[Cite as State ex rel. Savage v. Caltrider, 100 Ohio St.3d 363, 2003-Ohio-6806.]

THE STATE EX REL. SAVAGE, APPELLANT, v. CALTRIDER, REGISTRAR,

APPELLEE. 

[Cite as State ex rel. Savage v. Caltrider, 100 Ohio St.3d 363, 2003-Ohio-6806.] 

Motor vehicles — Administrative law — Mandamus — Writ sought to compel 

Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles Registrar to comply with R.C. Chapter 

119 before adopting new procedure for submitting license reinstatement 

applications — Court of appeals’ denial of writ affirmed.

(No. 2003-1299 — Submitted December 2, 2003 — Decided December 31, 

2003.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 02AP-453. 

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Per Curiam. 

{¶1} Appellant, Leo Victor Savage, is a customer-service representative 

and assistant to the president of License Resque. Savage serves as an agent for 

clients seeking to have their Ohio driver’s licenses reinstated. Savage submits 

license-reinstatement requests on behalf of clients at reinstatement centers 

operated by the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles. Reinstatement centers serve 

both individuals seeking reinstatement of their licenses and agents requesting the 

license reinstatement of one or more clients. 

{¶2} Before March 30, 2003, agents could present ten or more 

applications for reinstatement at a time. Shirley Franklin, the supervisor of the 

public service area of the Alum Creek Reinstatement Center, and her bosses 

determined that the reinstatement center should implement a policy to regulate the 

amount of time that caseworkers were spending with any one person and thereby 

improve service to other customers. 
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{¶3} As a result of this determination, on March 30, 2000, Franklin 

notified agents, runners, and carriers that the reinstatement center was changing 

its procedure. Under the new policy, on Mondays and Fridays, agents could 

submit only one reinstatement application at a time. On Tuesdays, Wednesdays, 

and Thursdays, agents could submit up to four applications at a time. This new 

policy was not implemented in a racially discriminating manner. 

{¶4} The reinstatement center also provided agents with the option of 

dropping off or mailing as many applications as they wanted, and the applications 

would then be processed within 48 to 72 hours of receipt. 

{¶5} In April 2002, Savage filed a complaint in the Court of Appeals for 

Franklin County against appellee, Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles Registrar 

Franklin Caltrider. In his complaint, as subsequently amended, Savage requested 

a writ of mandamus to compel Caltrider to comply with R.C. Chapter 119 in order 

to adopt the March 30, 2000 reinstatement center policy as a formal rule. 

{¶6} After the parties submitted certified evidence and briefs, in March 

2003, a magistrate recommended that the court of appeals deny the writ. Savage 

filed objections, and in June 2003, the court of appeals overruled Savage’s 

objections and denied the writ. 

{¶7} In his appeal of right, Savage asserts that the court of appeals erred 

in denying the writ. Savage claims that the court of appeals relied on an affidavit 

that was not introduced into evidence and that the March 30, 2000 policy 

implemented by the reinstatement center authorized and enforced racial 

discrimination that was enforced against him. 

{¶8} In order to be entitled to the requested extraordinary relief in 

mandamus, Savage had to establish a clear legal right to compliance with the R.C. 

Chapter 119 requirements for adopting a rule, a corresponding clear legal duty on 

the part of Caltrider to comply with these requirements before adopting the 

reinstatement center’s March 30, 2000 policy, and the lack of an adequate remedy 
January Term, 2003 

3 

in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Ferguson v. Court of Claims of 

Ohio, Victims of Crime Div., 98 Ohio St.3d 399, 2003-Ohio-1631, 786 N.E.2d 43, 

¶ 10. 

{¶9} As the court of appeals correctly concluded, Savage failed to 

establish either a clear legal right to the requested relief or a corresponding clear 

legal duty on the part of Caltrider to provide it. R.C. 119.01(C) provides that 

“internal management rules” that do not affect private rights are not rules that are 

subject to the formal rulemaking procedures of R.C. Chapter 119: 

{¶10} “ ‘Rule’ means any rule, regulation, or standard, having a general 

and uniform operation, adopted, promulgated, and enforced by any agency under 

the authority of laws governing such agency, and includes any appendix to a rule. 

‘Rule’ does not include any internal management rule of an agency unless the 

internal management rule affects private rights and does not include any 

guideline adopted pursuant to section 3301.0714 of the Revised Code.” 

(Emphasis added.) 

{¶11} An “internal management rule” is a “rule, regulation, or standard 

governing the day-to-day staff procedures and operations within an agency.” R.C. 

119.01(K). 

{¶12} The evidence introduced in the court of appeals established that the 

March 30, 2000 reinstatement-center policy was an internal management rule that 

did not affect private rights for purposes of R.C. 119.01. The policy governed the 

day-to-day staff procedures within the center by restricting the number of 

applications that agents could present in person at one time. This improved 

service to customers filing their own applications in person. And agents had 

options available to submit as many applications as they wish by dropping them 

off or by mailing them. 

{¶13} We denied a writ of mandamus under comparable circumstances in 

State ex rel. Life of Maryland, Inc. v. Katz (1983), 4 Ohio St.3d 140, 4 OBR 384, 
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447 N.E.2d 116. In Katz, a foreign life-insurance company sought a writ of 

mandamus to compel the Superintendent of the Department of Insurance to act on 

its application for a certificate of authority to transact life-insurance business in 

Ohio. The superintendent had a policy of considering only 15 applications at each 

of its quarterly meetings. The insurance company claimed that the policy was a 

“rule” that had not been promulgated in compliance with R.C. Chapter 119. We 

denied the writ because the policy constituted an internal management rule that 

did not affect private rights: 

{¶14} “The record clearly demonstrates that respondent’s department has 

limited resources and personnel. Respondent’s policy of reviewing fifteen 

applications each meeting is a managerial response to those limitations and not an 

administrative rule.” Id., 4 Ohio St.3d at 141, 4 OBR 384, 447 N.E.2d 116. 

{¶15} Similarly, the reinstatement center’s policy placing restrictions on 

agents filing multiple applications is merely a managerial response to customerservice problems encountered by some of the center’s patrons. Moreover, 

Savage’s claims lack merit. Franklin’s affidavit, relied upon by the court of 

appeals, was submitted by Caltrider as part of his certified evidence in that court. 

And the evidence establishes that the policy was not racially discriminatory in 

either its creation or its enforcement. 

{¶16} Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON,

O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 

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 Leo Victor Savage, pro se. 

 Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Rocco, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee. 

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