bissau uses the West African franc as its currency and is a member of the West African 

Central Bank. It also has strong political, economic, and military ties to other ECOWAS members, 

and the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council has experience in managing conflict and crises in 

the region. ECOWAS, however, needs to more firmly uphold its own protocols and democratic norms 

in Guinea-Bissau and commit to a broad-based stabilization effort in the country. The Contact Group 

and UN mission should work to ensure such obligations are met. Moreover, the ECOMIB stabilization 

force in Guinea-Bissau should be more assertive in preventing human rights abuses or criminality among 

the Bissau-Guinean security forces. ECOWAS should also ensure that there are adequate oversight and 

accountability mechanisms in place to ease the high levels of mistrust of ECOMIB prevailing among 

most Bissau-Guineans as well as to prevent West African troops from being drawn into trafficking 

and other criminal activities. For its part, the CPLP can use its strong connections to many influential 

actors in Guinea-Bissau, particularly the largest political party, the PAIGC, to support a political reform 

process based on genuine dialogue, compromise, and consensus. Working in coordination on a shared 

vision is in ECOWAS’s and the CPLP’s interests, as this will rebuild their legitimacy and credibility in 

the country as well as in the region and internationally. 

Lastly, multilateral actors must be wary of any destabilizing and opaque investment activity in GuineaBissau. Rich in natural resources, including minerals, timber, fisheries, and likely oil, Guinea-Bissau 

is a choice target for unscrupulous actors who often seek to take advantage of a fragile state with 

extremely weak institutions and politicians willing to compromise the public’s interest for short-term 

gain. Concerns have already been raised within Guinea-Bissau about Angolan and Chinese investments 

and activities. Regardless of their merits, they have become fodder for pre-existing political disputes 

and competition without contributing to any benefits in Guinea-Bissau. The Contact Group, the 
45

Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau

UN mission, ECOWAS, the CPLP, and others should all work toward ensuring that the government 

proceeds deliberatively and through a transparent process when evaluating large-scale extractive industry 

investments. Technical assistance should be made available to ensure that best practices are applied to 

minimize corruption and optimize accountability and broad-based benefits. 

Conclusion

Guinea-Bissau has been roiled by increasingly frequent and complex crises. The sensationalism of these 

crises risks distracting attention from the underlying institutional dysfunctions in Guinea-Bissau that 

are driving this instability. A system marked by the centralization of unaccountable political power has 

spawned many other drivers of instability, including a deeply politicized security sector, rampant illicit 

trafficking of high-value narcotics, and emerging challenges such as ethnic divides. Amid this fray, 

foreign states and multilateral organizations have often exacerbated instability by neglecting the need 

for institutional reforms in the country while favoring short-term solutions that maintain their leverage 

and interest. The consequences of such worsening instability have not been limited to Guinea-Bissau. 

Its problems have become intertwined with other militant and terrorist activity in West Africa and have 

fueled a drug trade across the region that is threatening security, development, and good governance. 

Given the degree of volatility and polarization within Guinea-Bissau, stabilizing this country cannot 

be done through domestic means alone. Likewise, it is inaccurate to characterize Guinea-Bissau’s crises 

simply as a series of domestic problems that are now spilling across borders. Guinea-Bissau’s predicament 

is in many ways a symptom of a broader transnational threat. International partners must therefore 

commit to a more strategic and unified stabilization effort in the country as part of this transnational 

response. Persistent and integrated interventions are needed to foster reconciliation and overcome 

polarization, reform the political system so that it is more balanced and accountable, to depoliticize and 

professionalize the armed forces, and target transnational drug networks through enhanced interdiction 

as well as by building the capacity of Guinea-Bissau’s judicial and law enforcement and related regulatory 

frameworks. The traction and sustainability of any reform effort will be contingent on the involvement 

and strength of Guinea-Bissau’s emerging civil society organizations, media sector, and democratic 

institutions. They should be consistently strengthened, protected, and included in stabilization activities. 

