PEACEW RKS

UNDERSTANDING PAKISTAN’S 

WATER-SECURITY NEXUS

Daanish Mustafa, Majed Akhter,

and Natalie Nasrallah

[ [
Cover photo: Haroon Sadiq. Tarbela Dam, Pakistan.

The views expressed in this report are those of 

the authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect 

the views of the United States Institute of Peace.

United States Institute of Peace

2301 Constitution Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20037

Phone: 202.457.1700

Fax: 202.429.6063

E-mail: usip_requests@usip.org

Web: www.usip.org

Peaceworks No. 88. First published 2013.

eISBN:978-1-60127-184-6

© 2013 by the United States Institute of Peace

ABOUT THE REPORT

Focusing on Pakistan, this report, sponsored by the U.S. 

Institute of Peace, provides a preliminary analysis of water 

management within a critical national context. 

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Daanish Mustafa, a member of the department of 

geography at King’s College London, worked for two 

years in Pakistan on donor-funded social development 

and environmental preservation projects. He holds a PhD 

from the University of Colorado. Majed Akhter specializes 

in the role experts play in political and economic development. His PhD studies at the University of Arizona 

focus on the role engineers have played, through water, 

in the development of the Pakistani state and in Pakistani 

state-society relations. He will be assistant professor of 

geography at Indiana University Bloomington beginning 

in August 2013. Natalie Nasrallah is an independent 

research consultant in international development and 

has worked with the United Nations Development 

Programme and various NGOs. She has previously 

worked with the U.S. Institute of Peace on studies involving conflict and natural resource management. She holds 

a master’s degree from the University of London. The 

authors wish to thank Raymond Gilpin for his support 

and contributions to this report.
PEACEWORKS • JUNE 2013 • NO. 88

CONTENTS

[In Pakistan, population growth, elite capture of public 

benefi ts, rapid urbanization, and shifts in production and 

consumption patterns have placed unprecedented stress 

on water resources.]

Introduction ... 5

Pakistan’s Water-Security Nexus... 6

Water Availability, Variability, and Demand ... 8

Water and Security Th reats... 14

Challenges to Eff ective Water Management ... 21

Addressing Perceptions... 28

Filling the Gaps... 31

Recommendations... 32

Conclusion ... 33

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UNDERSTANDING PAKISTAN’S WATER-SECURITY NEXUS

Summary

■ Pakistan, a semiarid region and a primarily agricultural economy, is facing declining water 

availability and quality, growing water pollution, and overall environmental insecurity. Th is 

situation, coupled with institutional, operational, and governance failures, is fostering 

domestic discord.

■ Th e water confl ict has both historical roots and emerging dynamics. 

■ Water scarcity, fl oods, droughts, and domestic mismanagement can embitter interethnic 

relations and prompt political tension, which can in turn lead to violence. 

■ Understanding water availability, allocation mechanisms, and demand is critical to understanding national management challenges and security threats.

■ A common response to the data on water supply and demand is to put it in the context of 

population growth. However, the greater issue concerns the politics of distribution, allocation, and access.

■ Rapid urbanization, intersectoral competition, and a growing industrial infrastructure will 

increase the need both for water and for development of new water infrastructures. 

■ Climate change forecasts may seem like an antidote to water scarcity but may not have the 

same implications for water security—that is, human and socioeconomic security. 

■ Varying perceptions of water and security among stakeholders and decision makers are 

preventing viable solutions for eff ective water resource management. 

■ Th e current policy approach is oriented in supply-side interventions, and the overall ethos 

favors engineering megaprojects, a bias refl ected in policy and in donor appeals. Th is 

approach only veils the problem of water use ineffi ciencies.

■ Water stress should not be the tipping point but rather a means to promote social harmony, 

environmental sustainability, and national unity. Eff ective management can only come 

from domestic reform, and dependence on foreign aid will not render lasting solutions.

■ It is crucial that the government invest greater political capital to regulate water competition and provide quality water services to all communities. Conservation will prove key.

USIP.ORG 5

UNDERSTANDING PAKISTAN’S WATER-SECURITY NEXUS

Introduction

Pakistan is headed toward a serious water crisis. By 2030, experts expect this semiarid nation 

to decline from being water stressed to water scarce.1 Because of overuse and misuse, the 

country is facing declining water availability and quality, growing water pollution, and overall 

environmental insecurity. In addition, its water and security nexus—which in this report refers 

primarily to human and socioeconomic security—is complicated by institutional inadequacies, 

a monochromatic supply-side vision, and a lack of substantive public participation in defi ning 

and solving problems. Water shortages may well pose the greatest future threat to the viability 

of Pakistan’s economy.

Water is essential, whether for livelihoods, health, food security, or general economic development. In Pakistan, as in many parts of Asia, population growth, elite capture of public 

benefi ts, rapid urbanization, and shifts in production and consumption patterns have placed 

unprecedented stress on water resources.2 Coupled with institutional, operational, and governance failures, increasing pressure over water use and misuse is fostering domestic discord. 

Although water is not a direct driver of confl ict, it is an aggravating factor that threatens various dimensions of Pakistan’s political fragility. Water is often used by communal, ethnic, and 

regional populations within the country to express discontent over the management of and 

increasing pressure on this most precious resource. Th us, understanding water availability, allocation mechanisms, variability, and demand is critical to understanding Pakistan’s resource 

management challenges and security threats.

Much focus has been directed on Pakistan’s interstate water issues with India and Afghanistan, but it is intrastate water tensions that are threatening domestic political and environmental security in an already fragile region. Intrastate confl icts can cause more damage and violence 

than interstate water disputes. Th e link to violent confl ict is evident in institutionalized social 

stratifi cation and recurrent episodes of dispossession and migration. Intrastate water disputes 

rarely gain the level of international attention that interstate confl icts do.3

 However, evidence 

from Pakistan is clear that water scarcity, fl oods, droughts, and domestic mismanagement can 

embitter interethnic relations and prompt political tension, which can in turn lead to violence. 

Diminishing water quality also leads to almost daily protests for better services. In a country 

that depends heavily on water for livelihoods, addressing water scarcity problems can alleviate 

much of the economic and social vulnerabilities that render Pakistan so unstable. Eff ectively 

managing water resources and use can create an avenue for rebuilding trust, confi dence, and 

cooperation between the various water stakeholders. If water quality could be maintained, the 

paucity of water can be better managed and tensions may subside.4

Th e country generally tackles its water scarcity problems by turning to supply-side approaches that focus on more storage and diversion. Th ese approaches are not only costly but 

generate a spatial imbalance in resource distribution, adding to the mistrust over perceived excessive or inadequate water channeling between the country’s water users, who already struggle 

with political enmity.5 Th e combination of water scarcity and prospective demand pressures 

thus becomes a key driver for disputes to become violent.

Pakistan’s water confl ict has both historical roots and emerging dynamics. Historically, the 

key intrastate issue is water geography and the question of location along the head, middle, 

and tail reaches of the canals of the Indus basin irrigation system. When the British colonial 

administration initiated the construction of the system, they undertook not only a physical 

engineering enterprise but also a social engineering enterprise, where farmers belonging to 

Water scarcity, fl oods, 

droughts, and domestic 

mismanagement can 

embitter interethnic 

relations and prompt 

political tension, which 

can in turn lead to 

violence.
6 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 88

more “loyal” or supposedly distinguished tribes or castes were given preferential access to the 

head reaches of canals and watercourses; poorer and more marginal farmers were allotted lands 

in the tail reaches of the canals and watercourses. Because farmers located at the tail ends of 

canals have less assured access to water, they tend to be signifi cantly less productive.6 Th is water 

geography reinforces social stratifi cation in irrigated rural canal colonies.

Th e occurrence of water-related environmental extremes, such as fl oods and droughts, accentuate this social stratifi cation and highlight climate change as one of Pakistan’s emerging 

threats. Environmental hazards have obvious implications for human and economic security, as 

illustrated by the recent 2010 fl oods and earlier by the decade-long drought in the southwest 

of the country.7 But the ability of the government to respond to and prepare for these hazards 

raises a number of concerns for overall political security in terms of legitimacy and accountability. For example, some commentary has noted that belligerent groups have engaged in relief 

and recovery operations, raising a fear of such militant outfi ts leveraging their humanitarian 

activities to gain public approval, legitimacy, and ultimately recruits for their operations. Fear 

of militancy, though well-founded, can also have detrimental eff ects on legitimate recovery and 

aid eff orts led by religious organizations.8

Th e domestically driven confl ict over water in Pakistan needs to be better understood so 

that appropriate development strategies can be implemented.

Pakistan’s Water-Security Nexus

Over the last decade, Pakistan became a water-stressed country: Th e United Nations (UN) 

currently estimates an annual per capita availability of 1,090 cubic meters.9 Th e UN’s Food 

and Agriculture Organization (FAO) measures the pressure on national water resources by 

calculating water withdrawal as a percentage of total renewable water resources (TRWR). 

Stresses are considered high if the TRWR value is above 25 percent. Pakistan’s water pressure 

amounts to a staggering 74 percent. Th is pressure is exorbitant even compared with neighboring high-pressured countries, including India at 34 percent and Afghanistan at 31 percent.10

Th e country is expected to become water scarce—less than fi ve hundred cubic meters per 

capita per year—by 2035, some analysts even predicting by 2020. Th is alarming prediction 

is derived from a growing population, ineffi cient supply management, distribution inequalities, and the eff ects of climate change. Despite uncertainty surrounding how quickly water 

resources are being depleted and what future populations and industries may need, it is clear 

that Indus basin water is precarious.

Security in the context of this study refers both to national security, in terms of direct 

confl ict and violence between diff erent groups and users, and to human security, defi ned as an 

individual’s security from environmental extremes and social instability. Water is the material 

basis of existence, livelihoods, and production, and lack of access adversely aff ects not only human security but also social stability. Human security and social instability typically manifest 

themselves at the subnational scale.

Water supply, as a historically produced condition, is not merely the amount of snowpack 

or precipitation in a given year. It is also the technological systems and institutions governing 

those systems, developed by society to access this resource. Although the absolute quantity of 

water available is clearly an important number, the social systems constructed to access that 

water are having a disproportionate impact on the regions and people who actually get water. 

Pakistan’s water scarcity problems are thus synonymous with its struggle with poverty and 

inequality in the distribution of water across regions and between social classes.

Stresses are considered 

high if the TRWR value 

is above 25 percent. 

Pakistan’s water pressure 

amounts to a staggering 

74 percent.
USIP.ORG 7

UNDERSTANDING PAKISTAN’S WATER-SECURITY NEXUS

Intrastate water tensions and challenges are deeply linked with agriculture. Th is sector has 

seen production growth over the last few decades, but it is rife with ineffi ciency and mismanagement. Water constraints will require changes in the types of food produced as well as more 

effi cient irrigation practices that improve water quality. About 80 percent of cultivated land in 

Pakistan is irrigated, of which about 33 percent is aff ected by waterlogging and soil salinity, 

leading to signifi cant declines (an estimated 25 percent) in crop yields, especially downstream. 

Th ese issues will remain problematic until more sustainable irrigation practices are put in place.

Due to Pakistan’s increase of commercial agriculture, a growing number of small and tenant farmers are being thrown off the land and are migrating to urban and peri-urban areas.11

Water is not the root cause, but it is directly linked to land rights and compounds problems of 

rural dispossession. Comments during fi eld interviews suggested that most extremist outfi ts 

in central and southern Punjab province, where land holdings are most skewed, rely on these 

armies of dispossessed small farmers to fi ll their ranks. Furthermore, common criminality in 

Pakistan is thought to be associated with this process of rural dispossession. Th is is not surprising, given that the mostly rural populations, of whom 40 percent are in poverty and 50 percent 

are landless, depend on the irrigated agriculture for their livelihoods.12

Urban water supply and sanitation is another security concern. Pakistan is home to eight 

cities with populations of more than one million, including the megalopolis of Karachi, which 

produces more than a quarter of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP). Water-related 

riots as a result of poor water and sanitation services are not unknown, and “water mafi as” 

often operate in collusion with criminal elements in the urban areas, especially in Karachi.13

Poor access to water supply and sanitation has obvious consequences for human security, and 

diminished security runs the risk of evolving into civil unrest and political instability.

Groundwater depletion, particularly in southwestern Balochistan province, is also a major 

warning sign of a looming crisis.14 Pakistan is currently withdrawing 83 percent of its total 

renewable groundwater.15 Wholesale promotion and then adoption of electric water pumps 

for groundwater tapping in the province has meant destruction of traditional karez irrigation 

systems and the communities and the social capital that crystallized around them.16 Again, 

initial fi eld interviews suggest that many young men released from local communal bonds as a 

result of the destruction of local livelihoods and ensuing rural-to-urban migration may be joining militant outfi ts in Pakistan and neighboring Afghanistan. However, the validity of these 

statements needs further investigation.

Another major source of trouble is interprovincial water confl ict, often leveraged by ethnonationalist movements to arouse passions and at times to justify separatist agendas. Water confl ict between the economically and geographically dominant upper riparian Punjab province 

and the lower riparian Sindh province over the distribution of the Indus River and its tributaries is one of the most notorious in the country.17

Ongoing arguments over royalties from dams and dam construction between the Punjab 

and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province, however, must be evaluated in light of the 

political economic eff ects of recent changes in federal structure.18 Passage of the 18th Amendment in 2010, which gave more autonomy to the provinces, failed to address the underlying 

causes of provincial water disputes and resulted only in discontinuities in water management 

structures. Th e ensuing complexities in governance show how the provinces proved to be unprepared to handle the problems of water quality, allocation, and distribution.

