Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed July 23 , 2024.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 23

- 00444

- CV

MEHRAN RAHBAR, M.D., AND FARINAZ ARBAB, M.D. , Appellant s
V.
SOUTHAMPTON CIVIC CLUB , Appellee

On Appeal from the 151st District Court Harris C ou n ty, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2022

- 05545

MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellants Mehran Rahbar and Farinaz Arbab challenge the trial court ’ s summary judgment and award of attorney ’ s fees in favor of appelle e Southampton Civi c Club ( “ SHCC ”). The Rahbars 1 argu e that the trial court erred in interpreting a deed restriction to prohibit them from renting their h om e to persons ot her than family mem bers ; that SHCC is not the proper entity to enforce the subject deed

1 The parties ref e r to appellants as the Rahbars, so we do as well.2 restriction against t hem; and that the trial cour t abused its discretion i n aw arding SHCC attorney ’ s fees. W e overrule the Rahbars ’ issues and affirm the trial court ’ s judgment. Background
The Rahbars own a lot with improve m ents (the “ Pro perty ” ) located in Southampton Place Addit ion ( “ Southampton ” or th e “ s ub division ” ) , Blo ck Number 42, Lot Number 17, known as 2135 Bissonnet Street, Houston, Texas 77005

. The

s ubdivision was placed on the m arket for home build ers in 1923, following the

exe cution of a trust agreement between E.H. Fleming, i ts developer, a n d the San Jacinto Trust Company, trustee. A reference incorporating the trust agreement and restrictions ( “ Basic Restrictions ” ) wa s place d in each deed to lot s sold in the subdivision , b inding all l ot owners to the Basic Restrictions

. The Ba sic Restrict ions were effective for an initial term of fifty years a nd subsequently extended in 1973 and in 2013

. E stablished as an unincorpo rated civic association in 1929 , SHCC exists to preserve and protect th e Basic Restric tions and to promote the maintenance, bea utification, and welfare of the subdivision

. SHCC was incorporated under the Texas Non

- Prof it Corporation Act in 2004. See Tex. Bu s. Orgs. Code § § 22.101
et seq

. In 201 1, SHCC filed a docum ent entitl ed “Notice Relating to Deed Restrictions Summary for S out h ampton Place ” (the “Notice ”) in the Harris County property records. The Notice included SHCC ’ s summary of certain restrictions , such as th ose re lating to se t back line s and alley easements

. The Not ic e directed interested persons to SHCC ’ s internet web site for a “detailed summary” of the applicable deed restrictions, as well as compliance procedures

.3 The Rahbars pur chased the Property in 2010 and immediately began renti ng the ho use for one
- year terms t o as many as five unrelated persons , usually student s at tending a nearby university. In 2022, S H CC sued the Rahbars for violating the following deed restriction : No ap artment house, or duplex will be permitted in the Addit ion ; the object of this provisi on being to prohibit multiple housing through out the e nti r e addition. SHCC alleged that the Rahbars were leasing the Property to several, unrelated
persons. SHCC sought decla ration s under the Texas Declaratory Judgment Act ( “ DJA ” ) that the Basic Restricti on s w ere valid and enforceable, that the Basic Restric tion s prohibit the Rahbars from using the P roperty for mul tiple housing
purposes or for any purpo se other than as a residence for a single family , a nd that the Basic Restr ictions pr ohibit the Rahbars fr om utilizing the P roperty primarily for financial gain rat her than a s a single

- family residence . SHCC also sought permanent injunctive relief and attorn ey ’ s fees.
The Rahbars filed a counterclaim to quiet title , a lleging that the Notice was an invalid enc umbrance on their title

. They also sought declar ation s un der the DJA concerning interpre tation of the Basic Restrictions. The parties filed competing motions for s ummary judgment

. In an interlocu t ory ord er, t he trial court found that the Rah bars are boun d by the Basic Restrictions , which prohibit the m from usin g the P roperty for anything other than a single

- family residence . T he court h eld that the Rahbars breached the Basic Restrictions and granted a ma n datory injunction prohibiting them from leasin g,

r enting, or using in an y way the P roperty for multiple h ous ing p urposes or for any purpose other than a s a single

- family residence. In a s eparate order, the court4 dismissed the Rahbars ’ c ounterclaim s . In a final judgment, the tri al court awarded SHCC its attorney ’ s fees. The Rahbars filed a timely appeal.
S tand ard of Revie w
We review a trial court ’ s ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo. Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Ass ’ n , Inc. , 556 S.W.3d 27 4, 278 (Tex. 2018); Texan Land & Cattle II, Ltd. v. ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. , 579 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. Ap p.

