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94–293 PDF 2015

S. HRG. 113–628 

#BringBackOurGirls: ADDRESSING THE 

THREAT OF BOKO HARAM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 15, 2014 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

DANIEL E. O’BRIEN, Staff Director

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Republican Staff Director

——————

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware, Chairman

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

(II)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Abdullahi, Lantana, project manager, Search for Common Ground, Jos, 

Nigeria .................................................................................................................. 30 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 32 

Coons, Hon. Christopher A., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement . 1 

Flake, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator from Arizona, opening statement ....................... 3 

Friend, Alice, Principal Director for African Affairs, U.S. Department of 

Defense, Washington, DC .................................................................................... 14 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 16 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by the following Senators: 

Christopher A. Coons ................................................................................ 50 

Benjamin L. Cardin ................................................................................... 51 

Bob Corker ................................................................................................. 51 

Jeff Flake ................................................................................................... 55 

Gast, Hon. Earl, Assistant Administrator for African Affairs, U.S. Agency 

for International Development, Washington, DC .............................................. 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 11 

Response to question submitted for the record to Earl Gast and Robert 

Jackson by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin .................................................... 42 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Robert 

Menendez ....................................................................................................... 48 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by Senator Christopher 

A. Coons ......................................................................................................... 50 

Jackson, Hon. Robert P., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 

African Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ........................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7 

Responses to questions submitted for the record by the following Senators: 

Christopher A. Coons ................................................................................ 39 

Benjamin L. Cardin ................................................................................... 40 

Robert Menendez ....................................................................................... 43 

Bob Corker ................................................................................................. 45 

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, statement ................... 3 

(III)

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

(1) 

#BringBackOurGirls: ADDRESSING THE 

THREAT OF BOKO HARAM 

THURSDAY, MAY 15, 2014 

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher A. 

Coons (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Coons, Menendez, Cardin, Shaheen, Flake, 

Rubio, and Barrasso. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE 

Senator COONS. Good morning. I would like to call to order this 

hearing of the African Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign 

Relations Committee. 

Good morning. Exactly 1 month ago today, extremists in northern Nigeria abducted nearly 300 schoolgirls in an unconscionable 

act of terror. The leaders of the group responsible, Boko Haram, 

are selling the girls into marriages, forcibly converting them to 

Islam, and using them as a bargaining chip in negotiations with 

the Nigerian Government. It is believed the girls are today being 

held in a dense tropical forest area roughly the size of West Virginia that straddles a porous and ungoverned border with three 

countries. 

Despite being forewarned of a possible attack, reports indicate 

the local and central government did nothing to protect them when 

told an attack was imminent. Parents should not have to be afraid 

to send their children to school, no child should live through the 

horror these girls have experienced, and no family should have to 

confront these threats alone. 

Unfortunately, these are not the only families who have suffered 

at the hands of Boko Haram. The same day as these abductions, 

75 more people were killed and 100 wounded in a bombing at a bus 

station in the Nigerian capital city of Abuja. More than 300 people 

were murdered during a Boko Haram attack in Gamboru just last 

week. According to Amnesty International, Boko Haram has killed 

more than 4,000 over the last 3 years, including 1,500 people in the 

last year alone. 

I want to welcome my partner in the Africa Subcommittee, 

Senator Flake, as well as Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member 

Corker, and other members, as we look at the response to these 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

2 

kidnappings and consider the grave and growing threat presented 

by Boko Haram. 

This subcommittee last met to consider conditions in Nigeria in 

2012, when we looked at the persistent divides between the north 

and south in economic potential, governance, education, and social 

services, and the very real security challenges created by these differences. Nigeria is an important partner in the region, but Boko 

Haram has capitalized on pervasive corruption, poor governance, 

and growing poverty in the north to undermine domestic and 

regional stability. 

Boko Haram, whose name means ‘‘Western Education is Sinful,’’ 

targets public institutions, churches, and schools, and children are 

the frequent victims of its vicious attacks. As New York Times columnist Kristof wrote, just last weekend, ‘‘The greatest threat to 

extremism is not drones firing missiles, but girls reading books.’’ 

The schoolgirls from Chibok in Nigeria demonstrated great courage, returning to their school to take their final exams in the face 

of an explicit terrorist threat, a group that targeted them simply 

because they sought an education. 

Boko Haram is trying to send a message, and the world, starting 

with the Nigerian Government, must respond by saying their 

crimes will not be tolerated and perpetrators held accountable. 

We are holding this hearing, in part, because of the outpouring 

of concern from many of my constituents and millions of Americans. The #BringBackOurGirls hash tag, which some pundits have 

mocked, has been mentioned more than 3 million times on Twitter, 

and those Tweets, posts on Facebook, Instagram, and others, were 

from people trying to get our attention and trying to make sure the 

United States is doing everything it reasonably can to help the 

Nigerians bring these abducted girls home. Those people deserve to 

know that we hear you and share your goals. 

Every day these girls are missing, it becomes less likely they will 

be returned home safely. It took too long for the Nigerian government to respond to these girls’ abduction. It took too long for the 

Nigerian Government to accept offers of assistance from the United 

States, the United Kingdom, France, and China. And, once 

accepted, it took too long for that assistance to be implemented. I 

am glad a U.S. team is on the ground now, and we need to make 

sure not another day is wasted. We cannot stand by while Boko 

Haram viciously attacks Nigerian citizens, their freedom, their 

security, and their right to an education. 

So, in this hearing, we will discuss the response of the Nigerian 

Government to Boko Haram both before and after the abduction; 

we will consider what the United States is doing, and can do, to 

help in response to the abductions and in confronting Boko Haram; 

finally, we will consider the regional implications of this growing 

threat and what action can and should be taken by Cameroon, 

Chad, and Niger to ensure the schoolgirls are not taken across borders and to minimize the growing regional threat. 

With that, I would like to invite an opening statement by my 

ranking Senator Flake and then a statement by the full-committee 

chairman, Senator Menendez. 

Senator Flake. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

3 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF FLAKE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for calling 

this hearing. 

Appreciate the witnesses coming forward. I look forward to their 

testimony. I will not take any time here, just to say that I agree 

with the chairman’s comments. We want to know what the U.S. 

Government is doing, what the Nigerians have asked for, whether 

we can help them, or not, in this regard. 

So, I look forward to the testimony, and thank you for calling the 

hearing. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator. And I greatly appreciate 

your cooperation and real partnership in working on this subcommittee. 

To the full-committee chairman, Senator Menendez. 

Senator. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As I sit here in your chair, I get the Blue Hen vibrations coming 

from Delaware. 

So, I appreciate your and Senator Flake’s leadership on the 

Africa Subcommittee on a wide range of topics. And today is a continuation of that leadership. And we are all thankful for the work 

that you do on behalf of all of us who serve on the committee. So, 

thank you for your work and your leadership. 

It is very rare, I should say, that I come to a subcommittee hearing. As a matter of fact, I have not done it in the 17 months that 

I have been the chairman. I remember Senator Lugar used to do 

it quite often. But, this is one that I clearly feel compelled to be 

a part of. 

We are all appalled at the plight of nearly 300 young women 

abducted in Nigeria by Boko Haram, which has been said many 

times. To me, it is amazing that the phrase ‘‘education is forbidden,’’ in the 21st century, is still a reality. Of course, it is a phrase 

that is counterintuitive to those of us who care about the future of 

the next generation. 

Right now, these girls are separated from their families and no 

doubt are terrified. I have seen the video released by Boko Haram 

this week, and my thoughts, as a father, are with the missing girls 

and their parents. 

Frankly, in my view, the fact that incidents like this are happening at all in the 21st century should be deeply troubling to 

every human being. We must reaffirm and recommit ourselves to 

the fundamental rule of law everywhere. As parents, as human 

beings, we must insist that women and girls be treated with dignity and allowed to live and learn in safety from extremists everywhere. 

Sadly, while the scale of this incident is staggering, the Boko 

Haram threat is not a new one. They have led an escalating campaign of atrocities against their own people for 5 years. They are 

extremists with a gangster mentality who represent no interest but 

their own, targeting young women, also young men, churches, and 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

4 

schools. I believe they do not represent Islam, and, in my view, 

their actions cannot go unanswered. 

The mothers, activists, and concerned citizens who have taken 

their outrage and grief to the streets of Abuja, London, and Washington, and the electronic highways of Twitter and Facebook, 

deserve credit for focusing the world’s attention on this crisis and 

insisting to the Nigerian Government, ‘‘Bring them home.’’ Just 

this past Friday, I joined outraged citizens in my own State of New 

Jersey, who added their voices to the chorus and took up the cause 

on social media. 

That said, despite offers of assistance from the United States and 

other international partners, the Nigerian Government’s response 

to this crisis has been tragically and unacceptably slow. I have 

called on President Jonathan to demonstrate the leadership his 

nation is demanding. My understanding is that our team of U.S. 

technical advisors is now on the ground, supporting existing teams, 

conducting aerial surveillance, and sharing commercial satellite 

imagery with Nigerian authorities. Beyond what is happening on 

the ground as we speak, I look forward to hearing our witnesses 

discuss a plan of action for coordinating with Nigeria over the coming days and weeks. 

Finally, from a 30,000-foot view, the rise of groups like Boko 

Haram do not occur in a vacuum. Nigeria has a long history of division along ethnic and religious lines, tensions that terrorists capitalize on by creating more distrust and more tension. But, as much 

as we are appalled by the actions of Boko Haram and their tactical 

effort to use societal fissures to create chaos and distrust, we 

should also be troubled by a record of excessive force and human 

rights abuses by Nigeria’s military. 

I am pleased to see, Mr. Chairman, that you have added an additional witness, Miss Lantana Abdullahi, who has worked in Nigeria 

on interfaith violence prevention and community reconciliation 

issues, and has brought together civil society groups, government 

leaders, and security forces to prevent human rights abuses in 

Nigeria. And we look forward to hearing her testimony. 

Finally, let me close by emphasizing the importance of elevating 

the issue of women’s issues globally, the question of sexual violence, violence against women, in general, to the international 

arena. I call on my colleagues in Congress to pass the International 

Violence Against Women’s Act that Senator Boxer and I introduced 

last week. I believe the world is watching and the time is now. 

My thanks to you, Mr. Chairman, to Senator Flake and to our 

witnesses. I look forward to hearing their testimony. 

Senator COONS. Thank you very much, Chairman Menendez. 

And we all look forward to the testimony of our witnesses today. 

I would like to welcome our first panel. Ambassador Robert Jackson, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African 

Affairs; Earl Gast, Assistant Administrator of Africa at USAID; 

and Ms. Alice Friend, a Principal Director for African Affairs at the 

Department of Defense—make up our first panel. 

And our second panel will be Lantana Abdullahi, project manager for Search for Common Ground, who is currently watching 

this hearing and will be joining us later via Google Hangout, from 

Jos, Nigeria. We look forward to Ms. Abdullahi’s testimony, 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

5 

commend her courage, and are honored by the opportunity to hear 

a voice from northern Nigeria today. 

I want to thank our first-panel witnesses for being here today, 

and welcome your opening statements. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. JACKSON, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN 

AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador JACKSON. Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, 

Chairman Menendez, other members of the committee, thank you 

for inviting me to update you about U.S. efforts to address the 

chilling threat that Boko Haram represents to Nigeria, one of our 

most important partners in sub-Saharan Africa. Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Thomas Greenfield regrets that her travel 

schedule prevented her from being here today. However, she will 

be attending the Regional Summit organized by French President 

Hollande in Paris on Saturday. 

It has now been 1 month since Boko Haram kidnapped the 200 

young women from the town of Chibok in northeastern Nigeria. At 

the time of the kidnapping, these brave young women had returned 

to their high school in order to complete examinations that would 

allow them to attend university. By seeking knowledge and opportunity, they represented a challenge to Boko Haram, since it 

opposes democracy and formal education. Indeed, Boko Haram has 

attempted to crush the kind of faith in the promise of education 

and prosperity that families in Chibok showed. 

The attack is part of a long, terrible trend. Boko Haram fighters 

have repeatedly targeted schools. In February, Boko Haram massacred at least 29 people when it destroyed a rural boarding school 

in Adamawa. Boko Haram has murdered police officers, snatched 

children, destroyed churches, burned schools, attacked mosques, 

driven people from their homes, challenged the government’s 

authority, and kidnapped Westerners in both Nigeria and neighboring Cameroon. 

Since January 1, Boko Haram has killed over 1,000 people, making Nigeria’s struggle against this group one of the deadliest conflicts in Africa today. In addition to terrorizing the capital and 

other cities, Boko Haram attacks villages and military installations. The abductions in Chibok fit into a larger pattern of violence. 

Throughout northeastern Nigeria, teachers and students have 

learned to fear the gunmen who come in the night to kill young 

men and teachers and steal away young women. Some of the young 

women from Chibok daringly escaped their captors, but many more 

remained prisoners of Boko Haram’s leaders, Abubakar Shekau, 

and his brutal followers. 

We join the world, the people of Nigeria, and the parents of these 

children, in expressing our outrage of Boko Haram’s shocking acts 

and its perverse ideology. This tragic kidnapping calls us to redouble our efforts to defeat a malicious terrorist organization that has 

troubled Nigeria for more than a decade. World leaders, including 

President Obama, have pledged their full support to the government and people of Nigeria as they seek to safely recover and 

assist these courageous young women. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

6 

We acted swiftly to carry out the President’s pledge. By Monday, 

May 12, we had deployed an 18-member interagency team to 

advise the Nigerian Government as it works to bring back the 

young women—specifically, by advising on how to safely recover 

and assist these girls, offering specialized expertise on military and 

law enforcement best practices, hostage negotiation, intelligencegathering, strategic communications, and how to mitigate the risk 

of future kidnappings. USAID has mobilized resources to provide 

humanitarian assistance to those affected by Boko Haram violence, 

including through the provision of psychosocial and medical support and treatment. We are cooperating fully with our partners— 

the U.K., France, and a host of other countries—who are also dedicating significant interagency manpower, resources, and time to 

this effort. 

Mr. Chairman, a peaceful and stable Nigeria is crucially important to the future of Africa, and we cannot stay on the sidelines 

if it stumbles. Nigeria has the largest economy and largest population. We look to Nigeria as an ally in our quest to help Africans 

lead lives free of violence and filled with possibility. As an engine 

of growth and a political giant, Nigeria is vital to the success of 

President Obama’s 2012 strategy toward sub-Saharan Africa. As 

we implement the strategy, we are focusing on building democratic, 

prosperous, and secure Nigeria. 

Since Boko Haram came to the world’s attention with a massive 

uprising in 2009, we have been working to help Nigeria counter 

this threat. We provide Nigeria with security assistance, which 

goes toward professionalizing the Nigerian military, investigating 

bomb sites, and enhancing border security. We have increasingly 

placed our response to Boko Haram in a regional context. Through 

our Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership, the Global 

Counterterrorism Forum, and our bilateral relationships with Nigeria’s neighbors, we are encouraging greater information-sharing 

and border security efforts. 

The importance of regional coordination is clear at a time like 

this as Nigeria and its partners seek to prevent Boko Haram from 

smuggling young women across the border or using neighboring 

countries as safe havens. I must note, however, that our ability to 

encourage regional collaboration is made more difficult at this time, 

as our highly qualified nominees to be the Ambassadors to Niger 

and Cameroon continue to await confirmation by the full Senate. 

We have also joined the international effort to isolate Boko 

Haram. In June 2012, the State Department designated Boko 

Haram’s top commanders as specially designated global terrorists. 

In June 2013, the State Department added Abubakar Shekau, 

Boko Haram’s leader, to our Rewards for Justice Program and 

offered up to $7 million for information leading to his location. In 

November 2013, the State Department designated Boko Haram 

and Ansaru as foreign terrorist organizations. And last week, our 

Ambassador met President Jonathan, and they agreed on the importance of quick action on the U.N. designation of Boko Haram as 

a terrorist group. This week, Nigeria brought this question to the 

U.N. Security Council. 

At the same time, we have been urging Nigeria to reform its 

approach to Boko Haram. From our own difficult experiences in 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

7 

Afghanistan and Iraq, we know that turning the tide of an insurgency requires more than force. The state must demonstrate to its 

citizens that it can protect them and offer them opportunity. When 

soldiers destroy towns, kill civilians, and detain innocent people 

with impunity, mistrust takes root. We share these lessons with 

our partners in Nigeria, urging them to ensure that security services respect human rights and officials end a culture of impunity 

while people see the benefits of government and diverse voices are 

heard and represented in the capital. 

We have seen some signs of reform. National Security Advisor 

Sambo Dasuki’s March announcement of a soft approach to countering violent extremism was encouraging. And we have worked 

through our Counterterrorism and Conflict Stabilization Operations Bureaus to promote narratives of nonviolence in Nigeria. 

As we strike a balance between counseling and empowering 

Nigeria, we regularly send high-level diplomats to Nigeria. On May 

12 and 13, our Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, 

and Human Rights, Dr. Sarah Sewall, and AFRICOM commander, 

General David Rodriguez, were in Nigeria to discuss how to intensify our efforts against Boko Haram, reform human rights practices, and pursue a comprehensive approach. 

All of these policy tools—our security assistance, our legal and 

sanctions actions, and our diplomatic engagement—constitute the 

framework within which we are working to help Nigeria bring back 

these girls kidnapped by Boko Haram. Resolving this crisis is now 

one of the highest priorities of the U.S. Government. 

Nevertheless, Nigeria’s conflict with Boko Haram will not end 

when these young women are brought home. Consequently, 

throughout this crisis, our assistance is framed by our broader and 

long-term policy goal of helping the Nigerians implement a comprehensive response to defeat Boko Haram that protects civilians, 

respects human rights, and addresses the underlying causes of conflict. We are sharing with the Government of Nigeria practices and 

strategies that will bolster its future efforts to defeat this deadly 

movement. 

Nigeria’s importance and the violent attacks committed by Boko 

Haram are both growing. We cannot ignore either trend. We welcome the committee’s interest in these urgent matters, and we look 

forward to continuing to work with you as we strive to bring these 

young women home and to address the broader threat. 

I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Jackson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR ROBERT P. JACKSON

Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, and members of the committee, thank 

you for inviting me to update you about U.S. efforts to address the chilling threat 

that Boko Haram represents to Nigeria, one of our most important partners in subSaharan Africa. 

It has now been 1 month since Boko Haram kidnapped more than 200 hundred 

girls from the town of Chibok in northeastern Nigeria. At the time of the kidnapping, these brave girls had returned to their high school in order to complete examinations that would allow them to attend university. By seeking knowledge and 

opportunity, they represented a challenge to Boko Haram in the heart of its area 

of operations. As the world now knows, Boko Haram opposes democracy and formal 

education. It has attempted to crush the kind of faith in the promise of education 

and prosperity that families in Chibok showed. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

8 

Boko Haram, the terrorist organization that kidnapped these girls, has shown it 

has no regard for human life. It has been killing innocent people in Nigeria for some 

time, and the attack at Chibok is part of that long, terrible trend. This year alone, 

Boko Haram has murdered more than 1,000 innocent people in vicious attacks on 

schools, churches, and mosques. Since 2013, it has targeted and systematically kidnapped women—including these girls—seeking to deny them the education and 

opportunity they deserve. The abductions in Chibok fit into this larger pattern of 

violence. Throughout northeastern Nigeria, innocent civilians are terrified by gunmen who come in the night to kill young men and teachers and steal away young 

women. Boko Haram has also retained its ability to target Abuja, as we saw with two recent bombings at the Nyanya bus depot outside the capital. And we’re concerned 

by the expansion of the group’s operations beyond Nigeria, including in Cameroon 

where it has also conducted kidnappings. The group is not just a Nigerian problem; 

it is a regional security problem. 

We join the world, the people of Nigeria, and the parents of these children in 

expressing our outrage at Boko Haram’s shocking acts and its perverse ideology. 

Young people, in Nigeria and across the globe, deserve the chance to pursue their 

dreams without suffering the predations of violent extremists. What happened in 

Nigeria resonates around the world, and pleas to free the kidnapped schoolgirls 

have come from First Lady Michelle Obama, from Pakistani activist Malala 

Yousafzai, U.N. Special Envoy for Global Education Gordon Brown, and other champions of women’s right to an education. 

This tragic kidnapping demands that we redouble our efforts to defeat a Foreign 

Terrorist Organization that has troubled Nigeria for more than a decade. World 

leaders, including President Obama, have pledged their full support to the government and people of Nigeria as they seek the safe return of these brave girls. We 

acted swiftly to carry out the President’s pledge. By Monday, May 12, the U.S. Government had deployed an 18-member interagency team to provide military and law 

enforcement assistance, as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

support. We have provided commercial imagery and are flying manned and unmanned ISR aircraft over Nigeria to support the search. We are working closely 

with international partners on the ground, including the U.K. and France, and we 

are pressing for additional multilateral action, including U.N. Security Council sanctions on Boko Haram. As the President has directed, we will do everything possible 

to support the Nigerians in their efforts to find and free these girls. But we won’t 

stop there. We can and must continue to work closely with Nigeria to prevent Boko 

Haram from harming any more innocent people. 

Given Nigeria’s importance, Boko Haram cannot be allowed to continue its array 

of bloody tactics: murdering police officers, snatching children, destroying churches, 

burning schools, attacking mosques, driving people from their homes, and challenging the government’s authority. 