Finally, climate change has the potential to shift the dynamics of the water-security nexus. 

Extreme weather events and shifts in water supply patterns could add more pressure to each 

Field interviews 

suggested that most 

extremist outfi ts in central 

and southern Punjab 

province rely on these 

armies of dispossessed 

small farmers to fi ll their 

ranks.
8 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 88

of the anticipated security concerns, highlighting the need for a comprehensive disaster risk 

management strategy integrated into a national water policy. Because Pakistan is a predominantly agricultural economy, any decrease in crop yields will aff ect not only livelihoods but also 

food security in both rural and urban populations. Such insecurity runs the risk of aggravating existing social inequalities in water use and availability and intensifying the sociopolitical factors that imperil Pakistan today. Although more or less isolated now, these fl ashpoints 

could heighten the reactions of disgruntled groups unless sustainable and effi cient practices are 

implemented.

Water Availability, Variability, and Demand

Pakistan is one of the most arid countries in the world. Most of its water supply comes from a 

single source, the Indus system, which is composed of six major tributaries: the Indus, Chenab, 

Jhelum, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej (see map 1). Glacier melt, snowmelt, rainfall, and runoff supply river fl ows. Rainfall averages around 494 mm a year19 and derives mainly from summer 

monsoons. Precipitation is unevenly distributed and greatly varies by season. Th e estimated 

long-term basin-wide surface water availability is approximately 194 to 209 million acre-feet 

(MAF), of which 142 MAF is extracted in Pakistan.20 Average renewable water availability is 

about 154 MAF, of which 45 MAF is from groundwater.

To historicize water supply, the analytical focus must fi rst shift from ecological reservoirs 

of fresh water to the physical structures society constructed to access that water and then to 

groundwater aquifers. Th e most important aspect of the agricultural water supply system in 

Pakistan is the extensive surface canal irrigation system, the foundation of which was laid during British colonial rule. Th e Indus basin system is the largest contiguously irrigated area in 

the world. By any measure, it is also the product of one of the largest hydraulic interventions in 

history. Th e canal colonies of southwest and central Punjab were the centerpiece of a massive 

social engineering project that built thousands of miles of canals between 1885 and 1947 in 

an arid landscape. More than one million people migrated to the nine canal colonies, and the 

region is today one of the most densely populated and agriculturally productive in South Asia.

British colonial rule was followed by decades of disputes over water infrastructure and allocations between Pakistan and India. To preempt any water wars, the two countries signed the 

Indus Water Treaty (IWT) in 1960. Th e agreement divides the Indus River system into the 

Western Rivers—composed of the main stem of the Indus, the Jhelum, and the Chenab—and 

the Eastern Rivers—the Ravi, the Beas, and the Sutlej. An average of about 138 MAF fl ows 

annually into Pakistan in the Western Rivers. Th e vast majority of surface water extractions are 

made from the Western Rivers, where fl ows are measured by “rim stations”—at Kalabagh for 

the Indus, Mangla for the Jhelum, and Marala for the Chenab. More than 80 percent of the 

annual fl ow of the Western Rivers occurs in the three kharif (summer) months.

Th e irrigation system was designed to deliver minimal water to sustain enough agricultural production for famine prevention. Th e Canal and Drainage Act of 1873 legally mandates 

enough water delivery to sustain 64 percent cropping intensity.21 Today, real cropping intensities are between 150 and 200 percent, thanks partially to Green Revolution technologies. 

However, this increased production had adverse eff ects. Economic power was concentrated in 

two ways: horizontally across regions and vertically across class structures. Rich farms became 

richer, because they could tap the capital-intensive technology package of the Green Revolution. Poor farmers became poorer, because their farms could not compete with the more 

productive farmers. Agrarian workers, those who did not formally own land, perhaps suff ered 

The Indus basin system is 

the largest contiguously 

irrigated area in 

the world.
USIP.ORG 9

UNDERSTANDING PAKISTAN’S WATER-SECURITY NEXUS

the greatest loss in security of livelihood because machines increasingly replaced their labor. 

Th e number of tenant farms was cut by half between 1960 and 1990, and the landless rural 

population working as wage labor in Pakistan swelled to about 40 percent of the rural population. Th e result was a complex chain of circular and permanent migration from the Pakistani 

countryside to urban centers.

Access to irrigation water in the Indus basin in Pakistan cannot be separated from access 

to land. Unlike in other arid regions, where water rights can be bought and sold separately 

from land, such as in the western United States and in groundwater-based irrigation systems 

in Afghanistan and Balochistan, water rights in the Indus basin are linked to land ownership. 

British development policy for the canal colonies favored certain segments of society over 

others through land grants. Th is preference for landed notables continues to defi ne the social 

reality of access to water in rural Pakistan today.22

Current water withdrawals in Pakistan total about 142 MAF. Approximately 71 percent of 

withdrawals are from surface water and 29 percent from subsurface groundwater. Withdrawals 

from surface water account for about 74 percent of the total surface water available, and withdrawals from groundwater account for 83 percent of total renewable groundwater available.23

River fl ows in Pakistan are highly uneven temporally, and year-round agricultural requirements depend on adequate storage capacity.24 However, the Indus’ massive irrigation system 

has a storage capacity of only 121 MAF per year, or a thirty-day supply.25 Th is capacity is 

extremely low given that India can store for 120 to 220 days, Egypt up to 700 days, and the 

United States for 900 days.

A little less than half of Pakistan’s population depends on irrigated agriculture for their 

livelihoods, and one-third lacks access to safe drinking water. Pakistan is often referred to as a 

hydraulic economy 26 because of its vast economic dependence on irrigated agriculture, which 

accounts directly for a quarter of the country’s GDP and directly or indirectly provides 60 perMap 1. Indus Basin Irrigation System Major Rivers and Infrastructure

Water rights in the 

Indus basin are linked 

to land ownership. This 

preference for landed 

notables continues to 

defi ne the social reality 

of access to water in 

rural Pakistan today.
10 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 88

cent of the population with their livelihoods. Ninety-seven percent of annual available surface 

water goes toward irrigation to support agriculture.

Because Pakistan’s transition to an urban and industrial economy is likely to continue, 

its competition with agriculture for water resources is likely to increase. Evidence points to 

a widening gap between water supply and demand. Th e UN estimates that water demand in 

Pakistan is growing at an annual rate of 10 percent.27 Th at is, demand is projected to rise to 

274 MAF by 2025. Th is said, total water availability by 2025 is not likely to change from the 

current 191 MAF. Th is gap of about 81 MAF is almost two-thirds of the entire Indus River 

system’s current annual average fl ow.28

Th e main source of drinking water in Pakistan comes from groundwater. Below the rim of 

the Himalayas lies one of the largest freshwater aquifers in the world. Th e groundwater footprint for the Upper Ganges Aquifer, which sustains both India and Pakistan, is more than fi fty 

times its size and is one of the most overexploited aquifers in the world.29 Pakistan’s subsurface 

groundwater resources amount to about 51 MAF,30 most of which lie in Punjab. A substantial 

amount of the available water diverted in the Indus basin canal system refi lls the groundwater 

reservoir. Farmers depend on groundwater to supply about 40 percent of their irrigation water 

demands. 

Rates of groundwater exploitation have increased rapidly in the past several decades, and 

some areas, mainly Balochistan, are mining aquifers beyond their capacity for natural replenishment.31 Aquifer mining is supplementing the surface water that reaches Pakistan’s farmland, 

but this indiscriminate pumping and heavy use of pesticides are contaminating the aquifer, 

where tubewell water salinity is increasing.32 Although evidence of exploitation is clear, tens of 

thousands of additional wells continue to be serviced every year. Both the government and donors have failed to reengineer their capacity and funding to deal with groundwater depletion.33

Th e total amount of water available in the Indus system depends ultimately on precipitation, but the timing of the availability of this precipitation as useable water fl ow depends on 

other factors, such as the precipitation captured by snowfi elds in the winter and how much is 

released as melt water in the summer. Although glaciers cover less than 2 percent of the total 

area of the Indus river system basin,34 they contribute 40 to 50 percent of the water used downstream in Pakistan. Despite the consensus among scientists on the crucial contribution of melt 

water in the Indus, the question of what is expected from this source of water in the context of 

global climate change is debated. Rainfall in the Indus basin is highly concentrated temporally, 

falling largely in monsoon summer months. Less certain is how climate aff ects monsoonal patterns, mostly because not enough data are available to run global circulation models to account 

for regional variation, just as monsoon dynamics are not well enough understood for scientists 

to model them.

Debate is considerable on how fast Himalayan glacier retreat is occurring and the extent to 

which it will aff ect Pakistan and other South Asian countries. Some analysts argue that deglacialization in the western Himalayas and the Karakoram Mountains in the north of Pakistan 

has already started, and that the eventual outcome will be reduced river runoff .35 Th ese analysts 

also argue that before average annual river runoff decreases, increased peak fl ooding in the 

summer months is likely, which could be interpreted as both a hazard and an opportunity.36

Th e phenomenon of glacier lake outburst fl ooding induced by climate change is also becoming 

a concern in northern Pakistan because it causes sudden catastrophic fl ooding in large areas 

and greatly threatens the lives and livelihoods of local communities. With these outbursts, a 

vital source of irrigation is also lost.

The UN estimates that 

water demand in Pakistan 

is growing at an annual 

rate of 10 percent.
USIP.ORG 11

UNDERSTANDING PAKISTAN’S WATER-SECURITY NEXUS

Th e Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) forecasts an increase in the 

number of rainy days in South Asia and in the number of extreme events as a result of climate 

change.37 More precipitation seems like an antidote to the threat of water scarcity, but it might 

not have the same implications for water security. More extreme precipitation events could 

lead to more severe landscape hazards.38 Indeed, rainfall is more likely to add water more intensely or over a shorter time, leading to the danger of fl ooding. Interannual variability in the 

monsoon, even if it means more rainfall some years, is also the chronic scourge of farmers in 

South Asia, especially the arid northwest.39 Others stress that regional information is still too 

scant for meaningful monsoonal change forecasts.40 Th e eff ects of climate change on water 

resources will be most signifi cant and visible in the way climate change interacts with glacial 

melt and monsoonal patterns, but scientifi c knowledge of these systems does not allow suffi cient predictive models.

A common response to the data on water supply and demand is to put it in the context 

of population growth. Th e most likely increase in future demand for water in Pakistan will 

come from cities. Population growth has been high, averaging an annual rate of just over 2.5 

percent. Most writing on the country’s water scarcity and water policy in general begins with 

the sobering fact that the per capita availability of water in Pakistan has decreased from 5,260 

cubic meters in 1951 to roughly 1,040 in 2010,41 a decline of more than 400 percent. Figures 1 

and 2 show the relationships between water availability, withdrawal, and population.

Pakistan is currently the sixth most populous country in the world, and its population is 

expected to increase from 180 million in 2012 to 230 million in 2025.42 Domestic water needs 

amount to about 100 liters per day, and food production requires between 3,000 and 5,000 

liters.43 Th eoretically, the agricultural sector will have to grow more than 4 percent annually 

to meet the food requirements of the increased population.44 However, the assumption that 

population growth will outstrip the capacity to produce enough food for everyone is not the 

source of a pending national crisis. Th e issue lies in the politics of distribution, allocation, and 

access—not in aggregate supply and demand.45

As previously mentioned, Pakistan had an average annual population growth rate of 2.61 

percent from 1961 to 2011. Th at the average population growth rate was only 1.81 percent from 

Figure 1. Water Availability and Withdrawal

Source: FAO, AQUASTAT database, 2013.

300

200

250

150

50

0

1973 1988 1998 2008

100

Total Renewable Water Total Withdrawal

(cubic kilometers)

The per capita availability 

of water in Pakistan has 

decreased from 5,260 

cubic meters in 1951 to 

roughly 1,040 in 2010, 

a decline of more than 

400 percent.
12 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 88

2001 to 2011 suggests that population is growing at a declining rate, however. More important, 

total crop production grew by an annual average growth rate of 3 percent for roughly the same 

period, from 1962 to 2010,46 and the annual food production index grew at an even larger rate of 

3.4 percent. Per capita caloric intake has increased from 1,812 calories per person between 

1961 and 1963 to 2,340 calories between 2001 and 2003.47

Despite this abundance, as of 2008, 25 percent of the country’s population are estimated 

to be undernourished. In other words, there is more than enough to go around, but the social 

and material infrastructure that distributes food and water across society is exclusionary. Th e 

slowdown in agricultural production in the fi rst decade of the 2000s, however, is worrying.48

Nevertheless, the main question is not how to increase the supply (or decrease the demand) of 

water but how to share it more equally. To speak of deprivation stemming from absolute water 

scarcity without taking into account the extreme social and geographical diff erentiation in the 

population is to fatally disregard how people actually access the goods they need and want.

