Listening to the

RUMRUNNERS:

Radio Intelligence 

during Prohibition during Prohibition
David Mowry served as a historian, researching and

writing histories in the Cryptologic History Series. He

began his Agency career as a linguist in 1957 and later

(1964-1969) held positions as a linguist and cryptanalyst.

From 1969 through 1981 he served in various technical

and managerial positions. In the latter part of his career, he

was a historian in the Center for Cryptologic History. Mr. 

Mowry held a BA with regional group major in Germany

and Central Europe from the University of California at

Berkeley. He passed away in 2005.

This publication is a product of the National Security Agency 

history program. It presents a historical perspective for informational 

and educational purposes, is the result of independent research, and 

does not necessarily reflect a position of NSA/CSS or any other U.S. 

government entity.

This publication is distributed free by the National Security 

Agency. If you would like additional copies, please email your request 

to history@nsa.gov or write to:

Center for Cryptologic History

National Security Agency

9800 Savage Road, Suite 6886

Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6886

Cover: The U.S. Coast Guard 75-ft. patrol boat CG-262 towing into 

San Francisco Harbor her prizes, the tug ELCISCO and barge 

Redwood City, seized for violation of U.S. Customs laws, in 1927.

From Rum War:The U.S. Coast Guard and Prohibition.
Listening to the

Rumrunners:

Radio Intelligence 

during Prohibition

David P. Mowry

Center for Cryptologic History

Second edition 2014

3

Foreword

M

ost Americans are aware of the era of lawlessness in 

this country that began with the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution in 1919. The 

institution of Prohibition brought with it major law enforcement 

problems, whose effects continue to be felt today. Few people, however, are aware of the major role played by communications intelligence in the enforcement of the Prohibition laws. The files of the 

United States Coast Guard (USCG) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), including the files of the Radio Division 

of the Department of Commerce, show that radio was used on a large 

scale in connection with rum-running activities. The radio operations of the rum-running organizations were, in fact, comparable in 

size, technical skill, and organization with the radio operation that 

would be conducted by enemy agents in World War II. 

A motorboat makes contact with the liquor-smuggling British 

schooner Katherine off the New Jersey coast, 1923. 

(Photo courtesy U.S. Coast Guard)
4

The Beginning

B

y the year 1924, five years after the beginning of the Great

Experiment in America, defiance of the Prohibition laws

had grown to such proportions that Congress appropriated

$13,852,980 just to expand the U.S. Coast Guard for the purpose of

enforcement. Intelligence operations against the rumrunners were thus

a harbinger of what might be expected in the event the United States

became involved in war on an international scale; and the experience

gained between 1919 and 1935 was to prove of great value after 1940.1

During World War I the science of long-distance radio transmission was effectively unexplored except for certain techniques known

only to a handful of scientists and engineers. Radio equipment was

bulky and difficult to obtain, and antenna installations were so conspicuous that any station capable of transoceanic communication could

have been tracked down by normal police methods. It was not until

shortwave communications became feasible and the invention of the

vacuum tube made small transmitters possible that clandestine radio

communications became a serious danger. Such equipment became a

practical reality in the 1920s and was immediately adopted by criminals

for various purposes. The first instance of an illegal transmitter small

enough to be concealed on a person’s body was recorded in 1928, when

a tipster was apprehended at Laurel Race Track in Laurel, Maryland,

with his vest pockets full of equipment and his body girded with wire.

2

The origins of the use of radio intercept in enforcing the Prohibition laws are obscure. In a letter written in 1934, Commander 

Stephen S. Yeandle, U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence Officer, Eastern 

Area, stated that he believed he wasthe first to use radio in obtaining 

intelligence while he was in command of a destroyer division operating offshore. His operators intercepted illegal radio traffic, and two 

of his officers developed considerable proficiency in breaking codes 

and ciphers. Yeandle said that this was prior to the establishment of 

the unit of the Coast Guard specializing in this work.

3

Unlicensed radio station transmissions onshore frequently interfered with local radio reception. The Radio Division of the Department of Commerce, which was charged with the supervision of radio 
5

communications in the United States, could do little about these unlicensed transmitters, as it was limited to inspecting only licensed stations, and its investigators had no police authority. The Coast Guard,

however, as an arm of the Treasury Department, had been tasked 

with enforcement of the Prohibition laws; and Commander Charles 

S. Root, the Intelligence Officer of the Coast Guard, was sure that 

many of the unlicensed stations were connected with rum-running.

4

By 1925 the overall structure of international liquor-smuggling

operations had assumed the form which characterized it until Repeal.

The major sources of illicit liquor were British Columbia and Mexico

for the West Coast; and Nova Scotia, British Honduras, and the West

Indies for the East Coast. Smuggler ships would take on legal cargoes

of spirits in these countries, with the cargo manifested for a country

where liquor importation was legal. The ships would then proceed to

a prearranged rendezvous point and transfer the cargo to high-speed

“contact boats” which would ferry the liquor ashore. Since the rendezvous points were outside U.S. territorial waters, defined in this case as

extending either twelve miles or “one hour’s sail” from the coastline, the

smuggling vessels sitting in this “Rum-Row” could not be seized by the

Coast Guard, but could be, and were, regularly harassed by them.

The Mary, a typical contact boat. The 43-footer was

powered with a 100-hp motor. (Source unknown)
6

“Radio New York” 

O

n 13 October 1925, Mr. Robert J. Iversen, of New York

City, wrote a letter to Commander Root, discussing the 

establishment of an intercept site in New York City.

5

 At 

the time, Iversen was employed at the New York Times Radio Station on West 43rd Street. In this letter, obviously not the first on the 

subject, Iversen told Root to send equipment either to the Times or to 

his (Iversen’s) home address on Long Island and reported the “lists of 

materials for high power had been submitted to various manufacturers for bids and would be purchased through the Times.” Iversen estimated that he would need a $500 advance for the first two months,

after which $150 per month would be satisfactory. He also informed 

Root that he had located two radio operators. One was a Canadian 

employed by RCA Corporation on its ship station at Chatham, Massachusetts, and the other (also a resident alien) had experience in ship 

operation and “high power” and had satisfied all requirements for 

American citizenship but had not taken out final papers.

Root instructed Iversen to determine if the second man could

get his citizenship papers right away. If this were possible, Root

could have the man ordered immediately to Washington to be

sworn into the Coast Guard. It would, however, be impossible to

commission an alien into Iversen’s service. With regard to the shipment of equipment, Root predicted that it would be sent by 17 or

18 October.

Iversen moved his base of operations on 16 October 1925 and 

began collecting with two receivers: one, a low-frequency receiver 

designed to collect signals in the 20 to 200 kHz range and the other, 

a medium-frequency receiver covering 300 to 750 kHz. On 18 October, he managed to pick up an exchange between the Coast Guard 

station at Rockaway, New York, and the Coast Guard cutter Mojave.

The same day he told Root that he was borrowing a 200-1000 kHz 

receiver from the Times and was having an amplifier constructed so 

that this receiver could be put on speaker watch on the 600 kHz 

London-New York commercial circuit. Construction of a new longwave receiver to collect London-New York traffic was also being 
7

pushed.The first batch of traffic from the site was sent to Root on 23 

October and consisted of ten messages, all international commercial 

plain text, mostly in English.

