UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4103

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

STEPHANIE CHAPMAN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, District 

Judge. (1:13-cr-00298-LO-1)

Submitted: December 19, 2014 Decided: January 7, 2015

Before NIEMEYER and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, 

Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Alfred L. Robertson, Jr., ROBERTSON LAW OFFICE, PLLC, 

Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United 

States Attorney, Michael J. Frank, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Stacey K. Luck, Special Assistant United States 

Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

A federal jury convicted Stephanie Chapman of 

conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of a child, sex trafficking 

of a child, and interstate transportation of a minor for 

purposes of prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 

1591(a)(1), 1594(c), 2423 (2012). The district court sentenced 

Chapman to a total of eleven months’ imprisonment, and she now 

appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.

Chapman first argues that insufficient evidence 

supported the jury’s finding of guilt. Specifically, Chapman 

contends that the Government failed to prove that (1) she 

benefitted financially; (2) she had knowledge or reckless 

disregard of Jane Doe’s age; and (3) violence, threats of 

violence, or coercion were used to engage Jane Doe in 

prostitution. By these assertions, Chapman challenges the 

Government’s proof of the elements of sex trafficking of a 

child, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). She does not 

however, address elements of the other charges against her in 

the indictment. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2423, 1594. By failing to 

brief these issues, Chapman has waived review of them. See

United States v. Al-Hamdi, 356 F.3d 564, 571 n.8 (4th Cir. 2004) 

(“It is a well settled rule that contentions not raised in the 

argument section of the opening brief are abandoned.”). 
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We review challenges to the sufficiency of evidence de 

novo. United States v. Roe, 606 F.3d 180, 186 (4th Cir. 2010). 

“The standard for reversing a jury verdict of guilty is a high 

one: the Court does so only where the prosecution’s failure is 

clear.” United States v. Perry, 757 F.3d 166, 175 (4th Cir. 

2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The jury’s verdict 

must be upheld on appeal if there is substantial evidence in the 

record to support it, where substantial evidence is evidence 

that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and 

sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In assessing evidentiary sufficiency, the evidence and 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light 

most favorable to the Government. Id. We do not reassess the 

jury’s determinations of witness credibility. United States v. 

Kelly, 510 F.3d 433, 440 (4th Cir. 2007).

In order to convict a defendant of a violation of 

§ 1591(a)(1), the government must prove that the defendant:

(1) knowingly recruited, transported, harbored, maintained, 

obtained, or enticed a person, (2) in or affecting interstate 

commerce, (3) knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that 

the victim had not attained the age of eighteen years and would 

be made to engage in a commercial sex act. United States v. 

Garcia–Gonzalez, 714 F.3d 306, 312 (5th Cir. 2013). However, 
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“[i]n a prosecution under subsection (a)(1) in which the 

defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the person so 

recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained or 

maintained, the Government need not prove that the defendant 

knew that the person had not attained the age of 18 years.” 18 

U.S.C. § 1591(c). We have thoroughly reviewed the record and 

conclude that there was substantial evidence of Chapman’s guilt 

of the offenses.

Chapman also argues that the district court erred by

denying her request to issue a jury instruction on mistake of 

fact. We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s 

refusal to give a particular jury instruction. United States v. 

Shrader, 675 F.3d 300, 308 (4th Cir. 2012). The district 

court’s refusal to grant a requested jury instruction is 

reversible error only if the proffered instruction was

“(1) correct; (2) not substantially covered by the court’s 

charge; and (3) dealing with some point in the trial so 

important, that failure to give the requested instruction 

seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to conduct [her] 

defense.” Id. When jury instructions are challenged on appeal, 

the issue is whether “the instructions, taken as a whole, 

adequately state the controlling law.” United States v. Bolden, 

325 F.3d 471, 486 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude 
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that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

declining to give Chapman’s proposed jury instruction.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED