The Honor able Da vid A. Katz, Unit ed S t at es Dist rict Judge f or the Nor

thern District of * Ohio, sitti ng by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0592n.06 No. 08-4291 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA , Plaintif f-Appellee , v. M AR CU S CO BB , Defendant-

Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON A PP E A L FROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E SO UT HE RN D IS T R IC T O F O H IO

O P I N I O N

BEF OR E: CO LE, CL AY , C ir c uitJudg e s; K AT Z , District

Judge. * COLE, Circuit Jud ge. Def endant- Appellant Mar cus Cobb was convicted, following a jury tr ia l, o f f ive c ri min a l counts re la te d to the ro bb e ri e s of a Bu c a di B e pp o re sta ur ant an d two ba

nk s in C o l u m b u s, Ohio. Cobb now appea ls his convictions and sentence , alleg ing that the district court committed numerous er

rors that re quire re versa l. We AF F IRM

.

I. BACKG ROUND On Sept ember 6, 2007, Defe ndant-Appe llant Marcus Cobb wa s char g ed in a f ive-c ount indictment with offense s relate d to thr ee robber ies. The f irst robbery

took place on O ctober

8, 2006, at the B uca di B eppo re staurant in Columbus, Ohio. After c losing time, at ar ound 12:43 a.m., Cobb demande d “all of your money” fr om the restaur ant’s as s i s tant g ener al manag er. ( Testimony ofNo. 08-4291

USA v. M arcus Cobb

- 2 - Debor a Sue Curry , Dist. Ct. Docket No. 130 at 20.) The manag er emptied the restaurant’s sa fe a nd handed Cobb $2640 in a c hef’ s hat. About fi v e m o n t hs after the robbe ry , the manag er ide ntified, with 70 perc ent ce rtainty , Cobb as the robbe r via a photo arra

y . The second robber

y occur red on J anuar

y 26, 2007, at the Huntington National Ba nk in Upper Arling ton, Ohio. Cobb appro ac hed a ba nk employ ee f

rom behind in the par

king lot as she was op e nin g the ba

nk fo r the da

y . He thr e a te ne d h e r w itha sil ve r h and g un

and a tte mpt e d to g a in a c c e ss to the bank. Upon g aining acc ess, he order ed her and a second employ ee, L ois Kauf man, t o open the bank’ s vaul t , s t at i n g: “You have 20 sec onds to open the vault now, or it will be a

mur de r/ su ic ide .” (T e sti mony of L ois Ka ufman , Di st . Ct . D oc ke t N o. 12 8 at 15 .) Cob b f le d w ith $18,100. Four

day s after

the robbe ry , Kauf

man identified a differ ent individual as the robbe r in a photo arra

y . Police commence d an in v es tigation of this indi vidual, Timothy Rispress, befor e

e lim inatin g him

a s a su sp e c t in

the ro bb e ry . T e sti fy

inga t a de po sit ion

the we e k b e fo re tr ia l, Kauf man identified Cobb as the r obber. Th e fi na l r ob be ry

ha pp e ne d o n Apr il 1 2, 20 07 , at th e Cha se B ank in Col umb us . Co bb a g a in approa ched a bank employ ee in the parking lot while she was ope ning the bank. He threatened he r with a g un. When Cobb enter ed the bank, he told the two employ ees that wer e pre sent to open the

sa fe , s ta tin g tha

t he ha d n o “p ro ble m w itha mur de r/ su ic ide .” (T e sti mony of L e ah K re nc ipr oc k, Di st. Ct. Do c ke t No

. 13 6 a t 84 .) Cob b fl e d wi th $1 26 ,2 81 in the ve hic le of on e of the ba nk e mpl oy e e s, Sean Hose lton, which later w as rec overe d at a ne arby fitness ce nter. Ne x t to the car , law enfor ceme nt rec overe d a g love that was te sted for D NA.No. 08-4291

USA v. M arcus Cobb

- 3 - Cob b p ro c e e de d to tr ia l, a ft e r w hic h th e jur y e nter e d a ve rd ic t of

g uil ty on a ll f ive c ounts : violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951; t wo co u n t s of ar med bank r obbery , 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d) ; br andishing a firea rm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c )(1) (A)( ii); and brandishing a fire arm duringa cr ime of violence (sec ond offe nse), 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1)( C)(i). The dis tr ic t c ourt

su mma ri zed the g ov e rnme nt’ s e vid e nc e a t tr ia l a s f oll ow s: Duri n g the prosec ution of the Def endant, the G overnme nt relied on a varie ty of evidenc e. F or example, the Gove rnment introduced videos and photog raphs take n from t h e ro b b eries. These videos a nd photogr aphs showed that in each of the robber ies, the robbe r wore a blue s weatshirt with a y ellow stripe down the side and in t wo of the ro bb e ri e s, a

blu e hat w ithdis tin c tiv e sti tch ing . T he ro bb e ry vic tim s testified that the videos a

nd pictures acc urate ly ref lected what they

reme mbere d the robber wea ring

. A Gover

nment witness testified that these article s of clothing wer e rec overe d from De fenda nt’s home. Ther e we re two in-c ourt identifications by ro bb e ry e y e -w itn e ss v ic tim s. Ev ide nc e wa s in tr od uc e d r e ve ali nglarg e c a sh purc ha se s ma de by De fe nd ant s ho rt ly a ft e r t he ro bb e ri e s. Th e Go ve rnme nt a lso relied on DNA evidenc e matching Def endant to a g love found near an aba ndoned ca r t h a tw a s t a k e nf

r o m th e s c e n e o f

o n e r o b b e r

y. (Op. a nd Orde r Reg ardingMot. for Ne w Trial, Dist. Ct. Docke t N o. 106 at 2.) Cobb was se ntence d to a term of 1224 months inca rce ration. He now c halleng es his convictions and sente nce on multiple g rounds. II. AN AL YSI S Cobb rais es m ultiple arg uments on appea l. We address fir st the three issues on w hich he focuse d at ora l argument. A. Suf

fi ciency of the evidence for brandish ing a f irear m conviction Cob b a rgue s th a t in su ff

ic ie nt e vid e nc e su

pp or ts h is c on viction s f

or br and ish inga

fi re a rm , in v iol a tio n o f 1 8 U .S. C. § 92 4( c ), duri ngthe robb e ri e s o f t he Hunti ng ton

and Cha se ba

nk s.No. 08-4291

USA v. M arcus Cobb

- 4 - Specifica lly , he conte nds that, beca use he used a pellet gun—as opposed to a rea l gun—dur ing the Buc a di Beppo robbery , the Government was obli g ated to provide a fac tual basis to sugg est that he used a r eal gun in the l at t er two r obberie s. Be cause it failed to do so, Cobb arg ues, insufficie nt

e vid e nc e su

pp or ts h is c on vic tio n o n th e se tw o c ounts
. I n rev ie w in g a s u f

f ic ie n c y o f th e e v id e n c e c h a ll e n g e , w e a s k w h e th e r , a f te r r e v ie w ing the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the prosec ution, a ny rational trier

of fa ct could have found the essential e lements of the c rime beyond a re asonable doubt. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 44 3 U.S. 30 7, 31 9 ( 19 79 ); United Sta te s v . G uth rie , 5 5 7 F

. 3 d 2 4 3 , 2 5 3 ( 6 th Ci r . 2 0 0 9 )