Rapid urbanization is likely to become increasingly controversial when it comes to the 

allocation of water. Industrial and domestic water demand is a tiny proportion of the overall 

water demand situation in Pakistan, as evident in fi gure 3, but given the numbers of people 

who depend on the domestic water sector and the spatially concentrated eff ects of industrial 

and domestic water demand, the political consequences of the present situation and future 

trends are likely to be out of proportion to the proportional volume of water involved for 

each sector. Load shedding greatly aff ects water pumping, and power shortages are directly 

related to water shortages in many cities. Without an integrated approach for water demand 

management, water shortages will continue to plague all sectors and have signifi cant negative 

economic repercussions.49

One study attempted to model future water demand in the industrial sector under high 

(roughly 10 percent), medium (about 7 percent), and low (just under 3 percent) annual economic growth scenarios from 2010 through 2030.50 Th is modeling study indicated that under 

each scenario, the water demand is likely to increase by 2.2, 1.3, and 0.8 times the baseline of 

2010 respectively. Th e reduction in the water demand in the low development scenario is based 

on the model assumption of technological advances increasing the productivity of water over 

Figure 2. Water Availability and Population Growth, 1967–2011

Source: FAO, AQUASTAT database, 2013.

5,000 200

150

100

50

0

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0

1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2011

Water Availability (cubic meters per capita) Population Growth (millions)















Total renewable water resources (cubic meters per capita)

Total population (million)



The main question is 

not how to increase the 

supply (or decrease the 

demand) of water but 

how to share it more 

equally.
USIP.ORG 13

UNDERSTANDING PAKISTAN’S WATER-SECURITY NEXUS

time. Unlike the agricultural sector, it is highly likely to expect substantial gains from technological advances. Th e study further modeled the industrial water demand proportions by industry until 2030, assuming that the existing industrial structure will continue to be based heavily 

on textiles. Th e textile sector will account for almost 70 percent of water demand, chemicals for 

10 percent, and other industries for 20 percent.

What this modeling attempts to demonstrate is that rapid urbanization and the growing 

number of industrial units in Pakistan will increase the need for development of new water 

infrastructures. Little research has been done on the changes in Pakistan’s water use as a result 

of economic activities and industrial production. Yet as table 1 shows, the prediction is that 

demand in all sectors will exceed supply.

Th e concern about industrial water demand may not be as much about volume as about 

localized pollution from certain industries and their eff ect on public health and ecosystem 

services that poor people depend on. Some studies paint a dreary picture of the pervasive pollution of water bodies around industrial estates and urban areas with heavy metals and untreated 

sewerage. Around 90 percent of industrial and municipal waste, which is largely untreated 

and often highly toxic, is dumped into open drains and fi ltrated into aquifers. Natural aquifer 

cleansing takes decades, even centuries. Furthermore, in Pakistan, which has the twenty-sixth 

highest infant mortality rate in the world, more than 60 percent of those deaths are caused by 

waterborne diseases. Th e eff ects of water pollution on public health and human security are 

obvious. Whether they will also translate into threats to peace is an open question.

In terms of volume, Pakistan seems to be well endowed with water resources. In terms of 

per capita availability, the water supply picture may seem worrying. More than the absolute 

volume, however, is the temporal, spatial, and social distribution of water, which ought to be of 

greater concern. Water security problems in the country are often presented as an excess of deFigure 3. Current Water Withdrawal by Sector

Source: FAO, AQUASTAT database, 2013.

industrial

Total Renewable water

250

200

225

175

125

150

100

50

75

25

0

1973 1988 1998 2008

municipal

agricultural

(cubic kilometers)

Around 90 percent of 

industrial and municipal 

waste, which is largely 

untreated and often 

highly toxic, is dumped 

into open drains and 

fi ltrated into aquifers.
14 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 88

mand over supply, but a deeper understanding of water scarcity must historically contextualize 

systems of supply and demand. In other words, water supply and demand are not exogenous 

variables. Rather, the magnitude and nature of supply and demand in any given region have developed as a part of a region’s history and geography. Water supply and demand are important 

in considering water security, not just because of the necessity of respecting absolute ecological 

thresholds but also because eff ective policy changes must recognize their deeply social nature. 

Th e historical and political economic context through which water demand and supply are 

established gives us the means to reframe the water scarcity debate and, thus, the connection 

between water scarcity and water security.

Water and Security Threats

Pakistan’s water pressures are only compounding the country’s volatility and rampant instability. Protests occur almost daily in cities over insuffi cient access to clean water. Farmers and 

landowners feud, sometimes violently, over water rights and lost livelihoods. Any diversion of 

or development on upstream waters becomes an ethnic confl ict between provinces. Increasing 

scarcity and environmental hazards are displacing the most vulnerable communities, leaving 

them in even worse social and economic conditions. Dispossession runs the risk of political 

destabilization and greater recruitment opportunities for extremist groups. If no signifi cant 

national policy and development strategy or clear laws and regulations that monitor water use 

are established, unemployment, poverty, and food insecurity are likely to increase and could 

become recruitment grounds for extremism. Climate change and rural-urban migration will 

only exacerbate this problem. Th e following fl ashpoints describe areas where water either causes 

or intensifi es insecurity. Th ey do not isolate water as the driver of, or sole factor in, these issues.

Interprovincial Disputes

Th e Indus basin irrigation system legitimately draws the bulk of attention and investment by 

Pakistani water managers and international donors. Greater attention, however, is needed on 

regional variations between provinces and how water issues might align with ethno-nationalist 

sentiment to become security concerns. Th e seemingly perpetual water confl ict between Sindh 

and Punjab reached a tentative settlement with the Inter-Provincial Water Accord of 1991, signed 

by all four provincial governments, which were governed by the same political party for the 

fi rst time. Th e accord was based on the assumed average fl ow of 114.35 MAF in the Indus system and allocated 55.94 MAF to Punjab and 48.76 MAF to Sindh province. Th e legitimacy of 

the accord was in question primarily because the negotiating process was not transparent and 

did not include all the stakeholders, particularly from the smaller provinces, and because of the 

suspect legitimacy of the political setup in Sindh province at the time. Furthermore, even the 

Table 1. Nonagricultural Water Needs (millions of acre-feet)

Year

2000 2025 Additional Requirements

Water supply and sanitation 4.5 10.5 6.0

Industry 2.2 3.5 1.3

Environmental protection 1.3 1.7 0.4

Total 8.0 15.7 7.7

Source: Authors’ compilation based on Government of Pakistan, National Water Policy.

Increasing scarcity and 

environmental hazards 

are displacing the most 

vulnerable communities, 

leaving them in even 

worse social and 

economic conditions.
USIP.ORG 15

UNDERSTANDING PAKISTAN’S WATER-SECURITY NEXUS

offi cial fi gures for average annual fl ows for the Indus basin and subsequent justifi cations for 

additional storage on the Indus river, particularly the Kalabagh dam, are suspect. Many analysts 

now argue against the offi cial methodology of using the higher number for fl ows in the Indus 

system, particularly because it is based on a shorter time frame—that is, since 1977—and 

because the higher number works to the disadvantage of downstream riparian Sindh province.

Hydroelectric development is controversial because it invariably displaces riparian communities. However, the rising pressure on Pakistan’s energy and agriculture sectors inevitably 

brings the signifi cance of this type of development to the forefront of policy debates. Th e 

connections between energy and water thus become an aggravating factor in provincial disputes. Th e offi cial argument in favor of the construction of the Kalabagh dam on the Indus 

River paints the picture of a scarce, wasted water resource being allowed to fl ow out to sea 

and outlines a doomsday scenario should additional storage not be built.51 Th e controversy 

is beginning to polarize public opinion, particularly in Sindh province, where the dam controversy is perceived as yet another insult to the long series of injuries infl icted on them by 

Punjab province through its appropriation of Sindh’s rightful share of water. Th e dam is also 

opposed by Pashtun nationalist parties, such as the governing Awami National Party in KPK, 

for fear that its reservoir will fl ood rich farmland in the province. In addition, Balochistan 

province has come out against the dam because of concerns about adverse impacts on the Pat 

Feeder Canal from the Indus in its territory. However, in no other province is the intensity of 

antidam emotion matched with that in Sindh. Given the depth of feelings in Sindh against 

Kalabagh, any initiative to start construction of the dam by the democratically elected, but 

Punjabi-dominated, government or by a military dominated nationalist government could 

precipitate intense hostility in Sindh.

Sindh and other provinces have acquiesced to the construction of the Bhasha Dam in the 

upper Indus, upstream from Tarbela. Th e government is moving forward with initial preparations for its construction. However, a drought in lower Pakistan, such as that of the late 1990s 

after the construction of the dam, could fl ame the perception that Bhasha is part of the problem. In such a scenario, intense civil unrest is possible in Sindh, similar to the speculation of 

unrest in Kalabagh. Construction of the dam in the most seismically active zone in the world 

raises important questions of safety. Dam failure is a nightmare scenario and could easily be 

used by ethno-nationalist elements—in Sindh, in particular—to further their agendas.

Groundwater Depletion

Th e water-security nexus of high dependence on groundwater is most obvious in Balochistan, 

an especially arid province. Th e region has been the focus of world attention because of the 

ongoing Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, the border regions of Pakistan, and the links of 

the insurgencies to international militant Islamist networks. Very little attention has been paid 

to the regional rural political economy and its possible linkages to the geographies of violence 

in the region. Baloch insurgency is also about provincial autonomy and control over its natural 

resources. Th us, groundwater depletion in Balochistan is likely to have unexamined consequences for the social stability of the province and perhaps even geopolitical stability in the 

region.

Th e groundwater situation in Balochistan is already tenuous, and the ongoing insurgency 

in the province is not helping. If the groundwater keeps declining at current rates and laws 

regulating groundwater pumping continue to be fl outed, groundwater may run out in the 

urbanized Quetta valley. Th e Pakistan army, which has large installations in the valley, already 

The connections between 

energy and water 

become an aggravating 

factor in provincial 

disputes. 
16 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 88

has contingency plans for evacuating its installations should the water situation worsen there. 

Groundwater depletions have already had some adverse social consequences in Balochistan.

Th e economy of Balochistan has always been heavily rural and dependent on agropastoralist activities. Because the province lies in an arid zone, the region is almost entirely 

dependent on groundwater to sustain agriculture and rural livelihoods.52 Th e main conduit for 

tapping groundwater had been the traditional karez system. A karez is an underground aqueduct that passively taps the groundwater in the piedmont and carries the water by gravity to 

the “daylight point,” where the water is then channeled into irrigation ditches for agricultural 

and domestic uses. Th e system is environmentally sustainable because it only passively taps 

the groundwater and cannot cause overdraft, unlike electric pumps. Beyond the importance of 

environmental sustainability is the signifi cant social capital that crystallizes around the infrastructure of a karez.

53 Th ese require a high level of social organization and collective eff ort for 

their routine maintenance and administration of water rights, which are almost like property 

rights, and can be bought and sold independent from land. Th e region might be one of the few 

places in South Asia where most rural farmers do not know the extent of their land holdings 

because land is so abundant. However, they do have a precise knowledge of their water rights, 

from which they derive their status and identity within a community. In essence, the karez 

system has been virtual glue holding the rural Baloch and Afghan society together, as well as 

providing a buff er during frequent droughts in the region.

In the name of agricultural modernization, electric water pumps were introduced to the 

region in the last three decades of the twentieth century, along with heavy subsidies of electricity for their use.54 Many of the larger, more powerful farmers in the region were able to access 

these tubewells and expand agricultural production. However, the electric tubewells have led 

to rapid declines in the water table, particularly in Pakistani and Iranian Balochistan, leading 

to the decline of the karez system.55 Even though the agricultural production is increasing, 

many of the old karez shareholders’ water shares are becoming unviable because their karezes 

have gone dry. Karez was not just a source of livelihood but also the basis of identity and status 

in the community. Once a water right was lost, people lost their social status and often had to 

migrate to nearby cities or take up jobs as farm laborers with tubewell owners. Th e consequence 

has been a breakdown of community cohesion and the social capital that coalesced around the 

karez system. It is highly likely that the breakdown in the karez-based social capital is, in fact, 

creating armies of young people outside of community structures. Th is social disintegration 

runs the risk of contributing foot soldiers for assorted insurgent outfi ts in the region.56

Migration and Urbanization

At the local level, water confl icts and constructed scarcities are likely to have even more serious 

consequences for national stability in the future. Small and tenant farmer dispossession and 

the inherent nature of the institutional structure of the irrigation system create conditions with 

considerable law and order problems and will likely continue to do so in the future. Increasing 

dispossession of small and tenant farmers could further swell the numbers of landless peasants 

migrating to urban slums. In the absence of employment opportunities for such migrants, increased urban unrest of the type witnessed every day in Karachi could spread to other large cities. Institutionally driven water scarcity in the irrigation system would have consequences not 

just in terms of rural to urban migration but could also lead to rural unrest. Some of that unrest 

was channeled by the intelligence agencies in the 1980s and 1990s in southern Punjab toward 

mobilizing armies of radicalized young men for jihad in Kashmir and then Afghanistan. Th e 

Increasing dispossession 

of small and tenant 

farmers could further 

swell the numbers 

of landless peasants 

migrating to urban slums.
USIP.ORG 17

UNDERSTANDING PAKISTAN’S WATER-SECURITY NEXUS

same unrest in the future with a greater number of people does not bode well for stability in 

rural Pakistan either.