In the meantime, Iversen had found another possible operator 

for whom Root forwarded the necessary application forms. Since 

RCA, the man’s employer, would undoubtedly try to find out where 

and for whom the man was working and the type of work he was 

doing, Iversen had not told him that the job was a government one. 

Root agreed with this precaution and suggested that the man should 

always be paid by Iversen, in cash. Iversen was not particularly happy 

with this arrangement, as he wanted the ultimate responsibility for 

the activity to devolve upon the Coast Guard.

At the end of October, Iversen received an official appointment 

from the Coast Guard. He was still constructing the long-wave set 

which he intended to use to cover the London-New York commercial circuit. He had, however, completed the recorder he intended 

Listening to radio traffic (source unknown; probably 1920s)
8

to use in conjunction with this receiver. The latter would allow him 

to let the long-wave receiver run unattended while he was intercepting traffic on another receiver. On 3 November, Root shipped a 

medium-wave receiver to him, billed as coming from a W. W. Reynolds in Washington, DC. The long-wave receiver was completed on 

9 November, and testing started that night. Iversen had quoted a 

price for the construction of this receiver, with recorder: $1,000. In 

fact, the entire installation, including the radio equipment, furniture, 

and all other expenses incurred in starting operations, cost less than 

$1,000. Tests of the long-wave equipment proved satisfactory, and,

after considerable red tape, Iversen was informed that Reeves, the 

RCA radioman, would be hired on 19 November. Collection emphasis was on international commercial circuits, although Iversen did 

ask Root what “enemy ships” were in his territory (i.e., Cape Cod to 

Cape May) and which ones had antennas on board.

By modern standards security seems to have been fairly lax at 

“Radio New York,” as the operation was titled by Root. Communications between New York and Washington were by mail and, during 

the first month or so, the extent of security consciousness seems to 

have been exemplified by the refusal to hire an alien (at least until 

he had been naturalized) and the provision of an alternate mailing 

address. (Iversen had suggested improving security by having Root 

send part of his correspondence via Iversen’s wife, Helen.) Toward the 

end of November, Iversen and Root started addressing one another 

intermittently as “2002” and “1000,” respectively. Iversen asked for 

some official government envelopes since he was unable to put his 

name on envelopes containing intercept being sent to Root. He was 

particularly worried about RCA acquiring one of the envelopes,

as its international circuits were the primary intercept targets. He 

informed Root on the same day that a telephone had been installed 

in the station and that the number was being forwarded separately. 

With regard to the mail, Root suggested sending intercept via registered mail using the return address of one Charles Gordon, who had 

offices in the Equitable Building (New York City). However, Root 

wanted this address used only on registered mail: he did not want 

Gordon’s name connected with the Intelligence Office. 
9

Murphy, the resident alien,

had been naturalized in November, but the paperwork on his 

loyalty oath had been delayed,

and this delayed his hiring. On 

2 December Reeves resigned 

but remained on board until the 

end of the month. Apparently 

he resigned because his wife 

would not move and he didn’t

like the commute. He intended 

to return to RCA and promised 

Iversen that he would work for 

Radio New York’s interests there. 

Iversen started looking for a 

replacement—unmarried.

Radio New York’s first rumrunner intercept was apparently 

accomplished on 4 December 

with the copy of a message from the SS Copeman to its principals in 

Cardiff, Wales, announcing its arrival date. The Copeman had been 

formerly known as the SS Avontown and had, under that name, 

been a rumrunner. As a result of this intercept, the Coast Guard was 

able to estimate the ship’s location at 40°N 73°W. Root immediately 

ordered Iversen to monitor its frequency continuously and forward 

intercept by Special Delivery since the Copeman’s cipher was readable 

and analysis could lead to the discovery of her shore connection.

With the intercept from the Copeman, everything began to fall 

into place, and Radio New York began to collect a considerable quantity of rumrunner traffic from schooners outside the territorial waters 

of the United States. In addition to this collection, the 600 kHz commercial circuit between London and New York was being monitored;

the rumrunner I’m Alone (about which more will be said later) was 

copied on 23 December; and on 26 December Root suggested that 

Iversen try to intercept stations on St. Pierre et Miquelon (off the 

southern coast of Newfoundland), which had both radio and cable 

Radio New York

began to collect 

a considerable 

quantity of rumrunner traffic 

from schooners 

outside U.S. 

territorial waters.
10

communications and was a major source of liquor. During the entire 

month of December, Iversen was supplied with considerable information concerning the identities of ships in Rum Row together with 

descriptions of their radio antennas.

At the end of the year, Iversen was notified that Root was going 

on leave. Root had made provision for feedback. Upon his return he 

was promoted and transferred. Iversen continued to supply intercept,

but he complained to Root in a personal letter on 2 March 1926 

that he had received no feedback. Root answered that he himself 

had received practically no information since their “original arrangement was brought to an end” but that he thought that would change. 

It is interesting to note that, with the change of command, Iversen 

was instructed to cease sending his traffic to Washington. His new 

instructions were to deliver it to a “decoder” in New York, apparently 

Victor Weiskopf of the Justice Department, who was a part-time 

member of Herbert O. Yardley’s MI-8 staff, the famous “American 

Black Chamber” of World War I, which continued in operation in 

New York City until 1929.
11

Coast Guard Collaboration 

with Other Agencies

T

he Coast Guard was not the only U.S. government agency 

involved in the rum war. There was cooperation among the 

Bureau of Prohibition, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI), the Bureau of Customs, and the Department of Commerce. 

Of these, the Radio Division of the Department of Commerce, the 

FBI, and, until at least 1930, the Bureau of Customs were involved in 

radio intercept. In addition, MI-8 and the infant Signal Intelligence 

Service (SIS) of the War Department provided some cryptanalytic 

assistance to the Coast Guard, although SIS interest was primarily in 

using solved systems as training problems.6

One of the more prominent individuals involved in intercept 

operations against the rumrunners was Forest F. Redfern of the 

Radio Division of the Department of Commerce. According to a 

19 October 1929 article in the New York World, Redfern’s involvement with radio had started in 1912 when his brother Otto, a former 

supervisor with the Radio Division, taught Forest to copy Continental Code. Forest served with the Signal Corps from 1912 to 1915 

and was assigned subsequently to the Army Transport Service (ATS) 

on the Mexican border with General Pershing. Later he became the 

chief operator of the ATS in San Francisco. He went on to serve in 

the Signal Corps in World War I, copying German codes in France, 

and received a certificate for meritorious service. After the war Redfern served five years with a private radio company and then joined 

the Radio Division.

In 1929 Redfern was detailed to work with the Treasury Department to aid its special agents in locating illicit radio stations. In these 

cases Treasury would develop a conspiracy case prior to the capture 

of one of the radios. Redfern would enter the illicit station at the 

invitation of either the special agents or a federal marshal and note 

the violation after inspection of the equipment. This rather cumbersome procedure permitted the enforcement of a law that provided for 

a five-year penalty.

