J-S21044-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.T.J.F., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.H., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 71 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered December 19, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000157-2016

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.T.J.F., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.H., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 72 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Decree Entered December 19, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000710-2019

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.D.J.F., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.H., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 73 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered December 19, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000159-2016
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IN THE INTEREST OF: D.D.J.F., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.H., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 74 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Decree Entered December 19, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000711-2019

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., NICHOLS, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED AUGUST 7, 2024

D.H. (Mother) appeals from the decrees terminating her parental rights 

to her minor sons, D.D.J.F. (born in January 2015) and D.T.J.F. (born in 

December 2015) (collectively, Children), and the orders changing Children’s 

permanency goals from reunification to adoption. Mother’s appointed counsel, 

Harry R. Levin, Esquire (Counsel), has also filed a petition to withdraw as 

counsel and an accompanying Anders brief.1 We grant Counsel’s petition to 

withdraw and affirm the juvenile court’s decrees and orders.

As summarized by the juvenile court,

[o]n December 24, 2015, [the Philadelphia Department of Human 

Services (DHS)] received a General Protective Services (“GPS”) 

report which alleged that on December 20, 2015, Mother gave 

birth to D.T.J.F. at Temple University Hospital and [D.T.J.F.] was 

____________________________________________

1 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); see also In re S.M.B., 

856 A.2d 1235, 1237 (Pa. Super. 2004) (explaining that the Anders

procedure for withdrawal of court-appointed counsel has been extended to 

appeals involving termination of parental rights).
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discharged from [the] hospital into Mother’s care. [DHS filed a 

dependency petition for the Children in January 2016, alleging 

that Mother and D.F. (Father)2 both had histories of mental illness 

and drug and alcohol use. The petition further alleged that Mother 

was transient and lacked proper parenting skills.] On March 16, 

an adjudicatory hearing was held for Children, and they were 

adjudicated dependent. Legal and physical custody remained with 

Mother, and DHS was ordered to supervise their care. Children 

were adjudicated [dependent] due to the conduct of Mother failing 

to protect them or placing them at a high risk. There was also 

inadequate shelter, substance abuse[,] and mental health 

concerns regarding Mother. The allegations were determined to 

be valid....

In September of 2016, Mother fled from Philadelphia with 

Children and did not make her whereabouts known to [the 

Community Umbrella Agency (CUA)]. On October 5, 2016, a 

permanency review hearing was held and the court ordered DHS 

to obtain an order of protective custody (“OPC”) for Children once 

they were located. On August 10, 2017, DHS learned that 

Children were in Philadelphia in the care of [their] paternal 

grandmother [(Grandmother)].... An OPC was obtained for 

Children[,] and they remained in the care of [Grandmother].

Juvenile Court Opinion, 3/14/24, at 1-2 (citations to record omitted; some 

capitalization modified); see also In the Interest of D.T.J.F., 283 A.3d 351, 

1770-1773 EDA 2021 (Pa. Super. filed July 8, 2022) (unpublished 

memorandum at 3) (“[The juvenile] court transferred legal custody of the 

Children to DHS and physical custody of the Children to Grandmother ... 

because Mother had absconded with them for approximately a year.”). 

Subsequently, at the dependency dockets, the juvenile court found

aggravated circumstances existed based on the involuntary termination of

____________________________________________

2 Father is not a party to the instant appeal.
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Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Children’s older siblings. In the 

Interest of D.T.J.F., 283 A.3d 351 (unpublished memorandum at 3). In 

September 2019, DHS filed petitions for termination and to change Children’s 

permanency goals to adoption. DHS later withdrew the petitions because 

Mother had enrolled in therapy. See id. (unpublished memorandum at 3, 5).

On August 4, 2021, DHS filed additional petitions for termination and to 

change Children’s permanency goals to adoption. This Court summarized the 

relevant testimony elicited during the termination hearing:3

[Tania Cody (Cody), the CUA case manager,] testified that CUA 

had assigned Mother the following objectives for reunification with 

the Children: maintain suitable housing and employment, submit 

to a Parenting Capacity Evaluation (“PCE”), participate in mental 

health services, and participate in visitation with Children. Cody 

agreed that Mother had obtained stable housing, had completed 

the PCE, and had demonstrated some employment history. Cody 

also acknowledged that Mother has a younger child in her care 

who has never been adjudicated dependent.