Guinea-Bissau’s experience with drug trafficking should be a warning to the rest of Africa. While no 

other African country has yet exhibited the same level of drug-fueled disputes, governance setbacks, 

or general instability, the continuing spread and evolution of drug trafficking and manufacturing in 

Africa raises the distinct possibility that other countries on the continent face a fate not dissimilar 

to Guinea-Bissau’s. The country’s difficulties should be a clear example that drug trafficking, even 

transshipment between supplier and user countries, has significant consequences and that prevention 

is critical since reversing such trends is enormously difficult and often requires years of work with 

substantial international support. Intervening to stabilize Guinea-Bissau, thus, should be viewed as a 

first essential step toward stemming a growing and complex problem across the continent. 
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Notes

1 “Relatório Sobre a Situação dos Direitos Humanos na Guiné-Bissau 2010/2012,” Liga Guineense dos Direitos 

Humanos, available at <http://www.lgdh.org/relatorioLGDH-Completo%2015Jan.pdf>.

2 “Guinea-Bissau turmoil sparks cocaine and cashew crisis: U.N.,” Reuters, November 29, 2012.

3 Adam Nossiter, “Leader Ousted, Nation Is Now a Drug Haven,” New York Times, November 1, 2012.

4 Andre Maria Costa, “Assisting Guinea-Bissau” (speech delivered at International Conference on Drug Trafficking 

in Guinea-Bissau, Lisbon, Portugal, December 19, 2007) available at <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/assistingguinea-bissau.html>.

5 “G.Bissau Cashew Harvest in Jeopardy After Coup,” Radio Netherlands Worldwide, April 23, 2012.

6 “Falling Cashew Exports Raise Hardship,” IRIN, August 15, 2012.

7 “Funds urgently needed to address a silent crisis in Guinea-Bissau,” World Food Programme, March 28, 2013.

8 “Mystery Jet Update: Malian 727,” The Yorkshire Ranter, December 23, 2009, available at <http://yorksranter.

wordpress.com/2009/12/23/mystery-jet-update-malian-727/>.

9 Frédéric Powelton, “Une réunion secrète des cartels de la drogue en Guinée-Bissau, AQMI présente,” Sahel 

Intelligence, November 2010, available at <http://www.sahel-intelligence.com/2417-article145.html>. MohammadMahmoud Ould Mohamedou, The Many Faces of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, GCSP Policy Paper No. 15 (Geneva: 

Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2011), 3.

10 Marco Vernaschi, “Guinea Bissau: Hezbollah, al Qaida and the Lebanese connection,” Pulitzer Center on Crisis 

Reporting, June 2009, available at <http://pulitzercenter.org/blog/untold-stories/guinea-bissau-hezbollah-al-qaida-andlebanese-connection>. 

11 “République de Guinée-Bissau : Recensement des Forces armées,” UN Integrated Peabuilding Office in GuineaBissau, April 2008 .

12 “65 Senior Officers Readmitted to Armed Forces,” IRIN, December 2, 2004. Guinea-Bissau: In Need of a State, 

Crisis Group Africa Report No. 142 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, July 2007), 16-17.

13 Alberto Dabo, “Guinea-Bissau leader survives post-election attack,” Reuters, November 23, 2008.

14 “G.Bissau Presidential Guards Disarmed After Alleged Life Attempt,” Agence-France Presse, January 6, 2009.

15 Marco Vernaschi, “Guinea Bissau: A Bomb, Private Jets and Cocaine,” Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting, June 

18, 2009.

16 Birgit Embaló, “Civil-Military Relations and Political Order in Guinea-Bissau,” Journal of Modern African Studies 

50, no. 2 (June: 2012),, 276-7.

17 Report of the Secretary-General on the Restoration of Constitutional Order in Guinea-Bissau (UN doc. S/2012/704, 

September 12, 2012).

18 Patrícia M. Ferreira, Guinea-Bissau: Perspectives on the Up-Coming Elections, Situation Report, (Pretoria: Institute for 

Security Studies, March 2004).

19 Interview with Ambassador Joseph Mutaboba, former Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in 

Guinea-Bissau and head of the UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau, January 28, 2013.

20 Freedom of the Press 2012: Breakthroughs and Pushback in the Middle East (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 

2012).

21 “PJ em perseguição furiosa a traficantes de droga,” Ditaduro di Consenso, April 24, 2012, available at <http://

ditaduradoconsenso.blogspot.com/2012/04/pj-em-perseguicao-furiosa-traficantes.html>.