In terms of surface water, Pakistan depends on a gravity-based irrigation system. In such 

systems, location of one’s plot of land along a water course is the arbiter of whether one gets 

water or doesn’t. Again, research undertaken in the Indus basin indicates that geographies of 

access to irrigation are very much congruent with geographies of social power.57 Smaller farmers tend to be at a disadvantage strategically when it comes to accessing water and are also more 

vulnerable to fl ood hazards.58 Due to the linkage of land and water rights, the trend of tenant 

and small farmer dispossession is partly the outcome of their vulnerable location at the tail 

end of canal commands and watercourses and partly their inability to invest in and maintain 

groundwater pumps. Armies of rural poor migrating to cities or loitering in rural areas have 

proven rich grounds for recruitment by extremist outfi ts. It is not a coincidence that most of 

the so-called Punjabi Taliban and militant sectarian outfi ts draw the majority of their recruits 

from southern Punjab, where such rural dispossession is highest and the land distribution is 

most skewed, in comparison to the rest of Pakistan.

With the highest urbanization rates in Asia,59 water and sanitation provisions within and 

between urban communities in Pakistan threaten water and security at the local level. Th is 

nexus manifests itself through violent protest over water and sanitation allocation and distribution, criminal gang monopoly over water sources in urban Pakistan, exploitation of the 

most vulnerable, gender-based violence, and the dangerous health impacts of contaminated 

water supplies. Water and sanitation provisions are critically and increasingly interlinked with 

human security in South Asia. Access to water and sanitation is increasingly being perceived as 

a right and an essential part of the social contract between the citizens and the state. Populations in Pakistan are accordingly negotiating access in both nonviolent and violent forms.60

Th e megalopolis of Karachi in southern Pakistan saw many violent riots in the late 1990s 

and early 2000s, particularly in its informal settlements (kaatchi abaadis) like Lyari. Residents 

of Lyari attribute their biggest problem to water access, or lack of it, which only infl ames their 

discontent with governance structures. Th e settlement is supposed to receive fi ve million gallons of water per day, yet research has shown the actual daily fi gure at thirty thousand gallons. 

One explanation for this discrepancy is corruption and illegal diversions of the supply to highincome settlements served by the same system.61 As a result, frustrated residents have staged 

several protests, which have developed into water riots, which are increasing in frequency. Th e 

offi ces of the Karachi Water and Sewage Agency, the government agency responsible for provisions, are increasingly subjected to violent attacks. In 2001 and 2003, residents of Lyari came 

onto the streets to protest regular and severe water shortages in their homes. When police responded to the four thousand protestors with force in 2001, violent reaction in the subsequent 

days led to three bombs exploding in the city, dozens of cars set on fi re, and 230 people arrested. 

Two people were killed and several were injured during the violence.62 Such incidents are becoming a frequent occurrence in Karachi. In June 2010, after politicians in the Sindh Provincial Assembly unsuccessfully called on the Pakistan government to address contamination and 

shortages of drinking water in their district, Lyari residents again erupted into violent protest, 

which the police responded to with tear gas and baton charges. Recurring drought, exacerbated 

by climate change, is only making the risk of water protests and violent riots more likely.63

One of the most common sources of access in Pakistan has become the water tanker.64

Tankers are often owned by a water mafi a, which charges extortionate rates or fi nds ways to 

cut supply from government and private sector actors, creating an artifi cial need for water. 

In a gravity-based 

irrigation system . . . 

location of one’s plot 

of land along a water 

course is the arbiter of 

whether one gets water 

or doesn’t. 
18 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 88

Th e power and control of the water tank mafi a has been documented in Karachi, where it has 

worked in league with corrupt public servants.65 One of the more insidious consequences of 

the long-standing arrangements between local politicians and the tanker lobby is to permanently delay the construction of new water infrastructure. For example, the Rangers, a paramilitary force in Karachi that has a strong presence in the metropolis to control law and order, are 

also involved in supplying domestic water through tankers and use it as a means of generating 

revenues in addition to leveraging control over local communities. Many political parties in the 

metropolis do the same.66

Water contamination causes serious health problems, particularly for women and children. 

Furthermore, although water crises aff ect women and men in diff erent ways, it has been widely 

argued that women suff er disproportionately.67 Th e human security of women and children 

has been adversely aff ected in particular, because they are responsible for collecting water and 

are often unable to leave the boundaries of their villages due to cultural reasons, whereas men 

can travel further to obtain safer sources.68 Th e human capital eff ects of water-related environmental risks amount to at least half of the country’s wage losses of 8.8 percent of GDP.69 Th e 

outbreak of dengue fever in Pakistan in the summers of 2011 and 2012 caused considerable 

public outcry, particularly in the provincial capital of Lahore.70 In the light of climate change 

and continuing poor water drainage and sanitation conditions, the threat to public health in 

Pakistan from waterborne diseases is likely to be further accentuated.

Security is not only linked to water in Pakistan at the international and provincial scales. 

Th e water and sanitation access that is negotiated and often fought for at the local level has 

resulted in violent repercussions that threaten the security of the individual and law and order 

in Pakistani cities and communities. More focus on anticorruption measures in water and 

sanitation service delivery in growing metropolises and on water as a right may help prevent 

simmering tensions over lack of access from turning into violent riots. Table 2 illustrates some 

recent examples of water-related confl icts in Pakistan.71

Climate Change and Environmental Hazards

Scientifi c uncertainty regarding glacier retreat and consequent long-term water availability 

in Pakistan is considerable. Analysts tend to agree that past patterns and timings of water 

availability are unlikely to continue into the future. Th e key climate change challenges in the 

Pakistani water sector are timing, location, and intensity of fl ood and drought hazards, which 

aff ect economic security and test institutional response and preparedness.

Th e recent fl oods are a stark reminder of the type of challenges and the level of natural 

disaster intensity that climate change could bring. In 2010, the country saw unprecedented 

monsoon rainfall in the northwest of the country, an area outside the monsoon zone. Populations and infrastructure that had never been exposed to those levels of precipitation suff ered 

equally unprecedented damage. More than 21 million people were aff ected and about 1.8 million homes damaged or destroyed.72

Floods in Pakistan are generally man-made phenomena, largely because of the highly 

regulated hydrology of the basin. Most major inundations of human habitations in the basin 

are a consequence of the breaching of side levees to release pressure on barrages and other 

diversionary infrastructure in the basin during fl oods. Th e operation of breaching sections has 

been deemed a purely technical matter, but more often than not it is also a political process. 

All infrastructure in the basin has a safe designed capacity for the fl ow of water, and once 

that capacity is exceeded, a breaching section upstream from the barrage is operated to reRecent fl oods are a stark 

reminder of the type 

of challenges and the 

level of natural disaster 

intensity that climate 

change could bring.
USIP.ORG 19

UNDERSTANDING PAKISTAN’S WATER-SECURITY NEXUS

Table 2. Recent Incidents of Water Violence and Confl ict in Pakistan 

Year Location

Level of 

Confl ict

Type of 

Confl ict Description

1900s—

present

Punjab, Sindh, 

Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

provincial water 

allocation

Protests and legislative disputes over 

water allocations; accusations of 

stealing water.

2001 Karachi, Sindh municipal

and 

provincial

service 

delivery and 

development

Civil unrest over severe water shortages resulted in riots, four bombs in 

Karachi (June 13), one death, twelve 

injuries, and thirty arrests. Ethnic 

confl icts ensue over accusations that 

the government favors Punjab over 

Sindh in water distribution.

2002 Mirpur City, 

Kashmir Region

municipal development Violent protests break out over 

Mangla Dam construction, twelve 

injured.

2003 Karachi, Sindh municipal development Police used force to break up 

protests over water shortages, 

twelve injuries.

2003 Okara District, 

Punjab

national service 

delivery

During a siege against a tenant 

farmer uprising after a farmer 

was killed, Pakistan Rangers, a 

paramilitary force, closed water 

canals to two villages, destroying 

their entire summer crop. 

2004 South Waziristan 

Tribal Areas, 

Khyber 

Pakhtunkhwa

national terrorism In military action aimed at Islamic 

terrorists, including al-Qaeda and 

the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, 

homes, schools, and water wells 

were damaged and destroyed.

2005 Shahdadkot, 

Sindh

community water 

allocation

An armed group of men killed fi ve 

people because of differences over 

irrigation water

2006 Federally 

Administered 

Tribal Areas 

community water 

allocation

Water war between Boshehra and 

Malikhel tribes killed fourteen, 

wounded thirty-fi ve.

2008 Peshawar, Khyber 

Pakhtunkhwa

national terrorism In October, the Taliban threatened 

to blow up Warsak Dam, the main 

water supply for Peshawar, during a 

government offensive in the region.

2010 Hangu District, 

Khyber 

Pakhtunkhwa

community water 

allocation

A water dispute between the Wazir 

and Bangash tribes killed six, injured 

three.

2010 Harnai District, 

Balochistan

community water 

allocation

A water dispute between two rival 

groups of a tribe led to two deaths, 

three injuries.

2010 Federally 

Administered 

Tribal Areas 

community water 

allocation

September saw two weeks of 

fi ghting over water, in which the 

Mangal tribe stopped water 

irrigation on lands used by the Tori 

tribe; 116 deaths and 165 injured.

2011 Sindh, Punjab municipal service 

delivery

Protests turned violent over 

power and water outages across the 

country.

2012 Sindh, Punjab municipal, 

provincial

service 

delivery

Civil unrest and protests over power 

and water outages led to property 

destruction and violent encounters 

with police.
20 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 88

lieve pressure. Th e capacity of the infrastructure on paper is typically a conservative estimate, 

however. Most engineers are quite aware that even when the capacity is exceeded, the barrage 

can still be operated within a certain safety envelope. Th e question then becomes which region—upstream or downstream—has the more powerful political representation. Upstream 

residents typically want the breaching section operated quickly to relieve water pressure on 

their land. Downstream communities, to save their land, either want to delay its operation 

or for it to not be breached at all. Such political negotiation is well known at the local level 

and has caused considerable alienation among the populace, who perceive their lands as being inundated because they lacked the political capital to save them. Th is alienation is further 

accentuated when relief is inadequate or is provided by actors who may have more belligerent 

agendas.

For example, unsubstantiated claims have asserted that the 2010 fl oods considerably compromised the legitimacy of the Pakistani government because of its fumbling response to the 

crises. Its inadequacies allowed the humanitarian wings of some Islamic militant organizations 

to insert themselves into the relief eff ort and, subsequently, gain greater legitimacy in the eyes 

of fl ood victims. Preliminary testimonies suggest that these groups used their involvement to 

win recruits for their causes:

I am not so sure if these jihadist elements like Lashkar-e-Tayyaba have any long-term 

impact on the social landscape in the flood affected areas as a result of their relief efforts. 

They have a single agenda item—to recruit people for Jihad. They show up in the aftermath of floods, provide relief, try and win recruits, and, in my experience, move on, only 

to reappear in the next flood.73

Systematic research on the linkages between inequity in access to irrigation and increased 

vulnerability to fl ood hazards on the rural poor and penetration of extremist ideologies amongst 

the young people in the rural area could help elucidate the linkages between local level irrigation and fl ood management and security.

Th e drought in the late 1990s and early 2000 in southern Pakistan was also a preview of the 

types of challenges that climate change may present in a more accentuated form. Th e period 

saw massive rural to urban migration: In some cases, entire communities were dislocated and 

abandoned. Inappropriate responses to the drought in the form of greater tubewell penetration 

in Balochistan had the type of consequences discussed. Th e ongoing Baloch insurgency that 

began in the mid-2000s coincided with the drought and was driven by many political factors. 

A detailed examination of the linkages between the drought, social dislocation, and alienation 

of the Baloch—and to a lesser extent Pashtun youth in the province—would be useful in understanding the types of security challenges that can emerge from such hazards.

Th e drought and fl ood hazards, along with less dramatic shifts in planting seasons and 

penetration of new disease vectors in Pakistan, will require the type of responsive and fl exible 

governance institutions that do not exist—at least not at the government level. Th e disconnect 

between the increasing expectations of a more politically aware population and the inability 

of the state institutions to respond to those challenges is likely to result in security challenges 

related to civil strife and delegitimization of the state that demand immediate attention.

Most alarmingly, many of Pakistan’s nuclear reactors are on the banks of the Indus along the 

Chashma Barrage (see map 2). A nuclear accident at that location could conceivably contaminate a sizeable portion of the country’s food supply. Details of the installations are not publicly 

available, and any studies on such a scenario are unknown. Given the importance of the river to 

the country’s agriculture, however, investigating such a scenario in greater detail is warranted.
USIP.ORG 21

UNDERSTANDING PAKISTAN’S WATER-SECURITY NEXUS

Challenges to Effective Water Management

Eff ective water management requires a strategy that integrates institutions, policies, skills, and 

technology to foster conservation, effi ciency, productivity, and disaster relief. A collaborative 

approach that embraces all stakeholders is needed to ensure that altering water supplies will 

meet future requirements. Th us far, Pakistan’s water stress has been explained in terms of supply and demand, but the crisis haunting the state is rooted in unsustainable practices and gross 

mismanagement. Unless serious changes are made to address these institutional ineffi ciencies, 

governance weaknesses, and political deadlock, Pakistan may witness upsurges in resourcebased violent confl ict. Yet successful reforms could be the key to more harmonious interactions.

Governance

Pakistan’s governance patterns may be one of the biggest factors preventing eff ective water 

management. Its regulatory and institutional defi ciencies are increasing tensions among stakeholders, who are failing to communicate and cooperate with each other to overcome the weak 

policies and enforcement mechanisms of the water sector. Most alarming is a seemingly general apathy toward changing current policies and practices.