Regarding visitation, Cody testified that Grandmother 

prevented Mother from visiting the Children at times because 

Grandmother “has difficulty with her communication with the case 

aid, who is the person who transports the Children and supervises 

the visits.” Cody has had to intervene to speak with Grandmother 

about her responsibility regarding the visits. Cody relayed that 

the trial court has also admonished Grandmother, who is not fully 

cooperative. Cody testified that more recently, visits have not 

taken place due to the Children’s and Mother’s sickness. She rated 

Mother’s compliance with her visitation objective as “minimal.” 

Cody said that since the last court date, there have been 

telephone visits between Mother and Children, but no video-

____________________________________________

3 This Court adeptly summarized the testimony of several witnesses. See In 

the Interest of D.T.J.F., 283 A.3d 351 (unpublished memorandum at 3-9). 

We limit our recitation to the testimony most relevant to the instant appeal.
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conferencing visits, because Grandmother does not have the 

capacity to facilitate them.

Cody testified that Mother’s lack of mental health treatment 

has been a concern throughout the life of the case and that 

Mother’s mental health is still of concern. Cody stated that the 

PCE recommended Mother complete a psychiatric evaluation along 

with individual therapy, but that Mother never had the psychiatric 

evaluation. Cody testified that Mother did not engage in any 

mental health treatment between 2016, when she took part in 

mental health, drug and alcohol treatment ..., and 2019, when she 

completed an intake at Alternative Community Services. Cody 

testified that Mother told [Cody] that meanwhile, in 2018, there 

was an incident in which Mother admitted herself to a hospital for 

mental health treatment, had an altercation with a security guard, 

attempted to assault a police officer, and threatened to kill the 

officer’s family.

According to Cody’s testimony, Mother never followed up 

with Alternative Community Services following her 2019 intake[,]

but finally resumed therapy in 2020 at Dr. Mary Berge & 

Associates. ... Cody learned after the 2020 [termination and 

permanency review hearing] that Mother had attended only three 

of her therapy sessions with [Dr. Mary Berge & Associates] and 

had missed four, and Mother was discharged from Dr. Mary Berge 

& Associates that same year. Ultimately, Cody opined that “the 

mental health component of this case,” which was “the very core 

component as to why the [C]hildren ... were removed in the first 

place,” “has not been addressed and there has not been any 

consistency in that matter.”

Id. (unpublished memorandum at 3-5) (citations to record and some brackets 

omitted).

Mother testified on her own behalf during the hearing. Mother testified 

that “Grandmother denied her video calls with the [C]hildren.” Id.

(unpublished memorandum at 8). Concerning her mental health treatment, 

this Court summarized Mother’s testimony as follows:
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Mother acknowledged that she was discharged from therapy with 

Dr. Mary Berge & Associates in 2020 due to her absences, but said 

she began going to therapy at Family Therapy Counseling in 

December 2020. Mother did not bring any documentation of her 

treatment at Family Therapy Counseling to the hearing. According 

to Mother, her therapist at Family Therapy Counseling had called 

Cody twice, and Cody had never responded or tried to obtain 

Mother’s records. When asked about her current attendance at 

Family Therapy Counseling, Mother responded,

My last visit to therapy was in June. I know its [sic] August, 

but in June, I went to therapy one last time, after court, 

because I know of – I don’t know, grew into a reluctance, I 

guess, a reluctance to deal with just continuously being –

like, I – I haven’t been in control of my life since DHS 

entered it 11 years ago.... So, I will be honest, when I 

stopped going in June, my therapist actually didn’t even 

really say she needed to see me. I’ve had three therapists 

diagnose me with adjustment disorder and nothing more. 

...

Mother repeated that she has not gone to therapy since June 

2021, but also said, “Yes, I am in treatment.” When asked if she 

intended to “go back to therapy,” Mother responded, “I am 

planning to go to counseling, not therapy.” She said she wants 

“to take a different approach” and would “rather do talk 

counseling, if you will.” She said that her understanding of the 

recommendation in the PCE was to engage in “a form of 

counseling, and if my counselor thought it necessary, which is in 

this recommendation as well—if the counselor made it necessary, 

then I would get a psychiatric evaluation.” [Mother] stated it was 

never recommended, so she never [completed] the psychiatric 

evaluation.

Id. (unpublished memorandum at 8-9) (citations to record and some brackets 

omitted).