22 “Autoridade Reguladora da Guiné-Bissau com equipamento para fiscalizar rádios,” Lusa, February 15, 2013.
47

Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau

23 Embaló, 265.

24 “Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat Assessment,” UN Office on Drugs and 

Crime, July 2009.

25 “Murdered GBissau General Found 200 kilos of cocaine: Officer,” Agence-France Presse, March 5, 2009.

26 Marco Vernaschi, “Guinea-Bissau: Colombian Cement,” Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting, Jun 24, 2009.

27 Cécile Sow, “Le jet, la coke et les militaires,” Jeune Afrique, September 9, 2008.

28 Au-déla des compromis : les perspectives de réforme en Guinée-Bissau, Rapport Afrique de Crisis Group No. 183 

(Brussels: International Crisis Group, January 2012), 24.

29 Report of the Secretary-General on the Restoration of Constitutional Order in Guinea-Bissau (UN doc. S/2012/887, 

November 27, 2012), 8. 

30 The chart excludes seizures less than 10 kilograms of cocaine. Values calculated using a wholesale price of cocaine 

in Europe of $52,000 (as estimated in World Drug Report 2011 (Vienna: UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011), 114) 

and wholesale price of cocaine in Guinea-Bissau of $16,000 (based on an average of prices from Au-déla des compromis : les 

perspectives de réforme en Guinée-Bissau, 23, endnote 185 and a U.S. indictment of Manuel Mamadi Mane, an alleged BissauGuinean cocaine trafficker on trial in New York. Mane was recorded by undercover investigators posing as drug traffickers 

agreeing to purchase cocaine in Bissau at a price of 14,000 euros per kilogram).

31 Chris Hawley, “South American Gangs Flying Vast Quantities of Cocaine to Europe,” The Guardian, November 15, 

2010. Tim Gaynor and Tiemoko Diallo, “Al Qaeda Linked to Rogue Aviation Network,” Reuters, January 13, 2010. 

32 Francesc Relea, “El ‘narco’ se instala en Guinea-Bissau,” El Pais, March 22, 2009. 

33 U.S. Federal Aviation Administration registry info is available at <http://registry.faa.gov/aircraftinquiry/NNum_

Results.aspx?NNumbertxt=351SE>.

34 See records from Delaware Chamber of Commerce, available at <http://de.chamberocommerce.com/

member/12555997/Aulgur_Whittington_2979_Barley_Mill_Rd_Yorklyn_DE_19736>.

35 Sow.

36 “Mystery Jet Update: Malian 727” 

37 “Drugs seized in Barcelona were not shipped from Cape Verde, according to Judiciary Police,” ASemana, January 

10, 2011.

38 U.S. Federal Aviation Administration registry info is available at <http://registry.faa.gov/aircraftinquiry/NNum_

Results.aspx?NNumbertxt=600AM>.

39 “Secure Aviation” registration information is available at <http://flightaware.com/resources/registration/N600AM>. 

40 Elyssa Pachico “Argentine ‘Narco Jet’ Trial Leaves Many Questions Unanswered,” InSightCrime, January 9, 2013.

41 Au-déla des compromis : les perspectives de réforme en Guinée-Bissau, 26. “Possibilities and Pitfalls following President’s 

Death,” IRIN, January 20, 2012.

42 “Guiné-Bissau: Reabilitação de Bubo Na Tchuto para reduzir tensões nas FA,” África Monitor, October 10, 2012, 

available at <http://www.africamonitor.net/?p=307>.

43 Lars Rudebeck, On Democracy’s Sustainability: Transition in Guinea-Bissau, Sida Studies No. 4 (Stockholm: Swedish 

International Development Agency (SIDA), 2001), 29. Embaló, 266.

44 IRIN, 2004.

45 “Dirigente do Maior Partido de Oposição Processado Após Chamar ‘Líder Violento’ a Kumba Ialá,” Lusa, October 

15, 2012.

46 Paul Collier, “Ethnic Diversity: An Economic Analysis,” Economic Policy 18, No. 2 (April 2011).
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ACSS Special Report

47 Alexander K.D. Frempong, “The Internal and Regional Dynamics of The Cycle of War and Peace in Guinea-Bissau 

(delivered at the CODESRIA International Colloquium on Lusophonie in Africa: History, Democracy and Integration, 28-

30 April 2005, Luanda, Angola), 25-28. Kovsted and Tarp, 13.

48 Beyond Turf Wars: Managing the Post-Coup Transition in Guinea-Bissau, Crisis Group Africa Report No. 190 

(Brussels: International Crisis Group, August 2012). 

