COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Fitzpatrick, Annunziata and Senior Judge Duff 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

GREGORY ROBERT FOLSON 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 1564-95-4 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA 

 NOVEMBER 26, 1996 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 

William T. Newman, Jr., Judge 

 Charles L. King, for appellant. 

 Richard B. Smith, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Following a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Arlington 

County, appellant, Gregory Robert Folson, was convicted of grand 

larceny from the person and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. 

 On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court's sentencing 

order should be reversed and that the case should be remanded for 

a new sentencing hearing because the trial court admitted 

improper evidence of his prior convictions. We disagree and 

affirm the sentence of the trial court. 

 I. 

 Attempting to present appellant's prior convictions at the 

sentencing phase of his trial, the Commonwealth sought to admit 

two packets of documents it received from the Circuit Court of 

Prince George's County, Maryland, as "certified, attested or 

exemplified copies of [appellant's] record of conviction." See
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Code § 19.2-295.1.1

 The first packet included a copy of 

appellant's indictment for unlawful distribution of PCP; the case 

number appears to have been 8802*5.2 The next document, entitled 

"DOCKET ENTRIES," established that appellant was sentenced to 

eighteen months imprisonment in case number 88-0275. The second 

packet contained a document entitled "commitment record," which 

established that appellant was found guilty and received a ten 

year sentence on charges of robbery, assault with intent to avoid 

lawful apprehension, and conspiracy to commit robbery.3

 Each 

packet was bound by seal and string and was received under cover 

of a document certifying that its contents were "true copies of 

originals on file and of record . . . and that [the] originals 

together, constitute the record of the proceedings . . . in [the] 

case." The certificates were signed by the clerk of the court; a 

 1 Code § 19.2-295.1 provides, in part: 

 In cases of trial by jury, upon a 

finding that the defendant is guilty of a 

felony, a separate proceeding limited to the 

ascertainment of punishment shall be held as 

soon as practicable before the same jury. At 

such proceeding, the Commonwealth shall 

present the defendant's prior criminal 

convictions by certified, attested or 

exemplified copies of the record of 

conviction . . . . Prior convictions shall 

include convictions . . . under the laws of 

any state . . . . 

 2 The fifth digit on the photocopy has a hole punched 

through it and is impossible to read. 

 3 The "commitment record" is prepared by the clerk of 

court when a defendant is convicted of an offense and sentenced 

to imprisonment. It is presented by the clerk to the officer 

into whose custody the defendant is placed. Md. Rule 4-351. 
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judge of the court certified the clerk's attestation; and the 

clerk then certified the judge's authority. The second packet 

contained another certification by the clerk that the "foregoing 

is a true copy of the docket entries in the above entitled case." 

 Appellant objected to the admission of the documents on the 

ground that they were not "records of conviction" within the 

meaning of Code § 19.2-295.1. Appellant further argued that the 

certification showed only that the documents were true 

representations of the originals, not that they were evidence of 

appellant's prior convictions. The court disagreed, finding that 

the statute does not require the Commonwealth to produce a final 

order, signed by a judge. Furthermore, the court found that the 

documents contained sufficient information to determine that 

appellant had been convicted for the identified offenses. 

Accordingly, the trial court found that the documents constituted 

"records of conviction" and admitted them as evidence of 

appellant's prior criminal convictions. 

 II. 

 On appeal, we must determine what evidence is admissible as 

a "record of conviction" within the meaning of Code § 19.2-295.1. 

 Appellant argues that only a final order, signed by a judge, is 

admissible as a "record of conviction." The Commonwealth 

contends that the statute should not be so narrowly construed. 

This is an issue of first impression.4

 4 We have held that a "record of conviction" includes 

evidence of prior sentences as well as the fact of conviction, 
(..continued) 

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see Gilliam v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 519, 465 S.E.2d 592 

(1996), and that evidence of convictions after the date of the 

charged offense but "prior" to the bifurcated sentencing hearing 

is admissible. See Bunn v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 593, 466 

S.E.2d 744 (1996). These decisions address the admissibility of 

evidence contained in a "record of conviction" and the 

admissibility of which "records of conviction." They do not 

address what evidence may be deemed to constitute a "record of 

conviction." 
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 Nothing in the plain language of Code § 19.2-295.1 requires 

that a "record of conviction" be established only by the 

admission of a final order of conviction. The language of Code 

§ 19.2-295.1 describes a "record," not an "order." The plain 

meaning of the word "record" is 

 [a] written account of some act, court 

proceeding, transaction, or instrument, drawn 

up, under authority of law, by a proper 

officer, and designed to remain as a memorial 

or permanent evidence of the matters to which 

it relates. 

Black's Law Dictionary 1144 (5th ed. 1979). Thus, we find that 

"record of conviction" means a "record" evidencing the fact of 

conviction. While a final order of conviction may be the most 

expedient means of establishing a "record of conviction," we do 

not find Code § 19.2-295.1 limited to such evidence. 

 For purposes of Code § 19.2-295.1, we find that the 

documents in question here constitute "records of conviction" 

because they are recorded evidence that the court convicted 

appellant for the crimes charged. The documents were properly 

admitted because the attached certifications by the clerk of the 

court and a judge of that court sufficiently authenticate them. 

The certifications by the clerk and the judge verify not only the 

accuracy of the photocopies, as appellant contends, but also 

reflect the state of Maryland's determination "that [the] 

originals together, constitute the record of the proceedings" in 

the case, reflecting the convictions obtained. (Emphasis added.) 

The evidence contained in these properly admitted documents, 
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viewed in the aggregate, was sufficient to establish the prior 

convictions. 

 III. 

 Appellant also contends that the best evidence rule bars the 

admission of the documents in question and limits the proof of 

conviction to the court's final order. However, the "best 

evidence rule" has no applicability to this case. In Virginia, 

the best evidence rule provides that "where the contents of a 

writing are desired to be proved, the writing [the primary 

evidence] itself must be produced or its absence sufficiently 

accounted for before other evidence of its contents can be 

admitted." Butts v. Commonwealth, 145 Va. 800, 816, 133 S.E. 

764, 769 (1926) (quoting 1 Greenleaf on Evidence 682 (16th ed.)); 

see also Myrick v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 333, 339, 412 S.E.2d 

176, 179 (1991); Randolph v. Commonwealth, 145 Va. 883, 889, 134 

S.E. 544, 546 (1926); Bradshaw v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 374, 

379, 429 S.E.2d 881, 884 (1993). 

 A judgment is the determination by a court of 

the rights of the parties, as those rights 

presently exist, upon matters submitted to it 

in an action or proceeding. A written order 

or decree endorsed by the judge is but 

evidence of what the court has decided. 

Rollins v. Bazile, 205 Va. 613, 617, 139 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1964) 

(quoting Haskins v. Haskins, 185 Va. 1001, 1012, 41 S.E.2d 25, 31 

(1947) (emphasis added). See also Weatherman v. Commonwealth, 91 

Va. 796, 798-99, 22 S.E. 349 (1895); Spicer v. Spicer, 192 Va. 

105, 109, 63 S.E.2d 773, 776 (1951). 
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 Here, the Commonwealth was not required to prove the 

contents of a written order reflecting the fact of appellant's 

conviction. Rather, it was required to prove the fact of the 

conviction itself. As stated above, Code § 19.2-295.1 provides 

limitations on the means by which the Commonwealth may establish 

such proof. In no way, however, does it implicate the best 

evidence rule by requiring proof of the contents of a conviction 

order. 

 For the reasons set forth here, we affirm the decision of 

the trial court. 

Affirmed.