Mr. Chairman, a peaceful and stable Nigeria is crucially important to the future 

of Africa, and we cannot stay on the sidelines if it stumbles. Nigeria has the continent’s largest population and biggest economy. We look to Nigeria as a partner in 

our quest to help Africans lead lives free of violence and filled with possibility. As 

an engine of growth, a fountainhead of art and industry, and a political giant, Nigeria is vital to the success of President Obama’s 2012 Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan 

Africa. As we implement that strategy, we are focusing on building a democratic, 

prosperous, and secure Nigeria. 

Since Boko Haram came to the world’s attention with a massive uprising in 2009, 

we have been working to help Nigeria counter this threat. We provide Nigeria with 

security cooperation, which goes toward professionalizing the Nigerian military, 

investigating bomb sites, improving border security, and carrying out responsible 

counterterrorism operations. As we hear reports of Boko Haram cells in neighboring 

countries, we have increasingly placed our response to Boko Haram in a regional 

context. Through our Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, the Global Counterterrorism Forum, and our bilateral relationships with Nigeria’s neighbors, we are 

encouraging greater information-sharing and border security efforts. 

At the same time, we have been urging Nigeria to reform its approach to Boko 

Haram. From our own difficult experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, we know that 

turning the tide of an insurgency requires more than force. The state must demonstrate to its citizens that it can protect them and offer them opportunity. When 

soldiers destroy towns, kill civilians, and detain innocent people with impunity, mistrust takes root. When governments neglect the economic development of remote 

areas, confidence can falter. We share these lessons with our partners in Nigeria, 

urging them to ensure that security services respect human rights; officials end a 

culture of impunity; people see the benefits of government; and diverse voices are 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

9 

heard and represented in the capital. We have seen some signs of reform—we were 

encouraged in March of this year to see National Security Advisor Sambo Dasuki 

announce his ‘‘soft approach’’ to countering violent extremism, though Nigeria needs 

to follow through on implementing this strategy. We have also worked through our 

Counterterrorism and Conflict and Stabilization Operations Bureaus to promote 

narratives of nonviolence in Nigeria, and we are working broadly to protect civilians, prevent atrocities, and ensure respect for human rights. 

At the same time, we are providing law enforcement assistance, including by 

training Nigerian law enforcement officials on basic forensics, hostage negotiations, 

leadership, and task force development. 

To counter the spread of violent extremist ideology, we support programs and initiatives—including job training and education—that create economic alternatives for 

those vulnerable to being recruited by terrorist organizations. 

All of this is part of a coordinated effort to help strengthen Nigeria’s ability to 

respond responsibly and effectively to these challenges in a way that ensures civilians are protected and human rights are respected. 

We have also joined the international effort to isolate Boko Haram. In June 2012, 

the State Department designated Boko Haram’s top commanders as Specially Designated Global Terrorists under section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224. In June 

2013, the State Department added Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram’s official leader, 

to our Rewards for Justice Program and offered up to $7 million for information 

leading to his location. In November 2013, the State Department designated Boko 

Haram and Ansaru as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, under Section 219 of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, and as Specially Designated Global 

Terrorists under section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224. Last week, our Ambassador 

met President Jonathan on the margins of the World Economic Forum, and they 

agreed on the importance of quick action on the U.N. designation of Boko Haram 

as a terrorist group. The United Nations Security Council has renewed calls for regional cooperation to address Boko Haram. This week, Nigeria brought this question 

to the U.N. Security Council. And as I mentioned, we continue to work with Nigeria 

and others to press for U.N. Security Council sanctions on Boko Haram. 

The importance of regional and multilateral coordination is clear at a time like 

this, as Nigeria and its partners seek to prevent Boko Haram from smuggling young 

women across the border or using neighboring countries as safe havens. I must note, 

however, that our ability to encourage regional collaboration is made more difficult, 

at this time, as our highly qualified nominees to be the U.S. Ambassadors to Niger 

and Cameroon continue to await confirmation by the full Senate. 

As we strike a balance between helping empower Nigeria and counseling its government on reform, we engage regularly with Nigeria at all levels of our government. President Obama and Nigerian President Jonathan discussed security issues 

during their bilateral meeting on the margins of the U.N. General Assembly last 

September. Most recently, our Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, 

and Human Rights, Dr. Sarah Sewall, and U.S. Africa Command Commander General David Rodriguez spent May 12 and 13 in Nigeria. They met senior Nigerian 

security officials to discuss how to intensify efforts against Boko Haram, reform 

human rights practices, and pursue a comprehensive approach to Boko Haram. 

Under Secretary Sewall and General Rodriguez devoted considerable attention to 

the crisis surrounding the kidnapped women. Under Secretary Sewall called the 

principal of the young women’s school in Chibok to express U.S. outrage and deep 

concern about the deplorable kidnapping. 

All of these policy tools—our security cooperation, our legal and sanctions actions, 

and our diplomatic engagement—constitute the framework within which we are 

working to help Nigeria safely bring back the women kidnapped by Boko Haram. 

Resolving this crisis is now one of the highest priorities of the U.S. Government. 

As I mentioned when I began, we deployed an interagency team to advise Nigerian 

authorities on how to recover safely and assist these young women. Led by a senior 

diplomat from our Africa Bureau, the team is liaising with counterparts across Nigeria’s Government to offer specialized expertise on military and law enforcement best 

practices, hostage negotiation, intelligence gathering, strategic communications, and 

how to mitigate the risks of future kidnappings. At the same time, USAID has mobilized resources to provide humanitarian assistance to those affected by Boko Haram 

violence, including through the provision of psychosocial and medical support and 

treatment. We are cooperating thoroughly with the U.K., France, and a host of other 

countries who are also dedicating significant interagency manpower, resources, and 

time to this effort. Our field team remains in close, coordinated contact with State 

Department headquarters here in Washington. 

Nevertheless, Nigeria’s conflict with Boko Haram will not end when these young 

women are bought home. Consequently, throughout this crisis, our assistance is 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

10 

framed by our broader and long-term policy goal of helping the Nigerians implement 

a comprehensive response to defeating Boko Haram that protects civilians, respects 

human rights, and addresses the underlying causes of the conflict. We are sharing 

practices and strategies with the Government of Nigeria that will bolster its future 

efforts to defeat this deadly movement. 

Nigeria’s importance and the violent attacks committed by Boko Haram are both 

growing. We cannot ignore either trend. We welcome your interest in these urgent 

matters, and we look forward to continuing to work with you as we strive to bring 

these young women home and address the broader threat posed by Boko Haram. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Ambassador Jackson. 

Assistant Administrator Gast. 

STATEMENT OF HON. EARL GAST, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. GAST. Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, and Chairman Menendez, thank you for the opportunity for me to speak 

before you today about the brutal kidnapping of more than 250 

young girls from their school just 1 month ago. 

This latest brutality was not an isolated incident. For years, 

Boko Haram has terrorized the people of northern Nigeria. They 

have attempted to exploit northern Nigeria’s low level of infrastructure, development, and security that affects all aspects of life, from 

economic growth to access to basic services, resulting in the north’s 

growing isolation. 

This conflict has caused decreases in agricultural production, 

price spikes, and serious concerns about food security, both in the 

north and also in neighboring states. For example, Niger is importdependent and dependent on exports from Nigeria. 

In Nigeria, nearly 4.2 million persons are at risk of food insecurity, and continued unrest will likely have long-term impacts on 

nutrition, agriculture, and trade. It is projected that by 2015 Nigeria will soon be home to the largest number of persons worldwide 

living in extreme poverty. 

In May 2013, due to an escalation of violence, the Government 

of Nigeria declared a state of emergency in Adamawa, Borno, and 

Yobe states. In early 2014, attacks carried out by Boko Haram 

militants killed more than 1,500 persons. According to the U.N., 

violence had displaced more than a quarter of a million persons to 

neighboring states by only a few months later, in March, 70 percent of whom were women and children. In communities hosting 

internally displaced persons, the presence of additional families is 

straining local resources, including already stretched water systems and basic commodities. 

To determine the extent of this crisis, the U.N., along with key 

international NGOs, are currently conducting a multiagency, multisector needs assessment, and USAID is a part of that assessment 

team. Last week, a team of humanitarian professionals from the 

U.N. and the NGO community traveled to the areas that are now 

part of the state of emergency, as well as three bordering states 

that have received most of the IDPs, the internally displaced persons. This team is meeting with state and local officials, with the 

displaced persons themselves, and other community members to 

establish the number of displaced persons, where they are living, 

their ability to access food, income, health care, education, and 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

11 

water and hygiene. The team will also evaluate food security, 

nutrition, and protection services along with identifying actors who 

are on the ground and who can help develop the most effective 

approaches to deliver relief. 

We will use the results of this mission to shape the provision of 

humanitarian assistance, in partnership with others, to meet 

urgent humanitarian needs among affected families. Assistance 

will include food, shelter, safe drinking water, emergency treatment of acute malnutrition, community-based psychosocial support, 

and programs target at preventing and treating sexual and genderbased violence. 

Exacerbating this humanitarian crisis is Boko Haram’s assaults 

on youth seeking education. A good education is a global public 

good, and it is a necessary ingredient for economic development 

and poverty reduction. Education enables people to live healthier 

lives, fulfill their potential, and it also contributes to open, inclusive, and vibrant societies. These attacks undermine northern 

Nigeria’s already precarious educational system by destroying 

schools, forcing others to close, and keeping thousands of students 

and teachers out of the classroom. School attendance in the region, 

already well below the national rate, will continue to suffer. 

USAID has active programs in nearly all of Nigeria’s northern 

states, with a particular focus on Bauchi and Sokoto. Through our 

education programs in the north, we have increased access to basic 

education services for more than 15,000 orphans and vulnerable 

children; we have strengthened the capacity of some 24 educationrelated NGOs; and we have also influenced Nigeria’s Educational 

Research and Development Council to include reading as a core 

objective of its curriculum. 

USAID’s conflict mitigation program, active in six states in the 

north, including Borno, the state most affected by the violence, has 

funded numerous community training programs on conflict mitigation. We have supported and trained conflict management and 

mitigation councils. And we have carried out, in partnership with 

local organizations, phone-in interfaith dialogues on radio and television programs. 

Today, our thoughts are with the schoolgirls and their families 

and the millions of Nigerians forced to live under the threat of 

Boko Haram’s violence every day. 

Thank you. And I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gast follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. EARL GAST

USAID partners around the world to end extreme poverty and promote resilient, 

democratic societies, while advancing our security and prosperity. Our work in 

northern Nigeria highlights the nexus between security, stability, and poverty 

reduction. We are committed to working with Nigeria to build a peaceful society 

that promotes inclusive economic growth and lifts its citizens out of poverty. 

One month ago, Boko Haram militants kidnapped more than 250 young girls from 

their school in an attack so shocking it mobilized the world behind returning these 

girls to their families. But this latest brutality was not an isolated incident. For 

years, Boko Haram has terrorized the people of northern Nigeria through bombings, 

kidnapping, and sexual violence. 

For decades, development in the northern part of the country has markedly 

lagged behind the relative progress made in the south as is evident through comparison of development indicators in Nigeria’s six geopolitical zones. In the three 

northern zones, per capita incomes are significantly lower than the national averFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

12 

age. Literacy in the southwest zone is around 80 percent for girls, while in the 

northeast it is only 15 percent. Health statistics paint a similar picture of disparity. 

Immunization coverage in the northeast is only about 8 percent, while in the southsouth it is closer to 36 percent. 

In recent years, Boko Haram has attempted to exploit northern Nigeria’s low level 

of infrastructure, public services, and security. Boko Haram attacks have affected 

all aspects of life, from economic growth to access to basic services, and resulted in 

the north’s growing isolation. Commercial activity in Kano, once a national economic 

hub, is estimated to have decreased by 50 percent in recent years, due in large part 

to the stream of businesses that have left northern states like Borno and Kaduna 

for the stability of the south. 

The conflict has caused decreases in agricultural production, price spikes, and 

serious concerns about food security both in the north and neighboring states, particularly import-dependent Niger. In Nigeria, nearly 4.2 million people are at risk 

of food insecurity, and continued unrest will likely have long-term impacts on nutrition, agriculture, and trade. 

Access to health care has dramatically declined in the hardest hit conflict areas; 

in Borno state, doctors are fleeing and clinics are closing, forcing the population into 

neighboring Cameroon for basic health services. Boko Haram has also been targeting cell phone towers so people in the region have less access to communications. 

As violence began to escalate, the Government of Nigeria declared a state of emergency in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states in May 2013. In early 2014, attacks carried out by Boko Haram militants killed more than 1,500 people. According to the 

U.N., violence had displaced more than a quarter million people to neighboring 

states by March 2014—70 percent of them women and children. An additional 

61,000 people, including returning migrants, have also fled to neighboring Niger, 

Cameroon, and Chad, where they are living in host communities. 

In communities hosting internally displaced persons, the presence of additional 

families is straining local resources, including already-stretched water systems and 

basic commodities. Increasing numbers of female-headed households is forcing widows to become the sole providers for their families. Such households and widows are 

exposed to additional violence within host communities. In the absence of their husbands, widows also lack access to financial resources, exacerbated by inheritance 

laws, and systems that limit women’s ownership of property. 

SITUATIONAL ASSESSMENT

Due to insecurity, presence of aid workers in the most affected areas is very limited and we do not yet have a comprehensive picture of the overall humanitarian 

situation. To determine the extent of the crisis, the U.N. along with key international nongovernmental organizations are currently conducting a multiagency, 

multisector needs assessment. Last week, a team of humanitarian professionals 

from the U.N. and NGOs traveled to the areas in states of emergency (Borno, Yobe, 

and Adamawa) as well as three bordering states (Bauchi, Gombe, and Taraba) that 

have received the most internally displaced people. 

This team is currently interviewing state and local officials and meeting with 

internally displaced persons and other community members to establish the number 

of displaced people, where they live, and their level of access to food, income, health 

care, education, water, sanitation, and hygiene. The team will also evaluate food 

security, nutrition, and protection services, identify humanitarian actors still on the 

ground, and develop the most effective approaches to deliver relief and identify 

opportunities to strengthen the capacity of state governments and local partners to 

monitor displacement, report, assess, and coordinate delivery of relief. 

USAID humanitarian experts have been involved in the assessment process since 

the beginning, working to help define indicators and processes. USAID humanitarian experts are currently in Nigeria and will continue to support the work of the 

U.N. and other agencies. USAID will use the results of this mission to shape the 

provision of humanitarian assistance in partnership with implementing organizations to meet urgent humanitarian needs among affected families. Assistance may 

include providing food, shelter, and household items for displaced populations; safe 

water in communities whose resources have been overstretched because of an influx 

of new families; support to emergency treatment of acute malnutrition; or community-based psychosocial support and programs targeted at the prevention and treatment of sexual and gender-based violence. USAID is also exploring opportunities for 

collaboration with key Nigerian agencies, the Nigerian National Emergency Management Agency, local emergency response actors as well as supporting efforts to 

increase food security data collection and analysis to inform potential response 

options. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

13 

Once completed, the U.N. and USAID assessments will give us a better understating of the situation and how best to respond, taking into account the operational 

realities of programming in Northern Nigeria. 

AN ATTACK ON EDUCATION

Exacerbating the humanitarian crisis, Boko Haram’s assaults on youth seeking 

education has become ever more brazen over the past 2 years. A good education is 

a global public good, and a necessary ingredient for economic development and poverty reduction. Education enables people to live healthier and more productive lives, 

allowing them to fulfill their own potential, as well as to strengthen and contribute 

to open, inclusive and economically vibrant societies. 

Boko Haram’s attacks on schools had consisted of destroying empty school buildings at night, but more recently has shifted to targeting Muslim and non-Muslim 

students and staff with guns, knives, and explosives. The group has killed or wounded hundreds of students and teachers since June 2013. The mass abduction of 

female students in Chibok marked a frightening shift: While in prior attacks, Boko 

Haram generally instructed female students to flee, they are now publically calling 

on girls to abandon Western education or be taken as slaves. 

Boko Haram is also seeking to perpetuate child marriage as an acceptable practice and is using it to sow fear, intimidation, and coercion. 

These attacks undermine northern Nigeria’s already precarious educational system by destroying schools, forcing others to close, and keeping thousands of students 

and teachers out of the classroom. School attendance in the region, already well 

below the national rate, most likely will continue to suffer. 

USAID ASSISTANCE

USAID has active programs in nearly all of Nigeria’s northern states, with a particular focus on Bauchi and Sokoto. Through our education programs in the north, 

we have increased access to basic education services for over 15,000 orphans and 

vulnerable children, strengthened the capacity of 24 education-related nongovernmental organizations to responsibly manage their finances, and influenced Nigeria’s 

Educational Research and Development Council to include reading as a part of the 

education curriculum. 

Through our economic growth programs, USAID has built the capacity of export 

firms, helped medium-sized, small, and microenterprises gain access to loans, and 

supported the development of a new customs and excise management act to reform 

and modernize the Nigerian customs service. At the same time, the Feed the Future 

program has helped Nigerian farmers more than double their yields in maize, rice, 

and sorghum, and leveraged millions of dollars in credit for thousands of beneficiaries and for numerous private sector partnerships. 

USAID has also helped the Sokoto and Bauchi State Houses of Assembly pass 

public procurement and fiscal responsibility laws, trained over 900 government officials in public procurement and financial management practices, and assisted with 

the passing of the federal freedom of information act and its adoption at the state 

levels. 

USAID’s conflict mitigation program—active in six states in the north, including 

Borno, the state most affected state by Boko Haram’s violence—has funded numerous community training programs on conflict mitigation, reconstituted and trained 

Conflict Management and Mitigation Regional Councils, and carried out phone-in 

interfaith dialogues on radio and television programs. 

Regionally, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, which USAID implements alongside the Departments of State and Defense, includes a regional Peace 

for Development program in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad—areas that are vulnerable as they may become fertile ground for the expansion of violent extremist 

groups. This initiative applies a holistic, community-led approach that has reached 

nearly 3.8 million people from at-risk groups through youth-led community mobilization activities, radio programming, and training in management skills, budgeting, 

leadership, vocational trades, and conflict resolution. In other areas of the Sahel, 

USAID supports a vocational education program in Mauritania and has expanded 

our program to counter violent extremism to key areas of Northern Mali. Given the 

immense size of the Sahel, interventions are limited to communities with the highest risk factors, which have been identified through assessments conducted by the 

project. A number of those target communities are in areas of Niger and Chad that 

border Nigeria. These programs have led to a noticeable rise in community action. 

This week, a local youth organization in Bamako, Mali, is sponsoring a mass demonstration and public outreach around the issue of the kidnapping of the Nigerian 

schoolgirls. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

14 

Today our thoughts are with the schoolgirls, their families; and the millions of 

Nigerians forced to live under the threat of Boko Haram’s violence every day. 

Senator COONS. Thank you very much. 

Principal Director Friend, thank you for joining us today. We 

welcome your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF ALICE FRIEND, PRINCIPAL DIRECTOR FOR 

AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. FRIEND. Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, members 

of the committee, thank you for calling us together to address the 

deeply disturbing abductions of over 270 schoolgirls in northern 

Nigeria by the terrorist organization Boko Haram. 

People of good will across the globe have been horrified by this 

barbarous act and are rightly demanding that the Nigerian 

authorities take immediate measures to recover the girls, and are 

asking what those of us in the international community can do to 

support Nigerian efforts. 

Last Friday, the United States dispatched a multidisciplinary 

State Department-led team of experts to Abuja to provide the Government of Nigeria with the specialized advice and expertise it 

needs to respond to these abductions. DOD has provided four 

subject-matter experts from U.S. Africa Command Headquarters in 

Stuttgart, Germany, to augment 10 DOD personnel already 

assigned to our Embassy in Abuja as part of this interagency team. 

In addition, two military officers with extensive experience supporting the Counter-Lord’s Resistance Army Mission in Uganda 

also have been temporarily relocated to Abuja to provide their 

advice and assistance. 

In total, 16 DOD personnel with medical, intelligence, counterterrorism, and communications expertise have been assigned exclusively to the mission of advising the Nigerian security forces’ efforts 

to recover these girls. Secretary Jackson also mentioned the concurrent visit of the commander of Africa Command, General Rodriguez, to engage with his Nigerian counterparts alongside Under 

Secretary Sewall. Their initial efforts have been to work with Nigerian security personnel to analyze Nigerian operations, identify 

gaps and shortfalls, and otherwise provide requested expertise and 

information to the Nigerian authorities, including through the use 

of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support. We are 

also working closely with other international partners, including 

the U.K. and France, to coordinate multilateral actions and maximize our collective assistance efforts. 

Mr. Chairman, the threat to Nigeria from Boko Haram has 

grown over the past 5 years, and mutates day by day, extending 

its reach, increasing the sophistication and lethality of its attacks, 

and growing its military capacity. These most recent attacks are 

especially unconscionable because they were perpetrated against 

innocent girls and because of the sheer scale of the attack in 

Chibok. 

Unfortunately, these kidnappings are only the most recent outrages in a growing portfolio of attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram 

in its war against education. On July 6, 2013, in an attack on the 

secondary school in Mamudo Village, 29 students were killed, 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

15 

including reports that some were burned alive when their dormitory was deliberately set on fire. Overnight between September 

28 and 29, 2013, upward of 40 students were slaughtered in a 

nighttime attack on the Yobe State College of Agriculture. And in 

yet another nighttime attack, this at the Buni Yadi Federal Government College in February of this year, at least 59 people, including boys ranging in age from 11 to 18, were killed. 