— H ouston [14th D ist.] 2019, no pet.). To prevail on a traditional motion for summary judgment, t he movant must show that no genuine issue of materia l fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment a s a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). When bot h pa rties move f or su mmary judgment on the same issue and the trial court grants one motion and de n ies the other, we consider the summary judgment evid ence presented by both sides, determine all questio ns presente d, and, if we determine that the trial cour t er red, render the j udgment the trial court should have rendered. Tarr , 556 S.W.3d at 278; see a l so Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Wedel , 557 S.W.3d 554, 557 (Tex. 2018) (“A declaratory judgment gran ted on a tr aditional motion for summary judgment is re view ed de novo.” ). Analysis
The Rahbars raise three issues on appeal. First, the y argue that the t rial court erred by granting declaratory and injunct ive relief regarding the Basic Restrictions ’ prohib ition ag ain st using the P r o perty for anything other th a n a s a residenc e for a single family. Second, they argue that the trial court erred by dismissin g the Rahbars ’ counterclaim s . Third, they challenge the trial court ’ s award of a ttorney ’ s fee s.5 A. SHC C ’ s Motion for Summary Judg ment
The summary judgment i n fa vor of SHCC requires this court to review the trial court ’ s interpretation of the Basic Restri c tions.
This is not the first occasion for a court to interpret the exact deed restriction at iss ue. In the first case to address the issue , a homeowner , Par do, rented her house to a partnership for business purposes. Pardo v. Southampton Civ ic Club , 239 S.W. 2d 141, 142 (Tex. Civ. App.

— Galveston 1951, w rit ref ’ d). SHCC sued Pardo for violating the Basic R estrictions and to enjoin her from using or ca using h e r pr operty to be used f or any purpose other than as a dwellin g and residen ce for a single fa mily. Id. T h e court of appeals concluded that it was undisputed that the lots in Sou thampton “ were restricte d to the use for single family d welling and for [certa in] business purposes. ” I d. at 143. Specifically, all of the lots reserved for residential use “ were desi gna t ed and sold as integral parts of a ‘ high class exclusive residential ’ area and were restric ted to the exclusive us e of a residence of a single fa mily

. ” Id. at 144. Accor di ngly, the court of appeals affirmed the injunction against Pardo.
The next case wa s Rudy v. Southampton Civic Club , 271 S.W.2d 431 (Tex. App.

— Waco 1954, writ ref ’ d n.r.e.)

. The Rudys erected on their lot a garage apartment as a sep a ra te structure from their dwelling house and rented it to persons other th an members of their family. Id. at 432. SHCC sued to enjoin the Rudys from using or permitting the use of their lot for any pur pose other than a single

family dwelling a n d par ticu larly from using or permitting to be used the garage apartment for the purpose of hous ing any person other than members of the Ru dy family

. Id. The court of appeals followed t he Pardo court ’ s “ express [] [ holding] that the use of the lot involved ‘ mus t be limited to a single family r esidence. ’ ” Id.6 at 433 (quoting Pa rdo , 239 S .W.2d at 145 ). Thus, the co urt concluded that SHCC

was entitled to inj unctive reli ef as a matter of law.

