About the Report

Boko Haram is an extremist sect in Nigeria that has caused 

devastating damage in Northern Nigeria and threatens the 

stability of Nigeria as a whole. The U.S. Institute of Peace 

commissioned the CLEEN Foundation in Nigeria to research 

how Boko Haram is able to continue to recruit young men to 

its membership. CLEEN published a full report on its findings; 

this Special Report is drawn from its conclusions. 

About the Author

Freedom C. Onuoha is a research fellow and currently the head 

of the Department of Conflict, Peacekeeping, and Humanitarian 

Studies at the Centre for Strategic Research and Studies of 

Nigeria’s National Defence College, Abuja. 

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 348 June 2014

© 2014 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Contents

Radicalization 2

Understanding Boko Haram 3

Why Young People Join Boko Haram 4

Policy Recommendations 7

Conclusion 9

Freedom C. Onuoha

Why Do Youth Join 

Boko Haram?

United States Institute of Peace www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

Summary

•	 Since Nigeria’s return to democracy in May 1999, armed nonstate groups have significantly 

undermined the country’s internal security environment, largely using young men as foot 

soldiers. Among these groups, Boko Haram has grown to become a serious national, regional, 

and international concern. Estimates of the death toll from Boko Haram attacks since 2009 

range as high as ten thousand fatalities. With Boko Haram and other groups seemingly gaining in strength, questions arise as to why young men join them in the first place and what 

the government and other actors can do to prevent it.

•	 Surveys, interviews, and focus groups conducted in Nigeria in 2013 suggest that poverty, 

unemployment, illiteracy, and weak family structures make or contribute to making young 

men vulnerable to radicalization. Itinerant preachers capitalize on the situation by preaching 

an extreme version of religious teachings and conveying a narrative of the government as 

weak and corrupt. Armed groups such as Boko Haram can then recruit and train youth for 

activities ranging from errand running to suicide bombings.

•	 To weaken the armed groups’ abilities to radicalize and recruit young men, the Nigerian government at all levels, perhaps with support from interested international actors, could institute 

monitoring and regulation of religious preaching; strengthen education, job training, and job 

creation programs; design robust programs to aid destitute children; promote peace education; 

and embark on an anticorruption campaign. Addressing the conditions that make it possible 

for insurgents to recruit young men in Nigeria can significantly diminish the strength of the 

insurgency, if not eliminate it altogether.

Introduction

Since Nigeria’s return to democracy in May 1999, armed nonstate groups, largely using young 

men as foot soldiers, have significantly undermined the country’s internal security environment. With the stability of the country, and possibly the region, at stake, urgent questions 

arise as to how and why youth become radicalized and join these armed groups in the first 
2 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 348

place—particularly Boko Haram, in northern Nigeria—and what the Nigerian government 

and other interested actors to do to prevent it.

The violent activities of the Jama’atu Ahlissunnah Lidda’awati wal Jihad, otherwise 

known as Boko Haram, have become a serious national, regional, and international concern. 

The group attracted worldwide attention in July 2009 when it staged a violent anti-government uprising that killed over eight hundred people, including civilians, group members, 

and security personnel. The revolt attracted one of the heaviest security crackdowns in 

Nigerian history. The five-day confrontation ended on July 30, when the police captured and 

executed Boko Haram’s charismatic leader, Mohammed Yusuf. In May 2014, the group again 

drew international attention when it kidnapped over two hundred schoolgirls in an attempt 

to broker a prisoner exchange.

Since the 2009 uprising, the group’s actions have “been driven by a desire for vengeance 

against politicians, police, and Islamic authorities for their role in a brutal suppression 

of the group that year. But the group has proved itself to be very adaptable, evolving its 

tactics swiftly and changing its targets.” 1 The group’s methods have evolved from poorly 

planned and open confrontations with state security forces to increasing use of improvised 

explosive devices, targeted assassinations, ambushes, drive-by shootings, suicide bombings, 

and kidnappings.2 There is no exact figure on casualties from Boko Haram attacks, though 

President Goodluck Jonathan has stated that the group has “so far claimed over 12,000 

lives, with more than 8,000 persons injured or maimed, not to mention the displacement of

thousands of innocent Nigerians.” 3

Against the above background, six researchers from the CLEEN Foundation (formerly 

known as the Center for Law Enforcement Education) based in Lagos carried out a 2013 mapping study, conducting interviews with at least one hundred informants each in six states 

to investigate why young Nigerians are inclined to join insurgent groups, particularly Boko 