The Department has been deeply concerned for some time by 

how much the Government of Nigeria has struggled to keep pace 

with Boko Haram’s growing lethality and capabilities. Recognizing 

this threat and the need for Nigeria to adopt a whole-of-government approach to defeating it, over the past several years DOD has 

undertaken a number of initiatives to assist Nigeria in its counterBoko Haram efforts. For example, we have supported the establishment of counter-IED and civil-military operations capacity within 

the Nigerian Army. We have also supported the establishment of 

an intelligence fusion center in an effort to promote informationsharing among various national security entities and, overall, to 

enable more effective and responsible intelligence-driven counterterrorism operations. More recently, we have begun working with 

Nigeria’s newly created Ranger Battalion to impart the specialized 

skills and disciplines needed to mount effective counterterrorism 

operations. 

Mr. Chairman, as dedicated as the Department of Defense is to 

supporting Nigeria in its fight against Boko Haram and in recovering these girls safely, we cannot ignore that Nigeria can be an 

extremely challenging partner to work with. In the face of this 

sophisticated threat, Nigeria’s security forces have been slow to 

adapt with new strategies, new doctrines, and new tactics. Even 

more troubling, Nigeria’s record of atrocities perpetrated by some 

of its security forces during operations against Boko Haram have 

been widely documented. As we have advised the Nigerians, consistent with U.S. law and policy, we review security-force units who 

may receive assistance, and we cannot, and do not, provide assistance when we have credible information that those units have committed gross violations of human rights. 

With this important consideration in mind, we have worked to 

engage where and how we are able to in viewing our engagements 

and training efforts with human rights and Law of Armed Conflict 

modules and emphasizing the importance of the broad counterinsurgency approach that we, ourselves, have spent so much blood 

and treasure fulfilling. Indeed, if this tragic episode is to end the 

way we all hope it will, Nigeria’s leaders must continue to match 

their public statements with a serious and focused response that 

draws on all elements of their government and makes maximum 

use of the resources international partners are offering to them. 

This will not be an easy task. We are still seeking information on 

whether, where, and how the girls may have been dispersed. But, 

DOD is committed to supporting Nigeria in locating these girls and 

seeing them safely returned to their loved ones. 

Thank you again for convening us here today, and I look forward 

to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Friend follows:] 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

16 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALICE FRIEND

Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Flake, members of the subcommittee, thank 

you for calling us together to address the deeply disturbing recent abductions of over 

270 school girls in northern Nigeria by the terrorist organization Boko Haram. People of good will across the globe have been horrified by this barbarous act and are 

rightly demanding that the Nigerian authorities take immediate measures to 

recover the girls and are asking what those of us in the international community 

can do to support Nigerian efforts. 

Last Friday, the United States dispatched a multidisciplinary, State Departmentled team of experts to Abuja to provide the Government of Nigeria with the specialized advice and expertise it needs to respond to these abductions. DOD has provided 

four subject matter experts from USAFRICOM headquarters to augment 10 DOD 

personnel already assigned to our Embassy in Abuja as part of this interagency 

team. In addition, two military officers with extensive experience supporting the 

counter-Lord’s Resistance Army mission in Uganda also have been temporarily relocated to Abuja to provide advice and assistance. In total, 16 DOD personnel with 

medical, intelligence, counterterrorism and communications expertise have been 

assigned exclusively to the mission of advising the Nigerian security forces’ efforts 

to recover these girls safely. Their initial efforts have been to work with Nigerian 

security personnel to analyze Nigerian operations, identify gaps and shortfalls, and 

otherwise provide requested expertise and information to the Nigerian authorities, 

including through the use of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support. 

We are also working closely with other international partners, including the U.K. 

and France, to coordinate multilateral actions and maximize our collective assistance efforts. 

Our intent is to support Nigerian-led efforts to recover the girls and help catalyze 

greater efforts to secure the Nigerian population from the menace of Boko Haram. 

The Department of Defense stands ready to do what we can to help the Nigerian 

Government, but both the immediate and the long-term solutions to the threat Boko 

Haram poses to the people of Nigeria must be implemented by the Government of 

Nigeria if a sustained security is ever to be reached. 

Mr. Chairman, that threat to Nigeria from Boko Haram has grown over the past 

5 years and mutates day by day, extending its reach, increasing the sophistication 

and lethality of its attacks, and growing its military capacity. It has now proven on 

multiple occasions—for example, through its successful attack on a Nigerian air 

base in which two of the Nigerian air force’s helicopters were destroyed, as well as 

the coordinated, methodical and highly successful attack at Giwa barracks—that it 

is now capable of directly and successfully engaging Nigeria’s Armed Forces. Its 

expanded reach was also convincingly and tragically demonstrated when over 70 

innocent Nigerian citizens were killed in a vehicle-borne IED attack just outside the 

national capital of Abuja. 

These most recent attacks are especially unconscionable because they were perpetrated against innocent girls and because of the sheer scale of the attack in 

Chibok. Unfortunately these kidnappings are only the most recent outrages in a 

growing portfolio of attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram in its war against education. On June 16–17, 2013, seven students and two teachers were killed when 

Boko Haram members attacked the Government Secondary School in Damaturu, 

Yobe state. This was followed on July 6, 2013, by an attack on the secondary school 

in Mamudo village, in which 29 students were killed, including reports that some 

were burned alive when their dormitory was deliberately set on fire. On September 

28–29, 2013, upward of 40 students were slaughtered in a nighttime attack by Boko 

Haram on the Yobe State College of Agriculture. And in yet another nighttime 

attack, this time at the Buni Yadi Federal Government College on February 18 of 

this year, at least 59 people, including boys ranging in age from 11 to 18, were 

killed. 

The Department has been deeply concerned for some time by how much the Government of Nigeria has struggled to keep pace with Boko Haram’s growing capabilities. Recognizing this threat and the need for Nigeria to adopt a whole-of-government approach to defeating it, over the past 2 years the United States has made 

a concerted effort to assist Nigeria in its counter-Boko Haram efforts. For its part, 

DOD has undertaken a number of initiatives. For example, we have supported the 

establishment of counter-IED and civil-military operations capacity within the Nigerian Army in order to make C–IED an integral part of Nigeria’s security doctrine. 

The concept is to build Nigerian institutions so that C–IED skills are organic and 

can be maintained and passed along by the Nigerians themselves. We have also supported the establishment of an intelligence fusion center in an effort to promote 

information-sharing among various national security entities and, overall, to enable 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

17 

more effective and responsible intelligence-driven CT operations. More recently, we 

have begun working with Nigeria’s newly created Ranger Battalion to impart the 

specialized skills and disciplines needed to mount effective CT operations. 

As has been demonstrated during recent Boko Haram movements and attacks, 

porous borders with Nigeria’s northeastern and western neighbors can also facilitate 

these terrorists’ operations in the region. For this reason, DOD and the Department 

of State are working closely and actively to develop a regional response to the Boko 

Haram threat to enhance border security along Nigeria’s common borders with 

Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. The concept is to build border security capacity with, 

and promote better cooperation and communication among, the security forces of 

each country. In some cases, assistance would go to the military, in others the gendarmerie, and in still others immigration forces, to more effectively detect and 

respond to the movement of Boko Haram members back and forth between Nigeria 

and its neighbors. If we can build these basic but critical capacities, serious progress 

can be made toward halting Boko Haram’s spread and reversing some of the gains 

it has made. 

As committed as the U.S. is to supporting Nigeria in its fight against Boko Haram 

and in returning these girls safely to their families, we cannot ignore that Nigeria 

can be an extremely challenging partner to work with. In general Nigeria has failed 

to mount an effective campaign against Boko Haram. In the face of a new and more 

sophisticated threat than it has faced before, its security forces have been slow to 

adapt with new strategies, new doctrines and new tactics. Even more troubling, 

Nigeria’s record of atrocities perpetrated by some of its security forces during operations against Boko Haram has been widely documented. As we have advised the 

Nigerians, consistent with U.S. law and policy, we review security force units who 

may receive assistance, and we do not provide assistance when we have credible 

information that they have committed gross violations of human rights. With this 

important consideration in mind, we have worked to engage where and how we are 

able to, imbuing our engagements and training efforts with human rights and law 

of armed conflict modules and emphasizing the importance of the broad counterinsurgency approach that we ourselves spent so much blood and treasure fulfilling. 

No discussion of how to address the Boko Haram threat would be complete without addressing some of the political dynamics in Nigeria underlying the security 

environment. In spite of its vast oil wealth, Nigeria continues to face enormous development challenges. These factors combine with pervasive federal and state government corruption and Boko Haram’s brutal terrorization of the population have 

made northern Nigerians susceptible to antigovernment narratives and afforded the 

group a more permissive operating environment. The long-term solution to Boko 

Haram does not depend exclusively on Nigeria’s military or security forces, but also 

requires Nigeria’s national political leaders to give serious and sustained attention 

to addressing the systemic problems of corruption, the lack of effective and equitable 

governance, and the country’s uneven social and economic development. 

Nevertheless, we will not lose our focus on the heartrending event that has 

brought us here today. The tragic situation of these girls and the families who hope 

for their safe return has captured the attention of the world. As I have highlighted 

already, DOD is committed to supporting Nigeria’s efforts to locate these girls and 

to seeing them safely returned to their loved ones. This will not be an easy task. 

We are still seeking information on whether and how the girls may have been dispersed. Indeed, if this tragic episode is to end the way we all hope it will, the government of Nigeria must continue to match its public statements with a serious and 

focused response that draws on all elements of its government and making maximum use of the resources international partners are making available to it. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Principal Director Friend. 

Thank you, to this panel, for your testimony. 

I would like to now begin questions in 7-minute rounds. And I 

will remind all of us, we have a scheduled vote at 11:15 and following a second-panel witness. 

If I might start, I would just like to begin with a direct question 

to each of you. You have addressed this in longer form, but if I 

could just have a, in the interest of time, concise and direct answer. 

When did your agency make its first offer of assistance after the 

kidnappings? What did that offer entail? What was the Nigerian 

Government’s response? And what do you see as the real impediFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

18 

ments toward the Nigerians taking full advantage of the opportunities and resources we have offered? 

Ambassador Jackson. 

Ambassador JACKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Kerry called President Jonathan roughly 2 weeks ago 

today, made the offer, which President Jonathan accepted with 

alacrity. And it involved intelligence collection and support and 

other resources that I described in my testimony. 

Senator COONS. Assistant Administrator Gast. 

Mr. GAST. Almost immediately after the incident, the Embassy 

and USAID declared a state of emergency, which allowed us to 

bring in additional resources and assessment teams. So, that was 

one way. 

The second was, our Administrator almost immediately traveled—after the incident, traveled to Nigeria to meet with the government as well as participate in other discussions, but certainly 

did focus on this issue. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

Principal Director Friend. 

Ms. FRIEND. Sir, the State Department took the lead in making 

the initial offers. However, once the Government of Nigeria, in fact, 

accepted our offer of assistance—I believe that was on the 4th of 

May—the Department had ISR overflight by the 9th of May. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

If I could, Ambassador Jackson—as you mentioned in your testimony, in 2012 the State Department deliberated over whether to 

designated Boko Haram as an organization—as a foreign terrorist 

organization—or to designate top leaders, which, indeed, happened 

in 2012, and then the group as a whole as an FTO the following 

year. But, what were the implications of designating those three 

individuals in 2012? And what additional steps have been taken by 

the administration to target Boko Haram’s funding and other 

sources of support? And why was there not initially unanimity 

around designating the whole organization? 

Ambassador JACKSON. Senator, the debate about whether to designate Boko Haram dates back many years, to at least 2011. And 

I think, as former Assistant Secretary Johnny Carson has 

explained in media interviews, the debate was really about the 

Nigerian attitude toward designation. The Government of Nigeria 

feared that designating these individuals and the organizations 

would bring them more attention, more publicity, and be counterproductive. 

For some time, we accepted that point of view. And the fact that 

the Nigerians are only now asking the U.N. to designate them continues to reflect Nigerian hesitancy over the impact of these designations. But, we decided to move ahead in 2012, precisely because we were convinced that they met the criteria for designation. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

If you would, Assistant Administrator Gast, describe the strategy 

of the Nigerian Government to address the root causes of Boko 

Haram support in northern Nigeria. The hearing that we conducted 2 years ago could almost literally be repeated today, in 

terms of ongoing structural challenges that have led to this insurFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

19 

gency and have created the conditions, and sustained and, in some 

ways, accelerated the conditions, for Boko Haram. 

Mr. GAST. As the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary mentioned in his testimony, there is a realization within the national 

security—among the national security group, including the security 

advisor himself, Dasuki, that this is a major concern. And so, there 

are two units within the National Security Advisor’s office that are 

working on developing plans for the north: one, a massive, long, 

multiyear development program; another one that would help 

address the immediate concerns of security, community, development. We are advising those two groups and helping identify areas 

where we can assist in providing programming support. 

Senator COONS. Girls in Nigeria and around the world are risking their lives every day just to get an education. USAID does 

deliver significant support for education opportunities, and, in particular, for the inclusion of women and girls in education. But, with 

a decline in USAID’s funding request for education programming, 

I am concerned we may not have enough resources to do what we 

should and what we must in Nigeria and elsewhere. USAID support is predominantly focused in Bauchi and Sokoto states—as you 

said, a small portion of the total north. Please speak, if you would, 

to the strategy for how to continue to support education, which 

really is the root cause of a lot of the violence, in this instance, the 

insistence on access to education for women. 

Mr. GAST. Education has always been a robust element of our 

program support in Nigeria. And if one were to look at the continent as a whole, the budget for education in Nigeria represents 

about 10 percent of the entire education budget. So, it is a significant contribution that we are making. 

The question is, Are we placing the resources in the right areas? 

And certainly because of access issues, it is extremely difficult to 

program resources in the north. We are working with DFID, the 

British development agency, and we believe we are very close to 

announcing a major effort to support education, primarily girls’ 

education, secure education in the north. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

Principal Director Friend, tell me more, if you would, about the 

Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Partnership and what we have done 

regionally with other countries that are directly affected by Boko 

Haram—Chad, Niger, Cameroon. And, if you would, just as a last 

question—you mentioned the gross human rights violations committed by some elements of the Nigerian Armed Forces. We are 

still able to find units with which we can partner. And it is still 

possible for the Nigerian military police and security forces to take 

the lead in ensuring the return—the safe return of the Nigerian 

schoolgirls. Is that not correct? 

Ms. FRIEND. Yes, sir. I will take those questions in reverse. That 

is correct. I mentioned in my testimony the Ranger Battalion that 

we will begin training, in fact, this month, and pretraining programming has begun to lay in the groundwork for that. So, we are 

able to find units inside the Nigerian Armed Forces that, in fact, 

pass Leahy vetting, and have passed Leahy vetting. It is, however, 

a persistent and very troubling limitation on our ability to provide 

assistance, particularly training assistance, that the Nigerians so 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

20 

badly need. This is one of the things that we have been talking to 

them about for quite some time. 

Another recent engagement that was also interagency in nature 

was a counterinsurgency-focused trip to Nigeria, I believe last fall, 

where we were urging them to take a more holistic approach, and 

a, frankly, much less brutal approach, in the north against Boko 

Haram. 

To your question of the Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Partnership, it is a State Department-led effort, so I do not want to speak 

out of turn for Mr. Jackson, but I will say that, in the region, we 

have been working increasingly with the Cameroonians and the 

Nigerians and the Chadians to talk about the regional threat that 

Boko Haram poses. As you, I am sure, have heard in the press, 

there is some thought that some of the girls may have been taken 

over international borders. And, of course, the border with Cameroon and Niger, in particular, is very porous, and we do know that 

Boko Haram does operate back and forth across the international 

border, particularly with Cameroon. The Cameroonian Government 

and the Cameroonian President, in particular, have recently been 

taking Boko Haram even more seriously than previously, and we 

are working with them and with the Nigerians and the Chadians 

to assist them and to do everything we can to ensure that all these 

countries coordinate with each other. 

Senator COONS. Thank you very much. 

Senator Flake. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks for the testimony. 

Ms. Friend, with our cooperation or assistance to the military, to 

what extent is it complicated by some of the rules and regulations 

we have about dealing with militaries that have human rights 

abuses lodged against them or have problems that way? What 

restrictions are we under? And how does that limit our ability to 

work with them? 

Ms. FRIEND. So, essentially, sir, under the Leahy provision, any 

unit that we suspect of having committed gross human rights violations, we cannot provide military training or assistance to. The 

broader implications of your question, however—‘‘How much does 

it affect our engagement with Nigeria?’’—it affects it very much. 

We have struggled a great deal, in the past, to locate units that we 

can work with, and, indeed, to convince the Nigerians to change 

their tactics, techniques, and procedures toward Boko Haram. 

Another way that we are very, very careful to ensure that we are 

only providing assistance to those who will not use it in ways that 

may affect civilians or otherwise violate international human rights 

standards is our intel-sharing. Though sharing intelligence with a 

foreign government that is available to—intelligence that is available to DOD would not normally be considered assistance subject 

to the DOD Leahy law, we nevertheless are exceedingly cautious 

when it comes to sharing information with the Nigerians, because 

of their unfortunate record. In this case, for example, we have 

sought assurances from them, that Ambassador Entwistle delivered 

a couple of days ago, that they will use any information that we 

pass to them from this ISR support in a manner consistent with 

international humanitarian and human rights law. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

21 

Senator FLAKE. As I understand it, we have a couple of issues 

with the military. One, they have been using pretty brutal tactics 

and pretty brutal justice, if you will, with regard to Boko Haram 

in the north, but also there is some fear that some of its ranks are 

infiltrated with Boko Haram sympathizers. Is that a concern, as 

well, the latter? 

Ms. ABDULLAHI. That is a concern, sir. I would say an even 

greater concern is the incapacity of the Nigerian military and the 

Nigerian Government’s failure to provide leadership to the military 

in a way that changes these tactics. The division in the north that 

mainly is engaging with Boko Haram, the 7th Division, has 

recently shown signs of real fear. They do not have the capabilities, 

the training, or the equipping that Boko Haram does. And Boko 

Haram is exceptionally brutal and indiscriminate in their attacks. 

And so, as heavyhanded as the forces on the Nigerian side have 

been, Boko Haram has been even more brutal. 

And so, we are now looking at a military force that is, quite 

frankly, becoming afraid to even engage. And that is one of the 

things that we are talking to the military leadership in Abuja 

about right now, about how to get the training and also the orientation of the forces under control so that they will feel more competent to face the threat. 

Senator FLAKE. The military’s decline in effectiveness in Nigeria 

is really traced to fear that the political leadership has to military 

coup. And that has been the pattern that has been followed around 

other countries, as well. Is that what you trace the decline to? And 

is this political leadership now, this President and those around 

him, do they fear strengthening the military for that purpose, fearing a coup later? What is the relationship right now between the 

political leadership and the military? 

Ms. FRIEND. The relationship between the political leadership 

and the military itself is reasonably healthy. My understanding is 

that the weakening of the Nigerian military does trace back a couple of decades, at least, to concerns about capability for a coup. At 

this point, that is not a concern in Nigeria. 

Another concern, which my colleagues can also speak to, is that 

the Nigerian military has the same challenges with corruption that 

every other institution in Nigeria does. Much of the funding that 

goes to the Nigerian military is skimmed off the top, if you will. 

Senator FLAKE. Assistant Administrator Gast, reports have been 

around for a while about kidnappings and whatnot in the north. 

Let me just read from one report. ‘‘For much of the past year, Boko 

Haram’s fighters have stalked the rugged hills of northeastern 

Nigeria, forcing teenage boys into their trucks as recruits and 

snatching teenage girls as sex slaves,’’ said Nigerian officials and 

analysts. ‘‘Villages and small towns in the northeast are dotted 

with parents who have not seen their children in months.’’ 

How aware has the State Department been of this activity? And 

should we have been more aware of the events that might have 

told us that a kidnapping of this kind was coming? 

Mr. GAST. So, from AID’s perspective—and I will let Deputy 

Assistant Secretary Jackson address it from State—yes, we are 

very aware. Access is an issue. And so, the programmatic response 

that we are able to deliver is less than it would be if we had access. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

22 

We do work with local organizations, and there are some very, 

very good local organizations that can help provide psychosocial 

services to families and to individuals, that can help promote dialogue between communities. Unfortunately, the capacity of them to 

expand and go into more areas and reach more deeply into pockets 

of society is somewhat limited. 

Senator FLAKE. AID usually learns of these things just because 

of the programs that you do with the local population there. Mr. 

Jackson, can you speak from State’s perspective? How aware were 

we of these kind of kidnappings and this activity going on long 

before the school kidnapping? 

Ambassador JACKSON. Senator, we have been very aware. And, 

as Ambassador to Cameroon for the last 3 years, I was witness to 

the kidnappings of French citizens there, starting early last year, 

and then that has expanded. We have just had a third kidnapping 

earlier this year. 

The kidnappings are part of this larger strategy of terror. And 

consistent with what the Lord’s Resistance Army has done in 

Uganda, if I may venture it, I think they are actually copying the 

LRA’s tactics, in some respects, which is why it is useful to have 

people from our military who are familiar with the LRA’s tactics, 

in an attempt to apply that in Nigeria. 

Senator FLAKE. Thank you. 

My time is up. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

Senator Shaheen. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, to 

you and Ranking Member Flake, for holding the hearing today. 