In Southampton C ivic Club v. Couch , 322 S.W.2d 516 , 517 (Tex. 1959) , SHC C so ught to restrain a homeowner , Cou ch , from renting a room or room s in his residence for lo dging. Most of the lodgers were s tudent s

. Id

. The court held that t he renting of a room or rooms in a pr ivat e residence, which is merely incidental to its use a s a family residence, does not v i olate a restriction limiting the

us e of the property to a single

- family residence

. Id. at 518. The court reasoned that the re i s no language in the Basi c Restrictions tha t specifically forbids the renting of a room or room s , a nd that a family home in which a spare room is inciden tally rented is nonetheless a single

- family residence. Id. at 519. The co urt remanded the case to th e tr ial court for a new trial to determine the nature and extent of the use of the defendants ’ p remi ses. Id

. at 520. The court st a ted that i f the e vide nce conclusively established that a particular defendant was operating a

roo ming or boar ding house as a bu siness or was “ using his dwellin g house pri marily as a source of financial gain rather than a s a residence for himself and his f

amily and domestic ser v ants, that activity should be enjoined. ” Id.

In Ullrich v. Southampton C ivic Club , 373 S.W.2d 511, 51 1

- 1 2 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 1963, no wri t) , the Ullrichs re nted the ir garage apartment to a univer sity student , and SHCC sought and o b tained injunctive re lief to enjoin the Ullrichs from doing so

. The court of appeals affirmed t he trial court ’ s injunction beca use the “ the evidence established that the Ullrichs were rentin g, for financial gain, sp ace o n th eir property for use, and used , as a housekeeping un it ” and thus were violating the Basic Restrictions. Id. at 513.

In South ampton Civic Club v. Foxworth , 550 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th D ist.] 1977, writ ref ’ d n.r.e.) , SHCC allege d the F oxwo rths were7 renting an apartment , located upstairs fr om their unattached garage, to a university student for profit , violatin g the Basic Re stricti ons

. O u r cour t , f ollowing Couch ,
conc luded that t h e evidence establishe d that the Fo xworths rented the gara ge f or financial gain in violation of the restrictions. Id. at 153

- 54

. The court rendered judgment that the F oxworths be enjoined from r enting the garag e apartm ent as a

sou rce of financial gain. Id. at 15 4. Finally, in Fink elstein v. S o uthampton Civic C lub , 675 S.W.2d 271, 272 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref ’ d n

. r

. e

. ) , the property owner, Finkelstein , without a valid partition of the original lot , attempted to subdivide her lot into two lots, each with its own separate residential structur e

— one of w h ich was a frame building that F inkelstein had been renting to tena nts . The court concluded that th is violated the Basic Restrictions ’ multiple

- housi ng pro vision : Summary judgm ent evidence showed that appellant Carol Finkelstein rented out t he t w o
- st ory wooden frame building to two young women not related to her or to each ot her, a clear violatio n of the prohibition agains t multiple family housing. Absent a valid partition of t he original lot, rental of either building to a tenant violates t he m u ltip le housing prohibition so long as the other building is occupied by a fam ily. Appellants have, in effect, sought to nu lli fy the restriction ’ s prohibition against multiple housing by simply creating multiple lots, while ignoring the limitations o n par t itio n imposed by the two earlier discussed restrictions. Such an attempted res ubdivision constitutes an invalid infringeme nt o n the restriction ’ s prohibition against multiple housing.
I

d. at 277

- 78.
Th e foregoing authority makes cl ear that the Rahba r s ha v e vi olated the Basic Restrictions by renting thei r house for fina ncial gain to persons unrelated to them

. The Rahbars a r gue that the definiti on of “ family ” is too restrictive for moder n usage, but we , as an intermedia te appe llate court, decline to deviat e fro m8 esta blished precedent, and we are further persuaded by the uniform holding s of our sister courts

. See Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williams , 868 S .W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam) (ex plaining that Texas courts are obligated to follow higher Texas cour ts and the United States Suprem e Court) ; In re Mittelsted , 661 S.W.3d 639, 6 58 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2023 , orig. proceeding ) (u nder the doctrine of horizontal stare decisis, a court owes respect to its own precedents ; t hree

- judge panels of a cour t must follow materially indistinguishable decisions of earlier panels of th e same court unless a higher authority has superseded that p rior deci sion ) (citing Mitschke v. Borromeo , 645 S.W.3d 251, 256 (Tex. 2022) ).
We overrule the Rahbars ’ first issue

