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## Qlcurt at Appeals mutfEtsirtri of®exns at lallas JUDGMENT 

### ANTHONY DEAN SNARE, Appellant
No. 05-95-01268-CR 

### THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2 of Dallas County, Texas. (Tr.Ct.No. F94-60039-TI). 

### Opinion delivered by Justice Chapman, Justices Morris and Hankinson participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered February 28, 1997.

RON CHAPMAN JUSTICEAFFIRM and Opinion Filed February 28, 1997

In The 

## (Uimrt ofAppeals iTtftlr Itsirtrt ofGkxas at lallas
No. 05-95-01268-CR ANTHONYDEAN SNARE, Appellant
V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appealfrom the Criminal District Court No. 2 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F94-60039-TI
OPINION Before Justices Chapman, Morris, and Hankinson Opinion By Justice Chapman 

### Appellant appeals his jury conviction for aggravated robbery. The jury assessed punishment, enhanced by two prior felony convictions, at fifty years' confinement. In his 

### sole point of error, appellant contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We
affirm.

### Appellant contends his trialcounselwas ineffective and thatcounsel's ineffectivenessV 

### caused the jury to assess a greater sentence. Appellantcomplains of errors duringvoir dire and errors during punishment. 

### The proper standard of review to measure counsel's ineffectiveness during voir dire isthat set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). SeeChambers v. State, 903 

### S.W.2d 21, 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Under this standard, an appellant must first establish that his counsel's representationfell below an objective standard ofreasonableness. 

### Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994);Hernandez, 726 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). The appellant must then show a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Jackson, 877 S.W.2d at 771; Hernandez, 726 S.W.2d at 55. The proper standard to review counsel's performance during punishment, however, is the standard set forth in Ex parte Duffy, 607 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). See Ex parte Walker, 794 S.W.2d 36, 37 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). We determine whether counsel
was reasonably likely to render effective assistance and whether counsel actually rendered reasonably effective assistance. Craigv. State, 825 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Several considerations are applicable to both standards. Under either standard, we 

### view the totality of counsel's representation and do not judge counsel's performance in 

### hindsight. ExparteFelton, 815 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991);Davis v. State,831 

### S.W.2d 839, 843 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd); Ybarra v. State, 890 S.W.2d 98, 111 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1994, pet. ref'd). Both standards require the appellant to prove

### ineffective assistance ofcounsel by a preponderance ofthe evidence. Moore v. State, 694 

## S.W.2d 528, 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Further, the record must support a claim of ineffective assistance. SeeJohnson v. State, 691 S.W.2d 619, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), cert, denied, 474U.S. 865 (1985). Finally, we are notpermittedto inquire into trial strategy unless no possible basis exists in strategy or tactics for trial counsel's actions. Johnson v. 

### State, 614 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981); Weeks v. State, 894 S.W.2d 390, 391 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no pet.). 

### Appellantpleaded notguiltyto aggravatedrobbery. Afterhearing evidence onguiltinnocence, the juryfound appellant guilty of theoffense. Appellant testified atpunishment and admitted he committed the offense. The jury assessed punishment at fifty years'
confinement. 

### Appellant contends counsel was ineffective during voir dire because counsel questioned the venire on issues concerning guilt-innocence. Specifically, counsel asked 

### questions concerning the credibility of police officers and the burden of proof. According to appellant, these questions would alienate the jury because he was "obviously guilty" and would admit he was guilty in the punishment phase. Appellant asks that wejudge counsel's performance in hindsight, which we are not permitted to do. See Felton, 815 S.W.2d at 735. 

### Further, appellant chose to plead not guilty and have the jury determine guilt-innocence. 

### We cannot, therefore, conclude counsel wasineffective for questioning the venire on issues concerning guilt-innocence.

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### Appellant next complains that his trial attorney did not question the venire on 

### punishmentissues. Thetrial courtdid, however, questionthevenire concerning theirability to consider the fullrange of punishment. Thereafter, the trial court granted five of counsel's 

### strikes for cause against venirepersons who could not consider the minimum punishment. 

### Appellant nevertheless maintains counsel should have argued issues which thevenire might consider in mitigation of punishment. The record, however, is silent with respect to counsel's reasons for not questioning the venire on mitigation issues. SeeJackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d at 771. We cannot conclude there is no plausible basis for counsel's actions.1 See Weeks, 894 S.W.2d at 392. 

### Appellant also asserts that reasonably effectivecounselwould havepleadedhimguilty before thejury. However, the decision to plead guilty or not guilty is the personal decision of the accused. Jackson v. State, 766 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Ramer v. State, 714 S.W.2d 44, 46 (Tex. App.-Dallas, pet. ref'd). Appellant has neither asserted,
nor shown, that counsel advised him to plead not guilty. Finally, appellant contends counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the facts and failing to interview witnesses. He asserts counsel failed to discover appellant had a drug problem and a difficult childhood. The record is silent with respect to counsel's preparation for trial. The record likewise does not show counsel was not aware that appellant used
Counsel may, for example, have decided not to question the venire on mitigation issues to avoid any suggestion that counsel believed his client was guilty.

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### drugs andhad adifficultchildhood. Evidencewas, infact, presented atpunishmentshowing thatappellant's fatherwas "tyrannical" and thatappellantused drugs. Although counsel did notfocus onthis evidence, counsel's punishmentargumentshows itwas herstrategy tostress that appellant had admitted his guilt and did not make excuses for his actions. We conclude 

### appellant has not met his burden to show counsel was ineffective. SeeRunnels v. State, 860 

### S.W.2d 545, 547 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, pet. ref'd). Accordingly, we overrule appellant's sole point of error and affirm the trial court's judgment.

Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 90 951268F.U05

-5- RON CHAPMAN JUSTICEChief Justice Linda Thomas Justices

Sue Lagarde Ed Kinkeade John Ovard Frances Maloney Ron Chapman Joseph B. Morris Mark Whittington Tom James Carolyn Wright Deborah G. Hankinson Jim Moseley David Bridges 

## (£aurt ofAppeals 

## Wxftlj Itstrtrt of Okxas at Satlas George L. Allen Sr. Courts Building 600 Commerce Street Dallas, Texas 75202-4658 (214) 712-3400 David Pagan business administrator (214) 712-3434

Lisa Rombok clerk of the court

(214) 712-3450

Facsimile (214) 745-1083

May 22,1997
R. D. Rucker Attorney at Law P.O. Box 222167 Dallas, TX 75222-2167 April E. Smith Assistant District Attorney Frank Crowley Courts Building 133 North Industrial Blvd., LB-19 Dallas, TX 75207 RE: Court of Appeals Number: 05-95-01268-CR Trial Court Case Number: F94-60039-TI Style: Snare, Anthony Dean

v. The State of Texas Dear Counsel: 

### Pursuant to Rule 86 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court has this day issued a Mandate in accordance with the Judgment and delivered it to the Clerk of the Trial Court.
Respectfully Yours, Lisa Rombok Clerk of the Court Stephanie Hughes