As I think we would all agree, this kidnapping of these young 

girls in Nigeria is horrible, it is outrageous. We all are in sympathy 

with their families and the community that they came from. And 

it is been interesting to me to see the outcry around the world as 

the result of these kidnappings. And I think it, sadly, reminds us 

that there are too many girls and women around the world who are 

threatened, who are—for young girls who are just trying to get an 

education and better themselves, they are victims of violence. Too 

many children are given as child brides. Too many women are kidnapped and sold into slavery or sex trafficking. And we have got 

to do a better job, not only in the United States, but in the world, 

in combating these crimes. 

And I know, this week, the International Violence Against 

Women Act was filed again. I am certainly hopeful that the full 

committee will take up this legislation and pass it, because we can 

either allow women to continue to be victims of violence and ignorance and repression or we can act on behalf of our wives, our 

daughters, our granddaughters and make a change in the world 

that will benefit everyone. 

I wonder—and I am not sure who to direct this question to— 

I understand that there have been a number of offers of assistance 

to Nigeria—from France, from Britain; I understand that Israel 

and China have also offered to help. Can someone describe the 

extent to which those offers are being taken up and how the coordination is happening? 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

23 

Ambassador JACKSON. Senator, I would be happy to take that 

question. In fact, we have a fusion cell, as we call it, in Abuja, the 

Nigerian capital, where the British, the French, the Americans, 

and the Nigerians are working together to develop the information 

that we have been able to gather through our various activities. We 

are also in touch with the Israelis and the Chinese, to a much 

lesser extent, but we are talking with them, to find out what is 

being provided. And I spoke with our team leader, just before coming to this hearing. He is very satisfied with the cooperation, and 

he is looking forward to expanding it this weekend, when the regional leaders meet in Paris. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And are there any Muslim countries that have 

offered assistance? 

Ambassador JACKSON. A number of Muslim countries have spoken out, and certainly Niger, which is predominantly Muslim, has 

offered its assistance to its neighbor, Nigeria, as has Chad. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And when you say there are a number that 

have spoken out, have spoken out to condemn what has happened? 

Ambassador JACKSON. Absolutely. And the message that all the 

Muslim leaders who have spoken out—whether religious leaders or 

political leaders, have passed is that this is not about Islam. And 

I think that is a very important point. Boko Haram’s philosophy is 

not an Islamic philosophy. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I agree, and I am glad that you made that 

point. Clearly, we need to make sure that Islam is not confused 

with some of these horrible terrorist acts that have been and continue to be perpetrated by terrorist groups. 

Mr. Gast, can I ask you to elaborate a little bit on the question 

that Senator Coons posed about what we are doing to help address 

women and girls in Nigeria, where two-thirds of women in northern Nigeria receive no education, only 1 out of 20 women has a 

high school education, and where half of Nigerian women are 

reportedly married at age 15? Can you talk to what more we can 

do to address the circumstances there and cooperate with those 

organizations in Nigeria who share the values of trying to support 

getting an education for women? 

Mr. GAST. Senator, I’d be pleased to take your question. 

If one were to look at the development indicators between the 

north and south, it is almost looking at two different countries. 

And that is one of the reasons why we are targeting a lot of our 

assistance in health. In fact, 60 percent of that which is not related 

to the HIV/AIDS epidemic is targeted toward the north—the northwest as well as the northeast—and for education, as well, because 

we know that education access for AIDS are very low, and, in fact, 

in comparison with the rest of the continent, also near the bottom. 

And part of the problem is that educators themselves do not meet 

standards—less than 50 percent of the teachers in the north do not 

meet the federal standards. 

So, we are helping the ministry with teachers’ training, we are 

also helping with access to education. 

The problem is—there are many problems, impediments along 

the way. One is security. And we do not want to do harm, we do 

not want to—in a very insecure environment, where we know Boko 

Haram is operating and where they are targeting girls, we do not 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

24 

want to encourage girls to go to schools. So, we are looking at alternative ways—at-home education, radio education, things of that 

sort. 

We are also very focused, and we are supporting the government’s program of saving 1 million lives, which is targeted toward 

maternal mortality and child mortality. And again—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. That is great. 

Mr. GAST [continuing]. Both of those programs are in the north. 

Senator SHAHEEN. And I guess—this is probably for Mr. Jackson—do you expect, or do we expect, either State or DOD to 

request additional funding to help with the situation in Nigeria? 

Ambassador JACKSON. Senator, that is an excellent question. 

I think we will have to see how the operation evolves and how 

quickly we are able to develop good intelligence, based on our overflights. And we will get back to you. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. 

Before I turn to Senator Rubio, I just want to remind all of us, 

we have a scheduled 11:15 vote. We have a second witness waiting 

to participate, live from Nigeria. And we will do what questions we 

can of her after hearing her opening statement. 

Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here today and for your attention to this 

horrifying crime that has been committed. 

Ambassador Jackson, from your testimony, from much of the 

media reporting on this, the perception is being created—and I 

wanted to ask you—is the prime motivator here of this instance, 

in your opinion—is the prime motivator the desire to deny young 

women access to education and empowerment? 

Ambassador JACKSON. Senator, I actually think the prime motivator is to raise more funds for Boko Haram through a ransom. 

However, the fact that Boko Haram opposes Western education is 

certainly a reason why these girls were targeted. 

Senator RUBIO. Well, can I suggest that I think there is another 

motivation that is not getting nearly enough attention? And that 

is that this is clearly motivated by an anti-Christian attitude of 

this group. 

And I want to read you the comments from the leader of Boko 

Haram. I am sure you are aware of it, because the whole world has 

seen it. It is a grotesque statement. But, it is—basically, it concludes by saying, ‘‘To the people of the world, everybody should 

know his status. It is either you are with Mujahideen or you are 

with the Christians. We know what is happening in this world. It 

is a jihad war against Christians and Christianity. It is a war 

against Western education, democracy, and constitution. We have 

not started. Next time, we are going inside Abuja. We are going to 

a refinery and town of Christians. Do you know me? I have no 

problem with Jonathan. This is what I know in Quran, this is a 

war against Christians and democracy and their constitution. Allah 

says we should finish them when we get them.’’ 

I do not think there is any doubt about what is motivating them, 

or one of their leading motivators here is—this is not simply—and 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

25 

I am—there is no doubt that this is a part of it, but this is not just 

about girls going to school, and it is not just about raising money. 

There is a strong anti-Christian element of this organization and 

of this activity. Am I right in saying that? 

Ambassador JACKSON. Senator, there is a strong anti-Christian 

element, but I would offer that more of the thousands of people 

who have died as a result of Boko Haram’s activities are Muslim 

than Christian. 

Senator RUBIO. Well, again, I mean, I think when you commit 

these horrifying atrocities, you are going to target numerous people. But, from the very statement that he said, we should not 

ignore the fact that there is a religious-persecution aspect of this 

that is very significant and deserves attention, especially in light 

of what we are seeing, not just in this part of the world, but multiple areas of the world, where we are seeing horrifying instances 

of religious persecution against Christians, which, in my opinion, 

has been underreported. 

So, would you agree that this is one such instance in which antiChristian motivations are a strong component of what drives this 

organization to target—for example, my understanding is, according to one pastor, a Nigerian evangelist, most of the 200-plus 

schoolgirls kidnapped are Christians. Is that—so, clearly, antiChristianity is a strong motivator in this effort. 

Ambassador JACKSON. Senator, I respectfully suggest that, while 

anti-Christian sentiment is a strong motivator, the fact of the matter is that Boko Haram is trying to portray its philosophy as being 

a Muslim philosophy. And that is just not accurate. What both—— 

Senator RUBIO. I have not said it is a Muslim philosophy, but 

obviously it is a radical philosophy dressed up in a perversion of 

the tenets of a faith they claim to be adherents to. 

I am not claiming that this is somehow driven by legitimate 

teachings of Islam. What I am arguing is that there is a strong 

anti-Christian element to this, and that it is part of a broader antiChristian persecution that we are seeing repeatedly throughout the 

world. Would you disagree with that statement? 

Ambassador JACKSON. I do not disagree, but I continue to want 

to emphasize that Boko Haram terrorizes all people. 

Senator RUBIO. Okay. And I do not think that is in dispute. I 

guess my question is, just from the very statement that I have read 

here to you today, clearly he has featured Christianity as a key 

component that motivates who they are targeting and why they are 

targeting them. 

Ambassador JACKSON. They are. But, if I may take the example 

of the schoolgirls, about 85 percent of the girls who were kidnapped 

were Christian, the other 15 percent were Muslim, but they are all 

hostages. 

Senator RUBIO. Well, I just do not—okay, I do not—I think that 

we would stipulate that there are non-Christians that are being 

impacted by this, and it is horrifying just as well. A crime against 

Muslims is no less worse or less bad than a crime against Christians. 

What I am trying to put aside—what I am trying to put forward 

here is that we cannot continue to ignore that persecution of Christians is a leading motivator, not just of what is happening in Boko 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

26 

Haram, but in other parts of the world, as well, but, in this specific 

instance, they are clearly motivated by anti-Christian attitudes and 

anti-Christian beliefs. And I do not think that is even debatable, 

given their very own statement. 

Here is my other question. In your opinion, in hindsight—and I 

know that hindsight’s 20/20—was it a mistake not to designate this 

organization as a terrorist organization earlier? 

Ambassador JACKSON. Senator, as I explained, I think we had a 

healthy debate. We are respectful of the Nigerian attitude toward 

Boko Haram and the fact that they feared that designating the 

organization would bring it more publicity. In retrospect, we might 

have done it earlier. I think the important thing is that we have 

done it and that we have offered a reward for the leadership of 

Boko Haram’s location. 

Senator RUBIO. I would just—for future reference, do you think 

there is a lesson here that, when we make decisions about designating groups as terrorists, they should not simply be—either you 

are a terrorist group or you are not, and that perhaps, in the 

future, we should not so heavily rely upon some government’s input 

with regards to whether an organization that happens to be operating within their territory should be designated, or not? Is there 

any lessons there for the future? 

Ambassador JACKSON. I think, Senator, that there is definitely a 

lesson here, and I think that we will be quicker to act to make designations based on our own assessments earlier on, based on 

this—— 

Senator RUBIO. Okay. And my last question has to do with a 

broader theme with regards to the risk of global jihadists and terrorism at large. There was a narrative not long ago—and I do not 

want to get into the politics of it—but, there was a narrative not 

long ago that al-Qaeda was on the run, that it was dissipating, but, 

in fact, what—a new risk has emerged, and this—want to rely, 

here, on the testimony of Director Clapper before the Senate Committee on Intelligence, of which I sit, where he said, ‘‘The decentralization of al-Qaeda movement has led to the emergence of new 

power centers and an increase in threats by networks of likeminded extremists with allegiances to multiple groups,’’ of which it 

is clear that AQIM, which is the—there appears to be some links 

or ties, at least with some elements of Boko Haram and Al Qaeda 

in the Islamic Maghreb. 

So, my question is, What do we know, at this point, about that? 

Do we have any indications, at this stage, that you could reveal in 

a setting of this type, that, in fact, this is a group whose aspirations potentially involve attacks outside of Nigerian territory 

against Western interests either elsewhere in Africa or potentially 

in Europe and the Western world? What do we know about that 

at this stage? 

Ambassador JACKSON. We have definitely determined that there 

are links between al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb and Boko 

Haram. They have probably provided at least training, perhaps 

financial support. But, more importantly, to the second part of your 

question, Boko Haram has become a regional threat. It has 

kidnapped a French family in Cameroon, it has most recently kidnapped a Canadian priest—a Canadian nun and two Italian 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

27 

priests, and it kidnapped a French priest, several months ago, who 

was liberated. This is an organization that is becoming an international threat and needs to be dealt with through international 

cooperation. 

Senator RUBIO. I just have a 15-second followup, Mr. Chairman. 

Is it fair to begin to hold this—is it fair to hold this group up 

as yet another example of what Secretary Clapper was—Dr. Clapper was talking about, when he said that the decentralization of 

al-Qaeda and the emergence of these different groups in different 

regions poses the new face of the al-Qaeda threat in the 21st century? This group is just one more example of those types of groups 

that are popping up in different parts of the world that pose a different challenge in nature from the al-Qaeda we confronted during 

the 9/11 period. 

Ambassador JACKSON. Senator, yes. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Rubio. 

Chairman Menendez has returned. Do you have a question for 

this panel? 

The CHAIRMAN. I do, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I was 

in a Banking markup, but appreciate the opportunity. 

Let me ask you, Mr. Secretary. It is my understanding that Nigeria has not been cooperative with us in our efforts to designate 

Boko Haram as a terrorist group at the United Nations. Is that the 

case? 

Ambassador JACKSON. Until very recently, they were very reluctant to designate them at the United Nations. However, this week 

their Permanent Representative did consult with the Security 

Council about designation, and I expect that will happen imminently. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. So, we finally got them to see the light 

now. It is a shame that it took the abduction of 300 girls to get 

them to understand that they should have joined us at the United 

Nations. 

But, you said ‘‘consulted.’’ Does that mean that we are headed 

toward a designation? They are going to support us in our designation at the United Nations? 

Ambassador JACKSON. Yes, Senator, we have been informed that 

they will work with us and other members of the Security Council 

to designate Boko Haram—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Good. 

Ambassador JACKSON [continuing]. By the United Nations. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is a good development. 

Now, we all want—even though the delay, I fear, may cause challenges to getting each and every one of these girls back, but that 

is our goal, and that is why I sent a letter to President Jonathan, 

calling on him to demonstrate leadership. But, what is your level 

of confidence that the Nigerian Government, after an indefensible 

delay, now has the political will and the military capacity to ensure 

a swift and effective response that utilizes international support to 

the fullest, and is in line with human rights standards? 

Ambassador JACKSON. Senator, if I may, I will answer the political-will department and defer to my colleague for the Defense 

piece. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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The CHAIRMAN. That is fine. 

Ambassador JACKSON. We do believe that the political will now 

exists. President Jonathan is seized with the issue. In fact, I just 

learned, this morning, that he is on his way to Chibok to visit the 

school and meet with the families of the kidnapped girls. 

Ms. FRIEND. Mr. Senator, if I may. After the social media campaign was underway in earnest, we found, in our engagements 

with the Nigerian military in particular, an unprecedented level of 

access and frankness with them. So, our impression from the 

Department of Defense is that they are quite certainly, for the first 

time in recent memory, taking this threat very seriously and 

engaging with us very seriously. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what is their capacity? Because I see that 

we are spending a significant amount of money engaging them, in 

terms of creating capacity. I also see what happened at the school, 

and the notice they had and the lack of response. So, the question 

is, what is their capacity? Even if I accept that President Jonathan 

is now, because of international outrage, willing to do something, 

if we were to share, at some point, intelligence, assuming we had 

it and came upon it and could have actionable intelligence, what 

is their capacity to execute such an effort? 

Ms. FRIEND. Senator, it is hard for me to answer that question 

right now, because we do not know what kind of situation we are 

facing, we cannot isolate particular courses of military action that 

might be appropriate for a rescue of the girls, because we do not 

know where they are. 

There are two answers to your question. One is their capacity 

overall to handle the threat from Boko Haram, to take defensive 

measures, as you alluded to, at the school. There was also a recent 

prison-break equivalent at the Giwa barracks, I believe in March, 

that was virtually undefended by the Nigerian military. Again, as 

I spoke of earlier, the Nigerian military in the north has significant 

capacity challenges. 

Our aim right now is to support them as much as possible, to get 

them training and assistance, where possible, and again—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, here is my problem, Ms.—— 

Ms. FRIEND [continuing]. We have an unprecedented level—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Here is my problem, Ms. Friend. 

Ms. FRIEND [continuing]. Of cooperation. 

The CHAIRMAN. We are going to support them as much as possible. But, if we found actionable intelligence that identified where 

a large part, or all, of the girls are, and we do not believe, or we 

do not know, if they have the capacity to act on it, what good will 

that be? 

Ms. FRIEND. I cannot speculate on that, Senator. I do not want 

to give you speculative information. I do not—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Well—— 

Ms. FRIEND [continuing]. Know what kind of—— 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. That is a problem. 

Ms. FRIEND [continuing]. Actionable information that might be. 

The CHAIRMAN. I need you to go back to the Department and 

bring back to the committee a better answer than that. 

Ms. FRIEND. I would be happy to, sir. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

29 

The CHAIRMAN. Because it is impossible to fathom that we might 

actually have actionable intelligence and that we would not have 

the wherewithal, either by the Nigerians themselves, or by other 

entities helping the Nigerians, to be able to conduct a rescue mission. And so, all of this would be worthless unless we know the 

Nigerians are capable of executing, or, in the absence of their ability to execute, that we have some other way to be able to effectuate 

an effective rescue. 

So, I would like for you to go back to the Department, at whatever level is necessary, to give the committee a better answer than 

that, because, otherwise, some of us will question all of our efforts 

if they cannot be executed upon. 

Ms. FRIEND. Sir, as we gather more information with the Nigerians, we would be happy to come back and talk to you about that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I would like, yes, from the Nigerians, but 

I want to know our own assessment. I want to have the Department of Defense’s assessment as to what would be the capacity of 

the Nigerian military and/or security to effectuate a rescue mission, 

assuming that that opportunity unveils itself. We are not going to 

wait until finding out that we have actionable intelligence and then 

find out we do not have the capacity to do this. 

Ms. FRIEND. I would be happy to come back to you with that 

information, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Wow. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator COONS. Chairman Menendez, any further questions? 

We are trying to work out the logistics of a vote that is about 

to be called, and a second-panel witness. Senator Cardin has questions for this panel. At the forbearance of the witnesses, I am going 

to invite Senator Cardin to question this panel. Senator Flake and 

I are going to go to the floor, cast our votes, and come promptly 

back, and Senator Cardin will transition to the introduction of our 

witness if we are not back within 7 minutes, which I suspect we 

will be. 

Senator CARDIN. And I do not expect to take 7 minutes, so I will 

keep it moving. 

Senator COONS. We will move as quickly as we can. 

Senator CARDIN [presiding]. Right. I understand the challenges. 

As I think the chairman has pointed out, the floor has a series of 

votes starting at 11:15, so I will do my best to keep things moving 

along. 

This is a matter of urgency globally, as I think has been 

expressed here. These Nigerian girls were not in the wrong place 

at the wrong time, they were in the right place at the right time. 

And what happened there is just beyond description. 

So, this is not a U.S. interest, this is a global humanitarian 

interest. The United States has certain unique capabilities, and the 

international community has certain capabilities. We are not yet 

clear as to the capacity of the Nigerian Government to act. We do 

believe that the international focus on this issue has given greater 

strength to the Nigerian Government to take the appropriate steps 

to ensure the safe return of the girls. 

So, I was listening to the comments of my colleagues, and I know 

it is frustrating when we know how long these girls have been held 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

30 

captive. So, I guess my only observation, not so much as a question, 

is that this is not about what we read in the paper, this is about 

getting the girls back safely. This is not about the United States 

or the United States being visible or invisible. It is about getting 

the girls home safely. And we want to do everything we possibly 

can in that regard. 

There is also the issue, generally in Nigeria, of how they handle 

opposition, how they handle the stability in their own country, 

which is of concern to the United States. And what I think most 

of us are concerned about is that we do not want the safety of these 

girls confused with the outrageous terrorist acts and we do not 

want to give these actors any legitimacy whatsoever. And I think 

that is a point that, again, it is not just U.S. interests, but it is a 

matter of global humanitarian interest. So, this is that balance 

that we are seeking. How can we be constructive and how can we 

be forceful in helping bring back these girls safely? 

And I thank you all for your testimonies today. And we know 

these are difficult, anxious moments. But, we want to be as constructive as we possibly can. We want to be very clear about the 

outrageous conduct of terrorists that go beyond the pale of anything any of us can imagine and that we recognize that this is a 

global matter that the Nigerians must handle, but they should seek 

help from the international community, and we are ready to assist. 

Thank you all very much. 

I would now invite up Ms. Lantana Abdullahi. I assume I mispronounced that. 

STATEMENT OF LANTANA ABDULLAHI, PROJECT MANAGER, 

SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND, JOS, NIGERIA 

Ms. ABDULLAHI [via videocast from Nigeria]. Hello. Members of 

the Senate. Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. Hello? 

Senator CARDIN. We hear you fine. Can you hear us? 

Ms. ABDULLAHI. Oh, good. Members of the Senate—Ladies and 

gentlemen, good morning. Chairman Coons, Ranking Member 

Flake, members of the committee, thank you for convening this important and timely meeting and for giving me the opportunity to 

speak today. 

I thank other witnesses today—Honorable Mr. Jackson, Honorable Mr. Gast, and Ms. Friend—for their all testimonies. I thank 

all of you for your leadership, commitment, and efforts to help 

Nigerians respond to the growing crisis in our country. 

My name is Lantana Abdullahi, and I work on country transformation and violence prevention with Search for Common Ground 

in Nigeria. The testimony that follows reflects my own views and 

informed by my experiences first as a mother with five children, as 

a Nigerian, and as a peace-builder. 

I will begin by briefly speaking how on the events that have 

brought us here today, the causes of the current crisis, and offer 

some practical recommendations. 

You will all recall that today marks the 30th day that is over 200 

Christian and Muslim girls were abducted from a school in Chibok, 

north Nigeria. Of course this means a whole generation is apparently at risk. This is only one of many attacks which Boko Haram 

has claimed responsibility. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

31 

The group was created in 2002 with the sole purpose of imposing 

a version of Islamic law throughout Nigeria. So far, the attacks 

have claimed more than 2,000 people, to date, and displaced tens 

of thousands of people, and more than 10 million people are currently at risk if you combine the population of Adamawa, Yobe, and 

Borno states. 