7
12

In October 1929 Redfern received the following cable of appreciation from the Treasury Department:

Treasury Department desires to express its appreciation for 

the excellent cooperation afforded this department and for 

the splendid service which you have performed on behalf of 

this government.8

Redfern continued to work in cooperation with the Treasury 

Department until 1935, when, as an inspector with the newly established Federal Communications Commission (FCC), he was transferred to Buffalo, New York. In an attempt to retain Redfern’s services, commander Yeandle wrote to the chief engineer of the FCC,

Dr. C. B. Jollife, that Redfern had the degree of familiarity with the 

wave lengths, callsigns, procedures, and the “fists” (transmission style) 

of illegal operators, that only long experience could produce. Yeandle 

thought that it would be of great assistance to the Coast Guard if 

Redfern were continued in his detail to radio inspection duty. He 

believed that Redfern’s services to the government would be more 

valuable if they took advantage of his long experience in handling 

smugglers’ traffic.9

Jollife replied that such an action, i.e., retaining him in his current job, would be detrimental to Redfern’s career and would result 

in financial loss to him, since the transfer to Buffalo carried with 

it a raise in pay. In addition, the FCC appropriation was not large 

enough to permit retaining Redfern on such duty. He suggested that 

if the Coast Guard felt that strongly about the matter then Redfern 

should be transferred from FCC to Treasury so that he could be paid 

from the proper appropriation and be assigned to the proper career 

structure. There is no evidence of a Coast Guard follow-up.

10

Prior to 1930, cooperation among these agencies in radio intelligence was strictly ad hoc. On 18 August 1930, a meeting was held at 

the National Press Building in Washington, DC, to formulate a definite plan regarding the enforcement of the Prohibition laws and use 

of radio intelligence. The meeting was attended by fifteen representatives of the Coast Guard, the Bureau of Prohibition, the Bureau of 

Customs, and the Radio Division of the Department of Commerce.
13

Present at the meeting were

the following:

• for the Coast Guard—

Lieutenant Commander

E. M. Webster, Lieutenant

Frank M. Meals, Lieutenant (Junior Grade) John L.

Steinmetz, Radio Electrician

C.T. Solt, and Chief Radioman Wendell W. Patten,Jr.; 

• for the Bureau of Prohibition—J. L. Acuff, Carlos 

M. Bernstein, and H. J. 

Simmons;

• for the Bureau of Customs—E. J. Shamhart and 

G. W. O’Kiefe;

• and for the Radio Division of the Department of 

Commerce—W. D. Terrell, L. C. Herndon, William R. Foley, Forest F. Redfern, and 

Emery H. Lee. The meeting was chaired by Mr. Terrell.

Lieutenant Commander Webster, chief of the Communications System at Coast Guard Headquarters, defined the situation.

The intercept stations of the Radio Division, the Bureau of Prohibition, and the Coast Guard had identified over seventy illicit stations,

ship and shore, operating in the vicinity of New York City since the 

beginning of 1930. Initially, most of the liquor-smuggling operation 

had been in the hands of independent operators. As the advantages of organization became apparent, the direction of the marketing 

operation in the U.S. came under the control of a few large gangs.

At the same time, the various independent sources of liquor abroad 

began to come under the control of a few corporations, primarily 

Consolidated Exporters Corporation of Vancouver, British ColumCaptain (then Lieutenant)

Frank Meals helped plan

Prohibition enforcement

using radio. (Photo USCG)
14

bia. The same companies also tended to take over the shipping of 

the liquor, but there always remained a place for the independent 

ship owner within the operation. The illicit radio stations were used 

to transmit internal communications of the rum-running organizations. These communications were concerned with the direction of 

ships, the arrangement of contact points, the ordering of supplies,

and the general conduct of the rum-running business. At the time 

of the meeting there were approximately 103 illicit stations between 

Maine and Florida, forty-five of them shore stations. Four of the 

shore stations were in Newark, one of them directing the activities of 

nine ships which accounted for illegal imports valued at six to seven 

million dollars a month.

The illicit stations were equipped with the best and newest radio 

apparatus, capable of working with stations in foreign countries, and 

manned with first-class, experienced operators. English and French 

traffic, both plaintext and encrypted, was transmitted; and radio procedure was primarily amateur and commercial, although, according 

to Webster, the occasional use of naval procedure indicated that some 

of the illicit operators were ex-Navy or ex-Coast Guard.

During the preceding twelve months, five illicit stations in the

vicinity of New York City had been raided as a result of information

obtained through intercept by the Coast Guard, the Bureau of Prohibition, and the Department of Commerce. Intercept was not difficult,

since it required only an adequate receiver and a competent operator. 

Location of the stations, however, was another matter. Direction finding

(DF) was still in its infancy, and DF bearings taken on high-frequency radio stations were only approximate and varied greatly in different localities. Lieutenant Meals pointed out that when the seventyfive-foot patrol boat CG-210, under his command, was fitted out as an

intercept platform with high-frequency receivers, a radio compass had

been installed for direction finding. Meals’s comment concerning this

apparatus defines the technical difficulties involved:

This is something new and just how it will work I do not 

know, but our experience before with the radio compass has 

been ... that the directional factor is limited as to distance 
15

and it is also approximate. In this connection we are up 

against high frequencies which are very erratic. The apparatus is not entirely suitable, especially compass apparatus, so 

that you encounter technical difficulties in locating stations,

but I think the success we have had in locating the Highland’s case and some of the others is very remarkable when 

you consider the apparatus.11

Direction finder model in use through 1930. Then a smaller,

more modern apparatus was built that could be mounted in 

an automobile. (Photo from Rum War: The U.S. Coast Guard

and Prohibition by Donald L. Canney)
16

The conclusions of the meeting were that the major problems

involved were lack of proper equipment, money, and a clear delineation

of areas of responsibility. Only time could solve the first two. As to the

third, it was decided that the Coast Guard had responsibility for targets at sea, the Bureau of Customs for the targets at points of entry, and

the Bureau of Prohibition for targets located farther inland, with the

Department of Commerce Radio Division making its expertise available as required and continuing in the exercise of its primary responsibility, the location of illicit transmitters. A committee, operating in

New York City, was constituted to determine exactly what equipment

and personnel were necessary to solve the overall problems; to specify

what each organization could contribute in terms of equipment and

personnel to provide each of them with the kind of information and

assistance it required.This committee was to be made up of Lieutenant

Meals and Messrs. Simmons, O’Kiefe, and Lee.

12

The CG-100 in 1928, one of the 203 75-foot patrol boats

built for Coast Guard Prohibition enforcement duties.

Known as “six-bitters,” they entered service between 1924

and 1925. With a top speed of 15 knots, they were slower

than most rumrunners but well built for off-shore operations. (Photo by Joseph N. Pearce, U.S. Coast Guard)
17

The Arrival of Mrs. Friedman

C

ryptanalysis of rumrunner traffic prior to Weiskopf’s

appearance on the scene in 1926 appears to have been done 

by such personnel in the cognizant agencies as were interested and had a knack for the work. As a consequence, results tended 

to be a bit “hit or miss.” By the spring of 1927, an enormous number 

of encrypted messages had accumulated in the Coast Guard Intelligence Division. Root, by then a captain, took the matter up with the 

Bureau of Prohibition and established a joint effort, with the Bureau 

providing the personnel and Coast Guard the equipment. Intercept 

stations were set up in San Francisco and Florida, and in April 1927 

Mrs. Elizebeth S. Friedman13 was employed by the Bureau of Prohibition as a cryptanalyst and established in the Coast Guard Intelligence Division to decrypt the material received and begin work

on the hundreds of messages on file. Within two months she had 

eliminated the backlog. Since the sources of encrypted traffic were

increasing, the Treasury Department launched an intelligence service 

based on the reading of illegal encrypted correspondence.

