[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-13003

Non-Argument Calendar

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TERRY RIGGINS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CITY OF ATLANTA, 

MICHAEL GEISLER, 

in his individual capacity, 

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-05085-JPB

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Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, WILSON, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Terry Riggins appeals the summary judgment against her 

amended complaint of retaliation in violation of the Georgia Whistleblower Act. See O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(d). Riggins has abandoned 

any challenge she could have made to the dismissal of her complaint of a violation of her right to free speech under the First 

Amendment, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the summary judgment 

against her complaint of fraud. See Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2012). The district 

court ruled that Riggins’s complaint of retaliation was untimely.

See id. § 45-1-4(e)(1). We affirm.

Riggins worked in the Department of Watershed Management for the City of Atlanta. After the Department combined its 

sewer and water departments, some City employees complained 

to officials and to Riggins about potential contamination of the 

clean water system. Riggins failed to report her concerns to a supervisor and repeated the second-hand information during a meeting of the City Council on March 17, 2014. Riggins stated that 

wastewater employees who had been reassigned to the clean water 

department failed to disinfect the gloves, uniforms, and tools they 

had used while working on the sewer system and possibly introduced blood-borne pathogens into the drinking water.

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On June 12, 2014, an investigator interviewed Riggins. The 

investigator questioned Riggins about the water systems and the

remarks she had made during the council meeting. Riggins remarked that the interview was “hostile” and, approximately two 

hours into the interview, she asked for a restroom break, called an 

attorney, and refused to proceed until counsel was present to assist 

her.

The City mailed Riggins three disciplinary letters. On August 15, 2014, the City notified Riggins that she was being placed 

on administrative leave for the duration of the water contamination investigation and faced termination for misconduct, which included “engaging in offensive conduct or language toward the public, supervisory personnel or fellow employees,” and “[w]illful 

making of false statements . . . .” City of Atlanta Code of Ordinances, Ch. 114, art. VI, Div. 3, § 114-528(b)(4), (12), (20). On October 23, 2014, the City rescinded its August notice and informed 

Riggins that she was fired effective November 7, 2014, for making

false statements during her interview in June. See id. On November 

3, 2014, the City sent a final notice that changed the effective date 

of Riggins’s termination to November 11, 2014. See id.

On November 6, 2014, Riggins appealed to and requested a 

hearing before the Civil Service Board. On August 6, 2015, the City 

replaced its Chief Operating Officer, Michael Geisler, with an interim officer, and Riggins learned she had been fired for her remarks during the Council meeting. On November 11, 2015, Riggins sued the City and Geisler in a Georgia court, but in 2018, she 

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voluntarily dismissed the action after the Board modified her discipline from termination to a 30-day dismissal.

On November 3, 2018, Riggins filed in the district court a 

complaint, which she later amended, that alleged she had been 

fired “in retaliation for making disclosures protected under 

O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4.” Riggins alleged that she was fired because “her 

statements led to the public exposure of potentially hazardous and 

illegal practices of the Department of Watershed and [the] City of 

Atlanta.” She also alleged that the City and Geisler “intentionally 

misled [her] by not informing her of the conduct that prompted 

[the] decision to terminate.”

The City and Geisler moved for summary judgment, which 

the district court granted. The district court ruled that Riggins’s 

cause of action for retaliation accrued on November 3, 2014, and 

the one-year statute of limitation expired before she commenced 

an action against the defendants. The district court rejected Riggins’s argument to toll the statutory period on the ground that the 

City and Geisler concealed the reason for her termination. 

We review de novo a summary judgment. See Pelaez v. 

Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 13 F.4th 1243, 1249 (11th Cir. 2021). We view 

the facts and draw all reasonable inferences from those facts in Riggins’s favor. See id. Summary judgment is appropriate when “there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

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The Georgia Whistleblower Act prohibits a public employer 

from “retaliat[ing] against a public employee for disclosing a violation of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation . . . unless 

the disclosure was made with knowledge that [it] was false or with 

reckless disregard for its truth or falsity.” O.C.G.A. § 45-1-4(d)(2).

The Act also prohibits retaliation “against a public employee for 

objecting to, or refusing to participate in, any activity, policy, or 

practice . . . [that she] has reasonable cause to believe is in violation 

of or noncompliance with a law, rule, or regulation.” Id. § 45-1-

4(d)(3). An employee must commence an action “within one year 

after discovering the retaliation or within three years after the retaliation, whichever is earlier.” Id. § 45-1-4(e)(1).

A cause of action for retaliation accrues “when the [employee] could first have maintained [her] action to a successful result.” Tuttle v. Ga. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 756 S.E.2d 

585, 588 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Sandy Springs Toyota v. Classic Cadillac Atlanta Corp., 604 S.E.2d 303, 305 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004)). 

An employee can maintain an action after she discovers that her 

employer has “made a definitive decision to take adverse action 

against [her].” Albers v. Ga. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 766 

S.E.2d 520, 525 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). And “ignorance of the facts 

constituting [the] cause of action does not prevent the running of 

the statute of limitation, for a plaintiff must exercise reasonable diligence to learn of the existence of a cause of action.” Tuttle, 756 

S.E.2d at 588 (quoting Sandy Springs, 604 S.E.2d at 305).

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The district court did not err when it entered summary judgment against Riggins’s complaint of retaliation as untimely. Riggins’s cause of action accrued on November 3, 2014, when she received final notice of her termination. It matters not whether Riggins knew the termination was based on her remarks during the 

council meeting in March 2014 instead of her conduct during her 

interview in June 2014. Because the one-year statute of limitation 

elapsed before Riggins filed her action, her complaint was untimely.

We AFFIRM the summary judgment in favor of the City and 

Geisler. 

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