Water disputes in Pakistan are chronic. Th e perennial irrigation water shortages create confl ict between provinces, with each accusing the other of bad faith and duplicity. Th e lack of 

water laws that defi ne water rights often pit users against each other; land ownership rather 

than water use serves as a proxy for water rights.74 Water bureaucracy in Pakistan is also notoriously corrupt due to both the ineff ective internal administrative checks on decisions made by 

irrigation bureaucrats and the pressure for these bureaucrats to accommodate large landowners, who are often politicians.75 A reported 25 percent of farmers have acknowledged paying 

Map 2. Location of Pakistan’s Major Nuclear Facilities

Pakistan’s water stress 

has been explained in 

terms of supply and 

demand, but the crisis 

haunting the state is 

rooted in unsustainable 

practices and gross 

mismanagement.
22 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 88

bribes to irrigation offi cials for water.76 Th ese offi cials have almost total discretion in deciding 

water entitlements. Fighting this corruption is often futile, because Pakistan’s legal system is 

slow and no actual system for enforcing rights is in place.

Pakistan has a multiplicity of water-related legislation and regulations, dating back to 

colonial rule, as evident in table 3. Th is list does not even touch on the numerous land and 

tenancy laws that defi ne water rights and usage based on land ownership. Th e most important legislation governing water in the country is the Canal and Drainage Act 1873, which 

provides the key legal framework for water management in the agricultural sector. Th e act 

allocates considerable administrative and judicial authority to irrigation department offi cials 

with almost no provision for public accountability.77 It mandates a fi xed time rotational irrigation schedule. It is well known that temporally equal water rights at the head and tail 

reaches of watercourses deliver much less water at the tail end. Th is geographical inequity, well 

known at the time of the framing of the act, is not accounted for in the legislation and hence 

legitimizes structural inequities in the irrigation system.78 Furthermore, the act provides for 

collective punishment for possible individual acts of sabotage of irrigation infrastructure, giving absolute administrative and judicial authority to irrigation department functionaries to 

adjudicate disputes.

Furthermore, the act recognizes all water resources as government property and specifi -

cally links water rights to the land. Water rights cannot be legally traded independently of the 

land. However, in reality, vibrant and active water markets do exist independent of land. Th e 

infl exibility inherent in the warabandi 79 (fi xed time rotational irrigation scheduling) system 

means that farmers have to take water when it is their turn, regardless of whether they need it 

or how much of it they need. From the beginning, Pakistani farmers have actively traded water 

rights for reciprocal times or cash payments. Th e act criminalizes this pervasive and somewhat 

effi cient practice.

Th e abiana (water tax) mandated in the act, and paid for by the farmers, kept the irrigation 

system profi table until the early 1970s, when the populist government of Zulfi kar Ali Bhutto 

froze the abiana. Today, the abiana remains at the same level, resulting in provincial irrigation and drainage authorities (PIDA) incurring massive losses that fail to provide adequate 

resources for the eff ective operations and management of the system. Donors have pressured 

the government to increase the abiana receipts and to decentralize the system from a bureaucratic system to a more cooperative farmer-run system, where the farmers are in charge of 

water allocation and revenue collection. Th e Provincial Irrigation and Drainage Act (1997) 

responded to this donor pressure to turn provincial irrigation departments from government 

agencies to regulatory authorities. In the future, these authorities would regulate farmer-run 

area water boards along canal commands and farmer organizations along village water courses 

while withdrawing from the day-to-day management of the system. In practice, governance 

methods have not really changed.

In the province of Balochistan, given its high dependence on groundwater, the importance of ongoing groundwater mining was recognized. Th e Balochistan Groundwater Rights 

Administration Ordinance of 1978 outlined a procedure for licensing tubewell development 

in the province in an attempt to tackle groundwater mining. Th e licensing of tubewells was 

supposed to be based on area-specifi c guidelines to be sanctioned by area water boards, but the 

guidelines were never formulated. In some instances, communities mobilized to institute selfregulating groundwater management in some districts, but in the aftermath of the drought in 

the 1990s, many of those systems came to naught. Some are in place in the southwest of the 
USIP.ORG 23

UNDERSTANDING PAKISTAN’S WATER-SECURITY NEXUS

Table 3. Key Water-Related Legislation in Pakistan 

Date Legislation Implementation Key Feature

1860 Pakistan Penal Code federal Penalizes water pollution as a 

public health issue

1873 Canal and Drainage Act federal and 

provincial

Governs irrigation water use

1882 Easement Act federal Grants and limits rights for water 

pollution

1883 Land Improvement Loans 

Act

provincial Provides loans for water distribution, drainage, and reclamation

1905 Punjab Minor Canals Act provincial Governs irrigation water use

1927 Forests Act federal and 

provincial

Governs disposal of waste and 

effl uent

1934 Factories Act federal Penalizes pollution of water in 

forests

1949 Karachi Joint Water 

Board Ordinance

municipal Prohibits pollution of water supply; 

fi rst water law at municipal level

1952 Punjab Development of 

Damaged Areas Act

provincial Allows government to 

construct sewage and drainage 

in “damaged areas”

1958 West Pakistan Water and 

Power Development 

Authority Act

provincial and 

federal

Establishes what is today the 

Water and Power Development 

Authority

1960 Indus Waters Treaty international Governs sharing of Indus River 

waters between Pakistan and India

1976 Territorial Waters and 

Maritime Zones Act

federal, 

international

Declares maritime territory and 

boundaries

1980 Sindh Fisheries 

Ordinance

provincial Prohibits dumping of pollutants in 

water

1981 On-Farm Water Management and Water Users’ 

Association Ordinance

federal Provides resources for improved 

irrigation water management

1991 Indus River System 

Accord

provincial Governs water sharing between 

provinces

1997 Provincial Irrigation and 

Drainage Authority Acts

provincial Implements irrigation reforms

1997 Environmental Protection 

Act

federal Governs protection, 

conservation, rehabilitation, 

pollution, and improvement of 

environment

2009 National Drinking Water 

Policy

federal Provides institutional framework 

and guidelines for provinces to 

assure quality and supply of 

drinking water

2010 18th Amendment to the 

Constitution of Pakistan

federal Devolves Ministry of Environment 

to provinces, establishes forums 

for interprovincial dialogue

2011 Punjab Environmental 

Protection (Amendment) 

Bill

provincial Establishes Punjab Ministry of 

Environment

Source: Jawad Hassan, Environmental Laws of Pakistan (Lahore: Book Biz, 2006)
24 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 88

province where a predominance of traditional karez-based systems remain. In the rest of the 

province, confl ict continues between tubewell adopters and the karez shareholders, the latter 

typically fi ghting a rearguard battle against the adopters.

Th e structure of institutions governing water and development at the federal, provincial, 

and local levels are quite complex and disconnected, muddling accountability and data sources. 

In 2009, the passage of the 18th Amendment devolved seventeen federal ministries to the provincial level. Now water management at the federal level lies mostly within the jurisdiction of 

the Ministry of Water and Power. In addition, each province has its own authorities that govern irrigation, water development, and supply and sanitation. Data on water use are circulated 

every ten days, from the Indus River System Authority (IRSA) to the provincial irrigation 

departments to the watercourses in the fi elds then back to the central offi ces and IRSA. As 

discussed later, how these data are collected and shared is a source of mistrust and controversy 

between the provinces. An overview of the formal water governance structure is presented 

in fi gure 4.

In water supply and sanitation, as well as in industrial water use, the most well-endowed 

and infl uential institutions are typically the area development authorities, because they are the 

primary conduits through which provincial governments channel their resources. Questions 

about the disconnect between their remit and power and their lack of accountability, however, are constant. Service delivery is both unreliable and corrupt. Local governments’ ability 

to raise funds and sustain the Water Supply and Sanitation Authorities is also questioned. 

PIDAs, however, continue to be at the bottom of the pecking order in the water sector, partly 

because of the low political infl uence of rural areas. Institutional reform would help reverse 

Figure 4. Water-Related Institutions in Pakistan

Data on water use 

are circulated every 

ten days ... How these 

data are collected and 

shared is a source of 

mistrust and controversy 

between the provinces.
USIP.ORG 25

UNDERSTANDING PAKISTAN’S WATER-SECURITY NEXUS

the weak governance that is fueling socioeconomic discontent and eroding citizens’ confi -

dence in their government and rule of law. Th e major obstacle will be garnering the political 

will to reform these traditional power structures.

Policy Approach

In addition to its institutional and regulatory shortcomings, Pakistan’s policy approach, which 

is oriented in supply-side interventions, is also lacking. Th e overall ethos of the water institutions favors engineering megaprojects, and this bias continues to be refl ected in the government’s main policy documents, as well as in the present project portfolio by donors and institutions in the country. Th is approach only veils the problem of water use ineffi ciencies.

Th e storage capacity of the Indus basin irrigation system, which commands thirty-four 

million acres for irrigation, is only about 121 MAF per capita per year, or a thirty-day supply. 

Existing dams are rapidly silting, with Mangla and Tarbela losing about 25 percent capacity since they were commissioned in 1967 and 1976. Furthermore, water losses from within 

watercourses and between canal heads and watercourses amount to about one-third of the 

total amount of delivered water; an additional 25 percent is lost within farms.80 Poor management and distribution of irrigated water translate to only 45 percent of cultivable land being 

farmed at any given time. In other words, Pakistan currently uses 97 percent of its allocated water 

resources to support one of the lowest productivities in the world per unit of water.81 Although 

dams contributed to turning arid land green and off ered productive benefi ts at the outset, the 

water realities of today render their current use unsustainable. By treating water as a raw material, 

technical solutions are deployed to harness the water’s fullest capacity, which ignore the shortfalls and constraints in water supply and funds for operation, maintenance, and investments.82

Simply repairing and maintaining Pakistan’s existing canal systems could free an estimated 

76 MAF of water.83

Focus on supply-side intervention comes with fi scal stress. Pakistan has been unsuccessful 

at making irrigation users pay for water or the operation, maintenance, and manpower costs 

of water infrastructure. So after donors foot the bill to build large storage projects, virtually no 

one supports their operation and maintenance, rendering the neglected projects almost useless 

in resolving the country’s water problems.

Over the past decade, Islamabad adopted a number of policies and strategies to address 

the country’s various water challenges. Th ese include the Drinking Water and Sanitation Policy (2009), the National Climate Change Policy (2011) and the Environment Policy (2005), 

which includes a supplemental Water Supply and Management Policy. In particular, the 2003 

Pakistan Water Strategy has become the focus of domestic and international debate about water management. Th is comprehensive strategy outlines the blueprint for water resources in the 

country for the fi rst quarter of the twenty-fi rst century. Th e question remains how these documents will be translated into action by the responsible institutions, which remain megaproject 

oriented. Earlier water sector investment plans84 made similar claims about integrated water 

resource management only to continue to focus on its megaproject supply-side interventions 

in the water sector. Th e prognosis for the present water strategy is the same in the absence of 

real institutional reform in the water sector.

Moreover, a comprehensive National Water Policy was drafted in 2005 but has yet to be 

adopted. Debate has been intense over the policy’s approach in addressing water scarcity, demand, and population pressures and whether the policy should focus more on storage projects 

Poor management and 

distribution of irrigated 

water translate to only 

45 percent of cultivable 

land being farmed at any 

given time.
26 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 88

or conservation and effi ciency strategies. Th e draft policy is marred by provincial disputes over 

water rights and priorities, demonstrating yet another obstacle to eff ective water management.

Intersectoral Competition

As the debate over water policy continues, the opportunities for developing additional water 

resources or maintaining water use at existing levels are diminishing, and intersectoral demand 

for additional water is rapidly increasing. Current management strategies are further polarizing 

society, posing threats of greater instability across society and water sectors. Th e challenge thus 

becomes developing an integrated water management and use strategy, water-effi cient techniques, and containment of environmental degradation across all water sectors.

Much of the forecasting on water availability and requirements focuses on agriculture and 

what the country will need to feed the growing population. But this increase in population 

also means changes in water use for urbanization, industrialization, agricultural diversifi cation, 

and environmental needs, which will inevitably increase competition. Water quality is becoming just as much of an issue as water quantity. Th e urban and industrial sectors face several 

development challenges. Th ese sectors need to raise the level of service quality and reliability in 

water supply in large metropolitan areas and industrial states. Access to a piped water supply 

in small towns and rural areas should be extended. Sources of sanitary and industrial effl uents 

need to be blocked before entering fresh water ways. Development should not come at the 

cost of contaminating already limited water sources. Finally, as Pakistan develops, balancing 

shifts in supply and demand will become a major challenge, as a growing middle class demands 

more water-intensive convenience technologies and higher commodities, such as meat, dairy, 

and more diversifi ed produce. With the right incentives, one can choose less water-intensive 

industries just as one can choose less water-intensive crops.

Supply-side water policies and the concentration on large-scale infrastructure projects to 

balance water availability—notably dams—often ignore these socioeconomic realities in addition to minimizing the consequences of fl ooding, population displacement, and lost livelihoods. 

Th is displacement often hits poorer communities, who may have no other safety nets and may 

be more vulnerable to violence and extremism. In addition, migration is adding pressure to 

urban water supply and sanitation. Th e extent of the problem requires further investigation.