Haram.4 This report draws extensively from that larger study to examine youth radicalization 

and insurgent affiliation in Nigeria.5

Radicalization

The concept of radicalization has gained significant currency among government officials, 

media practitioners, scholars, and security officials in discourses on terrorism and violent 

extremism, especially since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Those who use the 

term do not agree on a single definition, as Schmid has rightly noted,6 but a loose consensus 

has emerged that radicalization, whether at the individual or group level, involves a process of 

rejecting the status quo and often democratic ideals; adopting an extreme political, social, or 

religious ideology; and condoning violence as a means to achieving ideological goals.7

Experts believe that radicalization is the result of a complex overlap of concurring 

and mutually reinforcing factors,8 unique to each context and, to a certain extent, each 

individual. The process of radicalization begins with changes in self-identification due to 

grievances, frequently driven by personal or group concerns regarding local issues as well 

as international events. A grievance is understood to create the sense of alienation or disenchantment that provides a cognitive opening for radicalization. A radical ideology—an 

extreme set of ideas—then provides the individual with a new outlook and explanation for 

the world in which he finds himself. An individual becomes mobilized as he slowly integrates 

into a community of other like-minded people. Finally, a tipping point—usually a specific 

event—can push an individual or group from rhetoric to action.9 

This report defines radicalization as the process by which an individual or group transitions from passive reception of revolutionary, militant, or extremist views, ideas, and beliefs 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital 

worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others 

with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

Stephen J. Hadley, (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, LLC, 

Washington, DC • George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct 

Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, 

Washington, DC • Judy Ansley, Former Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. 

Bush, Washington, DC • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished 

Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced 

International Studies, Washington, DC • Joseph Eldridge, 

University Chaplain and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, 

School of International Service, American University, 

Washington, DC • Kerry Kennedy, President, Robert F. 

Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights, Washington, 

DC • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, 

LLC., Las Vegas, NV • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart 

Professor of International Relations at Stanford University, 

Palo Alto, CA • John A. Lancaster, Former Executive Director, 

International Council on Independent Living, Potsdam, NY •

Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason 

University, Fairfax, VA J. Robinson West, Chairman, 

PFC Energy, Washington, DC • Nancy Zirkin, Executive 

Vice President, Leadership Conference on Civil 

and Human Rights, Washington, DC 

Members Ex Officio

John Kerry, Secretary of State • Chuck Hagel, Secretary of 

Defense • Gregg F. Martin, Major General, U.S. Army; President, 

National Defense University • Kristin Lord, Acting President, 

United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 348 3

to active pursuit of these ideals, especially through supporting, promoting, or adopting 

violence to realize such intentions. This transition underlies violent extremism or terrorism. 

Understood in this way, the crucial challenge is to uncover why young people are inclined 

to join insurgent groups in northern Nigeria—particularly Boko Haram.

Understanding Boko Haram

It is not clear when Boko Haram came into being. A common account of the group’s origin 

traces it to 2002, when Mohammed Yusuf, a charismatic preacher, became its leader. To 

Nigeria’s intelligence community, however, its true historical roots hark back to 1995, when 

Abubakar Lawan established the Ahlulsunna wal’jama’ah hijra, or Shabaab group (Muslim Youth 

Organization), in Maiduguri, Borno state.10 The group flourished as a nonviolent movement 

until 2002, when Yusuf assumed leadership. It has appeared over time under various names, 

such as the Muhajirun, Hijrah, Ahlis Sunnah wal Jama’a, Yusufiyyah, and Nigerian Taliban.

Boko Haram’s ideology is premised on an extreme Islamic teaching that rejects most 

Western ideas and institutions as un-Islamic. This rejection earned the group its popular 

name: Boko Haram literally means “Western education is forbidden.” However, the group 

prefers to be called by its real name, Jama’atu Ahlissunnah Lidda’awati wal Jihad, meaning 

“people committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings and jihad.” Its core objective is to replace the secular Nigerian state with a regime adhering to strict Islamic sharia 

law, applicable throughout the entire country. 

Boko Haram draws its members mainly from disaffected youth, unemployed high school 

and university graduates, and destitute children, mostly from but not limited to northern 

Nigeria. Its membership also includes some wealthy, educated, and influential people. The 

group is known to sustain its operations through diverse sources of funding, including membership dues, donations from politicians, financial assistance from foreign terrorist groups, 

raiding of banks, and ransom from kidnapping. It also has extorted money from residents 

of areas it has controlled, as well as from wealthy persons whom they have intimidated into 

paying protection fees to avoid being attacked by them.