. “We do not independe ntly

assess the c redibility

of witnesses or

the weig ht of the evidenc e.” Gu thr ie , 557 F.3d at 253. “Circumstantial evide nce a lone is sufficient to sustain a c onviction and such e vidence need not remove ever

y rea sonable hy

pothesis except that of g uilt.” Un ite d S tat es v . B ar

ne tt , 398 F.3d 516, 522 (6th Cir. 2005) (c itation and quotation marks omitted). Th e re le va

nt s tatut or

y pr ov isi on

is 1 8 U .S. C. § 92 4( c ), wh ic h d e fi ne s “ fi re arm ” a s (A ) any we a

po n (in c lud inga

sta rt e r gun ) w hic h w ill or

is d e sig ne d to or

may re a dil y be conve rted to expel a projec til e b y t h e action of an explosi ve; (B ) the fr ame or rec eiver of any such we apon; (C) a

ny firea rm muffler

or fire arm silence r; or (D) a ny de str uc tiv e de vic e . Su c h te rm do e s n ot i nc lud e an a

nti qu e fi re arm . 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) . Pellet guns, a s Cobb points out, do not satisfy this definition. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, note 1.G. (“ A wea pon, commonly

known as a

‘B B’ or pellet gun, that uses air or car bon diox ide pre ssure to expel a projec tile is a dang erous we apon but not a fire arm.” ). I n th is c a se , s e vera l w itn e sse s te sti fi e d th a t th e y saw a fi re arm duri ngthe ba

nk ro bb e ri e s. Kauf m an t es tified that she sawthe robbe r appr oach he r co- worke r with “a big silver

g un.”No. 08-4291

USA v. M arcus Cobb

- 5 - (Testimony

of L ois Kaufman, D ist. Ct . Docke t No. 128 at 15.) When aske d if the wea pon appea

red to be a r eal gun, Kauf

man re sponded, “O h, y es . T h ere was no doubt, the fe ar in his ey es, it was horrible.” (

Id. ) L isa Ni ch o l s , Kaufman’s co- worke r, also testified that she “sawthe silver g un.” (Testimony

of L isa Nichols, Dist. Ct. Docke t No. 136 at 4.) L eah Krenc iprock, who was a teller at the Chase B ank, testified that the r obber pointed a g un at her . And her co-w orker , Hoselton, testified that the robbe r had “ a lar ge s i lver gun” that wa s likely a “se mi-automatic.” ( Testimony of Sean Hoselto n , Dist. Ct. Docket No. 132 at 4.) F urther, A TF Spec ial Ag ent CraigBr ennema n testified that: [I ]t seeme d to me that the wea pon used in t h e Buca

was not the same wea

pon that wa s u se d in

the ba nk s. . . . [W]he n y ou ’r e loo kin g a t th e vid e o and so me of the sti lls fr om t he B uc a ro bb e ry , y ou

kn ow , y ou

c an s e e the da

rk low e r p or

tio n, the fr a me portion of the firea

rm as being dark, black, the upper portion being silver, the port of the g un. The gun used in the, y ou know, in the Chas e, i n t h e Hu ntington, to me, l o o k s l i k e a

d i f f e r e n tw e a p o n . It ’ s s i l v e r

c o mp l e t e l y. (Testimony

of CraigBr ennema

n, Dist. Ct. Docket No. 139 at 16.) This evidence is sufficient for a rational trier of fac t to have conc luded that a r eal gun was used duringthe bank r obberie s. As we have noted, “ ‘[d] escr iptive lay opinion testim ony

can be sufficie nt’ to support a convic tion under § 924.” Un ite d S tat es v . W ill is , 23 2 F . App ’x 52 7, 53 7 ( 6th C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( al t er at i o ni no ri gi n al ) ( qu o t i n g United S t ates v. Robe rson , 459 F.3d 39, 47 ( 1st Cir. 2006)). “ ‘Althoug h § 924(c) require s proof that the gun i s re al, the g overnme nt’s proof ne ed not

rea ch a le vel of scie ntific ce rtainty .’” Id. (q u o t i n g R o b e r son , 4 5 9 F. 3 d at 47). The evidenc e her e includes more tha

n lay opinion testimony ; Spec ial Ag ent Br ennema n’s testimony

that the g un used in the bank robbe ries looks like a diff ere nt weapon tha

n the pellet g un used in the re staurant r obberyNo. 08-4291

USA v. M arcus Cobb

- 6 - also supports the conc lusion that the gun use d in the bank robbe ries wa s rea l. There fore , sufficie nt evidenc e supports Cobb’s conviction. See also U nited States v. Conner , 3 06 F . App ’x 97 8, 98 1 ( 6th Cir. 2009) (upholding § 924(c) conviction bas e d o n e ye witness testimony

that defe ndant was holding

a g un, surveillance footag e showing defe ndant holding what appea red to be a g un, and t es t i m ony from co- defe ndant that she saw defe ndant throw what “looked like a gun”). B. M ot ion to suppr e ss Cobb also appea ls the denial of his suppre ssion moti on, claiming that the war rant a uthorizi ng the se arch of his h ome wa s n ot s up po rt e d b y pr ob a ble c a us e . Co bb argue s th a t th e a ff ida vit

su pporti ngthe wa

rr ant f a ile d to de ve lop a

su ff ic ie nt n e xus b e tw e e n th e e vid e nc e so ug ht a nd his residenc e.

a. Standard of review When review ing a

denial of a

motion to s uppress, we re v i ew the district c ourt’s fa ctual finding s for c lear

err or and its leg al conc lusions—such as the exist ence of probable cause —de novo. United States v. W

illiams , 544 F.3d 683, 685 (6th Cir. 2008)

. We r eview the evidenc e “‘in the lig ht most li kely

to support the district c ourt’s dec ision.’” United States v. Higgins , 557 F.3d 381, 389 (6th Cir. 2009)(c itation and quotation marks omitted). We review a mag istrate judg e’s initial p r o b a b le c a u s e d eter mination more defe rentially . “[T] he tra ditional standard for revie w of a

n issuing mag istrate’s probable cause deter mination ha s been that so long as the mag istrate had a ‘ substantial ba sis fo r . . . c on c lud [ing ]’ that a se arc h w ou ld u

nc ov e r e vid e nc e of

wr on g do ing , th e F ourt

h Amendment re quires no more .” United States v. Allen , 211 F.3d 970, 973 (6th Cir. 2000) (en ba nc) (q u o t i n g Illinois v. G ates , 4 6 2 U. S

. 2 1 3 , 2 3 6 (1 9 8 3 ))

. W e gi v e an i s s u i n g m agi s t ra t e j u d ge’ s fi n d i n gsNo. 08-4291

USA v. M arcus Cobb

- 7 - of proba ble ca us e gre at defere nce, r ever sing only when its discre tion is arbitrarily exercised. Higgins , 557 F.3d at 389.

b. Pr ob ab le c au se sta nd ar d Probable c ause ma

y exis t “when ‘ there is a fair probability

that contra

band or evidence of a crime w ill be found in a par t i cu l ar pla ce.’ ” W illiams, 544 F. 3d at 686

. (q u o t i n g United States v. Laughton , 4 09 F .3 d 7 44 , 7 47 (6 th Cir . 200 5) ). I n mak ingthi s d e te rm inatio n, “ the iss uin g jud g e mus t undertake a ‘ prac tical, common sense’ ev al u at i o n of ‘a ll of the circ umstances se t forth in the aff idavit before him.’” Id. (c i t i n g Laughton , 409 F.3d at 747).

c. Application

“ ‘T o ju sti fy

a se arc h, the c ir c ums tanc e s mus t ind ic a te wh y e vid e nc e of ill e g a l a c tiv ity

wi ll be found in a p ar t i cu l ar p l ace.’” United States v. W ashington , 380 F.3d 236, 240 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (q u o t i n g United St ates v. Carpenter , 36 0 F .3 d 5 91 , 5 94 (6 th C ir . 2 00 4) (e n b anc )) . “ [T]he a ff ida vit

or wa rra nt reque st must s tate a ne x us betwee n t h e p l ac e t o b e sea rche d and the e vidence soug ht.” W illiams , 544 F.3d at 686 (citations omitted ). We have he ld repe atedly that the re quired ne x us between ev i dence soug ht in a sear ch and a n individual’s residenc e nee d not be base d on direc t evidenc e pre sented to the mag istrate judg e issuing the war rant. Rather , the nexus may be infe rre d. See H iggins , 557 F.3d at 391 (“This circ uit’s holding s indicate that a nexus between the pla ce to be

se arc he d a

nd the ite m to be se ize d ma

y so me tim e s b e inf

e rr e d. ” ); W

illiams , 544 F.3d at 686 (“[T]he courts may

aff ord consider able we ight to the c onclusion of experienc ed law e nforc ement officer s reg ardingwher e evide nce of a cr ime is likely

to be found a

nd [t he cour

ts are] entitled to draw

rea sonable infe renc es about whe re e vidence is likely to be kept, based on the nature of the crime a ndNo. 08-4291