Skills and Technology

Room for improving water effi ciency through technological interventions in the agricultural 

and domestic water supply and sanitation sector is considerable. Faith in technological solutions, however, must be tempered with an understanding of the environmental and social contexts within which technologies may or may not have their full potential impacts.

At the macro-basin scale of interprovincial water distribution and fl ood warning, Pakistan 

generally depends on manual gauge readers. Th e volumetric calculations for water fl ow are 

based on empirically calibrated equations. In interprovincial water disputes, Sindh frequently 

accuses Punjab of misreporting data. Furthermore, accusations have been made that those 

who operate gauge readers make up readings for absentee days or make up entire arrays of 

readings. Evidence also indicates that gauges cannot be accessed during high fl oods or become 

invisible because of high siltation and water levels in the channel. To improve data quality and 

to reduce suspicions between provinces, the government installed a telemetric system on the 
USIP.ORG 27

UNDERSTANDING PAKISTAN’S WATER-SECURITY NEXUS

Indus River system, which, according to press reports, is not functioning.85 Accusations have 

also been made that the Punjab government or some functionaries in the Punjab Irrigation and 

Drainage Authority are deliberately sabotaging the system to appropriate extra water for the 

province or to hide preferential illegal water diversions to more infl uential water users. When 

one of the authors of this report asked about these accusations, a senior offi cial said that the 

telemetry system was not as accurate as the manual system. Th e telemetry system is a simple 

and old technology used worldwide. Th e claim that human readings are more accurate is not 

credible. Th e problem may be the incentive structures of the institutions that militate against 

the use of technology.

Considerable attention has been given to dam construction for surface storage in the water 

bureaucracy, which in the Pakistani context is probably one of the most ineffi cient types of 

storage solutions in a hot, dry country because of evaporation losses. Little attention has been 

paid to groundwater storage through injection wells or otherwise, which could be much more 

effi cient. Often, energy generation benefi ts are pointed out as an additional benefi t of surface 

storage. Energy generation benefi ts are undeniable, but greater attention to groundwater storage in addition to surface storage could help water managers expand their range of options in 

the face of greater demands on water and uncertainty in the face of climate change.

At the microscale, laser land leveling has often been touted as an eff ective way of improving 

water’s productive effi ciency. Th e leveling makes a constant slope of a fi eld, thereby ensuring 

that during fl ood irrigation, gravity controls the fl ow of water and evenly irrigates the entire 

fi eld. Th e benefi ts of the technology, as might be expected, have largely been directed toward 

larger farmers. Th e technology has also been criticized for compromising the soil ecology by 

killing many benefi cial soil organisms, which contribute to soil productivity.

Sprinkler and drip irrigation has also been proposed as a substitute for fl ood irrigation to 

conserve water. Although the principle is obvious given the high silt content of Pakistani rivers, 

the two technologies are not suitable for use with surface water. Th ey could, however, be usefully deployed in conjunction with groundwater. But even there, the capital expenditure combined with the operation and maintenance costs mean that only relatively prosperous farmers 

who can aff ord the expenses of the technology can benefi t from them. Th e social implications 

of the technologies aside, farmers often prefer the silt-laden surface water for its soil rejuvenating qualities. A case can also be made for fl ood irrigation in the sense that it does recharge the 

aquifer, which is particularly useful near urban areas, being that most of urban water supply 

in Pakistan is from groundwater.86 Drip irrigation and sprinkler irrigation is, however, fi nding 

greater success in Balochistan, where most of the irrigation is from groundwater and a higher 

proportion of agricultural land is covered with orchards and trees, which are more suitable for 

drip irrigation.87

In terms of water supply and sanitation, the situation in Pakistan remains dismal. More 

than 40 percent of the population do not have access to clean drinking water—90 percent 

in rural areas.88 Th e water supply and sanitation systems remain on the old networked water 

systems for which Islamabad does not have the capital or human resources to maintain or 

enough water to maintain perpetual water pressure so as to avoid sewage contamination. Appropriate technologies promoting modular systems in urban and rural water supply as well 

as for sanitation could go a long way toward addressing the ongoing, and rather silent, public 

health crises. Nevertheless, behavioral change in water usage will prove key to ensuring lasting effi ciency.

Energy generation 

benefi ts are undeniable, 

but greater attention to 

groundwater storage 

in addition to surface 

storage could help water 

managers expand their 

range of options.
28 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 88

Addressing Perceptions

A number of fi eld studies and interviews were conducted to gauge a provisional level of understanding of Pakistan’s water and security issues at offi cial and grassroots levels.89 Th e statements 

here refl ect these fi ndings.

Th e water and security nexus in Pakistan is complex because water is such a dominant 

part of the economy and the society. Th e country’s water and security concerns are widely 

known, but it is the perceptions of water and security among stakeholders and decision makers 

that prevent viable solutions for eff ective water resource management. Th ree general perceptions have been observed. First, Pakistan’s decision makers and those in power are not directly 

aff ected by water insecurities and have little incentive to change the system or make water 

management reform a priority. Second, the people who work in the water sector generally 

have engineering backgrounds and tend to focus on supply-side solutions, disregarding the 

changing dynamics of water demand, society, and the environment. Finally, deep mistrust and 

perpetual disputes prevent provincial leaders from working together to fi nd constructive ways 

to address Pakistan’s water problems. Th ese initial conclusions are anecdotal and require more 

extensive surveying to be truly representative.

In addition, three disparate views of the water and security nexus across sectors and populations in Pakistan exist. Th e fi rst is on the issue of policy. For water managers, particularly civil 

engineers, and the federal government, the solution to shortfalls in water supply compared to 

demand is more storage. Forecasts of water scarcity and energy shortfalls are resulting in urgent 

pushes for the country to build more dams.

In Pakistan, water and security linkage is likely to be experienced via the energy sector. 

If we do not build more dams to address the energy supply situation in the country and 

continue to have the type of electricity load shedding that we are experiencing right now, 

there is likely to be a lot of civil unrest. . . . thermal and private power generation is too 

expensive and beyond the reach of the common person. Only the construction of more 

dams which generate cheap electricity with solve the problem.90

In addition, leaders of each province are suspicious of each other’s claims of the extent of 

their water insecurity. Disagreement is also strong between provincial leaders, namely Punjab 

and Sindh, and between the federal government and the provinces. Punjab’s water managers, 

for example, often portray themselves as victims of political machinations and foreign NGO 

infl uences, whose suggestions translate to the disadvantage of Punjab:

In Punjab, water demand is much greater, but there are fewer water projects compared to 

demand that have to work with lower water allocations. For example, in the 1992 interprovincial water accord, Punjab’s water demand and use was much higher compared to 

the allocation, and that allocation was even less than water the existing infrastructure in 

Punjab could deliver. . . . Sindh’s ecological argument is not valid—agriculture must take 

precedence over ecology. . . . politicization of this argument between Sindh and Punjab 

is causing mistrust between the two, and foreign-supported NGOs are the main culprits 

for this state of affairs.91

Th is statement illustrates the confl ation of Punjab and Pakistan interests, the dismissal of 

oppositional concerns as irrational or undesirably “political,” the implied equivalence of “politics” with “nuisance,” and the reliance on international expertise to bolster claims are all dominant perceptions that shape the public discourse on water politics and policy.

Th us, the political geography of center-province tension is crucial to understanding subnational water politics.
USIP.ORG 29

UNDERSTANDING PAKISTAN’S WATER-SECURITY NEXUS

[Kalabagh Dam] is for the benefit of the whole country and not for any particular province or region. It has been found feasible by the world’s leading experts and approved by 

the World Bank for financing. Despite the need for its earliest construction, it has been 

held hostage in a political quagmire.92

Th e Sindhis, on the other hand, express apprehension toward Punjabi claims about Kalabagh dam being a national interest:

In Sindh, there are apprehensions not just about Punjab’s intentions right now as a federating unit, but also in terms of the fragility of the Pakistani state. What if the worst 

fears are realized? Would Sindh want to hand over control to Punjab of a most critical 

resource for its survival? Kalabagh is being bandied about in terms of its benefits for 

power generation, but our fear is about the water diversions and canals they are going to 

be build on the right and left banks of the river with the Kalabagh project to irrigate 

districts in Punjab and KPK. In Sindh, we have accepted Bashar Dam in Kohistan 

because it is a purely power generation project with no possible water diversions—we can 

live with that.93

Pakistani water managers at the federal level tend to dismiss provincial apprehensions regarding construction of more dams and see it as unnecessary politicization of an essentially 

technical debate with national interest at stake, which must not be held hostage to regionalist 

parochial interests. In fact, Punjab’s irrigation managers even allege that Sindh is misrepresenting water data to cover the “wastage” of water that goes into the sea:

Water escaping downstream of Kotri (the last diversion structure on the Indus before the 

Arabian Sea) is going to waste. Sindh has been reporting less water escaping downstream 

of Kotri than we thought. My staff assessed the escapage [sic] at 15000 cusecs downstream of Kotri while Sindh was reporting it at 5000 cusecs. [In response to probing] 

Sindh habitually misreports water flows while we in Punjab definitely do not.94

Th ese dominant perceptions of water management at the policy level are manifested in 

increasingly rigid provincial identities and the unstable capacity and integrity of the Pakistani 

state.

A second divergent view of the water and security nexus concerns water usage. Th e politics 

of region give way to the politics of production and property as the scale of analysis shifts to 

the local level and focuses on issues of agricultural water management and irrigation reform. 

One leading water expert within civil society stated that the competition over water between 

agricultural (rural) and domestic (urban) use is already creating tension. For example, water is 

often cut off in the big cities, particularly Karachi, triggering protests on an almost daily basis. 

Landowners often “steal” this water for agricultural use:

Land rights are a proxy to water rights . . . whenever the government invests in infrastructure, land value goes up. [Since] landowners sit in Parliament, they do not want any 

law that compromises their benefits . . . [Pakistan’s] culture, politics, and economics 

render a lot of power in a few hands.95

Such disproportionate allocations of power breed insecurity. Civil society leaders emphasize 

Islamabad’s ability to “learn to cope with water scarcity,” just not at the Indus’s current levels. 

Th e country’s current culture of rent-seeking behavior has proved unproductive, yet there is 

“very little political will to change things.”96 What is missing is the investment in an infrastructure that could store and recycle fl oodwaters, which can compensate for years of drought and 

lessen the competition between water users. It should also be a priority to set water prices that 

represent its socioeconomic value, similar to how gas is priced.97

In Sindh, and certainly among environmental activists, focus on the health of the Indus 

delta and how that might aff ect the livelihoods of the indigenous communities is considerable. 

Th e progressive civil society actors also tend to be attentive to microscale inequities inherent 
30 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 88

in the irrigation system and stress the need to address those before large-scale storage projects 

are undertaken.98

In these modern times people are abandoning the ancient and traditional irrigation, and 

trying to maximize cropped area. Ever since the tubewells have arrived, a competitive 

trend has emerged amongst the people and farmers. The installation of tubewells for 

modern irrigation succeeded in increasing agricultural productivity, but it also gravely 

damaged the ancient karez system. Karezes were a great source of social and communal 

life for us village folks. People would sit on their sides and discuss their issues and find 

solutions to their problems.99

Th e third perspective of the water and security nexus concerns how informed and engaged 

the various stakeholders and policymakers are with each other. Finger-pointing over the country’s water problems is considerable, as evident in the almost daily protests. However, solutions 

are superfi cial, and cooperation often lacking.

Th e more progressive civil society actors tend to view the water and security nexus from an 

institutionalist lens, stressing the need to address water resources as a politico-technical issue 

where technological interventions should be fi ltered through the political lens to take all of the 

stakeholders along. Sympathy is considerable for the reservations of smaller provinces regarding construction of big reservoirs on the Indus and operations of link canals in Punjab and even 

for a nascent concern in Punjab about the diminishing regard for rivers as a cultural heritage.

In the middle Indus (southern Punjab) the water issue is less politicized. But starting in 

[the] 1990s, even in Punjab, the local communities have been resisting mega water development projects, starting with the construction of the Chasma irrigation project in 

1990s. We are slowly moving away from a heroic colonial perspective on water.100

Some show a refl exive understanding about the intermingling of region, water, and identity.

Water matters more to you depending on where you are. Village people are more sensitive 

to water issues than city people. . . . Debate on water shortages is much more important 

if you are in Sindh. They always feel that water shortages are because of Punjab. The level 

of awareness, of even kids and common people on the street, is therefore more 

advanced.101

As for the general public, the perceptions on water typically follow the ethnic divide. Th e 

Punjabi populace are typically more enamored of the offi cial government narrative about water 

scarcity as underpinning the water and security nexus. In rural Punjab, however, appreciation of 

the institutionally driven inequity in water access as underpinning the water and security nexus 

is greater.102 In the smaller provinces, sympathy for the progressive civil society’s perspective on 

water and security is decidedly greater.103

In addition, the public generally takes water for granted, which is why costs are often provided below economic value.