. B. The Rahbars ’ Motion for Summary Judgment
In their second iss ue, the Rahbars c onten d that the trial court erred by dismissing their counterclaim

. According to the Rahbars, SHCC is not a property

owners ’ as s ociation , and the Notice is not a valid dedic a tory instrument governing the Rahbars’ property. Chapter 202 of t he Property Cod e governs construct ion a nd enforcement of restrictive co venants

. See Tex. Prop. Co de § § 202 .002 et se q

. A p roperty owners ’ association or other representative designat e d by a n owner of real property may initiate, defend, or intervene in litigation or an administrative proceedin g a ffecting the enforcement of a re stric tive covenant or the protection, preservation , or operation of the property covered by the dedicatory ins t r ument

. Id. § 202.004(b). For purposes of chapter 202, “ p roperty owners ’ association” means an i n corporated or unincorporated assoc iatio n owned by or whose members consist primarily of the owners of the property covered by the dedicatory inst r ument and through which the owners, or the board of directors or sim ilar governing body, manage or regulate t h e residential subdivision, planned unit development,9 condominium or townhouse regime , or similar planned development. Id. § 202.001(2).
S HCC est a blished th at it i s an in corporated association whose members

c onsist of the owners of property covered by the dedicatory ins tru me nt. The dedica tory instrument is the original 1923 deed r estrict ions, which were extended in 1973 and 20 13. 2 SHCC produced i t s articles of inc orporat ion, which state that SHCC is a non

- profit co rporation organized to p reserve, maintai n , and protect the deed restriction s applicable to S outha mpton Place Addition , and to take all action necessary to promote the health, safety , and wel fa r e of the su bdivisi on . The corporation has one class of members, open to the residents or pr operty owners in
t he subdivision who pay annual dues

. Ac cording to SHCC ’ s bylaws , it is governed by a 12

- member board of directors , which has the p ower to, among o ther acti on s , enfo rce by legal means the provisions of the deed restrictions and the bylaws. Thus, S HCC is c o n sidered a property owner s ’ associ ation for purposes of chapter 202 and may initiate or defend litigation affecting the enforcement of Southampto n Pl ace Add i tion ’ s deed restrictions

. Id. § 202.004( b). The Rahbars assert that SHCC “ wrongfully and mislead i ngly claims its authority to regul ate t he subdivision , ” but they did not produce any evidence controverting SHCC ’ s articles of i ncorporation or b y law s.

2 “Dedicatory ins trument” means each document governin g the establ ishm en t, maint en ance, or operation of a residen tial subdivision, planned unit development, condominium or townhouse regi me, or any similar p lanned development. The term include s a declaration or similar ins trument subjecting real property to: ( A) restrict ive co venants, b ylaws, or similar instruments g overning the administration or operation of a property owners ’ assoc iatio n; ( B) properly ado p ted rules and regulations of the prop erty owners ’ association; or ( C) all lawful amendments to the coven ants, bylaws , in st ruments, r ules, or regulations. T ex. Prop . Code § 202.001(1).10 We t urn to the second part of the Ra hbars ’ argument, whi ch is that SHCC filed an invalid record ation in the cou nty deed records. In 2011, SHCC fil ed the Notice for the pur pose of “ providi ng information relating to the covenants, conditions and rest r ict ions ( ‘ Restric tions ’ ) applicable to the property w ith in Southampton Place

. ” T he N otice contains a reci tal that Southampton Civic Club , Inc. , as successor to the uninco rporated S outhampton Ci vic Club, has “ [o]ver the past 80 years . . . administered an d en forced the Res trictions for the benefit of the owners of property within South ampton. ” In the N ot ice, SHC C directed interested persons to its internet website for a “ detailed summary ” of the applicable deed restrictions, as well as SHCC ’ s compliance p r oce dures.
The N ot ice is not an en cumb rance and does n ot create a cloud of ti tle. Under Texas law, a n encumbr a nce is an interest in realty that diminishes its value and is a burden on its transf e r. City of Dayton v. Allred , 68 S.W.2d 172, 178 (Tex. 1934) ; Na tionwid e of Br yan, Inc. v. Dyer , 969 S.W.2d 518, 521 (Tex. App.