USA v. M arcus Cobb

- 8 - ty pe of of fe ns e .”) ( quotatio n ma

rk s and c itatio n o mit te d) ; id. (“[A] bank robber would keep the proce eds and instrumenta lities of his robbery in his home . . . .”). He re , B re nn e man’ s w arr ant a ff ida vit inc lud e d his co nc lus ion s th a t in div idu a ls i nv olv e d in serial r obbery routinely maintain clothing and other items to conce al their identity , the ca sh proce eds of robbe ries, and f

irea rms and ammunition to carr y out robberie s and that “the se items are maintai n e d

in s u c hp la c e s th a t t

h e y ma y b e r e a d il y

a c c e s s ib le , to in c lu d e h o u s e s , a p artm e n ts , a nd vehicles.” (Application and Affidavit for Search W arr ant (“Warrant Application”), J.A. at 31 ¶ 15.) Fur ther, the a ffidavit set forth sufficie nt f acts to pe rmit the issuing judg e to infer a link betwee n the eviden ce s o u g ht and Cobb’s reside nce. It noted that Cobb wore similar or the same c lothing and

us e d a sim ila

r or the same g un

in b oth ba nk ro bb e ri e s. The reasona

ble infer ence is that this clothi ng and g un likely

would have be en in Cobb’s possession six wee ks following the final robbe ry (whe n the a f f i d a v i t w a s s i g n e d ) e i t h e r t o h i d e o r p o t e n t i a l l y u s e i n a f u tu r e r o b b e r

y . A l s o , t h e a ff

ida vit

n o ted t hat Co b b to o k

$ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 in

th e Ch a s e r o b b e r

y , th a t h e p u r c h a s e d

a Je e p f o r $ 7 0 0 0 th e n e xt day , and that, on May 21, 2007, he had a “huge amount of $100 bills on him.” ( Id. at 29-30 ¶ 7, 9, 11.) Ag ain, t he reasonable infere nce is that Cobb had a signific ant portion of the r emaining funds in his control when the a ffidavit wa s signe d on May 31, 2007. I n th is w ay , th e pr e se nt c a se is d ist inguis ha ble fr om United States v. Be thal , 245 F. App’ x 46 0 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 7) . We a ff

ir me d th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on to g ra nt t he mot ion

to s up pr e ss i n Be tha l be c a

us e “ the a ff

ida vit on ly c on ta ine d inf

or ma tio n c on ne c tin g the a

pp e lla nt to t wo sh oo tin g s; it did not include any fac ts c onnecting him to drug s or to wea pons at his home other than his alleg ed status as a g ang member and known acqua intance of the Parke rs who re portedly kept drug s and g unsNo. 08-4291

USA v. M arcus Cobb

- 9 - in the ir residenc e.” Id. a t 46 8. Sin c e the a ff ida vit he re c on ta ine d inf

or ma tio n co nn e c tin g Cob b to

wea pons and other e vidence likely to be found in his home, we affir m the district court’s de cision to deny Cobb’s motion t o suppress. C. De te c ti ve M ont ag ’s te st im ony Cobb also argues that De tective Mon t ag’s testim ony reg ardingthe investig ation and

e lim inatio n o f T imo thy

Ris pr e ss a s a

su sp e c t in

the Hunti ng ton

B ank ro bb e ry wa s b oth impermissible opinion t estimony and impermissible embedde d hear say . Def ense c ounsel objecte d to the testimony

on both of these g rounds at trial a nd was ove rru led. We revie w evidentiar y decisions of the trial court for a buse of discr etion. United States v. Ole nder , 3 38 F .3 d 6 29 , 6 37 (6 th Cir. 2003). An abuse of discre tion occurs whe n “the d i s trict court r elies on cle arly err oneous finding s of fac t, improperly applies the law , or employ s an er roneous leg al standar d.” United States v. Lopez-M

edina , 461 F.3d 724, 741 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks and e llipses omit ted). “ Even when the district c ourt has abuse d its discretio n i n admitting evide nce, w e do not re verse a conviction if the e rror

is harmless . . . .” Id. F ir st, Cob b a sse rt s th a t Mo nta g ’s te sti mony re g ard ing Ris pr e ss v iol a te d Co bb ’s du e pr oc e ss ri g hts be c a

us e it w a s im

pe rm iss ibl e op ini on tes ti mo ny that us ur

pe d th e ro le of

the jur y in deter mining g uilt or i nnocenc e. In Coo pe r v . S owd e rs , we state d that permitting opinion testimony that direc tly

influence s a jury ’s consideration of g uilt or innocence is constituti onal er ror. 837 F .2d 284, 287 (6th Cir. 1988). I n that case , a poli ce office r testified that “ [t ]he only evidenc e we found that would link any one to this crime wo u l d be [the defe ndant].” Id. We noted that “the police office r wa s [i mpermissibly ] permitted to testify to his own, personal opinion that such evidenc e asNo. 08-4291

USA v. M arcus Cobb

- 10 - the re wa s a g a ins t ot

he r su sp e c ts wa s ins uf

fi c ie nt to jus tif

y the ir arr e st
. . . . Th is o pin ion su g g e sts to the jury

the g uilt of the acc used and the i n n o ce n ce o f o ther suspec ts.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Montag ’s testimony

is disti ng uishable bec ause i t was primarily fac t-based r ather

than opinion-based a

nd did not im p er m i s s ibly sug g est Cobb’s g uilt. Mont agoutlined the steps he undertook to investig at e Rispress’s possible involvement in the Hunting ton robbery , including int e rv ie wi ngthe e xec uti ve dir e c tor of the F a ithMis sio n Sh e lte r, wh e re Ri sp res s was a re sid e nt; interviewingRispress; and dec iding not to cha rg e Rispress. Montagwas c ross-examined furthe r two day s later, dur ing w hich def ense c ounsel questioned him in more d ep th about the investig ation of Rispress, which initially

was prompted by Kauf

man’s photo-arra

y identification of Rispess. Montag

ex p l ai ned that seve ral staf f member s at Fa ith Miss ion noted that Rispress had a likene ss to the individual in photogra

phs from the Hunting ton robbery . Fur ther, Rispress showed up at t he shelter

a ft e r t he ro bb e ry

wi th o ve r $ 25 0 w or

th o f g old

tee th and ha d a c c e ss t o a ve hic le . O n r e -d ir e c t, M o n t ag s t ated that he came to the conclusion that Rispress was not a “ver y intelligent pe rson” (T es t i m o n y o f H ea t h M o n t ag, Di s t
. C t
. Do ck et No

. 1 3 3 at 1 3 ), an d t h at , b as edo nan i m age compar ison, “there is a very striking r esemblanc e” be tween Rispre ss and Cobb, ( id. at 14). When asked w hy

he discontinued his investig ati on of Rispress without bring ing c harg es, Montag responde d: Th e re is a va ri e ty of re a so ns . I n spe a kin g to al l of the wi tne sse s and a sso c ia te s o f h is fianc ee, no one felt that he w as ca pable of this ty

pe of robber

y , or at lea st what had be e n r e le a se d thro ug h th e me dia , that he wo uld no t ha ve the int e lli g e nc e to c arr

y thi s out. We never found any evidenc e that he ha d a fire arm. The statements that wer e made to us about him having money or spending money wer e as a result throug h theNo. 08-4291