In May and June of 1927, the Coast Guard base at San Pedro, 

California, forwarded to headquarters a series of messages which 

resulted in the breaking of systems used by the two rival rum fleets 

operating on the West Coast. At that time all traffic was forwarded 

to Washington where it was broken and rendered into plain text.

If it appeared that the decrypt could be useful immediately, it was 

encrypted and telegraphed back to the West Coast; otherwise, it 

was forwarded by airmail. This method of operation continued until 

mid-1928. At the request of the law enforcement agencies on the 

West Coast, Mrs. Friedman went to San Pedro and San Francisco 

in June and July of that year to instruct personnel there in decrypting traffic passed in systems that had already been broken, making 

the information contained therein immediately available. Clarence 

A. Housel, of the Office of the Coordinator of Pacific Coast Details 

in San Francisco, was the first person selected to receive this training. 

Subsequently, as new systems were solved in Washington, complete 

details were forwarded to Housel, who thenceforth decrypted the 

messages immediately upon receipt.14
18

During 1927 and 1928, only two general systems changing 

approximately every six months were in use on the West Coast.

Between May 1928 and January 1930, some 3,300 messages were

passed between the Pacific Coast rumrunner fleets and their principals in Vancouver, British Columbia. Nearly fifty separate and distinct cryptosystems were employed by four or five shore stations and 

approximately twenty-five vessels. Many of the systems employed 

multiple encryption. By 1930, according to Mrs. Friedman, there 

was a different system for practically every vessel, some of them of 

a complexity never attempted by any government for its most secret 

communications.15

The use of only two general systems on the West Coast in 1927-

1928 reflected the fact that the rumrunners there were organized 

into two major fleets—Consolidated Exporters Corporation and the 

Hobbs’ interests, both of Vancouver. While the crypto net became 

more complex between 1928 and 1930, Consolidated Exporters took 

over most of the fleet during the same period and expanded operations into other waters. By 1930 the company had agents in Mexico, 

British Honduras, Cuba, Louisiana, Florida, the Bahamas, and Quebec, with a major operation working out of Belize, British Honduras.

All agents and operations were in direct communication with Vancouver, passing several hundred encrypted messages per month.

In October 1929 Mrs. Friedman went to Houston,Texas, where, 

over a month, she broke twenty-four different cryptosystems, solving 

650 messages for U.S. Customs there.

Traffic totals for the southeastern Atlantic coast were, at this 

time, running about twenty-five messages per day, mostly between 

Florida and Georgia, on the mainland, and from Cuba and the Bahamas.16 The other major source of rumrunner traffic on the East Coast 

was the New York City area. Decrypted traffic from this area revealed 

smuggling operations extending from the Gulf of Mexico to Nova 

Scotia.

From 1928 to 1930 the Cryptanalytic Unit decrypted approximately 12,000 messages for the Bureau of Customs, the Coast 

Guard, the Bureau of Narcotics, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, 
19

The Treasury Department’s leading cryptanalyst, 

Elizebeth S. Friedman, leaves her Washington, DC, home 

to appear in federal court, 1934. (Photograph courtesy of 

the George C. Marshall Foundation, Lexington, Virginia)
20

the Bureau of Prohibition, and the 

Department of Justice. To produce 

this quantity, about 25,000 messages were examined annually. The 

information derived from these 

texts concerned illegal activities on 

the Pacific Coast from Vancouver 

to Ensenada; on the Gulf Coast 

from Belize to Tampa; and on the 

Atlantic Coast from Key West to 

Savannah (including Havana and 

the Bahamas) and from New Jersey 

to Maine (including Bermuda, St. 

Pierre, and Newfoundland). During this period, the Cryptanalytic 

Unit consisted of Mrs. Friedman 

and one clerk.17

It is not known when Mrs.

Friedman transferred from the 

Prohibition Bureau to the Coast 

Guard, but in September 1930 

an attempt was made to transfer 

both her and her assistant from the 

Coast Guard Intelligence Office to 

the Division of Special Agents, Bureau of Customs. On 3 October 

the commandant of the Coast Guard ordered transfer held in abeyance until they could determine the feasibility of establishing a radio 

intelligence service in the field supported by a cryptanalytic section at 

Coast Guard Headquarters. This would put the enforcement agencies (Coast Guard, Customs, and Justice) in immediate possession of 

specific knowledge of the operations of the smugglers. As a consequence, they would be able to launch seizure actions or initiate preventive measures while the smuggling operations were still in the 

planning stage. Customs assented to Coast Guard retention of Mrs.

Friedman and also agreed that the Coast Guard was the logical government agency to handle the radio problem.18

... According to 

Mrs. Friedman,

[some of the 

cryptosystems 

were] of a complexity never 

attempted 

by any government for its 

most secret 

communications.
21

A Radio Intelligence Effort 

Becomes Necessary

I

n a recommendation to the commandant of the Coast Guard,

Lieutenant Commander Frank J. Gorman, head of the Coast 

Guard intelligence unit, stated that practically all operations 

of the smuggler were directed by radio in code and cipher. Gorman 

felt that once the government mastered rumrunner radio activities,

the smugglers would be so handicapped that smuggling from the 

high seas would be cut in half. On the East Coast the movement 

and operation of the smuggling vessels, usually referred to as “blacks” 

because of their habit of running without lights, were directed by

forty-five shore stations between Maine and Florida. At this time fifty-eight “blacks” in East Coast waters were known to be using radio. 

The Coast Guard had a record of eighty-one stations in a single 

group whose operations were directed from the New York area. On 

the West Coast all smuggling was directed by two radio stations, one 

in Vancouver and one on the California coast. Traffic intercepted on 

these nets contained much of the information that the investigative 

agencies of Customs and Justice were after and practically all of the 

plans—including contact points—that the Coast Guard needed.

Gorman admitted that, up to now, the material obtained from 

intercept had been primarily informative, but he pointed out that a 

recent experiment had shown that practical application to enforcement was possible. Elizebeth Friedman’s husband, Major William F. 

Friedman, chief of the War Department’s Signal Intelligence Division and an expert cryptanalyst, had been detailed to the CG-210 for 

a two-week cruise in the New York area. During these two weeks,

the code used by one group of smugglers was broken, and the operating orders to the rum ships were read as received. The code was also 

compiled and made available for use by other Coast Guard units.

Moreover, two radio stations, one in New Bedford, Massachusetts,

and the other in Coney Island, New York, were located, raided, and 

put out of business by Department of Justice agents and Department 

of Commerce inspectors working in conjunction with the Coast 

Guard. Lastly, ample evidence was obtained linking one radio station 
22

with the recently seized Nova

V to obtain an indictment on 

conspiracy charges. Gorman 

said that this two-week voyage with a nine-man crew had 

accomplished more than the 

destroyer force and all other 

units combined had been able 

to effect in months.