At the close of the August 2021 hearing, the juvenile court denied the 

termination and goal change petitions as to both Mother and Father. The court 

identified Children’s placement goal as “return to parent or guardian.” 
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Permanency Review Order, 8/4/21, at 1. At that time, the juvenile court 

reasoned that “none of the conditions that led to the Children’s removal 

continue to exist, apart from concerns for Mother’s mental health.” Juvenile 

Court Opinion, 9/30/21, at 14. The juvenile court emphasized that Mother 

gave birth to another child since the start of DHS’s involvement with Children, 

and Mother “competently parented the [youngest] child with no concerns from 

DHS for the past two years.” Id. at 14-15. Further, the court rejected DHS’s 

reliance on Mother’s inconsistent engagement with mental health services. 

Id. at 15-16. Rather, the juvenile court found that Mother

participated in at least some mental health services throughout 

the life of the case. She has engaged in mental health services 

with the Alternative Community Resources Program, participated 

in therapy with Dr. Mary Berge & Associates and is now currently

receiving mental health services from Family Therapy Counseling 

and plans to continue.

Id. at 15. This Court affirmed the denial of the termination and goal change 

petitions. See In the Interest of D.T.J.F., 283 A.3d 351.

Between October 2021 and January 2023, the juvenile court held 

several permanency review hearings. Mother did not attend any of those 

hearings. Following the January 9, 2023, permanency review hearing, the 

juvenile court found that DHS had made reasonable efforts to finalize 

Children’s permanency plan. See Permanency Review Order, 1/9/23, at 1. 

The court continued the case to schedule a goal change hearing.
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On April 24, 2023, DHS filed the termination and goal change petitions

underlying the instant appeal. DHS requested termination of Mother’s 

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b). 

After multiple continuances, the juvenile court held a termination and 

goal change hearing on December 19, 2023. Mother did not attend the 

hearing, but her interests were represented by Counsel. Children were 

represented by legal counsel, as well as their guardian ad litem (GAL). The 

court heard testimony from Stephanie Reilly, CUA case manager. At the close 

of the hearing, the juvenile court granted DHS’s petition and entered decrees

terminating Mother’s parental rights to Children pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). In separate orders, the juvenile court 

changed Children’s permanency goals to adoption.

Mother filed timely notices of appeal from the termination decrees and 

goal change orders, as well as contemporaneous Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) 

concise statements of errors complained of on appeal.4 The juvenile court 

filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.

Before reaching the substantive merits of this appeal, we address 

Counsel’s application to withdraw. See In re S.M.B., 856 A.2d at 1237 

(stating “this Court may not review the merits of the underlying issues until 

____________________________________________

4 This Court sua sponte consolidated Mother’s appeals.
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we address counsel’s request to withdraw”). To withdraw from representation 

under Anders, counsel must

1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after 

making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has 

determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy 

of the Anders brief to the appellant; and 3) advise the appellant 

that he or she has the right to retain private counsel or raise 

additional arguments that the appellant deems worthy of the 

court’s attention.

In re J.D.H., 171 A.3d 903, 907 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation and brackets 

omitted). Counsel must also “attach to [a] petition to withdraw a copy of the 

letter sent to the[] client advising him or her of their rights.” Commonwealth 

v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).

Additionally, a proper Anders brief must 

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that 

counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth 

counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state 

counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. 

Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling 

case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion 

that the appeal is frivolous.

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009).

Instantly, Counsel filed a petition to withdraw stating he filed the 

Anders brief on the same date. Petition to Withdraw, 3/26/24, ¶ 2. In the 

Anders brief, Counsel stated he “made a conscientious examination of the 

record” and concluded Mother’s appeal is frivolous. See Anders Brief at 12, 

14. Counsel attached to the Anders brief a copy of the letter he sent to 

Mother, which advised Mother of her right to retain new counsel or proceed 
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pro se to raise any other issues she deems worthy of this Court’s attention. 

Id., Exhibit A.5 Mother did not retain separate counsel or file a response 

raising additional issues.

Counsel’s Anders brief (a) summarizes the procedural history and facts 

of the case with citations to the record; (b) identifies four issues that could 

arguably support Mother’s appeal; and (c) explains why the appeal is frivolous. 

Accordingly, Counsel has complied with the requirements of Anders and 

Santiago. Thus, we “undertake an independent examination of the record to 

determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous.” In re S.M.B., 856 A.2d at 

1237.