And, in addition to one of the comments made about the goal of 

Boko Haram, about their anti-Christianity stance, I want to say 

that, of course, it is a ploy to pit Christians and Muslims against 

each other, and, of course, also seek, sympathy among some 

Muslims. 

This abduction just serves as a reminder, a sad reminder, of the 

longstanding challenges at play in Nigeria that may also produce 

a negative impact throughout the greater region. Currently, the 

lack of information on the current level of response from the government and armed forces is a great source of worry for many 

Nigerians. Nigerians are also very much frustrated by the history 

and current level of corruption in the government, associated, of 

course, with bad governance and impunity. 

Boko Haram argues that corruption is the result of democracy, 

a Western import that has failed. This description resonates well 

with marginalized groups if you look at their recruitment efforts 

and rife. 

Northern Nigeria, as we all know, has been historically disadvantaged, in comparison to the south—to the more developed 

south. Boko Haram took advantage of this to make inroads with 

local population by offering food, shelter, and free Quranic education. We must also acknowledge the porous nature of our borders 

near Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states, where violence has originated and allowed Boko Haram to traffic victims as well as escape 

prosecution by seeking refuge abroad. 

We have all been deeply touched by the attention—of the girls’ 

kidnapping—that has been received, but I think there is still a 

need for more to be done to end this crisis. Affected citizens have 

on-the-ground response. While securing the girls’ release will be a 

short-term gain, ensuring lasting peace in the region requires the 

militancy issue to be addressed from multiple angles with engagement of all stakeholders to prevent future atrocities. 

Despite the recent escalation of Boko Haram violent actions, 

there are a few reasons to be hopeful. First, we have witnessed a 

decrease in reprisal attacks, especially coming from regions like the 

north central Nigeria, and in particular, plateau state, Jos, where 

I come from. 

During earlier periods of the insurgency, victims appealed to 

their own communities to gain retribution. More recently, we have 

seen more and more Christians and Muslims working together, as 

seen by the #BringBackOurGirls movement, and driven, as was 

seen, of course, by Nigerians. 

In the past, there has been poor international coordination. However, the global attention generated by the abduction of these girls 

and the World Economic Forum for Africa, hosted in Nigeria, have 

created an opportunity for the United States and other foreign 

technical assistance. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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With this in mind, I will want to make the following recommendations. There is an urgent need for humanitarian assistance 

and support to prevent further marginalization of the populations 

who are at risk of being recruited into militancy. There is also urgent need for trauma counseling and psychosocial support to victims of violence in northeast Nigeria. 

Other recommendations support an original approach. Like all 

other witnesses have said, there is a need to have a regional collaboration between Nigeria and its neighbors, particularly Niger 

Republic, Cameroon, and Chad. Securing the borders will limit terrorist activities and prevent the spread of militancy. We need also 

to support a robust community-focused approach to improving 

human security. How do we ensure communities are also engaged 

in this? We also need to prevent and monitor human rights abuses 

by security forces. More importantly, we know that the level of 

presence of military and armed forces in most conflict locations 

have also increased the level of violations of human rights of citizens. We need to consolidate the gains in peace-building effort 

throughout Nigeria. 

Inasmuch as we want to concentrate on the current crisis in the 

northeast region particularly on the Boko Haram terrorist activities, we should not also forget the issues in the Niger Delta, the 

middle—and, of course, the upcoming general elections. 

I would like to close with a personal story. Three years ago, I 

was at a wedding in Maiduguri, Boko Haram’s place of birth. As 

soon as I arrived, I heard multiple explosions, serving as a painful 

reminder of the violence affecting the residents. Their ability to 

move freely was heavily restricted. Even during joyous celebrations, they were constantly made aware of the lack of security. Yet, 

it also warmed my heart to see how resilient my family were, as 

well as their friends and neighbors. Despite the terror, women still 

went to the market, and children courageously still attended 

school. My visit to Maiduguri strengthened my commitment as a 

peace-builder to ensure that all Nigerians, both Christians and 

Muslims, can work together and live free of fear. 

I tell you this story to remind you that my experience is not 

unique. Millions of other people throughout northeastern Nigeria 

and, indeed, Nigeria are affected by this violence. I hope my testimony today represents them all. 

I also want to thank the U.S. Senate for this opportunity to 

speak and for showing interest to support us to overcome these 

challenges. In particular, I also wish to appreciate and thank the 

American people for joining the global movement to 

#BringBackOurGirls and end terrorism. We must continue in this 

spirit until the war is won. 

Thank you, and I await your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Abdullahi follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LANTANA ADBULLAHI

Members of the Senate, ladies, and gentlemen, good morning. Chairman Coons, 

Ranking Member Flake, members of the committee, I would like to begin by thanking you for convening this important and timely meeting, and for giving me the 

opportunity to speak today on this crisis. I also thank the Honorable Mr. Jackson, 

Hon. Ms. Gast, and Ms. Friend for their testimonies today. I thank all of you for 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

33 

your leadership, commitment, and efforts to help Nigerians respond to the growing 

crisis in our country. 

My name is Lantana Abdullahi and I work on conflict transformation and violence 

prevention with Search for Common Ground in Nigeria. Since 2004, we have been 

developing innovative media and community projects that encourage mutual understanding across ethnic, religious, and gender lines. I recently led a project to empower Muslim and Christian girls from northern Nigeria and promote them as 

peace-builders, and currently work with communities, women, youth, and civil society groups to prevent violence and promote peace. The testimony that follows 

reflects my own views, which are informed by my experiences as a mother, a Nigerian, as well as a peace-builder. 

I will begin by speaking briefly on the events that have brought us together today, 

some of the causes of the current crisis, and conclude with some practical actions 

that can be taken in order to respond to the immediate crisis and bring about longterm solutions. 

THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS

On April 14, 2014, the Islamist militant group Boko Haram abducted more than 

200 girls from a school in Chibok, a town in northeastern Nigeria. While the identity of the girls is still being confirmed, the abductees included both Muslim and 

Christian girls. This abduction was just one of the latest attacks for which the militant group Boko Haram has claimed responsibility. The group began its insurgency 

in 2009, with the aim of imposing its own version of Islamic law throughout Nigeria. 

In the past 5 years, the group has targeted the United Nations headquarters in 

Abuja, churches, the police, markets, and schools throughout northeastern Nigeria, 

and has regularly engaged in bloody combat with the Nigerian military and police 

forces. These attacks have led to over 3,000 deaths—(World Report 2013: Nigeria)— 

a state of emergency declaration in May 2013 in three northeastern states, and the 

displacement of tens of thousands of my fellow citizens. In all, Boko Haram’s actions 

have affected more than 10 million people. It risks becoming a regional crisis, and 

placing serious strains on Nigeria’s relations with neighboring Niger, Cameroon, 

and Chad. 

UNDERLYING CHALLENGES

The abduction of the Chibok school girls last month is a sad escalation of the terror the Nigerian people have witnessed since 2009. This crisis comes as a result of 

four long-running challenges that not only affect the northeastern parts of the country, but have the possibility to produce widespread impact across all of Nigeria and 

in the neighboring countries. 

The first challenge is that of corruption and lack of confidence in government in 

Nigeria. Many Nigerians are frustrated, and feel that there is a high degree of corruption in the country. Boko Haram argues that corruption is the result of democracy and Western influences. According to this argument, democracy is a Western 

import that has not succeeded in Nigeria. Past elections have resulted in violence, 

and militants argue that this contradicts the principles of Islamic sharia law—given 

by God. This has a certain resonance with frustrated, poor, and desperate people 

who perceive a growing gap between rich and poor, and suspect that politicians are 

using their public offices to secure private wealth. 

The second challenge is chronic poverty. This is of particular concern in northern 

Nigeria, which is historically disadvantaged with regards to the more developed 

south. The effects of poverty on the population are pervasive: without a strong economy or income-generating activities, many parents send their children to the only 

schools available. An exclusively Koranic school education without other practical 

training offers limited opportunities for students when they graduate—as it leaves 

out subjects such as mathematics, science, and the liberal arts—leaving them unprepared and unable to find adequate employment. Thus these youngsters are more 

susceptible to recruitment into violent groups. Additionally, Boko Haram first made 

in-roads with the local population by offering food and shelter, thereby taking 

advantage of people’s vulnerability as a result of poverty. 

The third challenge stems from the geographical location of the Boko Haram 

insurgency. Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states—where this violence has originated— 

are located along Nigeria’s border with Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Weak borders 

and governance in the remote region allow for the trafficking of individuals and 

arms across countries. Boko Haram can not only facilitate the trafficking of victims, 

but it can also escape persecution and seek refuge in neighboring countries when 

the situation becomes too precarious for them in Nigeria. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Finally, these challenges go hand in hand with the lack of a strong civil society 

and media presence. In recent years, many different local and international organizations have been moving to the region but have yet to deliver a strong impact. 

Media programs and outlets continue to have limited reach compared to the rest of 

the country, and citizens have few opportunities to make their voices heard on 

national issues. Consequently, the local population does not trust available news 

sources, leaving no suitable outlets for popular expression. 

Key Opportunities and Recommendations 

I have been deeply touched by the attention the tragedy of the Chibok Girls’ kidnapping has garnered both in Nigeria and in the world. Their kidnapping comes 

after a long wave of killings, kidnappings, and abuses, and underscores the need 

for new approaches to the crisis. Thus far, citizens living in the most-affected areas 

have seen little on-the-ground response to the crisis apart from the current offensive 

undertaken by security forces. Yet despite these operations, the insurgency persists, 

and human rights groups have presented grave reports of extremely serious abuses 

committed by the security actors. While securing the girls’ release will be a shortterm gain, ensuring lasting peace in the region requires the militancy issue be 

addressed from multiple angles. It also requires the engagement of all stakeholders—communities, civil society, government, and its international partners—to 

ensure context-specific and sustainable solutions to improve human security, peacebuilding, and the prevention of future atrocities. 

While the violent actions perpetrated by Boko Haram have increased in scale, 

quantity, frequency, there are a few reasons to be hopeful. 

First, we have witnessed a decrease in reprisal violence within affected communities. During earlier periods of the insurgency, victims of violence appealed to their 

own communities, often divided along religious and ethnic lines, in order to attain 

justice or retribution. Recently we have seen more and more Christians and Muslims working together, supporting one another, and recognizing the need to unite 

to prevent violence. With the #Bringbackourgirls campaign, we have also seen a 

more concerted effort by Nigerians across the country to recognize the tragic consequences of the conflict in the northeast. 

Secondly, in the past, there has been poor coordination with the international 

community, as well as with neighboring countries. However, the global attention 

generated by the abductions of the girls and the campaign by CSOs, as well as the 

World Economic Forum for Africa hosted in Nigeria, have created an opportunity 

for foreign technical assistance from the U.S., UK, and France. 

These two changes present an opportunity for the U.S. Government to support 

Nigerians as they try to respond to this crisis. 

The challenges and opportunities call for a running engagement and specific 

actions to face longstanding problems. With this in mind, I make the recommendation for practical courses of action. 

The first set is focused on addressing the human consequences of the current crisis in three key ways: a. There is an immediate need for trauma healing and psychosocial support to victims of violence in northeast Nigeria. The psychological legacies of violence will create long-term scars, both for these girls, as well as the thousands of their fellow citizens who have lost loved ones, experienced abuses, lost their homes, and otherwise 

suffered as a result of the violence. 

b. There is an urgent need for humanitarian support. Tens of thousands of people 

have fled in fear, becoming refugees in neighboring countries and fleeing to other 

parts of Nigeria. In some places the influx of refugees has overtaxed local water and 

food supplies, overcrowded schools and clinics, and competes with locals for economic opportunities. There is a need to ensure the protection of women and children 

fleeing the violence, to ensure they are not exposed to sexual exploitation. There is 

a need to work with the displaced people to ensure that in their desperation, they 

do not themselves become recruited into militancy and violence. c. Finally, there is need to begin planning for early recovery. The Nigerian Government and its international partners should begin working with local communities 

to begin planning for how to rebuild from the devastation, including repairing infrastructure and homes that have been destroyed, creating economic livelihoods opportunities, and implementing emergency programs, such as catchup education programs for those whose schooling has been disrupted by war. 

Even while addressing its consequences, the international community can also 

undertake specific steps to help bring the crisis to an end in four ways: 

a. Support a regional approach to prevent the Boko Haram militancy from becoming a broader crisis. There needs to be regional collaboration to work with border 

communities and governments to improve security along the borders between NigeFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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ria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad. The porous borders between these countries have 

facilitated human trafficking, arms and drug trade, and the movement of mercenaries. Securing the borders will limit terrorist activities and prevent the spread of 

militancy. The regional collaboration should not be limited to the formal security 

forces, but can involve local leaders, civil society, media, and governments in all four 

countries to recognize a shared interest in more secure and productive communities, 

with a particular focus on youth. Actions can include strategic livelihoods programming, community empowerment, and supporting pluralistic platforms for dialogue 

on diversity and tolerance through the media sector. 

b. Allocate adequate funding to support a robust community-focused approach to 

improving human security in northeastern Nigeria. The U.S. strategy to support 

northeastern Nigeria should focus on empowering women, youth, local leaders and 

religious groups within the conflict-affected areas of the northeast. Building cohesive, empowered, and resilient local communities will help reduce the risk of recruitment, create alternative ways for local residents to raise their concerns to government officials, and help reduce the risk of recruitment of young people. Such an 

approach should also include civil society capacity-building and media engagement 

to document security conditions and monitor allegations of human rights abuses. 

c. Work with civil society, religious and local leaders, Nigerian authorities, the 

security forces and the National Human Rights Commission to prevent and monitor human rights abuses. This includes providing support platform building to 

strengthen relationships between civil society groups and the NHRC to prevent 

abuses in the north. Operations have been marked by reports of grave human rights 

abuses, and ensuring that there is a transparent process for addressing these grievances, agreed upon by all stakeholders, will prevent the allegations of abuses from 

becoming new grievances. 

d. Consolidate the gains in peace-building throughout Nigeria. Alongside the crisis 

in the northeast, Nigeria is facing a series of other violent conflicts in the Niger 

Delta, as well as in the Middle Belt. Additionally, the nation will be looking forward 

to elections next year. Even as we focus on resolving the crisis in the northeast, it 

is critical that sufficient funds should be allocated to continue to support the consolidation of peace in the Niger Delta, interfaith peace efforts in the Middle Belt, and 

support the electoral process. 

CONCLUSION

I would like to close with a personal story. Three years ago, I was in Maiduguri. 

As soon as I arrived, I was shocked to hear explosions all around us, serving as a 

painful reminder of the violence that my relatives, friends, and fellow citizens are 

subjected to on a regular basis. Witnessing the routine violation of my relatives’ 

rights and liberty particularly saddened me. Their ability to move freely was heavily 

restricted—even during joyous celebrations they were constantly made aware of 

their lack of freedom. Yet it also warmed my heart of see how resilient my family 

was, as well as their friends, neighbors, and communities. Despite the terror, 

women still went to the market. Children courageously still attended school. My fellow Nigerians were going about their lives in spite of the violence that surrounded 

them. 

My visit to Maiduguri strengthened my commitment to work as a peace-builder 

in Nigeria, to ensure that all Nigerians, both Christians and Muslims, can work together and live free of fear. I am reminded today that my experience is not unique 

and millions of people throughout northeastern Nigeria are affected by violence and 

gross violations of their individual rights and freedoms. 

Thank you once again for giving this opportunity and for your interest in supporting us to overcome the challenges facing our country. 

Senator COONS [presiding]. Thank you very much for your testimony, Lantana Abdullahi. We are grateful for you joining us today. 

You have experienced so much as someone from the north and 

as an advocate for peace-building. How has Boko Haram impacted 

your life, the community around you in the north? And what message would you like to send to the perpetrators of these vicious 

attacks? 

Ms. ABDULLAHI. I think I want to talk, first, as a Muslim. I want 

to say the activities of Boko Haram has actually affected almost all 

Muslims, you know, in Nigeria, because we have been left to actually start, you know, talking about defending our faith and, you 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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know, educating and sensitizing people that Boko Haram do not 

actually represent Islam and do not represent the interests of 

Muslims in Nigeria. 

And, of course, coming from where we are, we are dealing with 

other conflicts in other locations, like the north-central region, 

where we are dealing more with issues of ethnic and religious conflicts. You know, Boko Haram has also taken advantage of that to 

also try to, you know, perpetrate some of the terrorist activities, 

you know, in some of these locations, and it has taken, you know, 

a lot of, you know, our efforts to make sure we localize the context 

and not allow Boko Haram to actually hijack the process and the 

work we are doing in Nigeria. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

As you know, many Americans have taken to the Internet to 

express their outrage with Boko Haram and their support for safely 

returning—for bringing back the girls. And today’s hearing is an 

expression, in part, of American concern and solidarity and commitment to support the families and the girls. What message do 

you have for us, for the U.S. Government and the American people, 

as we consider what more we could do to support peace and security in Nigeria? 

Ms. ABDULLAHI. I think, very importantly, we want to acknowledge the American people and government for coming to our rescue 

at this moment. We know of the military cooperation currently 

going on between America and Nigerian Government. Even though, 

of course, the support of the—from Nigerian Government for such 

support is coming late, but we still believe that the time is now to 

actually act. 

And, in particular, we also need to look at other nonmilitary support from the American Government, particularly when we are 

looking at other community-driven, peace-building strategies and 

approach to also consolidate on the post-abduction stage. We need 

to do that to rebuild the communities, but, more importantly, we 

need to acknowledge that the northeast region is the one of the 

most backward, you know, regions in Nigeria. There is, you know, 

a weak media presence, there is weak civil society presence, and 

this means that we need to actually push to empowered communities to speak their voice, not to allow some people or institutions 

to speak for them. So, that is why we are pushing to see how we 

can have community-level, you know, -driven radio stations, even 

though, at this moment, there is actually no license. The government is not issuing such license. But, we think that the time has 

come to have community radios to work with young girls and to 

work with also women and youth. 

Senator COONS. Well, thank you for those comments. 

If you could tell us what other initiatives, in addition to the radio 

conversation, that your organization, the organization for which 

you work, Search for Common Ground, has taken. And, as a peacebuilder, Lantana, what are the most important steps you have 

taken to encourage reconciliation and dialogue amongst the communities in the north? What are the most positive steps you have 

seen so far? And what recommendations do you have for us about 

how we can best support peace-building efforts in the north? 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

37 

Ms. ABDULLAHI. As you know, Search for Common Ground is an 

organization that is very innovative. It meets peace-building efforts 

around the world. And that innovation and uniqueness is what we 

have brought to deal with conflicts in many parts of Nigeria. Currently, we are working basically more in the middle belt region, 

trying to bring, you know, ethnic groups together to look at their 

common grounds values, and to work on their differences. We are 

also, of course, supporting the federal government to work on the 

militancy problem and stability in the Niger delta region. We have 

been supporting communities to sit and, you know, dialogue over 

their differences using their own local initiatives. We have also 

been empowering them with skills and knowledge, particularly on 

conflict transformation, to be able to deal with those issues 

constructively. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Lantana. 

I am going to yield to Senator Flake so that he also has an 

opportunity to ask questions before we must return for our next 

vote. 

Thank you so much for your testimony today. 

Senator Flake. 

Senator FLAKE. Well, thank you. And I am sorry if I am asking 

questions that have already been answered. 

But, with regard to the government’s response to what is going 

on in the north, have there been any initiatives by the government 

that have been effective in diminishing the attractiveness of Boko 

Haram for recruiting or for their activities? Is the government winning this battle, or not, at this point? 

Ms. ABDULLAHI. Of course, it is obvious that if young—you know, 

over 200 young girls can actually be abducted right, you know, in 

the presence of the Nigerian Government, and remain missing for 

30 days, it means that we have lost it somewhere. It is obvious that 

there is still some lack of capacity to actually deal with the problem we are currently facing. It also seems that, since the advent 

of the Boko Haram in 2002, the government were not actually prepared to actually deal with the issue. And, of course, they have, for 

us, most Nigerians, there have been many analysts, many arguments, about, you know, the position of government on using just, 

you know, the military offensive to deal with the Boko Haram in 

suggest the—instead of, you know, trying to address some of the 

root causes, you know, that brought about the advent of Boko 

Haram in the first instance. 

Of course, recently, we have had some announcements by the 

government about, you know, some grants to northeast region to 

try to provide some sustainable and livelihoods—you know, address 

some of the livelihood and concerns of the region, to address the 

widespread poverty and the low educational level and political, you 

know, marginalization of that region. But, of course, we have also 

not seen anything happening in regard to the money that was 

meant for that. 

Senator FLAKE. One other question. I think we were struck, here, 

and the international community was struck, at how slow the Nigerian Government reacted to these kidnappings. Does that suggest 

that they simply are not ready and willing to address the issues, 

whether they are the root causes or more immediate concerns? And 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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are they only acting because the international community is putting pressure on them now? 

Ms. ABDULLAHI. Yes, I think that they were slow, of course, you 

know, responding to the crisis. And, of course, we also have to 

acknowledge the role played by Nigerians. They have been daily, 

you know, coming out to actually push and, you know, talk about 

the current, you know, crisis. 