From 1929 to 1930, there 

had been a 34 percent increase 

in the number of foreign 

“blacks,” from 103 to 138. As 

their number increased, the 

complexity of their radio communications kept pace. In 1930 one of the syndicates, probably Consolidated Exporters, was paying the man in charge of its radio operations $10,000 per year. According to Gorman, the Coast Guard on 

the West Coast was practically impotent, and on the East Coast it 

could do little more than annoy the rumrunners. He strongly recommended that a radio intelligence unit be established in order to better 

employ the Coast Guard’s resources. The necessary field intercept 

units could be provided from current resources, but funds would have 

to be provided to establish a central organization in Washington.19

The cornerstone of the whole effort, of course, would be cryptanalysis. And it was imperative, Gorman said, that such a section 

be established in the Intelligence Division. The alternative was that 

Mrs. Friedman would go to Customs and work on the intercept from 

two Customs stations, and

the Coast Guard with its destroyers and patrols on a military 

basis will continue to patrol the seas and operate precisely as 

if radio had never been heard of, spending hundreds of thousands of dollars in an effort to stumble across the information that is constantly on the air, i.e., the location and contact 

points of the rumrunners.20

In 1930, one of

the [smuggling]

syndicates ... was

paying the man

in charge of its

radio operations

$10,000 per year. 
23

The Cryptanalytic Unit

I

n addition to the dollars and cents side of the problem, there was 

a question of morale. A sense of futility was spreading through 

the Coast Guard, together with a feeling that a demonstration 

of effort, rather than the effort itself, was all that was required. The 

results that could be expected from a radio intelligence effort would 

more than compensate for the expenditure.

The central organization foreseen by both Gorman and Mrs.

Friedman was as follows:

Position Grade Salary Total 

Cryptanalyst in charge 

Assistant cryptanalyst

One senior cryptographic clerk

One cryptographic clerk

Three assistant cryptographic clerks

P-4

P-1

CAF-5

CAF-4 

CAF-3 

$4,000

$2,000

$2,000

$1,800

$1,620 

$4,000

$2,000

$2,000

$1,800

 $4,860 

$14,660

Gorman recommended that the funds for this organization be 

authorized in the FY31 appropriation. He deemed the matter to be 

of sufficient importance to justify asking for a “deficiency appropriation,” but doubted that that could be obtained because of the current 

fiscal situation. He also recommended that three more patrol boats 

be equipped as the CG-210 and manned with a crew of ten men 

each, including four radiomen; and that fifteen men, including six 

radiomen and six warrant officers, be assigned to the New York Intelligence Unit under the command of Lieutenant Meals, formerly captain of the CG-210. The warrant officers would receive preliminary 

training under Meals and would then be brought to Washington 

for cryptanalytic training after the cryptanalytic section was established. Gorman realized that these individuals were not available but 

considered the requirement to be so overriding that they could and 

should be provided from current strength, depleting other units if 

necessary.

21
24

The I’m Alone

I

n justifying the creation of the cryptanalytic unit, Mrs. Friedman cited, as one of the most conspicuous examples of the value 

of cryptanalysis in the enforcement of the Prohibition laws, the 

case of I’m Alone, a “black” sunk by the Coast Guard in the Gulf of 

Mexico in March 1929.

I’m Alone was a two-masted schooner built in 1923 in Lunenberg, Nova Scotia, for the liquor trade. Initially it operated out of St. 

Pierre et Miquelon along the coast of New England and New York, 

earning $3 million for its owners. In 1928 it was sold and placed 

under the command of a bemedalled ex-officer of the Royal Navy, 

John T. Randall. The ship sailed for the Gulf of Mexico with 1,500 

cases of liquor from St. Pierre, headed for a rendezvous off the Louisiana coast scheduled for early March 1929. Upon the arrival of the 

I’m Alone, the USCG cutter Wolcott appeared and trailed the schooner for two days. Randall left the area in disgust but returned a few 

days later, met a contact boat, and started unloading the liquor. On 20 

March 1929, the Wolcott returned and determined that the I’m Alone 

was within the territorial waters of the U.S. and ordered it to heave 

to and be searched. It refused to obey and the cutter gave chase. Two 

hundred twenty miles out in the Gulf of Mexico, in a rising gale, 

the cutter Dexter joined the chase and boxed in the I’m Alone, finally 

sinking the rumrunner on the high seas and killing one crew member. The rest of the crew were rescued.

The sinking had taken place miles beyond the limit of maritime 

law jurisdiction. Since the ship was flying the Canadian flag when it 

was sunk, the Canadian government filed a claim against the United 

States for $365,000 for the loss of ship and cargo.

The Canadian claim was based on the presumption of Canadian ownership of ship and cargo. In order to void the claim, the

United States government was required to prove its contention that

the I’m Alone was American-owned. Such proof would reduce the

incident from the sinking of a ship owned by a friendly power to

a flag insult, which could be settled by formal apology and a small

cash indemnity.
25

The Coast Guard had first started collecting the communications of the I’m Alone in December 1925 and had targeted the ship 

continuously during the next three years. Information derived from 

this traffic had made Coast Guard analysts certain that the ship was 

American-owned. In addition, traffic was subpoenaed from commercial cable companies. When the code system used in the latter 

was broken, the information therein, combined with intelligence 

from other sources, resulted in the identification and arrest of the 

ship’s owners, Dan Hogan and Marvin Clark of New York City. As 

a result, the final settlement between Canada and the U.S. amounted 

to $50,000 for the insult to the Canadian flag and for the destruction 

of Canadian seamen’s property.

22

The crew of the I’m Alone after its sinking.

Left to right: Edward Bouchard, sailor (in back); Captain 

John Thomas Randall, ex-officer of the Royal Navy; Jens 

Jensen, assistant engineer; John George Williams, mate; 

Chester Hobbs, engineer; James Barrett, sailor; William 

Wordsworth, cook; Eddie Young, sailor; and Mr. Simpson, 

British vice consul in New Orleans (photo source unknown)
26

Mrs. Friedman was later instrumental in the breaking up of Consolidated Exporters. By 1933 Consolidated Exporters Company was

the largest and most powerful smuggling syndicate in existence, controlling a near monopoly of smuggling in the Gulf of Mexico and on

the West Coast.23 In 1931 special agents of the Bureau of Prohibition

raided the syndicate’s New Orleans headquarters and began an investigation of Consolidated Exporters’ smuggling activities that lasted

nearly two years and cost several hundred thousand dollars. More than

100 persons were indicted, including the New Orleans ring leaders who

directed smuggling activities throughout the Gulf. The case against

the syndicate ring leaders was based on a charge of conspiracy, and it

was absolutely essential to connect these persons with the actual operation of the smuggling vessels. Convictions for conspiracy required the

construction of a case connecting the ship, the illicit shore station and

its operator, and the “bosses” controlling the operation. The only way

to accomplish this was through the encrypted messages originating in

the New Orleans office of Consolidated Exporters and transmitted by

their illicit radio station which would show that the defendants actually directed the movements of the smuggling vessels.