The Anders brief raises the following issues:

1. Whether the [juvenile] court committed reversible error when 

it involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights and changed 

the goal [to] adoption where such determinations were not 

supported by clear and convincing evidence under the Adoption 

Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8)[?]

2. Whether the [juvenile] court committed reversible error when 

it involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights and changed

the goal [to] adoption without giving primary consideration to the 

effect that the termination would have on the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs of the child as required by the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)[?]

3. Whether the trial court erred because the evidence was 

overwhelming and undisputed that Mother demonstrated a 

____________________________________________

5 The letter does not contain proof of service. The certificate of service 

accompanying the petition to withdraw (to which the letter was originally 

attached) indicates Mother was served with the petition. Taken together, we 

conclude Counsel satisfied the notice requirements of Anders.
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genuine and sincere, persistent, and unrelenting effort to maintain 

a parent-child relationship with [Children?]

4. Whether Mother was unable to attend the termination hearing 

due to no fault of her own[?]

Anders Brief at 6 (some capitalization modified).

We address Mother’s first three claims together.6 First, Mother argues 

DHS failed to establish grounds for termination under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), because she completed her reunification 

objectives. See Anders Brief at 15-21. Mother also challenges termination 

under Section 2511(b) and asserts she and Children share a bond. See id. at 

21-22.

Children’s GAL counters the juvenile court properly terminated Mother’s 

parental rights. See generally GAL’s Brief at 12-18. Children’s GAL 

highlights Mother’s failure to visit with Children and address her mental health 

concerns. Id. at 13-14. The GAL also claims there is no parental bond 

between Mother and Children. Id. at 17-18.

In considering Mother’s claims, we recognize

appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the 

decree of the termination court is supported by competent 

evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must 

accept the orphans’ court’s findings of fact and credibility 

determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the 

____________________________________________

6 The Anders brief does not include a separate argument concerning the third 

claim. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (providing the argument section of an appellate 

brief “shall be divided into as many parts as there are questions to be 

argued”). Because Mother’s third claim challenges the termination decrees, 

we will address all three claims together.
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orphans’ court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, 

an appellate court may not disturb the orphans’ court’s ruling 

unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.

An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the 

reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the 

facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court 

may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration 

of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or illwill. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial 

courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple 

hearings.

In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, the orphans’ 

court must balance the parent’s fundamental right to make 

decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her 

child with the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care, 

protection, and support. Termination of parental rights has 

significant and permanent consequences for both the parent and 

child. As such, the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving 

party to establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing 

evidence, which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and 

convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, 

without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.

Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-30 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citations and 

quotation marks omitted).

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which provides for a bifurcated analysis. First, the juvenile court 

“must focus on the parent’s conduct” relative to the enumerated ground for 

termination set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1)-(11). Id. at 830. If the 

court finds grounds for termination under Section 2511(a), it must then assess 

the evidence relative to the child’s needs and welfare under Section 2511(b), 

“giving primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional 

needs and welfare of the child.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).
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Here, the juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights to Children 

under Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). This Court may affirm the 

juvenile court’s decision to terminate parental rights if we agree with its 

determination concerning any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as 

Section 2511(b). See In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1215 (Pa. 

Super. 2015). We address Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide, in 

relevant part:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his 

physical or mental well-being and the condition and causes of 

the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. ...

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(2), the petitioner must 

prove “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 

that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without 
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essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” In re

A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 443 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted). Grounds for 

termination under this subsection “are not limited to affirmative misconduct, 

but concern parental incapacity that cannot be remedied.” Id.; see also In 

re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“[S]ubsection (a)(2) does 

not emphasize a parent’s refusal to perform parental duties, but instead 

emphasizes the child’s present and future need for essential parental care, 

control of subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being.” 

(citation omitted)). “Parents are required to make diligent efforts toward the 

reasonably prompt assumption of full parental duties.” In re C.M.K., 203 

A.3d 258, 262 (Pa. Super. 2019).

Instantly, the juvenile court found that DHS established the statutory 

grounds for termination under subsection 2511(a)(2):

The evidence established that “incapacity” and “refusal” under 

2511(a)(2) existed given that Mother failed to demonstrate a 

concrete desire or ability to care for Children. Mother has failed 

to adequately complete her single case plan objectives throughout 

the life of this case. Despite having over six years to do so, Mother 

failed to successfully engage in mental health and individual 

treatment[;] she failed to maintain employment[;] and [she]

failed to maintain stable and appropriate housing. There was no 

evidence of Mother’s treatment status or mental health status. 