— Austin 19 98, n o pet.). Examples of encumb r ances include liens, claims, easements, and servitudes. Allred , 68 S.W.2d at 178. Deed restrictions, such as the ones here, are also considered enc umbranc es. Le vine v. Turner , 264 S.W.2d 478, 479 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 1954 , wri t d ism ’ d ) ( “ As a ge neral rul e such restrictions as to the use to which premises may be put constitute encumbrance s

. . . . ” ). By filing the N otice, SHCC has ga ined no right o r i nterest in the Rahbars ’ propert y . The N otice does not diminish the value of t he Rahbar s ’ propert y , nor do e s it burden the transfer of title. The N otice merely provides a written summary of a n already existing encumbrance

— i.e., the Basic R estrictions. Th e N otice is no t an encumbrance on title. See, e.g. , Dyer , 969 S.W.2d at 521 (arbitra tion clause in home s a les contract did not constitute an enc umbrance on property).11 We overrule the Rahbars ’ second issue.
C. Attorney ’ s Fees

In t h eir third is sue, the R ahb ars chal lenge the award of atto rney ’ s fees to SHCC

. Attorney Linda Glover testified by affidavit regardin g fees incurred in prosecuting SHCC ’ s affirmative claims. Glover also testified rega rding fees incurred by two other lawyers in defending against the Rahbars ’ c oun terclaims. All three attorneys submitted contemporaneous billing records.
The Rahb ars attac k several aspects of the fee award, but they do not argue substantively that the awar d lacks legally or factually sufficient eviden tiary support

. We address each o f the Rahbars ’ arguments in turn.
1. Resolution by trial court instead of jury

In the f irs t part of their issue, the Rahbars assert in a heading that they

“ disputed and controve rted the basis, reasonableness, necessity and amount of
att o rney ’ s fees c laimed by SHCC for prosecuting its claims. ” However, the substance o f the argument is that the t rial court erred by deciding the fee issue rather than submitting the question of atto rney ’ s fees to a jury , so we limit our discussion to thi s p o int. See Tex . R. A pp. P. 38.1.

T he Rahbars contend that they made a timely jury demand but the cou rt

“ summa r ily ” awarded SHCC its attorney ’ s fees as a matter of law. SHCC responds that the Rahb a rs waived their complaint b y failing to timely object to t h e tri al court ’ s dec ision to hear the attorney ’ s fees issue rather than a jury. We agree with SHCC. “When a p arty has perfected its right to a jury trial but the trial court instead proceeds to tr ial without a jury, the party must either object on the rec o rd to the tri al cou rt’s action or indicate affirmatively in the record it intends to stand on its12 pe rfected r i ght to a jury trial.” Arredondo v. Betancourt , 383 S.W.3d 730, 746 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) ; accord also Bank of Houston. v

. Whi te , 737 S.W.2d 387, 388 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, orig. proceedin g) (holding that t rial cour t was not authorized to remove case from jury docket once it has been properly placed t hereon if “any party adversely affected objects to such rem o val”)

. The r eco rd here does not reflect that the Rahbars either affirmatively obj ected to the trial court ’ s d ecision to remove the attorney ’ s fee issue from a jury ’ s consideration or indicated th at they intended to stand on their right to a jury trial of this issue

. A t the hearing on SHCC ’ s fe e application, at which Dr. Mehran Rahbar appeared pro s e an d SHCC appeared re prese n ted by counsel , the judge asked whether SHCC intended to o ffer testimony or rely on th e submitted affidavits. SHCC responded that it wou ld rely o n the affidavits. The jud ge agreed to this, saying, “ Okay. Then I will gi ve you a fe w minutes to start, and then I will let Dr. Rahbar respond. Okay? ” SHCC ’ s counsel indicated her agreement, b ut Dr. Rah bar did not answer