49 “Stanley Ho’s Geocapital Enters Guinea-Bissau Finance Sector,” Macauhub.com, July 23, 2007, available at <http://

www.macauhub.com.mo/en/2007/07/23/3413/>. 

50 Isabel Pinto Machado, “Angola / Guine-Bissau, bauxite, negocios, dolares,” RFI, December 3, 2012.

51 Evan Osnos, “The God of Gamblers,” The New Yorker, April 9, 2012.

52 Loro Horta, “Guinea-Bissau: China Sees a Risk Worth Taking,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

October 5, 2007, available at <http://csis.org/story/guinea-bissau-china-sees-risk-worth-taking>.

53 Kit Dawnay, “Banking Loopholes Between Gambia and Hong Kong,” Current Intelligence, May 30, 2012, available 

at <http://www.currentintelligence.net/analysis/2012/5/30/banking-loopholes-between-gambia-and-hong-kong.html>.

54 Au-déla des compromis : les perspectives de réforme en Guinée-Bissau.

55 Monty Marshall, Fragility, Instability, and the Failure of States: Assessing Sources of Systemic Risk, Center for Preventive 

Action Working Paper (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, October 2008).

56 “The 2012 Failed States Index,” Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace, 2012, available at <http://www.foreignpolicy.

com/failed_states_index_2012_interactive>.

57 “U.S. Declares Lebanese Bank a Major Money Launderer,” Associated Press, February 11, 2011.

58 “President sacks transport minister over mysterious plane filled with cocaine,” Panapress, August 5, 2008. Foday 

Morris Ceesay, “Interpol Helps Sierra Leone Police Discover A 40 Foot Container Stuffed with Cocaine,” Sierra Leone Daily 

Mail, December 17, 2011.

59 “West Africa 2012 ATS Situation Report,” UN Office on Drugs and Crime, June 2012.

60 Comfort Oseghale, “Shocker: Illegal Drug Factories Flourish in Nigeria,” Punch, January 12, 2013.

61 “Graham Keeley and Paul Lewis, “The West African Connection: Drug Barons Find New Route on to the Streets 

of Britain,” The Guardian, August 26, 2008. “Cocaine Trafficking In West Africa: The Threat to Stability and Development 

(with Special Reference to Guinea-Bissau),” UN Office on Drugs and Crime, December 2007.

62 “The Transatlantic Cocaine Market,” UN Office on Drugs and Crime, April 2011. “The Global Afghan Opium 

Trade,” UN Office on Drugs and Crime, July 2011. “West Africa 2012 ATS Situation Report.”

63 “Mali seizes 750 kg cocaine,” Reuters, January 4, 2008.

64 Wolfram Lacher, Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara, Carnegie Papers (Washington, DC: Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace, September 2012). “Panel 1 – Clarifying the Forces of Instability in Northern Mali,” 

Africa Center for Strategic Studies, February 6, 2013, available at <http://africacenter.org/2013/02/video-priorities-forstabilizing-mali-panel-discussions-at-acss/>.

65 The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment (Vienna: United Nations Office of 

Drugs and Crime, 2010), 34-36.

66 Davin O’Regan, Cocaine and Instability in Africa: Lessons from Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa Security 

Brief No. 5 (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, July 2010). 

67 Francisco E. Thoumi, Political Economy & Illegal Drugs in Colombia (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995).

68 For further discussion of political and constitutional reform processes, see “Roteiro das organizacoes da Sociedade 

Civil para o Periodo de Transicao Politica,” Organizações da Sociedade Civil, March 14, 2013, available at <http://www.

casadosdireitos-guinebissau.org/2013/03/organizacoes-da-sociedade-civil.html>. 
49

Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau

69 “Constitutionnalisation de l’exploitation des ressources naturelles : ‘Réformer est toujours difficile. Chaque 

changement affecte des intérêts constitués’, déclare Pr Mamoudou Gazibo,” Niger Diaspora, January 25, 2011, available at 

<http://www.nigerdiaspora.info/index.php/item/13136-constitutionnalisation-de-lexploitation-des-ressources-naturelles--

re%CC%81former-est-toujours-difficile-chaque-changement-affecte-des-inte%CC%81re%CC%82ts-constitue%CC%81sde%CC%81clare-pr-mamoudou-gazibo>.