USA v. M arcus Cobb

Cobb further a sserts the pre judicial eff

ect of Montag ’s testimony was e x ace rbate d by the 1 g ov e rnme nt’ s im

pr op e r c los ingre mark s and tard y dis c los ur e of the de te c tiv e ’s inv e sti g a tiv e re po rt s and that th e re fo re any e rr or wa s no t ha rm le ss. Sin c e we c on c lud e that th e dis tr ic t c ourt did no t a bu se its discretion in making the rele vant evidentiar y decisions, there is no need to re ach the issue of ha rm le ssn e ss. - 11 - fianc ee g etting some money . Now, these $250 g old teeth that he cla imed to have at the shelter, w e found out that he got t hem at a local mall for $20 or $25. They wer e an imitation. And lastly , to interview Mr. Rispress, while he is simi lar, ha s a striking r esemblanc e, but his body ty

pe was not r ight. He was a larg e man, but he w as more of overw eig ht instead of a

muscular build. ( Id. at 14-15.) While Montag ’s testimony explained the rea sons why the Rispress investigation was discontinued, it did not “sugg est[] to t h e j u ry the g uilt of the acc used.” Cooper , 837 F.2d at 287 (citation omitted). As such, we find that Mo n t ag’ s testimony was not impermissible opinion t e s t i m o n y. 1 Se c on d, Cob b ar g ue s tha t Mont a g ’s te sti mony c on sti tut e d impe rm iss ibl e he ars ay . Be c a us e Cobb has insufficiently

explained why

this is t he ca se, we find the argu m en t waived. Se e Di lle ry v. City of Sandusky , 398 F.3d 562, 569 (6th Cir. 2005) (“It is well-established that issues adve rted to in a perf

unctory manner , unacc ompanied by some eff ort at deve loped ar g umentation, are deeme d waived.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). D. Suf

fi ciency of the evidence for Huntington Bankrobbery Cobb additionally

argues t hat t he evidence used to support his conviction under Count 2 for the ar med robbe ry

of the Hunting ton Ba

nk is leg ally

insufficient, in violation of Fe dera l Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. He c ontends that bec ause Kauf man, who wa s working the morning of theNo. 08-4291

USA v. M arcus Cobb

- 12 - ro bb e ry , in iti a ll y

ide nti fi e d a

dif fe re nt i nd ivi du a l du

ri nga ph oto arr ay , b e fo re ide nti fy ingCob b in person, a nd beca use no phy sical evide nce linked Cobb to the Hunting ton Ba nk robber y , insufficient evidenc e supports his c onviction. As expl ained a bove, in re viewing a suff iciency of the e vidence ch alleng e, we ask whe ther, a fter r eviewingthe evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the prosec ution, any

rational trier

of fa ct could have found the e ssential elements of the cr ime bey ond

a re asonable doubt. J

ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 4 43 U. S. 30 7, 31 9 ( 19 79 ); United Sta te s v . G uth rie , 557 F.3d 243, 253 ( 6th Cir. 2009). Her e, Ka ufman pre viously identified an individual other than Cobb as the Huntington B ank

ro bb e r a nd te sti fi e d th a t th e ro bb e r wa s c ov e re d fr om he a d to toe and that a ll sh e c ou ld se e we re his ey es. Yet, at her deposition she m ade an i n-per son identification of Cobb as the robber. T he jury ’s decision t o cre dit the l atter identification is not one that we can second g uess on appe al. Se e Gu thr ie , 557 F.3d at 253 (“We do not independe ntly assess the c redibility

of witnesses or the weig ht of the evidenc e.”)

. Fur thermore , additional evidenc e supports Cobb’s conviction for the Hunting ton Ba nk robber y . The Hunting ton robbery had a similar modus ope randi to the robber y of the Chase Ba

nk, i nwh i ch DN A e v i d en ce s u p p o rt ed C obb ’s co n v i ct i o n . Bo t h ro b b er i es o cc u rr edea rl y i nt h e m o rn i n g, while bank e mploy ees w ere prepa ring the fa cilities for opening ; the culpri t i n b o t h robber ies was

we ari ngda

rk c lot hin g that c on ta ine d a green or y e llo w s tr ipe ; and

the ro bb e r i nd ic a te d o n b oth

oc c a sio ns that he ha d n o p ro ble m w itha “ mur de r/ su ic ide .” B re nn e man te sti fi e d th a t us e of thi s

un iqu e ph ra se wa s “ e xce pti on a lly imp or tant” in ide nti fy

ing a c omm on su sp e c t in the tw o r ob be ri e s, since he had “never hear d that phrase d used” during his seven y ear s in law enforce ment. (TestimonyNo. 08-4291

USA v. M arcus Cobb

Cob b’ s c on te nti on

that the e vid e nc e wa s in su ff ic ie nt b e c a

us e no ph y sic a l e vid e nc e tie d h im 2 to t he Hunti ng ton

B ank ro bb e ry is n ot w e ll t a ke n. “ ‘[P]h y sic a l evi de nc e is n ot r e qu ir e d to su sta in a convic tion.’” Un ite d S

tat es v . W ill is , 23 2 F

. Ap p’ x 5 27 , 53 6 (6 th Cir

. 20 07 ) (a lte ra tio n in or ig ina l) (q u o t i n g Un ite d S

tat es v . D av is , 306 F.3d 398, 409 ( 6th Cir. 2002)). - 13 - of CraigBr ennema

n, Dist. Ct. Docke t No. 139 at 25.) I n addition, a blue swe atshirt with a y ellow stripe was r ecove red f

rom Cobb’s apar

tment, and Donna T hompson, Cobb’s girlfr iend at the time, counted somew here betwee n six and seve n thousand dollars in a dra wer in the bedro o m that she

s h ar e d w i t h C o b b i nJ an u ar

y o r F e b r u ar y o f 2 0 0 7 , ar o u n d

t h e t i m e o f

t h e H u n t i n g t o nr o b b e r

y. Thompson testified that she could not explain how the money appea red in her re sidence . Fur

ther, Thompson testified that Cobb pa id $2000 as a down pay ment to pur chase a Jeep in J anuar y 2007. As such, we fi nd that sufficie nt evidence supports Cobb’s conviction for the H untington B ank

r o b b e r y. 2 E. District

court denial of p ret rial m otions and other pre lim inary m atte rs Cobb makes seve ral a dditional arg uments reg arding pretria l motions and other preliminary matters that we re not the f ocus of or al ar g ument. We discuss them now. 1. Fa ilu re to s e v e r H ob bs Ac t ro bb e ry

c ou nt f ro m t wo a rm e d- ro bb e ry

c ou nts Cob b a rgue s th a t the Ho bb s Ac t rob be ry c ount wa s join e d impr op e rl y wi th t he fo ur c ounts relating to the ba

nk robber ies and should have been se vere d. We reviewquestions of misjoinder de

novo. Un ite d Stat es v . D e itz , 577 F.3d 672, 692 (6th Cir. 2009)

. Moreove r, “[w]e review the denial of a motion for sever ance under an abuse of discretion standa rd.” United States v. Tran , 433 F.3d 472, 477 (6th Cir. 2006).No. 08-4291

USA v. M arcus Cobb

- 14 - Fe dera l Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a) g overns whether mult iple offe nses m ay be joined in a sin g le ind ic tme nt. I t st a te s: The indictment or infor

mation may

char g e a defe ndant i n separ ate counts with 2 or more off enses if the offe nses cha rg ed—whe t h er f

elonies or misdemea

nors or both—are of the same or similar cha rac ter, or a

re b as ed o n t h e same act or transac tion, or are connec ted with or constitute par ts of a common sche me or plan. Fe d. R. C r im

. P. 8 ( a )