. After SHCC presented argumen t and the judge invited Dr. Rahbar to respond , Dr. Rahbar said:
I don ’ t really unde rsta nd why we ’ re here today because e verything has been in writing and it has been very inconvenient for me and my case award. So I ’ m not going to take the Court ’ s time by r epeat ing what I have already responded in my affidavit and I presented the respons es a nd everything and I ass u me that yo u have read and I ’ m sure you have read all of them. He also argued that the case law relied on by SHCC was inapplicable. At th e end of t he h earing, the judge st ated, “ I will take it under advisement and make a ruling a nd sign an order as to what amount, if any , of attorney ’ s fees will be awarded. ” Dr. Rahbar made no objection.13 Based on the record, we conclude that the Ra hbars waived t h e ir appellate complaint regarding the trial court a ct ing as fact finder

. See Walker v . Walker , 619 S.W.2d 196 , 198 (Tex. App.

— Tyle r 1981, writ ref ’ d n.r.e.) (explaining t hat even if jury demand wa s made and jury fee paid, party waives right to ju ry when h e fai ls to object to proceeding without a jury when the case is called to trial; after the trial court rules a d versely to a party, he cannot complain that he was entitled to have a jury, not the co urt, decide the fact question).
In another hea ding in thei r brie f, the Rahbars assert that th eir expert ’ s

“ controverting affidavit ” was adm itted over SHCC ’ s objection s, f or the fact find er to consider. Again, however, the substan ce of this argument is that “ the trial court erred by de nying the jury deter minat i on of th e necessity of SHCC’s counsel’s services, for which the fees were incurred ” and that the “ trial court ’ s de nial of jury tri al was reversible error. ” The Rahbars do not a r gue substantively any f act questions purport edly raised by their expert ’ s aff i da vit

. 2

. Reversal of attorney ’ s fees if merits ruling reversed In another part of their third issue, the Rah bars argue that , if w e reverse the trial court ’ s finding of breach of restrictive covenant, then we should als o reverse the fee award. Beca use w e are not reversing the trial court ’ s summary judgment on any basis, this argument i s moot. Teal Trading & Dev ., L P v. Champee Spri ngs Ranches Prop. Owners Ass ’ n , 534 S.W.3d 558, 595 (Tex. Ap p.

— San An t onio 2017 ) ( “ However, because we are not reversin g the tr ial co urt ’ s judgment with regard to the Non

- A ccess Easement, we need not reverse the award of attorney ’ s fee s. ” ) , aff ’ d , 593 S.W. 3d 324 (Tex. 2020)

.14 3

. SHCC ’ s capac ity and standing to su e
The Rahbar s also contend that they “ disputed and controvert ed SH C C ’ s capa city to sue ” and that the fee award wa s in error because SHCC “ has no justicia ble, propriet ary interes t in any specific property or propertie s within the Southampto n subdivision. ” This argumen t challenges both capacity and standing, which ar e dis t in ct con cept s. Nootsie, Ltd. v. Wi lliamson C n ty. Appraisal Dist. , 925 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. 1996) (“A plainti ff h as standing when it is personally aggrieved, regardless of whether it is acting with le gal authority; a party has capacity when it has t he le g al autho rity to act, regardless of w hether it has a justiciable interest in the controversy.”). Standing is a ne cessary component of subject

- matter jurisdiction and is determined at the time suit is filed in the trial court. Tex. Ass ’ n of Bus. v. Tex. A ir Contr ol Bd. , 852 S.W.2d 440, 445

- 46 (Tex. 1 993). An association has standing to sue when it satisfies a th ree
- prong test: (1) the members must otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (2) the interests it seeks to protect m ust be
german e to t he organ ization ’ s purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested may require the partici pati on of individual members in the lawsuit. See id. at 447. The first requirement “should not be interpreted to impose unreasonable obstac les t o a ssocia tional representation.” Id. “Ordinar ily, any person entitled to benefit under a restrictive covenant may enforce it.” Anders on v. The New Property Owners ’ Ass ’ n of Newport, Inc. , 122 S.W.3d 378, 38 4 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2003, pet. denied)

. “[G ] en erally , an interested property owner may enf orce a restrictive covenan t.” Id. at 384