The common perception says that you shouldn’t have to pay for water. Water should be 

free. It is God’s gift to mankind.104

If the current path of water management continues, Pakistan may see the angry protests 

and isolated acts of violence turn into a larger, more organized form of confl ict. Policy is not 

the only challenge. Citizen education is needed to overcome the public’s apathy toward water 

security. But citizen education requires support from the government in terms of legislation, 

conservation strategies, and law enforcement. Currently, government interest at this level is 

nonexistent, because the government tends to view only “big” projects as “real” projects.105

Th e facts of water supply and the security situation are not news to the country’s politicians 

and water stakeholders. Yet there seems to be a major disconnect on what the various actors see 

as the most contentious issues and how water problems should be solved. Th e result is a deep 

mistrust among stakeholders and decision makers, partly explaining the stalemate in passing 

If the current path of 

water management 

continues, Pakistan may 

see the angry protests 

and isolated acts of 

violence turn into a larger, 

more organized form of 

confl ict.
USIP.ORG 31

UNDERSTANDING PAKISTAN’S WATER-SECURITY NEXUS

meaningful water policies and strategies. Th e lack of consensus on water sector priorities not 

only creates a vacuum for improved resource management but also leaves the security around 

water that much more volatile. Th us it is crucial to correct these misperceptions if there is to 

be any signifi cant shift in water policy and management. Water stakeholders and policymakers would be better served using their collective skills, knowledge, and expertise to develop an 

eff ective strategy that tackles Pakistan’s precarious water environment and off sets any violence 

over water resources.

Filling the Gaps

Water is not a driver for insecurity but a contributing factor to overall instability. Water is a hot 

spot because the scarcity and quality threaten the livelihoods of the Pakistani people. Violence 

associated with water derives from the frustrations and grievances with mismanagement and 

poor governance. It becomes important, then, to address the nuances of the structural obstacles 

of distribution inequalities and general water shortages to tackle insecurity from the ground up.

Confl icts over water use often go full circle. Rural residents migrate to cities to escape 

either violence or lost livelihoods (notably agriculture), only to strain the urban water supply 

system that competes with agricultural water use. In addition, agricultural shortages cause increases in food prices, which adversely aff ect the urban poor who might have come from rural 

communities.106 Th e competition not only becomes an issue of inequality but also of imbalances. Also, linkages between sectoral water pressures should be further analyzed collectively. 

Solutions will require an integrated approach to supply and demand management.

Pakistan will have to develop the institutional mechanisms to deliver services to its burgeoning urban populations. Here there is a need to study the poor’s access to domestic water 

and fi nd avenues for formalizing and legitimizing those avenues. In the long term, conservation is key. Both surface and groundwater resources are being used at capacity, and current 

methods of extraction and uses are not only unsustainable but also damaging to the economy 

and human security. Future food security depends on changes in agricultural production. It is 

unsustainable to grow high water-consuming crops, such as sugarcane, in a semiarid country. 

It is more economical to import these commodities from water-rich countries and switch to 

farming crops that use local water resources more effi ciently and can bring better, more reliable 

fi nancial returns.

Debates surrounding the building of dams should also be scrutinized. Th e concentration 

on dams as the only solution to water and energy supply grossly ignores the need for resource 

behavioral change and the role of other energy sources, including renewable and alternative. 

Understanding the life cycle of water use for major production processes and products can help 

explain the effi ciency problems and guide policy formation.

Finally, greater experimentation with water pricing systems is needed. Pricing of water 

will not work by taking a one-size-fi ts-all model formulated by international development 

organizations. Rather, any sort of devolution of water allocation mechanisms, whether through 

market pricing or other means, must take the highly unequal agrarian property relations in 

Pakistan as its starting point.107 Given the fact that landed Pakistanis have long taken advantage of “free” water, public outreach campaigns will be crucial for transforming perceptions. 

Integrated water management will also require more domestic resources to repair and maintain 

infrastructure and invest in innovative technologies. In Pakistan, this translates to tax reform. 

Th e country’s tax rate is less than 9 percent of the value of its economy, and less than 1 percent of the population pays income tax, making it one of the lowest eff ective tax rates in the 

The concentration on 

dams as the only solution 

to water and energy 

supply grossly ignores 

the need for resource 

behavioral change and 

the role of other energy 

sources.
32 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 88

world.108 Eff ective management can only come from domestic reform, and dependence on 

foreign aid will not render lasting solutions.

Th is study is by no means a complete analysis of the security challenges facing Pakistan’s 

water sector. Its goal is to demonstrate how policymakers and water stakeholders seem to 

underestimate the extent of the potential threats to water and its economic future. More data 

and analysis are needed to understand the extent of each of these challenges and subsequent 

security threats to pinpoint potential hot spots. In particular, eff ective policies require greater 

supply and demand linkages, as opposed to the fi eld’s supply-oriented literature. Th is report 

also presents some areas where tensions are strong, but whether they have the potential to 

become violent needs more research. A better understanding of the water-security nexus will 

allow for more eff ective programming that empowers and engages water stakeholders from 

the offi cial to the grassroots level. Th e future of Pakistan’s water sector does not have to be 

ominous. Th ere are great opportunities to address these challenges and avert violent confl ict. 

Ultimately, change starts with political will.

Recommendations

Engage public, private, and civil sectors in the development of a comprehensive national 

water policy. Such alliances can better meet the various aspects of Pakistan’s water security 

challenges and help ensure a shared policy framework that includes mitigation, adaptation, 

and equitable distribution strategies. Given the realities of water supply, a national policy 

should emphasize both demand management and conservation to ease competition over water between users and sectors. Elements should include better crop patterns, disaster risk 

management, and strategies for changing water use behavior at all levels. Th e involvement 

of community, regional, and academic leaders can establish broad-based support for eff ective 

policy framework and initiatives.

Devise a strategy for improved service provision and strengthen enforcement mechanisms for water use. Such a strategy would fi rst require a comprehensive understanding of 

sector demands and the life cycle of water availability and use. Interventions would need to 

balance water requirements in relation to energy and food security, and appropriate regulations 

should ensure reliable and aff ordable service provisions. Stronger mechanisms of enforcement 

are needed to limit pollution, secure tariff collections, and ensure effi cient and equitable use of 

surface and groundwater.

Improve communication and data sharing mechanisms. Given that mistrust runs so 

deep and many decision makers are the ones benefi ting from the status quo, more eff orts 

should be made to ensure transparency and accountability at all levels of the water sector. 

Donors and civil society can both work to ensure appropriate checks and balances of reported 

water data and of decisions made by water managers and irrigation offi cials. Transparency can 

be achieved by using up-to-date technology and enacting stronger legislation that requires 

more oversight of water usage.

Promote the adoption of innovative business models and methods of water conservation. Such strategies would help ease microlevel tensions and confl icts surrounding water by 

addressing resource challenges through new technologies, investments, and effi ciency gains. 

Conservation strategies could include rainwater harvesting, water recycling, and drip irrigation.

Strengthen disaster risk management strategies at the local level. Th is is a bottom-up 

approach for addressing the impacts of environmental hazards, including dispossession and 

Better understanding 

of the water-security 

nexus will allow 

for more effective 

programming that 

empowers and engages 

water stakeholders 

from the offi cial to the 

grassroots level.
USIP.ORG 33

UNDERSTANDING PAKISTAN’S WATER-SECURITY NEXUS

migration. By doing so, Pakistan can ensure eff ective and timely relief and recovery through 

local institutions and help increase the legitimacy of formal governance structures.

Conclusion

Th e competition over water and the eff ects of environmental hazards in Pakistan provoke political instability when other problems and grievances already exist. In essence, water insecurity 

can make a bad situation worse. One way to ease the tension is to address water management 

in an altered environment. Solving the water scarcity problems should come from doing more 

with less. Doing nothing is not an option. As shortages become more widespread, it is crucial 

that the government invest greater political capital to regulate water competition and provide 

quality water services to all communities. Pakistan does not have the capacity to fi nd new 

sources of water or to inject more water into its national grid. Delaying eff orts to address its 

water insecurities will only intensify, perhaps even violently, the various disputes between water 

stakeholders. Civil unrest, economic vulnerabilities, and political fragility already plague the 

country. Water stress should not be the security tipping point but rather a path to social harmony, environmental sustainability, and national unity.

Water sector priorities should address economic effi ciency, environmental sustainability, 

and equity, which should be included in a framework to reorient water demand and improve 

water management. Regulating and altering water use behavior could curtail water shortages, 

and Pakistan could pave the way for more economic development, which could help lower 

poverty rates and ease tensions between water users. It will be a long incremental process, but 

one that needs to be initiated earnestly through appropriate institutional reforms in the water 

sector and a healthy dose of democracy in the water resources decision-making structures. Th e 

statistics, technology, and consequences of no change are known, but anticipating the confl ict 

ramifi cations of water insecurity in Pakistan requires further analytical work.

Notes

 1. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) defines water stress as availability 

between 500 and 1,000 cubic meters per capita per year and water scarcity as less than 500 cubic meters per 

year per capita (http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/data).

 2. Brahma Chellaney, Water: Asia’s New Battleground (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011).

 3. Ibid., 202.

 4. Ibid., 199.

 5. Ibid., 198.

 6. Muhammad Latif, “Spatial Productivity Along a Canal Irrigation System in Pakistan,” Irrigation and 

Drainage 56, no. 5 (2007): 509–21.

 7. Daanish Mustafa and David Wrathall, “Indus Basin Floods of 2010: Souring of a Faustian Bargain?” Water 

Alternatives 4, no. 1 (2011): 72–85; Daanish Mustafa and Muhammad Usman Qazi, “Karez versus Tubewell 

Irrigation: The Comparative Social Acceptability and Practicality of Sustainable Groundwater Development 

in Balochistan, Pakistan,” Contemporary South Asia 16, no. 2 (2008): 171–95.

 8. Louise Amoore and Marieke de Goede, “Risky Geographies: Aid and Enmity in Pakistan,” Environment 

and Planning D: Society and Space 29 (2011): 193–202. 

 9. United Nations Development Programme, “Environment and Climate Change,” http://undp.org.pk/

environment-and-climate-change.html.

 10. FAO, AQUASTAT database, 2013, www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/data.

 11. Taimur Rahman, The Class Structure of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press Pakistan, 2012). 

 12. Abdul Waheed Bhutto and Aqeel Ahmed Bazmi, “Sustainable Agriculture and Eradication of Rural 

Poverty in Pakistan,” Natural Resources Forum 31, no. 4 (2007): 253–62. 

 13. Syed Ayub Qutub, “Karachi—A Case of Asymmetric Inclusion in the Current Globalization?” in 

Globalization and Urban Development, edited by Harry W. Richardson and Chang-Hee Bae (Berlin: SpringerVerlag, 2005).
34 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 88

 14. Chellaney, Water, 199.

 15. Abdul Laghari, Davy Vanham, and Wolfgang Rauch, “The Indus Basin in the Framework of Current and 

Future Water Resources Management,” Hydrology and Earth System Sciences 16, no. 4 (2012): 1063–83.

 16. Mustafa and Qazi, “Karez versus Tubewell Irrigation.”

 17. Mir Atta Muhammad Talpur, “Water Shortage in Sindh: Causes and Consequences,” Sindhi Association of 

North America, March 2001, www.sanalist.org/kalabagh/a-19.htm; Daanish Mustafa, “Social Construction 

of Hydropolitics: The Geographical Scales of Water and Security in the Indus Basin,” The Geographical 

Review 7, no. 4 (2007): 484–501.

 18. Katharine Adeney, “A Step Towards Inclusive Federalism in Pakistan? The Politics of the 18th Amendment,” 

Plubius: The Journal of Federalism 42, no. 4 (2012): 539–65. 

 19. FAO, AQUASTAT database.

 20. Laghari, Vanham, and Rauch, “The Indus Basin,” 1065.

 21. A farmer sowing 100 percent of his or her land twice a year would be equivalent to 200 percent cropping 

intensity.

 22. Daanish Mustafa, “Colonial Law, Contemporary Water Issues in Pakistan,” Political Geography 20, no. 7 

(2001): 817–37; Daanish Mustafa “Theory versus Practice: The Bureaucratic Ethos of Water Resource 

Management and Administration in Pakistan,” Contemporary South Asia 11, no. 1 (2002): 39–56; Daanish 

Mustafa, “To Each According to His Power? Participation, Access, and Vulnerability in Irrigation and 

Flood Management in Pakistan,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 20, no. 6 (2002): 737–52.

 23. Laghari, Vanham, and Rauch, “The Indus Basin,” 1066.

 24. Government of Pakistan, National Water Policy, draft manuscript (Islamabad).

 25. Simi Kamal, “Pakistan’s Water Challenges: Entitlement, Access, Efficiency, and Equity,” in Running on 

Empty: Pakistan’s Water Crisis (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2009).

 26. John Briscoe and Usman Qamar, “Pakistan’s Water Economy: Running Dry” (New York: World Bank, 

2005); Imran Ali, The Punjab Under Imperialism, 1885–1947 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 

1988).

 27. UNESCO, UN World Water Development Report (New York: United Nations, 2012), p. 823

 28. Cited in Shaheen Akhtar, “Emerging Challenges to Indus Waters Treaty: Issues of Compliance and 

Transboundary Impacts of Indian Hydoprojects on the Western River,” Focus 28, no. 3 (2010).

 29. Amanda Mascarelli, “Demand for Water Outstrips Supply,” Nature, August 8, 2012, www.nature.com/

news/demand-for-water-outstrips-supply-1.11143. 