. “ I nmo s t c a s e s , th e a b s e n c e o f e v id e n c e a t t

r ia l l in k in g tw o s e ts o f

char g es results in misjoi nder only if the indictment was dr awn up in bad f aith – i.e. wher e the g overnme nt k new it could not prove a link betwee n the cha rg es at trial.” De itz , 5 7 7 F

. 3 d a t 6 9 1

. I n d e e d , the spirit of Rule 8(a) is to “promote the g oals of trial c onvenienc e and judicia l effic iency .” Tran , 433 F.3d at 478 (q u o t at i o n marks and c itation omit ted). He re, the Buc a di B eppo robbe ry and bank robber ies wer e of a

simil ar c hara cter . I n eac h robber y , Cobb approac hed a f

emale e mploy ee, threatened to kill her, a

nd brandished w hat appe are d to be a gun. I n addition, he wore simi l ar or perha ps the same c lothes. Fu rt h er m o re , some of the same witnesses testified a bout the differ ent counts. Tran , 433 F.3d at 478 (“[T]here was signific ant over lap of the w itnesses prese nted on ea ch offe nse.”) . We theref

ore f ind that the joinder of c ounts was prope r under Rule 8(a)

. Even if joinder

of off enses is prope r under

Rule 8 (a ), a district court may order sever ance purs ua nt t o F e de ra l Ru le of

Cr imi na l Pr oc e dure 14 . T hat r ule state s: I f the jo in d e r o f o f

f e n s e s o r d e f

e n d an ts in an in d ic tm e n t, an in f o r mati o n , or a consolidation for trial a

ppear s to pr ejudice a def

endant or the g overnme nt, the court may order separ ate tria ls of counts, sever the def endants’ tr ials, or provide a ny other re lie f t hat ju sti c e re qu ir e s. Fe d. R. Crim. P . 14(a)

. Her e, the district court denied Cobb’s Rule 14 motion for sever ance . “The resolution of a Rule 14 motion is left to the s o u n d d i s cre tion of the trial cour t and will not beNo. 08-4291

USA v. M arcus Cobb

- 15 - disturbed absent an abuse of that discre tion.” Tran , 433 F.3d at 478. “Rule 14(a) require s that the counts in an indictment be seve red only when the defe ndant demonstrates that he will be prejudice d by the joinder of the char g es.” De itz , 577 F.3d at 692

. H e r e , Co b b h a s f a il e d to s h o w , or eve n alleg e, that he w as pre

judiced by the j oinder of the offenses. The ref ore, w e af firm the district cour

t’s denial of Cobb’s Rule 14 motion to sever. 2. Sufficiency of the indictme nt C o b b al s o ar gu es t h at h i s i n d i ct m en ti s i n s u ff i ci en tb ec au s e t h e ro b b ery co u n t s fa i l t o al l ege

mens rea , a requisite element of the offe nses. “We revie w the sufficie ncy of an indictment de novo.” United States v. Combs , 369 F.3d 925, 934 ( 6th Cir. 2004). “When an indictment g oes uncha lleng ed until appe al, it must be liberally construed in f avor of its sufficienc y .” Id. “F urthermor e, unless the de fe nd ant c an s ho w p re

jud ic e , a c on vi cti on wi ll no t be re ve rs e d w he n th e ind ic tme nt i s f ir st challeng ed on appea l unless the i ndictment cannot reasona bly be construed t o char g e a crime.” Id. An ind ic tme nt “ mus t be a

pla in, c on c ise , an d de fi nit e wr itt e n sta te me nt of the e sse nti a l f

a c ts constituting the off

ense c harg ed.” F ed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1) . A sufficie nt indictment must: (1) “set out all of the ele ments of the cha rg e[d] o ff

en s e[ s ] and must g ive notice to the de fenda nt of the char g es he f

ace s” and ( 2) “be sufficie ntly specific to enable the defe ndant to plead double je opardy in a subsequent proce eding , if cha rg ed with the same crime ba sed on the same fac ts.” United States v. Kuehne , 547 F.3d 667, 696 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted). We have de termined that both Hobbs Act violations and bank r obberie s are specific intent crimes; intent is an esse ntial element of eac h offe nse despite the fact that it is not mentioned in theNo. 08-4291

USA v. M arcus Cobb

- 16 - crimes’ statutory

definitions. Un ite d S

tat es v . D ab ish , 708 F.2d 240, 242 ( 6th C i r. 1983) (Hobbs Ac t) ; United States v. Be asley , 438 F.2d 1279, 1282 ( 6th Cir. 1971) (bank r obbery ). L ibe ra lly c on str ue d, we fi nd

Cob b’ s in dic tme nt s uf

fi c ie nt. Al tho ug h it do e s n ot a lle g e int e nt, it does cite the a

ppropriate sections of the U nited States Code—18 U.S.C. § 1951 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d) —there by providing notice to Cobb of t he charg es, and specifie s the particular date s and locations of the offe nses sufficie nt to protect ag ainst double j eo pardy

. See U nited States v. Martinez , 9 81 F .2 d 8 67 , 8 72 (6 th C ir . 1 99 2) (h old ingind ic tme nt s uf fi c ie nt b e c a

us e “ a lth ou g h [it ] does not expressl y alleg e willfulness, it does alleg e the a ppropriate sections of the U nited States Cod e ” ); Kuehne , 5 47 F .3 d at 69 6 (f ind ing ind ic tme nt su ff

ic ie nt de sp ite fa ilure to a lle g e a re qu isi te

e le me nt o f c ri me wh e re ind ic tme nt tr a c ke d re le va nt statut or y langua g e and wa s suf

fi c ie ntl y sp e c if ic to provide protec tion ag ainst double jeopar dy ). F . Trial issu es Co b b ma k e s s e v e r a l a d d it io n a l a

r g u me n ts r e g arding the e v id e n c e a d mi tt e d a t t r ia l. We addre ss them now. 1. Admission of opini on and hearsay testimony First, Cobb cha lleng es the a dmission of testim ony that he cla ims was improper opinion.

a. Testimony that three robberies shared c ommon modus ope randi I n addition to the argument reg ardingDetec tive Montag ’s testimony that Cobb focused on at ora l argument, Cobb also argues that t h e d i strict court e rre d in permitting B renne man to testify reg ardingthe modus opera ndi simi larities among the three robber ies. Specifica lly , Cobb asserts that beca use B renne man’s testimony went beyond descr ibing t he g ener al methods and tec hniques ofNo. 08-4291

USA v. M arcus Cobb

- 17 - serial r obbers by

including B renne man’s own subjec tive opinions, it was improper expert opinion t es t i m o n y . Br en n em an t es t i fi edt o t h e f o l l o wi n g: You know, eve ry robber

is differe nt, but, y ou know, I don’t think signatur e is the wa y to put it, b u t , y ou know, people, e ven cr iminals, all human being s, Ithink, have te nd e nc ie s to do c e rt a in t hin g s in c e rt a in w ay s, and