Its history of violence dates to December 24, 2003, when it attacked police stations and 

public buildings in the towns of Geiam and Kanamma in Yobe state. Members occupied two 

buildings for several days, hoisting the flag of Afghanistan’s Taliban movement over the 

camps. Soldiers and police removed them only after killing eighteen of them and arresting 

dozens more.11 The sect had earlier established a base they called Afghanistan in Kanamma 

village in northern Yobe state. In Maiduguri, Mohammed Yusuf was already drawing youth 

to him through his preaching about the excesses of government officials, culminating in his 

frequent declaration of secular education as haram (forbidden) to Muslims.12 His preaching 

attracted youth from Yobe and Borno states, as well as neighbouring countries—Cameroon, 

Chad, and Niger.

The activities of the group became even more worrisome in 2004 when students, especially in tertiary institutions in Borno and Yobe states, withdrew from school, tore up their 

certificates, and joined the group. On September 21, 2004, members attacked the Bama 

and Gworza police stations in Borno state, killing several policemen and stealing arms and 

ammunition. The group continued with intermittent hit-and-run attacks on security posts 

in some parts of Borno and Yobe until the July 2009 antigovernment uprising in Nigeria.

The remote cause of the July 2009 revolt is often traced to the fatal shootings of sect 

members on June 11, 2009, by security forces involved in Operation Flush,13 following 

a clash with sect members for not wearing crash helmet while on their motorbikes for a 

funeral procession. In retaliation, the members attacked and destroyed the Dutsen Tanshi 

Boko Haram draws its members 

mainly from disaffected youth, 

unemployed high school and 

university graduates, and 

destitute children.
4 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 348

police station on July 26. This raised the curtain for a wave of unrest that swept through 

Bauchi, Borno, Kano, Katsina, and Yobe states. The revolt ended on July 30, 2009, when 

Mohammed Yusuf was finally captured in his residence in Maiduguri. After a few hours in 

police custody, the police killed Yusuf extrajudicially; police officials claimed that he was 

trying to escape. Over eight hundred people, mainly sect members, were killed during the 

revolt, and hundreds more were arrested. Nigerian authorities’ methods in repressing the 

2009 revolt proved to be crucial in the deadly escalation of Boko Haram’s violent attacks. The 

group went underground and later adopted Yusuf’s hard-line top deputy, Abubakar Shekau, 

as the sect’s new spiritual leader. It subsequently developed new violent tactics: bombings, 

targeted assassinations, ambushes, drive-by shootings, and slitting victims’ throats.

Since the July 2009 revolt, the sect has evolved into a more dynamic and decentralized 

organization, capable of changing and combining tactics as well as expanding or reordering 

target selection. Boko Haram has attacked a variety of groups, including security agents, 

Christians, traditional rulers, politicians, schoolchildren and teachers, Islamic scholars, 

public servants, traders, and, lately, anyone who is not a member. Most of the attacks have 

occurred in Maiduguri, the capital city of Borno state. The group also has claimed responsibility for several attacks in Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Kogi, Niger, 

Plateau, and Yobe states, as well as the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. The group leapt 

onto the world’s agenda in August 2011 when it bombed the UN compound in Abuja, killing 

twenty-three people.14 In January 2012, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of 

emergency in fifteen local governments across four states in the north. By July 2012, when 

the state of emergency ceased, the security crisis had not been addressed. In May 2013, 

President Jonathan again declared a state of emergency in the three most affected states 

of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe.

Reports show that the foot soldiers of the sect consist predominantly of young people 

who are ready to fight and die for the new cause they have been made to believe in. Based 

on the analysis of 144 arrested Boko Haram members, a recent study has shown that the 

median age of the group’s members is thirty years.15 Its young followers, who previously 

used local weapons in attacks, have become highly radicalized individuals willing to carry out 

suicide bombings in pursuit of martyrdom—a phenomenon that never occurred in Nigeria 

until the June 16, 2011, suicide attack on Abuja’s police headquarters by a thirty-five-yearold Boko Haram member, Mohammad Manga. This development makes the question of why 

young people are willing to join an insurgent group like Boko Haram that much more urgent. 