Hundreds of encrypted messages between the “black” ships and their

shore stations had been intercepted by the Coast Guard Intelligence

Office in Mobile, Alabama, and many more were seized by the special

agents when they raided the syndicate headquarters in New Orleans. All

of those messages were forwarded to Coast Guard headquarters, where

they were deciphered, decoded, and indexed by the Cryptanalysis Section.

When the United States attorney went before the grand jury for an indictment, Mrs. Friedman was sent from Washington as a witness, and when

the case came to trial in early 1933, she again went to New Orleans, where

she was the star witness for the prosecution. After the trial, Colonel Amos

W. W.Woodcock, former director of the Bureau of Prohibition, who had

been sent to New Orleans as special assistant to the U.S. attorney general

to prosecute the case in person, commended Mrs. Friedman, stating:

[She] was summoned as an expert witness to testify as to the 

meaning of certain intercepted radio code messages. Without their translations, I do not believe that this very important case could have been won.24
27

The I’m Alone—a “black,” or contact boat that ran without lights—being searched by Coast Guard vessel

CG-173. The I’m Alone was the center of a major 1929 Prohibition enforcement case that hinged on

Elizebeth Friedman’s cryptanalysis in the Coast Guard Intelligence Division. (Photo source unknown)
28

Security Problems

T

he cooperative system set up at the 18 August 1930 meeting contributed greatly to the success of these agencies in 

enforcing the Prohibition laws. As time went on, however, 

it was learned that collaboration with other agencies contributed to 

the rise of a problem which has plagued signals intelligence down 

to the present: the problem of avoiding the compromise of sources 

and methods used. Coast Guard policy was to freely forward paraphrased information derived from intercept and cryptanalysis. The 

same policy required that no information be divulged on rumrunner cryptosystems or on the degree of analytic success achieved, even 

to other Coast Guard units. The Intelligence Division had found 

that while the rumrunners realized that they were being intercepted 

and that the Coast Guard was trying to read their traffic, they usually relied on the infallibility of their cryptosystems until advised by

an informant that the system had been broken. When information 

concerning cryptanalytic success was distributed among government 

agencies, it invariably became known to the rumrunners.

In one case, an encryption system used between Belize and New 

Orleans was broken with considerable difficulty and with the aid of 

the Signal Intelligence Service. Because of the nature of the system,

long messages in it were far more difficult to break than short messages. Shortly after the system was broken and transmitted to the 

Intelligence Office at Mobile, a message from New Orleans to Belize 

was intercepted and decrypted. The message stated that the syndicate had definite information that the Coast Guard could break the 

system when short messages were used and directed that no messages of fewer than twelve words be sent. Subsequent investigation 

indicated that the source of the leak appeared to be a hanger-on at 

the Customs House in New Orleans.The Bureau of Customs was so 

informed, but the damage had been done.

25
29

After Repeal

W

ith the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt, a bill for the repeal

of the Eighteenth Amendment was proposed by Congress

on 20 February 1933 and ratified by the states on 5 December of the same year. Contrary to popular belief and hope, repeal did not

terminate efforts to smuggle alcoholic liquors; rather, it gave new hope

and grandiose ideas to the smugglers as a means of making easy money

on a large scale by smuggling liquor to evade the excise taxes.

This post-repeal smuggling cost the Treasury Department more

than $35,000,000 annually in lost revenue. Federal statutes were not adequate to cope effectively with this new smuggling problem, particularly

in view of the reduction in size of the Coast Guard and other enforcement agencies as a result of the Economy Act. Secretary of the Treasury

Henry Morgenthau immediately took measures to provide additional

funds to the Coast Guard and to coordinate the activities of all Treasury

law enforcement agencies. He further acted to increase cooperation with

the Canadian government, which was also experiencing problems with

liquor smuggling, now that it was being done to evade liquor taxes.26

ALake-class cutter, likely the Mendota, with rumrunner Edna,

later commissioned into USCG as the CG-936. (From Rum War:

The U.S. Coast Guard and Prohibition by Donald L. Canney)
30

Interagency and 

International Cooperation

B

y 1935, cooperation among Treasury law enforcement agencies was complete. A statement of responsibilities for the 

Coast Guard, the Alcohol Tax Unit, and the Bureau of Customs was formalized in the case of the rumrunner Reidun. The Coast 

Guard was responsible for “preventive work” and would endeavor to 

keep under surveillance the vessels taking cargo from the Reidun.

The Alcohol Tax Unit would furnish any equipment and personnel 

needed for patrol work to the responsible authorities in New York

and Boston and, jointly with the Bureau of Customs, would assume 

responsibility for investigation of the various organizations believed 

to be interested in the Reidun’s cargo. All three services were directed 

to provide full support to this effort.27

In the case of the Bodo, a “black” out of Antwerp, Belgium, a 

representative of the U.S. Coast Guard was ordered to proceed to 

Halifax, Nova Scotia, with intelligence personnel to work with the 

Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Halifax. RCMP, Ottawa,

was asked to assist in locating and observing Bodo. In addition, the 

Department of State arranged for Coast Guard cutters to call at Halifax and at Trepassey Bay and St. John’s, Newfoundland, as necessary, 

between 10 and 31 December 1935.28

During the Prohibition period, there appears to have been little

cooperation between U.S. and Canadian authorities in regard to

limiting the liquor trade. The smuggling of liquor into the United

States was not a crime in Canada, and a number of quite respectable

Canadian companies and persons were engaged, one way or another, in the trade. After repeal, the profits of liquor smuggling came

from the evasion of excise taxes, which were as vexing in Canada as

they were in the United States, and the smuggling organizations,

now working out of Europe, began to run alcohol into Canada.The

RCMP began intercepting “black” radio transmissions and established an informal exchange of the fruits of this intercept with the

U.S. Coast Guard.29
31

Initially, the cooperation was somewhat less than perfect. Canadian rumrunners returning to Canadian ports were required to file 

“Inward Reports” concerning their voyages. These were frequently 

untruthful. On 26 September 1935, the Miserinko filed the following:

I, George Lohnes, Master of the M/V Miserinko, do solemnly swear that I cleared from Yarmouth, N.S., on August 

29th for St. Georges, Bermuda; proceeded to position one 

mile west of Lurcher Lightship, loaded 1,200 cases of alcohol from MN Popocatapelt [sic]; then proceeded to position 

N. Lat. 37-15, W. Long. 73-20; transferred entire cargo to 

boat name unknown: then proceeded direct to Lunenburg 

in ballast, not having landed any spirituous liquors within 

territorial waters of Canada.

In fact, the Miserinko had hovered off the New Jersey coast for

nearly a month before succeeding in unloading her entire cargo, which

was disposed of in two or three contacts in several different positions.