Ido n’ t th ink , y ou

kn ow , th a t a suspect in a r obbery

is any differ ent. T h ey d o what’s f amiliar and w hat they ’re comforta ble wit h. So, y ou know, I g uess what I ’m saying is that, whe n I ’m looking at these photogr aphs, I see this disg uise, and, to me, it’s not – y ou know, I ’ve w orked nume ro us ro bb e ry

c a se s w he re su sp e c ts w or e ba nd a na s. Ok ay . You

c an w e ar a

ba nd ana aro un d y our n e c k a

nd pu ll i t up jus t li ke thi s (i nd ic a tin g ), but th is w a s d ra pin g . I do n’ t kn owif

that’ s th e ri g ht wa

y to p ut i t, b ut, y ou kn ow , it wa s lik e a sh ir

t or so me oth e r sh ir

t- size d ob je c t, tie d. I t lo ok e d to me – it appear ed to me as if it wa s tied behind his head, like this (indicating ). And, so, y ou’ve g ot the hat pulled down, and you’ve g ot this t ied over his face , and it’s draping down his chest. So, this is what – this is what I ’m seeing , and I ’m talking to Detec tive Fr anken, and we’ re discussing this ve ry issue. At that point, y ou know, we’ re like, y ou know, this looks like Buc ca, which is, you know, the Buc ca di Be ppo, t h e r o b b ery

ca s e t h at we we re al re ad y i n v o l v edi ni n v es t i gat i n g. (Dist. Ct. Docket No. 139 at 5-6.) He further testified: When a re staurant is closed or a bank is c lose d , y o u don’t have customers, or you ty pically don’t have any

customers ther e, a n d y ou have a limit ed number

of employ ees, w hich, y ou know, from my perspe ctive, for the robber , what that cr eate s is a mor e imm e diate sp an o f c on tr ol. He ha s mo re c on tr ol o ve r w hat he ’s tr y ingto acc omplish. So, there’s thought t hat goes int o this stuff, and that’s the kind of stuff that we look at when w e’ re try

ing to f igur e out whethe r these thing s are connec ted or not connec ted. So, there a

re othe r thing s, but this i s just kind of a sketc h of why Ithink that those two robber ies, even though one was at opening – two wer e at ope ning a nd one wa s at closing – is that it st ill kind of i mplies a set of standards or c onditions t hat t h e s u s p e c ti s l o o k i n g f

o r w h e nh e ’ s g o i n g t o c o m m i ta r o b b e r y. ( Id. at 26.) B eca

use def ense c ounsel failed to objec t to this testimony at trial, our re view is limit ed to plain error

. Lopez-Me dina , 461 F.3d at 743.No. 08-4291

USA v. M arcus Cobb

- 18 - We conclude that the district court did not err , let alone plainly err . First, we have note d that law enf orce ment office rs may

offe r ex pert testimony

reg ardingthe modus opera ndi of crimes. “ L aw enfor ceme nt office rs may testify conce rning the methods and t ec h niques employ ed in an a rea of

c ri min a l a c tiv ity

a nd to e sta bli sh‘m od

us op e ra nd i’ of pa rt ic ula r c ri me s. Kn ow le dg e of

su c h a c tiv ity is ge nera lly

‘beyond the under standing of the avera g e lay man.’” United States v. Pe arce , 912 F.2d 1 5 9 , 1 6 3 (6 t h C i r. 1 9 9 0 ) ( qu o t i n g Un ite d S tat es v . E sp ino sa , 8 2 7 F

. 2 d

6 0 4 , 6 1 1 ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 8 7 ) )

. If

a wi tne ss’ s q

ua lif ic a tio ns are ob vio us , w e have fo un d that the re is n o n e e d to fo rm a lly qu a lif y him

as an e x pert. United States v. Nee ley , 3 08 F . App ’x 87 0, 87 7 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 9) . Su ch w a s th e c a se here , wher e B renne man testified that he ha d been a specia l ag ent wit h AFT for seventee n y ear s and that his curre nt work involves investig ating arme d seria l b u s in e s s - robber ies. See Lopez- Medina , 461 F.3d at 743 (finding no abuse of discretion in fa iling to forma lly qualify witnesses as e x perts who had seve nteen a

nd six y ear s of DEA employ ment experience , respe ctively ). Second, like De tective Montag ’s testimony

discussed above , Ag ent B renne man di d not invade the province of the jury ; he did not “ sug g est[] to the jury the g uilt of the acc used and the innocenc e of othe r suspec ts.” Cooper , 83 7 F .2 d at 28 7. Ra the r, B re nn e man spe c if ic a lly te sti fi e d th a t ot

he rs c ou ld r e a so na

bly dis a g re e wi th his op ini on

re g ard ingthe mod

us op e ra nd i of the thr e e ro bb eri e s: A ft e r b e inga sk e d o n c ro ssexamination, “notwithst anding y our experienc e in law e nforc ement, y ou would ag ree with me that

someone e lse may be free to conclude differ ently than y ou have as to the relationships between the robber ies,” B renne man answe red, “ Yes, that’s f air.” (Dist. Ct. Docket No. 139 at 53.) We theref ore f ind that the district court did not err in permitting B renne man’s testimony

.No. 08-4291

USA v. M arcus Cobb

- 19 - b. Lack of jury instruction regarding fact and expe rt wit ness testimony Relatedly , Cobb arg ues that the district court err ed by failing to give a ca

utionary instruction to t he jur y re g ard ing Mo nta g ’s and

B re nn e man’ s d

ua l r ole s a s f

a c t and e xpe rt wi tne sse s. B e c a

us e defe nse counse l did not obje ct at trial, we revie w for plain err or. Lopez-Me dina , 461 F.3d at 743. We h a ve no te d th a t “ wh e n a po lice of fi c e r t e sti fi e s in

tw o d if fe re nt c a pa c iti e s in

the same

case , there is a signif

icant risk that the jury

will be confuse d by

the offic er’ s dual ro l e,” and the district court, there fore , should “take c are to assure that the jury is infor med of the dual roles of

a law enfor ceme nt office r as a fac t witness and an e x pert witness, so that the jury can g ive prope r we ight to eac h ty pe of te stimony .” United States v. Thomas , 74 F.3d 676, 682- 83 (6th Cir. 1996) abr og . on

o t h e r g r o u n d s r e c o g n i z e d

b y Morales v. Am. Honda Motor Co. Inc ., 151 F.3d 500 ( 6th Cir. 1998) As noted above , Montag did not testify as an e x pert; rather, his testimony was limited to factua l development a

nd limit ed lay -per son opinion. See U nited States v. Perk

ins , 4 70 F .3 d 15 0, 15 6 ( 4th Cir. 2006) (cla ssify ing of fice r testimony

based on c ontemporane ous perc eptions as lay opinion t e s t i m o n y)

. T h e r e f

o r e , a c a u t i o n ar y j u r y i n s t r u c t i o nw a s n o tn e c e s s ar

y w i t h r e g ar d s t o h i s t e s t i m o n y. Although B renne man was not offe red as an ex pert witness, his t estimony did include limited

e xpe rt op ini on . H ow e ve r, the dis tr ic t c ourt of fe re d th e fo llo wi ngjur

y ins tr uc tio ns : Th e te sti mony

of law e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e rs . Y ou

have he ard te sti mony fr om at le a st on e law e nf

or c e me nt o ff

ic e r. Th e fa c t that a wi tne ss may be e mpl oy e d b y

the state or fe dera l gove rnment as a law e n fo rc em en t officia l does not mean that his or he r testimony is ne cessa

rily deser ving of more or le ss consideration or g reater or le sser weig ht than that of an ordinary witness. I t is y our dec ision, after vie wing all of the evidenc e, whe ther to ac cept the te stimony of the law enfor ceme nt w itness a nd to give to t hat te sti mony

wh a te ve r w e ig ht you

fi nd it d e se rv e s. (Dist. Ct. Docket No. 134 at 13.) And:No. 08-4291

USA v. M arcus Cobb

- 20 - Op ini on te sti mony c re dib ili ty . You have he ard

te sti mony

fr om a n o pin ion wi tne ss. An o p in io n w it

n e s s is o n e w h o , b y kn o w le d g e , s k il l, e xp e r ie n c e , tr a in in g , or education, has specialized knowledg e in s ome art, scienc e, prof ession or ca lling. An opinion witness is allowed to e x press his or her opinion on those matters about whic h h e o r s h e h as s p ec i al kn o wl ed ge a n d t ra i n i n g. Op ini on wi tne ss tes ti mony

is p re se nte d to y ou

on the the or

y that so me on e is e xpe ri e nc e d in

the fi e ld a

nd c an a ssi st you

in u nd e rs tand ingthe e vid e nce or in re a c hin g an in de pe nd e nt d e c isi on on the fa c ts. You may consi d er the opinions rece ived in evidenc e in this case a nd g ive it such weig ht as y ou think it deser ves. I f y ou decide that the opinions a re not ba sed upon sufficie nt knowledg e, skill, ex p erience, tra ining or education, or that the rea sons g iven in suppor

t of the opinions a

re not sound, or that the opinion is out weig hed by other e vidence , y ou may

disreg ard the opinion entirely

. L ikewise, y ou may disreg ard the opinion witness if y ou decide that any assumptions of fac t upon which the opinion is based are not established by the evidenc e. You may g ive t he opini on witness testimony whateve r weight, if any , that y ou find it deserve s i n light of a ll of the evidenc e in the ca se. In y our daily life, y ou are c on sta ntl y de te rm ini ngwh o is wor th y of be lie f a nd wh o is no t. E mpl oy

the same tests in determining the weig ht and cr edibi lity , if any , that y ou will assign to the te sti mony of e a c h w itn e ss. ( Id. at 14 -1 5 .) The c ourt’s instruction on opinion testimony sufficie ntly