Why Young People Join Boko Haram

In 2013, the U.S. Institute of Peace commissioned a study from the CLEEN Foundation in 

Nigeria to examine the factors contributing to youth radicalization and recruitment into armed 

groups. In addition to reviewing media reports, databases, policy reports, newspapers, and 

academic literature, the foundation conducted primary research involving surveys, interviews, 

and focus group discussions. Consultants and experts ran field studies in two towns in each 

of the six states in northern Nigeria selected for the study: Borno (Maiduguri and Biu), Gombe 

(Gombe Town and Akko), Kaduna (Zaria and Kaduna), Kano (Nassarawa and Tarauni), Sokoto 

(Sokoto Town and Shagari Town), and Yobe (Damaturu and Potiskum). The field research, 

carried out between June and November 2013, included interviews with traditional leaders, 

religious leaders of all religious groups, security officials, women leaders, and political leaders, as well as focus group discussions with youth, women, and faith groups. Semi-structured 

questionnaires were administered to teachers, community leaders, religious leaders, youth, civil 

Young followers, who previously 

used local weapons in attacks, 

have become highly radicalized 

individuals willing to carry 

out suicide bombings in 

pursuit of martyrdom.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 348	 5

society organizations, security agents (e.g., officials in the police, state security, immigration, 

defense, prisons, customs, and army, as well as vigilante groups), and women groups. 

In the volatile area of northern Nigeria, especially Borno and Yobe, researchers encountered 

some challenges that may impinge on data quality. First, many respondents were uncomfortable with the interviews, especially Christians and security agents, who in a few cases turned 

down researchers’ requests out of an understandable fear of victimization. Second, researchers 

structured the questionnaire to mention Boko Haram sparingly. Third, the sample sizes for the 

questionnaires, interviews, and focus groups varied significantly, owing to the unique challenges and limitations researchers faced in their respective states. A stakeholder validation 

workshop was held on December 19, 2013, and the comments, observations, and suggestions 

made during the validation workshop were also used to enrich this report. 

Despite the study’s limitations and challenges, however, the results suggest a range of 

forces driving youth toward radicalization and extremism. Some of the variation likely arises 

because mobilization can be very specific to context. Personal engagement in Boko Haram 

also varies widely among its membership. Some are foot soldiers or bomb makers. Others are 

strategists, ideologues, or criminals. The reasons a young boy agrees to spy on police may be 

completely different than the reasons other members abduct two hundred schoolgirls. The 

boy who carries out a suicide bombing at a police station certainly has different motivations 

than the one who makes a little money helping the organization out. However, the study 

also revealed main causative factors, which are economic, social, political, and religious in 

nature and cut across all six states included in the research.

Ignorance of religious teaching opposed to violence makes youth more vulnerable 

and susceptible to recruitment. In all the states surveyed, there is unanimity that initial 

ignorance of religious teaching is the leading factor influencing the adoption of extreme 

religious views, especially among youth. The lack of deep knowledge of true religious teaching is partly related to three observable dangerous trends in the recent practice of religion 

in Nigeria: the proliferation of sects in both Islam and Christianity, the proliferation of independent preachers in both religions, and the increasing reliance on preachers rather than 

on the holy books themselves. As a result, young people are very vulnerable to recruitment 

and radicalization by independent and roaming preachers, extremist groups, and religious 

ideologues, who often distort religious injunctions. 

In Borno state, 93.2 percent of respondents were of the view that ignorance of the full 

teaching of their religion influenced young people’s adoption of extreme religious views. 

In Kano and Sokoto, 90 percent and 82 percent of respondents, respectively, believed that

ignorance of the full teaching of their religions is a factor that influences the adoption of 

extreme religious views by young people in the community. Kashim Shettima, the governor 

of Borno state, also gave credence to this observation when he lamented recently that 

“distorted translation of the Holy Book by the insurgents landed us in this mess. If we have 

had good understanding of Islam, we would have been in a better place. There is no room 

for extremism in Islam. We need to go back to Islam as practised by Prophet Muhammad, 

when Islam encouraged Muslims, Jews, and Christians to live in peace with one another.” 16 

In some cases, roaming preachers claiming to be Islamic scholars deceive impressionable 

youths. In others, youth are radicalized in the training camps of terrorist groups through 

distorted interpretation of the Holy Book.