 30. Laghari, Vanham, and Rauch, “The Indus Basin,” 1065

 31. Tushaar Shah, Taming the Anarchy: Groundwater Governance in South Asia (Washington, DC; RFF Press, 

2009); John Briscoe, Usman Qamar, Manuel Contigjoch, Pervaiz Amir, and Don Blackmore, “Pakistan’s 

Water Economy: Running Dry” (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2006), p. 27.

 32. Kamal, “Pakistan’s Water Challenges.”

 33. World Wildlife Fund, “Pakistan’s Waters at Risk: Water and Health Related Issues in Pakistan and Key 

Recommendations” (Lahore: WWF Pakistan, February 2007).

 34. Georg Kaser, Martin Grobhauser, and Ben Marzeion, “Contribution Potential of Glaciers to Water 

Availability in Different Climate Regimes,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States 

of America 107, no. 47 (2010): 20226.

 35. Briscoe and Qamar, “Pakistan’s Water Economy.”

 36. Walter Immerzeel, Ludovicus van Beek, and Marc F. Bierkens, “Climate Change Will Affect the Asian 

Water Towers,” Science 328, no. 5984: 1382–85; Muhammad Akhtar, Nasir Ahmad, and Martin Booij, 

“The Impact of Climate Change on the Water Resources of Hindukush-Karakorum-Himalaya Region 

under Different Glacier Coverage Scenarios,” Journal of Hydrology 355, no. 1–4 (2008): 148–63. 

 37. J. H. Christensen et al., “Regional Climate Projections,” in Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, 

eds. S. Solomon et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

 38. Planning Commission of Pakistan, Task Force on Climate Change: Final Report (Islamabad: Government of 

Pakistan, 2010); Briscoe and Qamar, “Pakistan’s Water Economy.”

 39. Kenneth Hewitt, “Climactic Hazards and Agricultural Development: Some Aspects of the Problem in the 

Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent,” in Interpretations of Calamity: From the Viewpoint of Human Ecology (Winchester, MA: Allen & Unwin, 1983), pp. 181–201.

 40. David R. Archer, Nathan Forsythe, Hayley J. Fowler, and Syed Muhammed Shah, “Sustainability of Water 

Resources Management in the Indus Basin Under Changing Climatic and Socio Economic Conditions,” 

Hydrology and Earth System Sciences 14, no. 8 (2010): 1669–80.

 41. Government of Pakistan, State of the Environment Report (Islamabad, 2005), www.environment.gov.pk/

Publications.htm. 
USIP.ORG 35

UNDERSTANDING PAKISTAN’S WATER-SECURITY NEXUS

 42. Population Reference Bureau, “2012 World Population Data Sheet,” http://www.prb.org/pdf12/2012-

population-data-sheet_eng.pdf.

 43. Briscoe and Qamar, “Pakistan’s Water Economy.”

 44. FAO, “AQUASTAT Survey: Pakistan,” 2010, www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries_regions/PAK/

index.stm.

 45. David Harvey, “Population, Resources, and the Ideology of Science,” Economic Geography 50, no. 3 (1974): 

256–77.

 46. World Bank Statistics Database, “Pakistan,” http://data.worldbank.org/country/pakistan.

 47. M. H. Khan, Agriculture in Pakistan: Change and Progress, 1947–2005 (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2006), 

p. 16.

 48. Planning Commission, “Task Force on Food Security: Final Report” (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 

2009). 

 49. Pongsak Suttinon, Asif M. Bhatti, and Seigo Nasu, “Industrial and Household Water Demand Management: A Case Study of Pakistan” (Kaohsiung, Taiwan: Society for Social Management Systems, 2009), 

http://management.kochi-tech.ac.jp/PDF/ssms2009/sms09_171.pdf.

 50. The precise figures are 9.7 percent, 6.9 percent, and 2.7 percent. Suttinon, Bhatti, and Nasu, “Industrial and 

Household Water Demand Management.”

 51. Ministry of Water and Power, Pakistan Water Sector Strategy, vols. 1–5 (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 

2002), http://cms.waterinfo.net.pk/?q=wss.

 52. Shah, Taming the Anarchy. 

 53. Mustafa and Qazi, “Karez versus Tubewell Irrigation.”

 54. Shah, Taming the Anarchy.

55. Mustafa and Qazi, “Karez versus Tubewell Irrigation.”

 56. Ibid.

 57. Mustafa, “Theory versus Practice.”

 58. Mustafa, “To Each According to His Power?”

 59. WWF, Big Cities, Big Water, Big Challenges: Water in an Urbanising World (Washington, DC: World Wildlife 

Foundation, 2011), www.wwf.se/source.php/1390895/Big%20Cities_Big%20Water_Big%20Challenges_ 

2011.pdf.

 60. Michael Renner, “Water Challenges in Central-South Asia,” Noref Policy Brief no. 4 (2009): 1–10. 

 61. Arif Hasan and Masooma Mohib, “Urban Slums Reports: The Case of Karachi, Pakistan” (London: 

University College, Development Planning Unit, 2010), www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu-projects/Global_Report/pdfs/

Karachi.pdf.

 62. Rory McCarthy, “Pakistan’s drought turns political: Explosions and street violence challenge the military 

regime,” The Guardian, April 18, 2001, p. 15. 

 63. Michael Renner, “Water and Human Security in Central-South Asia,” Institute for Environmental Security 

News, July 20, 2010, www.envirosecurity.org/news/single.php?id=312. 

 64. UNDP, “Environment and Climate Change.”

 65. Qutub, “Karachi.”

 66. Hajrah Mumtaz, “‘Tanker Mafia’ Behind Karachi’s Water Woes,” Dawn.com, March 31, 2008, http://

archives.dawn.com/2008/04/01/local4.htm.

 67. Farhana Sultana, “Water, Water Everywhere But Not a Drop to Drink: Pani Politics (water politics) in Rural 

Bangladesh,” International Feminist Journal of Politics 9, no. 4 (2007): 494–502.

68. Ibid.

 69. UNESCO, World Water Development Report, p. 537.

 70. Dengue numbers dropped in 2012 after heavy spraying.

 71. This list is an illustration of types of water conflicts in Pakistan at a micro level. It reflects the social instability resulting from water mismanagement and is not meant to be inclusive. Data collected from Pacific 

Institute, Water Conflict Chronology, www.worldwater.org/conflict.html; Human Rights Watch, www.

hrw.org/reports/2004/pakistan0704/6.htm; web archives of The Daily Times of Pakistan, www.dailytimes.

com.pk; CNN.com; and Dawn.com.

 72. Mustafa and Wrathall, “Indus Basin floods of 2010.”

 73. Interview with Sarwar Bari, 2012.

 74. Kamal, “Pakistan’s Water Challenges.”

 75. Feisal Khan, “Water, Governance, and Corruption in Pakistan,” in Running on Empty.

 76. Ibid.

 77. Mustafa, “ Colonial law, contemporary water issues in Pakistan.” 
36 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 88

 78. Ibid.

79. In warabandi, farmers take turns getting the full flow of the water entering a watercourse from a distributary 

canal. Farmers are allotted a turn, a fixed amount of time during the course of a seven-day cycle, which 

represents their formal water right. The farmer must take the water at the allotted time or lose their right to 

the water. This water right is calculated by the amount of land the farmer has under cultivation—not by the 

water requirements of the crop. Thus, unlike other irrigation systems, control of water in the Indus lies 

completely in the hands of the supplier, not in the hands of the farmer.

 80. Kamal, “Pakistan’s Water Challenges.”

 81. Ibid.

 82. Kaiser Bengali, “Water Management Under Constraints,” in Running on Empty.

 83. Kamal, “Pakistan’s Water Challenges.”

 84. Government of Pakistan, Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), Water Sector Investment 

Planning Study, 5 vols. (Lahore: Federal Planning Cell, 1990).

 85. “Telemetry System,” Dawn.com, July 10, 2010, http://archives.dawn.com/archives/32277.

 86. Muhammad A. Kahlown, Abdur Raoof, Muhammad Zubair, and W. Doral Kemper, “Water Use 

Efficiency and Economic Feasibility of Growing Rice and Wheat with Sprinkler Irrigation in the Indus 

Basin of Pakistan,” Agricultural Water Management 87, no. 3 (2007): 292–98.

 87. Muhammad M. Alam, Muhammad N. Bhutta, and Aftab H. Azhar, “Use and Limitation of Sprinklar and 

Drip Irrigation Systems in Pakistan,” paper no. 661, Pakistan Engineering Congress, 70th Annual Session 

Proceedings (Lahore: Pakistan Engineering Congress, 2007), http://pecongress.org.pk/images/upload/

books/Paper661.pdf.

 88. “More than 40 per cent Pakistanis lack access to clean water,” Dawn.com, June 12, 2011, http://dawn.

com/2011/06/12/more-than-40-per-cent-pakistanis-lack-access-to-clean-water.

 89. These interviews with government water managers, civil society, and the general public took place between 

2005 and 2007, in 2009, and again in 2012. 

 90. Interview with Shafqat Masood, former chairman of IRSA, March 27, 2012, Lahore, Pakistan.

 91. Interview with M. H. Siddiqui, technical adviser, PIDA, 2012.

 92. Bashir A. Malik, a prominent engineer and vocal proponent of Kalabagh Dam, quoted in Malik, “The Case 

for Kalabagh Dam,” in The Politics of Managing Water, ed. K. Bengali (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 

2003), pp. 170–73.

 93. Interview with Nisar Memon, executive director of SPO, 2012.

 94. Siddiqui interview.

 95. Interview with Simi Kamal, chief executive officer of Hisaar Foundation, Pakistan, November 15, 2012.

 96. Ibid.

 97. Ibid.

 98. Interview with Nisar Memon and Sarwar Bari, 2012.

 99. Quote from a village elder in Balochistan.

100. Interview with Mushtaq Gaddi, 2012.

101. Interview with Shafqat Masood. The quote is paraphrased and translated from Urdu by the author.

102. Mustafa, “Theory versus Practice,” “To Each According to His Power?”

103. Interview with Nisar Memon; Mustafa, “Social Construction of Hydropolitics.”

104. Quoted in Simi Kamal, “Use of Water for Agriculture in Pakistan: Experiences and Challenges,” working 

paper no. 12, University of Nebraska Lincoln, Office of Research and Economic Development Publications, 

2009, http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=researchecondev. 

105. Interview with Simi Kamal.

106. Michael Kugelman and Robert M. Hathaway, eds., Running on Empty: Pakistan’s Water Crisis (Washington, 

DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center, 2009). 

107. Shahrukh R. Khan, Fogia S. Khan, and Aasim S. Akhtar, Initiating Devolution for Service Delivery in 

Pakistan: Ignoring the Power Structure (Karachi: Oxford University Press Pakistan, 2007); Mustafa, “To Each 

According to His Power?”

108. Chellaney, Water, 227; “Pakistan has lowest tax to GDP ratio in world,” The Nation, February 18, 2013, 

www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/business/18-Feb-2013/

pakistan-has-lowest-tax-to-gdp-ratio-in-world.
 5

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

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institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to 

help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote post-conflict 

peacebuilding, and increase conflict-management tools, capacity, and 

intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering 

others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

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President: Jim Marshall

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George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct Professor of Practice, The George 

Washington University, Washington, D.C. • Judy Ansley, Former Assistant 

to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. 

Bush, Washington, D.C. • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C. • Joseph Eldridge, University Chaplain 

and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, School of International Service, 

American University • Kerry Kennedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy 

Center for Justice and Human Rights, Washington, D.C. • Ikram U. Khan, 

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Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations, Stanford 

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A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason University, Fairfax, Va. • Judy 

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Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Washington, D.C.

MEMBERS EX OFFICIO

John Kerry, Secretary of State • Kathleen Hicks, Principal Deputy Under 

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2 Looking for Justice UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE • 2301 CONSTITUTION AVE. NW • WASHINGTON, DC 20037 • USIP.ORG 

By 2030, experts expect Pakistan, a semiarid nation whose 

economy is still based primarily on agriculture, to decline 

from being water stressed to water scarce. The competition 

over water and the effects of environmental hazards in the 

country provoke political instability when other problems 

and grievances already exist. In essence, water insecurity 

can make a bad situation worse. Doing nothing is not an 

option, yet Pakistan does not have the capacity to find new 

sources of water or to inject more water into its national 

grid. Delaying efforts to address the situation will only 

intensify disputes between water stakeholders. Civil unrest, 

economic vulnerabilities, and political fragility already 

plague the country. Water stress should not be the tipping 

point but instead a means to promote social harmony, environmental sustainability, and national unity. This report provides a preliminary analysis of water management within 

this critical national context. 

Related Links 

■ Pakistan and the Narratives of Extremism by Amil Khan (Special Report, 

March 2013)

■ Conflict Dynamics in Gilgit-Baltistan by Izhar Hunzai (Special Report, 

January 2013)

■ Governance Reforms in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: The Long Road to Nowhere? 

by Joshua T. White and Shuja Ali Malik (Peace Brief, October 2012)

■ Conflict Dynamics in Karachi by Huma Yusuf (Peaceworks, October 2012)

■ Pakistan’s Energy Crisis by Elizabeth Mills (Peaceworks, June 2012)

■ Hydropolitics in Pakistan’s Indus Basin by Daanish Mustafa (Special Report, 

November 2010)

■ Flooding Challenges Pakistan’s Government and the International Community by 

Altaf Ullah Khan and Mary Hope Schwoebel (Peace Brief, August 2010)

PEACEWORKS • JUNE 2013 • NO. 88