Miserinko was under intermittent surveillance by the Coast Guard

during the entire period.The phrase “boat name unknown” occurs frequently in these reports. Commander Yeandle stated at one time:

Here are instances of vessels with cargoes running into hundreds of dollars with the transfer effected with the vessels 

alongside of each other and frequently during hours of daylight, and still the names of the vessels involved are unknown 

to the Masters. It is inconceivable and must likewise be to 

Canadian officials.30

On 29 January 1936, Commander Thompson of the United 

States Coast Guard and Mr. Avis of the Alcohol Tax Unit went to 

Ottawa to discuss, among other things, the problem of the Inwards 

Reports. The main problem was, apparently, that these declarations 

were made to the collector of customs of the individual ports. In 

many of the smaller ports, these men were related to, or associated 

with, the shipmasters. These collectors of customs did not require 

explicit details and did not scrutinize the reports closely, and for various reasons the RCMP was not in a position to query the collectors.31
32

In December 1935 the Coast Guard had loaned a Model 14-B 

direction finder to the RCMP, which proved to be of great value 

to both services. By mid-1936 the center of smuggling activity had 

shifted from the New Jersey coast and St. Pierre et Miquelon to 

Lurcher Shoal and Seal Island, Nova Scotia, and to Petit Manan and 

Grand Manan islands. As a result, the RCMP had shifted the 14-B 

to Chebucto Head, and Yeandle proposed the loan of a Model 14-D 

for use in the vicinity of Yarmouth, N.S.

Pursuing this policy to its logical conclusion, Yeandle also proposed establishing a direct radio link between New York District 

Headquarters and the RCMP Headquarters in Halifax for exchanging bearings and other pertinent information.32

General MacBrien, RCMP, had discussed with Commander

Parker, chief intelligence officer of the Coast Guard, the possibility

of providing a Coast Guard cryptanalyst to train RCMP personnel.

Radio Electrician O. M. Helgren, USCG, was a trained cryptographer

who had been to Halifax twice previously in connection with both the

Reidun and Bodo cases. Yeandle agreed to sending Helgren to Halifax

not only to provide cryptanalytic instruction but also to install and

maintain the 14-D direction finder and the two-way radio.

33

The rumrunners were not necessarily passive in this radio war. 

In fact, an attempt was made in July 1936 to infiltrate the RCMP 

intelligence effort. One individual approached the RCMP Marine 

Division in Halifax and asked if they had a DF station, as he would 

like to get a job operating one. When he received a negative answer, 

he asked if the U.S. Coast Guard used direction finders and if the 

RCMP copied rumrunner codes. Captain J. W. Bonner, the RCMP 

officer conducting the interview, told the man that the RCMP used 

aircraft for locating “blacks.” The aircraft then notified a cutter, 

which proceeded to the vicinity of the rumrunner and started trailing it. Bonner said later that he had used this story to try to convince 

the man that neither DF nor cryptanalysis was used by the RCMP. 

In another case, a “rummy” kept trying to get RCMP officials to tell 

him which of his men was a police informant, since he was convinced 

that his codes were being read.34
33

Cooperation between the two

countries was tightened and communications improved at a conference

held in Halifax on 27 July 1938, at

which it was agreed to bring the U.S. 

consul general in Halifax and the vice

consul in St. Pierre et Miquelon more

fully into the picture.

35

Later in the year, the RCMP 

suggested sending two of its personnel to New York for training in cryptography. The two men proposed had 

some experience in the field, but the 

commanding officer of the RCMP 

Marine Division felt that this training 

would improve their proficiency. The 

request originated with him and was 

addressed to the intelligence officer 

of the New York Division of the Coast Guard, Commander Yeandle. 

Lieutenant Frank E. Pollio, who had become the acting intelligence 

officer of the Coast Guard upon the departure of Commander Parker, examined the provisions of the 1925 treaty between the U.S. and 

Canada concerning the suppression of smuggling and reached the 

conclusion that extension of cooperation into this field required the 

permission of higher authority. The sending of Helgren to Halifax in 

1935 had been kept on a very unofficial basis with the idea that, after 

he gave the RCMP a start in the field, they would continue on their 

own. Pollio suggested that a formal request be made by the RCMP 

to the commandant of the Coast Guard, who could then present the 

matter to the State Department. Yeandle had pointed out that many 

of the RCMP radio operators were civilians from the Department 

of Transport, many of whom had not been investigated and some of 

whom were former rumrunner radio operators. It would therefore be 

necessary, if the training were provided, that the Canadian trainees 

be regular members of the RCMP. There are no records available 

indicating that the training ever did, in fact, take place.

36

A “rummy”

kept trying to 

get RCMP 

officials to tell 

him which 

of his men 

was a police 

informant ...
34

New Duties for the 

Intelligence Division

B

y November 1938 offshore liquor smuggling had ceased

almost entirely. In 1936 the Coast Guard had begun to

cooperate with the Bureaus of Customs and Narcotics to

suppress the smuggling of illegal drugs into the United States. Also

after 1936, the Cryptanalytic Unit was tasked by the secretary of

the treasury with developing cryptographic communications for his

office and for the law-enforcement bureaus. As a consequence, the

duties of the Intelligence Division were not reduced with the abatement of liquor smuggling.

37

After the establishment of the Money Stabilization Board under 

the Treasury Department, the Cryptanalytic Unit provided this 

board with information on foreign exchange control; after 1938 it 

maintained a close watch for any clues in radio traffic pointing to 

sudden changes in the international situation. In August 1939 the 

unit was transferred to the Communications Division of the Coast 

Guard, where it operated in response to requests from the Intelligence Division.

Organized smuggling had practically disappeared by 1939, and 

for several months before the German invasion of Poland, the Coast 

Guard had been assigned to monitor the shipborne communications 

of potential belligerents, watching for, among other things, indications of possible entry into the war by other nations. This was done 

to forewarn Treasury, which could then take appropriate actions concerning the freezing of funds.38
35

The Approach of War

W

ith the outbreak of war in Europe, the Treasury Department’s statutory responsibility for enforcement of U.S. 

neutrality brought on a number of new responsibilities 

for the Coast Guard. Among these were the sealing of communications equipment on all belligerent vessels entering U.S. ports and 

the prevention of communications concerning shipping of the movement of belligerent ships, communications which would compromise 

the neutrality of the United States.

In monitoring these communications, USCG stations reported 

repeatedly that they were intercepting traffic similar to that of the old 

rumrunner transmitters. Solution of this traffic showed that it was 

the communications of Axis agents. Intercept and analysis of these 

communications were to constitute a major part of the Coast Guard 

contribution to the intelligence effort in World War II.

39

The crew of the rum boat Linwood set fire to the vessel to

destroy evidence of their illicit trade. (From Rum War: The

U.S. Coast Guard and Prohibition by Donald L. Canney)
36

Notes

1. Federal Communications Commission, “The Radio Intelligence 

Division of the Federal Communications Commission,” August 

1943, 12-13. (This rather self-serving report was issued by the 

FCC in answer to the charges made by the U.S. House of Representatives Committee to Investigate the Federal Communications Commission, better known as the Cox Committee.) Information on the 1924 appropriation is from T. Michael O’Brien,

Guardians of the Eighth Sea: A History of the U.S. Coast Guard on 

the Great Lakes, Ninth Coast Guard District Command, Government Printing Office 1976.

2. Testimony of George E. Sterling, Chief of the FCC Radio Intelligence Division, before the House Committee to Investigate the 

Federal Communications Commission, August 1943, pp. 3-4 of 

his manuscript.