- 85 (citing Giles v. Ca rden as , 697 S.W.2d 422, 427 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 1985, writ ref ’ d n.r.e.)). The record

r eflects that SHCC is a Texas nonprofit corporatio n who s e member s include15 property owners in the s ubdi vision. Under the Basic Restrictions , the right to

“ enforce suc h re strictions . . . shall be vested in the respective lot owners .” SHCC members, as prope rty owners, would have standing to bring this sui t to e nf orce d eed restrictions. See id. at 385. Ac cordingly, SHCC satisfies the first requirement for standing as an a ssociation. See id. The record reflects that the primary purpose of SHCC is to preserv e, maintain, and protect the deed restrictions co verin g S outham pton Place Addition and to take all ac tion necessary to promote the health, safety, and welfare of the sub division

. Because the interests SHCC seeks to protect in its suit are germane to the a ssociation ’ s purpose, it satisfies the second pro ng of th e test

. See Tex. Ass ’ n of Bus. , 852 S.W.2d at 447

- 4 8; An derson , 122 S.W.3d at 385. Finally, the claims SHCC ass erts and the relief it requests do not require the participation of any individual memb ers. See Anderson , 122 S.W.3d at 385. Whe n , as here , an assoc iation seeks injunctive relief, it is reasonable to suppose that the relief sought will inure to the benef it of the injured members. See Tex. Ass ’ n of Bus. , 852 S.W.2d at 448; Anderson , 122 S. W.3d at 385. SHCC did not need to prove the indi vidu a l c ircums tances of its members to obtain such r elief. See Tex. Ass ’ n of Bus. , 852 S.W.2d at 448; Anderson , 12 2 S.W .3d at 385. Having met all three requirements, we conclude that SHCC , as an associatio n, had standing to bring suit against the Rahbars for all egedly violating the Basic Restrictions

. Wit h regard to capa city or authority, we have already determined a bove that SHCC had capacity to sue pursuant to section 202.004(b). Garden O aks Maint. Org. v. Chang , 542 S.W.3d 117, 139 n.18 (Tex. App.

— Hou ston [14 th Dis t.] 2017 , no pet. ) ( “ An entity meeting the definition of a POA under chapter 202 also has capacity to sue under section 202.004(b). ” ).16 In this same part of their issue in which they argue that SHCC lacke d a justiciable interest , the Ra hbars a lso a rgu e that SHCC sought only an ad visory opinion for future hypot hetical adjudicatio ns. We disagree. SHCC ’ s li ve pl eading makes clear that it sued the Rahbars for breach of the deed restrictions . SHCC ’ s answer makes clear that it i s de fending against the Rah ba rs ’ request f or declarations. The trial c our t ’ s re solution of these c laims a pplies to the parties at han d and does not constitute an advisory opinion. Lede v. Aycock , 630 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex. Ap p.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref ’ d n.r.e.) ( “An adv is ory opinion is one which does not constitu te specific relief to a litigant or affect legal relations.” ).

4

. P leading
The Rahbars contend that SHCC did not plead for attorney ’ s fees for defending t heir DJA counterclaim

. The purpose of pleadings i s to giv e a dve rse parties notice of each party ’ s cla ims and defenses, as well as notice of the relief sought. Hori zon/C MS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld , 34 S.W.3d 887, 896

- 97 (Tex. 2000); see also Tex. R. Civ. P

. 301 (“ T he judgment o f the court shall conform t o th e pl ead ing s

. ”). Texas follows a “fair noti ce” st andard of pleading, meaning we look to whether the opposing pa rty c an ascertain from the pleading the nature and basic issues of the controversy and what testimony will be releva nt. Daugherty v. Highlan d Ca p ita l
M gmt ., L.P. , No. 05

- 14

- 01215

- CV, 2016 WL 444 6158, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Dallas Aug. 22, 2016, no pet.) (mem. o p.). In its live pleading, SHCC sought declaratory relief under the DJA and expressly soug ht its attorney ’ s fees under the DJ A. This was s uffi c ien t for the t rial court to award attorney ’ s fees to SHCC und er the act

. See, e.g. , Nolte v. Flournoy , 348 S. W.3d 262, 270 n. 3 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2011, pet. denied) (“A party is17 also not required to request attorney ’ s fees with specificity to be el igib l e f or an award under the Declaratory Judgm ents Act, so long a s a general request for attorney ’ s fees exists.”) ; Zur ita v. SVH

- 1 Partners, Ltd. , No. 03

- 10

- 00650

- CV, 2011 WL 6118573, at *8 (Tex. App.