Mother failed to complete her domestic violence counseling and 

maintains contact with violent paramours. There was testimony 

that Mother was in a domestic violence situation with [Father] and 

had to flee Pennsylvania. Moreover, the evidence established that 

“neglect” existed given that Mother has failed to concern herself 

with [C]hildren’s medical, education, and therapeutic needs. 

Mother’s visitation schedule has been supervised at [DHS] for the 
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last six years. During Mother’s supervised visits, Mother 

Facetimed ... [F]ather[,] which raises a concern due to their history 

of domestic violence. Visits are at Children’s discretion and they 

have declined visits with Mother for at least three months. 

Juvenile Court Opinion, 3/12/24, at 8-9 (citations to record omitted).

During the December 19, 2023, termination hearing, DHS offered the 

testimony of Ms. Reilly, CUA’s case manager. Ms. Reilly explained that DHS 

received a GPS report regarding Children. N.T., 12/19/23, at 7. Ms. Reilly 

testified that DHS was concerned with Mother’s mental health since the start 

of its involvement with the family. Id. at 8. Mother’s case plan objectives 

are: 1) visitation with Children; 2) verify housing and income; 3) comply with 

CUA, including domestic violence counseling; and 4) complete PCE 

recommendations, including individual therapy and completion of a psychiatric 

examination. Id. at 9.

Concerning Mother’s mental health objective, Ms. Reilly testified that 

she received no documentation establishing Mother had completed treatment. 

Id. at 10. Ms. Reilly explained:

[Mother] had provided me information regarding therapy. When 

I attempted to contact that therapist, they stated that they could 

confirm she was not currently ... their client. I was also able to 

obtain documentation from Signature Health, which is where 

[Mother] had told me last year she was receiving mental health 

[treatment]. The only documentation I received from them was 

a documentation of an intake, but no further treatment.

Id. (paragraph break omitted). Ms. Reilly opined that Mother’s failure to 

undergo mental health treatment is a barrier to reunification with Children. 

Id. 
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Ms. Reilly also testified she was unable to confirm that Mother completed 

domestic violence counseling. Id. at 11. Mother “forwarded [to Ms. Reilly] 

an email that she received that laid out domestic violence classes through 

Jewish Family Services.” Id. at 22. However, neither Mother nor Jewish 

Family Services supplied confirmation that Mother completed the class. Id. 

Further, Mother lives in Ohio. Id. at 12. DHS referred Mother to Ohio 

Children and Youth Services for a home assessment, but the Ohio agency was 

not able to complete an assessment. Id. Ms. Reilly acknowledged a video 

call with Mother during which Mother “walked through a residence that she 

states is her home in Ohio.” Id. at 22. Mother also failed to provide evidence 

of employment. Id. at 12.

Regarding visitation, Ms. Reilly testified that following the denial of 

DHS’s first termination petition, Mother’s visits with Children were 

inconsistent. Id. at 17; see also id. (“[I]n September of [20]21, [Mother 

had] missed four consecutive visits, which resulted in a letter being sent to 

her stating ... how important it is to visit consistently.”). Ms. Reilly stated that 

Mother had participated in some virtual visits with Children. Id. at 22. 

The visits would consist of [C]hildren asking for things. Because 

Mother would actually [order food delivery] to [C]hildren, which 

was completely unnecessary, but she wanted to do that. So it 

became: What are you going to get for us today? That would be 

the quality of the visitation.

Id. Ms. Reilly testified that Children vocalized their opposition to participating 

in visits with Mother. Id. at 13. In particular, D.T.J.F. “had always been vocal 
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about not wanting to go on visits, but he would eventually comply.... Following 

some visits, [D.T.J.F.] would have bedwetting....” Id. 

Our review confirms the juvenile court’s findings are supported by the 

record, and free of legal error. We recognize that the juvenile court denied 

the August 2021 termination petitions because Mother had made some 

progress toward her mental health objectives. However, in the time following 

the denial of the previous petition, Mother’s efforts have remained stagnant 

at best. Mother offered no documentation of her participation in mental health 

treatment or domestic violence counseling. Mother also moved out of state, 

where DHS was unable to assess her home. The record reflects that Mother’s 

participation in visits with Children is inconsistent, and Children do not want 

to visit with Mother. Thus, we discern no error in the juvenile court’s 

determination that DHS proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights was warranted under Section 

2511(a)(2).