Unemployment and poverty make youth vulnerable to radicalization. Unemployment and poverty are socioeconomic challenges that are not only intricately interconnected but glaringly evident in northern Nigeria. Figures from Nigeria’s National Bureau 

of Statistics (NBS) show that the country’s unemployment rate in 2006 averaged 14.60 

In all the states surveyed, 

there is unanimity that initial 

ignorance of religious teaching 

is the leading factor influencing 

the adoption of extreme 

religious views, especially 

among youth.
6 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 348

percent until 2011, when it reached an all-time high of 23.90 percent. NBS figures released 

in early 2013 revealed that, despite favorable economic growth and performance, Nigeria’s 

poverty rate jumped from 54.7 percent in 2004 to 60.9 percent in 2010. In 2011, 100 million Nigerians lived in absolute poverty and 12.6 million more were moderately poor. The 

worst hit by these afflictions are young people, especially in northern Nigeria. 17 

In Borno and Kaduna states, survey respondents identified the high incidence of 

unemployment and poverty that prevail in the state as the second most important reason 

why youth engage in religious-based violence. In Kaduna state, 83 percent of respondents

reported that unemployment and poverty are important factors. In Kano, 92 percent cited 

them as important. This is not to argue that unemployment and poverty are direct causes of 

youth radicalization; rather, privation and other frustrating conditions of life render youth 

highly vulnerable to manipulation by extremist ideologues. As Komolafe has argued, even 

if unemployment and poverty are not the main factors in radicalization in Nigeria, “the 

tendency to produce suicide bombers is greater in a community defined by mass misery 

and joblessness than the one in which basic needs of food, education, health, housing, and 

sanitation are met for the majority of the people.” 18 

Children with difficult upbringings are more vulnerable to extremist views. The 

growing number of children without adequate parental guidance is a societal condition that 

has contributed to the problem of youth radicalization in Northern Nigeria. Children who 

lack a protective social environment are more likely to be exploited. Across the states in 

Nigeria, especially in the north, millions of school-age children are not enrolled in school, 

exacerbating illiteracy levels in the country and vulnerability to manipulation by extremist 

groups. Widespread poverty in northern Nigeria has contributed to a growing population 

of destitute children. In states such as Borno and Yobe, which have witnessed the worst 

cases of violence, as well as in states such as Gombe and Sokoto, which are relatively peaceful, respondents to questionnaires and participants in focus group discussions strongly 

agree that children from poor homes or those who were not brought up by their biological 

parents—including children from broken homes, abandoned and orphaned children, and 

children who are in the custody of relatives or others—are the most vulnerable to being 

used to perpetrate religious violence. In Kano state, 80 percent cited this as an important

factor. It is not surprising that terrorist groups such as the Boko Haram are tapping into this 

situation to achieve their violent objectives.19

In June 2013, young suspects who were released by the military claimed Boko Haram 

paid them 5,000 naira each (about $30 U.S. dollars) to set schools in Yobe and Borno states 

on fire and spy on soldiers. According to one of them, “We watched out for the soldiers at 

their units and reported back to them. We were reporting when soldiers were at ease or 

enjoying themselves and when they were off guard and we were paid for doing that.” 20 The 

children, who ranged from nine to fifteen years in age, have also helped Boko Haram traffic 

weapons, carry stolen items, and hide their guns after attacks. The children’s alienation from 

home and society provides the cognitive opening that extremist ideologues exploit in the 

process of recruitment and radicalization.

High levels of illiteracy linked to youth radicalization and extremism. Across the 

six states, study participants identified high levels of illiteracy as one of the major factors 

influencing young people’s adoption of extreme religious views. In Gombe state, illiteracy 

was ranked second out of the sixteen factors listed. It was also ranked second in Yobe state. 

It was slightly lower in Borno state, where it was ranked fourth out of the sixteen factors 

listed as causes of youth extremism and violence. In Kano, 75 percent cited it as important. 

Illiterate people can be more easily manipulated because their state of social deprivation 

denies them the capacity and knowledge to critically question the narratives and doctrines 

Children’s alienation from 

home and society provides 

the cognitive opening that 

extremist ideologues exploit 

in the process of recruitment 

and radicalization.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 348	 7

of extremist groups. While it is evident that illiterates do not manufacture the bombs that 

Boko Haram uses, arrest records suggest that the “real armies of suicide bombers and terrorists’ foot soldiers” are drawn from such “disadvantaged, stranded populations,” suggesting how poverty, lack of education, and indoctrination contribute to terrorism. 21 Poverty, 

illiteracy, and radicalization are interwoven; in the six states examined, they are correlated. 

The poor are unlikely to send their children to school and likely to be illiterate, unemployed, 

and thus vulnerable to recruitment and radicalization. 

Responses regarding excesses of the security forces were mixed. The Nigerian security and military forces deployed against Boko Haram have been criticized by an enraged local 

population, social commentators, opinion leaders, civil society organizations, and media for 

their harsh tactics, which have injured civilians and damaged property. Allegations include 

unlawful killings, dragnet arrests, extortion, and intimidation. A section of the media, especially international media, has repeatedly mentioned that the excesses of the security forces 

are a crucial factor in youth radicalization. Findings from this study show, however, that 

alleged excesses of security forces are among the least important driving forces of youth 

extremism and violence. In Yobe state, the action of the security agents toward the public 

was ranked fifteenth out of sixteen factors in youth radicalization. Security action toward 

members of extremist religious groups, such as Boko Haram, was ranked last. 