— Aust in Dec. 8, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“ It is undi s put ed tha t AZR sought declaratory relief a gainst the Landlord under the UDJA. Thus, the trial court was aut ho rized to award attorneys’ fees to any party with pleadings requesting them.”).

5

. Ex pert di sclosure The Rahbars argue that SHCC never disclo sed an e xpert to testify as to reasonable fees incurred in defend ing against the Rahbars’ counterclaim s seeking dec larat ory relief. The record establishes otherwise. SHCC disclosed its expert on atto rney ’ s fees by stating in part , “ Ms. Glover is couns el f or S H CC and wi ll offer testimony regarding the necessity and reasonableness of fees and costs paid and incurred by SHCC to prosecute the claims asserted in this lawsuit.” The Rahbars rely on SHCC ’ s u sage of the word

“ p r osecute ” to argue that the associati on d i d n ot dis close Glover as an expert on defe nsive fee s. We disagree. SHCC ’s disclosure provided the Rahbars wit h the general substance of counsel ’ s anticipated testimony. Corey v. Rankin , No. 14

- 17

- 0075 2

- CV, 2018 WL 5914531, at *8 (Tex. App.

— Houston [ 14th Dis t.] No v. 13, 2018 , no pet. ) (mem. op.) ( “ A disclosure identifying an attorney ’ s fees expert and stating tha t the expert will be testifying about the reasonableness and necessity of attorney ’ s fees is sufficient to give the ‘ gene ral substance ’ of th at e x per t ’ s te stimony. ” ).18 6

. Appellate fees
Th e Rahbars argue SHCC did not plead for its prospective attorney ’ s fe es

an d fa iled to disclose any expert to testify as to the reasonableness and necessity of
ap pellate fees. The general rule is that a trial co urt ’ s aw ard of attorney ’ s fees may include
appe llate attorney ’ s fe es. Hunsucker v. Fustok , 238 S.W.3d 421, 431 (Te x. Ap p.

— Houst on [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.); Keith v. Keith , 221 S.W.3d 156, 169 (Tex. App.

— H ouston [1st Dis t.] 2006, no pet.). SHCC ’ s design atio n of Glove r as an expert on attorney ’ s fees gave the Rahba rs sufficient notice of Glover ’ s intended testimony, inclu ding appellate attorney ’ s fees. E.g

. , Corey , 2018 WL 5914531, at *9 ( attorney ’ s testim ony supported award of appellate fees; expert des igna t ion did

n ot purport to limit attorney ’ s te stimony to fees incurred as part of the trial court
proc eedings )

. Furth er, t he Rahbars did not argue below that SHCC ’s evidence of appellate fees was outside the pleadings. Thus, th e issue was tried by cons ent. Se e Mans field v. Mansfield , No. 04

- 18

- 005 51

- CV, 2019 WL 6138984, at *4 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio Nov. 20, 2019, pet. denied) (mem . op.) (“Because [the appellant ’ s] attorn ey did not object to the absence o f any pleadings when the trial court addressed th e i s s ue of an award of appellate attorney ’ s fee s, we hold the issue was tried by consent.”); Sheen v. Sheen , No. 03

- 18

- 0 0358

- CV, 2019 WL 2554570, at *5 (Tex. App.

— Austin Jun e 21, 2019, no pet.) (mem . op.) (i ssue of appellate attorney ’ s fees was tried by co nse n t wh en the appellee ’ s attorney “testified

r egarding his trial and appellate fees without objection”).

* * *19 For the foregoing reasons, we overrule the Rahbar s ’ third issue in its entirety.
Conclusion

We affirm the trial court ’ s judgment.

/s/ Kevin Jewell Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Bourliot, and Pois sant

.