We now turn to Section 2511(b). “The plain language of Section 

2511(b) clearly mandates that, in assessing the petition to terminate parental 

rights, the primary consideration must be the child’s developmental, physical 

and emotional needs and welfare.” In the Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 

1105 (Pa. 2023) (quotation marks omitted). This Court has repeatedly stated 

that “[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved 

in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.W.U., Jr., 33 
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A.3d 1, 6 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). “[T]he court must consider 

whether a natural parental bond exists between child and parent, and whether 

termination would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.” 

Interest of: J.R.R., 229 A.3d 8, 12-13 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted).

The Section 2511(b) inquiry must also include consideration 

of other important factors such as: the child’s need for 

permanency and length of time in foster care ...; whether the child 

is in a preadoptive home and bonded with foster parents; and 

whether the foster home meets the child’s developmental, 

physical, and emotional needs, including intangible needs of love, 

comfort, security, safety, and stability.

K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113 (footnote and citations omitted).

Regarding Children’s best interests under Section 2511(b), the juvenile 

court found as follows:

Children would not suffer irreparable emotional harm if Mother’s 

parental rights were terminated. There was compelling testimony 

that [] Children would not suffer harm if Mother’s parental rights 

were terminated[,] and Children were significantly bonded with 

their kinship caregiver[, Grandmother].... Children refer to 

[Grandmother] as “Mother[,]” and look to her for care, support, 

and protection. [Grandmother] meets Children’s educational and 

medical needs, and provides them with love, stability, and 

support. [C]hildren have been with [Grandmother] throughout 

their placement in out-of-home care. [Grandmother’s] home is 

pre-adoptive, and it would be in [] Children’s best interest that 

they are freed for adoption.... There are no signs of significant 

harm from Mother not visiting with Children over the past 90 days. 

Children have stated they want to remain with [G]randmother 

with a goal of adoption. In determining that termination would 

best serve the needs the welfare of [C]hildren, [the juvenile court] 

considered that Mother has not been able to meet [C]hildren’s 

emotional, physical, and developmental needs for over six years 

prior to the termination hearing. ...
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Juvenile Court Opinion, 3/12/24, at 12-13 (citations to record omitted); see 

also N.T., 12/19/23, at 9, 15-16, 18.

The juvenile court’s conclusion is amply supported by the record. 

Children have been in Grandmother’s care for a majority of their lives. 

Grandmother provides for Children’s educational and medical needs, and 

provides them with love, stability, safety, and support. Additionally, the GAL 

testified that Children wish to be adopted by Grandmother, and they do not 

want contact with Mother. Id. at 27-28. As the court’s findings are supported 

by the record, and we otherwise discern no error, Mother is not entitled to 

relief. We affirm the orders terminating Mother’s parental rights.7

In her final claim, Mother argues she did not attend the termination 

hearing because her bus trip was canceled. Anders Brief at 22. 

Mother does not contest that she received adequate notice of the 

termination hearing. Nor does Mother assert that the juvenile court otherwise 

failed to afford her due process. Rather, as Counsel acknowledges in the 

Anders brief, Counsel informed the court at the start of the hearing that 

Mother’s trip had been canceled. See Anders Brief at 22; see also N.T., 

12/19/23, at 5. Counsel stated that notwithstanding Mother’s absence, he 

____________________________________________

7 Mother does not separately challenge the orders changing Children’s 

permanency goal to adoption. We note that any such challenge would be 

moot in light of our disposition. See Interest of D.R.-W., 227 A.3d 905, 917 

(Pa. Super. 2020) (father’s challenge to child’s goal change was moot after 

this Court affirmed the orphans’ court’s termination decrees).
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was ready to proceed with the hearing. N.T., 12/19/23, at 6. We also observe 

Counsel ably represented Mother’s interests throughout the hearing. Thus, 

Mother’s final claim merits no relief.

Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the juvenile court decrees

terminating Mother’s parental rights to Children, and the orders changing 

Children’s permanency goal to adoption. Further, as our independent 

examination of the record reveals no other non-frivolous claims that Mother 

can raise, we grant Counsel permission to withdraw from his representation 

of Mother.

Petition to withdraw granted. Decrees and orders affirmed.

Date: 8/07/2024