That the actions of security forces ranked last should not be construed as these factors 

having no effect in youth radicalization. In Kano state, 27 percent said it was a very important 

factor, and 50 percent of respondents in Kaduna state believed that security forces’ actions are 

important or very important. Notwithstanding, the appropriate authorities need urgently to 

address allegations of human rights violations by security forces to improve public confidence 

in and support for the security forces deployed in counterterrorism operations.

Widespread corruption conducive to recruitment and radicalization. The Nigerian 

government’s high rate of corruption and neglect of citizen welfare also feeds the extremist 

narrative. In Sokoto state, 70 percent of participants cited this as an important factor, while 

in Kano state, 67 percent cited it as important. Widespread corruption in Nigeria has not only 

deprived communities of needed amenities and infrastructure but has created an environment 

conducive for recruitment and radicalization. Pervasive malfeasance, especially in the public 

sector, provides a key referent around which extremists can frame antisecular ideology and 

radicalization. Mohammed Yusuf’s sermons and recorded tapes, as well as Abubakar Shekau’s 

tapes in which he claims responsibility for attacks, refer to the corrupt attitudes of yan 

boko—modern elites trained at secular schools—who have acquired Western education and 

are currently in positions of power. Their ideological refrain is that “the system represented 

by the yan boko is unjust, secular, and has no divine origin. It is therefore un-Islamic, which 

in turn accounts for its ineptitude and corruptness.” 22 In its drive to recruit members, Boko 

Haram presents a narrative about corruption that easily appeals to impoverished, alienated, 

and jobless northern Muslim youth.

Policy Recommendations

As the factors contributing to youth radicalization and violent extremism are numerous and 

diverse, the following are measures suggested to effectively curb them in northern Nigeria.

Monitor and regulate religious preaching. Given that independent, roaming preachers 

are key purveyors of distorted religious teachings, there is a need to regulate and monitor 

it in Nigeria. During Ramadan in 2013, Gombe’s state government brought out guidelines—

agreed upon by Muslim and Christian leaders—regulating all preaching and teaching at that 

time to avoid the use of strong language against another religion or sect. Taking a cue from 

Widespread corruption in 

Nigeria has not only deprived 

communities of needed 

amenities and infrastructure 

but has created an environment 

conducive for recruitment 

and radicalization. Pervasive 

malfeasance provides a key 

referent around which extremists 

can frame antisecular ideology 

and radicalization.
8 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 348

this experience, Nigeria’s government could create a Religious Affairs Regulatory and Monitory Commission (RARMC), including representatives of the major religions, state security 

service, credible civil society organizations with track records on promoting public safety, 

and the media. The RARMC could be established through a robust national consultation 

involving relevant stakeholders to agree on its mandate, power, composition, and functions. 

The commission would be responsible for monitoring and regulating the mode and content 

of preaching to prevent religious ideologues from misleading young people with false or 

distorted preaching.

Create job opportunities for Nigerian youth. The Nigerian government must embark 

on effective poverty alleviation and human capital development programs for youth who 

are most vulnerable to recruitment and radicalization. At local, state, and federal levels, the 

government should establish demonstration farms or workshops to give youth vocational 

skills or knowledge that allow them to be self-employed in gainful enterprises. The government also should establish business development service centers in each of Nigeria’s 776 

local government areas, adequately funded and staffed with skilled personnel to offer business development and career advice to jobless youth, facilitate young entrepreneurs’ access 

to credit or start-up funds, provide coaching services, and distribute market information 

data to inform youths’ decisions about career paths. A special youth empowerment fund 

or financial facility needs to be created; such a facility should be robustly structured to 

enhance transparency and accountability in its management to avoid unnecessary bottlenecks and patronage considerations that prevent youth who genuinely need such interventions from accessing them.

Design and deliver a robust program for destitute children. The Nigerian government 

should appropriately fund the National Council for the Welfare of the Destitute (NCWD) to 

enable the agency to formulate and implement robust rehabilitation programs for destitute 

children in Nigeria. Government at all levels, especially working through the NCWD, should 

partner with credible civil society organizations to design and implement effective reorientation programs for destitute children to provide them with the support and training 

they need to function effectively in society. Philanthropic individuals, civil society groups, 

religious bodies, and government can put to use the skills of university graduates who 

studied social work and social psychology. Such rehabilitation and reintegration interventions could be expedient, given the finding that children who were not brought up by their 

parents are more disposed to use violence in propagating their religious views; given their 

socioeconomic situations, such children are extremely vulnerable to religious extremism and 

financial influences. 