“g uard[s] aga inst a jury mistakenly weig hing opinion testimony as if the opinion wer e fa ct” a nd “instruct[s] the jury

that they

are fre e to re

ject the opinions g iven.” Lopez-Me dina , 461 F.3d at 744. As such, we find that the district court did no t co m m i t p l ain er ror by failing to provide a spe cific jury instruction reg arding Montag ’s and B renne man’s dual r oles as fa ct and e x pert witnesse s. 2. Admission of DNA expert without foundat ion Cobb arg ues that the district cour t also err ed in admitting the te stimony of t he Gove rnment’s DNA e x pert without an ad eq uate f oundation. Specifica lly , Cobb contends that the Gove rnment failed to e stablish the scientific validity and re liability

of the statistical m et h o d s u s ed by theNo. 08-4291

USA v. M arcus Cobb

- 21 - laboratory . Cobb objected to the DN A evidenc e at tria l on differ ent g rounds; there fore , we r eview his pr esent argument only for plain e rror . See Lopez- Medina , 461 F.3d at 743. To show plain er ror, Cobb must s how (1) error (2) that was obvious or clear (3) t hat affec ted hi s substantial rig hts and (4) that aff ecte d the fa irness, integ rity , or public re putation of judicial proce eding s. United States v. Vonner , 516 F.3d 382, 386 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (en ba nc). The lack of

foundational que stions about the

sc ie nti fi c va lid ity

a nd re lia bil ity of the e xpe rt ’s statis tic a l meth od s wa s not pla in e rr or : T he e rr or did not affe ct the trial’s outc ome since the rele vant foundation could have be en esta blished; theref

ore, Cobb’s substantial r ights we re not a ffe cted. See P erkins , 470 F.3d at 156 (finding opinion testim ony

a dmi tte d w ith ou t f

ound a tio n d id n ot a ff

e c t ou tc ome of

tr ia l be c a us e of pr e se nc e of

oth e r a dmi ssi ble evidenc e and f

act that opinion testimony could have been pr operly offered in the first instance); United States v. Bonds , 1 2 F .3 d 5 40 , 5 68 (6 th Cir . 199 3) (f ind ing DN A t e sti ngto b e sc ie nti fi c a lly valid and re liable). 3. Firearm jury instruction Cobb nex t argues that the district cour t erre d in r efusing to instruc t the jury that a pellet g un does not qualify

as a f irea rm for purposes of the firea rm counts of Cobb’s indictment. The district

c ourt e xpla ine d it s d e c isi on

to l e a ve ou t Co bb ’s pr op os e d in str uc tio n a s f

oll ow s: Wel l, t he e vid e nc e we ’v e he ard

is that th e g un

us e d in the B uc c a ro bb e ry wa s not a firea r m, an d , h o w e v e r , th e d e f e n d an t is n o t c h ar g e d w it h th e f ir e ar m 9 2 4 ( c ) count with respec t to the r obbery

. And we’ ve not he ard any testimony

that the g uns used duri ngthe Hunti ng ton

Cha se B ank

ro bb e ri e s w e re no t f

ir e arm s. The Court c oncludes that adding the reque sted jury instruction w ould c ause j ury c on fu sio n a s to the ins tr

uc tio n. . . . Afi re arm

is d e fi ne d w ithre sp e c t to tho se c ounts in a c c or da

nc e wi th t he Sixth C ir c uit

.No. 08-4291

USA v. M arcus Cobb

- 22 - (Dist. Ct. Docket No, 139 at 65.) We apply the following standard of revie w: A d istri c t c ourt ’s re fu sa l to de liv e r a re qu e ste d instru c tio n is re ve rs ibl e e rr or on ly if the instruction ( 1) is a corr ect state ment of the law , (2) is not substantially cover ed by the c ha rg e a c tua lly

de liv e re d to the jur

y , a nd (3 ) c on c e rn s a

po int so imp or tant i n the trial that the fa ilure to g ive it substantially impairs the def

endant’ s defe nse. Un ite d S tat es v . D e Sa nti

s , 134 F.3d 760, 7 6 8 (6 t h Cir. 1998). We conclude that the re quested instruction was substantially cover ed by the instruction that was g iven. The district c ourt instructed the jur y a s f oll ow s: Th e term “f

ir e arm ” me ans any

we a po n w hic h w ill or

is d e sig ne d to or

may re a dil y be conve rted to expel a projec tile by the ac tion of an explosive. The ter m “fire arm” also includes the frame or rec eiver of any such we apon, and a

ny firea rm, muffler

or fire arm silence r, and a ny destructive de vice. The ter m “fire arm” does not include an antique firear m. The term “fire arm” includes starter g uns. The fire arm ne ed not be loade d. (D ist . Ct. Doc ke t No. 13 4 at 26. ) Th a t a pe lle t g un

do e s n ot s a tis fy

the de fi nit ion

of a “ fi re arm ” is

su bs tanti a lly

c ov e re d b y

the langua g e “ de sig ne d to or may re a dil y be c on ve rt e d to e xpe l a

pr oje c til e by the ac tion of an explosive.” We theref ore fi n d t h at t h e district cour t’s ref usal to deliver the reque sted instruction was not re versible e rror . G. Motion for new trial Cob b n e xt ar g ue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in de nyinghis mot ion

purs ua nt t o F e de ra l Ru le of Criminal Procedur e 33 for a new trial based on newly discovere d evidenc e. See F e d. R. C ri m. P

. 33(b)( 1). Cobb’s motion was based on counsel’s post-trial discovery that Cobb’s DNA ex pert ha d not been pr ovided with elec tronic data from the Apr il 2007 and Au gu s t 2 0 0 7 DNA tests when perf orming his re-a

naly sis; rather, he had re lied exclusively on hard data when co n d ucting the re

-No. 08-4291

USA v. M arcus Cobb

- 23 - analy sis. Rul e 33 per

mits t he district cour

t to “vacate any

jud gm en t and gra

nt a new tr ial if the interest of justice so r equire s.” F ed. R. Crim. P. 33(a)

. We r eview a denial of a motion for a new trial for a buse of discr etion. United States v. J ones , 399 F.3d 640, 647 ( 6th Cir. 2005). To obtain a ne w trial base d on newly discovere d evidenc e, “a defe ndant m u s t show the following : ‘(1) the new e vidence was discove red a fter the trial; (2) the evidenc e could not have be en discovere d ear lier with due d i l i gence ; (3) the e vidence is material and not mer ely cumulative or impeaching ; and (4) the evidenc e would likely produce acquittal.’” Unit ed States v. Carson , 560 F. 3 d 5 6 6 , 5 8 5 (6 th C i r. 2 0 0 9 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Seago , 930 F.2d 482, 488 ( 6th Cir. 1991)). This case involved three DNA tests: (1) the April 2007 test, which extracted DNA from the g love found near the abandone d car stolen at t he C hase robbery scene ; (2) the J une 2007 test, which

was p e r f o r me d o n a D N A s a mp le p r o v id e d b y Co b b ; an d ( 3 ) th e A u g u s t 2 0 0 7 te s t, w hich was perf ormed on a DNA sample provided by Cobb’s former g irlfriend, Donna Thompson. Accor ding to t he Go ve rnme nt’ s D NAe xp ert , th e DN A e xtra c te d f ro m th e g lov e ma tc he d th e DN A s a mpl e provided by Cobb. Cobb a dvance s no argument that there was a DNA mix -up or that t he Gover nment’s DNA e x pert used imprope r testing methods. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

fo un d th a t Co bb c ou ld n ot s a tis fy the fi na l th re e pro ngs of t he ne wl y discovere d evidence an aly sis. First, he fa iled to expl ain why the fa ulty disk could not have be en discovere d befor e t ri al