70 Roots of Conflicts in Guinea-Bissau: The Voice of the People (Bissau: Voz di Paz and Interpeace, August 2010), 32-36 

and 54-58.

71 Mathurin Houngnikpo, Africa’s Militaries: A Missing Link in Democratic Transitions, Africa Security Brief No. 17 

(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, January 2012).

72 Dan Rice and Guy Fillepi, “One Cell Phone at a Time: Countering Corruption in Afghanistan,” Small Wars Journal,

September 2, 2010, available at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/527-rice.pdf>. Geoffrey Wong, “Can 

Mobile Phone Technology Help Address ANSF Abstenteeism?” Security Sector Reform Resource Centre, November 2, 2010, 

available at <http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/2010/11/02/can-mobile-phone-technology-help-address-ansf-absenteeism/>.

73 “M-Commerce in Sub Saharan Africa,” Ericsson Incorporated, August 2012, available at <http://www.ericsson.

com/res/docs/2012/consumerlab/m-commerce_sub_saharan_africa.pdf>.

74 “DR Congo Banking on Wage Revolution for State Workers,” Agence France-Presse, April 13, 2013.

75 Tomislav Z. Ruby and Douglas Gibler, “US Professional Military Education and Democratization Abroad,” 

European Journal of International Relations 20, no. 10 (2010).

76 “Ex-Chefe de segurança de António Indjai em greve de fome,” Portuguese News Network, February 11, 2013, 

available at <http://www.bissaudigital.com/noticias.php?noticia=2000331405>.

77 Houngnikpo.

78 Zoltan Barany, The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the 

Americas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). Peter Albrecht and Paul Jackson, Security Sector Reform in Sierra 

Leone 1997-2007: Views from the Front Line (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, 

2010).

79 “Fishermen Turn to Trafficking as Fish Profits Drop,” IRIN, July 29, 2008.

80 Au-déla des compromis : les perspectives de réforme en Guinée-Bissau, 24-25.

81 “Novo governo e alargamento à CPLP de força de estabilização em perspetiva,” África Monitor, March 9, 2012, 

available at <http://www.africamonitor.net/?p=287>. Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and on 

the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in that Country, (UN doc. S/2010/335, June 24, 2010), 11.

82 Morris Panner and Adriana Beltrán, “Battling Organized Crime in Guatemala,” Americas Quarterly, Fall 2010.

83 Police Reform in Guatemala: Obstacles and Opportunities, Latin America Report No. 43 (Brussels: International 

Crisis Group, July 2012). Guatemala: Squeezed Between Crime and Impunity, Latin America Report No. 33 (Brussels: 

International Crisis Group, June 2010). “Commissioner Presents CICIG’s 2012-13 Work Plan at UN Headquarters,” 

International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala, September 6, 2012, available at <http://cicig.org/index.php?mac

t=News,cntnt01,detail,0&cntnt01articleid=237&cntnt01returnid=105>.

84 Andrew Hudson and Alexandra W. Taylor, “The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala: A New 

Model for International Criminal Justice Mechanisms,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 8, No. 1 (March 2010).

85 “Crise política revela interesse internacional na Guiné-Bissau,” Deutsche Welle, September 9, 2012.

86 “All at Sea Over Drugs,” Africa Confidential, May 10, 2013.

87 Report of the Joint ECOWAS/AU/CPLP/EU/UN assessment mission to Guinea-Bissau, (Addis Ababa: African Union 

Peace and Security Council, March 23, 2013).
50

ACSS Special Report

About the Authors

Davin O’Regan is a Research Associate at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies. He can be reached 

at oregand@ndu.edu.

Peter Thompson is the Mediator of the Commission on National Reconciliation established by GuineaBissau’s National People’s Assembly. He is also the Coordinator of the All-Party Parliamentary Group for 

Guinea-Bissau in the British Parliament and led its observation of Guinea-Bissau’s presidential elections 

in 2012. He can be reached at peter.thompson@guineabissau.org.uk.
51

Advancing Stability and Reconciliation in Guinea-Bissau
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