Of course, we also have to acknowledge that there have been 

many, you know, push by the international community to come in 

and support, but the government were very skeptical, they were 

very, you know, slow in accepting those offers. But, I think Nigerians have actually pushed for that, and we have seen it, you know, 

happening now, and we hope that, apart from just wanting to have 

the girls released, we also want, beyond, you know, the abduction, 

to address, you know, those root causes. 

Senator FLAKE. All right. Thank you. I will turn it back to the 

chairman. Thank you for your participation. We really appreciate 

you doing this. 

Ms. ABDULLAHI. Thank you so much. 

Senator COONS. So, Ms. Abdullahi, if you have any closing comments you would like to make to us—we have to go back to the 

Senate floor in just a moment for another vote. I know it was a little disjointed, between Senator Cardin, Senator Flake, and myself. 

If there is any closing comments you have for us, suggestions about 

how we can most be helpful in supporting reconciliation and development in the north that will address some of the root causes of 

the Boko Haram insurgency or that can address some of the root 

causes of violence and of difficulties between communities, I would 

welcome that. And if you have any other suggestions for how we 

can best support the Nigerian schoolgirls who have been kidnapped 

and their families, we would welcome that, as well. 

Thank you so much for your testimony. We look forward to a 

closing comment from you. 

Ms. ABDULLAHI. Thank you so much for the opportunity to actually talk today. And, of course, like I said, we need a lot of support. 

There is currently weak presence of the civil society on ground to 

actually support the current crisis in the region, so we want the 

U.S. Senate to push to see how we can have more of the civil 

actions going on right now in the region by, you know, sorting out 

the humanitarian issues immediately, but also looking out to plan 

long-term interventions, working with youth groups, women 

groups, and young girls to promote civilian protection and also promote human rights respect by armed forces and also on a community-driven approach. 

Senator COONS. Thank you so much. Thank you for your focus 

on peace-building, on respecting human rights, and on reconciliation. We are grateful—— 

Ms. ABDULLAHI. Thank you. 

Senator COONS [continuing]. For the effort that you made to testify before us today. 

I will leave the record open for an additional week, until the 

close of business, Thursday, May 22, for any members of this committee who were not able to attend but who have questions either 

for our first or second panel. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

39 

We greatly appreciate the testimony that was offered today by all 

four of our witnesses and the very hard work that many are doing 

here in the Capitol of the United States to provide support and 

assistance to the Nigerian schoolgirls and their families, to the people of Nigeria, and to all who are working for peace and reconciliation in Nigeria. 

Thank you. And, with that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR ROBERT P. JACKSON TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER A. COONS

Question. Human Rights Violations.—To what degree has Nigeria’s poor track 

record with regard to human rights limited bilateral cooperation with the military 

and police? What steps has the Nigerian Government taken to address this issue. 

Specifically, how have Leahy restrictions on U.S. security assistance limited assistance offered to Nigeria’s police and military in the past, and what are the current 

plans for providing military and police support moving forward? 

Answer. The military’s heavy-handed approach to combating Boko Haram and the 

resulting gross violations of human rights have prevented the United States from 

assisting some units. Nevertheless, despite these challenges, we continue to work 

with eligible units to help the Nigerian Government to locate and liberate the kidnapped school girls, and to combat Boko Haram. In 2013, we vetted and approved 

1,108 individuals and units from the Nigerian security forces that were nominated 

to receive training, equipment, and other forms of assistance. There are currently 

187 Nigerian military units and 173 Nigerian police units that have been Leahy vetted and approved, and are cleared to receive U.S. assistance and training, including 

soldiers from Nigeria’s elite Special Boat Service (SBS) commando unit, the 101st 

and 143rd counterterrorism units. 

We help the Nigerian Government professionalize its military and security services, improve its ability to participate in peacekeeping operations and conduct maritime security to improve its counterimprovised explosive device (IED) capacity, and 

carry-out responsible and effective counterterrorism (CT) operations. We also provide law enforcement assistance, including by training Nigerian law enforcement 

officials on CT investigations, border security, counter IED and post-blast investigations, tactical operations, and crisis management. All of this assistance is part of 

a coordinated effort to help strengthen Nigeria’s ability to respond responsibly and 

effectively to their security challenges in a way that ensures civilians are protected, 

human rights are respected, and violators are held accountable in accordance with 

the Leahy law and our foreign policy objectives. 

We have referenced the Leahy law in engaging with senior-level Nigerian officials, 

in our efforts to encourage the Nigerian Government to adopt a smarter approach 

to fighting Boko Haram and to professionalize their forces. These efforts have led 

to difficult but productive discussions on the damage that human rights violations 

can do to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts, and the importance of 

accountability for those responsible. We have seen some signs of progress, like President Jonathan’s February 24 order to include more human rights training for officers, but we expect more as we continue to engage Nigerians on these challenging 

issues while also providing assistance in critical areas in accordance with our laws 

and policies. 

Under the Leahy laws, and consistent with U.S. policy to seek rights-respecting 

security partners, we do not provide assistance, including training, to security force 

units when we have credible information that they have committed gross violations 

of human rights, including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearance, rape, and 

torture, unless the host government is taking effective steps to bring those responsible to justice. Even if the Leahy Law did not exist, we recognize that such abuses 

undermine the fight against Boko Haram by alienating the civilians that the Nigerian military and security services should be protecting, and whose allegiance the 

Nigerian Federal Government needs to defeat the terrorists. 

The U.S. decision to provide assistance to any military, security, or law enforcement unit is driven both by overall policy considerations as well as the Leahy laws. 

We continue to urge the Nigerian Government to adopt a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy that includes action both to hold the perpetrators of human violaFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

40 

tions accountable and to curtail further human rights abuses by security forces. 

Such actions by the Nigerian Government will also allow us to deepen our partnership with the Nigerian Government in its fight against Boko Haram. 

Question. Police.—You mentioned in your testimony that you are providing law 

enforcement basic forensics, hostage negotiations, leadership, and task force development. When did this assistance begin? It does not appear that International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds were requested for Nigeria in 

FY13, FY14, or FY15. Given the important role played by the police in civilian protection, why hasn’t U.S. police assistance been prioritized for Nigeria, and what 

police assistance is planned moving forward? 

Answer. Since 2012, the Department has provided law enforcement and rule of 

law INCLE-funded assistance to Nigeria under the West Africa Cooperative Security 

Initiative (WACSI), a whole-of-government effort to increase global security by 

addressing transnational organized crime in West Africa. WACSI receives International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds under the State 

Africa Regional account (funded in the West Africa Regional Security Initiative Program line), rather than a bilateral INCLE funding line for Nigeria. 

In recent discussions with INL, high-level Nigerian Police Force officials expressed willingness to engage on institutional reform at their training academies. 

Future INL programming will focus on building the long-term institutional capacity 

of the police to perform their duties, while meeting international standards and 

human rights norms. As part of this effort, INL plans to initiate a Police Training 

Modernization project at Nigerian police academies in late 2014 and a regional 

project to facilitate community and police dialogues utilizing Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) funding allocated for police reform in Nigeria. 

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR ROBERT P. JACKSON TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

Question. While there is strong civil society and interreligious commitments to 

peace-building elsewhere in Nigeria, there has been little on-the-ground response to 

the crisis in northeastern Nigeria apart from the security forces. 

A security-only approach has led to both an out-of-control insurgency and atrocious human rights abuses, and as we’ve seen time and again across the Middle 

East and North Africa, including in Mali, will not successfully counter violent extremism. And yet, since the global public outrage on the abduction of the school girls, 

the administration has focused disproportionately on security assistance to the Government of Nigeria. 

♦ How are we supporting local civil society organizations, including local and 

international interreligious and peace-building organizations, to ensure a balanced, well-rounded approach to protect civilians from and prevent the further 

emboldening of Boko Haram? 

♦ What are some of the major underlying grievances among civilian populations 

in northern Nigeria and what can the U.S. do to help address these challenges? 

♦ How have issues related to resource-scarcity and climate-impacted communities 

throughout Nigeria and particularly in the north? 

Answer. The administration continues to press the Nigerian Government to implement a comprehensive approach to combating violent extremism and insecurity in 

northeastern Nigeria that addresses the underlying causes of the conflict and grievances of northern populations while concomitantly emphasizing civilian protection, 

respect for human rights, the rule of law, and accountable security forces. 

Operating in the poorest part of Nigeria, Boko Haram exploits the northern population’s legitimate grievances to garner recruits and support. Heavily reliant on subsistence agriculture, the Northeast already faces issues of resource scarcity and 

climate change. However, the population’s most serious grievances include lack of 

employment, infrastructure, sanitation, health care, education, and political marginalization. Corruption, patronage networks, and weak institutions have resulted in 

the systemic poor performance of the Federal, State, and local governments to meet 

basic citizen needs. These unfulfilled demands are exacerbated when resources allocated to address these issues are misappropriated, also impeding development and 

investment. Heavy-handed tactics by security forces against the civilian population 

has tended further compound the alienation from the government of people living 

in northeast Nigeria. 

We are taking a number of steps to help alleviate these grievances: 

• We are working with the Nigerian Government to more effectively engage communities vulnerable to extremist violence and promote practices among its secuFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

41 

rity forces that protect civilians, respect human rights, and do not further alienate already aggrieved communities. 

• The U.S. Embassy supports local religious leaders who reach across sectarian 

lines and promote human rights, social justice, and conflict resolution. USAID 

has conducted conflict mitigation and management interventions to lessen sectarian and intercommunal tensions and to increase interfaith civic engagement 

and tolerance among flashpoint communities. 

• USAID is helping to strengthen education management systems; improve the 

reading skills of 5.5 million northern Nigerian primary school students; improve 

the quality of education for teachers to teach reading, and increase access of 

orphans and vulnerable children, including itinerant Qur’anic youth (Almajiri), 

and girls, to basic education. These programs focus on the northern states of 

Bauchi and Sokoto. 

• USAID is supporting economic growth and poverty alleviation by improving 

agricultural productivity and expanding jobs in the rural sector through the 

Feed the Future initiative. 

• Through President Obama’s ‘‘Power Africa’’ initiative, the United States will 

continue to partner with Nigeria to ensure that the Nigerian people have greater access to electricity. 

• In the health sector in northern Nigeria, USAID supports increased access to 

quality family planning, immunization, and maternal health services. USAID 

also supports efforts to decrease the number of malaria-related deaths in pregnant women and children by increasing access to treatment, insecticide-treated 

bed nets, and retreatment kits. USAID provides HIV/AIDs prevention, care, and 

treatment services as well as services to orphans and vulnerable children. 

• We are working with civil society to advance transparent and accountable governance. In 2013, the State Department launched a 2-year pilot program to 

build the capacity of civil society (including media) to increase citizens’ access 

to government-held information. 

• USAID works with state and local governments to improve budget preparation 

and fiscal oversight to ensure adequate service delivery. Working with a diverse 

group of civil society organizations, USAID strengthens their ability to advocate 

and engage with government officials to deliver quality social services. 

• The Department also is running a project in Nigeria to educate civil society, 

extractive industry leaders, and government officials about human rights and 

promote the incorporation of the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human 

Rights, which apply to the extractive sector. 

• In the runup to Nigeria’s February 2015 elections, the United States is reinforcing the electoral process through support to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and political parties. We also continue to stress our 

concerns to INEC and the Nigerian Government that any suspension of democratic or electoral processes in northeastern Nigeria could undermine the integrity of the elections. 

• USAID also facilitates dialogue among government institutions, civil society, 

political parties, faith-based organizations, and other stakeholders to prevent, 

manage, and mitigate the impact of conflict, including election-related conflict. 

All these initiatives are part of a coordinated effort to help strengthen Nigeria’s 

ability to respond responsibly and effectively to these challenges in a way that 

ensures civilians are protected and human rights are respected. 

Question. According to the State Department, corruption in Nigeria is ‘‘massive, 

widespread and pervasive.’’ 

♦ How have allegations of corruption and lack of transparency affected civilians 

views of the Nigerian Government? 

♦ Has this led to distrust and/or animosity? 

♦ How does this corruption impact our relationship with the Nigerian Government? 

Answer. Pervasive corruption remains a central impediment to effective governance, economic development and stability in Nigeria. Public demands for meaningful 

reforms and an end to impunity for corrupt officials have grown over the past year, 

to include an ongoing campaign to pressure President Jonathan to publically declare 

his personal assets. Nigerians consistently view their public institutions as corrupt 

and cite the police and national government officials as the most corrupt. This perception fuels public distrust in government institutions. For example, reliable polling conducted in 2013 illustrated that 85 percent of Nigerians believe there is at 

least a fair amount of corruption among the police and as a result only 23 percent 

of the public trust the police. The Nigerian military is not immune to the Nigeria’s 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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broader corruption challenges, and corruption within the military erodes the effectiveness of security forces engaged in combating Boko Haram. 

To reduce the culture of impunity for those who engage in corruption, we support 

Nigerian anticorruption agencies, such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, to develop the capacity to investigate and prosecute cases relating to highlevel corruption or financial crime. We are also working with civil society to advance 

transparent and accountable governance. In 2013, the State Department launched 

a 2-year pilot program that will build the capacity of civil society (including media) 

to work with government agencies to fight corruption and transnational organized 

crime by leveraging citizens’ access to government-held information. We also continue to promote anticorruption and human rights norms through engagement with 

high-level officials from the Nigerian Police Force on the subject of restarting bilateral police training. In 2006 we had to end trainings after the former Inspector General of Police was convicted of stealing $83 million from the Police Force. 

Question. Amnesty International has reported that thousands of people suspected 

of links to Boko Haram have been extrajudicially executed or unlawfully killed by 

security forces, and thousands of suspects have died in military or police custody. 

♦ How have these abuses fueled the conflict and how do they constrain our ability 

to help the Nigerian Government respond to this crisis? 

Answer. Boko Haram has carried out a brutal campaign of terror that has killed 

over 1,500 innocent civilians since the beginning of the year. It has attacked churches, mosques and schools, burned villages, killed political official and security officers, and kidnapped innocent children. Unfortunately, the Nigerian security forces 

have responded to this brutality with their own heavy-handed tactics. These tactics 

have involved human rights violations that include extrajudicial killings and prisoner deaths. The continued lack of accountability for these violations has reinforced 

preexisting perceptions of many northerners that the Nigerian Government does not 

care about them. This situation can compromise the credibility of those international partners who attempt to help the Government of Nigeria address the legitimate need to combat violent extremism if the partners are perceived as condoning 

or overlooking the heavy-handed tactics of the Nigerian security forces. In turn, 

criminal terrorist groups such as Boko Haram use these circumstances to exploit the 

grievances of the northern population to garner recruits and public support. 

Consequently, the United States continues to encourage the Government of Nigeria to implement a comprehensive approach to combating Boko Haram that addresses the underlying causes of the conflict and grievances of northern populations while 

at the same time emphasizing civilian protection, respect for human rights, the rule 

of law, and accountable security forces. Defeating Boko Haram requires much more 

than a military response; it also requires coordination among civilian law enforcement entities, civic and political outreach, and development that addresses the 

legitimate concerns of the people of northern Nigeria. 

RESPONSE OF EARL GAST AND AMBASSADOR ROBERT P. JACKSON TO QUESTION

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

Question. There are girls in Nigeria and around the world risking their lives every 

day to get an education—it is time for the administration to stand behind them in 

the long term. Under Goal 3 of the Education Strategy, USAID has pledged to 

expand access to education for children and youth living in conflict and crisis situations. Currently there are more than 57 million primary school-aged children who 

are not in school worldwide and half of them live in countries affected by armed 

conflict. 

♦ Will the U.S. step up its leadership role by significantly increasing support for 

the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) replenishment conference in June? 

♦ What steps can the U.S. take to promote better and safer access to education 

in Nigeria, particularly in the North? 

Answer. USAID will participate in the GPE replenishment conference at the end 

of June. USAID is currently in the process of planning its budget for the release 

of FY 2014 funds, and the U.S. contribution to the GPE is part of that budget strategy. While we anticipate that the FY 2014 contribution to the GPE will increase, 

final determinations on FY 2014 allocations have not yet been made. We would be 

happy to follow up with you and/or your staff once the amount in FY 2014 allocations are finalized. 

USAID currently focuses the vast majority of education program resources for 

Nigeria in the northern region of the country, where national education indicators 

are the lowest. USAID is coordinating education activities in northern Nigeria with 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), to ensure 

the maximum impact and geographical coverage. Additionally, USAID is developing 

a new program that will specifically address equitable access to quality education 

in the areas that are affected by conflict and safety concerns. Last, it is important 

to note that USAID has some education related programs that are not in the north. 

These programs support nationwide household and schooling data collection and a 

national children’s television program. 

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR ROBERT JACKSON TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

Question. Human Rights Abuses by Nigerian Military.—Despite Nigeria’s strategic importance as Africa’s most populous nation and largest economy, our security 

assistance has historically been constrained by human rights abuses committed by 

Nigerian soldiers in their campaign against Boko Haram. These have been well documented in, for example, the State Department’s 2013 Human Rights Report. 

♦ How are we working with the government to correct this troubling record in 

order to ensure that the Nigerian people have a military they can trust and that 

the international community has a stable security partner moving forward? 

What accountability measures are we pushing the Nigerian Government to 

implement? 

Answer. The United States has been very open about our concerns about Nigeria’s 

human rights record. We continue to encourage the Government of Nigeria to implement a comprehensive approach to combating Boko Haram that addresses the 

underlying causes of conflict and valid grievances of northern populations while 

emphasizing civilian protection, respect for human rights, rule of law, and accountability of security forces. We ensure that promoting respect for human rights is a 

key aspect of any assistance we provide to Nigerian security forces. 

We have urged the Government of Nigeria to work with the families of victims 

and their communities in order to bring to justice not only those responsible for acts 

of terrorism, but also Nigerian security officials responsible for unlawful violence 

and abuses against civilian populations, including detainees. Impartial accountability for serious crimes committed by all sides is necessary to break the cycle of 

violence. We continue to push the Government of Nigeria to take steps to ensure 

accountability for security forces by conducting credible investigations and prosecuting the individuals responsible. 

Question. U.S. Efforts to Address the Boko Haram Threat.—I hope this is the last 

time we have a conversation about such a horrific event at the hands of Boko 

Haram, but, realistically, it probably won’t be. The chaos and brutality perpetrated 

by Boko Haram is not isolated to this incident and is increasing. 

♦ Does the changing nature of the threat put U.S. interests at additional risk? 

♦ Of our significant bilateral assistance (some $700 million), a relatively small 

portion (an estimated $10–20 million) is devoted to counterterrorism efforts— 

is this adequate? 

Answer. To date, Boko Haram has not specifically targeted U.S. citizens in its 

attacks. However, in his public statements Boko Haram’s leader, Abubakar Shekau, 

has threatened to attack U.S. interests, and we remain concerned about the growing 

threat to our interests in the region as Boko Haram expands the geographic scope 

of its operations. The U.S. mission in Nigeria monitors closely any such threats to 

official and private American citizens and their interests, and provides guidance 

accordingly. 

The administration continues to encourage the Nigerian Government to implement a comprehensive approach toward combating violent extremism and insecurity 

in northeastern Nigeria, which stresses addressing legitimate grievances of northern 

populations. As a result, the majority of our bilateral assistance focuses on the Nigerian population’s most serious grievances. These include unemployment, infrastructure, sanitation, health care, education, political marginalization, and corruption. 

Additionally, Nigeria benefits from centrally managed assistance through programs such as the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the 

West Africa Regional Security Initiative (WARSI), which are not reflected in the 

country’s bilateral funding levels. 

Our current levels of security assistance devoted to counter terrorism in Nigeria 

are appropriate, contingent upon the Nigerian Government’s ability to absorb the 

assistance, emphasize civilian protection, respect human rights and the rule of law, 

and develop accountable security forces. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Question. Support to Civil Society.—A security-centric approach has led to an outof-control insurgency and repeated human rights abuses in the Middle East, Mali, 

and elsewhere. And yet, since the abductions, the international community has been 

primarily focused on security assistance to the Nigerian Government. 

♦ How is the United States supporting local civil society organizations, including 

local and international interreligious and peace-building organizations, to 

ensure a balanced, well-rounded approach to protect civilians and prevent Boko 

Haram from becoming even more emboldened? 

Answer. The U.S. Embassy supports local religious leaders who reach across sectarian lines and promote human rights, social justice, and conflict resolution. 

USAID has conducted conflict mitigation and management interventions to lessen 

sectarian and intercommunal tensions and to increase interfaith civic engagement 

and tolerance among flashpoint communities. 

In May 2014, the U.S. Special Envoy to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation 

(OIC) held a series of video conferences with leading Nigerian Islamic leaders representing a wide range of Muslim communities in Nigeria to discuss strategies for 

countering Boko Haram’s narrative. USAID is also providing training to religious 

and traditional leaders to help increase stability in Nigeria by enhancing the legitimacy and capacity of governance structures to defend religious freedom. 

USAID is helping to strengthen education management systems; improve the 

reading skills of 5.5 million northern Nigerian primary school students; improve the 

quality of education for teachers to teach reading, and increase access of orphans 

and vulnerable children, including itinerant Qur’anic youth (Almajiri), and girls, to 

basic education. These programs focus on the northern states of Bauchi and Sokoto. 

The United States is working with civil society to advance transparent and 

accountable governance. In 2013, the State Department launched a 2-year pilot program to build the capacity of civil society (including media) to increase citizens’ 

access to government-held information. The State Department also is running a 

project in Nigeria to educate civil society, extractive industry leaders, and government officials about human rights and promote the incorporation of the Voluntary 

Principles on Security and Human Rights, which apply to the extractive sector. 