3. Letter from Commander Yeandle to Commander Stanley V. Parker, Chief Intelligence Officer, USCG, 7 November 1934.

4. Malcolm F. Willoughby, The Rum War at Sea (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1964), 109.

5.The description of the establishment of “Radio New York” is based 

on the correspondence of Commander Charles S. Root, intelligence officer of the Coast Guard, with Robert Iversen, employee 

of the New YorkTimes radio station, October 1925 to March 1926.

This and other documents cited are in the National Archives 

Record Group 26,“Records of the U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence 

Division.” Box 53, “Correspondence Relating to New York in 

1925.”

6. Memorandum from Lieutenant Commander F. J. Gorman to the 

Commandant, USCG, “Radio Intelligence; Establishment of 

Cryptanalytic Section at Headquarters and Intercept Stations in 

the Field,” 10 October 1930; and 26 August 1982 interview with 

Dr. Solomon Kullback, NSA Oral History Collection.

7. Report from Forest F. Redfern to Arthur Batcheller, U.S. Supervisor of Radio, 2nd Radio District, New York, 26 April 1930.
37

8. Cable from Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Lowman to Forest 

F. Redfern, 17 October 1929.

9. Letter from Commander Yeandle to Dr. C. B. Jollife, 3 December 

1934.

10. Letter from Dr. Jollife to Commander Yeandle, 12 December 

1934.

11. Coast Guard Lieutenant Frank M. Meals; “Report of a Meeting 

Held in Room 633, National Press Building, on August 18, 1930,

at 10:00 A.M., for the Purpose of Formulating a Definite Plan of 

Procedure Regarding the Enforcement of Prohibition Laws and 

the Use of Radio in Connection with the Rum-Running Activity,” 1-4.

12. Ibid., 4-12 and addenda.

13. Elizebeth Smith Friedman, born in 1898, was the first woman 

in the United States to engage professionally in technical cryptanalysis. She received her start in this field in 1916 when she was 

hired by George Fabyan to work in his Riverbank Laboratories 

in Geneva, Illinois. Her job was to aid in the research attempt to 

read “Baconian” cipher and thus prove that Francis Bacon wrote 

Shakespeare’s plays and sonnets. At Riverbank she met and married, in 1917, William F. Friedman, head of the Department of 

Genetics at Riverbank Laboratories. She is sometimes credited 

with having first interested her husband, who later became the 

head of the War Department’s Signal Intelligence Service, in 

cryptanalysis. Mrs. Friedman was the Treasury Department’s

leading cryptanalyst during Prohibition and the immediate preWorld War II period, and she became possibly the world’s most 

famous cryptanalyst during that period as a result of her court 

appearances as an expert witness for the prosecution.

14. Elizebeth S. Friedman,“History of Work in Cryptanalysis, April 

1927 to June 1930,” undated, 1-3. [Portions reprinted in the Cryptologic Quarterly, 1998, Vol. 17, No. 4, 119-125.]

15. Ibid., 3.

16. Ibid., 4.

17. Ibid., 4-5.
38

18. Memorandum from F. J. Gorman to Commandant, USCG, 10 

October 1930, 1.

19. Ibid., 1-4.

20. Ibid., 5.

21. Ibid., 5-6, and Elizebeth S. Friedman, “Memorandum upon a 

Proposed Central Organization at Coast Guard Headquarters for 

Performing Cryptanalytic Work,” 30 November 1930.

22. Elizebeth S. Friedman’s “Memorandum upon a Proposed Central 

Organization,” 30 November 1930; Leah Stock Helmick, “Key 

Woman of the T-Men,” Reader’s Digest, September 1937; Willoughby, Rum War at Sea, 128-30; and Howard V. L. Bloomfield,

The Compact History of the United States Coast Guard (New York: 

Hawthorne Books, 1966), 151-152.

23.This according to a memorandum from Lieutenant Commander 

Gorman to the Commandant, USCG, “Work of the Cryptanalytic Section of Headquarters for Other Branches of the Government,” 8 July 1933.

24. Letter from Colonel A.W.W. Woodcock to the Secretary of the 

Treasury, 28 June 1933; Gorman’s 8 July 1933 memorandum to 

the Commandant; and Willoughby, Rum War at Sea, 112.

25. Memorandum from Lieutenant Commander Gorman to Mr. 

T. J. Gorman, Deputy Commissioner of Customs, Washington,

DC, 22 June 1933 (classified), and Kullback NSA Oral History 

interview, 1982.

26. Memorandum for the Secretary of the Treasury from Rear Admiral R. R. Waesche, Commandant, USCG, 16 November 1938.

27.“Preventive and Investigative Program Agreed upon in the Reidun Case,” 12 November 1935 (classified); memorandum from 

the Commandant, USCG, “Special Investigation,” 14 November 1935 (classified); and memorandum from the Commandant,

USCG, to the Commander, New York Division, “Reidun Cargo, 

Operations and Investigation Relative Thereto,” 13 November 

1935 (classified).
39

28. Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. Graves, 3 December 

1935 (classified).

29. Memorandum from Chief Intelligence Officer, USCG, to Intelligence Officer, New York. “Black Radio Intercepts,” 15 March 

1935.

30. Memorandum from Commander S. S. Yeandle, “False Statements in Inward Reports of British Motor Vessels,” 27 January 

1936. The quote from Master Lohnes’ report and the details of 

the true voyage of the Miserinko are from the same memorandum.

31. Memorandum from Commander Yeandle, “Proposed Conference at Ottawa between Treasury Department and RCMP Officials,” 27 January 1936.

32. Memorandum from Commander Yeandle to the Chief of the 

Division of Intelligence, “Royal Canadian Mounted Police; cooperation with,” 15 June 1936.

33. Letter from Commander Parker to Commander Yeandle, 13 June 

1936 (classified).

34. Memorandum from Yeandle to Chief, U.S. Coast Guard Division of Intelligence. “Information Regarding Smuggling off Nova 

Scotia,” 14 August 1936.

35. Memorandum from Clinton K. MacEachran, U.S. Consul General, Halifax, NS, to the Secretary of State, “Conference at Halifax 

Concerning Liquor Activities,” 30 July 1938 (classified).

36. Letters from F. J. Meade, Commander “H” Division, RCMP, to 

Commander S. S. Yeandle, “Re: Cryptography-RCMP Marine 

Section,” 27 September and 25 October 1938 (classified). Letter from Yeandle to Pollio, 18 October 1938: memorandum from 

Intelligence Officer, New York Division, to Chief Intelligence 

Officer, “RCMP Request for Training of Personnel,” 18 October 

1938; letter from Pollio to Yeandle, 24 October 1938 (classified);

and memorandum from J. F. Jacot, Acting Intelligence Officer, 

New York Division, to Chief Intelligence Officer, “RCMP Personnel; Instruction in Cryptography,” 1 November 1938.
40

37. Memorandum for the Secretary of the Treasury from the Commandant, USCG, 16 November 1938.

38. Memorandum from Commander J. F. Farley, USCG, to Commander John R. Redman, Office of Naval Communications, 6 

March 1942 (classified).

39. Ibid.

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