Enhance provision of education and literacy programs. High levels of illiteracy in 

Nigeria contribute to young people becoming more easily susceptible to manipulation and 

recruitment into extremist groups. Although the right to education is one of the basic rights 

of every Nigerian, access to this right is hardly attained. The issue of free and compulsory 

primary and secondary education in Nigeria should transcend mere statement to practical 

delivery of this basic entitlement to Nigeria’s children. The recent federal government program aimed at remodelling the (Quranic) Almajiri educational system is a step in the right 

direction but needs further overhauling of the curriculum. To reinforce the recommendations 

above, it must inculcate the training, skills, and scientific knowledge to make children competitive in the modern economy. Local and state governments need to deliver quality and 

accessible education to more children in northern Nigeria through enhanced allocation to, 

and judicious use of funds in, the educational sector.

Promote peace education. The Nigerian government, religious institutions, the private 

sector, and civil society groups should invest more resources in promoting peace education, 

Government at all levels 

should partner with credible 

civil society organizations to 

design and implement effective 

reorientation programs for 

destitute children to provide 

them with the support and 

training they need to function 

effectively in society. 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 348	 9

including reorientation programs that inculcate the value of peaceful coexistence. Peace 

education will help youth better appreciate the value of peace, making it more difficult 

for extremists to use them to foment trouble. Peace education should be integrated in the 

educational curriculum of schools, from primary to tertiary education. Youth radicalization and insidious ideologies that underpin violent extremism also can be curbed through 

enlightenment programs delivered through radio, television, jingles, and group discussions. 

The Nigerian government, civil society groups, and the private sector could partner with 

Nigeria’s film industry to produce movies and support radio and television programs in the 

three major languages (Hausa/Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba) designed to specifically counter 

narratives and messages promoting youth radicalization.

Improve anticorruption campaign. Growing animosity toward the government and 

particularly corruption, especially among young people, makes youth more vulnerable to 

recruitment. The Nigerian government needs to urgently reinvigorate the fight against corruption by repositioning institutions such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 

and the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission. This could 

help neutralize and deconstruct Boko Haram’s violent ideology by denying its ideologues a 

rallying point for radicalizing frustrated individuals. Money recovered from corrupt officials 

also would add to funds available for rehabilitating willing Boko Haram adherents, as well 

as providing basic amenities and infrastructure sorely need in northern Nigeria. Convicting 

corrupt officials will also have deterrent effects.

Conclusion

Boko Haram’s activities in the past five years demonstrate the urgent need to address youth 

radicalization and religious extremism in northern Nigeria, as they have resulted in the 

destruction of private and public property, grievous bodily injury and death, and the displacement of thousands of people. Ignorance of true religious teachings is the most important condition for youth to acquire radical views of religion, often propagated by roaming, 

independent preachers. Poverty and unemployment, poor parental upbringing, and neglect 

of children also underpin young people’s vulnerability to falling prey to violent extremism. 

Boko Haram has leveraged this vulnerability to deepen their process of recruitment and 

radicalization, especially in northern Nigeria. Thus, any attempt to effectively weaken the 

insurgency in northern Nigeria must consider these factors. Addressing the conditions that 

make it possible for insurgents to recruit from the pool of young men in Nigeria can significantly diminish the strength of the insurgency, if not eliminate it altogether.

Peace education will help youth 

better appreciate the value of 

peace, making it more difficult 

for extremists to use them to 

foment trouble. Peace education 

should be integrated in the 

educational curriculum 

of schools.
10 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 348

Notes

1.	 Andrew Walker, “What Is Boko Haram?” Special Report no. 308, United State Institute of Peace, Washington, DC

(June 2012), 2.

2. Freedom C. Onuoha, “Boko Haram’s Tactical Evolution,” African Defence Forum 4, no. 4 (2012).

3. Isiaka Wakili and Terkula Igidi, “Boko Haram Has Killed over 12,000 Nigerians—Jonathan,” Sunday Trust, May 

18, 2014, available at http://sundaytrust.com.ng/index.php/news/16983-boko-haram-has-killed-over-12-000-

nigerians-jonathan, accessed May 26, 2014. 