Through a pilot program in the Niger Delta, the State Department is working with 

civil society organizations to enhance nonviolent problem-solving between communities and government through a multimedia campaign and targeted assistance. The 

engagement counters the narrative that violence is the only effective means to create change. USAID also works with civil society to strengthen its ability to influence 

the development and implementation of key democratic reforms at national, state, 

and local levels. 

The Embassy in Abuja is about to launch a portfolio of activities totaling $1.7 million targeting northern, at-risk youth. These projects will be implemented through 

the public affairs and political sections, and will build upon a new multiyear Hausa 

language satellite television initiative (Arewa 24) and ongoing VOA radio programming. These youth-oriented projects will transmit information on job skills as well 

as entrepreneurial and employment opportunities, and will address concepts of cultural tolerance and communication. The Embassy is working through local NGOs 

to address the scourge of children pressed into street begging. Our efforts support 

ongoing local stakeholder efforts to stamp out these abuses that too often result in 

children (the so-called ‘‘al-majiri’’) being vulnerable to recruitment into violent gangs 

and networks as they get older, including Boko Haram. 

All these initiatives are part of a coordinated effort to strengthen Nigeria’s ability 

to respond responsibly and effectively to these challenges in a way that ensures 

civilians are protected and human rights are respected. 

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR ROBERT JACKSON TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BOB CORKER

Question. 1. The administration has provided numerous assessments of Boko 

Haram’s threat as limited to Nigeria and an occasional regional outreach as was 

seen recently in its involvement in Mali and ongoing safe haven and sporadic violence in neighboring Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Nonetheless, internally it has 

become more sophisticated and lethal with over 1,500 Nigerians killed since the first 

of the year, hundreds of children and others abducted for ransom and trafficking, 

and the recent threat to western hotels in Abuja. 

♦ Even though Boko Haram’s place in the global threat matrix might appear less 

relevant to the U.S. given its limited reach beyond Nigeria, should the United 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

45 

States take a more strategic approach to limiting its further influence in the 

face of this mounting capacity to destabilize a large regional power? 

♦ Given the Nigerian Government’s lack of capacity and political willingness to 

engage Boko Haram and its own reluctance to effectively cooperate with international partners, what have we learned that would improve the U.S. pursuit 

of its interests in the region? 

♦ What practical limitations exist to U.S. cooperation with Nigeria? 

♦ Please provide the waivers and exceptions to legal limitations that are permitted and how they are determined to be utilized. 

♦ Have any waivers or exceptions been utilized as it relates to security cooperation with Nigeria? Have any waivers or exceptions been utilized as it relates 

to security cooperation with any countries in Africa? 

Answer. The United States continues to reiterate privately and publically to Nigeria that we will do all we can to support the Nigerian Government to meet its 

responsibility for the safety and security of its own citizens. We are urging the Nigerian Government to ensure that it brings all resources to bear in a concerted, effective, and responsible effort to ensure the safe return of the abductees. The United 

States continues to encourage the Government of Nigeria to implement a comprehensive approach to combating Boko Haram, which addresses grievances of 

northern populations, and emphasizes civilian protection, respect for human rights, 

the rule of law, and the accountability of security forces. The United States has been 

open about our concerns regarding Nigeria’s human rights record. We must ensure 

that promoting respect for human rights remains a key aspect of any assistance we 

provide to Nigerian security forces. Unless action is taken to severely reduce Boko 

Haram’s capabilities, it will carry out more atrocities. At a minimum, we must work 

with Nigeria’s neighbors and partners to prevent Boko Haram from continuing to 

threaten peace and security in the region. 

On Leahy restrictions, the Department understands that the only possibility of 

resuming assistance to a unit once credible allegations of a gross violation of human 

rights are identified is for the host government to take effective steps to bring the 

responsible parties to justice. The Leahy law affecting the Department of State does 

not include any ability to waive Leahy restrictions. The Leahy law affecting the 

Department of Defense includes certain waiver provisions; we would refer you to the 

Department of Defense for more information. 

We have not yet exercised any waivers or exceptions in fiscal year 2014 for Nigeria related to security cooperation under State Department authorities, nor have we 

determined yet that the immediate circumstances would warrant such action. 

Assistance to other countries in Africa is subject to a number of restrictions; these 

restrictions include both country-specific restrictions as well as restrictions triggered 

by a failure to meet certain statutory standards. Fiscal year waivers for the latter 

category include the following: 

• The Department applied restrictions under the Trafficking Victims Protection 

Act (TVPA) in fiscal year 2014 to the Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea Bissau, 

Mauritania, Sudan, and Zimbabwe. Full waivers of these restrictions were 

granted to CAR, Guinea-Bissau, and Mauritania, while partial waivers were 

granted to the others. The restrictions were not waived for Equatorial Guinea, 

Eritrea, or Zimbabwe. 

• The Department applied restrictions under the Child Soldier Protection Act 

(CSPA) in fiscal year 2014 to CAR, Chad, DRC, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, 

and Sudan. Full waivers of these restrictions were granted to Chad and South 

Sudan. Partial waivers of restrictions on security assistance were granted to 

DRC and Somalia. No waivers were granted to CAR, Rwanda or Sudan. 

Question. Direct cooperation on security with Nigeria and its neighbors encompasses a variety of programs and sources but little clarity on the coherence across 

or even within U.S. agencies. Testimony provided at the hearing intimated at a fairly robust cooperation in CT which appears less than apparent from funding and program reviews. 

♦ Provide information on the broader U.S. security cooperation with Nigeria since 

2009 and outline more recent changes and the funding sources that will be utilized, to include training or equipping, mentoring, technical assistance or other 

program that provides for: 

Æ Intelligence sharing; 

Æ Training to a new unit known as the 143rd Ranger Battalion; 

Æ Training to the 101st CT battalion and the 111th Special Operations 

Group; 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Æ C–IED training and civ-mil training; 

Æ Nigerian Army Special Operations Command (NASOC); 

Æ And remaining GSCF funding or its replacement. 

♦ Incorporate regional training and equipping programming and plans into the 

above strategic approach to helping Nigeria and the broader region counter militant extremists, including to provide training to the Multi-National Joint Task 

Force (Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria). 

♦ What if any additional outcomes emerged from the summit of heads of state 

that was convened by President Hollande in France on May 17 regarding the 

region. 

Answer. The Department of State uses bilateral and regional funding from the following foreign assistance accounts to advance U.S. security cooperation with Nigeria: (1) Foreign Military Financing (FMF); (2) International Military Education and 

Training (IMET); (3) Peacekeeping Operations (PKO); (4) International Narcotics 

Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE); and (5) Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, 

Demining and Related Programs (NADR). 

Since 2009, Nigeria has received FMF, IMET, and/or PKO funding for enhancing 

capabilities for counterterrorism, peacekeeping, maritime security, and/or professionalism. Nigeria has also consistently received INCLE and NADR funding to 

strengthen the professionalism and capacity of select law enforcement and judicial 

entities, with a focus on countering terrorism and combating financial crimes. The 

Department of Defense also uses title 10 authorities (e.g., section 1206) to enhance 

cooperation with the Nigerian military. 

In the face of the growing threat posed by Boko Haram, we are seeking to 

increase several lines of security assistance to help Nigeria pursue a more comprehensive approach toward the Boko Haram threat. For example, we have obligated $4.5 million of FY 2014 PKO funding allocated as part of the Trans-Sahara 

Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) to build Nigerian military capabilities for 

civil-military operations and countering improvised explosive devices. We are also 

planning to increase FY 2014 NADR funding allocated to TSCTP to expand 

Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) training for Nigerian law enforcement agencies. 

Separately, we are using prior year FMF funding obligated for Nigeria to support 

U.S. training of Nigeria’s 143rd Ranger Battalion and possibly other vetted units 

of the Nigerian military. 

In addition to building Nigeria’s counterterrorism capabilities, we continue to promote enhanced regional cooperation and capacity to counter the Boko Haram threat. 

We are encouraging Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria to follow through on their 

commitments to establish a regional task force to combat Boko Haram, building on 

regional mechanisms such as the Multinational Joint Task Force for Lake Chad 

(MNJTF). We will seek to support these efforts as much as possible. Through 

TSCTP, we continue to provide a range of bilateral and regional assistance to Niger 

and Chad to enhance their counterterrorism capabilities. We added Cameroon as a 

member of TSCTP earlier this year, which will enable its participation in this programming. In addition, State and DOD are finalizing a plan for a proposed $40 million program to help the governments of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria 

develop institutional and tactical capabilities to enhance joint efforts to counter 

Boko Haram and to lay the groundwork for increased cross-border cooperation to 

counter Boko Haram. 

As a result of the May 17 summit in Paris, Nigeria and its neighbors agreed to 

do the following, with international assistance: 

• Implement coordinated patrols with the aim of combating Boko Haram and 

locating the missing school girls; 

• Establish a system to pool intelligence in order to support this operation; 

• Establish mechanisms for information exchange on trafficking of weapons and 

bolster measures to secure weapons stockpiles; 

• Establish mechanisms for border surveillance; 

• Establish an intelligence pooling unit; and 

• Create a dedicated team to identify means of implementation and draw up, during a second phase, a regional counterterrorism strategy. 

Nigeria’s neighbors and friends in the international community have maintained 

a strong, united resolve in helping Nigeria and its neighbors combat and defeat violent extremism. We are committed to a comprehensive, long-term approach, while 

also working to see the kidnapped girls return home safely. 

Question. The continuing challenge for the United States is that our efforts will 

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47 

tant to do so, but with regional neighbors who have much to lose if this violent militancy spreads, as reports indicate it can. 

♦ What is the state of U.S. cooperation with neighbors in Niger, Chad, and Cameroon and set it against the domestic capacity of these three countries to 

address the border security threat as well as the respective governments efforts 

to address internal tensions that may mirror Nigeria’s current situation? 

♦ How have we utilized the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership and 

other Countering Violent Extremism and other CT programs in the region to 

address the growing Boko Haram threat and how are they to be augmented if 

at all? What office or vehicle for coordination exists to harmonize such regionally significant programs as CT–CVE? 

Answer. As a result of the May 17 regional summit in Paris, Nigeria and its 

neighbors agreed to do the following, with international assistance: 

• Implement coordinated patrols with the aim of combating Boko Haram and 

locating the missing school girls; • Establish a system to pool intelligence in order to support this operation; • Establish mechanisms for information exchange on trafficking of weapons and 

bolster measures to secure weapons stockpiles; • Establish mechanisms for border surveillance; • Establish an intelligence pooling unit; and • Create a dedicated team to identify means of implementation and draw up, during a second phase, a regional counterterrorism strategy. 

With support from the Government of France, Nigeria has recently attempted 

to establish border security cooperation agreements with its neighbors and to 

strengthen the Multinational Joint Task Force for Lake Chad (MNJTF). However, 

actual cross-border cooperation remains ad hoc. Alongside the French, the United 

Kingdom, and other international partners, we are working to encourage the development of stronger regional mechanisms to counter Boko Haram and other crossborder threats. We are also developing new programs to assist Nigeria, Niger, Chad, 

and Cameroon to develop enhanced border security capabilities (e.g., command-andcontrol, communications, logistics, and tactical reconnaissance). All four countries 

need significant assistance in developing these capabilities. 

Through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), the United 

States seeks to build the capacity and resilience of military, law enforcement, and 

civilian actors across the Sahel and Maghreb regions to counter terrorist groups, including Boko Haram. The State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs oversees 

TSCTP and chairs an interagency working group to align programs and strategies. 

Chad, Niger, and Nigeria are longstanding TSCTP partners and have benefited from 

various TSCTP’s programs. Earlier this year, the United States added Cameroon as 

a TSCTP partner nation, which will enable it to participate in future TSCTP 

programming. 

The Department’s Bureau of Counterterrorism oversees a variety of programs to 

help defeat Boko Haram (and Ansaru) under the framework of TSCTP. Through the 

Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, the Department trains law enforcement in 

Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and soon in Cameroon, to counter the threat posed by Boko 

Haram and effectively respond to and manage terrorist attacks. ATA training and 

associated equipment grants build the capacity of police, Gendarme, and other law 

enforcement CT-focused units on border security, investigations (including post-blast 

investigations), and critical incident management. 

Our Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programs aim to limit recruits to Boko 

Haram by reducing sympathy and support for its operations, through three primary 

objectives: (1) building resilience among communities most at risk of recruitment 

and radicalization to violence; (2) countering Boko Haram narratives and messaging; and (3) building the CVE capacity of government and civil society. Such 

efforts include promoting engagement between law enforcement and citizens, and 

elevating the role of women civil society leaders in CVE. 

These efforts include USAID support to promote conflict mitigation and reconciliation programs in six Nigerian states. Further, the Public Affairs Section at U.S. 

Embassy in Abuja and USAID work with northern Nigerian youth, women through 

mass media education programs with countering violent extremism messaging. 

USAID and Centers for Disease Control (CDC) programs focus on development of 

health, agricultural, and educational programs in nearly all states of Northern Nigeria. The Bureau of Counterterrorism and Center for Strategic Counterterrorism 

Communications (CSCC) have developed a strong partnership with the Office of the 

National Security Adviser (ONSA)’s Strategic Communications/CVE office and, in 

conjunction with the United Kingdom, provided assistance on developing a comprehensive communications strategy. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

48 

USAID’s current TSCTP activities include a regional Peace for Development 

(PDEV II) program in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. PDEV II is a 5-year $60 million initiative launched in November 2011 that applies a holistic, community-led 

approach. PDEV II covers a large number of geographically distant and often culturally, linguistically, and socioeconomically diverse communities. Given the immensity of the Sahel, interventions are limited to communities with the highest violent 

extremism risk factors, determined through assessments conducted by the project. 

A number of those target communities are in areas of both Niger and Chad that 

border Nigeria. To date, nearly 3.8 million people from at-risk groups have been 

reached through various USAID PDEV II activities, including youth-led community 

mobilization activities; radio programming; and training in management skills, 

budgeting, leadership, vocational trades, and conflict resolution. 

We also work closely with Nigeria within the Global Counterterrorism Forum 

(GCTF) framework—an informal, multilateral counterterrorism (CT) platform that 

focuses on identifying critical civilian CT needs, mobilizing the necessary expertise 

and resources to address such needs and enhance global cooperation. As one of the 

member states of the GCTF, Nigeria has cohosted with us several regional workshops focusing on human rights and law enforcement issues. Nigeria has also 

agreed to become a pilot country to the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF), a GCTF-inspired initiative announced by Secretary Kerry at 

the September 2013 GCTF ministerial. This will enable community-based organizations in Nigeria to receive grants from the GCERF to carry out grassroots CVE 

projects. Furthermore, Nigeria will be one of the founding members of the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law in Malta, whose primary mission 

will be to train justice and security sector officials on how to prevent and respond 

to terrorist activity and other transnational criminal activity within a rule of law 

framework. 

RESPONSES OF EARL GAST TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN THE NORTH

I am particularly interested in U.S. efforts in the isolated northeast, where there 

is an ongoing state of emergency and where development indicators are especially 

concerning and have contributed to a sense of alienation. 

Question. What specific efforts are underway to support the people of Nigeria to 

overcome key social and economic drivers of instability, such as entrenched poverty, 

corruption, displacement, ethnic and religious strife, and poor service delivery? 

Answer. USAID programming in northern Nigeria is designed to help the Government of Nigeria (GON) address sources of disenfranchisement by improving its ability to promote private-sector-led economic growth and provide basic services to its 

citizens. The USAID portfolio in the north is comprehensive, ranging from agriculture to health to education to governance. Several large projects are geographically colocated in the states of Bauchi and Sokoto—states with heightened developmental need—in an effort to maximize developmental impact. It is important to note 

that USAID is currently implementing activities in states adjacent to the ‘‘State of 

Emergency’’ states—states which are receiving significant numbers of internally displaced persons who place additional stress on already weak social service provision. 

Expansion of USAID programming into State of Emergency states would depend 

entirely on the security situation. 

In addition to the following programs in northern Nigeria, USAID is currently 

carrying out an assessment of all mission programs and activities to improve understanding of the drivers and mitigating factors of armed conflict in Nigeria, ensure 

all USAID programming minimizes the risk of exacerbating conflict dynamics, and 

to the degree possible, mitigates drivers of conflict over issues that intersect with 

sectors such as health, education, and agriculture. 

Democracy and Governance 

USAID works with state and local governments to improve budget preparation 

and fiscal oversight to ensure adequate service delivery. Working with a diverse 

group of civil society organizations, USAID strengthens their ability to advocate and 

engage with government officials to deliver quality social services. USAID also facilitates dialogue among government institutions, civil society, political parties, faithbased organizations, and other stakeholders to prevent, manage, and mitigate the 

impact of conflict. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

49 

Health and HIV/AIDS 

USAID supports increased access to quality family planning and reproductive 

health services, immunization and polio eradication, and maternal health services. 

USAID also supports efforts to decrease the number of malaria-related deaths in 

pregnant women and children each year by increasing access to and availability of 

treatment, insecticide-treated bed nets, and retreatment kits. USAID provides 

HIV/AIDS prevention, care and treatment services, as well as services to orphans 

and vulnerable children. Detection and treatment services for tuberculosis are also 

provided. 

Education 

USAID provides technical assistance at all levels of government in the two northern Nigerian states of Bauchi and Sokoto to ensure that the human and financial 

resources are available and mobilized for the education sector. USAID programs 

support equitable access to quality basic education through teacher training, support for girls’ learning, infrastructure improvement, community involvement, and 

reading and literacy skills development. The programs target public schools, as well 

as Islamiyyah schools, which provide both secular and religious education. 

Economic Growth 

USAID supports Nigeria’s poverty alleviation efforts by improving agricultural 

productivity and expanding jobs in the rural sector. USAID’s program supports market-based solutions and privatization of the energy sector for improved efficiency. 

Additionally, USAID helps to improve access to safe drinking water and reduce morbidity and mortality due to water-borne and sanitation-related illnesses. 

Question. What kind of humanitarian and development programming is possible 

to both assist Nigerians and counter Boko Haram’s false and inflammatory rhetoric 

that the United States is at war with Islam? 

Answer. In mid-2013, USAID commissioned an assessment of violent extremism 

in Nigeria. The study provides the underlying historical, economic, political, and cultural forces that led to the formation of Boko Haram. Due to the high level of instability in the most affected states, as well as the complexity of the Government of 

Nigeria response, the assessment recommends development assistance interventions 

that indirectly counter violent extremism by enhancing economic opportunity for 

young men in the agricultural sector or improving the curriculum and education 

options offered at semiformal Koranic schools. This report was shared with USAID’s 

counterparts in the Government of Nigeria formulating a development component 

to their counterterrorism strategy. 

The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) has also sent a team to assess the situation in northeastern Nigeria as it relates to political instability, violence, and lawlessness brought about by the growing threat of Boko Haram throughout the region. 

This assessment will provide OTI with a better understanding of the situation and 

its effect on political stability in the region, allow OTI, USAID/Nigeria, and the 

interagency to consider holistic approaches for a coherent and comprehensive response to Boko Haram-related issues, and consider the feasibility of any programming recommendations given security conditions in the target region. 

Question. We have heard that USAID is planning to move OFDA money to 

address needs in the northeast region of Nigeria. Could you please provide more 

details on the types of projects those funds will support? 

Answer. The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is working with 

other donors to determine the humanitarian needs of those affected by this crisis. 

OFDA has already provided $100,000 to support trauma counseling and psychosocial assistance in Borno State for the abducted girls upon their return as well as 

for their families. USAID/OFDA has also committed $750,000 to the International 

Organization for Migration to improve the timely tracking and monitoring of internally displaced persons and humanitarian needs in conflict affected areas, which 

will help improve the delivery of critical, appropriate humanitarian assistance for 

affected populations. OFDA expects to provide additional humanitarian assistance 

that will target internally displaced people and their host communities. Anticipated 

humanitarian needs include: food and nonfood items, food security, protection/ 

psychosocial support, livelihoods, shelter, emergency education, livelihoods, water, 

sanitation, and hygiene. 

Within the last several months, OFDA staff has traveled to Gombe, Bauchi, and 

Adamawa states, and has a strong understanding of the humanitarian needs in 

those areas. To date, support to those affected by the conflict has been hindered due 

to the increase in frequency of violent attacks in 2014. Currently, humanitarian 

access is possible, albeit precarious due to the volatile nature of the security threat. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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RESPONSES OF EARL GAST TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER A. COONS

Question. Electricity.—Since towns such as Chibok have limited to no electricity, 

what is USAID doing to bring electricity to the North? Obviously, Nigeria is one of 

the six Power Africa focus countries. Are there any Power Africa projects in the 

North, and what more could we do to partner with the Nigerian Government to 

address energy poverty? 

Answer. The Government of Nigeria, and in particular, the Ministry of Power, has 

prioritized expanding electricity access in the North through renewable and other 

approaches. The Nigerian Bulk Electricity Trader (NBET) had presented the North 

Solar Capital Project as one of their priority efforts. There are significant challenges 

with this project due to security issues and the ability of private investors and 

financial institutions to effectively carry out due diligence and monitor the project. 

The Minister of Power, Mr. Chinedu Nebo, has approached USAID and other 

donors with ideas on how to support off grid and mini-grid projects in the North 

as part of a nationwide effort to bring access through off-grid and mini-grid projects 

to areas that lack access. Working with other donors, USAID can potentially look 

at what incentives and risk mitigation measures can be put into place to encourage 

development of projects in the North, but it will be a complex and challenging process. USAID and the Power Africa team are also providing technical advice to renewable energy project developers on how to navigate the various government agencies 

while developing bankable and sound proposals. 