— “If the elec tronic data (as c ompare d to the underly ing ha rd copie s of the data ) i s a s c ri tic a l to pe rf or min g a re -a na ly sis a s D e fe nd ant ’s c ouns e l no w s ug g e sts , th e n s ur e ly Def endant’ s DNA e x pert would have made Def endant’ s counsel aw are of his inability to acc ess the

e le ctr on ic data

on the dis k h e ha d b e e n p ro vid e d. ” (D ist . Ct . D oc ke t N o. 10 6 at 6; se e als oNo. 08-4291

USA v. M arcus Cobb

- 24 - SentencingTr., Dist. Ct. Docket No. 124 at 3 (“The re’ s one letter that indicates that notice w as g iven to t he de fe ns e , I

be lie ve , o n Apr il 2 9th , 2 00 7, thi s w a s a fe w w e e ks be fo re tr ia l, t hat th ere w a s a problem with the CD disk that contained the raw data, that it could not be r etrieve d by the expert

e mpl oy e d b y

the de fe ns e .” )) . Se c on d, he fa ile d to sh owthat the dis c ov e ry that his DN A e xpe rt c ou ld not acc ess the ele ctronic ba ck-up f iles from the Apr il 2 007 and August 2007 DNA tests when perf orm in g h is D N A r e - an a ly s is w a s mate r ia l s in c e th e D N A e xp e rt w a s a b le to c o mp le te an

e va luatio n o f t

he DN A t e sts wi tho ut t

he e le c tr on ic data , de sp ite the fa c t tha t th e la c k o f e le c tr on ic data did no t pe rm it a

re -t e sti ngof

the g lov e . An d fi na lly , Cob b f a ile d to de mon str a te that th e po sttrial discover

y likely would result in an ac quittal for the same rea sons that the discovery is not materia l. We a g re e and fi nd that the dis tr ic t court did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in

de nyingCob b’ s Ru le 33 motion. H. Reasonableness of sentence Finally , Cobb argues that his sentenc e is both proce durally and substantively

unrea sonable. 1. Pr oc e du ra l R e as on ab le ne ss Procedur ally , Cobb contends that the district cour t erre d in countin g his 1991 felonious assault conviction towar d his classification as a car eer offe nder. We re view de novo the district court’s interpretation of t he Sentenc ing G uidelines. United States v. Galvan , 4 53 F .3 d 7 38 , 7 39 (6 th Cir. 2006). Acc ording to U.S. Se nte ncing Guidelines Manua l § 4B1.1(a ), a de fenda nt is a car eer

offe nder if :No. 08-4291

USA v. M arcus Cobb

- 25 - (1) the defe ndant was at l east eighte en y ear s old at the time the defe ndant committed the instant offe nse of conviction; (2) the instant off ense of conviction is a fe lony

that is either a c rime of violenc e or a controlled subst ance offe nse; and (3) the def endant has at lea st two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a contr olled substance of

fense

. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a ). A prior conviction counts only if (i) imprisonment e x cee ding one y ear and one month was imposed within fiftee n y ear s of t he defenda nt’s commence ment of t he ins tant offe nse or (ii) if imprisonment exceeding one y ear and one month, whene ver imposed, resulted in the de fenda nt being incar cer ated dur ing a ny part of suc h fiftee n-y ear

period. U.S.S.G. § 4A1

. 2 (e )( 1). “‘ ‘I n the

case of a pr ior revoc ation of probation . . . [ or] p ar o l e . . . [ t h e sentencing court should] add the

o r ig in a l te r

m o f im p r is o n me n t to an y te r

m o f im p r is o n me n t im

p o s e d u p o n r e v o c a tion.’ ’” United States v. Ande rson , 3 3 3 F. Ap p ’x 1 7 , 2 5 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 9 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Shannon , 449 F.3d 1146, 1148 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(k)( 1)))

. “Thus, a conviction that is imposed

re su lti ngin a

se nte nc e of imp ri so nme nt fo r thi rt e e n mo nth s o r m or e , a nd on wh ic h th e de fe nd a nt i s parole d outside the fiftee n-y ear window, is counted for t he purpose s of ca ree r off ender status if the de f e n d an t i s l a t e r i n c ar c e r a t e d w i t h i n t h e f i f t e e n - y e a r w i n d o w f

o r b r e a c h i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f h is parole .” Id. Her e, Cobb serve d eig ht months in pr ison f or his 1991 felonious assault convic tion before being rele ased o n five y ear s of shock proba tion. His probation was re voked, and his orig inal

s e n te n c e im

p o s e d , in D e c e mb e r

2 001

. Cobb ag ain was r elea sed on par ole in 2006; his sentence

e xpir e d th e fo llo wi ngy e ar. Th e re fo re , th e fo ur plu s y e ars that Co bb se rv e d in pr iso n f ro m 20 01 to 2006 count for pur

poses of car eer offe nder status: Cobb’s orig inal sentenc e for felonious assault wa s for thirtee n y ear s or more (four to fiftee n y ear s imprisonment; more than five of which were se rved) ;No. 08-4291

USA v. M arcus Cobb

- 26 - he wa s paroled outside the fiftee n-y ear window (in 1992); and he later w as inca rce rate d within the fiftee n-y ear

window for violatingthe terms of his probation (in 2001). See A nderson , 333 F. App’ x at 25. Cobb additionally argues that his 2001 probation re vocation wa s ineffe ctive under state law beca use the state c ourt’s subject- matter jurisdiction expired once the initial f i v e- y ear term of probation ende d, which happe ned in 1997. See O hio v. Jac kson , 565 N.E.2d 848, 849 (Ohio App. 1988). B ut any

such jurisdictional defe ct i s not indicated on the face of the federa l rec ord and w e have he ld previously

that district courts ar e “not require d to sear ch bey ond the record” in sentencing

case s. Galvan , 4 53 F .3 d at 74 1. Ac c or din g ly , th is a rgume nt m

us t f a il. We theref ore c onclude that Cobb’s sente nce w as proc edura lly rea sonable. 2. Su bs tan tiv e Re as on ab le ne ss Additionally , Cobb arg ues that his se ntence is substantively unrea sonable beca use he is 38 y e ars old and a se nte nc e of 10 2 y e ars (1 22 4 mont hs ) i s ta nta mou nt t o a te rm of lif e imp ri so nme nt, gre at er t h an necessar

y to satisfy

the objectives of

a robbe ry

sentenc e. We re view substantive

rea sonablene ss under a

n abuse- of-discr etion standard. United St ates v. Higgins , 557 F.3d 381, 397 (6th Cir. 2009). “We have held that within-Guidelines sentenc es ar e pre sumed rea sonable.” Id. at 39 8. Th e Gu ide lin e ra

ng e fo r Counts 1 thro ug h 4 is 3 60 mon ths to l if e , to be se rv e d c on se c uti ve ly to the mandatory

minimum of 300 months for Count 5. We theref ore f ind that the sentenc e of 1224 months, which falls within this rang e, is substantively rea sonable. III . C ON CL USI ON For these re asons, we AF F IRM Cobb’s convictions and sente nce.