4. B.N. Salami, “Suicide Bombing and National Security: Implications for the Armed Forces of Nigeria,” Research 

Project submitted to the National Defence College, Abuja, Nigeria, July 2013.

5. The mapping study on the drivers of youth radicalization focusing on two towns each in Borno, Gombe, Kaduna, 

Kano, Sokoto, and Yobe states was undertaken by the CLEEN Foundation, Nigeria, in 2013 with funding from the 

United States Institute of Peace.

6. Alex P. Schmid, “Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, and Counter-Radicalisation,” research paper, International 

Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague, March 2013, available at www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-SchmidRadicalisation-De-Radicalisation-Counter-Radicalisation-March-2013.pdf, accessed May 18, 2014, 1.

7. See Omar Ashour, Votes and Violence: Islamists and the Processes of Transformation (London: The International 

Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, 2009) 4, and Michael O. Sodipo, “Mitigating Radicalism in Northern 

Nigeria,” Africa Security Brief no. 26 (August 2013), 4.

8.	 See, e.g., Ryan Evans and Peter Neumann, Islamist Militant Radicalization in Europe: A Critical Assessment of 

Literature (London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalization, 2009); Aiden Kirby, “The London Bombers 

as ‘Self-Starters’: A Case Study in Indigenous Radicalization and the Emergence of Autonomous Cliques,” Studies 

in Conflict & Terrorism 30, no. 5. (2007), 415–428; Mario Ferrero, “Radicalization as a Reaction to Failure: An

Economic Model of Islamic Extremism,” Public Choice 122, no. 1-2 (2005), 199–220; and Jessica Stern, Terror in 

the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: HarperCollins, 2003). 

9. Alejandro J. Beutel, “Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism in Western Muslim Communities: Lessons Learned 

for America,” Minaret of Freedom Institute, August 30, 2007.

10. See Julian Taiwo and Michael Olugbode, “Boko Haram Leader Killed,” Thisday, July 31, 2009.

11. Tajudeen Suleiman, “Terrorism Unsettles the North,” Tell, February 26, 2007, 25.

12. Muhammed K. Isa, “Militant Islamist Groups in Northern Nigeria,” in Wafula Okumu and Augustine Ikelegbe, eds., 

Militias, Rebels and Islamist Militants: Human Security and State Crises in Africa (Pretoria: Institute for Security 

Studies, 2010), 333.

13. Operation Flush was a Borno state-owned security outfit established to combat armed banditry in the state. 

14. Walker, “What Is Boko Haram?”

15. Salami, “Suicide Bombing and National Security.”

16. Kingsley Omonobi and Ndahi Marama, “15 Civilians Killed in Borno ‘Suicide Attack,’” Vanguard, April 1, 2014, 

available at www.vanguardngr.com/2014/04/15-civilians-killed-borno-suicide-attack/, accessed May 18, 2014.

17. “Tackling Poverty in Nigeria,” Vanguard, November 27, 2013, available at www.vanguardngr.com/2013/11/

tackling-poverty-nigeria/ (accessed May 26, 2014).

18.	 Kayode Komolafe, “Boko Haram: A Crisis in Search of Strategy,” Thisday, January 25, 2012, 56.

19. Author has watched videos recovered from Boko Haram camps showing school-age children running errands or 

engaging in shooting practice. They will likely become future fighters and commanders of the group.

20. John Alechenu, “Boko Haram Paid Us N5, 000 Each to Burn Schools—Kid Suspects,” Punch, June 1, 2013.

21. Law Mefor, “Nyanya Tragedy and Surviving Asymmetry Terrorist War (1),” Punch, April 16, 2014, www.punchng.

com/opinion/nyanya-tragedy-and-surviving-asymmetry-terrorist-war-1/. 

22. Isa, “Militant Islamist Groups.”

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ISBN: 978-1-60127-227-0

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our Web site 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.

Of Related Interest

•	 Engaging Extremists edited by I. William Zartman and Guy Olivier Faure (USIP Press, 2011) 

•	 Talking to Groups That Use Terror edited by Nigel Quinney and A. Heather Coyne (USIP Press, 2011) 

•	 What is Boko Haram? by Andrew Walker (Special Report, 2012)

•	 Mediating Peace with Proscribed Armed Groups by Véronique Dudouet (Special Report, June 2010) 

•	 When Should We Talk to Terrorists? by Audrey Kurth Cronin (Special Report, May 2010) 

•	 Is Nigeria a Hotbed of Islamic Extremism? by Stephanie Schwartz (Peace Brief, May 2010)