Question. Education.—Given that children are risking their lives to go to school 

because education is so important, can you address the administration’s decision to 

cut funding for international basic education programs by 33 percent from the current levels? 

Answer. In response to the very robust appropriation for education funding in FY 

2013, the Nigeria education program received a 24-percent increase in funds above 

their prior year levels. However, because of the fragile security environment and difficulties in operating in northern Nigeria where education funds are needed most, 

USAID adjusted some activities and temporarily drew down its work pending a 

change in the security environment. Currently, USAID is addressing this by pursuing new programming options which specifically focus on increasing access to education and improving reading performance through institutional strengthening 

activities. In response to the major increase in FY 2013 education funds, and to ensure that the Nigeria program has the resources it requires to sustain other critical 

investments, including democracy and governance programs, the Agency proposed 

a lower level of education funding for Nigeria in FY 2014. That level increases in 

the FY 2015 request by 15 percent as the prior year education funds on hand are 

drawn down. 

RESPONSE OF ALICE FRIEND TO QUESTION

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER A. COONS

Question. Professionalization of the Military.—It has been mentioned that U.S. 

support for the professionalization of Nigeria’s military has been ongoing. What improvements have you seen as a result of that support? Since professionalization of 

the military is so important to addressing Boko Haram, why is the FY15 request 

for Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Nigerian $400,000 less than it was in 

FY14? 

Answer. Promoting professionalization among foreign militaries is a long-term, 

even generational, process. In the case of Nigeria, DOD believes that our progress 

to date manifests itself in two distinct ways. The first is the deliberate and ongoing 

effort to provide Nigerian officers, noncommissioned officers, and other military personnel examples of what military professionals look like and how they conduct 

themselves. We consider every training event, exercise, and day-to-day interaction 

to be a powerful and important opportunity to influence and shape the behavior of 

Nigeria’s military. Second, under the Africa Military Education Program (AMEP), 

DOD is supporting Nigerian efforts to overhaul and expand the curricula at two of 

its professional military education institutions. Once complete, this initiative will 

provide Nigeria with its own organic capability to promote a more professional 

officer corps across its armed forces, now and into the future. Foreign Military 

Financing (FMF) levels alone are an insufficient metric to gauge DOD’s resolve or 

commitment to helping Nigeria professionalize its military. A wide range of other 

authorities and funding sources are brought to bear to address the professionalFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

51 

ization challenge, including International Military Education and Training (IMET) 

and section 1206 authorities, for example. 

RESPONSES OF ALICE FRIEND TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

Question. Extrajudicial Executions and Unlawful Killings by Security Forces.— 

Amnesty International has reported that thousands of people suspected of links to 

Boko Haram have been extrajudicially executed or unlawfully killed by security 

forces, and thousands of suspects have died in military or police custody. 

♦ How have these abuses fueled the conflict and how do they constrain our ability 

to help the Nigerian Government respond to this crisis? 

Answer. The reported abuses committed by Nigeria’s security forces actively feed 

the very extremist ideology Nigeria is attempting to defeat, and thus undermine its 

counterinsurgency efforts. Moreover, such abuses trigger provisions of U.S. domestic 

law that preclude the United States from providing assistance and training to units 

about which there is credible information that a member of the unit has committed 

a gross violation of human rights. As a result, we are limited in our ability to help 

develop the expertise, skills, and abilities Nigeria lacks and that are indispensable 

to its success against Boko Haram. A significant percentage of Nigeria’s Army, including the 7th Division, which has been assigned to northeast Nigeria to conduct 

counter-Boko Haram operations, is excluded from U.S. counterterrorism (CT) capacity-building assistance due to its failure to be successfully vetted under the DOD 

‘‘Leahy law.’’ The Nigerian Special Boat Service has been a notable exception and 

has been successfully vetted, as there is no credible information that this unit has 

committed gross violations of human rights. Similarly, a newly created Nigerian 

‘‘Ranger Battalion’’ has been successfully vetted, and U.S. Africa Command personnel are currently conducting training on basic individual and unit military skills. 

Question. Long-Term U.S. Strategy.—What is the long-term U.S. strategy for 

countering Boko Haram in Nigeria? In your opinion, how receptive is Nigeria to U.S. 

technical assistance? How much can we really do within the confines of our laws? 

Answer. U.S. Africa Command forces are presently laying the groundwork for a 

regional, partner force-led counterterrorism effort in Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and 

Chad that focuses on border security. Continued congressional support for various 

uncodified National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) provisions authorizing DOD 

support to foreign forces is critical to the success of this effort. The U.S. strategy 

is to promote a Nigerian whole-of-government approach that addresses the full 

range of social, economic, governance, security, and other factors that contribute to 

Nigeria’s instability and insecurity, particularly in the north. We have consistently 

advised the Government of Nigeria that although security capacity-building is an indispensable element of its counter-Boko Haram efforts, a force-centric approach that 

fails to address legitimate northern Nigerian grievances will ultimately be unsuccessful. The receptivity of Nigeria’s military to U.S. assistance varies within its 

Navy and Air Force, with some elements being more receptive to train-and-equip 

efforts than others. The Nigerian military’s well-documented record of human rights 

abuses has rendered approximately 50 percent of its army ‘‘off limits’’ for purposes 

of U.S. train-and-equip efforts. We do engage and will continue to engage with those 

units that have been successfully vetted for human rights abuses, including its Special Boat Service and, most recently, the 143rd Infantry Battalion. 

RESPONSES OF ALICE FRIEND TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BOB CORKER

Question. Threat Assessment.—The administration has provided numerous assessments of Boko Haram’s threat as limited to Nigeria and an occasional regional 

outreach as was seen recently in its involvement in Mali and ongoing safe haven 

and sporadic violence in neighboring Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Nonetheless, internally it has become more sophisticated and lethal with over 1,500 Nigerians 

killed since the first of the year, hundreds of children and others abducted for ransom and trafficking, and the recent threat to Western hotels in Abuja. 

♦ Even though Boko Haram’s place in the global threat matrix might appear less 

relevant to the U.S. given its limited reach beyond Nigeria, should the United 

States take a more strategic approach to limiting its further influence in the 

face of this mounting capacity to destabilize a large regional power? 

♦ Given the Nigerian Government’s lack of capacity and political willingness to 

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52 

national partners, what have we learned that would improve the U.S. pursuit 

of its interests in the region? 

♦ What practical limitations exist to U.S. cooperation with Nigeria? 

♦ Please provide the waivers and exceptions to legal limitations that are permitted and how they are determined to be utilized. 

♦ Have any waivers or exceptions been utilized as it relates to security cooperation with Nigeria? Have any waivers or exceptions been utilized as it relates 

to security cooperation with any countries in Africa? 

Answer. Although it has only come to the public’s notice since the tragic kidnapping of school girls from Chibok, DOD has recognized the relevance and growing 

threat of Boko Haram since 2009 when it reemerged in a new and more lethal form 

after going dormant for several years. Indeed, in June 2012, then-commander of 

U.S. Africa Command General Carter Ham, described Boko Haram as one of the 

three most dangerous groups operating in Africa. 

Moreover, Boko Haram’s transnational nature and linkages have long been recognized and known to be growing. As it has grown as a regional threat and as Nigeria’s limitations in combating the group have become clearer, we have adjusted our 

engagement efforts accordingly. As a practical example, DOD and the Department 

of State have collaborated to develop a $40M package using the Global Security 

Contingency Fund (GSCF) authority to train border security forces in Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria, to check Boko Haram’s largely unfettered movement back 

and forth across regional borders. We anticipate this proposal being notified to the 

relevant congressional committees soon, and we look forward to collaborating closely 

with Congress on this important initiative. 

Nigeria presents the United States with a range of challenges and limitations as 

a counterterrorism (CT) partner. The baseline capacities of its security forces to take 

on the sophisticated threat Boko Haram represents was and remains extremely low. 

Nigeria has never faced a terrorism or insurgency threat as intense as it currently 

faces, and has been slow to adapt new security strategies, tactics, and doctrines to 

support more effective operations. 

Similarly, Nigeria has failed to adopt a whole-of-government approach that takes 

into account the legitimate grievances of its population, particularly in the north, 

thereby failing to pursue an indispensable element of any successful counterinsurgency strategy. And, perhaps most debilitating, it has conducted brutal and often 

indiscriminate military campaigns that have victimized its own citizens; Nigeria’s 

security forces are believed to be responsible for the deaths of nearly as many innocent civilians as Boko Haram itself. Beyond these factors, a scarcity of political will 

and rampant corruption at all levels and within all elements of government limit 

the United States ability to bring about necessary change. 

DOD has not sought waivers that would permit more robust security cooperation 

with Nigeria and is not convinced that Nigeria is a good candidate for such waivers. 

Even if waivers were granted, it is not clear that the engagement opportunities that 

would be made available through the waiver process would produce significant improvement in Nigeria’s ability to combat Boko Haram. Although Nigeria’s record of 

human rights violations does significantly limit the units DOD is able to train and 

equip, the other factors noted above are at least as limiting in terms of the U.S. 

ability to build the necessary CT capacities. 

Question. Cooperation with Nigeria.—Direct cooperation on security with Nigeria 

and its neighbors encompasses a variety of programs and sources but little clarity 

on the coherence across or even within U.S. agencies. Testimony provided at the 

hearing intimated at a fairly robust cooperation in CT which appears less than 

apparent from funding and program reviews. 

♦ Provide information on the broader U.S. security cooperation with Nigeria since 

2009 and outline more recent changes and the funding sources that will be utilized, to include training or equipping, mentoring, technical assistance or other 

program that provides for: 

Æ Intelligence-sharing; 

Æ Training to a new unit known as the 143d Ranger Battalion; 

Æ Training to the 101st CT battalion and the 111th Special Operations 

Group; 

Æ C–IED training and civ-mil training; 

Æ Nigerian Army Special Operations Command (NASOC); 

Æ And remaining GSCF funding or its replacement. 

♦ Incorporate regional training and equipping programming and plans into the 

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itant extremists, including to provide training to the Multi-National Joint Task 

Force (Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria). 

♦ What if any additional outcomes emerged from the summit of heads of state 

that was convened by President Hollande in France on May 17 regarding the 

region. 

Answer. USSOCOM–SOCAF CT/COIN Lessons Learned Exchange: From January 

13–18, 2014, U.S. Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA) personnel participated in a counterterrorism/counterinsurgency (CT/COIN) seminar with Nigerian 

Army and Navy representatives at Wu Bassey Barracks in Abuja. The seminar discussed U.S. and Nigerian successes, mistakes, and lessons learned in CT/COIN 

operations during their respective campaigns against terrorism. Each topic was 

introduced and taught by both U.S. and Nigerian instructors, after which participants broke into workgroups to discuss the topic and how it could be interpreted 

and put to use in Nigeria’s current situation. The CT/COIN seminar reflected upon 

past experiences—both positive and negative—and emphasized key lessons to be 

applied in future operations. 

Intelligence Fusion Center: U.S. Africa Command and other DOD elements are 

supporting interagency efforts to develop a Nigerian National Intelligence Fusion 

Center (IFC) in Abuja. The IFC mission will be to synchronize efforts of Nigerian 

intelligence and security communities, institutionalize collaborative communications 

among national defense, foreign relations, CT, and law enforcement organizations, 

and improve Nigeria’s ability to detect and preempt terrorist activities. This is a 

modest train-and-equip program utilizing counternarcotics funding in light of the 

‘‘narco’’ nexus with Nigeria’s National Drug and Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA). 

143d Infantry Battalion (INF BN): On April 23, 2014, U.S. Army Africa began a 

4-week series of familiarization events with key 143 INF BN staff leading to a 5- 

week Foreign Military Sales (FMS)-funded field training period on individual and 

units tasks. The FMS portion will include communication, land navigation, squad 

and platoon tactics, law of armed conflict, and human rights training. Companylevel training will include urban operations, cordon and search, reconnaissance, and 

MEDEVAC. Specialized staff training includes the military decisionmaking process, 

fires integration, and intelligence-driven targeting. The training period will culminate in a battalion training exercise to apply gained knowledge. 

Section 1206 human rights training and equipment transfer to the 101st CT Battalion (CT BN). This $2.25M FY 2009 Section 1206 Light Infantry Company redirected from Chad to Nigeria (plus supplemental package) was originally an FY 2007 

funded section 1206 program for Chad, which could not be executed. The case was 

redirected to Nigeria in FY 2009, but the training was postponed because of human 

rights concerns. Nigeria was unable to establish an acceptable national CT unit that 

could successfully be vetted until November 2013, with the establishment and vetting of the 101st CT BN. A Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) 

team went to Abuja May 6–9, 2014, to provide Law of Armed Conflict and human 

rights training required in connection with this equipment transfer. The section 

1206-authorized equipment (6x 8-ton trucks, 15x Land Cruisers, 2x ambulance 

trucks, 5x trucks, communications equipment, as well as various uniform and field 

equipment items) was transferred to the 101st CT BN on May 9, 2014, immediately 

following completion of the training. 

Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) Detainee Operations 

Engagement: (FOUO) DIILS, with additional engagement team support from the 

U.S. Army Office of the Provost Marshall General (OPMG), plans to conduct a 3– 

5-day Legal Aspects of Detention Operations Workshop and Exchange at the Infantry Training School Headquarters at Jaji Camp in Kaduna, Nigeria in August 2014. 

The intended Nigerian audience is approximately 50 operational-level Nigerian 

Army detention facility commanders and staff personnel. 

Nigerian interest in FMS purchases through the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program. (FOUO) The Nigerian Navy has had great success in purchasing needed vessels through the EDA program, most notably USCG Cutters Chase (now NNS Thunder) and Gallatin (now NNS OKPABANA, transferred to the Nigerian Navy on May 

7, 2014, in Charleston, SC). Most recently, the Nigerian Army expressed interest in 

purchasing several EDA equipment items, including 5x rotary-wing assets (2x 

gunship, 2x transport, 1x MEDEVAC); up to 50x HMMWVs; and up to 60x MineResistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles. 

C–IED Training: USAFRICOM has received $3.5M in TSCTP funding, to be executed through Naval Forces Africa (NAVAF), to support the training of Nigerian 

Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) instructors at the Nigerian Army Engineer School in Makurdi, Nigeria. The Navy International Programs Office (NIPO) 

is coordinating the transfer of equipment to enable NAVAF to execute the program 

effectively. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Civil-Military Operations: USAFRICOM, through the Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA) Civil-Military Support Element (CMSE) in Abuja, has 

been working with the Nigerian Army (NA) Department of Civil Military Affairs 

(DCMA), which serves as a coordinating and advising body for the Chief of Army 

Staff (CoAS) on civil-military relations. These efforts include CMSE support to Nigerian Army development of Civil Affairs doctrine as well as planned training for 

Nigerian Army Civil-Military planners and advisors deployed to each of the seven 

NA divisions. 

USAFRICOM has received $1M for Nigeria Civil-Military Operations (CMO) 

development through the State Department’s Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). The engagement plan includes two primary streams of training: 

1. Training in CMO for the currently untrained CMO planners at the divisions 

is planned to begin in late June 2014 and continue through the end of 2015. 

2. Training in CMO for a pool of existing instructors at several Army training 

institutions, based on CMO doctrine and curriculum. This would begin in late 2014 

and continue through the end of 2015. 

NASOC: USAFRICOM, through SOCAFRICA, has been providing an advisory element to the proposed commander of the Nigerian Army Special Operations Command (NASOC). The new Chief of Army Staff has placed NASOC development 

efforts on indefinite hold, citing several factors including ongoing offensives against 

Boko Haram; however, engagement efforts with the vetted units are continuing in 

earnest awaiting resolution of where they will now fall in the Nigerian Army 

structure. 

GSCF: DOD and DOS have collaborated to develop a $40M Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) assistance program to train border security forces in Chad, 

Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria, to disrupt Boko Haram’s largely unfettered movement back and forth across regional borders. The Multi-National Joint Task Force 

(MNJTF) Lake Chad is the most viable organization with which to engage and is 

the focus of U.S. efforts. DOD anticipates the proposal being notified to relevant 

congressional committees soon, and we look forward to collaborating closely for 

approval of this important initiative. 

Summit Outcomes: Discussions at the May 17 summit were in keeping with the 

themes of a regional approach utilizing the MNJTF Lake Chad. 

—Participants agreed that over the medium term a coordinated program for economic development in the region is required. The Lake Chad Basin Commission 

(LCBC) might play a role in these efforts. 

—The Multinational Joint Task Force, a part of the LCBC, was also suggested as 

a vehicle for enhanced regional security cooperation and assistance. This will be 

pursued; however, Cameroon is not currently a member of the MNJTF. 

Question. U.S. Cooperation with Foreign Governments.—The continuing challenge 

for the United States is that our efforts will have to be creative and coordinated, 

not only with a partner in Nigeria who is reluctant to do so, but with regional 

neighbors who have much to lose if this violent militancy spreads, as reports indicate it can. 

♦ What is the state of U.S. cooperation with neighbors in Niger, Chad and Cameroon and set it against the domestic capacity of these three countries to 

address the border security threat as well as the respective governments efforts 

to address internal tensions that may mirror Nigeria’s current situation? 

♦ How have we utilized the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership and 

other Countering Violent Extremism and other CT programs in the region to 

address the growing Boko Haram threat and how are they to be augmented if 

at all? What office or vehicle for coordination exists to harmonize such regionally significant programs as CT–CVE? 

Answer. The United States has experienced good counterterrorism (CT) cooperation with Chad and Niger, although their focus has been on CT threats elsewhere 

in their countries where the AQIM threat has been, until recently, more visible and 

more direct. In both cases, Boko Haram has been viewed as ‘‘Nigeria’s problem,’’ 

presenting only a limited and localized threat to their own security. With the 

group’s expansion this perception has changed and, along with it, we are seeing a 

willingness to reallocate security resources away from other missions and toward 

Boko Haram’s operating areas along their respective common borders with Nigeria. 

In short, both countries are capable, and their will to counter the Boko Haram 

threat is growing, but both also lack adequate resources. With respect to Cameroon, 

DOD’s cooperation with Cameroon is also robust, but regional collaboration is hampered by strained relations with Nigeria. Like Chad and Niger, Cameroon was slow 

to acknowledge the threat of Boko Haram, but fully recognizes it now and is dediFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

55 

cating national resources to control its border with Nigeria more effectively and to 

conduct operations against the group. Also, like Chad and Niger, Cameroon has 

capable security forces that are nevertheless resource-constrained and overextended. 

To capitalize on this increasing awareness of Boko Haram as a regional threat, the 

United States has developed a $40M proposal under the Global Security Contingency Fund authority designed to build all four countries’ respective border security 

capacity. Along with our interagency partners, DOD will continue to seek opportunities to promote and materially support regional collaboration, cooperation, and 

deconfliction of efforts against Boko Haram. The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism 

Partnership (TSCTP) is a State Department-led mechanism by which the USG 

coordinates support to regional efforts to contain, degrade, and ultimately defeat 

AQAA, including Boko Haram, in the region. Although Nigeria only recently became 

a TSCTP partner, DOD has received $1M in TSCTP funding to help establish a 

civil-military operations (CMO) capacity within the Nigerian military, including 

establishing organic Nigerian capability to train and sustain CMO skills into the 

future. 

RESPONSE OF ALICE FRIEND TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF FLAKE

Question. U.S. Cooperation with Foreign Governments.—I asked a question 

regarding the ability of the United States to cooperate with the Nigerian Government in the security sector and though a response was given that there are restrictions on U.S. assistance in law, including the Leahy amendment restrictions on the 

provision of assistance, training, and equipment, you did not discuss the exceptions 

and waivers associated with these restrictions. 

♦ Please describe the legal restrictions, as well as any waivers or exceptions 

allowed by the so-called ‘‘Leahy amendment.’’ Have any waivers or restrictions 

been utilized under these provisions in Nigeria? 

Answer. The DOD Leahy law provides that DOD appropriated funds may not be 

used for training, equipment, or other assistance for the members of a foreign security force if there is credible information on a gross violation of human rights. The 

Leahy law also includes two exceptions and a waiver provision to the general prohibition. The exceptions apply if the Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the 

Secretary of State, determines that the government of the proposed recipient country has taken all necessary corrective steps; or if the equipment or other assistance 

is necessary to assist in disaster relief operations or other humanitarian or national 

security emergencies. DOD does not believe that the Nigerian Government, to date, 

has met the requirements to apply the first exception in that it has not taken meaningful corrective steps to address the problem of gross human rights violations or 

to identify and discipline those responsible. The waiver applies if the Secretary of 

Defense, after consultation with the Secretary of State, determines that such waiver 

is required by extraordinary circumstances. Although the current circumstances in 

Nigeria are certainly extraordinary, we do not believe they are of such a nature as 

to warrant use of an exception to, or waiver of, U.S. human rights requirements. 

Further, even if Leahy restrictions were waived or excepted from, DOD believes that 

other factors, including corruption and a pervasive lack of political will, would still 

inhibit building the capacities that Nigeria requires. 

DOD has not, to date, relied on an exception or the waiver provision to the general prohibition. To pursue such an exception or waiver, a Combatant Command or 

Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy) office would prepare and coordinate a proposal for Secretary of Defense consideration and decision. 

Æ 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER